Content Type: Article

  • No Compulsory License for Internet Retransmissions of Broadcast TV

    ARTICLE

    No Compulsory License for Internet Retransmissions of Broadcast TV

    May 15, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sarah Bro wrote this bylined article on a Ninth Circuit panel ruling which reversed the district court and held that Internet streaming service FilmOn did not qualify as a cable system under the Copyright Act and therefore is not eligible for a compulsory license to stream copyrighted content from broadcast television signals. FilmOn has petitioned for en banc review by the full Ninth Circuit, Ms. Bro noted.

    In depth
    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

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  • How to Prepare and Respond to a Major Cybersecurity Attack

    How to Prepare and Respond to a Major Cybersecurity Attack

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    How to Prepare and Respond to a Major Cybersecurity Attack

    May 15, 2017

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    In today’s digital age, data privacy and security incident response plans are critical. Companies need to have a well-designed cybersecurity plan to protect their systems from attacks and respond to a crisis when they are affected. Whether you are preparing your incident response plan to respond to a cyber attack, or if you are caught off guard by a major cyber incident, you should consider deploying the following steps in the first hours of a cybersecurity breach:

    • Taking steps to preserve a claim of attorney-client privilege over the incident response, including by establishing a written communications protocol covering the investigation and requiring all participants in the investigation to commit to adhere to the protocol.
    • Working with the company’s chief information security officer and IT security team to ensure that the organization is taking appropriate steps to protect the company’s systems and, if necessary, to prepare for a forensic investigation to determine the full scope of compromise. Depending on the type of attack, such steps may include taking services offline, scanning and imaging affected systems, forcing password resets, adjusting firewall settings, identifying and terminating unauthorized programs running on the system, implementing software patches, updating anti-virus definitions, rebooting systems after the updates at an appropriate time and generating backups of critical systems.
    • Ensure that key IT security personnel remain alert to signs of the attack, are available to the company and its workforce 24/7 and are prepared to activate the company’s incident response plan immediately if the company’s system is compromised.
    • As appropriate, communicate with the company’s workforce to:
      • Remain alert for phishing emails and pay attention to the details of emails, including the sender, body of message, attachments and links directing to an unknown site;Be alert for suspicious emails and notify a designated contact in the company’s IT team if the employee suspects that he/she has received a phishing email, if he/she has unexpected difficulty accessing a file or if he/she sees anything that might suggest a compromise of the company’s systems;
      • Keep on hand the contact information for the IT security team and ensure that the IT security is on 24-hour call until further notice.

    If the company has been a victim of a cyber attack, such as a ransomware attack where system files have already been encrypted, then additional steps will be necessary:

    • Work with counsel on a plan to manage the incident response, including preservation of a claim of attorney-client privilege, the retention of a cyber-forensics consultant under privilege, compliance with notification requirements, and the assessment of legal exposure arising from the incident.
    • Work with the cyber-forensics consultant to preserve logs and images for affected systems and to begin work on analyzing the attack, the extent of the compromise and the adequacy of remedial measures.
    • Evaluate backup system availability and adequacy.
    • Consult with counsel, IT and your forensic expert about other appropriate steps.
    Authors

    Michael G. Morgan

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Silicon Valley

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  • New Requirements for Independent Contractor Agreements in New York City

    New Requirements for Independent Contractor Agreements in New York City

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Requirements for Independent Contractor Agreements in New York City

    May 12, 2017

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 15, 2017, a new New York City law, the “Freelance Isn’t Free Act,” will take effect. The law applies to arrangements between independent contractors and businesses or individuals that retain them to provide services in New York City. It sets forth required contractual elements and penalties for non-compliance.

