Content Type: Article

  • US Supreme Court Issues Affirmative Action Decision

    US Supreme Court Issues Affirmative Action Decision

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    US Supreme Court Issues Affirmative Action Decision

    July 16, 2013

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its long-awaited opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, where the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions policy at the University of Texas at Austin. The case has been followed closely by colleges and universities concerned about what impact it might have on diversity and admissions.[1] In a 7-1 decision (Justice Kagan recused herself), the Court held that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit misapplied the “strict scrutiny” standard required by the Court’s previous decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003)and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and therefore vacated the Circuit Court’s decision and remanded the case so the Circuit Court could apply the correct standard.

    According to the Court, “racial ‘classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.’” Fisher, at 18 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S., at 326). Thus, the inquiry involves two steps: a determination that there are “compelling governmental interests” involved, and a second determination of whether the means chosen are sufficiently “narrowly tailored” to meet that goal.

    The Fisher opinion confirmed that “the attainment of a diverse student body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.” Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S., at 311-312). Further, the Court agreed with the lower court’s decision to defer to the University’s judgment “that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals,” though the Court emphasized that there must still be “a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic decision.” Id., at 19. The Court took issue, however, with the lower court’s analysis of the “narrow tailoring” prong. The Court stated that “the University receives no deference” in this analysis and criticized the lower court for “confin[ing] the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications,” stating that, instead, a “searching examination” needs to be performed to ensure that race or ethnicity are merely considered in the application process, and not determinative or defining, and that no race-neutral alternatives could achieve similar results. Fisher, at 20-22.

    Since the Court did not reach an actual conclusion on the constitutionality of the University of Texas’ policy, much uncertainty remains as to what the Fisher decision means for educational institutions going forward. Both sides have claimed victory: affirmative action defenders pointing out that the Court did not find the current policies at the University of Texas unconstitutional and did not overrule affirmative action; opponents hopeful that it has set the stage for the lower court to reject its original ruling.

    While Fisher and most of the affirmative action cases deal with college and graduate programs, their constitutional analysis will also be applied to public elementary and secondary school affirmative action programs. While independent schools need not comply with the constitutional principles addressed by the Court, we recommend continuing to watch the evolution of the Fisher case and affirmative action jurisprudence generally, as all schools should consider their rulings as best practices in drafting policies.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • FATCA Effective Dates Delayed Six Months

    FATCA Effective Dates Delayed Six Months

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FATCA Effective Dates Delayed Six Months

    July 12, 2013

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Today, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued Notice 2013-43, which postpones by six months, from Jan. 1, 2014 to July 1, 2014, the effective date for certain requirements under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”).

    Foreign financial institutions (“FFIs”) will not be required to register with the IRS or, where applicable, enter into an FFI agreement with the IRS until June 30, 2014. The IRS will publish the first list of global intermediary identification numbers (“GIINs”) by June 2, 2014, with monthly updates to follow. In order for an FFI to be on the first published list of GIINs, it now will need to register by April 25, 2014.

    In addition, withholding under FATCA will not be required for U.S.-source income payments made prior to July 1, 2014. The definition of grandfathered obligations has also been revised to now include obligations outstanding on July 1, 2014.

    For regular (Chapter 3) withholding tax purposes, the Notice further extends the expiration date of withholding certificates (e.g., IRS Forms W-8BEN and other Forms W-8) and documentary evidence that would otherwise have expired on Dec. 31, 2013 to June 30, 2014, unless a change in circumstances would otherwise have caused such certificates or documentary evidence to become incorrect or unreliable.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Reminder for UK Private Fund Managers: The AIFM Directive Takes Effect on 22 July 2013

    Reminder for UK Private Fund Managers: The AIFM Directive Takes Effect on 22 July 2013

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reminder for UK Private Fund Managers: The AIFM Directive Takes Effect on 22 July 2013

    9 July 2013

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Summary

    The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFM Directive“) of the European Union (“EU”) must be implemented into the national law of all EU countries by 22 July 2013. The AIFM Directive, which sets forth rules for the authorisation, operation and transparency (i.e., disclosure requirements) of managers of alternative investment funds (“AIFs”), will apply to any private fund manager (defined under the AIFM Directive as an alternative investment fund manager or “AIFM”) that:

        (2) Markets[1] one or more AIFs (EU or non-EU) to investors in the EU.

        (1) Manages one or more EU AIFs; or

    In our previous Briefings,[2] we have provided detailed guidance and summaries of the requirements for AIFMs. The same issues and principles as are discussed in our Briefings remain relevant, but as we approach 22 July 2013, the date that the AIFM Directive becomes effective in all EU member states, we are beginning to see final rules published in certain EU member states, including the UK. These final rules are leading to further action items becoming apparent, which UK AIFMs may wish to consider. Some of these action items relate to the existence of transitional periods in certain EU countries and reverse solicitation procedures — both of which may be critical for UK AIFMs if they wish to be able to market their AIFs in the EU during the transitional period before they register with the UK Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) as authorised AIFMs — without having to comply with the AIFM Directive’s onerous requirements for notification filings/registration, statutory disclosures, and regulatory reporting (together, the “Marketing Compliance Requirements”).[3]

    United Kingdom

    Although we do not yet have all of the final rules that will be required to implement the AIFM Directive in UK law and regulation, the following two papers have recently been published by the UK authorities which give a great deal of detail about the manner in which the AIFM Directive is being implemented in the UK and the FCA’s guidance on many of the concepts and issues under the AIFM Directive:

    • HM Treasury. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013 (the “Regulations”);[4] and
    • FCA. Policy Statement 13/5 — Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“PS13/5”).[5]

    It must be emphasised that the Regulations and PS 13/5 relate only to the position as regards the implementation of the AIFM Directive in the UK. Other EU member states will implement the AIFM Directive under their own regulations and there may be variances between one EU member state’s approach and that taken in another EU member state. If in doubt, the advice and assistance of local counsel should be sought. However, notwithstanding the fact that each EU member state could take a slightly different approach to implementation, there are some significant concepts in the Regulations and PS 13/5 that UK AIFMs should be aware of.

    Transitional Period. The Regulations confirm that there will be a one-year transitional period for the implementation of the AIFM Directive in the UK. This one-year transitional period applies to those UK AIFMs that are already managing an AIF in the UK on 22 July 2013.

