Content Type: Article

  • Dealing with Allocations of Tax Liabilities in Non-IRS Agreements

    Dealing with Allocations of Tax Liabilities in Non-IRS Agreements

    ARTICLE

    Dealing with Allocations of Tax Liabilities in Non-IRS Agreements

    May 23, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrew Roberson and Jane Zhao wrote this bylined article on tax sharing agreements where the parties allocate current or future tax liabilities or potential refunds. “Taxpayers should remember that such agreement is not binding on the IRS, which is not a party to that agreement,” the authors wrote, so if one party ultimately has a tax liability more than stated in the agreement, “that party must seek contribution from the other party and cannot force the IRS to collect from the other party.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Jane Zhao

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Nexus Is Crucial, Complex Connection for State Tax Professionals

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    Nexus Is Crucial, Complex Connection for State Tax Professionals

    May 22, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mark Yopp wrote this bylined article analyzing state enactment of broader nexus laws (especially for sales and use taxes) to increase their revenues. As more states expand nexus, Mr. Yopp urged companies to “monitor legislative and litigation developments on nexus to prepare for what is coming” and to “be wary of any state that attempts to use nexus expansion to go after past tax liability, rather than collecting and remitting on a prospective basis.”

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  • False Claims Act Overreach in Healthcare: Patients Lose

    False Claims Act Overreach in Healthcare: Patients Lose

    ARTICLE

    False Claims Act Overreach in Healthcare: Patients Lose

    May 22, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mark Pearlstein and Laura McLane wrote in this bylined article that “a discussion about reform is necessary” for government use of the False Claims Act to pursue Medicare and Medicaid fraud. “Particularly when matters of physician judgment are involved, a fraud statute has no place except in egregious cases,” the authors wrote. “The current, contrary reality strains the American healthcare system by increasing costs and impeding access to care, ultimately failing the patient.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark W. Pearlstein

    Partner

    Boston

    Laura McLane

    Partner

    Boston

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  • Second Circuit Affirms Mandatory Subordination of Employees’ Securities Claims

    Second Circuit Affirms Mandatory Subordination of Employees’ Securities Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Affirms Mandatory Subordination of Employees’ Securities Claims

    May 19, 2017

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Claims held by employees of a Chapter 11 debtor based on “restricted stock units (‘RSUs’) … must be subordinated [under Bankruptcy Code § 510(b)] to the claims of general creditors because … (i) RSUs are securities, (ii) the claimants acquired them in a purchase, and (iii) the claims for damages arise from those purchases or the asserted rescissions thereof,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on May 4, 2017. In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7920, *6 (2d Cir. May 4, 2017). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit stressed that the “claims asserted here … would not have arisen but for the claimants’ agreement with [the debtor] to receive part of their compensation in the form of RSUs.” Id. at *35.

    “[C]orporate employers [often] compensate their high-ranking employees not only with cash, but also with equity in the [c]orporation. Such arrangements align the employees’ financial incentives with those of the company: If the company succeeds, so too do its stakeholding employees; but if the company falters — even to and beyond the point of bankruptcy — its employees bear some of the loss.” Id. at *4. The debtor here, had, in fact, “adopted this approach, compensating many of its employees in part with [RSUs], which gave them a contingent right to own [the debtor’s] common stock at the conclusion of a five-year holding period. The holder of an RSU had risk and return expectations similar to those of a shareholder; he or she would ultimately benefit from any increase in the stock price or suffer from any decline.” Id.

    Relevance

    Courts have broadly interpreted the nature and scope of claims arising from the purchase or sale of a security under Code § 510(b). Section 510(b) provides in relevant part that “a claim arising from the rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of a debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, [or] for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such security … shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior or equal to the claim or interest represented by such a security, except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock.” The Code thus “mandates subordination of ‘a claim … for damages arising from the purchase or sale of … security [of the debtor].’” In re Med. Diversified, Inc., 461 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).

    Courts typically ask whether the claim in question has a “nexus” with the purchase or sale of a security. In re Am Hous. Found., 785 F. 3d 143, 155 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Telegroup Inc., 281 F. 3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2002). As the Second Circuit had previously explained, “Section 510(b) is to be construed broadly because it is a remedial statute intended ‘to prevent shareholders from changing their claims into creditors’ claims.’” In re Med. Diversified, Inc., 461 F. 3d at 254. In “enacting § 510(b), Congress focused on the problem of claims alleging fraud or other violations of law in the issuance of the debtors’ securities.” Id. at 256. “Section 510(b) thus represents a Congressional judgment that, as between shareholders and general unsecured creditors, it is shareholders who should bear the risk of illegality in the issuance of stock in the event the issuer enters bankruptcy.” Id., quoting In re Telegroup Inc., 281 F. 3d at 141. According to the Second Circuit, appellate courts uniformly subordinate the claims of “those who conclude the bargain to become investors or shareholders … .” Id. at 257.