    The law is intended to provide “freelance workers” with similar protections to those available to employees under existing labor laws. Under the law, a “freelance worker” is defined as “any natural person or any organization composed of no more than one natural person, whether or not incorporated or employing a trade name, that is hired or retained as an independent contractor … to provide services in exchange for compensation.” This definition includes contractors retained by businesses and individuals. The law requires that any contract with a freelance worker entered into on or after May 15, 2017 that has a value of $800 or more (or set of contracts in a 120-day period that has a value of $800 or more) be in writing. Under proposed rules issued by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs, the value of the contract includes “the reasonable value of all actual or anticipated services, costs for supplies, and any other expenses under the contract.” The law requires the written contract to set forth the following information:

    • The names and mailing addresses of the hiring business or individual and the freelance worker;
    • An “itemization of all services” being provided by the freelance worker;
    • The value of the services being provided by the freelance worker and the rate and method of payment of the freelance worker; and
    • The date by which payment is due (or the process by which the payment date will be determined).

    The law requires that freelance workers be paid no later than the date specified in the contract. If, despite the law’s requirements, a contract does not contain a date of payment (or mechanism to determine a date), the freelance worker must be paid within 30 days of the completion of services. A freelance worker cannot be required to accept less than the contracted amount as a condition of timely payment.

    The law permits a freelance worker who believes his or her rights under the law have been violated to file a complaint with the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs’ Office of Labor Policy and Standards. Alternatively, a freelance worker may bring an action in court for violations of the law. Even if no other violations of the law exist, a court can award a freelance worker $250 and costs and attorneys’ fees as a result of the failure to have a written contract as required under the law. For additional violations of the law, damages will be equal to the value of the contract itself. If a freelance worker is not paid as set forth in the contract, a business or individual can be liable for double damages, injunctive relief and other remedies. Finally, freelance workers seeking to enforce their rights under the law are protected from retaliation.

    Any provision in an agreement that attempts to waive a freelance worker’s rights under the law will be considered void. The Department of Consumer Affairs’ proposed rules expand on this provision, providing that any provision in a contract which would require a freelance worker to “waive or limit” any right to participate in a “class, collective or representative proceeding” or to “waive or limit … any other procedural right normally afforded to a party in a civil or administrative action” will be considered void.

    Any individual or business in New York City hiring an independent contractor on or after May 15, 2017 should review the law’s requirements and ensure that any contracts being entered into with independent contractors comply with the law’s requirements, that all independent contractors are paid on time, and that all payments are made in accordance with the terms of the contract.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold and Adam B. Gartner.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam B. Gartner

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Directive on Business Transfers Do Not Contradict Dynamic Considerations

    ARTICLE

    Directive on Business Transfers Do Not Contradict Dynamic Considerations

    May 12, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Volker Teigelkötter, commenting on the ECJ ruling of April 27, 2017 the “Directive on Business Transfers do not contradict dynamic considerations – Clarification of the ECJ on employment-related clauses for the transfer of employment.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Volker Teigelkötter

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • New IRS Guidance Extends the Retroactive Reach of the Windsor Case for Transfer Tax Purposes

    New IRS Guidance Extends the Retroactive Reach of the Windsor Case for Transfer Tax Purposes

    ARTICLE

    New IRS Guidance Extends the Retroactive Reach of the Windsor Case for Transfer Tax Purposes

    May 11, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Elyse Kirschner and Toni Ann Kruse wrote this bylined article on new IRS guidance for taxpayers seeking to recalculate gifts, bequests and GST taxable transfers made between same-sex spouses prior to the Supreme Court’s Windsor decision legalizing same-sex marriage, whether or not the statute of limitations period has expired.

    In depth
    Authors

    Elyse G. Kirschner

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Toni Ann Kruse

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • The New EU Regulation on Medical Devices Aims at Enhanced Product Safety and Further Harmonization

    The New EU Regulation on Medical Devices Aims at Enhanced Product Safety and Further Harmonization

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The New EU Regulation on Medical Devices Aims at Enhanced Product Safety and Further Harmonization

    May 9, 2017

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 5, 2017, the new Regulation on Medical Devices (MDR) and the new Regulation on In Vitro Diagnostics (IVDR) have been published in the European Official Journal. The Regulations will become effective 20 days after publication and will be fully applicable after a transition period of three years for the MDR regulation and five years for the IVDR regulation, respectively.

