Content Type: Article

  • The Tasks of a Preliminary Trustee – Case note on the Court Order of the German Federal Court of Justice

    The Tasks of a Preliminary Trustee – Case note on the Court Order of the German Federal Court of Justice

    ARTICLE

    The Tasks of a Preliminary Trustee – Case note on the Court Order of the German Federal Court of Justice

    December 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Thiemo Schäfer and Matthias Kampshoff have co-authored this bylined article in reference to the tasks of a preliminary trustee in accordance with the Court Order of the German Federal Court of Justice. The article is in Volume 23 of NZI, 2016.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Matthias Kampshoff

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • View From McDermott: Accelerating Deductions for Compensation and Benefits if Corporate Tax Rates Are Reduced

    ARTICLE

    View From McDermott: Accelerating Deductions for Compensation and Benefits if Corporate Tax Rates Are Reduced

    December 13, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stephen Pavlick wrote this bylined article discussing President-Elect Trump’s proposal to reduce the maximum corporate income tax rate from 35% to 15%. Pavlick notes, “While the effective date of any rate reduction is uncertain, it likely will not occur before 2018. Deductions claimed when tax rates are 35% are worth 20% more to the taxpayer than if the same deduction is claimed when rates are 15%.”

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  • Ninth Circuit Gives Creditors’ Committee Members Limited Litigation Protection

    Ninth Circuit Gives Creditors’ Committee Members Limited Litigation Protection

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ninth Circuit Gives Creditors’ Committee Members Limited Litigation Protection

    December 13, 2016

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Any … suit [against creditors’ committee members for their official acts] must be brought in the bankruptcy court, or in another court only with the express permission of the bankruptcy court,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 28, 2016. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016). Modifying the lower courts’ broad dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit against the chairman of the creditors’ committee (“Committee”) in the district court (“another forum”), Id. at *5, the Ninth Circuit found that: (a) the prior-leave requirement (the so-called “Barton” doctrine) protects Committee members, not just bankruptcy trustees; (b) claims against Committee members based on asserted pre-bankruptcy “tort, contract and fraud” could be brought outside the bankruptcy court without prior permission; and (c) a Committee member is not “entitle[d] … to immunity for all actions as” a member. Id. at *15. More importantly, Yellowstone did not insulate Committee members from liability. In fact, the Ninth Circuit remanded the matter to the bankruptcy court “to consider whether [the defendant Committee member] is [even] entitled to derived judicial immunity for [the plaintiff’s] post-[bankruptcy] claims.” Id. at *15.

    Relevance

    A party must obtain prior leave of the appointing court before suing a trustee in a non-appointing court for acts done in the trustee’s official capacity, held the U.S. Supreme Court in Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881). According to the Supreme Court, “before suit is brought against a receiver[,] leave of the court by which he was appointed must be obtained.” Id. at 127-128. If a plaintiff fails to obtain that permission, the unauthorized suit can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the words of the Supreme Court, the suit would be a “usurpation of the powers and duties which belonged exclusively” to the court administering the debtor’s estate. Id. at 136. Although Barton involved a state court receiver, the appellate courts have extended the rule to protect a bankruptcy trustee. E.g., In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996).

    The Barton rule does not insulate a trustee from suit for actions taken in its official capacity, but merely requires the plaintiff to obtain prior leave of the court that appointed the trustee, usually the bankruptcy court, before suing in another court. As a practical matter, bankruptcy courts typically protect their appointed officials, as Yellowstone confirms.

    “No court of appeals has held that Barton applies to suits against [Committee] members … .” Yellowstone, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *11. Nevertheless, said the Ninth Circuit, other circuits have “extended Barton to actors who aren’t bankruptcy trustees or receivers.” Id., citing In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993) (counsel for trustee entitled to Barton protection because he is the “functional equivalent of a trustee” for purposes of administering estate); Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249, 1251, 1252 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (Barton protection extended to court-authorized individual sellers of estate property, adopting “functional equivalent” test). The Ninth Circuit is the first appellate court to extend Barton protection to Committee members.

    Facts

    The original owner-developer (“B”) of the debtor established a resort in Montana for the “ultra-wealthy.” Yellowstone, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *3. Claiming to have relied on the advice of his attorney at the time (“S”), he borrowed a large sum of money but used the loan proceeds to pay off personal debts and later settled with the debtor’s shareholders for his misconduct, again purportedly on the legal advice of S. Id. B also later divorced his spouse and entered into a property settlement where he was represented by S.

    The debtor later filed a Chapter 11 petition and S was appointed by the U.S. Trustee to serve as chairman of the Committee. At the time, S was B’s “former counsel.” Id. Nevertheless, B “suspected that [S] used confidential information to [B’s] detriment in the bankruptcy [case],” and sued S in the district court. Id. at *4. After further procedural litigation setbacks, B eventually “asked the bankruptcy court for permission to bring his claims [against S] in district court,” explaining that “a number of his claims against [S] were based on pre-bankruptcy conduct … so they didn’t relate to [S’s] actions on the [Committee].” The bankruptcy court refused to separate B’s pre-bankruptcy claims from S’s actions as a member of the Committee, however, denying B permission to sue in the district court and dismissing B’s “claims on the merits.” The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court on appeal. Id. at *5-*6.

