ARTICLE
Increasing Appetite to Initiate Reviews
March, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Dr. Nikolaus von Jacobs and Dr. Germar Enders wrote this bylined article on the German investment clearance process. It is a wider overview of the functions and process.
Dr. Nikolaus von Jacobs and Dr. Germar Enders wrote this bylined article on the German investment clearance process. It is a wider overview of the functions and process.
A Prime Example of Bungled Bundled Transactions
ARTICLE
A Prime Example of Bungled Bundled Transactions
March 20, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Stephen Kranz was co-author of this bylined article which used a recent Iowa administrative ruling to show the difficulty of applying sales and use tax to bundled transactions of taxable and nontaxable items. In ruling that the sale of Prime Video was taxable as part of an Amazon Prime membership, the authors wrote, Iowa “got the answer wrong … Because the price of Prime Video is known, there is no clear justification for not removing it from the products in the bundled transaction.”

ANDA Update
ARTICLE / OTHER
ANDA Update
March 2017
Read time: 2 min

OCC Issues Draft Guidance and Requirements for Fintech Charter Applications
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
OCC Issues Draft Guidance and Requirements for Fintech Charter Applications
March 17, 2017
Read time: 11 min
On March 15, 2017, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) issued a draft supplement (“Supplement”)[1] to its existing Licensing Manual[2] that provides additional detail on evaluating special purpose national bank (“SPNB”) charter applications from financial technology (“fintech”) companies that engage in the business of banking. In addition to the Supplement, the OCC also released a summary of comments and explanatory statement (“Summary”) that addresses key issues raised by commenters and explains the OCC’s decision to issue the Supplement for public comment.[3] The OCC is accepting comments on the Supplement through the close of business April 14, 2017. It should be noted that this date occurs after the term of Thomas J. Curry, the current Comptroller of the Currency (“Comptroller”), expires. Accordingly, we would not expect the Supplement to be finalized until his successor (“appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”[4]) is seated. It is, therefore, quite possible that a new Comptroller appointed by President Trump could make substantial changes to the Supplement before it becomes operative.
Background
The Supplement was informed by comments received on the OCC’s December 2016 paper that discussed issues associated with issuing SPNB charters to fintech companies (“Whitepaper”).[5] The Whitepaper outlines the OCC’s authority to issue such charters, its approach to supervising fintech companies, and its process for evaluating charter applications.
In his remarks at an industry conference on March 6, 2017 (“Remarks”), Comptroller Curry said the OCC “received more than 100 thoughtful comments” since publishing the Whitepaper and will continue with its plan to “issu[e] charters to fintech companies engaged in the business of banking because it is good for consumers, businesses, and the federal banking system.”[6]
In response to the Remarks, all 34 Republican members of the Financial Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, in a letter dated March 10, 2017 to Comptroller Curry (the “GOP Letter”), urged the OCC not to “rush” the decision to “proceed with creating the special charter in the form of a supplement to the OCC’s licensing manual for banks, without providing the details of the charter or an opportunity for comment.”[7] The GOP Letter also reminded Comptroller Curry of his term’s expiration in April and emphasized that “[t]he OCC should provide a full and fair opportunity for stakeholders to see the details of the special charter, solicit feedback, and allow the incoming Comptroller the opportunity to assess the special purpose charter.”[8]
The Summary
In response to the comments received on the Whitepaper, the OCC emphasizes in its Summary that it will be guided by the following “threshold principles” when evaluating fintech company SPNB charter applications:
- The OCC will not allow the inappropriate commingling of banking and commerce.
- The OCC will not allow products with predatory features nor will it allow unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
- There will be no “light-touch” supervision of companies that have an SPNB charter. Any fintech companies granted such charters will be held to the same high standards that all federally chartered banks must meet.[9]
The OCC believes making such charters available would be in the public interest and support a “robust dual banking system by providing [fintech companies] the option of offering banking products and services under a federal charter and operating under federal law, while ensuring essential consumer protections.”[10] Further, the OCC believes its supervision of fintech companies that become SPNBs would “deepen the [OCC’s] expertise in emerging technologies that will be crucial to delivering banking products and services in the future.”[11]
While the OCC addresses several Whitepaper comments in its Summary, including those pertaining to consumer protection, capital and liquidity requirements, regulator coordination, and the OCC’s chartering authority, it does not discuss certain open issues specifically related to money services businesses or payment processors (which were raised in the comments). Additional clarification may be expected from the next Comptroller.
The Supplement
The Supplement “explains how the OCC will apply the licensing standards and requirements in its existing regulations and policies to fintech companies applying for an SPNB charter.”[12] Accordingly, fintech companies seeking such a charter would be required to satisfy the standards and requirements already in place for the formation of new national banks. The SPNB charter process for fintech companies would not be materially different from the national bank charter process for non-fintech companies.