    In depth

    On May 5, 2017, the new Regulation on Medical Devices (MDR) and the new Regulation on In Vitro Diagnostics (IVDR) were published in the European Official Journal. The Regulations will become effective 20 days after publication (i.e., on May 26, 2017) and will be fully applicable after a transition period of three years for the MDR regulation and five years for the IVDR regulation, respectively.

    Background

    The European market for medical devices is large and diverse–including products as different as contact lenses, pacemakers, breast implants and ultrasound machines, plus in vitro diagnostics such as HIV tests, pregnancy tests and blood sugar monitoring systems. In total, there are over 500,000 different types of medical devices on the European Union (EU) market. Under the current framework, medical devices are classified into the following classifications based on risk: (1) class 1 (low risk); (2) class IIa and IIb (moderate risk); (3) class III (high risk). This regime is similar to the US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) device classification regulations, with some distinctions in the types and categories of device that belong to each class.

    The existing EU regulatory framework for medical devices consists of three directives that were issued in the 1990s: (1) the Directive on Medical Devices (Dir. 93/42/EC), (2) the Directive on Active Implantable Medical Devices (Dir. 90/385/EEC), and (3) the Directive on In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices (Dir. 98/79/EC). These three directives will now be replaced by only two regulations, as active implantable medical devices will be covered by the MDR. The primary objectives of the new law are to improve quality, safety and reliability of medical devices. Reform efforts were triggered by the Poly Implant Prothèse (PIP) breast implant scandal, where breast implants made of industrial silicone were marketed as medical devices and received a European Conformity (CE) certificate from a renowned notified body. The new Regulations impose additional requirements on notified bodies and set higher standards for clinical evaluation of medical devices. However, the general processes for obtaining market authorizations have remained largely unaffected.

    Significant Changes

    Clinical Evaluation and Post-Marketing Surveillance: The new Regulations place greater emphasis on clinical data to support medical device registration and post-market safety. Under the MDR, manufacturers have to create a clinical development plan that includes a plan for post-marketing surveillance. As part of the technical documentation, manufacturers have to provide a report on the clinical evaluation. Once devices are available for use on the market, manufacturers will be required to collect data about their performance and EU countries will coordinate more closely in the field of market surveillance. Documentation will be required on a regular basis, i.e., under certain conditions, manufacturers will have to provide a Post Market Surveillance Plan/Report (PMS), a Post Market Clinical Follow-up Report (PMCF), Periodic Safety Update Report (PSUR) and/or a Summary of Safety and Clinical Performance (SSCP). Furthermore, for more medical devices and in vitro diagnostics, clinical trials will have to be performed–and regulatory requirements for such clinical trials will be stricter, including but not limited to the new obligation of the sponsor to provide damage compensation insurance for participants (Article 69 MDR / Article 65 IVDR).

    Supervision and Advisory of Notified Bodies: The MDR rules will impose stricter controls on high-risk devices. Similar to the FDA Advisory Committees that provide recommendations to the FDA regarding the approval of certain devices for the US Market, the MDR provides that a pool of experts at the EU level will have to be consulted before placing certain devices on the market. This requirement applies to class III implants and class IIb products that deliver a medicinal product (e.g., certain drug delivery devices or combination products). Furthermore, according to Article 35 of the MDR / Article 31 IVDR, each Member State has to appoint an authority that will be responsible for the oversight and review of notified bodies. This authority is entitled to review whether notified bodies comply with the requirements for notified bodies listed in Annex VII MDR. Under the new Regulations, notified bodies can start to be re-certified six months after the date they become applicable–i.e., from end-November 2017. Three years after first notification, and again every four years thereafter, a re-assessment will take place. Furthermore, the competent authority is entitled to review an appropriate number of notified body assessments of manufacturers’ technical documentation.