    Ninth Circuit Analysis

    The court rejected B’s attempt to distinguish Barton and its progeny. First, as a member of the Committee, S was authorized to “maximize recovery for the creditors by increasing the size of the [debtor’s] estate … . Because creditors have interests that are closely aligned with those of the bankruptcy trustee, there’s good reason to treat the two the same for purposes of the Barton doctrine.” Id. at *8. In addition, reasoned the court, creditors, as Committee members, are required by the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) to “investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor’s business and the desirability of the continuance of such business.” Id., quoting Code §1103(c)(2). They not only “participate in the formulation of a [reorganization] plan,” but also may “examine the debtor.” Id., citing Code §§1103(c)(3) and 343. Litigation outside the bankruptcy court, reasoned the Ninth Circuit, “could seriously interfere with already complicated bankruptcy proceedings.” Id. The mere “fear that such a lawsuit could be filed” and that Committee members would be forced to litigate “in a court unfamiliar with bankruptcy proceedings” might cause these individuals “to be timid in discharging their duties.” Id. Therefore, found the Ninth Circuit, “Barton applies to [Committee] members like [S] who are sued for acts performed in their official capacities,” meaning that all such litigation “must be brought in the bankruptcy court” in the first instance. Id. at *9. But if a plaintiff wishes to sue in another court, it must obtain “the express permission of the bankruptcy court.” Id.

    Pre-Bankruptcy Claims

    The Ninth Circuit also reversed the bankruptcy court’s broad dismissal of B’s claims based on S’s pre-bankruptcy representation. According to B, S “gave dubious legal advice [prior to bankruptcy] about how [B] could use funds from [a lender’s] loan,” resulting in B’s becoming “the target of a shareholder lawsuit.” Id. B also challenged S’s inadequate representation “during the shareholder litigation and [B’s] divorce by overlooking key defenses and [by] drafting” agreements that were later held unenforceable. Id.

    The Ninth Circuit stressed that B’s “pre-petition claims have nothing to do with [S’s] position on the [Committee].” Id. at *10. Because B had “clearly separated his pre-petition claims from the post-petition claims [implicating S’s] activities on the [Committee],” B “didn’t need permission from the bankruptcy court before bringing his pre-petition claims in district court,” contrary to what the lower courts held. Id. at *10.

    Post-Bankruptcy Claims

    The Ninth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court’s application of the Barton doctrine to B’s post-bankruptcy claims because he had sought “a personal judgment against [S].” Id. at *11. B had attacked S’s “acts done … within [S’s] authority as an officer of the court.” Id. at *10. According to the Ninth Circuit, bankruptcy courts “have applied a five-factor test to decide whether to grant leave to sue in another forum pursuant to Barton, or to retain jurisdiction over the claims in the bankruptcy court.” Id. at *11. Among the criteria that bankruptcy courts have considered are: whether the allegations relate to the carrying on of the debtor’s business; the actions of the officer in administering the estate; whether the officer is entitled to quasi-judicial or “derived judicial immunity”; and whether the plaintiff was seeking to hold the officer personally liable for, among other things, “either negligent or willful” breach of fiduciary duty. Id.

    The Bankruptcy Court’s Power to Hear the Dispute

    The Ninth Circuit quickly rejected B’s challenge to the bankruptcy court’s power to decide his claims against S. Although B never consented to having his tort and contract claims heard by the bankruptcy court, his “suit against a bankruptcy court officer for actions undertaken in his official capacity necessarily ‘stems from the bankruptcy itself.’” Id. at *14, quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 499 (2011). Thus, the bankruptcy court had the requisite power to hear the post-bankruptcy claims.

    But the Ninth Circuit remanded to the bankruptcy court the issue of whether S had “derivative judicial immunity for actions taken as [Committee] Chair … .” Id. at *14. S did not have “immunity for all actions as Chair.” Id. (emphasis in original). To have such immunity, S “must have acted within the scope of his authority and ‘candidly disclosed [his] proposed acts to the bankruptcy court’” with notice to the debtor and with bankruptcy court approval. Id., citing In re Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 742 (9th Cir. 2009). If S did lack immunity, B would be allowed to conduct “discovery on his claims.” Id.

