Content Type: Article

  • The National Assembly Creates a New Obligation of Vigilance for Large Companies

    ARTICLE

    The National Assembly Creates a New Obligation of Vigilance for Large Companies

    March 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Aymeric Discours and Nisrin Abelin wrote this bylined French article on a law which proposes that large companies have a “duty of vigilance” to establish and operate a vigilance plan to prevent damage likely to be caused by their activities. However, the authors wrote, “no one knows how the courts will interpret the law’s requirement for ‘reasonable’ vigilance to be taken.”

    This article is in French.

    Authors
    More insights

  • CFPB Proposes Six-Month Extension to Effective Date of Prepaid Accounts Rule

    CFPB Proposes Six-Month Extension to Effective Date of Prepaid Accounts Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Proposes Six-Month Extension to Effective Date of Prepaid Accounts Rule

    March 10, 2017

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 8, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) proposed to delay the effective date of its rule providing consumer protections for prepaid products (“Prepaid Accounts Rule”) for a period of six months, to April 1, 2018 (“Proposed Extension”). In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“Proposal”),[1] the CFPB explains that the primary factors behind the Proposed Extension were discussions with industry participants and additional time to allow the CFPB to assess whether any adjustments to the Prepaid Accounts Rule may be appropriate. Comments on the Proposal will be due within 21 days of its publication in the Federal Register, which is expected to occur shortly.

    Background

    On Oct. 5, 2016, the CFPB released a final version of the Prepaid Accounts Rule to create comprehensive consumer protections for prepaid accounts, including disclosure and error resolution requirements.[2] These protections include the extension of Regulation E coverage to prepaid accounts and adoption of provisions specific to such accounts, as well as the expansion of Regulation Z’s coverage to overdraft credit features that may be offered in conjunction with prepaid accounts. Pursuant to this final version, the Prepaid Accounts Rule has a general effective date of Oct. 1, 2017 (“Effective Date”).

    Proposed Extension

    While the CFPB wants the Prepaid Accounts Rule to become effective “as soon as feasible,” it has determined the Proposed Extension is necessary to help facilitate compliance with the rule’s requirements. According to the Proposal, through its efforts to support industry implementation, the CFPB has learned of industry participants’ concerns regarding their ability to comply with the Prepaid Accounts Rule by the Effective Date while also ensuring continued availability of their prepaid products with minimal disruption to consumers. Due to these concerns, the CFPB has proposed a six-month extension to the Effective Date. The CFPB believes the Proposed Extension will be sufficient for industry participants to ensure compliance and also “would both allow more time for package printing and allow pull-and-replace processes at retail locations to occur after the winter holiday season, which is a particularly busy time for retailers.”

    In addition to compliance concerns, the CFPB also cited the opportunity to assess whether any adjustments to the Prepaid Accounts Rule are appropriate as an additional consideration for the Proposed Extension. Specifically, the Proposed Extension will allow the CFPB to “more closely evaluate concerns raised by industry participants regarding certain substantive aspects of the [Prepaid Accounts Rule] that they assert are posing particular complexities for implementation or may have negative consequences for consumers that were not anticipated or fully explained by commenters in response to the [proposed rule published on Dec. 23, 2014], and to propose revisions to those provisions of the [Prepaid Accounts Rule] if it determines that amendments are necessary and appropriate.”

    Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Kara A. Kuchar and Adam J. Barazani.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The Proposal is available on the CFPB’s website.

