Content Type: Article

  • Appellate Court Mows Down Objections to Preliminary Injunction

    ARTICLE

    Appellate Court Mows Down Objections to Preliminary Injunction

    March 29, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Brian Jones wrote this bylined article on why the Federal Circuit’s upheld the district court’s injunction for the plaintiff in a patent dispute over lawnmower technology (Metalcraft v. Toro). The Court determined that “that the grant of an injunction was in the public interest” because it would “highlight the importance of encouraging innovation [and] the public would also continue to have access to the patented system” of the plaintiff, Mr. Jones wrote.

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  • Ordinance on the Supervisory Requirements for Financial Institutions’ Remuneration Systems 3.0: “Claw Back”

    ARTICLE

    Ordinance on the Supervisory Requirements for Financial Institutions’ Remuneration Systems 3.0: “Claw Back”

    March 24, 2017

    Read time: 1 min

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    Overview

    Thomas Gennert wrote this bylined article on the new supervisory requirements for financial institutions’ remuneration systems.

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    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • Taxpayer Rights Around the World (Parts 1 and 2)

    ARTICLE

    Taxpayer Rights Around the World (Parts 1 and 2)

    March 24, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Andrew Roberson wrote this bylined article summarizing the second International Conference on Taxpayer Rights held in Vienna, Austria. The conference explored “how taxpayer rights globally serve as the foundation for effective tax administration,” Mr. Roberson wrote, and reviewed such issues taxpayer international legal status, privacy and transparency, multijurisdictional disputes, and building trust with tax authorities.

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  • Environmental Claims in Advertising

    ARTICLE

    Environmental Claims in Advertising

    March/April 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Arthur DeCelle wrote this bylined article describing how brewers can use product labels, point of sale (POS) advertising, social networks, and other media to tell customers about their environmental responsibility efforts. Such information “must be truthful and substantiated by evidence [and] must not be deceptive to reasonable consumers,” Mr. DeCelle wrote, urging brewers to “carefully consider the language you use and any potential for consumer deception [regarding] false or deceptive environmental claims.”

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  • External Personnel Without a Safety Net

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    External Personnel Without a Safety Net

    March 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    On April 1, the amendment to the Temporary Employment Act comes into force. The legislature thus wants to prevent abuse that has been widespread so far. For the companies, it is now necessary to establish a compliance system in order to ultimately not pay dearly. Dr. Sandra Urban-Crell and Dr. Gudrun Germakowski wrote this bylined article on the upcoming changes to the Temporary Employment Act.

    This article is in German.

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  • Why a Surgical Divestiture May Not Be Enough

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    Why a Surgical Divestiture May Not Be Enough

    March 22, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Jon Dubrow and Gregory Heltzer wrote this bylined article describing how government antitrust regulators have recently rejected surgical divestitures or other proposed remedies in business combinations. Recent failed deals show that the DOJ and FTC “have continued to raise the bar for what they view as acceptable remedies and buyers,” the authors wrote.

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    Authors

    Jon B. Dubrow

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Gregory E. Heltzer

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • CFPB Issues Notice and Request for Comment Regarding Assessment of Remittance Rule

    CFPB Issues Notice and Request for Comment Regarding Assessment of Remittance Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Issues Notice and Request for Comment Regarding Assessment of Remittance Rule

    March 21, 2017

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 15, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) issued a notice (“Notice”) regarding its plans to conduct an assessment of the final rule concerning remittance transfers (“Remittance Rule”).[1] The CFPB is requesting public comment on these plans as well as certain recommendations and information that may be useful in conducting the planned assessment. Comments will be due within 60 days of the Notice’s publication in the Federal Register, which is expected to occur shortly.

    According to the Notice, the CFPB intends to focus its assessment, which is required by the Dodd-Frank Act, in two areas: (1) whether the remittances market has evolved after the Remittance Rule in ways that promote access, efficiency and limited market disruption by considering how remittance volumes, prices and competition in the remittance market may have changed; and (2) whether the Remittance Rule’s consumer protections have brought more information, transparency and greater price predictability to the market. Upon the assessment’s completion, the CFPB plans to issue an assessment report no later than Oct. 28, 2018.