    To be “managing” an AIF in the UK on 22 July 2013, the UK AIFM would have to be: (1) already authorised by the FCA as an investment manager under the current MiFID rules;[6] and (2) managing an AIF that is already trading. Assuming that the UK AIFM is able to satisfy these requirements, it will be able to take another full year during which to submit its variation of permission (“VoP”) application to the FCA to change its status from being an authorised MiFID firm and instead to be an authorised AIFM.[7]

    During the transitional period:

    • A UK AIFM managing a non-EU AIF will be able to continue marketing its AIF(s) in the UK in accordance with the UK’s national private placement rules (i.e., the FCA’s financial promotion rules). In other EU member states, the UK AIFM, if it wished to market its non-EU AIFs, would have to comply with the national private placement rules in the relevant member state and any additional requirements imposed by the local regulator under the AIFM Directive. It is probable that some other EU member states will likely also have a one-year transitional period for marketing, so the specific requirements should be assessed on a member-state-by-member-state basis.[8]
    • A UK AIFM managing a UK AIF will be able to market its AIF(s) in the UK in accordance with the UK’s national private placement rules until such time as the UK AIFM becomes regulated by the FCA as an authorised AIFM. However, a UK AIFM that has not yet become regulated by the FCA as an authorised AIFM will NOT be able to market its EU AIF(s) in other EU member states until such time as the UK AIFM is authorised as an authorised AIFM and can thereby obtain the marketing passport for that EU AIF.[9] EU AIFs will ONLY be able to be marketed in the EU under the marketing passport after 22 July 2013 — unless a particular country has adopted a transitional period for marketing purposes. However, once the marketing passport is obtained, the UK AIFM would then be able to market the EU AIF freely around the EU to any professional investors without consideration as to the national private placement rules, which would cease to be of relevance after the passport is obtained.

    Marketing. The FCA’s recent guidance on the AIFM Directive in PS 13/5 has commented that “marketing” means more than merely providing information on a fund or verbal discussions with a potential EU investor. For “marketing” to have taken place, the units or shares in the AIF must have been made “available for purchase” by the EEA investor — i.e., there has to have been a formal offering or placement of interests in the relevant AIF.

    The FCA has noted: “The terms ‘offering’ or ‘placement’ are not defined in the AIFMD UK regulation but, in our view, an offering or placement takes place for the purposes of the AIFMD UK regulation when a person seeks to raise capital by making a unit or share of an AIF available for purchase by a potential investor. This includes situations which constitute a contractual offer that can be accepted by a potential investor in order to make the investment and form a binding contract, and situations which constitute an invitation to the investor to make an offer to subscribe for the investment.”

    Reverse Solicitation — or “Passive Marketing.” The AIFM Directive itself and the Regulations specify that the AIFM Directive’s requirements that would otherwise apply to the AIFM for an AIF being marketed in the EEA do NOT apply to an offering or placement of units or shares of an AIF where the marketing activity takes place in the EEA at the initiative of the EEA investor. PS 13/5 refers to such marketing “at the initiative of the investor” as passive marketing, although it will be more familiarly known to most industry participants as “reverse solicitation” marketing or as “reverse inquiry” marketing.

    The FCA’s guidance in PS 13/5 states: “A confirmation from the investor that the offering or placement of units of shares of the AIF was made at its initiative should normally be sufficient to demonstrate that this is the case, provided this is obtained before the offer or placement takes place. However, AIFMs and investment firms should not be able to rely upon such confirmation if this has been obtained to circumvent the requirements of AIFMD.”

    Action Items

    UK AIFMs would be advised to consider the following action items:

    • FCA — VoP Application. Determine when they will be making their VoP application to the FCA to become authorised AIFMs. Various factors will be relevant in making this assessment, including whether or not the AIFM manages an EU AIF (in which case it would be beneficial to become authorised earlier rather than later so as to get the benefit of the pan-EU marketing passport), and if the AIFM has no EU AIF, then one of the key factors will be whether or not the AIFM wishes to become fully compliant with the AIFM Directive (including the potentially onerous remuneration requirements) sooner, or later.[10]
    • Transitional Periods. Assess which EU jurisdictions will have a transitional period and whether or not the AIFM will be able to take advantage of it/them so that it will be able to continue marketing in that jurisdiction/those jurisdictions for the duration of the transitional period without having to comply with the Marketing Compliance Requirements.
    • Active Marketing. Assess in which other EU jurisdictions the AIFM may otherwise wish to conduct active marketing after 22 July 2013 (i.e., marketing at its own initiative in compliance with the AIFM Directive requirements). Such AIFMs will need to assess what the local law requirements will be for the Marketing Compliance Requirements.
    • Reverse Solicitation — Existing Investors. Review EU investor lists and EU contact lists to assess whether they have already been marketing to those EU persons at their initiative — i.e., whether the UK AIFM has an email, letter or other evidence from the EU investor to show that the marketing relationship with that EU person was as a result of a reverse solicitation.
    • Reverse Solicitation — Ongoing Marketing to Existing Investors. Consider whether the ongoing materials sent to existing EU investors in the AIFM’s AIF(s) are marketing materials and whether existing EU investors have indicated in writing that they wish to receive such marketing materials.
    • Reverse Solicitation — Prospective Investors. Identify those EU prospective investors with whom the AIFM has been having initial discussions — but to whom the AIFM has not yet sent any formal offer documents/private placement memorandum or subscription documents and determine whether the EU prospective investor has confirmed in writing to the AIFM that they would like the AIFM to send them the formal marketing materials.

    Note

    This Alert identifies action items that UK AIFMs may wish to consider in the period before the AIFM Directive is fully implemented in each EU member state. EU member states have discretion to implement the AIFM Directive under their own national regulations and there may be variances between one EU member state’s approach and that taken in another EU member state, which local counsel in the relevant member states can address.

    Authored by Neil Robson and Christopher Hilditch .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Under the AIFM Directive, “marketing” means a direct or indirect offering or placement at the initiative of the AIFM, or on behalf of the AIFM of units or shares of an AIF it manages, to or with investors domiciled, or with a registered office, in the EU.

    [2] For more information, please see SRZ Briefings on the SRZ AIFM Directive Resource Center.

    [3] For more information, please see SRZ Briefing, Marketing Requirements.

    [4] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111540206/pdfs/ukdsi_9780111540206_en.pdf. We understand that the Regulations were passed into law by the UK Parliament on 3 July 2013.

    [5] http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-statements/ps13-05.

    [6] The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC), which is the existing EU directive regulating investment services firms in the EU.

    [7] An authorised UK AIFM must also, from the date it becomes authorised as an AIFM, comply with the FCA AIFM remuneration rules — the details of which are not anticipated to be published by the FCA before the end of September or early October 2013. For more information on the general remuneration principles that the FCA’s remuneration rules will be modeled on, please see SRZ Briefing, AIFM Remuneration Rules.