    Comments

    1. The dispute in Yellowstone is, according to the Ninth Circuit, “but the latest chapter in the long-running saga of the Yellowstone … bankruptcy litigation.” Id. at *3, citing Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 742 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (affirmed denial of B’s motion to recuse bankruptcy judge; noted B’s “scorched earth litigation tactics”; B’s “claims are a transparent attempt to wriggle out of an unfavorable decision by smearing the reputation of the judge who made it.”); In re BLX Grp., Inc., 419 B.R. 457 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009). Because of this negative litigation history, B undoubtedly wanted to litigate outside the bankruptcy court.
    2. The result in Yellowstone is undoubtedly correct. One rationale for the Barton doctrine supports the result here: The “trustee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court that appoints him,” which “has a strong interest in protecting him from unjustified personal liability for acts taken within the scope of his official duties.” In re Lehal Realty Assocs., 101 F.3d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1996); 1 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 10.01[1][a], at 10-4 (16th ed. 2016). As one bankruptcy court put it, the leave requirement “enables the bankruptcy court to maintain control over the estate and furthers the goal of centralizing all creditors’ claims so they can be efficiently administered.” In re Ridley Owens, Inc., 391 B.R. 867, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2008). Courts have cited the need to obtain capable court officers and to ensure the cost-effective administration of estates. A further purpose of the Barton rule is “to prevent a party from obtaining ‘some advantage over the other claimants upon the assets’ in the trustee’s hands.” Ridley, 391 B.R. 867, 871, quoting Muratore v. Darr, 375 F. 3d 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2004). “If dissatisfied parties in bankruptcy [cases] can freely sue the trustee in another court for discretionary decisions made while administering the estate, ‘that court would have the practical power to turn bankruptcy losers into bankruptcy winners and vice versa.’” Ridley, 391 B.R., 871, quoting In re Linton, 136 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 1998). According to the Seventh Circuit, the Barton rule “enables bankruptcy judges to monitor the work of the trustees more effectively. It does this by compelling suits growing out of that work to be as it were pre-filed before the bankruptcy judge that made the appointment; this helps the judge decide whether to approve this trustee in a subsequent case.” Linton, 136 F.3d 544–545.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Market-Based Sourcing Applied to Service Fees in New Jersey

    ARTICLE

    Market-Based Sourcing Applied to Service Fees in New Jersey

    December 12, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Alysse McLoughlin and Kathleen M. Quinn wrote this bylined article discussing the New Jersey Tax Court’s Bank of America decision. “Even though the Legislature has not adopted market-based sourcing, this decision improperly opens the door for the [Division of Taxation] to employ market-based sourcing principles to source all types of receipts from services to New Jersey, even when those services are performed outside the state,” the authors wrote.

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  • 21st Century Cures: Health Information Technology and Digital Health Tool Provisions in Title IV

    21st Century Cures: Health Information Technology and Digital Health Tool Provisions in Title IV

    CLIENT ALERT / INTEROPERABILITY

    21st Century Cures: Health Information Technology and Digital Health Tool Provisions in Title IV

    December 12, 2016

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The 21st Century Cures Act encourages biomedical research investment and facilitates innovation review and approval processes, but also serves as a vehicle for a wide variety of other health-related measures, including provisions relating to health information technology (HIT) and related digital health initiatives. President Barack Obama has expressed support for the Cures legislation and is expected to sign the bill this month. This On the Subject summarizes the HIT and digital health tool provisions in title IV of the new legislation. Our continuing coverage of the 21st Century Cares Act addresses additional titles and provisions.

    In depth

    On December 7, 2016, the US Congress approved the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures legislation), which is intended to accelerate the “discovery, development and delivery” of medical therapies by encouraging public and private biomedical research investment, facilitating innovation review and approval processes, and continuing to invest and modernize the delivery of health care. The massive bill, however, also served as a vehicle for a variety of other health-related measures, including provisions relating to health information technology (HIT) and related digital health initiatives. President Barack Obama has expressed support for the Cures legislation and is expected to sign the bill this month.

    This On the Subject summarizes the HIT provisions in title IV of the new legislation. Other titles and provisions will be examined through other On the Subject articles.

    Overview of the Health Information Technology Provisions in the Cures Legislation

    The HIT provisions of the Cures legislation in general seek to

    • Reduce administrative and regulatory burdens associated with providers’ use of electronic health records (EHRs)
    • Advance interoperability
    • Promote standards for HIT
    • Curb information blocking
    • Improve patient care and access to health information in EHRs

    Why These Provisions Matter

    As public and private payers increasingly move from fee-for-service payments to value-based payment models, with a focus on maximizing health outcomes, population health improvement, and patient engagement, HIT—including EHRs and digital health tools—will be increasingly relied upon to collect clinical data, measure quality and cost effectiveness; assure continuity of care between patients and providers in different locations; and develop evidence-based clinical care guidelines. Further, newly implemented government programs like the Quality Payment Program will increasingly require clinicians and hospitals to use certified EHR technology (CEHRT) that meets certification guidelines specified by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The continued evolution of these certification guidelines will also influence the development of digital health tools that are designed to interface or otherwise interact with CEHRT and assist providers to succeed under value-based payment models.

    Congressman Tom Price (R-GA), a physician and a strong advocate for reducing burdens associated with the use of EHRs by providers, has been nominated to serve as HHS secretary in the administration of President-elect Donald Trump. Should Congressman Price be confirmed by the Senate, industry can likely expect HHS to use the new authority provided to it under the Cures legislation to reduce requirements of the Meaningful Use and Advancing Care Information programs, electronic clinical quality measure reporting requirements and other federal requirements relating to HIT that are perceived to make providers less efficient without improving quality or reducing costs. The new HHS secretary, however, will face competing pressures to leverage the expansion of HIT adoption and quality measure reporting to incentivize high-quality care at lower Medicare program costs.