    To inform the assessment, the CFPB is inviting members of the public to submit information and other comments relevant to assessing the effectiveness of the Remittance Rule in meeting the purposes and objectives of Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act as well as the CFPB’s specified goals. The Notice specifies several issues on which the CFPB seeks comments, recommendations and information, including but not limited to: (1) recommendations for modifying, expanding or eliminating the Remittance Rule; (2) data and other factual information concerning the benefits and costs of the Remittance Rule for consumers, remittance transfer providers and others; and (3) comments on the feasibility and effectiveness of the assessment plan.

    Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Kara A. Kuchar and Adam J. Barazani.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


     [1] A copy of the Notice is available here.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Marshall and Cordy: Monan Guided Mass. Court Reforms

    ARTICLE

    Marshall and Cordy: Monan Guided Mass. Court Reforms

    March 21, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Robert Cordy, as a former associate justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, collaborated with former justice Margaret Marshall on this bylined article saluting the contributions that the late Rev. Donald Monan, Boston College’s longtime president and chancellor, made to improve the administration of justice in the Massachusetts courts.

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  • Application Partially Voided Where Defendant Lacked Bona Fide Intent to Use Mark

    ARTICLE

    Application Partially Voided Where Defendant Lacked Bona Fide Intent to Use Mark

    March 21, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Han (Jason) Yu wrote this bylined article on the Six Circuit ruling in Kelly Servs., et al. v. Creative Harbor. The court held that trademark applicant Creative Harbor lacked a bona fide intent to use at least some of the marks for listed goods and services, and remanded the case back to the district court to evaluate intent for each application based on objective documentary evidence.

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  • Ninth Circuit Holds Bank Liable for Preference, Applying Hypothetical Liquidation Analysis

    Ninth Circuit Holds Bank Liable for Preference, Applying Hypothetical Liquidation Analysis

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ninth Circuit Holds Bank Liable for Preference, Applying Hypothetical Liquidation Analysis

    March 20, 2017

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017. In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017). According to the court, the hypothetical “inquiry [must be] factually warranted, [be] supported by appropriate evidence, and … not contravene an independent statutory provision.” Id. Applying Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §547(b)(5) (the “greater amount test”), the court reasoned that the Bank “received a greater amount than it would have if the [debt repayment] had not been made and there had been a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation as of the petition date.” Id. at*7 quoting In re Smith’s Home Furnishings, Inc., 265 F. 3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2001).

    The Bank had received $190,000 from the debtor (i.e., fully satisfying the debtor’s outstanding loan obligations to the Bank) within 90 days of the debtor’s bankruptcy, but the lower courts found that the Bank was fully secured with a setoff right against $526,000 on deposit in the debtor’s account at the Bank as of the date of bankruptcy. Because it was fully secured, the Bank had not received more than it would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case; therefore, it had no preference liability, reasoned the lower courts. Reversing the district court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the Ninth Circuit explained that, in the hypothetical required by Code §547(b)(5), the debtor’s later $526,000 deposit “would be voidable, leaving less than $190,[000] in [the debtor’s account]” as of the petition date. 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, at*4. Significantly, the concurring judge noted the “strained boundaries of [the majority’s] hypothetical analysis” Id. at*36. As shown below, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is not only murky, but also questionable.

    Facts
    The Bank had made a loan to the debtor three years prior to its Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, secured by the debtor’s personal property, including its deposit accounts with the Bank. Ninety days prior to bankruptcy, the debtor had roughly $173,000 on deposit with the Bank and owed it about $190,000. Five weeks before bankruptcy, the debtor satisfied “fully its outstanding loan obligations,” id. at*5, from the escrowed proceeds of a sale of unencumbered assets. On the “same day,” it deposited “the rest of its net sales proceeds” — $526,000 — with the Bank. Id. The Bank thus received, according to the Ninth Circuit, “two transfers simultaneously within 90 days of [the debtor’s] bankruptcy” — the $190,000 payment from a sale escrow and the $526,000 deposit. Id. at *28-*29. The Bank later voluntarily turned over the net balance (more than $500,000) in the debtor’s account to the Trustee, never having set off anything. Id. at *20n.6. 

    The Trustee sued to recover the debtor’s $190,000 payment to the Bank. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s granting of the Bank’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Id. at *6.

    Relevance

    “This case,” said the concurring judge in Tenderloin, “raises the important question of how to measure the preferential impact of commonplace bank deposits, which will often turn on the permissible extent of a hypothetical post-petition setoff” Id. at *35, n.3.

