Content Type: Article

  • The Impact of Federal Tax Reform on State and Local Taxation

    ARTICLE

    The Impact of Federal Tax Reform on State and Local Taxation

    March 6, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Peter Faber wrote this bylined article, which compares the tax reform plans proposed by House Republicans and President Trump and outlines the ways in which each may affect state taxation. Given the proposals’ uncertain outcome, Mr. Faber wrote, “I would not recommend that companies start restructuring their operations now in anticipation of what Congress and the president may do over the next year or so, but they should at least be thinking about what they may do if some scenarios come to pass.”

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  • Understanding the Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S. Craft Beer and You

    ARTICLE

    Understanding the Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S. Craft Beer and You

    March 6, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Marc Sorini wrote this bylined article about the advantages of the three-tier distribution system to craft brewers and importers that “would have a hard time affording all the warehouses and trucks needed to distribute beer over wide territories on their own.” Fortunately for such companies, Mr. Sorini wrote, “the laws of many states provide flexibility allowing many brewery business models to thrive within the overall three-tier structure.”

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  • A Sea Change for Beneficiaries’ Right to Information?

    A Sea Change for Beneficiaries’ Right to Information?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    A Sea Change for Beneficiaries’ Right to Information?

    March 3, 2017

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Court of Appeal’s ruling in Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing offers beneficiaries rights of access to personal data held by trustees and their legal advisers. This is a landmark case in which our clients, the claimants, obtained a judgment that clarifies the provisions of the Data Protection Act and provides individuals with greater access to confidential information held on them by English solicitors.

    In depth

    In the recent case of Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing, the Court of Appeal issued a ruling about the right of beneficiaries who are Data Subjects under the Data Protection Act (DPA) to personal data held by the London-based solicitors for the trustees.

    The DPA is the United Kingdom’s implementation of the EU Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC), which is designed to protect the privacy of all personal data collected for or about EU citizens, especially with regard to the processing, use or exchange of such data. It also provides a right of access of “Data Subjects” to their personal data held by “Data Controllers”.

    An individual’s right to access data is regarded as a fundamental right, sufficient to require a data controller to provide full details of any personal data held about the subject. The DPA sets out a number of exemptions to that right, including a Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) exemption: if a document, or the data it contains, are privileged against the applicant, the document (or data) need not be disclosed. Unless one of the relevant exemptions is engaged, a data controller is obliged to comply with the request and provide the applicant with his or her personal data.

    In Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing, the claimants, who are (or have been) beneficiaries of certain Bahamian trusts, had discovered that substantial funds had been paid out of one of the trusts for the benefit of others, potentially in breach of trust. Prior to issuing proceedings, they served a Subject Access Request under the DPA on a number of people, including individual fiduciaries and their London solicitors, Taylor Wessing.

    Some of the fiduciaries disclosed relevant information, but Taylor Wessing refused to do so on the following grounds:

    • All of the documents in their possession were protected from disclosure by LPP, which should be interpreted widely to include more restrictive interpretations under foreign law.
    • Reviewing their files would involve disproportionate effort.
    • The Court should not order disclosure when the requesting individual has a “collateral reason” for wanting the data—e.g., to obtain disclosure for the purpose of litigation.

    The Court of Appeal rejected all three arguments and held as follows:

    • Not all documents in lawyers’ file would be privileged. It was incumbent upon the lawyers to inspect their files and determine which documents were privileged and which were not. The LPP exemption would extend only to LPP as it is understood by English law; in particular, the Court should not have regard to foreign law on privilege and should not extend the exemption to data which may be “confidential” under principles of trust law (e.g., under the rule in Schmidt v Rosewood) but is not privileged.
    • Taylor Wessing is obliged to explain why it considers that an inspection of the relevant files would involve disproportionate effort; simply asserting this without putting forward evidence in support of its position was not sufficient.
    • The motivation of a Data Subject is not prescribed by the DPA, and the DPA does not contain an exemption for “collateral purpose”. The Court of Appeal accepted that individuals may have a number of reasons for wanting to receive their personal data, and held that it was inappropriate to deny them this important right by reason of their perceived motivation.

    This is a landmark case which provides trust beneficiaries a right to access information which may not be made available to them under the established trust law routes.

    It is also a wake-up call for lawyers and their clients, whether fiduciaries, employers or corporations. Data controllers must take care to understand the extent and limits of LPP, and to ensure that they comply with their duties under the DPA on the receipt of a Subject Access Request. The position under the DPA is likely to be transformed further in May 2018, when the General Data Protection Regulation will come into force (Brexit notwithstanding) and introduce greater DPA compliance burdens on persons who are not resident in the United Kingdom but wish to offer goods or services to individuals in the United Kingdom.

