Content Type: Article

  • The Board’s Quality of Care Responsibilities: Six Dimensions of Oversight

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    The Board’s Quality of Care Responsibilities: Six Dimensions of Oversight

    January 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Regulation of Social Media by TTB

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    Regulation of Social Media by TTB

    January/February 2014

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  • Projected Governance Trends for Nonprofit Hospitals and Health Systems

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    Projected Governance Trends for Nonprofit Hospitals and Health Systems

    January 2014

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  • Current Rules for the United States Income and Transfer Taxation of Nonresident Alien Individuals

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    Current Rules for the United States Income and Transfer Taxation of Nonresident Alien Individuals

    January 2014

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  • Corporate Law & Governance Update

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    Corporate Law & Governance Update

    January 2014

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  • CFTC Defers Effectiveness of Oral Recording Requirements for Registered Commodity Trading Advisors Holding SEF Memberships

    CFTC Defers Effectiveness of Oral Recording Requirements for Registered Commodity Trading Advisors Holding SEF Memberships

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC Defers Effectiveness of Oral Recording Requirements for Registered Commodity Trading Advisors Holding SEF Memberships

    December 23, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 21, 2013, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued broadly applicable no-action relief deferring (through May 1, 2014) the effectiveness of recordkeeping requirements that would have required fund managers registered as commodity trading advisors who hold swap execution facility memberships to preserve oral communications (including telephone calls) relating to any trading of commodity interests.

    This relief, requested by the Asset Management Group of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and the Managed Funds Association, covers “asset managers”[1] registered as CTAs, many of which are obtaining SEF memberships as a direct and necessary response to the Dodd-Frank Act’s central clearing mandates.

    The request for relief related to certain unanticipated effects of recent amendments to Regulation 1.35(a), a long-standing rule that imposed recordkeeping rules on a variety of CFTC registrants. The 2013 amendments, which were to go into effect on Dec. 21, were drafted to accommodate the new statutory framework for cleared swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act (including the creation of SEFs) which, by definition, preceded the actual formation of SEFs; some of the SEF documentation published subsequent to the amendments, when combined with other CFTC guidance, resulted in an effective conclusion that registered CTAs that hold SEF memberships are covered by the revised Regulation 1.35(a).

    Revised Regulation 1.35(a) requires that registrants holding SEF memberships “keep full, complete, and systematic records … of all transactions relating to its business of dealing in commodity interests[;]” however, the rule also states that:

    [I]ncluded among the records required to be kept … are all oral and written communications provided or received concerning quotes, solicitations, bids, offers, instructions, trading, and prices that lead to the execution of a transaction in a commodity interest and related cash or forward transactions, whether communicated by telephone, voicemail, facsimile, instant messaging, chat rooms, electronic mail, mobile device, or other digital or electronic media. [Emphasis added.]

    In the revised Regulation 1.35(a), the CFTC included an exclusion to the oral recordkeeping requirements for CPOs, but notably not for CTAs. Absent no-action relief, private fund managers (and others) that are registered CTAs[2] and that are members of SEFs would have had to implement systems to capture and classify voice communications related to all their commodity interest trading (and not limited to the trading done on a SEF).[3] Covered CTAs deemed this obligation to be onerous, unnecessary and potentially counterproductive and with this delay the CTFC will be examining those concerns more closely.

    As noted above, this relief is time-limited and is effective through May 1, 2014.

    Authored by Craig Stein, Brian T. Daly and Jacob Preiserowicz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] While “asset manager” is not a registration category or defined term under the Commodity Exchange Act or the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, the CFTC accepted this definition provided by the two trade associations: “any person in the business of providing investment advice or advice regarding the value of securities or commodity interests for compensation and includes persons registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or any U.S. state as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, any person registered with the Commission as a commodity trading advisor or commodity pool operator, any person regulated by a foreign regulatory authority as an investment adviser and any person operating pursuant to an exemption or exclusion from registration with or regulation by any such regulators.”

    [2] Fund managers registered as CPOs would likely fall within the exemption in the current text; others are registered as CPOs and CTAs and could have elected, assuming that they could still satisfy one or more of the CTA exemptions (e.g., the fifteen-or-fewer-clients exemption in 4.14(a)(10)), to deregister as CTAs and therefore avoid being covered by this aspect of the recordkeeping obligation. For managers that trade in commodity interests and have a large number of clients, however, this relief is likely to be particularly well-received.

    [3] New Rule 1.35(a) otherwise went into effect on Dec. 21 with respect to other CFTC registrants who are not CTAs and are covered by the rule.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • New York Bankruptcy Court Awards Billions in Damages Arising from Corporate Spin-Off Avoided as Fraudulent Transfer

    New York Bankruptcy Court Awards Billions in Damages Arising from Corporate Spin-Off Avoided as Fraudulent Transfer

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Bankruptcy Court Awards Billions in Damages Arising from Corporate Spin-Off Avoided as Fraudulent Transfer

    December 20, 2013

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A New York bankruptcy court, on Dec. 12, 2013, issued a 166-page decision after a 34-day trial, concluding that the spin-off of a highly profitable energy business constituted a fraudulent transfer intended to shield the business from massive environmental liabilities, and awarding damages of up to approximately $14.5 billion.[1] Tronox Inc. et al. v. Kerr McGee et al. (In re Tronox et al.) (Bankruptcy S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013) (J. Gropper).[2] The decision is significant because, among other things, the bankruptcy court (i) bucked the judicial trend of relying on market evidence of solvency (including a capital raise of unsecured debt and public equity) in favor of expert testimony; (ii) avoided asset transfers that began seven years before the bankruptcy filing even though the applicable fraudulent transfer law provides for a four-year reach-back period because the earlier transfers were part of a “single integrated scheme” culminating within the reach-back period; and (iii) awarded damages in an amount that far exceeds the amount of unpaid creditor claims. An appeal is certain to be filed.