In particular, the Supplement discusses: (i) permissible activities of the SPNB; (ii) the SPNB charter application process for fintech companies engaged in the business of banking; (iii) the OCC’s approach to evaluating such charter applications; and (iv) the OCC’s approach to supervising and examining those fintech companies that become SPNBs.
Permissible Activities of the SPNB
As noted in the Supplement, an SPNB “that conducts activities other than fiduciary activities must conduct at least one of the following three core banking activities: taking deposits, paying checks, or lending money.”[13] The Supplement, however, does not cover entities that accept deposits and therefore must be insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.[14] “Accordingly, the OCC anticipates that SPNBs likely will elect to demonstrate that they are engaged in paying checks or lending money.”[15] Discounting notes, purchasing bank-permissible debt securities, engaging in lease-financing transactions and making loans are examples provided by the OCC as forms of lending money.[16] In addition, the OCC notes that “issuing debit cards or engaging in other means of facilitating payments electronically may be considered the modern equivalent of paying checks.”[17] If the activities proposed by the fintech company have not previously been determined to be part of, or incidental to, the business of banking or to fall within an established core banking function, the OCC may ask the fintech company to prepare a legal analysis supporting its view that its proposed activities are permissible and fall within one of the core banking categories.[18]
Fintech SPNB Charter Application Process
According to the Supplement, fintech companies interested in an SPNB charter should make an initial inquiry with the OCC’s Office of Innovation, which is the primary point of contact for all fintech company inquiries. The Supplement also encourages prefiling communications between the OCC and the fintech company.[19] After such exploratory communications, the OCC will be better equipped to identify certain aspects of the charter proposal that “present novel or complex issues.”[20]
The prefiling stage may include one or more formal meetings with the OCC Licensing Division and other appropriate staff. Before such a meeting occurs, organizers for a fintech SPNB charter (“Organizers”) should provide the OCC with an overview of the charter proposal, including a discussion of the business plan.[21] Furthermore, “[t]he OCC will expect an SPNB applicant whose business plan includes lending or providing financial services to consumers or small business to demonstrate a commitment to financial inclusion,” and “the OCC will condition its preliminary approval of an SPNB charter on the applicant’s implementation of a Financial Inclusion Plan (‘FIP’).” The FIP must address the applicant’s “proposed goals, approach, activities and milestones for serving the relevant market or community.”[22]
After the prefiling stage, the Organizers should file the charter application, including the business plan and the appropriate Interagency Biographical Report on all identified insiders.[23] These filing procedures “will be substantially the same as those applicable to any other national bank.”[24]
OCC Evaluation of Fintech SPNB Charter Applications
The Supplement walks through the chartering standards the OCC will apply and explains that the OCC is guided by certain principles when evaluating an application to establish any national bank.[25] To determine whether these standards are met, the OCC will consider, among other things, whether the applicant:
- Has organizers and management with appropriate skills and experience;
- Has adequate capital to support the projected volume and type of business and proposed risk profile;
- Has a business plan that articulates a clear path and a timeline to profitability; and
- Includes in its business plan, if applicable, a FIP that has an appropriate description of the proposed goals, approach, activities, and milestones for serving the relevant market and community.[26]
In addition, the “OCC’s evaluation may identify specific controls or requirements that are necessary for the success of the applicant’s business plan or to ensure the OCC’s chartering standards are met.”[27]
OCC Supervision and Examination of Fintech SPNBs
After the OCC issues final approval and the fintech SPNB becomes operational, the OCC will supervise the SPNB, as it does with all other national banks, under scheduled supervisory cycles, including on-site examination and periodic off-site monitoring. Because the Supplement is focused on the licensing process for SPNBs, it does not provide extensive guidance regarding the OCC’s supervisory expectations and the supervision of national banks. Key supervisory considerations, however, are highlighted in Appendix A to the Supplement. In general, the OCC indicates its supervisory framework will “incorporate core elements already in place for all national banks” and “will follow a risk-based approach commensurate with the size and complexity of the institution, focusing on any elevated risks and unique supervisory challenges presented by a given SPNB.”[28]
The OCC typically does not solicit comments on procedural manuals and supplements. However, “consistent with its guiding principles of transparency and fostering open dialogue with stakeholders” (and possibly with the GOP Letter in mind), the OCC is accepting comments on the Supplement through the close of business April 14, 2017. Comments should be submitted to specialpurposecharter@occ.treas.gov.
Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Joseph P. Vitale, Kara A. Kuchar and Adam J. Barazani.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] See Supplement, available at www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-lm-fintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf.
[2] The OCC’s Licensing Manual consists of a series of booklets that explain the OCC’s policies and procedures on key licensing topics and is available on the OCC’s website.