    More recently, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that Code § 510(b) confines “claims which are in essence claims corresponding to ownership of securities (debt or equity) … to their proper tier of the
    waterfall … .” In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 808 F. 3d 942, 944 (2d Cir. 2015). Noting that § 510(b) “should be read ‘broadly,’” the court affirmed the subordination of claims arising from securities of the debtor’s affiliate. Id. at 950-51 (emphasis added).

    Some courts, however, still struggle with the broad reading of § 510(b). For instance, the Ninth Circuit recently held that a claim based on the debtors’ conversion of the claimant’s stock was not subject to subordination under § 510(b). In re Khan, F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2017) (2-1). According to the majority in Khan, the claimant’s demand for money damages “has nothing to do with his investment, other than the fact that he had purchased the now-purloined securities many years earlier.” Id. at 1064.

    A Delaware district court also held that an employee’s contractual claim was not an “equity interest subject to subordination” under Code § 510(b) and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s refusal to subordinate it. In re Cybersight LLC, 2004 WL 2713098 (Del. 2004). The creditor was an employee of the debtor who had bought a 1.5-percent membership interest in the debtor LLC. After his employment was terminated in 1999, the debtor was “obligated to” buy his equity interest at its fair market value under the terms of the debtor’s LLC agreement. To determine the fair market value of that equity interest, the parties entered into an arbitration, where the creditor received an award of $1.291 million, which was confirmed by a state court judgment on March 26, 2001. The debtor later filed a Chapter 11 petition more than a year later, on April 5, 2002. Most important, according to the court, the creditor’s “equity stake in the [debtor] extinguished pre-petition and with it, [the creditor’s] ability to participate in any of the [the debtor’s] profits or losses.” Id. at *3. In short, the employee creditor’s “former equity interest … has been converted into a fixed debt obligation.” Id. at *4 n.2.

    The Ninth Circuit also denied a request to subordinate a financial adviser’s claim for pre-bankruptcy services when his compensation was tied to the value of the debtor’s stock. In re Am. Wagering, 493 F. 3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2007). According to the Ninth Circuit, the financial adviser was never a shareholder. Rather, the debtor’s stock value was simply the basis for calculating his compensation. Id. at 1073.

    Analysis

    The Second Circuit discarded as unnecessary part of the bankruptcy court’s holding in Lehman Brothers that “the claimants may assert only proofs of interest — not proofs of claim … .” 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7920, at *13. Still affirming the result below, the Court of Appeals narrowed its holding to mandate subordination “pursuant to section 510(b).” Id. at *15.

    RSUs as Securities

    According to the court, each RSU is a “security” under Code § 101(49), quoting the bankruptcy court’s explanation: “a grant of an RSU constitutes a contingent right to participate in, receive [or] purchase [the debtor’s] common stock … once certain employment-related conditions have been satisfied.” Id. at *26, quoting 519 B.R. at 60. Moreover, reasoned the court, “these RSUs bear many of the hallmark characteristics of a security. Like many security holders, the RSU holders had limited voting rights and received any declared dividends in the form of additional RSUs. And of most significance, they had the same risk and benefit expectations as shareholders because the value of their RSUs was tied to the value of [the debtor’s] common stock.” Id. at *27. Unlike a creditor that can only recover its investment, “an RSU holder ‘expect[ed] to participate in firm profits.’” Id., quoting Med Diversified at 461 F.3d at 257.

    Purchase of Security

    Because the debtor “awarded the claimants the RSUs as compensation for their labor,” reasoned the court, they received the RSUs through a “purchase or sale,” as required by Code § 510(b). Indeed, the term “purchase” in § 510(b) “is properly construed broadly to include circumstances where a claimant has received equity securities in exchange for labor.” Id. at *29. Here, the “claimants ‘purchased’ RSUs within the meaning of section 510(b) by agreeing to receive them, in lieu of cash, in exchange for a portion of their labor.” Id. “By agreeing to work for [the debtor], the claimants voluntarily accepted that [the debtor] had the discretion to pay part of their total compensation in RSUs.” Id. at *30.