    [8] The terms and details of any other EU member states’ transitional periods is not entirely clear at the time of writing.

    [9] However, a UK AIFM will be able to continue marketing its EU AIF(s) for the duration of any transitional period in those EU member states that elect to have one (assuming the UK AIFM is able to come within the scope of such transitional period(s)).

    [10] We anticipate that many UK AIFMs with non-EU AIFs will likely not submit their VoP applications to the FCA until the first or second calendar quarters of 2014. At the time of writing, the FCA’s processes and the forms needed to make any VoP application have not been published, although we anticipate that these details will be published during the course of this week (week commencing 8 July 2013).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Christopher Hilditch

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

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  • Safe Harbor Update: Still a Good Defense to Fraudulent Transfer and Preference Claims

    Safe Harbor Update: Still a Good Defense to Fraudulent Transfer and Preference Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Safe Harbor Update: Still a Good Defense to Fraudulent Transfer and Preference Claims

    July 8, 2013

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Appellate courts continue to agree on the vitality and breadth of the safe harbor defense contained in Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) (insulating from the trustee’s fraudulent transfer or preference attack “settlement payment” or “margin payment” on a “securities contract,” “commodity contract” or “forward contract” except when the debtor’s payment is made with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors). In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 2013 WL2460726, *1 (2d Cir. June 10, 2013) (held, payments by the debtor to the noteholder trustee for the noteholders “in exchange for private placement notes. . .clearly fell within the safe harbor for ‘transfers made. . .in connection with a securities contract.’”); In re Derivium Capital LLC, 2013 WL2284876, *8 (4th Cir. May 24, 2013) (held, commission payments to stockbroker shielded from recovery by “settlement payment” defense; no exception for stockbroker defense in context of Ponzi scheme); In re MBS Management Services, Inc., 690 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 2012) (held, pre-bankruptcy payments to power company for supplying electricity to the debtor’s apartment complexes were settlement payments on “forward contract” for purchase of a “commodity”).

    Academics have unsuccessfully complained about the courts’ expansive reading of Code § 546(e). See Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 319, 329-32 (2010) (describing weaknesses of safe harbor system and arguing against recent expansive definition given safe harbors by courts); Edwards & Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment? 22 Yale J. On Reg. 91, 98 (2005) (safe harbors given to derivatives “encompass. . .far too many transactions.”); Note, 2012 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 423, 424 (2012) (“. . .safe harbors have been expanded to include securities, commodities contracts and entities for which Congress did not envision the safe harbors affording protection.”), citing Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B.de C.V. (In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.)[1] 651 F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2011) (held, settlement payments include the Chapter 11 debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payments for early redemption of publicly traded commercial paper).

    Protection for Privately Placed Note Repayments to the Noteholder Trustee with No Beneficial Interest in the Funds

    The creditors’ committee in Quebecor sued to avoid payments made by the debtor to certain noteholders “in exchange for private placement notes that had been issued by one of [the debtor’s] affiliates.” 2013 WL2460726, at *1. As the Second Circuit noted, the debtor “transferred funds to [the noteholder] trustee. . .in the amount and manner prescribed. . .for purchasing Notes. The parties agreed that [the noteholder trustee] is a financial institution. The [note purchase agreements] were clearly ‘securities contracts’ because they provided for both the original purchase and the ‘repurchase’ of the Notes.” Id. at *3. In the words of the court, because “this was a transfer made to a financial institution in connection with a securities contract,” it was “exempt from avoidance.” Id.

    More significant was the plaintiff committee’s argument that the noteholder trustee was “only serving as a conduit or intermediary.” Id. at *3. Noting a “split of authority regarding what role a financial institution must play in the transaction for it to qualify for the section 546(e) safe harbor,” the Second Circuit followed its earlier Enron holding that “the absence of a financial intermediary that takes title to the transacted securities during the course of the transaction is [not] a proper basis on which to deny safe-harbor protection.” Enron, 651 F.3d at 338, citing three other circuit courts’ reliance on the Code’s “plain language.” Id., at *3, QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.), 571 F.3d 545, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2009); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir, 2009); and In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir. 1999). Contra, In re Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (2-1) (held, financial institution must acquire beneficial interest in transferred funds or securities for safe harbor to apply).

    The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff committee’s “conduit” argument in Quebecor, reasoning as follows:

    “Enron rejected a similar argument, holding that the financial intermediary need not have a beneficial interest in the transfer. . . . To the extent Enron left any ambiguity in this regard, we expressly follow the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in holding that a transfer may qualify for the section 546(e) safe harbor even if the financial intermediary is merely a conduit. . . .

    “A transaction involving one of these financial intermediaries, even as a conduit, necessarily touches upon these at-risk markets. Moreover, the enumerated intermediaries are typically facilitators of, rather than participants with a beneficial interest in the underlying transfers. A clear safe harbor for transactions made through these financial intermediaries promotes stability in their respective markets and ensures that otherwise avoidable transfers are made out in the open, reducing the risk that they were made to defraud creditors. . . . Accordingly, it was sufficient that [the debtor’s] transfer was made to [the noteholder] trustee, even though [that entity] did not take title to the transferred funds.”

    Id. at *4-*5.

    The Quebecor decision also contained an important footnote confirming the statutory limitation on the use of the safe harbor. “Of course, the ‘securities contract’ safe harbor is not without limitation, and, for example, mere structuring of a transfer as a ‘securities transaction’ may not be sufficient to preclude avoidance.” Id. at *5 n.4, citing Code § 546(e), § 548(a)(1)(A), (transfer made “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” the creditors expressly excluded from § 546(e) safe harbor protection). This explicit statutory limitation was also stressed by the Fourth Circuit in its recent Derivium decision, discussed below.

    Commission Payments; No Ponzi Scheme Exception to Safe Harbor

    The Fourth Circuit affirmed, among other things, in the Derivium case, the dismissal of the trustee’s claims to recover commissions paid by a fraudulent stockbroker on the ground that the § 546(e) safe harbor protected those payments. Customers of Derivium transferred securities in exchange for three-year recourse loans worth 90 percent of the market value of the securities. When the loans matured, customers could either repay the principal plus interest and recover their securities, surrender the stock or refinance the loan for an additional term. Customers transferred their securities into brokerage accounts at a stockbroker that maintained accounts in the debtor’s name. The debtor told its customers that they would hedge their collateral using a confidential, proprietary formula, but actually had directed the stockbroker to transfer the securities into other accounts and liquidate them, using the proceeds from the stock sales to fund, among other things, loans to other customers.