    The Unique Device Identifier (UDI): The UDI requirement introduces greater parity between the FDA and EU requirements. Like the recently implemented FDA requirements, the MDR and the IVDR require a unique product number to be assigned once for each medical device. The UDI consists of UDI device identifier (UDI-DI) specific to a manufacturer and a device, providing access to the information described in Part B of Annex VI and UDI production identifier (UDI-PI) that identifies the unit of device production and, if applicable, the packaged devices, as specified in Part C of Annex VI. This information must be stored in an electronic system for Unique Device Identification (UDI database) in accordance with Article 28 MDR / Article 25 IVDR.

    Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the MDR extends the applicability of the medical devices regime to certain products that do not have a medical purpose but are considered equivalent in terms of risk. These products are listed in Annex XVI of the MDR and include, among other things, cosmetic contact lenses and skin fillers. Some of the classification rules in Annex VIII—the Annex providing the rules for risk classification—have changed. As a result, several medical devices have been reclassified into a higher risk class. One example of this reclassification is mobile medical apps for smartphones and other mobile devices. According to Rule 11 in Annex VIII MDR, software for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes is generally risk class IIa, but under certain conditions can be risk class IIb or III. While under the old regime, medical apps were mostly in class I, hence manufacturers could self-certify without the involvement of a notified body, keeping the procedure simple and costs low; it is likely that in the future, a notified body will often be required for registration of a medical app.

    Next Steps

    Because the new legal framework was issued as regulations, the individual EU Member States are not required to issue their own implementing laws to codify the MDR and IVDR. Instead, both regulations will be directly applicable in the 28 Member States of the EU. Furthermore, the Member States will have less discretion to interpret their national laws to impose different or new requirements because these Regulations are more detailed and proscriptive than the current medical device regime based on the Directives.

    Upon expiry of the transition periods in 2020 (MDR) and 2022 (IVDR), the new Regulations will become fully applicable. During the transition periods, manufacturers may choose whether they want a medical device to be certified under the old or the new regime. However, four years after the effective date of the MDR, i.e., in 2024, all CE-certificates issued under the old rules of the MDR will expire. By then at the latest, all medical devices marketed in the EU will have to comply with the new regime. The transition periods are not as long as some would have hoped, given the significance of the changes. These changes will require medical device manufacturers to review and evaluate current operations and systems to ensure compliance with new and enhanced requirements. While the new Regulations reflect a trend toward greater harmonization of EU and US requirements, companies with global operations, distributions and products should take a holistic approach to compliance and implement regulatory and compliance processes that are appropriate, adaptable and scalable for a global marketplace.

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  • Canadian Tax Court Holds that Agreements Reached Under the Mutual Agreement Procedure are Binding on the Canada Revenue Agency

    ARTICLE

    Canadian Tax Court Holds that Agreements Reached Under the Mutual Agreement Procedure are Binding on the Canada Revenue Agency

    May 9, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    K. Christy Vouri-Misso and Steven Hannes wrote this bylined article about a Tax Court of Canada ruling which overturned a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) action and upheld agreements reached under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP). “This case is helpful to taxpayers with cross-border transactions between the US and Canada and demonstrates that MAP agreements are binding on the CRA,” the authors wrote.

    In depth
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  • Court Guts Lyondell Trustee’s Bankruptcy-Related Claims

    Court Guts Lyondell Trustee’s Bankruptcy-Related Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Court Guts Lyondell Trustee’s Bankruptcy-Related Claims

    May 8, 2017

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, after a lengthy trial, dismissed on April 21, 2017 a litigation trustee’s multibillion-dollar bankruptcy-related claims arising out of a December 2007 merger, finding that:

    • “The Trustee failed to establish” insolvency “on two key dates”;
    • “The Trustee … failed to establish that an actual fraudulent transfer occurred”; and
    • “[T]he Trustee [could] not prove the essential element of ‘fault’” to support his breach of fiduciary duty claims.

    In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1097, **6, 13, 14, 16, 17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 21, 2017). The Trustee did prevail on one count, however, obtaining a $7.2-million judgment on his claim for a lender’s breach of a financing contract.

    Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, in a 177-page opinion, found that the Chapter 11 debtor, formed by a large pre-bankruptcy merger, had been “buffeted by a series of unplanned and [largely] unforeseeable events in the year after the Merger, including a deadly crane collapse and two unusually destructive hurricanes at its Houston refinery, wildly fluctuating oil prices, and the effects of the Great Recession at the end of 2008.” Id., at *6. This theme — unforeseeable economic disasters — dominated the court’s analysis, in contrast to the Trustee’s assertions of fraud and deceit.

    Relevance

    Most relevant in Lyondell is the Trustee’s attack on “distributions (approximately $12 billion) to [the debtor’s] shareholders paid as the merger consideration.” Id., at 141. The Trustee alleged that the debtor’s chief executive officer (“CEO”), S, had inflated the debtor’s projections. Id. This asserted misconduct, which allegedly enabled the financing for the merger, was the “underlying factual predicate” for the Trustee’s claim that the corporate debtor made the distributions to shareholders “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 548(a)(1)(A). According to Judge Glenn, “the Trustee relied on a novel theory, … attempting to prove a fraudulent intent on the part of pre-merger Lyondell’s CEO, [S], and then impute [S’s] intent horizontally to [the acquiring parties].” Id., at *14. Because the trustee “failed to prove actual fraudulent intent by [S], … no amount of mental gymnastics [could] substantiate a recovery on an intentional fraudulent transfer claim … against” the buyer’s ultimate owner, “the person who himself lost billions on [the debtor’s] failure.” Id. Moreover, “the Trustee gave no legitimate reason why [S] would volunteer to captain a ship he had engineered to sink. … [Nor would] the financing banks invest … billions of dollars in the doomed company despite seeing an iceberg on the horizon.” Id., at *15-*16.

    Earlier decisions in Lyondell by another bankruptcy judge (Gerber) and a district judge “dealt with the actual fraudulent transfer claims.” Id., at *141. Reversing the bankruptcy judge’s dismissal of the complaint, the district judge held, “based on the facts alleged [by the Trustee], … [S’s] knowledge, as [CEO] and chairman of the board of directors, of the grossly inflated … projections, could be imputed to Lyondell.” Id., at *142, quoting In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 554 B.R. 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Cote, J.). Another district judge in a similar case, however, disagreed with this reasoning and dismissed an actual fraudulent transfer claim. In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2017 W.L. 82391 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (Sullivan, D.J.) (intent could not be imputed to board members). Although bound by the earlier district court holding, Judge Glenn found that, despite the allegations of the complaint, “the proof at trial failed to establish [S’s] intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,” causing “the actual fraudulent transfer claims” to “fail.” 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1097, at *144.

    Facts

    A, a New York-based Delaware corporation, and its affiliate, B, “a Netherlands-based petrochemical company,” Id., at *3, acquired the debtor in a merger that “closed on December 20, 2007.” Id., at *6. “The merger financing totaled $20.3 billion,” and left the debtor “with [about] $2.3 billion of liquidity at the Closing Date.” Id. B’s equity was worth “billions of dollars when the merger … was arranged.” Id., at *27. “While [B] did not contribute cash toward the Merger, its equity value supported the equity of the combined companies.” Id., at *27. The goal of the merger was to combine B “with an American refining company” such as the debtor to become “a global petrochemical and refining company.” Id., at *3-*4.

    The merger also included “a leveraged finance component more emblematic of a leveraged buyout.” Id., at *50-51. Unlike the typical buyout, however, B “borrowed funds from financing banks secured by assets of the combined company while contributing its own equity to the transaction … with the financing banks funding the acquisition … .” Id., at *51. Funds from the financing, “totaling $20.3 billion,” were used to pay the debtor’s shareholders ($11.256 billion), an affiliate of B and an investment bank for their pre-merger “Toehold” investments in the debtor’s securities ($1.2 billion), the debtor’s creditors ($7.178 billion), B’s creditors ($447 million), closing costs and professional fees ($219 million) plus other identified uses ($14.1 million). Id., at 53.