    [2] The final version of the Prepaid Accounts Rule is available on the CFPB’s website.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Fourth Circuit Clarifies the Role of the Collection Due Process Hearing

    ARTICLE

    Fourth Circuit Clarifies the Role of the Collection Due Process Hearing

    March 10, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Joshua Ellenberg wrote this bylined article on the Fourth Circuit’s Iames v. Commissioner, upholding the US Tax Court’s limiting of collection due process (CDP) hearings to challenge tax liabilities. “In Iames, the Tax Court may have been reacting to the explosive growth of CDP cases overall on the court’s docket, and trying to ensure those cases are limited to their statutory purpose,” Mr. Ellenberg wrote, advising taxpayers “to raise any challenges to liability as early as possible.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Joshua M. Ellenberg

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Sixth Circuit Trims Bank’s Good Faith Defense to Fraudulent Transfer Claims

    Sixth Circuit Trims Bank’s Good Faith Defense to Fraudulent Transfer Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sixth Circuit Trims Bank’s Good Faith Defense to Fraudulent Transfer Claims

    March 9, 2017

    Read time: 15 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017). As for “earlier … loan repayments” made before the investigator’s discovery, held the court, “the bankruptcy court erred” in rejecting the Bank’s good faith defense merely because the Bank had “inquiry notice of … fraud.” Id. In remanding, the Sixth Circuit directed the bankruptcy court to ascertain whether the Bank’s “lack of knowledge of the voidability of the transfers ceased during [the] period” prior to its investigator’s discovery of the fraud on April 30, 2004. Id. According to the court, “inquiry notice, although sometimes enough to constitute ‘knowledge of the voidability of the transfer,’ is not necessarily enough in every case.” Id. at *33. Thus, said the court, the bankruptcy court should make “a holistic review of the facts to determine whether a reasonable person would have been alerted to a transfer’s voidability.” Id.

    The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the Bank was a “transferee of the [debtor’s] direct and indirect loan repayments” for its affiliate. But the court reversed the lower court’s finding that $55 million of the debtor’s “excess deposits” into the affiliate’s account were transfers “because banks are not ‘transferees’ with respect to ordinary bank deposits,” reasoning that the Bank “did not gain ‘dominion and control’ over them.” Id. at *16.

    Finally, the Sixth Circuit approved the bankruptcy court’s awarding pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate “instead of the market rate.” Id. at *40. Although the “bankruptcy court satisfied its duty to consider case-specific factors when it considered whether the statutory rate was fair in light of the type of conservative investment that a fiduciary like the Trustee would have pursued,” the Sixth Circuit still permitted the lower court on remand “to exercise its discretion to apply a different rate.” Id. at *43-*44. It did so because its reversal of any “excess deposit” liability reduced the lower court’s judgment by “about $55 million.” Id. at *44.

    Relevance

    Appellate courts have struggled with the Bankruptcy Code’s good faith defense to fraudulent transfer claims. Just last year, the Seventh Circuit rejected a bank’s good faith defense. The bank had lent approximately $300 million to a company that had capital equal to roughly 1/150 of that amount, yet the debtor was mysteriously “able to secure the entire loan.” In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc., 809 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2016). According to the Seventh Circuit, the bank was on inquiry notice that the assets securing the loan had been fraudulently pledged to it. Id. at 966. Just three years ago, however, the Fourth Circuit had approved a lender’s reliance on the “good faith” defense. Gold v. First Tenn. Bank N.A., 743 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2014) (2-1) (applying “objective good-faith standard,” bank held to have acted in good faith; bank had investigated facts before lending; when debtor offered excuses for non-payment, bank visited collateral “properties,” reviewed records and market conditions, consistent with industry practice; bank had no “information” requiring it to “investigate further.”). See also In re Equipment Acquisition Resources, Inc., 803 F.3d 835 (7th Cir 2013) (“Red flags” not sufficient to impose duty on casino to investigate debtor’s transfers to insiders; casino may have had a clue that insider’s payments came from debtor, but had no reason to suspect fraud; also unlikely that casino would have uncovered fraud).

    Relevant Statutory Reference

    Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 548(a)(1)(A) enables a trustee to “avoid any transfer” of the debtor’s property made within two years of bankruptcy if the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” present or future creditors. Code § 548(c) provides, in relevant part, that an initial transferee is not liable for the transferred property if it: (i) took the property “in good faith”; and (ii) “gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer.” Code § 550(b)(1), in turn, provides that a subsequent transferee is not liable for the transferred property if it took the property: (i) “for value”; (ii) “in good faith”; and (iii) “without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided.”