    What Is Required by These Cures Legislation Provisions

    Reduction of Burdens ‒ In response to clinician and hospital concerns about the regulatory and administrative burdens associated with EHR technology

    • The HHS secretary is required within one year of enactment to develop with public comment from providers, suppliers, payers, technology developers and others a strategy and recommendations to reduce regulatory or administrative burdens related to the use of EHRs; this strategy must prioritize the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs, HIT certification, the Merit-based Incentive Payment System, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, Alternative Payment Models, and other value-based payment programs that the HHS secretary determines are appropriate;
    • Physicians may delegate EHR documentation requirements to unlicensed assistants, or “scribes” (to the extent permitted by state law), provided the physician signs and verifies the documentation;
    • The HHS secretary must encourage, keep or recognize voluntary certification of HIT for use in sites of services and medical specialties for which no certified technology is currently available, with the goal of making EHR certification more relevant and useful for those who use such EHRs.
    • The HHS secretary must report to the new HIT Advisory Committee statistics on attestation of Meaningful Use under the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs to assist in informing standards adoption and related practices. The statistics must include, to the extent practicable, the number of providers who did not meet the minimum criteria necessary to attest, and must be made publically available on the HHS website;
    • Authorizes $15 million to award grants, contracts or agreements to independent entities on a competitive basis to develop a required CEHRT reporting system to address provider concerns that CEHRT technology does not always work as intended. As a condition of certification and attestation, CEHRT would be required to report measures developed by the independent entity on attributes that include
      • Security
      • User-centered design
      • Interoperability
      • Testing in real-world conditions

    This provision aims to create an unbiased reporting system on EHR product usability, interoperability and security to assist providers in choosing product. This reporting system replaces a proposed “Star Rating” plan for EHR technology found in an earlier version of the legislation.

    Advancement of Interoperability ‒ In response to lawmakers’ and stakeholders’ concerns that while the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) increased the adoption by clinicians and hospitals of electronic health records, it did not sufficiently move the national needle on interoperability, the Cures legislation seeks to advance interoperability through

    • Creating a definition for “interoperability” as HIT that
      • Enables the secure exchange of electronic health information with, and use of electronic health information from, other HIT without special effort on the part of the user
      • Allows for complete access, exchange and use of all electronically accessible health information for authorized use under applicable state or federal law
      • Does not constitute information blocking as defined in the Cures legislation
    • Replacing the HIT Policy and Standards Committees with a new HIT Advisory Committee. This new committee will consist of at least 25 members, eight of whom shall be appointed by Congress, three appointed by the HHS secretary and the remainder appointed by the comptroller general of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO). Specific health sectors must be represented on the committee. This new federal advisory committee will address, in general, issues related to interoperability and privacy and security of health information and will also engage stakeholders to identify priorities for standards adoption. The Cures legislation provides additional direction on priority target areas on which the committee shall make recommendations. These directives are highly similar to those provided to the predecessor HIT Policy and Standards Committee in HITECH. This reiteration of areas for consideration likely signals that lawmakers believe that many of the objectives set forth in HITECH have not yet been fully achieved.One new priority area is patient matching, which relates to the unfulfilled directive to further interoperability between EHR systems. Specifically, the Cures legislation requires the new HIT Advisory Committee to make recommendations for “technology that provides accurate patient information for the correct patient, including exchanging such information, and avoids the duplication of patient records.” This directive and the call for a GAO study on patient matching indicates that policy makers recognize the importance of accurately identifying patients for electronic exchange of health information among providers in different organization and locations as well as for patient safety.
    • Tasking ONC to create a process by which the public could submit complaints that HIT products or developers are not interoperable or engage in information blocking.
    • Directing ONC to, within six months of enactment, convene stakeholders to develop or support (within 12 months of convening) a trusted exchange framework for trust policies and practices and for a common agreement for exchange between health information networks. ONC and the National Institute of Standards and Technology are to provide technical assistance on developing this trusted exchange framework and common agreement. A process will be established through rulemaking by which health information networks may voluntarily adopt the framework and common agreement. Federal agencies may by contracting or entering into agreements with health information exchange networks that require such networks to adopt the trusted exchange framework and common agreement.

    Promotion of Standards – Lawmakers have increasingly recognized that stronger leadership is needed to ensure the consistent implementation and use of common standards. Accordingly, the Cures legislation requires the ONC to, not later than six months after the date on which the HIT Advisory Committee first meets, convene the HIT Advisory Committee to

    • Enhance the use of common standards with deference given to standards published by private standards development organizations and voluntary consensus-based standards bodies.
    • Identify priority use cases for HIT, focusing on use cases relating to
      • The implementation of Medicare’s EHR Incentive Program, the Merit-based Incentive Payment System, Alternative Payment Models, the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program and any other value-based payment program determined appropriate by the HHS secretary
      • Quality of patient care
      • Public health
      • Clinical research
      • Privacy and security of electronic health information
      • Innovation in the field of HIT
      • Patient safety
      • Usability of health information technology
      • Individuals’ access to electronic health information
    • Identify existing standards and implementation specifications that support such use cases.
    • Publish a report summarizing the findings of the analysis and make appropriate recommendations.
    • Evaluate the need for a core set of common data elements and associate value sets to enhance the ability of CEHRT to capture, use and exchange structured electronic health information.