    As noted earlier, the debtor faced increasing unforeseeable liquidity problems during 2008. It obtained more financing from four banks and an affiliate of A. The banks had undertaken their own diligence prior to the 2007 merger and created internal projections for themselves in reliance on projections obtained from the debtor’s management. Despite the additional financing, “a series of business setbacks” caused the debtor’s “liquidity [to] dwindle[] as 2008 came to a close,” forcing it to seek Chapter 11 relief on Jan. 6, 2009. Id., at 23.

    Analysis
    Excerpts from the lengthy Lyondell opinion show how the court disposed of the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer, preference, and breach of fiduciary duty claims. As the court stressed, the “results in this case are very fact-dependent,” but, “at bottom are driven by the Trustee’s failure to prove his claims (except for breach of contract).” Id., at *21.

    Constructive Fraudulent Transfer

    Because “the Trustee failed to prove that [the debtor was] insolvent on [the relevant] transfer dates, it is unnecessary to include an extensive discussion of the separate reasonably equivalent value requirement,” for “[i]f the transferor was solvent, a constructive fraudulent transfer claim fails.” Id., at *126. As to the adequacy of the debtor’s capitalization, “unforeseen challenges ultimately faced by a debtor are pertinent … .” Id., at *131. “Additionally, made-for-litigation projections should be viewed skeptically. … Here, the Trustee’s litigation projections were billions of dollars lower for the projection period than contemporaneous ones that [the Trustee’s expert] conceded were reasonable when made.” Id., at *139. The debtor’s projections may have been inaccurate, but it was “the Great Recession and a number of other factors discussed elsewhere in this Opinion [that] rendered Lyondell’s projections unattainable,” enabling the court to find that the debtor was still adequately capitalized. Id., at *213.

    Of significance to the court was “the fact that the financing banks committed billions to the future of [the debtor] after a diligent review of the transaction. … [T]he financing parties had droves of public and private information on which to develop their own reasoned investment decisions.” Id., at *215.

    Actual Intent – Fraudulent Transfer

    As for the debtor’s asserted actual fraudulent intent, “the Trustee fell far short of showing fraudulent intent during the preparation of the [debtor’s] projections.” Id., at *19. “As the district court made clear, the standard of intent for a fraudulent transfer claim is high, requiring that the actor actually desires to cause a certain action or that he believes that consequences are ‘substantially certain to result from it.’” Id., at *222, quoting 554 B.R. at 648. Although the district court here “only held that the Trustee adequately pled an intentional fraudulent transfer claim[,] the standard of pleading a claim is not equivalent to the high bar in proving a claim.” Id. (emphasis in original text). Not only had the Trustee “failed to establish that the [debtor’s] projections were used to defraud Lyondell’s creditors,” but he also “did not prove that [S] told [the debtor’s financial officer] what result he should reach or attempt to fraudulently influence the [projections] process.” Id., at *223. Nor did the principal of the acquiring parties have the requisite intent: “he invested with a view to enhance the profitability of the newly created [merged entity], not to defraud Lyondell’s creditors.” Id., at *225.

    The Trustee further failed to “establish the required intent by proving badges of fraud.” Id. There was no “transfer of essential assets; there were no pending lawsuits related to the transaction; no party absconded; and the transfer was not for essentially all of the debtor’s assets. … [T]his was not a heist being committed in the dead of night. … [T]he Toehold transactions were negotiated between two sophisticated parties as a result of arms’ length dealing,” and the Trustee “procured no evidence” of actual fraud. Id., at *225-*226.