    Facts

    Kerr McGee Corporation (“Old KM”) was an energy and chemical company with a “wide range of operations and liabilities that accrued over the course of more than seventy years.” In 2002, a strategic acquirer (Anadarko Petroleum Corp.), had “rejected an acquisition of [Old KM], concluding that [Old KM] had more than 500 active pollution sites, had owned more than 1,000 such sites and that the annual costs of remediation ‘eat[] up most of [Old KM’s] free cash flow.” After doing its diligence, Anadarko found the prospect of acquisition unattractive, given that Old KM’s “future environmental liability was ‘$BILLIONS’ and there was ‘no end in sight for at least 30 more years.” Id. at 8. Thereafter, Old KM began a “corporate reorganization” aimed at segregating its profitable oil and gas business (the “E&P Assets”) from the rest of its holdings, which were comprised of a comparatively small chemical business along with nearly all of the corporate family’s legacy environmental and tort liabilities. This reorganization was accomplished through “a series of 11 transactions” that began in 2002 and was completed in 2005. The transaction highlights are as follows:

    1. Separation of Chemical Business from E&P Business. In 2002, Old KM (later renamed “Tronox”) transferred to its newly-formed parent company (“NKM Parent”) the equity of the subsidiaries that owned the valuable E&P Assets, leaving behind Tronox with the chemical business and “85 years and billions of dollars of legacy environmental and tort liabilities.”

    2. IPO. In 2005, Tronox incurred secured bank debt, issued unsecured bonds and issued equity in an IPO. Tronox transferred substantially all the proceeds of the financing (approximately $800 million) to NKM Parent. After the IPO, NKM Parent remained a majority shareholder of Tronox, with the remaining shares publicly traded.

    3. Spin-Off. In March 2006, NKM Parent distributed its remaining shares of Tronox stock to NKM Parent’s shareholders, effectively making Tronox a free-standing public company (as opposed to a majority-controlled subsidiary of NKM Parent). Tronox “began to struggle immediately after” the 2006 spinoff. At this point, it was essentially a one-product company, operating in a “cyclical” market, “dependent on the strength of the U.S. housing market” and faced with “increasing operating costs,” “stagnant prices” and “thin margins.” At the same time it was “struggling with poor cash flow,” Tronox was obligated to fund the legacy liabilities left behind by NKM Parent.

    4. Anadarko Acquisition. Three months later, in June 2006, Anadarko acquired NKM Parent (which owned the highly profitable E&P Assets formerly owned by Tronox) for approximately $18 billion in an all-cash transaction.

    Tronox filed for Chapter 11 protection in 2009. During the bankruptcy case, Tronox (as a debtor-in-possession) filed a lawsuit against NKM Parent (a subsidiary of Anadarko) and other defendants seeking to avoid, as fraudulent transfers, the “corporate reorganization” transactions and the transfer of the E&P Assets (collectively, the “Transaction”) and sought more than $15 billion in damages. The court ultimately confirmed a Tronox reorganization plan pursuant to which environmental and tort plaintiffs agreed to accept the proceeds (if any) of the pending fraudulent transfer action as their plan distribution.[3] The trial was “hotly contested, consuming 34 days of trial at which 28 witnesses testified, 14 of who were qualified as experts. Over 6,100 exhibits and thousands of pages of deposition testimony of 40 witnesses were also admitted into evidence.” Id. at 4.

    “Reach-Back Period” and “Collapsing” the Transaction

    As a threshold matter, the bankruptcy court had to address whether the 2002 transfer of the E&P Assets from Tronox to NKM Parent (which occurred seven years before Tronox’s bankruptcy filing) could be avoided as a fraudulent transfer where the applicable fraudulent transfer statute had a four-year reach-back period.[4] The court found that the relevant transfer agreements had been backdated to 2002, but were not “finalized or executed” until 2005, thus falling within the four-year reach-back. Id. at 35. Relying on a well-established body of law allowing courts to “collapse” a series of transactions into one transaction, the court also found “overwhelming” evidence that the “[D]efendants devised, carried out and had complete knowledge that the . . . transfers in 2002 were part of a ‘single integrated scheme’ to create a ‘pure play’ E&P business free and clear of the legacy liabilities” Id. at 38. Thus, the 2002 transfer, the court held, was “part of an integrated scheme, known to the Defendants, that culminated only in the years 2005-2006.” Id. at 39.

    Actual Fraudulent Transfer

    Plaintiffs alleged that the Transaction was undertaken with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. The court distinguished between “intent to defraud” and “intent to hinder or delay” and determined that it was legally sufficient to impose fraudulent transfer liability where Defendants acted with “intent to hinder and delay.” Id. at 52 (citing Supreme Court precedent (seeShapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348 (1932)). Thus, the “scheme did not have to be undertaken for nefarious or malicious purposes but merely with the purpose of hindering or delaying creditors.” Id. at 55. The court also noted that the word “intent” is “used to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of this act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.” Id. at 55 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts).