    The debtor’s scheme fell apart when it could no longer return the customers’ securities and when the stockbroker closed its accounts. The trustee sued the stockbroker asserting several claims, including fraudulent transfer claims to recover $161 million in securities that customers had transferred into the brokerage accounts, plus commissions that the debtor had paid to the broker. After holding the customers’ transfer of their securities to the broker not to have involved the debtor’s property, the court then held that the debtor’s commission payments were also insulated from recovery by reason of the “settlement payment” safe harbor in § 546(e), reasoning as follows:

    “Because Congress included in the definition of ‘settlement payment’ ‘any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade,’ we also look to standard practice of the securities industry to inform the definition of ‘settlement payment.’ Several industry texts suggest that ‘settlement payment’ means the transfer of funds paid in connection with the completing of a securities transaction.”

    2013 WL 2284876, at *6.

    Equally important was the Fourth Circuit’s holding that it was not required “to establish an extra-statutory fraud exception to the stockbroker defense” contained in § 546(e). Id. at *8. According to the unsuccessful trustee, allowing “a broker to retain ill-gotten profits” in a Ponzi scheme would “undermine the ‘equitable goals of the. . .Code.’” Id. Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts, however, the Court of Appeals rejected the trustee’s argument for “an exception to the stockbroker defense. . .in the context of an alleged Ponzi scheme. . . .” Id.

    Critical to the court’s holding was its finding “several express [statutory] exceptions to the [stockbroker] defense, including claims. . .under [Code] § 548(a)(1) — ‘fraudulent transfers’ made ‘with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. . . .’” Id. Indeed, courts have regularly held that the “existence of a Ponzi scheme [gives] rise to a presumption of actual fraud on the part of the broker, triggering the fraud exception to the stockbroker defense.” Id., citing In re Manhattan Investment Fund Limited, 397 B.R.1, 14 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 328 F. App’x 709 (2d Cir. 2009). In Derivium, the actual fraud issue was left “unanswered” because “the parties [later] settled certain claims, and it appears the later hearing was not held.” Id. at *8.

    Preferences, Settlement Payments, Forward Contract for Commodity Purchase

    The Fifth Circuit held that a debtor’s pre-bankruptcy payments to a power company for supplying electricity to the debtor’s apartment complexes were settlement payments exempted from the trustee’s preference claim. In re MBS Management Services, Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2012). According to the court, the debtor’s electricity-requirements contract with the power company constituted a “forward contract” covered by Code § 101(25)(A) (“a contract (other than a commodity contract. . .) for the purchase, sale, or transfer of a commodity. . .with a maturity date more than two days after the contract is entered into. . .”). Id. at 355. Code § 546(e) also exempts from avoidance “a transfer that is a. . .settlement payment by or to [a]. . .forward contract merchant. . . .” Id. Relying on the statutory language alone, the court rejected the trustee’s proffered requirements of specific quantity and delivery date, explaining that no “such limitations” existed in the Code. Id. at 356. Moreover, explained the court, participants in forward contracts “sell or purchase the commodity in advance to hedge against. . .price fluctuations. . . . [F]orward contacts for electricity do not typically limit the quantity sold or purchased. Instead they are generally for the entire needs or demands of the purchaser,” Id. at 357, citing In re Nat’l Gas Distributors, LLC, 556 F.3d 247, 258 (4th Cir. 2009) (deflected attempts to restrict definition of “forward agreements”; supply contracts between industry participants are not per se excluded as forward contracts).

    Case to Watch

    Pending in the Second Circuit is an appeal from the district court’s ruling in AP Services LLP v. Silva, 483 B.R. 63, 68-69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 12) (held, § 546(e) even bars state common law claims such as unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting or conversion when the underlying facts show that the plaintiff seeks to undo a transaction otherwise insulated by § 546(e).). In AP Services, the court dismissed a litigation trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint under New York Law (Code § 544(b) and NY Debt & Cred. Law § 278) when a failed leveraged buyout preceded bankruptcy by three years. The debtor transferred funds “directly to [the selling shareholder defendants’] bank accounts and did not pass. . .through a clearing house or [similar] intermediary.” Id. at 68. According to the district court, the “transaction fits within [the Code’s] safe harbor.” Id. at 69. Neither the Code nor “case law indicates that an intermediary is ‘necessary’ to trigger the safe harbor.” Id. Moreover, “every circuit but one” has held that “§ 546(e) is not limited to publicly traded securities but also extends to transactions, such as the [one] here, involving privately held securities.” Id.

    Comment

    Only Congress can amend the Code’s safe harbor provision, much to the chagrin of certain academic commentators. Because Congress has only expanded the safe harbor between 1982 and 2006, however, parties seeking certainty need only look to the Circuit Courts of Appeals, whose interpretations of the § 546(e) safe harbor are “extremely broad.” Enron, 651 F.3d at 334; QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d at 549.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or the author.

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  • Reminder for US and Other Non-EU Private Fund Managers: The AIFM Directive Takes Effect on 22 July 2013

    Reminder for US and Other Non-EU Private Fund Managers: The AIFM Directive Takes Effect on 22 July 2013

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reminder for US and Other Non-EU Private Fund Managers: The AIFM Directive Takes Effect on 22 July 2013

    8 July 2013

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Summary

    The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFM Directive“) of the European Union (“EU”) must be implemented into the national law of all EU countries by 22 July 2013. The AIFM Directive, which sets forth rules for the authorisation, operation and transparency (i.e., disclosure requirements) of managers of alternative investment funds (“AIFs”), will apply to any US and other non-EU private fund manager (defined under the AIFM Directive as an alternative investment fund manager or “AIFM”) that:

        (1) Manages one or more EU AIFs; or

        (2) Markets[1] one or more AIFs (EU or non-EU) to investors in the EU.