    The court also rejected the Trustee’s efforts to impute the purported fraudulent intent of S to B, one of the acquirers. “The Trustee’s theory would … allow … bankruptcy trustees to impute the intent of company officer A to corporation B,” but he was unable to provide the court with “support for such authority.” Id., at *229. According to the court, accepting the Trustee’s legal theory “would upend conventional wisdom, making a corporation not only liable for the actions of its officers (which is uncontroversial), but mak[e] a corporation accountable to the officers of a wholly unrelated corporation.” Id., at *229. “[T]he Trustee’s theory of imputing the intent of an alleged fraudulent transferor toward a transferee (or in this case, a new entity) would be directly opposed to a long line of case law holding that the intent of the transferor, not the transferee, is the relevant inquiry here.” Id., at *229. Finally, because “the Trustee failed to prove wrongdoing by [S], the intent required to sustain an actual fraudulent transfer claim is lacking … .” Id., at *230.

    Preference

    As noted earlier, the Trustee failed to prove an essential element of his preference claim — insolvency. Specifically, the court found “the expert testimony of [the Trustee’s expert] unreliable” and because that testimony was the “only evidence” offered by the Trustee on the critical insolvency issue, the Trustee had failed to carry “his burden to prove that [pre-bankruptcy payments] were an avoidable preference.” Id., at *234.

    The court rejected the Trustee’s reliance on the debtor’s internal emails referring to “the possibility of bankruptcy.” Id., at *234. According to the court, “these emails may show that [the debtor’s] employees were considering bankruptcy as a future possibility, [but] none of this internal discussion shows that [the debtor] was actually balance-sheet insolvent” on the relevant dates.” Id., at *235. “[T]he applicable test for a preference claim is not whether management at the company was considering a Chapter 11 filing. The test is balance-sheet insolvency.” Id.

    Breach of Contract

    The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the debtor’s “impending Chapter 11 filing constituted a material adverse change, excusing [the lending affiliate of B] from performance under the” material adverse change (“MAC”) clause in the parties’ revolving credit agreement. Although the defendants argued that the debtor’s “preparations for bankruptcy [were] analogous to a decline in revenues,” the court refused to “infer a solvency requirement where none was drafted by the parties.” Id., at *236. Indeed, reasoned the court, the revolving credit agreement contained no “ongoing solvency requirement for the good reason that it was largely unnecessary, given the security for the loan. … [In the context of this transaction, it was] even less likely that the parties intended the [credit agreement] to contain an ongoing solvency requirement, when the agreement it was based on had every reason not to contain such a requirement.” Id., at *237 (emphasis in original text). “The parties had the opportunity to include an ongoing solvency provision in the … Credit Agreement when it was drafted and executed in 2008, but they did not. The Defendants cannot now stretch the MAC clause to include it.” Id., at 239. B’s lending affiliate “breached its obligation … to fund the draw request in December 2008.” Id., at *239. Because of this breach, the court awarded restitutionary damages to the Trustee of “$7.2 million — representing the value unjustly retained by [B’s affiliated lender].” Id., at *242.

    Breach of Fiduciary Duty

    The court rejected the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary claims against the acquiring parties and their controlling shareholder. In short, “the Trustee failed to prove that [the debtor’s] Chapter 11 filing was the result of [the acquiring principal’s] alleged misconduct rather than of the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008.” Id., at *253.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.  

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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  • State Taxation of Carried Interests

    ARTICLE

    State Taxation of Carried Interests

    May 8, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Alysse McLoughlin wrote this bylined article to discuss how carried interest for investment fund management partner profits is taxed at the state level. Noting the favorable federal tax treatment of carried interest, Ms. McLoughlin described how legislators in several northeastern states want greater curbs on it at the state level. “None of these four states, however, wants to act in isolation,” she continued, making it “very unlikely that any of these state tax, carried interest bills will pass.”

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  • When Selling to Investors: Consider Minority Shareholders and their Rights

    When Selling to Investors: Consider Minority Shareholders and their Rights

    ARTICLE

    When Selling to Investors: Consider Minority Shareholders and their Rights

    May 5, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Sebastian von Lossow wrote this bylined article in Issue 3 of Unternehmensjurist. In the German middle class, the succession roll is rolling. If no internal family solution is chosen, entrepreneurs often sell to external investors. But they remain minority shareholders regularly. Therefore, the future partnership must be defined.

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