    Facts

    The debtor, T, was a sham company formed by the Bank’s borrower, C, “which had crea[ted] it to perpetuate a Ponzi scheme.” Id. at *2. W “was the Chairman and Chief Executive of” C and had “masterminded [the] Ponzi scheme.” Id. at *4. Between September 2002 and October 2004, the Bank “had lent about $9 million to C, but by 2004, the loan had grown to $16 million.” Id. at *5.

    T would collect cash from defrauded equipment financiers and deposit the funds into C’s bank accounts maintained at the Bank. Although C was the Bank’s borrower, T’s bankruptcy trustee sought to recover funds transferred by T to C’s accounts. The transfers consisted of: (i) “direct loan repayments, which [T] sent directly to [the Bank] to pay down [C’s] debt to [the Bank]; (ii) indirect loan repayments, which [T] sent to [C’s] deposit account at [the Bank], and which [C] later used to repay its debt to [the Bank]; and (iii) excess deposits [of $55 million] which [T] sent to [C’s] deposit account at [the Bank], and which [C] later withdrew or the government later seized.” Id. at *2.

    A Bank employee had discovered that C was receiving bounced checks from T, but neither she “nor her superiors knew what [T] was.” Id. When the Bank employee asked about T, W “explained that [T] was a recent addition to [C’s] holdings” and that it was “not yet operational,” but “was already collecting [C’s] receivables … .” Id. at *6.

    Between September 2003 and April 2004, the Bank’s employees had discovered several troubling facts about C: conflicting descriptions of T as either an affiliate or as an equipment supplier; transfers of large amounts of cash to C; C’s refusal to use the Bank’s lock-box system; the Bank’s employees’ doubts about or failure to understand the computer service business; overdrafts on C’s accounts; and C’s failure to provide the bank with the required audited financial statements. In April 2004, the Bank found that C had falsely listed the names of customers who had failed to pay their bills. As a result, the Bank’s account managers asked its security department to investigate. The Bank’s investigator learned that “the FBI was investigating” C and that W “had a fraudulent past: [he] had been permanently blacklisted by the National Association of Securities Dealers; he had confessed to a bank fraud in Michigan and another fraud in California; and he had served three years in jail for a fraud-related crime.” Id. at *9.

    Although the investigator reported the results of his investigation to the FBI, he never shared that information with the Bank’s account managers. Id. The Bank then asked a major accounting firm to verify the identities of C’s customers. The accounting firm “reported that [C’s] customers were real, although it later turned out that W ‘had deceived [the accounting firm]’ by providing it with fake responses from [C’s] fake customers.” Id. at *9 – *10. Eventually, by Oct. 29, 2004, C had repaid its entire $16 million debt to the Bank. Later that year “the FBI raided [C’s] offices,” and W “committed suicide shortly thereafter.” Id. at *10. C was later placed into bankruptcy by its creditors, and T by its court-appointed receiver.

    The bankruptcy court “conducted two trials and issued multiple opinions” in the Trustee’s litigation against the Bank to recover “all of the direct loan repayments, the indirect loan repayments, and the excess deposits” in C’s bank accounts. Id. The bankruptcy court ultimately held the Bank liable for approximately $72 million, representing the loan repayments and excess deposits, plus pre-judgment interest at the federal statutory rate for post-judgment interest. Id. at *14. Because the bankruptcy judge questioned his constitutional authority to enter a final judgment, he summarized his findings of facts and conclusion of law in a “Report and Recommendation.” The district court’s judgment affirmed the bankruptcy court, holding that the Trustee could recover all three types of transfers from the Bank. The Bank argued on appeal that it was “not a transferee of the excess deposits, and that it received the loan repayments in good faith.” Id.