    In our previous Briefings,[2] we have provided detailed guidance and summaries of the requirements for AIFMs, including the specific issues of relevance to US private fund managers[3] and other non-EU private fund managers.[4] The same issues and principles as are discussed in our Briefings remain relevant, but as we approach 22 July 2013, the date that the AIFM Directive becomes effective in all EU member states, we are beginning to see final rules published in certain EU member states, including the UK. These final rules are leading to further action items becoming apparent, which US and other non-EU AIFMs may wish to consider — particularly where the US or non-EU AIFM is not managing an EU AIF and is only marketing its non-EU AIFs in the EU. Some of these action items relate to the existence of transitional periods in certain EU countries and reverse solicitation procedures — both of which may be critical for US or non-EU AIFMs if they wish to be able to market their AIFs in the EU without having to comply with the AIFM Directive’s onerous requirements for notification filings/registration, statutory disclosures and regulatory reporting (together, the “Marketing Compliance Requirements”).[5]

    United Kingdom

    Although we do not yet have all of the final rules that will be required to implement the AIFM Directive in UK law and regulation, the following two papers have recently been published by the UK authorities which give a great deal of detail about the manner in which the AIFM Directive is being implemented in the UK and the UK regulator’s guidance on many of the concepts and issues under the AIFM Directive:

    • HM Treasury. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013 (the “Regulations”);[6] and
    • Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). Policy Statement 13/5 — Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“PS 13/5”).[7]

    It must be emphasized that the Regulations and PS 13/5 relate only to the position as regards the implementation of the AIFM Directive in the UK. Other EU member states will implement the AIFM Directive under their own regulations and there may be variances between one EU member state’s approach and that taken in another EU member state. If in doubt, the advice and assistance of local counsel should be sought. However, notwithstanding the fact that each EU member state could take a slightly different approach to implementation, there are some significant concepts in the Regulations and PS 13/5 that US and non-EU AIFMs should be aware of.

    Transitional Period. The Regulations confirm that there will be a one-year transitional period for the implementation of the AIFM Directive in the UK. This one-year transitional period applies not only to those UK AIFMs that are already managing an AIF in the UK on 22 July 2013, but also to US and non-EU AIFMs that are marketing a specific fund in the European Economic Area (“EEA”)[8] before 22 July 2013. Such marketing activity need not necessarily have taken place in the UK – any marketing activities within the EEA will be sufficient. In addition, while the draft Regulations referenced marketing “immediately” before 22 July 2013, the final Regulations do not now use the word “immediately.”

    The FCA’s recent guidance on the AIFM Directive in PS 13/5 has commented that “marketing” means more than merely providing information on a fund or verbal discussions with a potential EU investor. For “marketing” to have taken place, the units or shares in the AIF must have been made “available for purchase” by the EEA investor — i.e., there has to have been a formal offering or placement of interests in the relevant AIF. The FCA has taken the position that providing draft offering documentation does not constitute marketing.

    The FCA has noted: “The terms ‘offering’ or ‘placement’ are not defined in the AIFMD UK regulation but, in our view, an offering or placement takes place for the purposes of the AIFMD UK regulation when a person seeks to raise capital by making a unit or share of an AIF available for purchase by a potential investor. This includes situations which constitute a contractual offer that can be accepted by a potential investor in order to make the investment and form a binding contract, and situations which constitute an invitation to the investor to make an offer to subscribe for the investment.”

    Reverse Solicitation — or “Passive Marketing.” The AIFM Directive itself and the Regulations specify that the AIFM Directive’s requirements that would otherwise apply to the AIFM for an AIF being marketed in the EEA (other than if the AIFM can come within the scope of the one year transitional period) do NOT apply to an offering or placement of units or shares of an AIF where the marketing activity takes place in the EEA at the initiative of the EEA investor. PS 13/5 refers to such marketing “at the initiative of the investor” as passive marketing, although it will be more familiarly known to most industry participants as “reverse solicitation” marketing or as “reverse inquiry” marketing.

    The FCA’s guidance in PS 13/5 states: “A confirmation from the investor that the offering or placement of units of shares of the AIF was made at its initiative should normally be sufficient to demonstrate that this is the case, provided this is obtained before the offer or placement takes place. However, AIFMs and investment firms should not be able to rely upon such confirmation if this has been obtained to circumvent the requirements of AIFMD.”

    Action Items

    US and non-EU AIFMs would be advised to consider the following action items:

    • Transitional Periods. Assess which EU jurisdictions will have a transitional period and whether or not the AIFM will be able to take advantage of it/them so that it will be able to continue marketing in that jurisdiction/those jurisdictions for the duration of the transitional period without having to comply with the Marketing Compliance Requirements.
    • Full Compliance. Assess in which other EU jurisdictions the AIFM may otherwise wish to conduct active marketing after 22 July 2013 (i.e., marketing at its own initiative in compliance with the AIFM Directive requirements). Such AIFMs will need to assess what the local law requirements will be for the Marketing Compliance Requirements.
    • Reverse Solicitation — Existing Investors. Review EU investor lists and EU contact lists to assess whether they have already been marketing to those EU persons at their initiative — i.e., whether the AIFM has an email, letter or other evidence from the EU investor to show that the marketing relationship with that EU person was as a result of a reverse solicitation.
    • Reverse Solicitation — Ongoing Marketing to Existing Investors. Consider whether materials sent to existing EU investors in the AIFM’s AIF(s) are marketing materials and whether existing EU investors have indicated in writing that they wish to receive such marketing materials.
    • Reverse Solicitation — Prospective Investors. Identify those EU prospective investors with whom the AIFM has been having initial discussions — but to whom the AIFM has not yet sent any formal offer documents/private placement memorandum or subscription documents — and determine whether the EU prospective investor has confirmed in writing to the AIFM that they would like the AIFM to send them the formal marketing materials.

    Note

    This Alert identifies action items that US and non-EU AIFMs may wish to consider in the period before the AIFM Directive is fully implemented in each EU member state. EU member states have discretion to implement the AIFM Directive under their own national regulations and there may be variances between one EU member state’s approach and that taken in another EU member state, which local counsel in the relevant member states can address.

    Authored by Neil Robson and Christopher Hilditch.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

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    Christopher Hilditch

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

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  • LSTA’s Revised Trading Documents Allow Revolver Loan Investors to Protect Their Posted Collateral — But Only If They Ask

    LSTA’s Revised Trading Documents Allow Revolver Loan Investors to Protect Their Posted Collateral — But Only If They Ask

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    LSTA’s Revised Trading Documents Allow Revolver Loan Investors to Protect Their Posted Collateral — But Only If They Ask

    July 1, 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 28, 2013, the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (“LSTA”) announced that the revised Collateral Annex for Loan Participations and revised LSTA Par and Distressed Trade Confirmations became effective. The revisions to the LSTA’s suite of documents has improved the ability of investors in revolver loan participations to protect themselves against the lender of records’ insolvency risk. Investors face this risk when they are required to post collateral with the lender of record to support their obligations to fund the borrower’s future draws on the revolving loan under the participation agreement. The revisions to the LSTA’s documents include, among several other changes: (i) a check-the-box option that allows collateral to be segregated with the seller or a third-party custodian; (ii) a revised formula to calculate the amount of collateral required; and (iii) more frequent triggers for the seller to return any excess collateral.