    Arising From the Purchase of the Security

    Because the claims here were “claims for damages arising from the purchase of a security,” as required by Section 510(b), regardless of how the claimant characterize them, the claims “arise … from a securities transaction so long as the transaction is part of the causal link leading to the alleged injury.” Id. at *34, citing Med Diversified, 461 F.3d at 257-59 (§ 510(b) applies to a claim arising from a failed securities transaction even though the claimant never received shares in the debtor). In other words, these claims only arose because the claimants had agreed with the debtor “to receive part of their compensation in the form of RSUs.” Id. at *35.

    Claimants’ Other Arguments

    The court rejected the claimants’ various “theories” opposing subordination. 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7920, at *35. First, as to the argument that the RSUs “never vested,” the claimants “have already been paid the compensation they were due in the form of RSUs and, as a result, have no right to any other mode of performance [e.g., cash] [from the debtor].” Id. at *37. As for their “restitution” claim, the claimants “suffered no actual injury” merely because the debtor’s common stock “had no value.” Id., at *38.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.  

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • A guide to Patent Litigation and Patent Office Procedures Across the World: Germany

    ARTICLE

    A guide to Patent Litigation and Patent Office Procedures Across the World: Germany

    May 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Henrik Holzapfel and Martin Königs wrote a bylined chapter on Germany in this guide to international patent law. The authors described the process to bring civil law patent infringement litigation in Germany’s 12 district courts and discussed such recent trends as a stricter case law approach toward infringement by equivalents, more willingness of German infringement courts to assume an infringement in Germany even if the infringer only acted abroad, and personal CEO liability for company infringement.

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  • Antitrust Risks of Earnings Calls

    ARTICLE

    Antitrust Risks of Earnings Calls

    May 17, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    David Hanselman and Lisa Peterson wrote this bylined article on antitrust risks of earnings call statements. “The fact that a statement is public does not immunize it from antitrust scrutiny,” the authors wrote, especially when “antitrust plaintiffs increasingly quote these or other public statements to bolster their conspiracy claims.” The authors thus urged executives to “avoid making public statements that could be construed as an invitation to their competitors to collude on price, output, or other competitive terms.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Lisa P. Rumin

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Korea Newsletter

    ARTICLE

    Korea Newsletter

    May 2017

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    David J. Levine

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Raymond Paretzky

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Lindsey Reighard

    Partner

    Dallas

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  • To Agree or Not to Agree, That Is the Question

    ARTICLE

    To Agree or Not to Agree, That Is the Question

    May 17, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Elizabeth Erickson and Andrew Roberson wrote this bylined article about compliance with IRS factual requests in audits. When faced with an Acknowledgement of Facts in an Information Document Request from the IRS, the authors wrote, “taxpayers need to be careful in their response to avoid agreeing to ‘all relevant facts’ without first understanding the IRS’s legal position and the taxpayer’s response to that position.”

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  • Textualism and Contextualism in English Contractual Interpretation – Concord Not Conflict

    Textualism and Contextualism in English Contractual Interpretation – Concord Not Conflict

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Textualism and Contextualism in English Contractual Interpretation – Concord Not Conflict

    May 16, 2017

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A recent UK Supreme Court judgment provides helpful guidance on the alternative pathways available to the courts in construing commercial contract provisions.

    In depth

    In Wood v Capita Insurance Services Limited [2017] UKSC 24, the UK Supreme Court has unanimously affirmed a Court of Appeal decision, shedding much needed light on the various contractual interpretation pathways that have emerged in English law.

    Background

    A claim was brought under an indemnity provision contained in a share purchase agreement for the sale and purchase of the entire issued share capital of Sureterm Direct Limited, a specialist motor insurance broker. The buyer sought to rely on the indemnity terms and conditions to recover the losses it incurred in connection with the payment of compensation to customers affected by the seller’s mis-selling of certain insurance products. The seller argued that, on a proper “natural and ordinary” construction of the instrument wording, a claim of the nature claimed by the buyer was not caught by the indemnity scope.

    The primary interest of this case concerns the significance of the Supreme Court’s propositions in relation to true contractual construction.

    Decision

    Where there are rival interpretations of commercial contractual language, some doubt has arisen concerning how a court ought to construe a contract in order to resolve them.