[3] See Summary, available at www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/summary-explanatory-statement-fintech-charters.pdf.
[4] 12 U.S.C. § 2.
[5] See Whitepaper, available at www.occ.treas.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf.
[6] See Remarks, available at www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2017/pub-speech-2017-27.pdf.
[7] See GOP Letter, available at www.s3.amazonaws.com/cdn.orrick.com/files/03102017LetterComptrollerCurry.pdf.
[8] Id.
[9] See Summary at 2.
[10] See id.at 3.
[11] Id.
[12] Supplement at 2.
[13] Id. at 5.
[14] Id. The Supplement defines “SPNB” as a national bank that engages in one of the core banking activities “but does not take deposits within the meaning of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.” Id. at 2.
[15] Id. at 5.
[16] See id.
[17] Id.
[18] See id.
[19] “[T]he OCC finds it mutually beneficial for the applicant and the OCC to maintain an open dialogue throughout the process.” See Supplement at 3.
[20] See id.
[21] The Supplement provides more details regarding the submission of a business plan. See id. at 9-13.
[22] See id. at 13; see also Summary at 8-9.
[23] See Supplement at 5.
[24] See id.
[25] The principles are: “(i) maintaining a safe and sound banking system; (ii) encouraging a national bank or Federal savings association to provide fair access to financial services by helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community; (iii) ensuring compliance with laws and regulations; and (iv) promoting fair treatment of customers including efficiency and better service.” 12 CFR 5.20(f)(1).
[26] Supplement at 7.
[27] Id. The Supplement provides a detailed discussion of conditions associated with approvals. See id. at 13-15.
[28] For additional information on specific supervisory areas, applicants should refer to the booklets of the Comptroller’s Handbook, available on the OCC’s website.
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

UK Supreme Court Clarifies English Curial Powers to Impose Security Payments in Enforcement of New York Convention Arbitral Awards
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
UK Supreme Court Clarifies English Curial Powers to Impose Security Payments in Enforcement of New York Convention Arbitral Awards
March 16, 2017
Read time: 7 min
A recent UK Supreme Court judgment will likely impact on the interplay between the New York Convention and national law
In IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corp [2017] UKSC 16, the UK Supreme Court overturned a Court of Appeal decision that imposed upon a New York Convention arbitral award debtor an obligation to pay US$100 million in security, as a condition to challenging enforcement or recognition of the award before the Commercial Court.
Background
In 2004, following Nigerian-seated proceedings, an arbitral tribunal awarded IPCO Nigeria Ltd US$152 million plus interest (the award) connected with a dispute arising out of a contract, under Nigerian law, for the design and construction of a petroleum export terminal for Nigerian National Petroleum Corp (NNPC). As respondent in the arbitration, NNPC commenced set aside proceedings before the Nigerian Federal High Court, originally on jurisdictional grounds (the non-fraud challenge) and, from 2009 onwards, on allegations of fraud concerning the quantum of IPCO’s underlying claim.
IPCO sought to enforce the award in the English courts. On 29 November 2004 an ex parte order of the Commercial Court, made pursuant to Sections 101(2) and 101(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the Act), recognised the award in England and required NNPC to effect full payment of the award to IPCO. Upon NNPC’s subsequent application, however, the enforcement proceedings were adjourned under Section 103(5) of the Act, pending resolution of the non-fraud challenges in Nigeria.
As the Commercial Court agreed that the challenge before the Nigerian courts was bona fide and had a realistic prospect of success, it maintained the adjournment conditional upon payment by NNPC of the undisputed amounts under the award, plus US$80 million in security.
NNPC subsequently argued that the award had been procured by fraud, and sought to resist and adjourn the enforcement proceedings on that basis. Given that NNPC’s challenge before the Nigerian courts was amended to capture the fraud allegations, and upon an undertaking by NNPC to maintain the US$80 million security, the parties consented to set aside the Commercial Court’s order for payment of the undisputed amounts under the award and to adjourn the award enforcement action pursuant to Section 103(5) of the Act.
Against this backdrop of protracted delays in the Nigerian courts, in 2012 IPCO issued a fresh application to enforce the award in England. The Commercial Court dismissed the application on the basis that it was inappropriate to enforce in England while NNPC had a good prima facie fraud case before the Nigerian courts.
Nonetheless, on appeal, the Court of Appeal decided that the continued lengthy delays in the Nigerian proceedings warranted the English court itself determining whether or not the award should be enforced. Specifically, the Court of Appeal ordered that conditional upon NNPC paying a further US$100 million in security, the proceedings
Shall be remitted to the Commercial Court for determination, pursuant to Section 103(3) of the Act, as to whether the arbitral award…should not be enforced in whole or in part because it would be against English public policy so to do (the Section 103(3) Proceedings)… Any further enforcement of the Award shall be adjourned, pursuant to Section 103(5) of the Arbitration Act 1996, pending determination of the Section 103(3) Proceedings.