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  • SRZ Client Quigley Company Inc. Emerges from Heavily Litigated Chapter 11 Asbestos Reorganization

    SRZ Client Quigley Company Inc. Emerges from Heavily Litigated Chapter 11 Asbestos Reorganization

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SRZ Client Quigley Company Inc. Emerges from Heavily Litigated Chapter 11 Asbestos Reorganization

    June 28, 2013

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    United States Bankruptcy Judge Stuart M. Bernstein held, on June 26, 2013, after a contested hearing, that SRZ client Quigley Company Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer Inc., could emerge from its Chapter 11 reorganization despite a dissenting creditor class and an objecting group of asbestos personal injury claimants. The Quigley reorganization plan discharged at least $5.6 billion of current and future asbestos liability, provided Pfizer with an injunction barring further Quigley-related asbestos claims and crammed down a rejecting class of silica personal injury claimants.

    Background

    Quigley, a former manufacturer of industrial refractory products used mostly in the steel industry, had been besieged, since 1980, with massive asbestos litigation arising out of its manufacture and sale of three asbestos-containing products. When it filed its Chapter 11 petition, approximately 212,000 asbestos personal injury claims totaling $1.2 billion, were pending against it and its corporate parent, Pfizer. Uncontradicted expert testimony during the case estimated about 260,000 future asbestos claims against Quigley, extending until 2058, with “an undiscounted value” of $4.4 billion. When Quigley sought Chapter 11 relief, Pfizer was also a defendant with respect to 280,000 claims, based on the claimants’ asserted exposure to Quigley’s products. The growing number of asbestos claims forced Quigley to file a Chapter 11 petition when its remaining insurance coverage, shared with and bought by Pfizer, began to erode.

    Pfizer’s Contribution to the Plan and Other Settlements

    Pfizer contributed a total of $964 million in value to implement the Quigley reorganization plan. That contribution consisted of approximately $500 million of shared insurance assets, $260 million of cash, $126 million of secured debt forgiveness and a $44 million dollar commercial building occupied under a long-term lease generating at least $2.5 million a year through 2026. In addition to its plan contribution, Pfizer had paid another $1.25 billion to other large groups of claimants who had asserted claims against it. The details of these non-plan settlements were disclosed during the Chapter 11 case.

    Bankruptcy Litigation

    The federal courts issued no less than 18 decisions during the contentious Quigley case. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court denied Pfizer’s petition for a writ of certiorari regarding a 2012 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that the injunction obtained by Quigley for the benefit of Pfizer had certain limits. In that decision, the Court of Appeals also held that Quigley had properly obtained the injunction, reaffirming the bankruptcy court’s broad jurisdiction to protect Quigley’s critically important insurance assets.

    Other decisions by the Southern District of New York and the Bankruptcy Court during the case affirmed the validity of Quigley’s preliminary injunction staying suits against Pfizer, Quigley’s classification of its creditors, and denied an effort to have a trustee or examiner appointed to investigate Quigley’s affairs.

    Critically important to the courts, Quigley had an independent board of directors and counsel with no ties to Pfizer. The court had denied confirmation of Quigley’s earlier reorganization plan because of what it viewed as Pfizer’s improper settlements with certain claimants and inadequate contribution to the plan. After further negotiations with Quigley, the creditors’ committee and future claims representative, Pfizer increased its plan contribution by at least $750 million. Pfizer also settled with a key group of litigants and their counsel for another $820 million to cover its separate liability.

    Cramdown of Silica Claimants

    An entire class of silica personal injury claimants had voted against the Quigley plan. Because Quigley proved, without contradiction, that: (a) it had reasonably and properly placed the silica claimants in a separate class; (b) the silica claimants would receive less in a Chapter 7 liquidation than they would get under the Plan; and (c) no class of creditors or shareholders junior to the class would receive anything, the court crammed down the silica class — i.e., held that its acceptance was unnecessary.

    Objection to the Plan

    One group of asbestos claimants objected to the Quigley plan, arguing that it had been proposed in bad faith because Pfizer had settled its own liabilities with other claimants, but not with this group. The objectors also challenged Quigley’s classification of creditor claims, Pfizer’s payments to other settlers and the court’s allocation of Pfizer’s derivative liability (23 percent) for Quigley’s direct asbestos liability. After receiving undisputed evidence from Quigley and Pfizer going to the parties’ good faith, Quigley’s independence from Pfizer and the future viability of Quigley’s reorganized business, the court rendered its decision from the bench after hearing arguments. It found that: Quigley’s plan had been proposed in good faith; Quigley had properly classified the different categories of creditors; Quigley was entitled to “cram down” the class of silica claimants despite their rejection of the plan; its prior allocation of Pfizer’s derivative liability remained valid; and that Quigley’s plan was in the best interests of Quigley’s creditors.

    The Quigley team was led by business reorganization partners Michael L. Cook and Lawrence V. Gelber, and consisted of litigation partner Robert J. Ward, tax partner Kurt F. Rosell and real estate partner Robert S. Nash, supported by associates Victoria A. Lepore, Aaron B. Wernick, and Brian C. Tong. Paralegal Donna Angiulo ably managed all of the logistics for the case.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Robert J. Ward

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Enforcement Division Increases the Pace of Rule 105 Investigations

    SEC Enforcement Division Increases the Pace of Rule 105 Investigations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Enforcement Division Increases the Pace of Rule 105 Investigations

    June 28, 2013

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Enforcement Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently increased the pace of investigations of potential violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 105 makes it unlawful for any person during the “Rule 105 restricted period” to “sell short” an equity security that is being offered for cash pursuant to a registration statement in a firm-commitment, underwritten offering and purchase the offered securities. Hedge fund managers should review their compliance with the Rule.

    Background of Rule 105

    Rule 105 charges involving hedge fund managers have increased since 2007 when the Rule was amended to make it easier for the SEC to prove a violation. Prior to the amendment, Rule 105 prohibited a manager from selling short ahead of an offering and then using the shares purchased in the offering to cover the short position. The 2007 amendments made the rule simpler — now, a manager may either short within the restricted period, or participate in the offering, but may not do both.

    There are limited exceptions to Rule 105 that may apply: (1) a “bona fide purchase” exception if the manager covers the restricted period shorts no later than one business day prior to the day of pricing of the offering; and (2) a “separate accounts” exception if the manager is advising separate accounts, where one sells short and the other participates in the offering. A critical note for both exceptions, and the Rule generally, is that the requirements are technical and precise — the Rule and related guidance must be carefully analyzed to assure compliance.