    Here, the court held, “there can be no dispute that [Old KM] acted to free substantially all its assets—certainly its most valuable assets—from 87 years of environmental and tort liabilities. The obvious consequence of this act was that the legacy creditors would not be able to claim against [the E&P Assets] and with a minimal assets base against which to recover in the future, would be accordingly hindered or delayed as a direct consequence of the scheme. This was the clear and intended consequence of the act, substantially certain to result from it.” Id. at 55.[5]

    The court also found evidence of so-called “badges of fraud,” including (i) transfers among insiders; (ii) retention of control of the transferred assets; (iii) “ineffective and insubstantial” disclosure of the 2002 transfers in the SEC filings; (iv) that the transferor had been threatened with litigation regarding its environmental and tort liabilities prior to consummating the transactions in 2005; (v) the transfer was of all or substantially all of Tronox’s assets; and (vi) as explained below, the transfer left Tronox insolvent and was not supported by reasonably equivalent value. Id. at 61-63.

    To rebut the evidence of actual intent, Defendants asserted that the Transaction was consummated for “legitimate supervening purposes.” Id. at 63. First, Defendants argued that they “intended and believed that Tronox was and would be solvent and able to pay its debts and a successful independent company.” Id. at 64. The court disagreed. The question was not whether “Tronox was doomed to fail” or whether the Defendants “wanted Tronox to be a big success.” Instead, the court stated, the “real question is whether the Defendants had a good faith belief that Tronox would be able to support the environmental and other legacy liabilities that had been imposed on it.” Id. at 65. The court continued by observing that “the record on this point is extraordinary because it does not exist. . . . Thus, one of the most compelling facts in the enormous record of this case is the absence of any contemporaneous analysis of Tronox’s ability to support the legacy liabilities being imposed on it.”[6] Id.

    Next, Defendants argued that the primary purpose of the spinoff was to “unlock” the value of the chemical business and E&P Assets rather than evade legacy liabilities. Again, the court rejected this argument and found, in light of the magnitude of the legacy liabilities imposed upon a fraction of the total assets, that Defendants failed to prove a legitimate supervening purposes for “the manner in which the transfer was structured.” Id. at 72 (internal citations omitted).

    Finally, the court rejected Defendants’ argument that it was appropriate for Old KM to contain or limit environmental exposure of the corporate group. It found this argument unacceptable from a policy perspective, for if such a defense were allowed to stand, all enterprises with substantial existing environmental liability “would be encouraged to do exactly what Defendants did—manage the liabilities so as to leave them attached to a fraction of the assets unable to bear them.” Id. at 72. As a result, the court found that Defendants acted with intent to hinder and delay the creditors.

    Constructive Fraudulent Transfer

    To succeed on their constructive fraudulent transfer claim, Plaintiffs had to prove that Tronox (i) received less than reasonably equivalent value (“REV”) and (ii) was insolvent, inadequately capitalized, or unable to pay its debts as they became due.

    Reasonably Equivalent Value

    Plaintiffs’ REV expert testified that Tronox transferred property worth $17 billion (most notably the E&P Assets) and received only $2.6 billion in return.[7] Id. at 76. Defendants did not dispute these figures, but raised three objections, each of which the court rejected.

    First, the court rejected Defendants’ view that the transfer of the E&P Assets should be excluded from the REV analysis because those assets were transferred seven years before the bankruptcy and, therefore, outside the four-year reach-back period. Id. at 77. Second, Defendants argued that the waiver of an intercompany claim of $378 million owed by Tronox to NKM Parent should be valued at its face amount and treated as additional consideration from NKM Parent to Tronox. Defendants, however, “never provided sufficient evidence” of the intercompany claim’s existence and, even if it existed, the court stated that it would have treated the claim as an equity contribution rather than debt. Id. at 78. Third, the court dismissed Defendants’ claim that the REV analysis must be performed on a strict entity-by-entity basis. The court reasoned that because Tronox operated its businesses, handled environmental liabilities, and marketed the IPO on a consolidated basis, and because no creditor had relied on the separate identity of the Tronox entities, it would inappropriately elevate form over substance to consider the Tronox entities individually. Id. at 78-82.

    Insolvency — Market Evidence

    Relying on the recent trend of cases that favor market evidence of solvency over expert testimony, Defendants argued that Tronox’s solvency was well established by market evidence—namely, in the form of a successful IPO and a private equity firm’s (“PE Firm”) offer to purchase the chemical business. Indeed, the court noted that Tronox’s ability to “sell into the market $350 million in [unsecured] bonds and $224.7 million in stock” in the IPO was “Defendants’ strongest indication of solvency based on the market.” Id. at 85-87.[8] The court found that Plaintiffs successfully rebutted the market evidence of solvency “by demonstrating that the financial statements on which the market relied were false and misleading.” Id. at 87 (“IPO projections were unrealistic when compared with Tronox’s historical performance”; “financial statements omitted certain critical contingencies and potential liabilities”; “no disclosure of the risks related to [a certain] land sale contract”).[9] On this issue, Plaintiffs’ expert “convincingly demonstrated that the projections on which the IPO was based were inflated, sell-side projections, and that key numbers were imposed at the direction of [NKM Parent’s] chief financial officer.” Id.