NNPC appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court. The principal issue for the Supreme Court’s adjudication was whether the Court of Appeal’s order was validated by virtue of Section 103(5) of the Act, or by the English court’s procedural powers more generally.
Decision
There were several components central to the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision to allow NNPC’s appeal.
First, the Supreme Court held that English courts possess no powers, neither under Section 103(2) nor 103(3) of the Act, to impose upon an award debtor any obligation to provide security when resisting enforcement of an arbitral award in England on properly arguable grounds.
Second, the Court of Appeal erroneously characterised its Section 103(3) order as involving an “adjournment” within the scope of Section 103(5), which only contemplates any imposition of security being allowable where English proceedings had been adjourned pending challenge at the relevant arbitral seat. On the facts, that had ceased to be the case. Consequently, having remitted the question of the enforceability of the award to the Commercial Court under Section 103(3) of the Act, the Supreme Court opined that the Court of Appeal was wrong to adjourn the enforcement proceedings under Section 103(5) of the Act.
Citing Dardana Ltd v Yukos Oil Co (No.1) [2002] EWCA Civ 543, the Supreme Court ruled that an order for security under Section 103(5) of the Act, pending the set aside proceedings at the arbitral seat, is “the price of an adjournment which an award debtor is seeking” which should “not be imposed on an award debtor who is resisting enforcement on properly arguable grounds”. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered for NNPC’s challenge to be remitted to the Commercial Court without payment of further security, albeit without releasing the existing security as the price of earlier adjournments under Section 103(5).
Third, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal’s order for further security was not validated by virtue of its general civil procedural powers. Citing Gater Assets Ltd v Nak Naftogaz Ukrainy [2007] EWCA Civ 988, in the Supreme Court’s opinion the conditions for enforcement embodied at Articles V and VI of the New York Convention (the Convention), effect to which is given by Sections 103(2) and 103(3) of the Act, constitute a complete code “intended to establish a common international approach”. This code “excludes requiring security for an award” where there is an “arguable challenge under Article V”. Had the Convention envisaged security orders possibly attaching to rulings under Sections 103(2) or 103(3) of the Act, it would have expressly provided for them.
Absent any such Convention power, and approving Huscroft v P&O Ferries Ltd (Practice Note) [2010] EWCA Civ 1483, the Supreme Court determined that the general power to impose conditions on orders contained at Civil Procedural Rule 3.1(3) bore “no relevance on this appeal” and should not be exercised so as to fetter party entitlements to raise properly arguable challenges to recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards.
Observations
A number of significant points arise from this Supreme Court judgment.
It provides a shot in the arm for arbitral award debtors seeking to challenge flawed awards in England. That the English courts possess no powers to order security where properly arguable challenges are posited before the enforcing courts removes a potential deterrent for arbitral award debtors, particularly where the amounts granted under a challenged award are substantial.
For award creditors litigating under Sections 103(2) or (3) of the Act, alternative paths must be trodden to secure an award indirectly. For instance, as noted by the Supreme Court in obiter, it remains permissible to exercise other court powers for the making of disclosure and freezing orders without impinging upon award debtors’ rights of challenge.
The decision adds to an already considerable corpus of consistent English curial authority giving effect to enshrined Convention principles.
The last, and perhaps most striking aspect is that, by its interpretation of the Act and the Convention, the Supreme Court upholds the latter as providing for a “complete code”. In England, that effectively eradicates any lingering notion that English courts retain a jurisdiction to order security as a condition to advancing properly arguable challenges to award enforcement. Any such discretion may only be invoked in the specific circumstances prescribed by Section 103(5) of the Act, in full chime with Article VI of the Convention. Internationally, the Supreme Court’s judgment may provoke disputants to test any potential fault lines at the interface between the Convention and other state national laws. On the question of security, it is less clear whether other state courts will uphold Convention principles so robustly.

IRS Opposes Granting of Certiorari in Cases Addressing Definition of Return
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
IRS Opposes Granting of Certiorari in Cases Addressing Definition of Return
March 15, 2017
Read time: 9 min
Two petitions for certiorari are pending before the Supreme Court of the United States, asking the Court to resolve the question of whether a tax return filed after an assessment by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is a “return” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The answer to this question will determine whether a bankrupt taxpayer’s tax debts can be discharged or are permanently barred from discharge—according to these petitions, the courts of appeal are divided as to the answer.
There are presently two petitions for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court of the United States asking the Court to resolve the question of whether a tax return filed after an assessment by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is a “return” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The answer to this question will determine whether a bankrupt taxpayer’s tax debts can be discharged or are permanently barred from discharge. According to these petitions, the courts of appeal are divided as to the answer.
The Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) generally allows a debtor to discharge unsecured debt. However, it also provides a list of non-dischargeable debts that includes three types of non-priority tax debts: (1) tax debts of a debtor who fails to file tax returns (11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(i)); (2) tax debts of a debtor who filed fraudulent tax returns (11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(C)); and, (3) tax debts of a debtor who filed late tax returns if a bankruptcy petition is filed within two years after the date the late return was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Prior to 2005, the Bankruptcy Code did not define a “return” for purposes of the non-dischargeability rules. Somewhat surprisingly, the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) similarly provides no definition. The most influential case interpreting the term “return” for federal tax purposes has been Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984). In Beard, the US Tax Court provided a four-part test to determine whether a document was sufficient to constitute a “return.” To qualify as a return, the court held that a document must: (1) provide sufficient data to calculate tax liability; (2) purport to be a return; (3) be an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the requirements of the tax law; and (4) be executed by the taxpayer under penalties of perjury. Beard, 82 T.C. at 777 (the “Beard Test”). The third prong of the Beard Test has divided courts and given rise to reclassifications of some late-filing taxpayers as non-filing taxpayers. Some courts, like the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have held that tax returns filed after the IRS has already assessed tax liability are not “returns” because the taxpayer did not make the “honest and reasonable attempt” required under Step 3 of the Beard Test. As a result, the bankrupt’s tax liability is non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(i) for failure to file, rather than qualifying for the waiting period for late filing under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(ii). Other circuits, like the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, have held that the “honest and reasonable attempt” prong of the Beard Test requires only that a taxpayer attempt to complete the tax return and have treated tax returns filed after the IRS has assessed tax liability as “returns” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning thus allows a bankrupt taxpayer to file a “return” after the IRS has assessed tax and still discharge his or her tax debt after the two-year waiting period under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(ii).
In 2005, Congress amended 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) to provide that a “‘[tax] return’ means a return that satisfies the requirements of applicable non-bankruptcy law.” However, as noted above, the IRC provides no definition of “return.” Some courts have since held that this amendment had no effect on the analysis set forth in Beard, while others have held that the amendment neutralizes the Beard analysis, creating a current circuit split. At present there appear to be three distinguishable approaches to determining the dischargeability of a late-filing bankrupt taxpayer’s tax debt. The Eighth Circuit treats post-assessment returns as late returns under the Beard analysis, which only postpones dischargeability by two years. The Ninth, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits treat post-assessment returns as non-returns under the Beard analysis, thereby rendering the relevant tax debt non-dischargeable. Finally, the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits treat all late and post-assessment returns as non-returns under the amended 11 U.S.C. § 523(a), therefore triggering the dischargeability bar.
Martin Smith did not timely file his 2001 Form 1040, and the IRS prepared a Substitute for Return (SFR) pursuant to IRC section 6020(b). In March 2006, the IRS mailed Smith a notice of deficiency asserting a deficiency in his 2001 taxes. Smith did not challenge the deficiency asserted in the notice, and the IRS assessed the full amount. In May 2009, Smith filed a Form 1040 for his 2001 tax year, noting that this was the “original return to replace the SFR.” On his May 2009 return, Smith reported more income than on the IRS’s SFR, and, accordingly, a higher tax liability than that assessed by the IRS. The IRS added the additional tax liability reported by Smith to the assessment for 2001. On December 22, 2011, Smith declared bankruptcy and sought to discharge his 2001 tax debt. The IRS contended that taxes assessed prior to Smith’s 2009 filing for the 2001 tax year were non-dischargeable taxes for which no return had been filed.
The Bankruptcy Court disagreed with the IRS and ruled in Smith’s favor, holding the post-assessment Form 1040 a late “return” under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(ii) and not a non-return under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(i). The IRS appealed, and the district court reversed, holding that Smith’s 2001 tax debt was not dischargeable. Smith appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and, on July 14, 2016, the Ninth Circuit found that Smith’s post-assessment tax return was not an “honest and reasonable attempt” to comply with the tax law, and therefore Smith had not filed a “return” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(i). Smith v. Internal Revenue Service, 828 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2016).
In a similar case, the IRS solicited tax returns from Christopher Justice for tax years 2001–2006. Justice hand-delivered his Forms 1040 for SFR years of 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 as well as for 2004, 2005 and 2006, three non-SFR years, on October 22, 2007. The returns for the SFR tax years were not processed, while the returns for the non-SFR years were processed and reflected a filing date of October 22, 2007. Two years later, the returns for the SFR tax years were again solicited by the IRS. Justice resubmitted the signed copies of the Forms 1040 for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 on September 1, 2009.