    The SEC views Rule 105 as a prophylactic rule which does not require any showing that the manager intended to manipulate the price of the securities sold short, or that the short selling had that effect or even could have had that effect in the circumstances. Charges against fund managers have been brought even where there was a single offering at issue and where the number of shares traded was relatively modest.

    Enforcement’s New Approach

    The SEC’s Enforcement Division has recently sought information from a number of hedge fund managers related to potential Rule 105 violations. The staff of the Enforcement Division appears to be taking a more uniform and streamlined approach in these instances. Specifically, the request from the SEC typically focuses on a small number of offerings in which funds or accounts managed by the adviser participated, after having recently sold short. The information sought by the staff with respect to the particular trades at issue may be more detailed, and the request may be for it to be produced in a standardized chart or spreadsheet format, at least initially. Information about the personnel involved in the relevant trading, and applicable compliance policies and procedures may be requested. The staff may also in its initial request ask the manager to review its trading in all securities for a period of years for potential Rule 105 violations. Finally, the request may indicate that the manager may include a narrative description as to why charges are not appropriate or if there are mitigating circumstances.

    To be prepared for this type of letter from the SEC’s Enforcement Division, hedge fund managers should review their compliance with Rule 105 and take any appropriate steps to improve their compliance with the Rule.

    Authored by Harry S. Davis, Marc E. Elovitz, David K. Momborquette, Howard Schiffman and Peter H. White .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Howard Schiffman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: US Levies $720K Civil Penalty for Failure to Re-File for Additional Stock Acquisitions

    Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: US Levies $720K Civil Penalty for Failure to Re-File for Additional Stock Acquisitions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: US Levies $720K Civil Penalty for Failure to Re-File for Additional Stock Acquisitions

    June 25, 2013

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 20, 2013, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “Antitrust Division”) and the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC” and, together with the Antitrust Division, the “Agencies”) announced that MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. (“MacAndrews & Forbes”) agreed to the payment of a $720,000 civil penalty in order to settle charges that it violated the premerger reporting and waiting period requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the “HSR Act”). According to the complaint filed by the Antitrust Division (at the FTC’s request), MacAndrews & Forbes, a firm owned by Ronald O. Perelman, did not make the required subsequent filing under the HSR Act for acquisitions of voting securities of Scientific Games Corporation (“SG”) made in June 2012, more than five years after it had made an initial HSR Act filing to acquire voting securities of the same issuer.

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    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Update: Enforcement Program Taking Shape Under New Leadership

    SEC Update: Enforcement Program Taking Shape Under New Leadership

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Update: Enforcement Program Taking Shape Under New Leadership

    June 24, 2013

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Jo White last week announced an important change to the SEC’s policy of permitting parties to settle SEC securities claims without admitting wrongdoing. Chairman White’s announcement follows other remarks that further illuminate how Co-Directors George S. Canellos and Andrew J. Ceresney will oversee the SEC’s Enforcement Division under White’s leadership. These developments demonstrate the impact that White, Canellos and Ceresney — who worked together during White’s tenure as the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York — are having on SEC Enforcement, including adopting familiar approaches based on their experience as prosecutors.

    Revision of “No Admit, No Deny” Policy

    According to White’s public remarks, in certain cases, the SEC will require that settling parties admit wrongdoing as a condition of resolving securities-related charges. Like other civil regulatory agencies, the SEC historically has allowed parties to settle claims without admitting or denying the factual allegations in the charging documents. Departing from that practice for some cases will make the SEC’s settlement policy more consistent with the approach of U.S. Attorneys’ offices (“USAO”) in criminal plea and similar agreements.

    Most SEC settlements will not be impacted by the new policy of seeking factual admissions of wrongdoing, according to White. The SEC intends to seek admissions only in select cases — those involving significant investor harm or egregious intentional conduct — where the SEC concludes that a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing is appropriate. Whether to seek such an admission will be decided by the SEC on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the new policy will not apply to pending matters where settlement talks had begun before the policy change was announced.

    The impact of this change will depend on how frequently the SEC seeks factual admissions and the extent to which defendants resist such demands. Defendants typically are reluctant to make admissions due to potential collateral consequences. For instance, admissions may undercut the ability to defend companion private securities litigation, including shareholder class action suits. They also could serve as the basis for criminal prosecutions. White stated that when parties refuse SEC demands for admissions, the SEC is prepared to litigate when it concludes that admissions of wrongdoing are required to serve the public interest. In such cases, defendants face two unattractive options — accepting the harsh collateral consequences of admitted wrongdoing or confronting the financial and reputational risk of protracted litigation with the SEC.

    Particularly following the financial crisis, the SEC’s “no admit, no deny” settlement policy has been questioned. Among the critics are a handful of federal court judges who have hesitated before approving or have rejected high-profile SEC settlements. The most notable critic may be Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, who initially rejected, then approved one settlement and later refused to approve another in a decision that is currently under review by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In the aftermath of such criticism, the SEC modified its settlement approach in early 2012 by announcing that it would no longer allow defendants who admit wrongdoing in connection with criminal proceedings to resolve civil SEC charges for the same conduct without similar admissions.[1]

    White emphasized that the SEC’s policy change was not a criticism of the traditional “no admit, no deny” approach. Indeed, she noted that the ability to seek such settlements will remain an important aspect of the SEC’s Enforcement program. The SEC has argued that allowing it the flexibility of settling certain enforcement actions under circumstances where the defendant does not have to admit liability enables the SEC to resolve cases more quickly, preserves resources and avoids litigation risk.

    Only time will tell how frequently the SEC will insist on admissions to resolve its claims. How often it does so, and whether potential defendants refuse, could have far-reaching consequences for both the SEC and those it regulates and investigates.

    SEC Enforcement Trends

    The change in SEC settlement policy may prove to be the first of many modifications the new leadership has in store for the Enforcement Division. Earlier last week, SEC Enforcement Co-Director Canellos provided valuable insights regarding other key aspects of the SEC’s enforcement program under the new chairman, many of which are summarized below.[2]

    Structural Issues

    One of the most noticeable changes so far was White’s appointment of co-directors for the first time in the Enforcement Division’s history. Canellos explained that there has been no formal division of responsibilities or areas of focus between the co-directors — nor is such a division expected. While the most “significant” investigations might justify involvement from both co-directors, in other matters one or the other will take the lead. Canellos and Ceresney expect to work together closely and to be in constant communication with regard to enforcement matters.