    Ziva Robertson (Partner) and Catrin Hughes (Associate) of McDermott Will & Emery represented the Claimants, the Dawson-Damer family, in this matter.

    For further information or legal advice, please contact Ziva Robertson.

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  • Disability Claim Rule Raises Duties for Administrators

    ARTICLE

    Disability Claim Rule Raises Duties for Administrators

    March 3, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    McDermott benefits lawyers wrote in a note to clients, cited here, that plan sponsors and administrators should review employer welfare and retirement plan documents, summary plan descriptions, appeals and administrative practices and procedures in light of new Labor Department rules on disability claim reviews.

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  • Time Credit for Works Council Activities Outside Working Hours

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    Time Credit for Works Council Activities Outside Working Hours

    March 3, 2017

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    Maximilian Baur commenting on the decision of the Landesarbeitsgericht Baden-Württemberg of 25 October 2016 regarding time credits for works council activities outside of working hours.

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  • Hospital Business Decisions: Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Physician Litigation

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    Hospital Business Decisions: Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Physician Litigation

    March 3, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Justin Uhlemann and Audrey Pumariega authored this bylined article on how the due process procedures of hospital medical staff bylaws may not apply to business-related decisions. The authors wrote, “Many courts have held that, unless the bylaws expressly state otherwise, a physician is not contractually entitled to due process procedures when a hospital business decision incidentally affects physician clinical privileges; other courts disagree,” increasing litigation risk.

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  • Business Development Company Update: Excessive Fees Lawsuit Against Adviser Dismissed

    Business Development Company Update: Excessive Fees Lawsuit Against Adviser Dismissed

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Business Development Company Update: Excessive Fees Lawsuit Against Adviser Dismissed

    March 2, 2017

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A decision issued on Jan. 24, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a complaint alleging the payment of excessive advisory and administration fees by Prospect Capital Corporation (the “Fund”), a business development company (“BDC”) regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “1940 Act”).[1] The litigation (“Prospect Capital”) involved a claim that fees received by the Fund’s investment adviser and the adviser’s affiliated administrator constituted a breach of the fiduciary duty established by Section 36(b) of the 1940 Act and sought to recover on behalf of the Fund damages resulting from the breach.

    Although there have been numerous Section 36(b) lawsuits relating to registered investment companies, Prospect Capital is a rare Section 36(b) action brought against the adviser of a BDC. Moreover, the granting of the defendants’ motion to dismiss in Prospect Capital stands in contrast to decisions in most other Section 36(b) actions commenced subsequent to the 2008 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris Assocs. (“Jones”),[2] in which motions to dismiss were not granted.

    What Is Section 36(b)?

    In pertinent part, Section 36(b) of the 1940 Act provides that the investment adviser of a 1940 Act registered fund or BDC is deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services paid by the fund or BDC to the adviser or any affiliated person of the adviser.[3] It provides, generally, that an action may be brought for breach of that duty by the Securities and Exchange Commission, or by a shareholder on behalf of the fund or BDC, against the adviser or its affiliated person. Section 36(b) also provides that, in any action brought pursuant to Section 36(b), approval by the board of directors of a registered fund or BDC of the adviser’s compensation, or of a contract providing for such compensation, shall be given such consideration by a court as is deemed appropriate under all of the circumstances.

    In this regard, Section 15(a) of the 1940 Act requires that the investment advisory contract of a registered fund or BDC be approved by the board of directors of the company and by the vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of the company (a “majority shareholder vote”). It also requires that, after an initial term of two years from the date of its execution, the contract may continue in effect only so long as its continuance is specifically approved at least annually by the board of directors or by a majority shareholder vote. Section 15(c) of the 1940 Act imposes the additional requirement that an advisory contract and any renewal thereof must be approved by vote of a majority of the directors of the company who are not parties to the contract or “interested persons” of any such party (“independent directors”),[4] cast in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such approval. Section 15(c) also provides that, in connection with the approval and renewal of an advisory contract, the directors of a registered fund or BDC have a duty to request and evaluate, and that the investment adviser of the company has a duty to furnish, such information as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms of the advisory contract.