    Analysis

    T’s Direct Loan Repayments

    The Sixth Circuit accepted the lower court’s finding “that a critical breakdown in [the Bank’s] internal communications ended its proven good faith on April 30, 2004.” Id. at *27. Thus, the trustee could recover “all subsequent loan repayments,” including “some of the indirect loan repayments and all of the direct loan repayments” made after April 30, 2004. Id. at *27-*28.

    The Court of Appeals also agreed that the Bank’s “continued cooperation with the FBI did not cure the corporate bad faith embedded in [the Bank’s] breakdown in communication … .” Id. at *30. In its view, the Bank’s “good faith may end while its employees’ good faith … continued” because “its [investigator] failed to share information … with the person whom [the Bank] charged with managing” its relationship with C. Id. at *31. The “innocent miscommunication” was immaterial, for the Bank was “ultimately responsible for the investigator’s withholding from [the account manager] information that would have truly put [the manager] to the test.” Id. As a result, the Trustee was able to recover “all direct loan repayments, of which [the Bank] is an initial transferee” because the Bank received them after April 30, 2004, when it could no longer claim good faith. Id. at *32. The trustee was also entitled to recover any indirect loan repayments where the Bank was a subsequent transferee after April 30, 2004. Id.

    Indirect Loan Repayments

    Between Sept. 25, 2003 and April 30, 2004, the lower court found that the Bank acted in good faith prior to April 30, 2004, but still held the Bank liable because of its “inquiry notice of [C’s] fraud on the earlier date.” Id. at *32. It agreed with the Trustee that “inquiry notice constituted ‘knowledge of the voidability of the transfers’” under Code §550(b)(1), eliminating the Bank’s subsequent transferee defense. As noted above, however, the Sixth Circuit disagreed, explaining that “inquiry notice,” by itself, “is not necessarily enough in every case.” Id. at *33.

    The court analyzed its two applicable precedents. In re Nordic Village, Inc., 915 F.2d 1049, 1056 (6th Cir. 1990) (2-1), rev’d on other grounds, U.S. v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (on facts of that case, “inquiry notice” sufficed for “knowledge of the voidability”); In re First Independence, 181 App’x 524, 526 (th Cir. 2006) (fraudulent principals of debtor deposited checks into their personal accounts at defendant bank, giving bank “inquiry notice,” but those facts “would not lead a reasonable person to believe that the transfers were voidable.”). According to the court in Nordic, “the transferee failed to prove lack of knowledge of voidability because the facts would have ‘placed a reasonable person on notice that the transfer was illegitimate, and by extension that it was voidable.’” Id. at *36. The IRS in Nordic had received a check from the corporate debtor who instructed it to “credit the payment against the outstanding tax liabilities of the delivering individual.” Id. at *33, citing 915 F.3d at 1050-51. Because “it is not in an ordinary practice for corporate entities to pay one another’s taxes, that irregularity was notice of voidability.” Id. at *34, citing 915 F. 3d at 1056. In First Independence, however, the court held that although “inquiry notice sometimes suffices to ‘alert’ a reasonable person to voidability, … , on different facts [viewed] holistically, a reasonable person may not be alerted to a transfer’s voidability even if there was inquiry notice … .” Id. There were at least two “legitimate scenarios” in First Independence that would eliminate “knowledge” of voidability: the checks could have been salary payments, and “any inquiry into the legitimacy of the checks would have been futile” for the debtor’s principals would have been the only knowledgeable source. Id. at *34, citing 181 F. App’x at 529.

    Test of Good Faith

    The Sixth Circuit rejected the Trustee’s challenge to the district court’s analysis of the “good faith” requirement. Although the lower court had “struggled” to decide “whether the proper test is objective or subjective,” it “concluded that the correct standard … is a ‘subjective’ test probing [the Bank’s] ‘integrity, trust and good conduct.’” Id. at *38. In fact, said the Sixth Circuit, “other courts have ‘struggled’ to define good faith in this context.” Id. at *39, citing First Independence, 181 App’x at 524. In First Independence, “the court approved the bankruptcy court’s determination of good faith when … the transferee did not have actual notice of the voidability of the transfers and did not undertake ‘egregious, vindictive or intentional misconduct.’” Id. Here, the bankruptcy court asked whether the Bank “legitimately continued to believe that [T’s] transfers to [C’s] account were merely [C’s] receivables that [T] had collected.” Id. at *40. The question on remand, therefore, is simply whether the Bank eventually “gained knowledge of the voidability of the transfers [to it] before April 30, 2004.” Id.