    Canellos indicated his view that having a former prosecutor as SEC chairman is a “good thing” for both the Division and those the SEC regulates. In an obvious understatement, Canellos noted that White “gets” enforcement issues. According to Canellos, White is more likely than other commissioners to focus on litigation risks and nuances such as whether evidence on which an enforcement recommendation is based would be admissible in litigation.

    Enforcement Priorities

    • Asset Management. Canellos expects the Asset Management Unit, one of five specialized units created within the Enforcement Division following the financial crisis, to remain active. He predicted it will continue to spawn more than its share of Enforcement matters. He believes the unit is sized appropriately given the ascent of investment advisers and growth in assets under management.
    • Accounting Fraud. Canellos expects Enforcement to increase its focus on suspected accounting and financial fraud. He does not, however, believe that a specialized “accounting fraud” unit is necessary. Instead, he favors having accountants from Enforcement and the SEC’s Office of Chief Accountant help identify matters worthy of further investigation by Enforcement attorneys. These efforts will be aided by the (still aspirational) “accounting quality model” being developed by the SEC’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. That model will use computer software to help the SEC discern whether financial statements signal potential accounting fraud. Until the model is operational, staff will continue to look for traditional indicia of potential accounting issues, such as restatements, auditor turnover and earnings management.
    • Insider Trading. Canellos believes the “wave” of insider trading cases is not over, though he expects the number of future cases to be flat, in part because recent efforts resulted in so many enforcement actions. He mentioned investigations concerning so-called “political intelligence” firms as examples of such cases, though he noted that certain aspects of those inquiries present unique challenges to pursuing enforcement actions.

    SEC/USAO Cooperation

    Perhaps not surprisingly given that White, Canellos and Ceresney are former prosecutors, Canellos advocates continuing the SEC/USAO collaboration that has developed in recent years. He predicts the number of criminal referrals by the SEC will remain stable.

    U.S. Attorneys’ offices will, according to Canellos, continue to use wiretaps in appropriate cases. However, the evidence needed to obtain a wiretap authorization and the vast resources needed to sift through the resulting evidence necessarily limits the circumstances in which wiretaps will be used, he said.

    Canellos identified two trends he expects to continue in the criminal arena. First, U.S. Attorneys’ offices will pursue what formerly might have been considered only “marginal” criminal securities-related cases. Second, criminal prosecutors will become involved in SEC investigations at early stages (often to pre-empt later requests from other U.S. Attorneys’ offices).

    Specialized Units

    Canellos indicated that the Enforcement Division continually assesses the effectiveness and composition of its specialized units. While he does not perceive a need to create any additional units, he believes specialized units will remain an Enforcement fixture for at least two reasons. First, the complexity of certain products and industry practices requires expertise best developed through specialized units. Second, the units allow Enforcement to direct necessary attention to important programmatic areas and priorities.

    Canellos explained that he believes specialized units have resulted in numerous cases that otherwise would not have been pursued, though he acknowledges the risk that specialized units could pursue increasingly marginal cases. He said avoiding that result requires both robust supervision and empowering junior staff with the discretion to make charging decisions, again drawing on the model of U.S. Attorneys’ offices.

    Wells Process/Charging Decisions[3]

    Canellos favors more and earlier pre-Wells dialogue between Enforcement staff and defense counsel. He recognizes “obstacles” to that approach, however, including staff fears that doing so could delay investigations unnecessarily or subject staff to claims of unfairly “shifting” theories during the course of an investigation.

    Enforcement has adopted a “scoring” technique that senior management use in quarterly reviews of open investigations. Staff score investigations from 1 – 3 based on how likely they are to result in an Enforcement recommendation. As investigations age, supervisors press staff to close or conclude those that are less likely to result in Enforcement actions. Canellos cited this review process as another reason defense counsel should engage in early dialogue with Enforcement staff about the merits of investigations.

    Canellos generally supports providing defense counsel with access to the investigative record during the Wells and pre-Wells process, but he does not believe doing so should be mandatory. Instead, whether to do so should be decided case by case, consistent with the goal of ensuring that the staff understands defense counsel’s position and the SEC makes informed decisions. He encourages defense counsel to make surgical requests and to press the staff for additional information if necessary.

    Canellos emphasized that whether to recommend enforcement action should not vary depending on whether the case will be settled or litigated. In either case, the relevant question is whether the SEC “should win” based on the evidence.

    Other Predictions

    Canellos indicated his view that Enforcement and the SEC’s Office of Compliance Investigations and Examinations should increase their cooperation. While the result could be more Enforcement referrals, Canellos believes the SEC’s response to issues uncovered during exams must be “calibrated” depending on the facts — ranging from counseling, to deficiency letters, to Enforcement investigations and, finally, to criminal referrals.

    Regarding “whistleblower” awards, Canellos confirmed that a number of substantial awards are in the pipeline. Although Canellos indicated he was aware of one potential award that could approach $10 million, he believes whistleblower awards will fall short of the “avalanche” some have predicted.

    Financial-crisis-era investigations are wrapping up, according to Canellos. He noted that senior Enforcement officials are focusing attention “aggressively” on concluding pending inquiries. At this point, Canellos thinks that to justify commencing a “new” investigation of financial-crisis-era conduct would require very compelling and unique facts.

    Conclusion

    These developments confirm that the newly installed team of White, Canellos and Ceresney will not hesitate to modify approaches — including adopting policies familiar to them from their work as prosecutors — and will put their own imprimatur on the SEC’s Enforcement Division.

    Authored by Harry S. Davis , David K. Momborquette and Jeffrey F. Robertson .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Jan. 7, 2012 statement by Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami, available at: http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch010712rsk.htm.

    [2] Canellos responded to questions during a June 17, 2013 forum of the Federal Bar Association’s Securities Law Section in Washington, D.C.

    [3] During the Wells process, named after John A. Wells, the lawyer who chaired the advisory committee that made recommendations to improve the SEC’s Enforcement process, Enforcement staff provide counsel with a non-public “Wells notice” that they are considering recommending that the Commission authorize enforcement proceedings. The notice outlines the general nature of the potential violations, including the relevant statutes or regulations at issue and the contemplated relief. Prospective defendants are afforded the opportunity to provide a “Wells submission” designed to dissuade the staff from making the contemplated recommendation. If the staff pursue the enforcement recommendation, the Wells submission is provided to the Commission along with the staff’s recommendation, known as an “action memorandum.”


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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