Content Type: Article

  • Supreme Court: SEC Disgorgement Claims Are Subject to Five-Year Statute of Limitations

    Supreme Court: SEC Disgorgement Claims Are Subject to Five-Year Statute of Limitations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    Supreme Court: SEC Disgorgement Claims Are Subject to Five-Year Statute of Limitations

    June 6, 2017

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 5, 2017, a unanimous Supreme Court in Kokesh v. SEC[1] held that SEC enforcement actions seeking disgorgement must be brought within the five-year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Kokesh resolved a split in the Courts of Appeals by concluding that disgorgement in SEC federal court actions is a “penalty,” thus triggering § 2462’s statute of limitations. As a result, we may see the SEC bringing enforcement actions more quickly or becoming more aggressive in pressing parties to agree to toll the applicable limitations period.

    Background

    Under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, government “enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,” must be commenced within five years of when the claim accrues. Initially, the only remedies available to the SEC in enforcement actions for violations of the federal securities laws were injunctions barring future violations. Unable to impose monetary sanctions, the SEC urged federal courts to order disgorgement as part of the courts’ “inherent equity power to grant relief ancillary to an injunction.”[2] Since the 1970s, courts have used this implied authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions. In 1990, Congress authorized the SEC to seek monetary civil penalties. In Gabelli v. SEC, the Court held that the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies to civil penalties sought by the SEC, but did not address whether that limit also applies to disgorgement. 568 U.S. 442, 454, n.1 (2013). Since Gabelli, the SEC has increasingly sought disgorgement in cases where civil penalties were time-barred.

    Proceedings Below
    In 2009, the SEC sued Charles Kokesh in federal court, alleging that, through two investment adviser firms, Kokesh misappropriated nearly $35 million between 1995 and 2009. The SEC sought civil penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction barring future securities law violations. Following a jury verdict for the SEC, the district court addressed the SEC’s claims for relief. The district court held that the five-year statute of limitations applied to the SEC’s request for a civil penalty but not to its disgorgement request. Agreeing with the SEC, it held that disgorgement was not a “penalty” within the meaning of § 2462.

    On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 834 F.3d 1158 (2016). It agreed that disgorgement was not a penalty, held that disgorgement was not a forfeiture, and concluded that the statute of limitations in § 2462 did not apply to SEC disgorgement claims. Id. at 1164-67. Due to a split in the circuits on whether § 2462 applies to disgorgement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.[3]

    The Kokesh Decision

    The issue in Kokesh was whether disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions is a penalty and, thus, subject to § 2462’s limitations period.[4] According to the Court, that question turns on two ways the Court noted that penalties are distinguished from other monetary sanctions. First, penalties typically redress an offense against the state — that is, a public wrong, rather than a wrong to a private individual. Slip op. at 5-6. Second, the purpose of penalties is to punish the wrongdoer and deter others from engaging in similar conduct. Id. at 6-7.

    These principles, the Court concluded, “readily demonstrate[] that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty within the meaning of § 2462.” Id. at 7. The Court noted that disgorgement is imposed as a consequence of violating public laws — the violation is committed against the United States, even if there may be individual victims. Id. at 7-8. Disgorgement is punitive since it deprives the defendant of unlawfully obtained profits and its primary purpose is to deter future violations. Id. at 8. Moreover, disgorgement is not compensatory in many cases. The Court noted that while disgorged funds sometimes are paid to victims, often such funds are paid to the U.S. Treasury. Id. at 9. In sum, “SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a penalty: It is imposed as a consequence of violating a public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate.” Id.

    The Court rejected the SEC’s argument that disgorgement is remedial and merely restores the status quo, noting that SEC disgorgement “sometimes exceeds the profits gained” through the violation. Id. at 10-11. For instance, the Court observed that insider trading tippers often are ordered to disgorge the profits of downstream tippees, even though the tipper did not share in those profits. Id. at 10. Similarly, when disgorgement fails to take into account the expenses a defendant incurs in committing a violation, which would reduce the amount of illegal profit, disgorgement punishes rather than restores the status quo. Id. Acknowledging that disgorgement has multiple purposes, the Court concluded that because SEC disgorgement orders “‘go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers’ as a consequence of violating public laws,” they are subject to the five-year limitations of § 2462. Id. at 11 (quoting Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 451-52).