    As additional market evidence of solvency, Defendants relied on the offer by the PE Firm and argued that the PE Firm’s “valuation of the Chemical Business was ultimately and powerfully manifested in its November 20, 2005 fully-funded and signed offer for $1.3 billion, which the record shows as final and binding.” Id. at 96. The court rejected the significance of the offer, noting that it contained many open items and requested large indemnities for environmental and tort liabilities, which were rejected as frustrating the “clean break” from the legacy liabilities that NKM Parent demanded. Id. at 96. (In the end, NKM Parent went forward with the IPO and never even brought the bid to the attention of its board. Id. at 97.) The court also afforded little weight to the PE Firm’s valuation of environmental liabilities because its analysis was limited to “known environmental sites” (for which a third party had filed a claim) and thus “materially underestimated . . . [the] total exposure for the purposes of a valid solvency analysis.” Id. at 99. As a result, the court rejected Defendants’ reliance on market evidence of solvency in determining that the Transaction rendered Tronox insolvent.

    Insolvency — Contingent Liabilities

    “[T]he amount of Tronox’s environmental and tort liabilities,” the court observed, “is what this case is all about.” Id. at 103-04. Although Plaintiffs and Defendants both retained environmental liability experts, Plaintiffs’ expert conducted the only comprehensive valuation of Tronox’s environmental liabilities. Id. at 105. In what the court characterized as a “major failure of proof,” Defendants did not provide a comprehensive environmental liability analysis of their own. Id. at 106. Instead, Defendants’ experts only offered criticism of the report submitted by Plaintiffs’ expert. Id. Additionally, the extremely low estimate of future environmental liability provided by Defendants’ experts—approximately the same amount that NKM Parent had recently paid in reclamation over a two-year period—did “not pass the common sense test.” Id. at 107. The Court essentially adopted the low-end of the estimate provided by Plaintiffs’ expert, finding $1.5 billion in environmental liability as of the IPO date. Id. at 111.

    Defendants’ expert on tort liability hardly fared better than their environmental liability expert. Once again, the court noted that Defendants’ expert did not provide an independent analysis and instead limited his testimony to a critique of Plaintiffs’ expert report. Id. at 112. Furthermore, Defendants’ expert provided an extremely low liability estimate, testifying that Tronox had no future tort liability relating to the chemical creosote, even though at least 9,450 claims were pending at the time. Id. at 113. In the court’s view, this testimony “wholly undermined his credibility.” Id. Finding Plaintiffs’ expert far more credible, the court once again essentially adopted the low range of Plaintiffs’ figures, settling on $257 million in tort liability as of the IPO date. Id. at 114. Combining Tronox’s $1.27 billion in legacy liabilities ($1.757 billion minus $484.4 million in reimbursements) with $803 million in additional, undisputed liability, the court valued Tronox’s total liabilities at slightly above $2 billion. Id. at 114.

    Insolvency, Inadequate Capitalization, and Inability to Pay Debts

    Plaintiffs and Defendants both retained experts who calculated Tronox’s business enterprise value using three methods: discounted cash flow analysis, comparable company analysis, and comparable transaction analysis. Id. at 114-15. Finding the valuation performed by Plaintiffs’ expert to be more reliable, the court concluded that Tronox was insolvent as of the IPO date by approximately $850 million. Id. at 120. The court also found that Tronox was unreasonably undercapitalized in light of its legacy liabilities, and that Defendants reasonably should have believed that it would be unable to pay its debts as they became due. Id. at 122-29.[10]

    Measure of Damages

    The court determined that the net value of the property fraudulently transferred was equal to $14.459 billion, but deferred ruling on the precise measure of damages on a final basis. Id. at 135. At an earlier stage in the case, Defendants argued that section 550(a) caps Plaintiffs’ recovery on their fraudulent transfer claims at the amount of unpaid creditor claims in the range of $2-6 billion.[11] The court, however, rejected the imposition of a damages cap, concluding that a ceiling would unfairly value Plaintiffs’ agreement to give up their rights to a pro rata distribution of estate property and instead take limited cash and an uncertain litigation recovery.[12]

    Before the court makes a final determination on damages, Defendants will be able to file a section 502(h) claim—pursuant to which any claim arising from the recovery of property under section 550 becomes a prepetition claim entitled to a share of recovery from the estate on the same basis as all other prepetition claims. Thus, Defendants will be able to assert a section 502(h) claim in the amount of $14.459 billion. According to the terms of the confirmed plan, the distribution on account of Defendants’ 502(h) claim could be used to “discount and/or otherwise reduce any judgment” in the fraudulent transfer action. Id. at 145 (internal citation omitted). The open issue, which the parties will brief, concerns competing interpretations of the plan’s provisions. Under one interpretation, the offset constitutes more than $9.3 billion, thereby reducing the damage award from $14.4 billion to $5.1 billion. Under the interpretation advanced by the Plaintiffs, the offset should be valued at only about $300 million, thereby reducing the damage award from $14.4 to $14.1 billion.

    Conclusion

    The Tronox decision is significant given the impact it may have on the way market participants evaluate the front-end fraudulent transfer risk of any transaction, including LBOs, asset divestitures, dividend recapitalizations, and spin-offs. We will continue to share our insights on this case with our clients and friends.

    Authored by David M. Hillman , Michael L. Cook , Mark J. Arnot and Jonathan D. Kurland.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] As explained below, there will be further proceeding to determine the impact of the Defendants’ section 502(h) claim against the Tronox estate, which will reduce the damage award from approximately $14.5 billion to either $5.1 billion or $14.1 billion depending on the interpretation of certain plan provisions.