    Transferee Analysis

    The Court of Appeals held that the trustee could not “recover [C’s] excess deposits (those deposits not applied to pay back debts to [the Bank]).” As noted, “banks are not ‘transferees’ with respect to ordinary bank deposits” because they lack “dominion and control over them.” Id. at *16, citing In re Hurtado, 342 F.3d 528, 533 (6th Cir. 2003); Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988). Other circuits have routinely applied this analysis: the account-holder’s right to withdraw the deposits keeps the bank from obtaining dominion and control. Thus, when a bank provides “two services to a customer” –lending money and maintaining the customer’s deposit account –the deposit account does not belong to the bank. It is “only when the customer instruct[s] the bank to use [the funds on deposit] to reduce its debt to the bank that the bank gains dominion over the money.” Id. at *17. Accord, In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 848 F.2d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Incomnet, Inc., 463 F.3d 1064, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006). In short, the depositor of the funds, not the bank, maintains dominion and control over its deposits. Id. at *20, citing Hurtado, 342 F.3d at 535. Thus, the Bank “did not become a transferee of [C’s] deposits simply by maintaining [C’s] deposit account.” Id. at *21.

    No Dominion and Control by Reason of Security Interest

    The Trustee further argued that the Bank’s perfected security interest in about $64 million of C’s deposits gave it “dominion and control.” Id. at *21. Rejecting the Trustee’s “security interest theory,” the Sixth Circuit reasoned that “a security interest cannot grant dominion over $48 million more than the underlying debt.” Id. at *22. Here, the loan agreements explicitly provided that C “owned the deposits despite [the Bank’s] security interest in them.” Id. The law of secured transactions limits recovery upon default to the underlying debt. Id. at *22. Because C’s underlying debt to the Bank was only $16 million, the Bank lacked “dominion and control over” the excess deposits. Id. at *23. The Bank’s “rights’ were limited to the amount of the [underlying] debt.” Id. at *24. “In short, [C] retained dominion and control over its [excess] deposits despite [the Bank’s] security interest in them, and [C] could use its money and other assets however it wanted to.” Id. at *24-*25.

    Meoli confirms the fact-intensive nature of “good faith” litigation in the fraudulent transfer context. After two trials and at least five bankruptcy court opinions between 2009 and 2012 covering events occurring between 2002 and 2004, the litigation still continues. A 45-page opinion from the Sixth Circuit in this case led a concurring judge to write two more pages stressing that “transferees” such as the Bank “are not required to undertake unduly onerous investigations, and that whether an investigation is unduly onerous depends on the circumstances of the case.” Id. at *47. Citing other circuits, the concurring judge stressed that “[n]o one supposes that ‘knowledge of voidability’ means complete understanding of the facts and receipt of a lawyer’s opinion that such a transfer is voidable; some lesser knowledge will do.” Id. at *46, citing In re Sherman, 67 F. 3d 1348, 1357 (8thCir. 1995), quoting Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F. 2d 890, 898 (7th Cir. 1988) (failure to make inquiry did not permit court to attribute to transferee knowledge of voidability of transaction; “‘knowledge’ is a stronger term than ‘notice.’ A transferee that lacks information necessary to support an inference of knowledge need not start investigating on his own”; bank knew nothing of debtor’s “financial peril” and debtor was not bank’s “customer”; debtor had provided funds to its principal who repaid the bank). See also In re Bressman, 327 F. 3d 229, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2003) (law firms took in “good faith” and for “value … without knowledge of voidability”; firms paid by debtor’s wife who had received assets fraudulently).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Drafting and Negotiating R&W Insurance Provisions in M&A Transactions