    Taken together, judicial decisions relating to Section 36(b) and the provisions of Section 15(c) establish the legal framework applicable to approvals of advisory contracts by fund boards and applicable to judicial determinations as to whether the fees received pursuant to such contracts meet the fiduciary standard established by Section 36(b). These standards were enunciated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. (“Gartenberg”).[5] In Gartenberg, the court stated that an adviser’s receipt of an advisory fee will not constitute a breach of the adviser’s fiduciary duty if “the fee is in range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.”[6] The court observed that, to violate Section 36(b), an adviser must charge a fee that is so “disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”[7] In making this determination with respect to the fee at issue in Gartenberg, the Second Circuit explained that “all pertinent facts must be weighed”[8] and noted that specific factors to consider include: (i) the nature and quality of the services provided by the adviser; (ii) the cost to the adviser of providing such services, with special attention to the adviser’s profitability and whether the adviser realizes economies of scale; (iii) the direct and indirect benefits received by the adviser from its relationship with the fund (including any fall-out benefits or float the adviser receives from its relationship with the fund); and (iv) the relationship that the amount of the advisory fee bears to the fees paid by other funds of similar size and objectives. In addition, the nature and extent of any non-advisory services provided by the adviser or an affiliated person of the adviser, including any administrative, shareholder accounting and transfer agent services, must also be considered.

    In Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time addressed the standard that should be applied in determining whether an advisory fee is consistent with Section 36(b). In its landmark decision in Jones, issued on March 30, 2010,[9] the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the Gartenberg standard by holding that an investment adviser will not be deemed to be in breach of its fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation from a mutual fund under Section 36(b) unless it is proven that the adviser’s fee is “so disproportionately large” that it “bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”[10] The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Gartenberg approach fully incorporates this understanding of the fiduciary duty standard and thus, “[w]here a board’s process for negotiating and reviewing investment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should afford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining process.”[11] Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that if the disinterested directors of a mutual fund have considered the relevant factors, their decision to approve a particular fee agreement is entitled to considerable weight, even if a court might weigh the factors differently.

    In recent years, the fund industry has been subject to lawsuits brought pursuant to Section 36(b)[12] and no court has as yet, in such action, held that the fee at issue violated Section 36(b).[13]

    Why Did the Court Dismiss the Complaint in Prospect Capital?

    The plaintiff’s claim in Prospect Capital was that the fees paid by the Fund to its adviser and the adviser’s affiliate for investment advisory and administrative services were excessive because they substantially exceeded the fees paid by comparable BDCs for comparable services. In this regard, the plaintiff alleged that the fees paid by the Fund exceeded the average fees paid by similar BDCs. The complaint also included allegations addressing the various factors articulated in Gartenberg. These included allegations that: (i) the adviser’s portfolio selection services were poor based on the fact that the Fund had underperformed its benchmarks; (ii) the adviser’s profits were “higher than the norm, and thus excessive”;[14] (iii) the adviser benefited from significant economies of scale that were not shared with the Fund; and (iv) the independent directors were not truly independent because the adviser’s website listed them as “members” of the adviser’s “team” and they did not actually evaluate the adviser’s fees because they did not reject them or negotiate for lower fees.[15]

    The plaintiff alleged that the Fund’s board had failed to conduct an independent evaluation as required by Section 15(c) and had merely “rubberstamped” the advisory agreement.[16] The plaintiff also argued that the investment adviser’s and administrator’s fees were “blatantly excessive” in that they were markedly above the average fees charged by peer funds. The court disagreed and gave particular deference to the board’s review process, finding that “Section 36(b) does not provide relief where more arduous bargaining could have resulted in lower fees” and that the plaintiff failed to show “that the fees resulted from the purportedly deficient process.”[17] In addition, the court noted that, although above average, the fees were still below the highest fees charged by a peer fund and that, regardless of that fact, “charging a fee that is above the industry average does not violate Section 36(b).”[18]

    In evaluating the plaintiff’s claims as they related to each Gartenberg factor, the court stated that: (i) the claims regarding the nature and quality of the adviser’s services were insufficient because the plaintiff did not allege that the Fund has underperformed with respect to comparable funds; (ii) the claims regarding the adviser’s profitability were insufficient because they were based on “unsupported speculation” that the adviser’s costs were equal to the “average fee rate paid by internally-managed BDCs”; (iii) the claims regarding economies of scale were insufficient because the decrease in fees received by the adviser from 2009 to 2015 “indicate[d] some sharing of economies of scale” with the Fund;[19] (iv) the claims regarding the board’s independence and conscientiousness were insufficient because the adviser’s website’s characterization of the independent directors as “members” of the adviser’s “team” was too vague “to overcome the heavy statutory presumption”[20] that the directors are in fact disinterested.