On July 22, 2011 Justice filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and received a Discharge of Debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 727 on November 4, 2011. On January 10, 2012, Justice sought determination that the tax liabilities for the 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 tax years were not excepted from the discharge. The Bankruptcy Court held for the United States and on appeal the district court affirmed. Justice appealed, and on March 30, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit found that Justice had failed to establish that he had made an “honest and reasonable attempt” to comply with the tax law. The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that Justice’s tax debt for the SFR years could not be discharged by the bankruptcy.
Both Smith and Justice have filed petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court (Docket No. 16-497 and No. 16-786, respectively). Both petitions are based on a division among the circuits regarding whether a tax return filed after an assessment by the IRS is a “return” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. This division, the petitioners argue, creates uncertainty and causes dissimilar treatment of bankrupt taxpayers, making this a paradigm case for the Supreme Court to address. Smith’s petition argues that a filed and accepted late tax return is in fact a return “[t]hat is ‘[l]ate’.” Justice’s petition argues that the third prong in the Beard Test should focus on the return itself and not the reasons for not filing, specifically that the hanging paragraph in 11 U.S.C. §523 provides that the non-filing debtors cannot rely on an IRC section 6020(b) assessment by the IRS for purposes of starting the two year waiting period under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1)(B)(ii).
In support of Smith’s petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, the National Consumer Bankruptcy Rights Center (the NCBRC) and National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (the NACBA) filed a brief as amici curiae in support of certiorari. The NCBRC is an organization that works to preserve bankruptcy rights of consumer debtors and protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system. The NACBA is an organization of consumer bankruptcy attorneys throughout the country that works to educate the bankruptcy bar and the community at large. In their amicus brief, the NCBRC and NACBA noted the well-developed conflict among the circuits. Specifically, the brief cited the three-way split in the judicial interpretation of late-filed tax returns. The NCBRC and NACBA highlighted the discrepancy in the treatment of similarly situated debtor taxpayers.
On January 13, 2017, the IRS filed its brief in opposition of certiorari in Smith. The IRS argues that there is no conflict among the circuits as to whether a tax filing made after the IRS prepares an SFR qualifies as a return. Specifically, the IRS concludes that the circuit courts’ differing approaches to interpreting 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1) does not in itself provide a basis for further review. In its brief, the IRS notes that while some courts apply the Beard Test and some circuits have found that deadlines are applicable filing requirements, the circuits have come to the same conclusion that post-assessment filings were not “returns” under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1).
On February 22, 2017, the IRS filed its brief in opposition to certiorari in Justice. Similar to its opposition in Smith, the IRS argues that, although the circuits have differing approaches to analyzing dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(1), every court of appeals has addressed whether a tax filing made after the IRS prepares an SFR qualifies as a return and has reached the same result: a debtor cannot make a tax debt dischargeable by filing a Form 1040 after the IRS has already assessed the debtor for the given year because a post-assessment filing is not a “return.”
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari, the circuit split alleged by the petitioners and the amici curiae would be resolved, as well as the uncertainty and potential dissimilar treatment of bankrupt taxpayers that Smith, Justice, and the amici argue exists today.
The Evolving Role of AI in Health Care Delivery
ARTICLE
The Evolving Role of AI in Health Care Delivery
March 15, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Dale Van Demark wrote this bylined article on how use of artificial intelligence could transform health care delivery regulation. “Under some circumstances, AI systems will start to look more like a practitioner than a device — they will be capable of, and we will expect them to, render judgments in a health care context,” Mr. Van Denmark wrote. “In such a circumstance, is it fair to burden the treating practitioner with the liability for the patient’s care that is determined by the AI system? Are existing ‘product liability’ standards appropriate for such AI systems?”
Law on Employees’ Inventions
ARTICLE
Law on Employees’ Inventions
March, 2017
Read time: 2 min
The work of an employee can result in a patentable invention, software that is copyright protected, or in other forms of intellectual property. The chapter in Tschöpe’s “Labor Law Manual” handbook on labor law, written by Dr. Henrik Holzapfel, explains the claims and obligations of employer and employee under the law on employees’ inventions, and under similar regulations in copyright law.

Artificial Intelligence in Health Care Delivery: Where Might it Take Us, and What Happens if We Get There?
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Artificial Intelligence in Health Care Delivery: Where Might it Take Us, and What Happens if We Get There?
March 14, 2017
Read time: 11 min
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is everywhere these days, and the health care sector is no exception. While AI in health care delivery is no longer new, recent advances in AI systems increase the likelihood that we will have to face a new set of perplexing issues in health care delivery regulation.
It is difficult to avoid the specter of “artificial intelligence” (AI) these days, and for those working in the health care sector, there is no exception. Health care delivery has been impacted by a variety of tools that use some form of AI for many years. Further, recent advances in hardware and computer science development have increased the likelihood of even more significant impact. Today, some health diagnostic tools using advanced AI systems in research settings perform as well as their human counterparts, and sometimes better; in the future, performance will continue to improve, and the scope of activities subject to this kind of automation will likely increase.