    Drafting and Negotiating R&W Insurance Provisions in M&A Transactions

    ARTICLE

    Drafting and Negotiating R&W Insurance Provisions in M&A Transactions

    March 9, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Diego Gómez-Cornejo and Soren Lindstrom co-authored this bylined article on the increased use of representation and warranty (R&W) insurance in private M&A transactions. Despite this increase, the authors wrote, “there is no established practice among M&A professionals on how to properly integrate R&W insurance into the terms of the acquisition agreement,” and they provide guidelines for doing so, particularly for buyer-side policies.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • IRS Campaign Focuses on Definition of “Qualified Film” Under Section 199

    IRS Campaign Focuses on Definition of “Qualified Film” Under Section 199

    ARTICLE

    IRS Campaign Focuses on Definition of “Qualified Film” Under Section 199

    March 9, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Roger Jones and Elizabeth Chao wrote this bylined article on an IRS Large Business & International (LB&I) “campaign” to target tax deductions claimed by multi-channel video programming distributors and TV broadcasters under Tax Code Section 199. Such taxpayers should expect “challenges from the IRS on the definition of ‘qualified film’ and whether gross receipts from distributing channels and subscription packages to customers qualify” as deductions, the authors wrote.

    In depth
    Authors

    Roger J. Jones

    Counsel

    Chicago

    Elizabeth Chao

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • Private Equity Players Confront the Teachings of Darwin

    Private Equity Players Confront the Teachings of Darwin

    ARTICLE

    Private Equity Players Confront the Teachings of Darwin

    March, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Carole Degonse and Henri Pieyre De Mandiargues wrote this bylined article on how economic crisis, technological changes and trade globalization have caused many companies of all sizes to drastically rethink their approach. “When these companies are controlled by private equity players, their ability to adapt to change is put to the test,” the authors wrote, “but such change is essential to ensure, as Darwin suggested, the survival of the fittest.”

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Texas to Take a Leap Forward in Telehealth – A Proposed Bill Drops the Controversial In-Person Evaluation Requirement

    Texas to Take a Leap Forward in Telehealth – A Proposed Bill Drops the Controversial In-Person Evaluation Requirement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Texas to Take a Leap Forward in Telehealth – A Proposed Bill Drops the Controversial In-Person Evaluation Requirement

    March 8, 2017

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Texas telehealth requirements will significantly change in the near future if Texas Senate Bill 1107 is passed into law, which removes the controversial “face-to-face” or in-person consultation requirement to establish a physician-patient relationship and lawfully provide telehealth and telemedicine services within the state. This bill comes after a six-year-long battle between telemedicine stakeholders and the Texas Medical Board, and will better align Texas’ regulations with those found in other states.

    In depth

    After several months of behind-the-scenes negotiations involving legislators, doctors’ groups and telehealth advocates, including the Texas Medical Association, Texas Hospital Association, Texas Academy of Family Physicians, the University of Texas and the Texas e-Healthcare Alliance, Texas Senate Bill 1107 (the Proposed Bill) is scheduled for public hearing today. If enacted, the Proposed Bill will significantly impact telehealth in Texas, the state which currently holds the lowest composite score—“suggesting many barriers for telemedicine advancement”—as determined by the American Telemedicine Association in its 2017 State Telemedicine Gaps Analysis: Physician Standards and Licensure report published last month. Most significantly, the Proposed Bill removes the controversial “face-to-face” or in-person consultation requirement to establish a physician-patient relationship and lawfully provide telehealth and telemedicine services within the state. The Proposed Bill comes after a six-year-long battle between telemedicine stakeholders and the Texas Medical Board. Since 2011, Teladoc—one of the country’s largest telehealth services providers—has been embroiled in conflict with the Texas Medical Board, chiefly stemming from a letter the board sent to Teladoc concerning Teladoc’s prescribing of medications without first establishing a patient relationship through a face-to-face meeting. In 2015, Teladoc sued the Texas Medical Board alleging that its implementing regulations of the Texas telemedicine and telehealth statute violate antitrust laws—ultimately stifling both access to care and provider competition by adding an unnecessary hurdle for tele-providers. The case has been stayed until mid-April pending settlement. In September 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) advocated in support of Teladoc and the broad use and adoption of telehealth, which we previously analyzed here.