    In considering the complaint and determining whether, assuming the truth of the facts asserted therein, it stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to plead facts creating a plausible inference that the defendants were liable. Among other things, the court noted that the plaintiff had failed to meet its burden of showing that the fees paid by the Fund were outside the range that would have been produced by arm’s length bargaining. In this regard, the court observed that charging a fee that is above “industry average” does not violate Section 36(b) and concluded that, because the effective fee rate was within the range of fees paid by other BDCs, the Fund’s fee was not outside of the “outer bounds of arm’s length bargaining.”[21]

    To prevail on a motion to dismiss, a defendant must show that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.[22] In this regard, the court in Prospect Capital determined that the plaintiff’s complaint did not allege sufficient facts indicating a plausible basis for concluding that the fee at issue was not comparable to what would have been negotiated at arm’s length.

    What Are the Implications of Prospect Capital?

    As previously noted, Prospect Capital stands in contrast to most other recent Section 36(b) lawsuits in which motions to dismiss have not been granted. However, those other lawsuits have involved either: (i) a “manager of managers” situation, where a fund’s adviser had delegated portfolio management responsibilities to one or more sub-advisers, and the plaintiff claimed that the portion of advisory fees retained by the adviser was excessive given the limited scope of services required to be provided by the adviser; or (ii) a situation where a fund’s adviser received a higher level of compensation from the fund as compared to the compensation that the adviser received for providing similar services as sub-adviser to a non-proprietary fund. In comparison, the adviser in Prospect Capital did not retain a sub-adviser and did not provide advisory services to any clients other than the Fund. Thus, the Prospect Capital decision may reflect the high bar a plaintiff must overcome post-Jones in fashioning a Section 36(b) complaint that will survive a motion to dismiss, absent facts providing strong support for an excessive fee claim.

    Authored by Kenneth S. Gerstein, Pamela Poland Chen and Jessica A. Falzone.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Susan Paskowitz v. Prospect Capital Management L.P. et al, No. 16-cv-2990 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

    [2] Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010).

    [3] Section 59 of the 1940 Act makes various sections of the 1940 Act, including Section 36(b), applicable to BDCs.

    [4] In order to qualify as an independent director under Section 2(a)(19) of the 1940 Act, an independent director generally cannot currently have, or at any time during the previous two years have had, a significant business relationship with the fund’s adviser, principal underwriter or affiliates.

    [5] 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 906 (1983).

    [6] Id. at 928.

    [7] Id.

    [8] Id. at 929.

    [9] Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010).

    [10] Id. at 9. Several other federal courts also have interpreted Section 36(b) to determine whether advisory fees were excessive, and have reiterated the “so disproportionately large”/”no reasonable relationship” principle established in Gartenberg. Strougo v. BEA Associates, 188 F.Supp.2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the fee at issue was not unreasonable based on the nature and quality of the services, the profit and fall-out benefits received by the adviser, the economies of scale, the comparative fee structures and the directors’ care in approving the fee); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, Inc., et al., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that plaintiffs failed to state a claim because they did not address the relationship between the fees received and the services provided by the adviser and, as a result of that omission, the court was unable to conclude that the fee was excessive); and In re Franklin Mutual Funds Fee Litigation 04-CV-982 (WJM) (D.Ct. N.J. 2007) (fund underperformance, coupled with the payment of above-market fees, is not sufficient to state a Section 36(b) claim).

    [11] Id. at 15.

    [12] “Section 36(b) Litigation Since Jones v. Harris: An Overview for Investment Advisers and Fund Independent Directors,” ICI Mutual, July 2016 at 1.

    [13] ICI Mutual at 1.

    [14] Prospect Capital at 15 quoting complaint.

    [15] Prospect Capital at 20.

    [16] Prospect Capital at 15 quoting complaint.

    [17] Id. at 20-21.

    [18] Id. at 12.

    [19] Prospect Capital at 18.

    [20] Prospect Capital at 20.

    [21] Prospect Capital at 6 quoting Jones.

    [22] Prospect Capital at 5.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Avoiding Errors When Dismissing a Bankruptcy Appeal

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    Avoiding Errors When Dismissing a Bankruptcy Appeal

    March 2, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Darren Azman and Michael Galen wrote this bylined article on a recent case that clarifies appellate jurisdiction for bankruptcy court decisions under Rule 8008. “The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Cox v. Nostaw Inc. serves as a useful reminder of Bankruptcy Rule 8008’s proper application in the context of a settlement that occurs pending appeal, and provides welcome guidance for a rule that was only recently enacted, and for which there is sparse case law,” the authors wrote.

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    Darren Azman

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Five Tips to Making Your Carve-Out Transaction a Success

    Five Tips to Making Your Carve-Out Transaction a Success

    ARTICLE

    Five Tips to Making Your Carve-Out Transaction a Success

    March 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Robert Goldstein and Frank Steinherr wrote this bylined article on the challenges of carve-out transactions which dispose of part of a company’s business. “These transactions present a number of unique challenges and are among the most difficult types of M&A deals to execute successfully,” the authors wrote, adding that in-house counsel can “play an integral role [by following tips discussed here] to help minimize disruptions to the business, reduce deal risk/uncertainty and maximize the chances for a successful transaction.”