    Code §553(b) contains its own preference provision with respect to setoffs —an “improvement in position” test. Specifically, §553(b) permits a trustee to recover from a creditor any improvement in that creditor’s position resulting from a setoff of its claim during the 90-day period preceding bankruptcy. The section applies only to pre-bankruptcy setoffs. If, for example, the creditor’s claim against the debtor (e.g., the outstanding balance of a loan) exceeds the debtor’s claim against the creditor (e.g., the amount on deposit with the bank), there is an “insufficiency.” Code §553(b)(2). If the earlier insufficiency exceeds the insufficiency on the day of the actual setoff, the creditor (i.e., the Bank) has improved its position, and the trustee is permitted to recover the difference between the two amounts. As the concurring opinion in Tenderloin stressed, Section §553(b) provided a simpler, more “straightforward” way to dispose of this appeal, rather than the “strained” hypothetical preference analysis used by the majority. Id. at *37. But even the concurring judge’s reasoning is questionable, for the Bank never set off its claim against the debtor’s funds.

    The Ninth Circuit’s Majority Analysis

    The premise of the majority’s opinion was the voidability of the debtor’s $526,000 deposit. The majority “assum[ed] in a hypothetical liquidation, that the hypothetical trustee would sue to recover the $526,[000] deposit,” consistent with the Code’s preference provision, §547(b). Id. at *20. Although the Bank argued against “permitting the hypothetical trustee to do something the actual trustee did not do,” the majority stressed the “Trustee had no incentive to challenge the deposit,” for the Bank had already voluntarily turned the funds over to the Trustee, “preclud[ing] any subsequent claim of setoff … .” Id. at *20n.6.

    Had the Bank not waived its setoff right, reasoned the majority, the Bank would still have received more as a result of the debtor’s $190,000 payment than “it would have received in a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation.” Id. at *21. According to the majority, the Bank’s setoff right also “improved … between the 90th day before [bankruptcy when the debtor had $173,000 on deposit] and the date of the bankruptcy [when it had $526,000 on deposit].” Id. at *21n.8. Under Code §553(b), the Bank’s improvement in position during the critical 90-day period would have enabled the trustee to recover more than $17,000 from the Bank if the Bank had set off its $190,000 claim prior to bankruptcy, which it did not do. Id. Because the Bank actually received a direct $190,000 payment, said the majority, that was more than the Bank would have received ($173,000) in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Id.

    The majority also reasoned the Bank’s $190,000 claim would not have been allowed under Code §502(d) until the bankruptcy court had “decide[d] the Trustee’s hypothetical preference action … .” Id. at *22. To find a preference, the majority focused on the “greater amount test” of Code §547(b)(5) and applied it to the facts. “In the hypothetical liquidation where the debt payment had not been made, [the Bank] would still be a creditor because it would be owed the [$190,000] it loaned to [the debtor].” Id. at *22-*23. The debtor’s deposit of $526,000, made during the 90-day period preceding bankruptcy, said the Ninth Circuit (though noting it was a closer question), “would be for or on account of antecedent debt,” an essential element of a preference under Code §547(b)(2). Id. at *23. Although the debtor paid the Bank $190,000 before making its $526,000 deposit, the preference provision, reasoned the majority, would make “the deposit [effectively] diminish … the funds available to [the debtor’s] creditors [by] increas[ing] the size of [the Bank’s] secured claim against the bankruptcy estate. The deposit would also constitute a ‘transfer’ under the … Code. It would subject the funds to [the Bank’s] security interest, give [the Bank] title to the funds, and deplete the assets available for distribution to [the debtor’s] creditors.” Id. at*23-*24.

    The majority stressed that the $526,000 deposit effectively “deplete[d] the estate’s assets.” Id. at *26-*27n.13. “Through the deposit… one creditor — [the Bank] — gained a beneficial interest in the funds … and … increased its right to exercise a setoff for the full amount of its loan. The deposit… represents the kind of pre-[bankruptcy] ‘transfer’ that the preference provisions target.” Id. at *27 “[They] ‘created an actual or potential diminution of the estate by subjecting the funds to the [Bank’s] power under [its] credit agreement.’” Id. at *27-*28, quoting Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 539 B.R. 77, 87n.14 (M.D. N.C. 2015).

    The majority reasoned that the Trustee’s “hypothetical preference challenge to the [$526,000] deposit would still be successful” had the Bank sought to set off after bankruptcy. Id. at *28. Therefore, said the majority, the debtor’s “account functionally would contain $37,713… on the petition date, a sum far less than the $190,[000] … [the Bank] received, even allowing for its right of setoff.” Id. On these “hypothetical facts,” said the majority, the Trustee satisfied the “greater amount test” of Code §547(b)(5) and “can prove each required element of its claim.” Id. at *29.

    The Concurring Opinion

    The concurring judge agreed with the ultimate result, but disagreed “that the entirety of the $526,000 deposit was itself a preferential transfer subject to clawback under” Code §547. Id. at *30. Noting that the “circuits are divided on” the question of whether a bank deposit is a “transfer” under the Code, he argued that Code §553 “is an entirely separate provision that subjects setoffs, exclusively, to different rules than those applicable to the recovery of preferences generally.” Id. at *32-*34, n. 1, citing New York County Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904) and In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991). Moreover, “to hold that the creation of a setoff right that the Code preserves under the terms of §553 may be preferential under §547 would, as in Massey, ‘enlarge the scope of the statute defining preferences so as to prevent [the exercise of] set-off in cases coming within the terms of [§553].’” Id. at *33. “Because Massey’s reasoning applies with the same force today as it did in 1904,” the concurring judge refused “to join in the majority’s holding that the $526,000 deposit was a preference subject to attack under §547.” Id. at *35. Because of the Code §553(b) limitation on the creditor’s right to set off after it has improved its position, the concurring judge would have enabled the Trustee to recover only “the $17,580.50 difference” received by the Bank. Like the majority, the concurring judge “would reverse the judgment below and send the case back to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings … to consider … [the Bank’s] affirmative defenses … .” Id. at *37.

    Comment

    The concurring judge’s “straightforward” analysis clearly is a more effective way of preventing “an offsetting creditor” from improving its position, consistent with Code §553(b). But, critically, the Bank in Tenderloin never set off. Although the majority, too, noted the Bank’s improvement in position by $17,580, Id. at *21n.8, it went too far in treating the debtor’s $526,000 deposit as a transfer for preference purposes under §547(b), for there was no transfer, as shown below.

    The majority’s strained preference analysis ignores both longstanding and recent precedent, is practically unworkable, and is at least questionable, if not simply wrong. The Bank should petition for rehearing en banc.

    According to the leading bankruptcy treatise, “a debtor’s deposit of a nonexempt check into a non-exempt bank account… is not a transfer from the debtor to [it]self … — so classifying such transactions would be akin to holding that a debtor’s moving of money from one pocket to another is a transfer. The debtor’s interest in the property has not substantively changed, and at all times the debtor’s interest was exposed to creditors.” 2 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 101.54, at 101-216 (16th ed. 2011), rejecting legislative history (S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1978). Accord, In re Whitley, 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (“… when a debtor deposits … funds into his own unrestricted checking account in the regular course of business, he has not transferred those funds to the bank that operates the account.”), citing Massey, 192 U.S. at 145; Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F. 2d 522, 527-28 (4th Cir. 1930); In re Prescott, 805 F. 2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1986); Katz v. First Nat’l Bank of Glen Head, 568 F. 2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1977). Incredibly, the Ninth Circuit also ignored the Sixth Circuit’s Feb. 8, 2017 decision in Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *16. (6th Cir. Feb 8, 2017) (“banks are not ‘transferees’ with respect to ordinary bank deposits” because they lack “dominion and control over them.”) citing In re Hurtado, 342 F. 3d 528-533 (6th Cir. 2003) and Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F. 2d 890, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1988).

    Nor did the Bank’s security interest in the debtor’s account give it “dominion and control” over the debtor’s $526,000 deposit in Tenderloin, for “a security interest cannot grant dominion” over anything in excess of “the underlying debt.” Meoli, 21017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *22. Further, in Tenderloin, the debtor owed the Bank nothing when it made the $526,000 deposit. The deposit, accordingly, was not on account of an antecedent debt, an essential element of a preference under Code §547(b)(2). In sum, the $526,000 deposit was neither a transfer nor a preference.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Lawrence V. Gelber.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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