    Under the Proposed Bill, synchronous audiovisual technology or a combination of store and forward technology, synchronous audio technology, and certain clinical information may be used to create a physician-patient relationship as long as the provider complies with the conventional standard of care. The conventional, in-person standard of care is the same standard for telemedicine and telehealth services in many states, a practice also supported by the FTC, the DOJ and many industry groups. Proponents argue that parity incentivizes tele-providers to enter the market without requiring compliance with additional—sometimes burdensome—regulations. To reinforce the requirement that telehealth services conform to the in-person standard of care, the Proposed Bill requires that the Texas Medical Board, the Texas Board of Nursing, the Texas Physician Assistant Board, and the Texas State Board of Pharmacy jointly adopt rules and FAQ responses related to the issuance of a prescription under a valid provider-patient relationship where telemedicine or telehealth services are provided.

    Texas law currently has a telehealth and telemedicine “coverage parity law.” The Texas Insurance Code provides that (1) a health benefit plan may not exclude a telemedicine or a telehealth service from coverage under the plan solely because the service is not provided through a face-to-face consultation and (2) the health benefit plan may require a deductible, a copayment or coinsurance for a telemedicine medical service or a telehealth service, which may not exceed the amount of the deductible, copayment or coinsurance required for a comparable medical service provided through a face-to-face consultation. The Proposed Bill further narrows Texas’ limited coverage parity law by excluding coverage for a telemedicine or a telehealth service provided by only synchronous or asynchronous audio interaction or a facsimile. Notably, the Texas Insurance Code currently lacks a “payment parity” requirement (i.e., a requirement that the amount paid to the provider for rendering the telehealth or telemedicine services be the same as or similar to the amount paid for a service delivered through a face-to-face consultation), and the Proposed Bill does not propose a solution to address its absence.

    The Proposed Bill also bans physicians from using telemedicine to prescribe “an abortifacient or any other drug or device that terminates a pregnancy.” If passed, Texas would become the twentieth state to specifically ban telemedicine abortions. This type of ban has been controversial across the country. Recently, Utah stripped the limitation from its telemedicine bills, and Planned Parenthood settled a lawsuit with Idaho legislators over a similar restriction and won a similar suit in Iowa in 2015.

    Overall, the Proposed Bill is a leap forward for virtual care in Texas. In 2016, 44 states introduced over 150 telehealth and telemedicine-related pieces of legislation addressing issues ranging from licensing and reimbursement to delivery standards. Just three months into 2017, telehealth and telemedicine related legislation does not appear to be slowing down. The Texas Proposed Bill is yet another legislative effort in a continued response to the growing utilization of technology in the delivery of health care.

    Authors

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • Understanding LB&I “Campaigns”

    ARTICLE

    Understanding LB&I “Campaigns”

    March 8, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Robin Greenhouse and Kevin Spencer wrote this bylined article on how the new IRS Large Business & International (LB&I) “Campaign” examinations will change the auditing process. “The IRS clearly does not have sufficient resources to examine returns in the same manner that was done over the last 30 years,” the authors wrote. “With limited resources, the new Campaign process may ease the burden on taxpayers of protracted audits mired in the details of the return.”

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Legal Risks in External Offshore Staffing

    ARTICLE

    Legal Risks in External Offshore Staffing

    March, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sandra Urban-Crell and Gudrun Germakowski wrote this bylined article on a new amendment to the German Workers’ Leave Act which is intended to prevent abuse in the use of offshore foreign staffing. “With the new amendment companies must establish a compliance system on the use of outside staff, or face the risk of paying expensive fines,” the authors wrote.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights