Content Type: Article

  • The Tool & Techniques of Estate Planning for Modern Families, 2nd Edition

    ARTICLE

    The Tool & Techniques of Estate Planning for Modern Families, 2nd Edition

    2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael Rosen-Prinz was a contributor regarding digital asset issues for this text, which discusses the estate planning issues that are unique to modern families, including tax issues, premarital and relationship formalization considerations, and lifetime estate planning options.

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  • Planning for Digital Assets in California, Now With Less Uncertainty!

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    Planning for Digital Assets in California, Now With Less Uncertainty!

    2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael Rosen-Prinz wrote this bylined article describing how California has recently enacted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA), which provides guidance for California residents seeking to authorize disclosure of digital assets to fiduciaries. This article, in turn, provides guidance to California estate planning attorneys as to the new law and how they can best assist their clients with planning for digital assets.

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  • Avoiding Sticky Situations: Simple Steps for Creating a More Effective Conflicts Program

    ARTICLE

    Avoiding Sticky Situations: Simple Steps for Creating a More Effective Conflicts Program

    December 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Megan Rooney and Brad Dennis wrote this bylined article on emphasizing effective conflict plans for healthcare organization board attention. “Creating an effective conflicts program and avoiding surprise conflicts does not have to be hard,” the authors wrote. “Just a few simple steps to follow up on director disclosures and to help your board continue to think about potential conflicts throughout the year can help your healthcare organization avoid its next sticky situation.”

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    Authors

    Brad Dennis

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Proposed Changes to 409A Regulations Provide Greater Clarity and Planning Alternatives

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    Proposed Changes to 409A Regulations Provide Greater Clarity and Planning Alternatives

    Winter 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrew Liazos and Allison Wilkerson wrote this bylined article on the IRS revisions to Internal Revenue Code Section 409A. The authors wrote that these modifications and clarifications “are favorable to taxpayers and provide some planning opportunities. Plan sponsors have more flexibility to exempt arrangements from Section 409A and vary payment schedules under special circumstances.”

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    Authors

    Andrew C. Liazos

    Partner

    Boston, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Allison Wilkerson

    Partner

    Dallas

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  • IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 12

    IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 12

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 12

    December 2016

    Read time: 1 min

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    Overview
    In depth
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    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • State Tax Implications of the New Federal Partnership Audit Rules

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    State Tax Implications of the New Federal Partnership Audit Rules

    December 27, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Alysse McLoughlin and Peter L. Faber wrote this bylined article on state and local tax considerations when partnerships are created or restructured to comply with new federal partnership audit rules. “The states, for the most part, have not yet adopted rules or guidance concerning the implications of the new audit rules,” the authors wrote, but they cautioned that “any decision made at the federal level may have concomitant implications at the state level.”

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  • The Chink in the Armor of the Communications Decency Act

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    The Chink in the Armor of the Communications Decency Act

    December 26, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Banks Brown wrote this bylined article on how short-term rental companies attempt to use Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to argue that their online activities are not subject to state and local regulation. “To the contrary,” Mr. Banks wrote, “the law, as enacted, put significant burdens on internet providers.”

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  • New York Bankruptcy Court Saves Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fees

    New York Bankruptcy Court Saves Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fees

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Bankruptcy Court Saves Investment Bankers’ Transaction Fees

    December 23, 2016

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Transaction fees are part of the standard, negotiated base compensation for the investment banker,” held the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on Dec. 16, 2016. In re Relativity Fashion, LLC, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4339, *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (Wiles, B.J.). The court denied objections to the transaction fees sought by two investment bankers, P and H, ruling that the objecting parties (a fee examiner, the debtor and a secured lender) had no right under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 328(a) to challenge the transaction fees. Id. at *25. Moreover, said the court, it “had no power to give anyone else [other than the U.S. Trustee in this case] the right to assert objections based on [‘reasonableness’] standards.” Id. The sensible, sweeping opinion in Relativity Fashion is essential reading not only for investment bankers and their counsel, but also for lawyers and other business bankruptcy professionals.

    Relevance

    Code § 327(a) provides that a bankruptcy trustee or a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, “with the court’s approval, may employ one or more accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons … to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s [or debtor-in-possession’s] duties” in the case. Code § 328(a) further provides that a trustee or Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, “with the court’s approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 … on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment.” In other words, under Code § 328(a), a trustee may hire a professional on either a fixed fee or contingency fee basis.

    Trustees and Chapter 11 debtors often retain investment bankers on terms that are quite different from the hourly rate method used by accountants and attorneys. In a “structure that is common to most investment banker retentions, both within and outside bankruptcy,” reasoned the court in Relativity Fashion, investment bankers usually receive “monthly fees plus a transaction fee.” Id. at *2. Although the monthly fees are typically “paid on an ongoing basis,” as was the case here, the “transaction fee was to be paid if and when a transaction was consummated, so long as any other conditions in the agreement were met.” Id.

    Bankruptcy courts have at times in the past been hostile to the retention of investment bankers, particularly when they sought to be retained on a fixed fee basis. See, e.g., In re Wang Labs., Inc., 143 B.R. 794, 795 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (“Even if debtor could gain some potential benefit from the proposed services of [the investment banker] that are not redundant to the services of the other employed professionals, that benefit would be severely offset by the tremendous expense to the estate of hiring [the investment banker].”); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 133 B.R. 13, 25, 26, 27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“ … investment bankers want to be paid like residential real estate brokers but with none of the accountability required under the Code.”; “whenever we have dealt with investment bankers … , we have been left with the strong impression that for them the debtor is the cash cow to be milked, Chapter 11 the milking parlor, and the Judge the milking stool”; applications to retain investment bankers must describe selection process; “indemnification agreements are inappropriate,” explaining that they are inconsistent with professionalism and reflect an attempt to impose banker’s overhead expenses on debtor’s estate); In re Mortg. & Realty Trust, 123 B.R. 626, 630-31 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (same). In an auspicious ruling, however, the Third Circuit signaled a change in how courts should be reviewing the retention of financial advisers and investment bankers. United Artists Theater Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d. 217, 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2003) (Chapter 11 debtor’s retention of financial adviser under agreement with indemnification clause “reasonable and … permissible;” “market-driven” approach; indemnification “common in the marketplace;” “financial advisors are an essential part of reorganizations.”).

    When the court “pre-approves” the terms of a professional’s retention under Code § 328(a) it may not later change those terms unless it finds that the agreed-upon terms and conditions were “improvident.” In re National Gypsum Co., 123 F.3d 861, 862, (5th Cir. 1997) (bankruptcy court could only change terms and conditions of employment if they proved “to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions.”) (quoting Code § 328(a)); In re Smart World Techs., LLC, 552 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (when fee had been pre-approved under Code § 328(a), bankruptcy court erred in reducing fee because of developments that were unforeseen, because correct standard is “not capable of being anticipated”); In re Northwestern Corp., 332 B.R. 534, 537 (D. Del. 2005) (reversing bankruptcy court, fee arrangement held not “improvident” when potential duplication of services between two investment banks was “not unforeseeable” because services to be performed were clearly set forth in banks’ engagement agreements).

    Facts

    Both P and H were to be paid monthly fees on an ongoing basis. They also would receive a transaction fee “if and when a transaction was consummated, so long as any other conditions in the agreement were met.” 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4339, at *2. The fee examiner and a secured lender challenged P’s application, while the fee examiner, the secured lender and the debtor challenged H’s transaction fee.

    The objectors essentially argued that: (a) P had not satisfied “the contractual conditions to the payment of the transaction fee”; (b) the court should review the P and H applications “for reasonableness using the standards set forth in” Code § 330, not the standard under Code § 328(a); (c) the fee applications did not satisfy the criteria of Code § 330 “with respect to the proposed transaction fees”; and that (d) the court should deny the transaction fees “in their entirety.” Id. at *3-*4. Neither the U.S. Trustee nor the creditors’ committee objected to the fee requests.

    Analysis

    Significance of Code § 328(a)

    The court stressed the different standards of judicial review for professional fee applications under Code §§ 328(a) and 330. “… Section 330 calls for a review of reasonableness that, to some extent, is made after-the-fact, although the case law makes clear that the judgment is not supposed to be done completely with 20/20 hindsight.” Id. at *6. Code § 328(a), in contrast, allows the court to judge “reasonableness … in advance, and the issue is not revisited except in the very narrow circumstances permitted by the statute.” Id. Regardless of whether Code §§ 328(a) or 330 applies, however, “a professional does not earn compensation if the terms and conditions of the retention agreement do not call for it.” Id. at *5.

    Finally, explained the court, Code § 328(a) “reflects the view that professionals are entitled to know what they are likely to be paid for their work … . [T]here should be some comfort that the compensation will be paid and that a court will not simply impose a new and different deal after all the work has been done.” Id. at *7.

    Investment Banker Compensation

    Investment bankers typically receive monthly fees, but their “main compensation is through transaction fees … contingent on the consummation of a transaction … .” Id. at *8. The transaction fees “merely require that the transaction occur with no other conditions whatsoever [and are usually] independent of the amount of time it takes to complete the transaction, the involvement of other people, etc.” Id. at *8.

    Investment bankers also typically charge for their services “in this exact same way outside of bankruptcy,” and New York courts have regularly “upheld and enforced this transaction fee structure.” Id. at *9. More significant, the judicial rulings outside of bankruptcy have “rejected claims … that a banker had not played a pivotal role in a transaction, or had not identified the party with whom the final transaction actually was completed … .” Id. Despite confusion in some bankruptcy cases when objecting parties have referred to, or sought to characterize, transaction fees as “bonuses” or “success fees,” “[t]ransaction fees are part of the standard, negotiated, base compensation for the investment banker  … .” Id. at *10.

    The court quickly rejected cases relied upon by the objectors in Relativity Fashion for the proposition that transaction fees are success fees or bonuses. See, e.g., In re Northwest Airlines Corp. 400 B.R. 393 (Bnkr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (court denied request for extra compensation when retention agreement and order did not provide for payment of any such fee, but merely provided for monthly fees). In sum, reasoned the court, “[t]here is a big difference between a discretionary bonus and a percentage-based or flat fee that is the base compensation for the professional’s work.” Id. at *13.

    The court also rejected any attempt “to calculate an investment banker’s compensation based on inferred hourly rates.” Id. at *13. Not only is this “a false understanding of what the [investment banker] fees represent,” but such a “calculation would always show that the monthly fees have already covered the reasonable hourly rates” — a “false assumption that the monthly fees represent the full expected compensation for all of the work that was done.” Id. at *13-14.

    The Blackstone Protocol

    The court expressed strong skepticism about the validity of the so-called “Blackstone Protocol,” “an arrangement that started in the Southern District of New York … . It says, in effect, that parties are bound by the Section 328(a) standards, except for the United States Trustee, which has the right to object on Section 330 grounds [i.e., reasonableness].” Id. at *15. Delaware courts later accepted this practice, after a period of “heated negotiations between the United States Trustee and the bankers” because, as in New York, “some bankers did not want to fight over it, and it was hard for bankers to ask for limitations on the United States Trustee’s objection rights if other bankers in similar positions did not think those limits were needed.” Id.

    These provisions, now common in many jurisdictions, “typically bar[ ] parties other than the U.S. Trustee from” objecting to an investment banker’s fee application under Code § 328(a). In the words of the court, the practice “creates a hybrid situation in which the court must apply or may apply the Section 330 standards to an objection made by the U.S. Trustee, but otherwise must apply Section 328(a).” Id. at *17.

    The court doubted whether “Congress contemplated this kind of hybrid approach when it enacted Section 328(a).” Id., citing In re Smart World Technologies, LLC, 552 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2009). As the Second Circuit noted, “Section 328 and 330 [are] ‘mutually exclusive,’ and … a court may not conduct a Section 330 inquiry if there has been a Section 328(a) approval.” Id. at *17, citing Smart World, 552 F.3d at 233.

    Moreover, once a court has approved a banker’s retention under Code § 328(a), it may not “appoint a new party with standing to object and give that new party the right to make objections on grounds other than Section 328(a).” Id. at *18-*19. In the court’s view, the Second Circuit prohibited a court “from doing that” in Smart World. Id. at *19. “Once the arrangement is approved and becomes part of the approved terms of employment, it is locked in.” Id.

    Finally, the court expressed strong skepticism as to whether the so-called Blackstone Protocol “makes sense. Why should the United States Trustee retain a right to object after the fact on points that could have been raised and resolved at the outset? Fairness to all parties … means that issues that can be raised at the time of retention should be raised then, so the terms are resolved as far in advance as possible before the work is done.” Id. at *20.

    Disposition of P and H Applications

    No party objected to H’s application on the agreed premise that “the Section 328(a) standard applies.” Id. at *2. But the fee examiner and the secured lender argued that P “did not provide material support or services after the restructuring,” as required under P’s retention agreement, claiming that it “worked only on the sale of” particular assets of the debtor. Id. at *29. The court readily dismissed the objection, stressing that the sale “was an integral part” of the restructuring and admittedly “part of a single package with the rest of the restructuring,” confirmed by undisputed witness testimony, by filed papers, and by the parties’ representations. Id. at *29-*30. Not only was P’s work part of the entire reorganization “package,” but it also “provided material support and services in producing that package,” leading “directly to the confirmed [reorganization] plan,” Id. at *31. Merely because “other people played a part” in the plan negotiations “hardly means that [P] did not provide material support and services.” Id. at *32.

    Comment

    Relativity Fashion sheds welcome light on investment bankers’ fees in business reorganization cases. Because of its thoughtful, thorough analysis — one based on fairness — other bankruptcy courts should follow it.

    The ability of U.S. Trustees to challenge investment bankers’ fees in § 328(a) retentions should be eliminated for the reasons cited by the court. The issue was not directly before the court in Relativity Fashion, but investment bankers now have powerful ammunition to resist a U.S. Trustee’s attempt to second-guess a fixed fee or contingent fee retention under Code § 328(a). Most significant, fairness, not political expediency, should govern the professional compensation process.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • What Corporate Counsel Need to Know About the Antitrust Guidance for HR Professionals

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    What Corporate Counsel Need to Know About the Antitrust Guidance for HR Professionals

    December 22, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stephen Wu and Lauren Salins wrote this bylined article on new government antitrust guidance for human resource professionals. “The guidance emphasizes that, while HR professionals do not sell a company’s products or services, they do assist their company in ‘buying’ labor … [and] the DOJ and FTC will deem companies to be competitors in the labor market if they compete to hire or retain employees,” the authors wrote.

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    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Money Talks: Important Takeaways from the OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalties Final Rule

    Money Talks: Important Takeaways from the OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalties Final Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Money Talks: Important Takeaways from the OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalties Final Rule

    December 22, 2016

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a burst of rulemaking in December 2016, the US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, issued two new final rules containing significant changes to OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalty authorities.

    In depth

    In a burst of rulemaking in December 2016, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), issued two new final rules containing significant changes to OIG’s Civil Monetary Penalty (CMP) authorities. We covered the first rule, addressing multiple issues regarding the beneficiary inducement CMP statute as well as new anti-kickback statute safe harbors. In the second rule, OIG tackled all the other wide-ranging CMPs it can assess against health care providers, suppliers, managed care organizations and drug manufacturers. This On the Subject gives an overview of this second rule.

    Revised Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Incentivize Self-Disclosure

    OIG made substantial changes to the structure of the CMP regulations at 42 CFR Part 1003. The rule streamlined the regulation to create topic-specific subparts for different CMPs (e.g., false claims, anti-kickback and Stark Law, etc). As part of this reorganization, OIG created a global list of aggravating and mitigating factors that it considers in assessing monetary penalty amounts and exclusion “to add clarity and improve transparency in OIG’s decision-making process.” OIG is careful to say that these factors are illustrative, not comprehensive, with additional specificity contained in a subject matter subpart.

    The global factors are (1) the nature and circumstances of the violation; (2) the person’s degree of culpability; (3) the person’s or entity’s history of prior offenses; (4) other wrongful conduct; and (5) other matters, as justice may require. Key points on these factors include the following:

    • OIG emphasized that weighing these factors is done on a “case-by-case” basis, but the presence of “any single aggravating factor” may justify a penalty at or close to the maximum regardless of the presence of one or more mitigating factors.
    • On the aggravating side, OIG will consider actual knowledge as an aggravating factor where a “knows or should know” scienter standard is required to establish liability. OIG also changed the threshold for when the loss amount could be considered aggravating from “substantial” to $50,000 or more.
    • On the mitigating side, OIG sets limits on the “corrective action” factor. The rule says that “corrective action must include” use of “and fully cooperating with” OIG’s Self-Disclosure Protocol (SDP) or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ (CMS’s) Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol (SRDP). OIG states that if “the conduct involves only overpayments and no CMP liability, there is no penalty at issue to mitigate.” Here, OIG doubles-down on its “carrot and stick” approach to encourage use of the SDP or SRDP by indicating it may take a more aggressive stance when seeking penalties in an affirmative case. In the preamble, OIG confirmed that it will continue to generally apply the 1.5 multiplier on SDP submissions, even if aggravating factors are present.
    • As the last factor shows, OIG retains expansive regulatory discretion in the monetary and exclusion approach it chooses to take in an individual case.

    Alternate Methodology for Employing Excluded Persons

    OIG codified the SDP’s alternate “damages” methodology for calculating the assessment for employing or contracting with excluded persons to provide items or services that are billed to federal health care programs as part of a bundled payment. Where the item or service provided by the excluded person is separately billable (e.g., physicians billing for office visits and pharmacist filling prescriptions), the employing or contracting party will continue to be subject to assessments and penalties based on the number and value of those separately billable items and services. However, where the item or service provided by the excluded person is non-separately billable, assessments are based on the total costs to the employer or contractor of the excluded person (including salary, benefits, etc.). “Non-separately billable” items or services include nursing or clerical services associated with a physician office visits, skilled nursing facility per-diem payments or hospital prospective payments. In response to commenters’ objections, OIG moved away from the proposed rule’s per-day penalty to a penalty based on the number of items or services provided by the excluded person.

    Notably, OIG rejected commenters’ suggestions to consider the entity’s federal health care program payor mix when calculating the assessment. OIG gave a few reasons for this position, such as some difficulty in determining the payor mix for certain provider types and a desire to reserve this benefit for resolving SDP submissions and negotiating settlements in affirmative cases. Again, OIG is using the CMP regulations to incentivize self-disclosure, but also indicated that entities could seek to negotiate a payor mix discount in an affirmative case provided the entity can show a reasonable calculation method.

    New ACA Authorities

    OIG codified the changes to its CMP authorities from the Affordable Care Act (ACA) into regulations. Under the ACA, OIG may impose CMPs for the following reasons:

    • Failing to grant the OIG timely access to records in response to a reasonable request
    • Ordering and prescribing while excluded
    • Making false statements, omissions or misrepresentations in an application to participate or enroll as a provider in a federal health care program
    • Failing to report and return an overpayment
    • Making or using a false record or statement that is material to a false or fraudulent reimbursement claim

    OIG also obtained new CMP authorities against Part C and D managed care plans for enrolling individuals without their consent, transferring an enrollee to another plan without their consent or solely for the purpose of earning a commission, or failing to adhere to CMS’ applicable marketing restrictions. The managed care section of the regulations specifies which CMP authorities apply to different types of managed care organizations, reflecting the disparate statutory structure. In addition, under the ACA and these final regulations, OIG may hold managed care companies responsible not just for the actions of its employees, but also for those entities with which it contracts.

    EMTALA Becomes More Aggressive

    The new regulations also ramp up penalties under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). Based on the inflation adjustments made in September, most hospitals and “responsible physicians” are now subject to a maximum CMP of $103,139 for violating EMTALA, and penalties be assessed against on-call physicians who fail or refuse to appear within a reasonable time. The new regulations removed several mitigating factors that were favorable to hospitals, such as an individual subsequently demonstrated a clear intent to the leave or the hospital developed and implemented a corrective action plan. OIG noted that hospitals always have to develop and implement a corrective action plan as part of successfully resolving a CMS survey of an EMTALA complaint. Instead, OIG narrowed the mitigating factor to when the hospital self-reports to CMS before CMS receives a complaint from another source or otherwise learns of the incident and completes its corrective action prior to CMS initiating an investigation.

    CMP for Drug-Price Reporting

    Drug manufacturers have been subject to CMPs as part of the Medicaid Drug Rebate statute for not reporting, or late reporting, correct drug pricing and product information to CMS. This pricing information includes the average manufacturer price (AMP), average sales price (ASP), wholesale acquisition costs and best price. How precisely OIG would calculate the penalty amount has not been clear to date because there were no regulations for this CMP, until now. OIG finalized its proposed approach to calculate penalties at the National Drug Identifier (NDC) level for both the daily penalty for late reporting and the penalty for reporting false information or refusing to provide information requested by HHS. For example, OIG could seek up to $89,080 per day for each day a manufacturer is late reporting pricing data for five NCDs (based on the inflation-adjusted maximum penalty of $17,816).

    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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