    Potential Implications for Parties to SEC Investigations

    Beyond increasing SEC incentives to complete investigations in a timely manner, Kokesh may result in more SEC requests for tolling agreements for matters that cannot be concluded before the statute of limitations runs. These include some of the SEC’s most challenging investigations, including those related to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, accounting fraud, and other complex or novel financial matters. By eliminating the uncertainty as to whether disgorgement claims are governed by the statute of limitations, Kokesh may require that parties to SEC investigations consider the benefits of agreeing to, or deciding to resist, the SEC’s requests for tolling agreements. Refusing such requests may force the SEC to bring actions before it otherwise is prepared to do so. It could also cause the SEC to focus more on the remedies that are not subject to applicable limitations periods, including injunctions and the potentially severe collateral consequences of them.

    Authored by Jeffrey F. Robertson and Peter H. White.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the attorneys in the firm’s Securities Enforcement Group or White Collar Defense & Government Investigations Group.

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  • University Retirement Plans Under Scrutiny for Excessive Fees

    University Retirement Plans Under Scrutiny for Excessive Fees

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    University Retirement Plans Under Scrutiny for Excessive Fees

    June 6, 2017

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    There have been 12 proposed class actions brought against major universities with regard to their employee benefit plans. These lawsuits allege numerous claims of fiduciary breach including plan sponsors retaining expensive and underperforming investment options, incurring duplicative fees from using more than one recordkeeper and offering too many investment options. Federal district courts have issued two recent decisions on motions to dismiss, allowing many of the claims to proceed.

    Henderson v. Emory Univ.

    In Henderson v. Emory Univ., a class of participants and beneficiaries of Emory University’s two 403(b) tax-sheltered annuity plans, both subject to ERISA, brought suit against the plans’ fiduciaries alleging that the university breached its fiduciary duties by not using its bargaining power to negotiate for lower expenses and using poor judgment in selecting and retaining investment options.[1] The court granted Emory’s motion to dismiss in part, but allowed the following claims to proceed:

    1. That Emory imprudently chose retail-class shares over institutional-class shares;
    2. That Emory imprudently selected actively managed funds as opposed to passively managed funds;
    3. That Emory imprudently selected funds affiliated with the plans’ service providers;
    4. That Emory failed to remove underperforming funds with higher costs compared to similar funds;
    5. That Emory should have used a stable value fund instead of an annuity fund offered by one of the plans’ service providers;
    6. That Emory failed to monitor the plans’ recordkeepers, who overcharged recordkeepers’ fees;
    7. That Emory imprudently chose three recordkeepers rather than one recordkeeper; and
    8. That Emory imprudently entered into arrangements in which certain investments affiliated with the plans’ service providers had to be included in the plans and that there was no process to remove these investments.

    Additionally, the plan participants sufficiently alleged that Emory breached its duty of loyalty and engaged in prohibited transactions with parties-in-interest. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ theory that offering too many investment options constituted a breach of Emory’s fiduciary duty.

    Clark v. Duke Univ.

    In Clark v. Duke Univ., a class of participants and beneficiaries of Duke University’s 403(b) defined contribution plan, subject to ERISA, brought suit against Duke University, the plan’s fiduciary.[2] The class participants asserted many of the same theories that were asserted by the plaintiffs in Henderson v. Emory Univ. The court in Clark v. Duke Univ. allowed the following claims to proceed:

    1. That Duke imprudently chose four recordkeepers instead of one and selected the recordkeepers’ proprietary investments;
    2. That Duke engaged in prohibited transactions with parties-in-interest;
    3. That Duke failed to remove underperforming funds with higher costs compared to similar funds; and
    4. That Duke failed to monitor the plans’ recordkeepers, who overcharged recordkeepers’ fees.

    Unlike the court in Henderson v. Emory Univ., the court did not dismiss the theory that offering too many investment options constituted a breach of Duke’s fiduciary duty.

    Best Practices for Plan Sponsors

    Plan sponsors must take their fiduciary responsibilities seriously and ensure that their employee benefit plans are operated in accordance with ERISA. Plan sponsors should undertake an internal audit to identify if any corrective actions are appropriate. Some steps that plan sponsors should take to minimize potential liability include:

    • Verify that the fiduciaries understand their status, duties and responsibilities under the law;
    • Hold fiduciary meetings at least quarterly and retain minutes of the meetings to demonstrate a thorough and prudent governance process;
    • Confirm adequate fiduciary liability insurance coverage is in place (fiduciary liability coverage is often a separate endorsement or rider from the regular business liability policy, and plan sponsors should not assume that the coverage is in place);
    • Retain an investment consultant to provide expert advice with respect to the plan’s investments, investment policy and benchmark and analyze fees, revenue sharing arrangements and expense ratios;
    • Adopt an investment policy statement and review it annually;
    • Benchmark service providers’ fees and plan expenses to ensure reasonableness;
    • Review performance of investment funds under the plan regularly (e.g., quarterly) and document the review process, and carefully consider replacing underperforming investment options;
    • Scrutinize high-cost investment options and illiquid annuities and consider whether to replace with lower-cost index funds and institutional investment options (ERISA does not require, however, that plan sponsors replace all funds with the cheapest possible investment options);
    • Ensure that enough investment options are available to adequately allow plan participants to select from a broad array of investment options with different asset classes, different levels of risk and expense ratios to diversify their accounts, but not so many as to create confusion;
    • Reduce the number of recordkeepers to eliminate duplicative costs and increase compliance;
    • Review plan documents and operations for compliance issues and voluntarily correct any failures identified; and
    • Distribute the required compliance disclosures to participants and beneficiaries, including disclosure of fee and revenue sharing arrangements.

    The decisions in these two cases highlight the ERISA fiduciary standards applicable to the administration of defined contribution plans and the importance of not-for-profit plan sponsors having procedures in place to oversee the operation of their plans, including review of fees and the performance of investment options.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Susan E. Bernstein and Aaron S. Farovitch.    

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] No. 1:16-cv-02920-CAP (N.D. Ga. May 10, 2017).

    [2] No. 1:16-cv-01044 (M.D.N.C. May 11, 2017).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Analysis of the ECJ Decision of 13.03.2017 – C-138/16 – AKM/Zürs.net – About the Copy Right Protection of Unaltered, Simultaneous, Complete Program Distribution

    Analysis of the ECJ Decision of 13.03.2017 – C-138/16 – AKM/Zürs.net – About the Copy Right Protection of Unaltered, Simultaneous, Complete Program Distribution

    ARTICLE

    Analysis of the ECJ Decision of 13.03.2017 – C-138/16 – AKM/Zürs.net – About the Copy Right Protection of Unaltered, Simultaneous, Complete Program Distribution

    June 2017

    Read time: 1 min

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  • New DOL ERISA Fiduciary Regulation Takes Effect (at Least for Now)

    New DOL ERISA Fiduciary Regulation Takes Effect (at Least for Now)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New DOL ERISA Fiduciary Regulation Takes Effect (at Least for Now)

    June 2, 2017

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The DOL regulation expanding the definition of who is a fiduciary in the context of marketing investment products to Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”) and ERISA-covered pension plans (“ERISA Plans”) takes effect on June 9. On May 22, the Secretary of Labor authored an op-ed piece in which he expressed concern that this new fiduciary regulation did not align with President Trump’s deregulatory goals. However, he concluded that the DOL could not act on its own to postpone the effective date of the regulation. Thus, the Secretary of Labor stated that the DOL continues to study the rule, but any changes will have to be effected in the ordinary course under the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires proposal, notice and a comment period before any changes can be made.

    Action Items for Private Fund Managers

    1. Identify all fee-paying IRA and ERISA Plan investors.
    2. Send a notice to the fee-paying IRA and ERISA Plan investors that sets forth the required manager disclosures and the manager’s understanding of the availability of a carve-out from fiduciary status.
    3. For new subscriptions and additional investments, consider using an attachment to the subscription documents containing the manager disclosures and representations from IRA and ERISA Plan investors. Because the DOL could change the applicable requirements, it may be advisable to use an attachment at this point instead of revising the subscription documents themselves.

    The DOL regulation has no impact on whether the assets of a private fund such as a hedge fund or a private equity fund are treated as “plan assets” of the investors that are ERISA-covered plans and Individual Retirement Accounts. Rather it delineates when the manager of the private fund may become a fiduciary of its investors and potential investors in marketing the fund, and provides carve-outs that eliminate fiduciary status. The carve-outs should permit the continued marketing of private funds to sophisticated plan fiduciaries almost unimpeded. Many investors will fit within one of the carve-outs briefly summarized below, and thus the fund manager will not be a fiduciary to those investors when recommending the purchase of, or continued holding of, interests in a fund.

    In the absence of one of the carve-outs, recommending investment in a fund will cause the manager to be a fiduciary in connection with the decision of an IRA or ERISA Plan to invest in the fund. The term “recommendation” is very broad and encompasses any communication that a reasonable person could view as recommending that he or she buy, hold or sell interests in a fund. While the offering memorandum of a fund may not be viewed as a recommendation, a periodic letter may be viewed as recommending that the investor continue to hold his or her investment in the fund. In addition, discussions about the fund with Investor Relations or other fund personnel may also be viewed as a recommendation.

    Institutional Investors

    The broadest carve-out applies when marketing to institutional ERISA Plan investors. A private fund manager will not be a fiduciary when it markets its fund to a plan committee that the fund manager reasonably believes holds or has under management and control total assets in excess of $50 million if certain conditions are met. The size of the particular ERISA Plan investor is irrelevant as long as the plan committee that controls the investment of the ERISA Plan’s assets meets the $50 million test. The conditions to the fiduciary carve-out require that the private fund manager know or reasonably believe that: (a) the plan committee is capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and with regard to the private fund’s investment program and strategies; and (b) that the plan committee is a fiduciary with respect to the transaction and is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the transaction.

    In addition to the status of the plan committee, the carve-out requires the private fund manager to take several proactive steps. As set forth in the Notice, the private fund manager must: (a) fairly inform the plan committee that it is not undertaking to provide impartial investment advice, or to give advice in a fiduciary capacity, in connection with the investment in the private fund; and (b) fairly inform the plan committee of the existence and nature of the person’s financial interests in the transaction (this information may already be set forth, at least in a general way, in the fund’s offering memorandum). Further, the private fund manager cannot receive a fee, directly or indirectly, for the provision of investment advice. This condition is not violated by the fact that the private fund pays its manager an asset under management fee and/or incentive compensation.

    Independent Fiduciaries

    Regardless of the size of an ERISA Plan investor’s assets and in all cases with respect to an Individual Retirement Account or a self-directed 401(k) plan participant, similar carve-outs apply to the extent that the private fund manager knows or reasonably believes that an ERISA Plan investor or Individual Retirement Account has an independent fiduciary advising it with respect to an investment in a fund. The independent fiduciary can be a bank, a registered investment adviser, or a broker-dealer. This independent fiduciary must meet the tests otherwise applicable to a plan committee that holds or manages assets in excess of $50 million. Thus, while the independent fiduciary need not have discretionary authority over the ERISA Plan’s or Individual Retirement Account’s investment, he or she must be advising the plan decision maker (or Individual Retirement Account holder) as an ERISA fiduciary and make the recommendation to buy or hold interests in a private fund. The disclosures that the private fund manager must make to the plan committee are the same as those it must make to the independent fiduciary (as set forth in the Notice).

    The DOL has stated that, a plan representative or Individual Retirement Account holder may attend a meeting in which the private fund manager makes a presentation. However, for the independent fiduciary carve-out to be available, the private fund manager must know or reasonably believe that the independent fiduciary is making the buy or hold recommendation and otherwise meets the test applicable to the plan committee of large pension investors. In light of this interpretation, private fund managers should consider adopting procedures that require the presence of the independent fiduciary if a representative of an ERISA plan or Individual Retirement Account holder contacts Investor Relations directly, whether prior to the investment or any time after the investment. Similarly, if interests in a private fund are sold through investment bank or broker-dealer platforms or are sold using third-party placement agents, a representative of the platform sponsor or third-party placement agent should participate in any call or other discussions with the direct investor in the fund.