    Starting five years after the enactment of the Cures legislation, and every three years thereafter, the ONC must convene stakeholders to review the existing set of adopted standards and implementation specifications and make recommendations for maintaining or phasing out such standards and implementation specifications.

    Combating Information Blocking ‒ The Cures legislation builds on the April 2015 ONC Report to Congress on Health Information Blocking and the voluntary ONC interoperability pledges signed earlier this year by companies that provide at least 90 percent of EHRs used by hospitals, and takes even stronger steps to combat information blocking by

    • Defining “information blocking” as a practice, except as required by law or allowed by the HHS secretary pursuant to rulemaking, that
      • Is likely to interfere with, prevent or materially discourage access, exchange or use of electronic health information
      • If conducted by an HIT developer, exchange or network, such entity knows or should know that such practice is likely to interfere with, prevent or materially discourage the access, exchange or use of electronic health information
      • If conducted by a health care provider, such provider knows that such practice is unreasonable and is likely to interfere with, prevent or materially discourage access, exchange or use of electronic health information
    • Establishing that information blocking practices may include
      • Practices that restrict authorized access, exchange or use of such information for treatment and other permitted purposes under such applicable law, including transitions between certified HIT systems
      • Implementing HIT in nonstandard ways that are likely to substantially increase the complexity or burden of accessing, exchanging or using electronic health information
      • Implementing HIT in ways that are likely to
        • Restrict access, exchange or use of electronic health information with respect to exporting complete information sets or in transitioning between HIT systems
        • Lead to fraud, waste or abuse, or impede innovations and advancements in health information access, exchange and use, including care delivery enabled by HIT
    • Establishing new civil monetary penalties of up to $1 million per information blocking violation, including false attestations, that would be applicable to HIT developers, health information exchanges and networks. In contrast, provider penalties will be determined through notice and comment rulemaking. Importantly, for enforcement purposes, information blocking does not include any practice or conduct occurring prior to the date that is 30 days after enactment

    Improving Patient Care and Improving Patient Access to Their Health Information in EHRs

    • Requires the GAO to conduct two studies
      • A study on patient matching within two years of enactment. In calling for this study, lawmakers recognize that, with the increasing use of EHRs and the push toward interoperability, identifying accurately a single individual represented in multiple databases of different provider, payer and clearinghouse organizations is increasingly important for facilitating health information exchange and ensuring patient safety
      • A study on patient access to their own health information, including barriers to patient access
    • Enables developers of HIT to participate in discussions with patient safety organizations without fear of liability risk in order to help improve the safety of HIT products for patients. Within four years after the date of enactment, the HHS secretary must submit to Congress a report concerning the best practices and current trends voluntarily provided, without identifying individual providers or developers
    • Requires CEHRT to be capable of transmitting data to, and receiving data from clinician-led clinical data registries

    Action Steps for Providers and Developers of HIT and Digital Tools

    Providers and Developers of HIT and Digital Tools Should

    • Review the definition of information blocking and take measures necessary to avoid engaging in practices that may constitute information blocking as defined in the new statute.
    • Review applicable state laws that permit physician delegation to scribes to determine if the new federal flexibility applies.
    • Assess potential interest in seeking representation on the new HIT Advisory Committee, either directly or through an association or other group (note that it is unclear how quickly after enactment ONC will form the HIT Advisory Committee, as a timeline for the transition from the HIT Policy Committee and the HIT Standards Committee to the new HIT Advisory Committee is not specified).
    • Assess their implementation of HIT standards to determine the extent to which different standards and inconsistent implementation of the same standards may be prevalent.
    • Be aware that changes to existing government requirements relating to EHRs are likely forthcoming.

    Providers Should

    • Assess their unique regulatory environment to provide input on the forthcoming HHS efforts to reduce regulatory burdens.
    • Determine whether their sites of service or specialties would benefit from CEHRT certified to meet their sites’ or specialties’ unique needs.

    Developers of HIT and Digital Tools Should

    • Consider participating in stakeholder outreach efforts to advise ONC on
      • The establishment of a trusted exchange framework and common agreement
      • Criteria and measures for the new CEHRT reporting system
      • The HIT Advisory Committee’s review of the existing set of adopted standards and implementation specifications every three years
    • Adapt HIT development and testing strategies based on the criteria and measures established by the independent entity selected by ONC.
    • Consider opportunities to partner with clinician-led organizations or professional societies to develop clinician-led clinical data registries.
    • Keep abreast of new HIT requirements to inform the development of digital tools.
    • Evaluate how best to work with patient safety organizations to promote shared learning to improve HIT safety now that privilege and confidentiality protection has been extended to HIT developers.

     

    Authors

    Jennifer S. Geetter

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

    Karen S. Sealander

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Salman Spawns No Sweeping Change in Insider Trading Law

    Salman Spawns No Sweeping Change in Insider Trading Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Salman Spawns No Sweeping Change in Insider Trading Law

    December 12, 2016

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 6, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld the insider trading conviction of Bassam Salman, who had received material, nonpublic information from a friend, who, in turn, had been tipped by a family member.[1] The decision, the Supreme Court’s first foray into the law of insider trading in nearly two decades, was eagerly awaited by many who anticipated that the Supreme Court could seize the opportunity to overhaul the underpinnings of tipper-tippee liability under the federal securities laws.

    Instead, Salman ended not with a bang but with a whimper. In a relatively short, narrowly focused opinion, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the so-called “personal benefit” test articulated in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, the Supreme Court concluded that a person who tips material, nonpublic information to others must receive a personal benefit from the disclosure for insider trading liability to attach. In Salman, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had “properly applied Dirks” when it concluded that a “tipper benefits personally by making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”[2]

    In so ruling, the Supreme Court quashed the hopes of those who read the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), to mean that, to prove an illicit tip, the government must always show that the tipper received a pecuniary or other tangible benefit. Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Salman is important, particularly in the context of tips to family and friends, it is also important to recognize that Salman does not cast doubt on the Second Circuit’s reversal of the two hedge fund traders’ convictions in Newman, which rested largely on grounds not addressed in the Supreme Court’s opinion. Below we summarize what Salman did and did not do.

    What Salman Did

    The tipper-tippee chain in Salman involved three individuals linked by bonds of blood or marriage. The tipper, Maher Kara, shared confidential information about upcoming mergers and acquisitions with his older brother, Mounir (“Michael”) Kara. The brothers were extremely close siblings, and Maher testified that he tipped his older brother to “help him and to fulfill whatever needs he had.”[3] Maher did not receive a pecuniary or tangible benefit from his brother in exchange for the information. Ultimately, Michael began sharing the confidential information that he was receiving from Maher with Salman, who was the brother of Maher’s then-girlfriend (and later Maher’s wife). Salman knew that the information was coming from Maher, and also was aware of the “brothers’ close fraternal relationship.”[4]

    The chief issue that the Ninth Circuit faced was whether Maher received a personal benefit when he disclosed the information to his brother. In other words, can evidence of a “friendship or familial relationship between tipper and tippee,” in the absence of a pecuniary or tangible benefit, be sufficient to “demonstrate that the tipper received a benefit”?[5]

    In an opinion that would later parallel the Supreme Court’s decision, the Ninth Circuit decided that “Dirks governs this case.”[6] The Ninth Circuit declined to read Newman broadly as standing for the proposition that the personal benefit test requires a pecuniary exchange even when the tip is between people who share a friendship or familial relationship, as doing so would have required the court “to depart from the clear holding of Dirks.”[7] In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court agreed that Dirks was controlling. Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for the Court stated that the “narrow issue” presented by Salman’s conviction was “easily” resolved by the “commonsense point we made in Dirks”; the personal benefit derived by a tipper in Salman’s position is akin to a tipper “trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the trading relative.”[8] The Court went on to explain that “[t]o the extent the Second Circuit [in Newman] held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”[9] By reaffirming its decision in Dirks, in essence, Salman restores the status quo that has long existed but was briefly thrown into question by Newman.

    In one respect, Salman could be read to cabin potential insider trading liability. In its decision, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that the tip was intended as a gift — that Maher “disclos[ed] confidential information as a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it.”[10] Prior case law, including the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), had rejected a requirement that the tipper have knowledge of the tippee’s intent to trade on the tip. Libera reasoned that the tipper’s knowledge that he or she was breaching a duty to the owner of the confidential information “suffices to establish the tipper’s expectation that the breach will lead to some kind of a misuse of the information.”[11] Salman appears to call into doubt the validity of that reasoning and may therefore stand as a barrier to prosecution of tippers who disclose inside information with no expectation that the recipient will trade on the information.

    What Salman Did Not Do

    Congress has never enacted a statute of general application specifically prohibiting insider trading (although there were calls in Congress to do precisely that following the Second Circuit’s Newman decision). Rather, the prohibition is based upon judicial interpretation of the anti-fraud provisions contained in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. The defendant in Salman, joined by several amici curiae, mounted a broad-brush attack on the fairness of subjecting participants in the securities markets to criminal prosecution under federal law based on these judge-made, and frequently amorphous, standards. But, that argument did not catch fire with the Justices. “Dirks created a simple and clear ‘guiding principle’ for determining tippee liability,” the Supreme Court found, “and Salman has not demonstrated that either §10(b) itself or the Dirks gift-giving standard ‘leav[e] great uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime’ or are plagued by ‘hopeless indeterminancy.’”[12] For now, the Court seems content to allow insider trading law to continue to develop in a case-by-case manner, with results varying depending on the vicissitudes of particular fact patterns, rather than to lay down clear categorical rules, or to invite Congress to do so.