    [2] Click here for the decision.

    [3] The plan established a litigation trust to act as plaintiff to prosecute action for the benefit of the environmental and tort creditors.

    [4] The court applied Oklahoma law.

    [5] The court relied heavily on ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 375 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (finding actual fraudulent intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors where a parent corporation transferred to itself its subsidiary’s “crown jewel” assets and attempted to isolate them “from risk of exposure to the government and other creditors.”)

    [6] A solvency opinion was obtained in connection with the transactions but the court found that the opinion failed to scrutinize the “critical issue” of contingent liabilities independently, and instead relied wholly on Defendants’ representations. Id. at 67.

    [7] The $2.6 billion received by Tronox in connection with the IPO consisted of approximately $2 billion in debt that was assumed by NKM Parent, $285 million in chemical assets, $100 million in environmental reimbursements, $140 million in pre-paid insurance policies, and a $41 million indemnity for environmental liabilities. Id. at 77.

    [8] The court gave no weight in the solvency analysis to Tronox’s ability to issue $450 million in senior secured debt because “the sophisticated lenders who bought this debt well knew they would come first in any bankruptcy or liquidation of the enterprise.” Id. at 86.

    [9] In addition, the court emphasized that financial statements do not report on contingent liabilities in a manner that is necessarily useful when determining solvency. Id. at 91-93. According to generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), contingent liabilities must be reported only when “probable and reasonably estimable.” Id. at 91. Determining solvency, however, requires assigning a fair value to each contingent liability, even those which are not necessarily probable. Because financial statements may underestimate contingent liabilities, the court concluded that they “are of no probative value in a solvency analysis.” Id. at 92 (emphasis added).

    [10] Defendants asserted an affirmative defense under section 546(e), which the court rejected because (i) it was not timely raised; and (ii) Defendants failed to adduce any evidence that (a) “the change of ownership of the stock of the E&P subsidiaries from [Old KM] to [NKM Parent] constituted a settlement payment,” (b) Old KM was a “financial participant” and (c) changes of ownership were not made in connection with a “securities contract,” each as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 156-58. Additionally, the court rejected Defendants’ argument that it lacked jurisdiction to enter a final order pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). The court held that the Defendants failed to timely raise this issue and that they had consented to entry of a final order. The court acknowledged that the issue of whether consent is sufficient to empower a bankruptcy judge to enter a final order is an issue where the circuit courts are split and on which the Supreme Court is expected to rule in 2014. SeeExecutive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency), 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4727 (June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1200) (consent sufficient to confer jurisdiction). 

    [11] In its disclosure statement, Tronox valued tort and environmental claims in the case at between $1.9-6.2 billion. The Defendants asserted that such claims were “worth no more than $2 billion.” In re Tronox, 464 B.R. 606, 611 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).

    [12] In re Tronox, Inc., 464 B.R. at 609.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • HMRC Limited Liability Partnerships Review — Treatment of Salaried Members

    HMRC Limited Liability Partnerships Review — Treatment of Salaried Members

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    HMRC Limited Liability Partnerships Review — Treatment of Salaried Members

    11 December 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) has published draft legislation and guidance[1] in relation to “disguised employment” in UK limited liability partnerships (“LLPs”). This draft legislation and guidance is intended to implement the proposals set out in HMRC’s consultation document[2] published on 20 May 2013. The new legislation is scheduled to be effective from 6 April 2014 and will tax as employees certain individual LLP members who are in substance employees of the LLP despite being admitted as members of the LLP (“Salaried Members”).

    HMRC appears to have taken a much more restrictive approach in the draft legislation and guidance than was anticipated based on the provisions of the consultation document.

    Broadly, a member of an LLP will be a Salaried Member (and taxed as an employee) if all of the following three conditions are satisfied:

    1.  The member performs services for the LLP and the reward for the performance of those services is fixed or, if variable, is variable without reference to or is in practice unaffected by the overall amount of the profits or losses of the LLP. HMRC’s draft guidance clarifies that, in order to avoid this condition being met, amounts payable to a member must be determined by reference to the overall profitability of the firm — amounts calculated by reference to a member’s personal performance or by reference to objective performance criteria of the individual member (for example, the performance of their own “book”) will not be sufficient to avoid this condition being met.

    2.  The member does not have significant influence over the affairs of the LLP. This is required to be significant influence over the business as a whole — influence over specific matters, such as voting for the LLP’s management committee or to approve the accounts, will not be sufficient to avoid this condition being met. The draft guidance also makes clear that where an LLP has a management committee which effectively runs the LLP, only those members who are on the management committee will be regarded as having significant influence and non-management committee members are potentially Salaried Members (if they also meet the other two conditions).

    3.  The member’s capital contribution to the LLP is less than 25 percent of the compensation which the member receives from the LLP in the relevant year by way of fixed or variable income from the LLP for the tax year as described in Condition 1. The intention is that members will not be able to avoid Salaried Member status under this condition unless they have made a significant investment in the business (at least 25 percent of their income from the LLP for that tax year) so that they have a real risk resting on the success or failure of the business.