Currently, advanced AI systems are being used in health care delivery settings in very discrete ways, and are designed to provide practitioners with more and better information with which to make decisions. The function of the practitioner remains unchanged and familiar—the practitioner is the final authority with respect to the provision of diagnostic and treatment service. The practitioner’s judgment remains paramount.
It is, therefore, easy to be lulled into a false sense of security regarding the application of legal and regulatory standards with what seems to be nothing more than the addition of another tool in a practitioner’s bag. There are, however, reasons to take a more critical view and to consider what the future may hold—because the future and the expanded potential of AI systems in health care deliver is likely not as far away as we might think.
Whose Judgment?
Any professional is held to a standard of care that, at its most fundamental level, recognizes that the professional will exercise his or her judgment in the performance of the profession. That judgment is exercised in the context of past and ongoing learning, training, experience and the utilization of existing tools that assist the professional in exercising that judgment. The professional takes the facts and circumstances and weighs various conclusions regarding a course of action. In this context, AI tools can be extremely beneficial—particularly in the health care context—as they can speed analysis, expand the knowledge base of the provider and speed the review of vast amounts of data.
For liability and licensure purposes, however, the practitioner must never lose sight of his or her own responsibility and always exercise independent judgment. The practitioner must not delegate to the AI system the essential function of being a licensed professional and making the final call. While this may be a simple concept to express, as AI system functionality continues to improve, and expand on their clinical diagnostic and even treatment plan capabilities, it may be a harder concept to implement as time goes on.
Experience indicates that technology will continue in its development as a ubiquitous tool. We accept information technology into our professional and personal lives with ease. Studies indicate that younger generations adopt technology with ease and confidence; and demand that these technologies be made available to them in a variety of contexts. It appears that, unless there is a law against it—and even if there is—someone is going to build an app, and people will use it. The health care sector is not immune to this trend, even though the significant regulatory environment makes rapid and systemically valuable adoption difficult. This pressure for adoption will only increase as AI systems continue to develop, improve and demonstrate their effectiveness in the health care delivery setting.
Clearly, there is nothing wrong with relying on proven technology; but at what point do we, as a society, accept that proven technology can replace the judgment of a licensed professional? If an AI system proves to be more effective and reliable than a human physician at a certain function, then should we not rely on the AI system’s judgment?
Oversight and Standards of Care
Regulation is largely about allocating responsibility among actors, and ensuring that certain actors have the requisite skills, knowledge, assets, qualifications or other protections in place given the nature of what they are doing. We regulate health care practitioners, financial institutions, insurers, lawyers, automobile salesmen, private investigators and others because we believe, as a society, that these actors—human or corporate—in exercising their judgment should be held to heightened standards. Accordingly, not only are these actors subject to potentially more exacting standards of care, but also they frequently must be licensed, demonstrate a certain financial stability or otherwise prove a degree of trustworthiness.
Similarly, we hold products to a more exacting standard. In health care in particular, not only do we require medical devices to prove their efficacy and safety, but we also require that their manufacture adhere to certain quality standards. Further, certain products may be held to a standard of “strict liability” if they do not function properly. Accordingly, the developers or manufacturers of these products face significant liability for the failures of their products.
A health care practitioner’s standard of care is an evolving standard, and one that does not exclude the appropriate utilization of technology in the care setting—indeed, it may eventually require it if the technology establishes itself in common usage. It is possible to foresee advanced, judgment-rendering AI systems integrated into the care setting. The question we must ask is whether our existing legal and regulatory tools provide an appropriate and effective environment in which these tools are deployed.
Allocating Responsibility
At some point, under some circumstances, AI systems will start to look more like a practitioner than a device—they will be capable of, and we will expect them to, render judgments in a health care context. The AI system will analyze symptoms, data and medical histories and determine treatment plans. In such a circumstance, is it fair to burden the treating practitioner with the liability for the patient’s care that is determined by the AI system? Are existing “product liability” standards appropriate for such AI systems?
This latter question is relevant given the “black box” nature of advanced AI systems. The so-called AI “black box” references the difficulty or inability to access the workings of the AI system, as we may otherwise do with other software systems. The reason for this is the nature of some of these AI systems, which are frequently systems that utilize neural networks. In essence, neural networks are large layers of interconnected nodes. The nodes are subject to generally fairly simple functions, but by inputting a great deal of information and “training” the network, these relative unsophisticated interconnected layers of nodes can produce remarkably sophisticated results.
While these neural networks can produce excellent results, their “reasons” for coming up with a conclusion are not easily discernable. In a sense, these new AI systems become functional and effective in a manner similar to the manner a human does. We learn, for example, what a dog is by seeing dogs and being told that these are dogs. The same is true of neural network AI systems. While we may learn later that dogs share common features and are categorized in certain ways, we recognize dogs on the basis of experience; and the same is true for AI systems. Unpacking why an AI system misidentifies a cat as a dog, accordingly, can be very difficult—in essence it is an exercise in understanding why a neural network rendered a judgment.
In this context, it is fair to ask whether a judgment-rendering AI system in any sector should be held to the same standard as other products. We may want to consider any number of factors and actors when determining how to allocate responsibility. We may want to allocate responsibility among the practitioner, the developer of the AI system, the “trainer” of the AI system, the “maintainer” of the AI system and, perhaps, the AI system itself.
How to Regulate: Start Asking the Questions
Achieving a reasonable approach to effectively regulate new dynamics in health care delivery will require thinking carefully about how best to regulate AI systems and care delivery as this technology continues to advance and become capable of taking over certain “professional” functions. A number of factors must be taken into consideration.
1. The existing oversight regime: Right now, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the manufacture and distribution of medical devices, including software, intended to be utilized for the diagnosis, treatment, cure of prevention of disease or other condition. FDA approval or clearance of a medical device does not necessarily limit physician utilization of a product for off-label purposes. State medical boards regulate the practice of medicine, assuring that the physician community is adhering to appropriate standards of care. Both of these regulatory bodies will need to review their approaches to regulation in order to effectively integrate AI systems into care delivery.
2. The ubiquity of AI in the IoT: While some AI systems may be discrete pieces of system machinery, it would be a mistake to ignore AI penetration into the “internet of things” (IoT) and the larger digital landscape, and the related penetration of the IoT into health care through patient engagement, data tracking, wellness and preventative care tools and communication tools. In short, we need to recognize that increasingly sophisticated levels of “health care” are increasingly taking place away from hospitals, doctors’ offices and other traditional care settings, and not under the direct supervision of health care professionals.
Directly related to this, of course, is the utilization and maintenance of data. AI health care tools integrated within the IoT will likely be privy to massive amounts of data—but under what approval and subject to what restrictions? Frequently, even the most isolated AI tools in health care rely on massive data sets. Accordingly, data privacy and security issues will increase in importance and consideration of how the existing privacy and security regulatory regime applies to advanced AI systems will necessitate a forward-thinking approach.
3. Liability and insurance: Given the black box nature of AI systems and the unique ways they are developed to perform their functions, determining liability becomes complicated. As noted above, different actors, performing different functions come into play, and the role and function of the health care practitioner may begin to change given the nature of some of these AI systems. The practitioner may take on responsibility for AI system training or testing, for example. How liability should be allocated in such a complex environment is a difficult question, and one that will likely evolve over time.
Further, the standards for liability may need to be reconsidered, and the standards of care for the delivery of care may need to undergo radical transformation in the future if AI systems prove themselves able to function at a higher level of quality than their human counterparts. As the interaction between human physician and AI systems evolve, the standard of care can easily become quite complex and confusing.
4. The robot doctor: Political and legal theorists are already seriously contemplating imbuing AI systems with legal attributes of personhood. While fully sentient and sapient robots may be far off in the future, legal rights and responsibilities do not require such features. For example, we provide corporate bodies and animals with legal rights and responsibilities. We also discriminate among different groups of “people” (e.g., between citizens and non-citizens; between pets and wild animals). In fact, the notion of rights and responsibilities for an AI system may assist in designing an appropriate regulatory environment.
Similarly, we may borrow from human-based liability standards to evaluate whether an AI system caused event is actionable. Given the manner in which neural networks are trained and their black box nature, a “reasonable robot” standard of care may become an effective way in determining whether a wrong has occurred.
The Future of Health Care Professionals
We have not yet reached the age of the machine, and our health care is still best served by rich engagement between patient and well-educated, trained and equipped health care professionals. Health care professionals have the opportunity to shape the way AI systems can best be used in care delivery, and also to shape the way future AI systems can best be utilized in the future as they continue to improve and evolve.
They should take advantage of this opportunity.
The author would like to thank Stephen W. Bernstein, Bernadette M. Broccolo, Shelby Buettner, Jennifer S. Geetter, Vernessa T. Pollard and Erin L. Thimmesch for their comments and suggestions for this article.
Rare Appellate Ruling on Indirect Purchaser Class Action
ARTICLE
Rare Appellate Ruling on Indirect Purchaser Class Action
March 14, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Stefan Meisner and Ashley McMahon wrote this bylined article on the Third Circuit decision on In re: Class 8 Transmission Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, which the authors called a “rare appellate court decision [that] gives insights into the intricate legal and economic issues that indirect purchaser plaintiffs and defendants must grapple with when litigating the class certification issue.”