    On one hand, there is the pathway forged by the Supreme Court in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, whereby competing contractual interpretations would be resolved by preferring the relevant terms most consistent with commercial common sense. By nature, that is a contextual approach involving consideration of the wider factual matrix and circumstances in which the bargain is struck. Consequently, subsequent disputants posited the Supreme Court’s “business common sense” dicta in contending for a contextual contractual construction.

    On the other hand, four years later, the Supreme Court in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 traversed a different pathway placing greater emphasis on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used. It thus favoured a more literal approach in construing contractual terms, and cautioned against the adoption of “business common sense” to relieve a party’s bad bargain. That, in many commentators’ eyes, marked a clear curial shift in emphasis to contractual interpretation and, in particular, a retreat from the preceding Rainy Sky guidance.

    By concentrating its gaze on the common ground in Wood, the Supreme Court has squarely addressed and instructively reconciled some, if arguably not all, of that lingering doubt.

    In lead judgment, with which the other Justices were in unanimous agreement, Lord Hodge JSC dismissed the buyer’s appeal and, on the question of contractual interpretation, opined the following key principles:

    • The court’s task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the contractual language. That is not a literalist mechanism exclusively focused on parsing the given wording. Rather, the court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of its drafting, attach the appropriate weight to wider contextual elements in arriving at the objective meaning.
    • Interpretation is a unitary exercise, involving an iterative process by which each asserted interpretation is checked against the contractual provisions, and its commercial consequences investigated.
    • Where rival constructions occur, the court can give according weight to their implications by determining the construction most consistent with business common sense. The drafting quality must, however, be considered in balancing the indications given by the language and the implications of the competing constructions, and the court must also be alive to one party possibly having agreed to something that in retrospect did not best serve its interests. The court must also not overlook the possibility that a provision may be a negotiated compromise, or that the negotiators were unable to agree more precise terms.
    • “Textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms”; both approaches may be utilised as “tools” to arrive at the objective meaning of the contractual language. The extent to which each tool assists contractual interpretation will vary depending on the particular circumstances and drafting quality of the relevant provisions. Some contracts might be successfully interpreted by textual analysis, for instance, owing to their sophistication or complexity, or because they were professionally prepared. Others may be better suited to heightened emphasis on the factual matrix because, for example, they are less sophisticated, informal or drafted without professional input. Where professionally drafted contracts contain provisions lacking clarity, “considering the factual matrix and the purpose of similar provisions in contracts of the same type” may assist their interpretation.

    Observations

    This is an important decision, as it provides helpful guidance on the alternative pathways available to the court in exercising contractual interpretation. Some significant points emerge from the Supreme Court’s analysis.

    • Though somewhat trite, it emphasises that clear and precise drafting is essential to ensure that no ambiguity surrounds the meaning of a contractual provision. For a contract draftsperson, that means harmonising and safeguarding against any potential adverse impacts of one particular clause on others contained in the same instrument.
    • Although an instrument drafted and negotiated by lawyers will be predisposed to a textual “natural and ordinary” interpretation, Lord Hodge acknowledged that a commercial instrument does not exist in the abstract and that its commercial context may also be relevant to any true construction.
    • Where a contractual provision throws up rival meanings, the court will likely prefer the construction most consistent with business common sense. This powerfully rebuts the misconception that Arnold had “rowed back” on the role of business common sense in contractual construction. It is perfectly permissible under English law to apply all available tools to construction analysis, depending upon the surrounding circumstances, to avoid yielding erroneous conclusions.
    • No recalibration of the Rainy Sky or Arnold approaches to contractual interpretation is required. Lord Hodge made that very plain by remarking the two authorities were, essentially, speaking the same language. Rather than steering current common law contractual interpretation principles towards new waters, Wood merely exemplifies some of the tools at the courts’ disposal. As the court concluded per curiam:

    The recent history of the common law of contractual interpretation is one of continuity rather than change. One of the attractions of English law as a legal system of choice in commercial matters is its stability and continuity, particularly in contractual interpretation.

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  • IRS LB&I Reveals Details of Its Inbound Distributor and OVDP Decline-Withdrawal Campaigns

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    IRS LB&I Reveals Details of Its Inbound Distributor and OVDP Decline-Withdrawal Campaigns

    May 15, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Kristina Novak and Laura Gavioli wrote this bylined article about an IRS webinar concerning a campaign targeting inbound distributors and taxpayers not participating in the IRS Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP). As discussed in the webinar, the authors wrote, “this campaign is somewhat unique in that the IRS is still evaluating whether this issue presents an actual—rather than a mere potential—threat of noncompliance.”

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