    On the basis of this published draft legislation and guidance, it would appear that many UK LLPs with “junior members” who receive profit shares based upon their own personal performance or who do not have significant influence over the affairs of the LLP would be at risk of Salaried Member categorisation. In this case, the amounts received by the Salaried Member would be treated as employment income subject to the applicable employment income tax rules, including deduction of income tax and employee’s national insurance contributions under the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system and the requirement for the LLP, as the deemed employer, to account for the 13.8 percent employer’s national insurance contributions based on the deemed employment income of the Salaried Member.

    The Salaried Member rules will be applicable only to UK limited liability partnerships and not to general partnerships or to limited liability partnerships formed under the laws of jurisdictions outside the UK, even if they are operating in the UK. However, where a US investment manager has structured its UK-affiliated entity as a UK LLP, the new rules will be applicable to amounts received from that UK LLP by the members of the UK LLP, if those members are deemed to be Salaried Members.

    Authored by Nicholas Fagge.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] Click here to view the draft legislation.

    [2] Partnerships: A review of two aspects of the tax rules: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-two-aspects-of-the-tax-rules-on-partnerships.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
    Authors

    Nick Fagge

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

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  • SEC Releases “Bad Actor” Rule Guidance

    SEC Releases “Bad Actor” Rule Guidance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Releases “Bad Actor” Rule Guidance

    December 11, 2013

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 4, 2013, the Division of Corporate Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission supplemented its Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (“C&DIs”)[1] to address some of the questions raised by private fund managers (and others) regarding the recently promulgated “bad actor” rules contained in new Rule 506(d).[2]

    New Rule 506(d), which became effective on Sept. 23, 2013, disqualifies issuers that have committed or experienced (or who have a relationship with certain categories of persons who have committed or experienced) one or more of an enumerated list of bad acts and actions from relying on the exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933 provided by Regulation D. However, the final text of the rule raised a number of questions on how certain provisions of the bad actor rule would be interpreted in the context of private funds.

    While the December 4 C&DIs do not answer all of the questions that private fund managers have about Rule 506(d), they resolve several points of confusion, including the following:

    • Resolving the “Affiliated Issuer” Question
      Under Rule 506(d), an issuer is disqualified from relying on Regulation D if an “affiliated issuer” is a bad actor. There was considerable confusion and concern about whether the “affiliated issuer” concept captured situations such as separate private funds with a common adviser, private funds advised by another manager under a shared corporate parent or a portfolio company in which a private fund holds an interest.[3] Question 260.16 provides a resolution that private fund managers will generally welcome, stating that under Rule 506(d), “affiliated issuer” is limited to an entity that is an affiliate (as defined in Rule 501(b) of Regulation D) of the issuer that is issuing securities in the same offering. Therefore, this C&DI, among other things, makes clear that portfolio companies are not “affiliated issuers.” (Managers were also reminded that “in the same offering” picks up the integration concept in Rule 502(a) of Regulation D and that they should, therefore, analyze that point in appropriate situations.)
    • The Division’s Interpretation of “Participation in an Offering”
      Covered persons under Rule 506(d) include officers of — among others — compensated solicitors and private fund managers who are “participating in the offering” of privately placed securities. One C&DI, Question 260.19, seeks to resolve confusion over the applicability of “participation in an offering” to non-soliciting officers of a placement agent. The Division’s response confirms that it does not intend to employ a narrow construction of the scope of “participation” in an offering: it states that participation “is not limited to solicitation of investors . . . [it includes] participation or involvement in due diligence activities or the preparation of offering materials . . . providing structuring or other advice to the issuer in connection with the offering, and communicating with the issuer, prospective investors or other offering participants about the offering.” It does, however, provide a list of some activities that “would generally not be deemed to be participating in the offering” (e.g., opening brokerage accounts, wiring funds and bookkeeping activities).
    • Limited Guidance on “Reasonable Care”
      Rule 506(d) introduced a “reasonable care” standard into an issuer-directed savings provision. In Question 260.23, the Division clarified that the following actions, if reasonable under the surrounding circumstances, would not necessarily constitute Rule 506(d) violations:    (i) An inability to determine the existence of a disqualifying event;     (ii) An inability to determine that a particular person was a covered     person; and    (iii) An initial (but ultimately incorrect) determination that a particular     person was not a covered person. However, no express guidance was provided in this C&DI on appropriate subsequent steps once the applicable error was discovered, although a non-exclusive list of options was included (e.g., obtaining waivers of disqualification, terminating the relationship with such a covered person, providing Rule 506(e) disclosures or other remedial steps).
    • Obtaining Bringdowns and Updating Disclosures
      Question 260.14 confirms that “if an offering is continuous, delayed or long-lived, the issuer must update its [Rule 506(d)] factual inquiry periodically through bring-down of representations, questionnaires and certifications, negative consent letters, periodic re-checking of public databases, and other steps, depending on the circumstances.” The C&DI does not provide any further guidance or any safe harbor on frequency or extent.
    • Universal Placement Agent Disclosures
      Question 260.26 makes it clear that the Division expects issuers to send Rule 506(e) disclosures on placement agent prior bad acts to all investors — not just to those introduced by the placement agent making the bad act disclosure.
    • The “Termination” Solution
      Another C&DI confirms that timely termination of a disqualifying solicitation arrangement or termination or modification of an employment relationship can preserve an issuer’s prospective ability to rely on Regulation D. With respect to the termination of a placement agent, Question 260.15 also states that the terminated solicitor may “not receive compensation for the future sales.” In a related C&DI, Question 260.27, the Division makes clear that an issuer conducting a continuous offering is not required to provide Rule 506(e) disclosures with respect to compensated solicitors who are no longer involved with the offering.
    • No Foreign Bad Acts
      Some of the “bad acts” listed in Rule 506(d) do not specifically identify geographic restrictions (e.g., the disqualification for a person “subject to any order, judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction . . . [that] restrains or enjoins such person from engaging or continuing to engage in any conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . .”). Question 260.20 provides confirmation that a Regulation D disqualification will not result from convictions, court orders, injunctions in a foreign court or regulatory orders issued by foreign regulatory authorities. (Note that this determination accords with pre-existing language in the SEC’s releases.)
    • Rule 105 Orders
      Rule 105 is a non-scienter-based rule and Question 260.21 confirms that a cease and desist order under Rule 105 will not trigger a Regulation D disqualification, even though Rule 105 is itself promulgated under a scienter-based provision of law (i.e., Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).