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    Frank P. Steinherr

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • FinCEN Renews GTOs Targeting Real Estate Transactions

    FinCEN Renews GTOs Targeting Real Estate Transactions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN Renews GTOs Targeting Real Estate Transactions

    March 1, 2017

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Feb. 23, 2017, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, announced the renewal of various temporary Geographic Targeting Orders (“GTOs”) involving certain real estate transactions, an existing initiative to address concerns about money laundering in the real estate market.[1] The renewed GTOs require U.S. title insurance companies to report to FinCEN within 30 days of closing specific information about “all cash” high-end residential real estate transactions in six major metropolitan areas, including the following information: (1) the identity of the beneficial owner of the legal entity; (2) if the purchaser is a limited liability company, then the names, addresses and taxpayer identification numbers of its members; and (3) the identity of the individual primarily responsible for representing the purchaser in the transaction. Reporting is to be made via Form 8300 on the Bank Secrecy Act E-Filing System.[2]

    FinCEN initially issued similar GTOs involving real estate transactions in January 2016. Those GTOs were scheduled to be in effect only from March 1 through Aug. 27, 2016, and covered two geographic areas: Manhattan and Miami-Dade County. At that time, the chief of the FBI’s financial crimes section, Patrick Fallon, stated, “We fully intend to encourage expansion of [the GTOs], so, not only to different geographic areas but as far as the time frame as well.”[3]

    The government delivered on this promise in July 2016, at which time FinCEN announced that it was expanding the reach of its initial GTOs, noting that the initial GTOs had helped law enforcement “identify possible illicit activity” and were “informing future regulatory approaches.”[4] The expanded GTOs, which were effective for 180 days beginning on Aug. 28, 2016, covered six U.S. geographic areas: (1) all boroughs of New York City; (2) Miami-Dade County and the two counties immediately north (Broward and Palm Beach); (3) Los Angeles County; (4) three counties comprising part of the San Francisco area (San Francisco, San Mateo and Santa Clara counties); (5) San Diego County; and (6) the county that includes San Antonio, Texas (Bexar County). Under the GTOs effective beginning Aug. 28, 2016, the monetary thresholds that prompt the reporting obligation vary for each jurisdiction: $3 million for residential real property in Manhattan and $1.5 million for the remaining New York City boroughs; $1 million for the three Florida counties subject to the GTOs; $2 million for the five California counties subject to the GTOs; and $500,000 for Bexar County, Texas.[5]

    FinCEN’s action on Feb. 23 renews these expanded GTOs for 180 days, or through Aug. 22, 2017. In its Press Release renewing the GTOs, FinCEN stated that it has “found that about 30 percent of the transactions covered by the GTOs involve a beneficial owner or purchaser representative that is also the subject of a previous suspicious activity report,” and that this fact corroborates its “concerns about the use of shell companies to buy luxury real estate in ‘all-cash’ transactions.”[6] FinCEN has also suggested that it may take additional steps in the future to address money laundering in the real estate sector and that the information being provided pursuant to the GTOs is helping to inform those efforts.[7]

    Authored by Jeffrey A. Lenobel, Seetha Ramachandran, Gary Stein, Betty Santangelo, Jennifer M. Opheim and Mari S. Dopp.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


     [1] For FinCEN’s summary of the GTO renewal, see FinCEN’s Press Release, “FinCEN Renews Real Estate ‘Geographic Targeting Orders’ to Identify High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas” (Feb. 23, 2017). A sample GTO is available on FinCEN’s website here.

    [2] For background on GTOs, see “New Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Initiative Targets Real Estate Industry,” Westlaw Journal White-Collar Crime, Vol. 30, Issue 6 (March 2016).

    [3] “U.S. Will Track Secret Buyers of Luxury Real Estate,” The New York Times (Jan. 13, 2016).

    [4] See FinCEN’s Press Release, “FinCEN Expands Reach of Real Estate ‘Geographic Targeting Orders’ Beyond Manhattan and Miami” (July 27, 2017).

    [5] An electronic copy of FinCEN’s Geographic Targeting Order Covering Title Insurance Companies (Major Metropolitan Areas and Monetary Thresholds) is available here.

    [6] See FinCEN’s Press Release, “FinCEN Renews Real Estate ‘Geographic Targeting Orders’ to Identify High-End Cash Buyers in Six Major Metropolitan Areas” (Feb. 23, 2017).

    [7] Id.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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