    In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision leaves for another day what “personal benefit” is required for tipper-tippee liability outside the factual scenario presented by Salman. The Supreme Court did not address the government’s argument that a “gift of confidential information to anyone,” not just a family member or friend, should be sufficient to prove insider trading.[13] Accordingly, a gift made to a complete stranger, a mere acquaintance, or a colleague may require a finding of “something of value” to satisfy the personal benefit element, as under Salman a jury can only infer a personal benefit where the tipper receives “something of value in exchange for the tip or makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”[14] Indeed, it is not clear that Salman abrogates Newman’s conclusion that the government’s evidence under the facts of that case was “simply too thin to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received any personal benefit in exchange for their tips.”[15] Put differently, Newman’s holding that the government may not “prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature,” may well remain good law, especially in the Second Circuit.[16]

    Further, perhaps the most consequential holding of Newman — that a remote tippee must know that the tipper received a personal benefit in exchange for the tip — remains unchanged.[17] This defense is useful for remote tippees, who, removed at least one level from the initial tip, often do not know or have reason to know whether or not the tipper received some tangible benefit for the disclosure or the relationship between the tipper and initial tippee. The Supreme Court made it clear that “[t]his case does not implicate” that holding of Newman.[18] That defense, however, as Newman itself makes clear, will not be available when tippees “consciously avoid[] learning” of the existence of a personal benefit, as the law treats such conscious avoidance as the legal equivalent of actual knowledge.[19]

    In fact, Salman only explicitly targeted one excerpt of Newman: “[t]o the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends,” that requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.[20] This result should not have been surprising, as that portion of Newman had already been questioned by district courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere as being either potentially inconsistent with Dirks or overbroad.[21]

    Conclusion

    Ultimately, Salman is a narrow holding that does not address tipper-tippee liability outside the scope of trading relatives and friends. For better or for worse, insider trading actions will remain steeped in fact-specific inquiries. For traders who find themselves at the end of an informational chain — i.e., as a potential remote tippee — perhaps the key takeaway from Salman is that being unaware of any pecuniary benefit between the original tipper and tippee is not a defense if there is enough to place the remote tippee on notice that the original tipper and tippee were relatives or close friends.

    Moreover, whatever impact Salman may have on the ability of civil and criminal authorities to regulate and prosecute insider trading cases, the decision does not alter the types of policies and procedures that an investment adviser should implement to prevent the misuse of confidential information. Investment advisers should remain vigilant in ensuring that their compliance programs are adequate in structure and adhered to in practice.

    Authored by Eric A. Bensky, Barry A. Bohrer, Charles J. Clark, Harry S. Davis, Marc E. Elovitz, Alan R. Glickman, Douglas I. Koff, David K. Momborquette, Martin L. Perschetz, Howard Schiffman, Gary Stein, Craig S. Warkol, Peter H. White, Jeffrey F. Robertson and Mark L. Garibyan.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Salman v. United States, No. 15-628, 580 U.S. __ (2016).

    [2] Id. at 2, 5.

    [3] Id. at 4.

    [4] United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015).

    [5] Id. at 1093.

    [6] Id. The opinion was written by Judge Jed Rakoff, a senior judge from the Southern District of New York who sat on the Ninth Circuit by designation for the case. Judge Rakoff had previously expressed concern about Newman’s potential inconsistency with Dirks. See, e.g., SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

    [7] Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093.

    [8] Salman, slip op. at 8, 11.

    [9] Id. at 10.

    [10] Id. (emphasis added).

    [11] 989 F.2d at 600.

    [12] Salman, slip op. at 11.

    [13] Id. at 7.

    [14] Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

    [15] United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 451-52 (2d Cir. 2014).

    [16] Id. at 452 (emphasis added).

    [17] Id. at 447.

    [18] Salman, slip op. at 5, n.1.

    [19] 773 F.3d at 453.

    [20] Salman, slip op. at 10.

    [21] See, e.g., Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 563 (“Whether [Newman’s pecuniary benefit standard] is the required reading of Dirks may not be obvious, and it may not be so easy for a lower court, which is bound to follow both decisions, to reconcile the two.”); SEC v. Megalli, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Newman recognizes and appears to preserve Second Circuit precedents acknowledging that not all benefits must be immediately pecuniary … Newman has made waves, but the Court is not convinced it is a total sea change.”); United States v. Riley, 90 F. Supp. 3d 176, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“While a court could rule that merely maintaining or furthering a friendship is not a sufficient personal benefit, it is not ‘plain’ that the Second Circuit has done so already.”); United States v. Gupta, 111 F. Supp. 3d 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“While Newman arguably narrowed the range of evidence that would support an inference of ‘benefit,’ it did not purport to overrule any binding precedent, something, indeed, that its panel lacked authority to do.”)


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Douglas I. Koff

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Howard Schiffman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • SALT Implications of Final Section 385 Debt-Equity Regulations

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    SALT Implications of Final Section 385 Debt-Equity Regulations

    December 9, 2016

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    Peter Faber wrote this bylined article discussing the final Treasury regulations under Internal Revenue Code section 385. “The final regulations significantly narrow the scope of the proposed regulations in many respects,” Mr. Faber wrote. “Still, they are sweeping and are likely to have many unintended consequences, particularly in the SALT area.”

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  • Remembering John Glenn, Lawmaker

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    Remembering John Glenn, Lawmaker

    December 9, 2016

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    Stephen Ryan wrote this bylined article about his work as campaign staffer and committee legal counsel with former astronaut and US Senator John Glenn, who died December 8. “Sen. Glenn always acted with integrity: in his marriage to his sweetheart, in his devotion to his country, in his work with his colleagues. He was always a gentleman in the best sense,” Mr. Ryan wrote.

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  • Affordable Care Act Repeal and Impact on False Claims Act Liability and Defenses

    Affordable Care Act Repeal and Impact on False Claims Act Liability and Defenses

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    Affordable Care Act Repeal and Impact on False Claims Act Liability and Defenses

    December 9, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Rebecca Martin and Tony Maida wrote this bylined article on the possible effect of Affordable Care Act repeal on False Claims Act prosecutions. The ACA “punched holes in common defense strategies for fending off FCA actions,” the authors wrote, adding that whether ACA repeal “would be a broad roll-back or a more surgical endeavor, it is clear that repealing the FCA-related portions of the law would bring some breathing room to the health care industry.”

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    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Year-End FATCA Action Items for Investment Funds That Are Sponsored Entities or Have Investors That Are Sponsored Entities

    Year-End FATCA Action Items for Investment Funds That Are Sponsored Entities or Have Investors That Are Sponsored Entities

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Year-End FATCA Action Items for Investment Funds That Are Sponsored Entities or Have Investors That Are Sponsored Entities

    December 9, 2016

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In order to comply with the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”), certain investment managers chose to sponsor their non-U.S. investment funds, whereby the investment manager (or an affiliate) agreed to perform all FATCA due diligence, withholding, reporting and other requirements on behalf of its sponsored funds.[1] To date, sponsored funds were permitted to rely on the registration of their sponsor and to utilize the Global Intermediary Identification Number (“GIIN”) of their sponsor. Going forward, investment managers acting as “sponsoring entities” will have to register certain of their sponsored entities with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and receive a separate GIIN for each sponsored entity.

    Sponsored entities resident in jurisdictions that have entered into a Model 1 intergovernmental agreement (“IGA”) with the United States (e.g., the Cayman Islands) are required to obtain a GIIN by year-end if they have (or have had) reportable investors.[2] Sponsored entities in these jurisdictions that do not currently have (and have not had) reportable investors do not need to obtain a GIIN by the end of the year but will need to obtain a GIIN within 90 days of admitting or otherwise determining that they have a reportable investor.

    A sponsored entity that does not benefit from a Model 1 IGA (i.e., a sponsored entity that either benefits from a Model 2 IGA or does not benefit from any IGA) will have to obtain a GIIN by year-end even if it does not have (and has not had) reportable investors.

    Each sponsored entity that requires a GIIN should, upon obtaining a GIIN, send updated IRS Forms W-8 and, as applicable, self-certification forms that include its GIIN to its banks, prime brokers and counterparties in order to avoid unnecessary FATCA withholding.

    All Investment Funds Should Obtain Updated FATCA Certifications From Investors That Are Sponsored Entities

    All investment funds should speak with their internal and external FATCA service providers to determine if any investor is a sponsored entity. Investment funds with investors that are sponsored entities should reach out to each such investor for an updated certification that includes the investor’s GIIN or otherwise obtain comfort that such investor does not require a GIIN.[3]

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Shlomo C. Twerski, Philippe Benedict, David S. Griffel, Christine Harlow or David S. Wermuth.


    [1] The default mechanism for a non-U.S. investment fund to comply with FATCA, and the route chosen by most non-U.S. investment funds, is to register directly with the IRS as a participating FFI, Reporting Model 1 FFI or Reporting Model 2 FFI (as applicable), to obtain its own GIIN and to undertake its annual reporting obligations on its own. Some investment managers chose to sponsor their investment funds, and thereby centralize FATCA compliance for each such investment fund in one “sponsor.” Other than the centralization achieved by sponsorship, there is generally no substantive difference in compliance obligations between sponsored investment funds and those investment funds that registered directly with the IRS.

    [2] The Model 1 IGA considers an investor to be “reportable” if the investor is a “United States person” other than certain types of entities that the Treasury Department has determined represent a low risk of tax evasion. Certain non-U.S. entities are also reportable if they are controlled by one or more individuals (so-called “Controlling Persons”) who are citizens or residents of the United States.

    [3] Investment funds should pay close attention to how a non-U.S. investor who certified to its status as a sponsored entity completed its IRS Form W-8. The IRS Forms W-8 generally provide for a sponsored entity to certify to its sponsored status either pursuant to the Treasury Regulations or pursuant to an applicable IGA.

    For example, an investor who certifies on a Form W-8BEN-E that it is a “Sponsored FFI” and completes Part IV has certified to its status pursuant to the Treasury Regulations. Such an investor will need to provide the investment fund with the GIIN that it obtains by year-end. Investment funds should proactively reach out to such investors to obtain updated Forms W-8 in order to avoid any unnecessary withholding obligations under FATCA in 2017.

    On the other hand, an investor who certifies on a Form W-8BEN-E that it is a “Nonreporting IGA FFI” under a Model 1 IGA and completes Part XII as a “sponsored entity” has certified to its status pursuant to a Model 1 IGA. Such an investor will be required to provide the investment fund with an updated Form W-8 that includes the investor’s own GIIN by year-end only if it has a reportable account. Investment funds may wish to reach out proactively to all sponsored investors who are Nonreporting IGA FFIs to confirm whether or not each such investor is required to provide an updated Form W-8 with a GIIN.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Philippe Benedict

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David S. Griffel

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David S. Wermuth

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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