    Authored by Brian T. Daly and Marc E. Elovitz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The C&DIs, generally presented in a question-and-answer format, comprise a publicly available source of Division guidance on certain issues raised by the rules promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933. They are subject to revision from time to time and will often also contain an indicator of the latest date of publication or revision.

    [2] The relevant C&DIs are Questions 260.14 through 260.27 and can be found on the SEC website. This Alert provides a short summary of some of these C&DIs and, in addition, we have appended the full text of Questions 260.14 through 260.27 hereto.

    [3] While this has been referred to as a “private equity issue,” it also was a concern for hedge funds that take concentrated positions in public companies, private equity funds and all managers with multiple product offerings.


    APPENDIX
    December 4, 2013 Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations Regarding Rule 506(d)

    Source: Division of Corporate Finance of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

    Question 260.14 When is an issuer required to determine whether bad actor disqualification under Rule 506(d) applies?

    Answer: Rule 506(d) disqualifies an offering of securities from reliance on a Rule 506 exemption from Securities Act registration. Issuers must therefore determine if they are subject to bad actor disqualification any time they are offering or selling securities in reliance on Rule 506. An issuer that is not offering securities, such as a fund that is winding down and is closed to investment, need not determine whether Rule 506(d) applies unless and until it commences a Rule 506 offering. An issuer may reasonably rely on a covered person’s agreement to provide notice of a potential or actual bad actor triggering event pursuant to, for example, contractual covenants, bylaw requirements, or an undertaking in a questionnaire or certification. However, if an offering is continuous, delayed or long-lived, the issuer must update its factual inquiry periodically through bring-down of representations, questionnaires and certifications, negative consent letters, periodic re-checking of public databases, and other steps, depending on the circumstances.

    Question 260.15 If a placement agent or one of its covered control persons, such as an executive officer or managing member, becomes subject to a disqualifying event while an offering is still ongoing, could the issuer continue to rely on Rule 506 for that offering?

    Answer: Yes, the issuer could rely on Rule 506 for future sales in that offering if the engagement with the placement agent was terminated and the placement agent did not receive compensation for the future sales. Alternatively, if the triggering disqualifying event affected only the covered control persons of the placement agent, the issuer could continue to rely on Rule 506 for that offering if such persons were terminated or no longer performed roles with respect to the placement agent that would cause them to be covered persons for purposes of Rule 506(d).

    Question 260.16 For purposes of Rule 506(d), does an “affiliated issuer” mean every affiliate of the issuer that has issued securities?

    Answer: No. Under Rule 506(d), an “affiliated issuer” of the issuer is an affiliate (as defined in Rule 501(b) of Regulation D) of the issuer that is issuing securities in the same offering, including offerings subject to integration pursuant to Rule 502(a) of Regulation D. Securities Act Forms C&DIs 130.01 and 130.02 provide examples of co-issuer or multiple issuer offerings.

    Question 260.17 Are compensated solicitors limited to brokers, as defined in Exchange Act Section 3(a)(4), who are subject to registration pursuant to Exchange Act Section 15(a)(1), and their associated persons?

    Answer: No. All persons who have been or will be paid, directly or indirectly, remuneration for solicitation of purchasers are covered by Rule 506(d), regardless of whether they are, or are required to be, registered under Exchange Act Section 15(a)(1) or are associated persons of registered broker-dealers. The disclosure required in Item 12 of Form D expressly contemplates that compensated solicitors may not appear in FINRA’s Central Registration Depository (CRD) of brokers and brokerage firms.

    Question 260.18 Does the term “participating” include persons whose sole involvement with a Rule 506 offering is as members of a compensated solicitor’s deal or transaction committee that is responsible for approving such compensated solicitor’s participation in the offering?

    Answer: No.

    Question 260.19 Are officers of a compensated solicitor deemed to be “participating” in a Rule 506 offering only if they are involved with the solicitation of investors for that offering?

    Answer: No. Participation in an offering is not limited to solicitation of investors. Examples of participation in an offering include participation or involvement in due diligence activities or the preparation of offering materials (including analyst reports used to solicit investors), providing structuring or other advice to the issuer in connection with the offering, and communicating with the issuer, prospective investors or other offering participants about the offering. To constitute participation for purposes of the rule, such activities must be more than transitory or incidental. Administrative functions, such as opening brokerage accounts, wiring funds, and bookkeeping activities, would generally not be deemed to be participating in the offering.

    Question 260.20 Is disqualification under Rule 506(d) triggered by actions taken in jurisdictions other than the United States, such as convictions, court orders, or injunctions in a foreign court, or regulatory orders issued by foreign regulatory authorities?

    Answer: No.

    Question 260.21 Is disqualification under Rule 506(d)(1)(v) triggered by all Commission orders to cease and desist from violations of Commission rules promulgated under Exchange Act Section 10(b)?

    Answer: No. Disqualification is triggered only by orders to cease and desist from violations of scienter-based provisions of the federal securities laws, including scienter-based rules. An order to cease and desist from violations of a non-scienter based rule would not trigger disqualification, even if the rule is promulgated under a scienter-based provision of law. For example, an order to cease and desist from violations of Exchange Act Rule 105 would not trigger disqualification, even though Rule 105 is promulgated under Exchange Act Section 10(b).

    Question 260.22 If an order issued by a court or regulator provides, in accordance with Rule 506(d)(2)(iii), that disqualification from Rule 506 should not arise as a result of the order, is it necessary to seek a waiver from the Commission or to take any other action to confirm that bad actor disqualification will not apply as a result of the order?

    Answer: No. The provisions of Rule 506(d)(2)(iii) are self-executing.

    Question 260.23 Does the reasonable care exception only cover circumstances where the issuer has identified all covered persons but, despite the exercise of reasonable care, was unable to discover the existence of a disqualifying event? Or could it also apply where, despite the exercise of reasonable care, the issuer (i) was unable to determine that a particular person was a covered person (for example, an officer of a financial intermediary that the issuer did not know was participating in the offering, despite the exercise of reasonable care) or (ii) initially determined that the person was not a covered person but subsequently determined that the person should have been deemed a covered person?

    Answer: The reasonable care exception applies whenever the issuer can establish that it did not know and, despite the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known that a disqualification existed under Rule 506(d)(1). This may occur when, despite the exercise of reasonable care, the issuer was unable to determine the existence of a disqualifying event, was unable to determine that a particular person was a covered person, or initially reasonably determined that the person was not a covered person but subsequently learned that determination was incorrect. Issuers will still need to consider what steps are appropriate upon discovery of Rule 506(d) disqualifying events and covered persons throughout the course of an ongoing Rule 506 offering. An issuer may need to seek waivers of disqualification, terminate the relationship with covered persons, provide Rule 506(e) disclosure, or take such other remedial steps to address the Rule 506(d) disqualification.

    Question 260.24 Is there a procedure provided in Rule 506(e) for issuers to seek a waiver of the obligation to disclose past events that would have been disqualifying, except that they occurred before September 23, 2013 (the effective date of Rule 506(d))?

    Answer: No. The disclosure obligation is not subject to waiver.

    Question 260.25 Does Rule 506(e) require disclosure of past events that would no longer trigger disqualification under Rule 506(d), such as a criminal conviction that occurred more than ten years before the offering or an order or bar that is no longer in effect at the time of the offering?

    Answer: No. Rule 506(e) requires only disclosure of events that would have triggered disqualification at the time of the offering had Rule 506(d) been applicable. Because events outside the applicable look-back period and orders that do not have continuing effect would not trigger disqualification, Rule 506(e) does not mandate disclosure of such matters in order for the issuer to be able to rely on Rule 506.

    Question 260.26 In an offering in which the issuer uses multiple placement agents or other compensated solicitors, is the issuer required to provide investors with disclosure under Rule 506(e) only with respect to the particular compensated solicitor or placement agent that solicited those investors and its covered control persons (i.e., general partners, managing members, directors, executive officers, and other officers participating in the offering)?

    Answer: No. Issuers are required to provide all investors with the Rule 506(e) disclosure for all compensated solicitors who are involved with the offering at the time of sale and their covered control persons.

    Question 260.27 In a continuous offering, is the issuer required to provide disclosure under Rule 506(e) for all solicitors that were ever involved during the course of the offering?

    Answer: No. A reasonable time prior to the sale of securities in reliance on Rule 506, the issuer must provide the required disclosure with respect to all compensated solicitors that are involved at the time of sale. Disclosure with respect to compensated solicitors who are no longer involved with the offering need not be provided under Rule 506(e) in order for the issuer to be able to rely on Rule 506.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Derivatives Update: Applicability of EU Reporting to US Private Fund Managers

    Derivatives Update: Applicability of EU Reporting to US Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Derivatives Update: Applicability of EU Reporting to US Private Fund Managers

    27 November 2013

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As we recently reported, the pan-European regulator ESMA announced that it had approved the first trade repositories to collect and maintain the records of derivatives contracts. The reporting obligations under the European Market Infrastructure Regulations (“EMIR”) with respect to derivative transactions do not apply to non-EU funds managed by US managers. US managers of non-EU funds should, however, note that if they engage in derivatives trades with a counterparty covered by EMIR, the counterparty will have to report the trade details to a trade repository. For EU funds managed by US managers, EMIR will require reporting to a trade repository if the manager is authorized or registered in accordance with the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFMD”) (Directive 2011/61/EU; for more information as to when such authorization and registration under the AIFMD will apply, please refer to SRZ’s AIFM Directive Resource Center.). EMIR may require reporting if the manager is not yet registered under the AIFMD in reliance on an AIFMD transition period (subject to further guidance from ESMA and local regulators).

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.

    Click here to visit SRZ’s AIFM Directive Resource Center.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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