    In order to comply with the carve-out for recommendations to large pension plans and represented ERISA Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts, the private fund manager must make specific disclosure with respect to itself and may rely on written representations from the plan committee or a negative consent with respect to those items the private fund manager must know or reasonably believe. Although the typical offering memorandum may already contain most if not all of the disclosures required to take advantage of one or more of the fiduciary carve-outs, an additional notice to this effect may be included in an update to investors. While the DOL has approved of negative consent, we believe that it makes sense, on a going-forward basis, to supplement the subscription documents to request large and small ERISA Plan investors as well as investors who have invested through their self-directed 401(k) Plan or an Individual Retirement Account, to identify the carve-out applicable to ongoing communications.

    Other Investors

    Recommendations to an unrepresented Individual Retirement Account, a participant in a self-directed 401(k) plan or small ERISA Plans (i.e., where the plan committee controls less than $50 million) will not fall within one of the fiduciary carve-outs and may cause the fund manager to be a fiduciary to a new investor in this category with their decision to invest in the fund. Accordingly, private fund managers may wish to suspend new investments by this category of potential investor. A grandfather rule may apply to existing investors in certain circumstances.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Second Circuit Affirms Refusal to Approve Foreign Debtor’s Asset Sale

    Second Circuit Affirms Refusal to Approve Foreign Debtor’s Asset Sale

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Affirms Refusal to Approve Foreign Debtor’s Asset Sale

    May 31, 2017

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “… [A]ny sale of [a foreign] debtor[‘s] property [in the U.S.] outside of the ordinary course of business can be approved by the bankruptcy court only after notice, hearing, and a finding of good business reasons to permit the sale,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on May 22, 2017. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (“Sentry II”), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *11 (2d Cir. May 22, 2017). The court relied on the language of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 1520(a)(2), which mandates the application of Code § 363(b) in a foreign debtor’s Chapter 15 case “to a transfer of … property that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” In an earlier decision, In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (“Sentry I”), 768 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit had ordered the bankruptcy court, on remand, to apply Code § 363(b) to a foreign representative’s sale of a foreign debtor’s U.S. asset. In Sentry II, the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s disapproval of the asset sale, because the asset had dramatically increased in value before any court had approved the sale, calling it a “sound business reason” for disapproval. 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *2.

    Relevance

    Fairfield Sentry is important to asset buyers in bankruptcy sales. Until the bankruptcy court approves an asset sale, the seller may decline to go forward if it has “no good business reason” for proceeding with the sale — if, for example, the property has increased in value, rendering the original contract price inadequate. A bankruptcy court’s “principal responsibility … is to secure for the benefit of creditors the best possible bid.” Sentry I, 768 F.3d at 246-47, quoting In re Fin. News Network, Inc., 980 F.2d 165, 169 (2d Cir. 1992).

    Nor must a U.S. bankruptcy court necessarily defer to a foreign court’s judgment as a matter of “comity.” Despite Chapter 15’s general deference to foreign courts for the sake of consistency, in this case Code § 1520(a)(2) “explicitly” required the bankruptcy court to review the asset sale “to the same extent” as it would in a domestic Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case. Sentry II, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *14.

    Facts
    U.S. Recognition of Sentry Case

    Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (“Sentry”) was a British Virgin Islands (“BVI”) investment fund that had invested 95 percent of its assets with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (“Madoff”), which later became the subject of a liquidation under the Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”). After Sentry filed three customer claims (collectively, the “SIPA Claim”) in the SIPA liquidation, the SIPA trustee and Sentry negotiated a settlement allowing Sentry’s SIPA Claim in the amount of $230 million. Sentry itself later became the subject of a BVI liquidation and a BVI Court appointed a “Liquidator” under BVI law. The Liquidator then sought “recognition” of the BVI liquidation under Chapter 15 of the Code as a “foreign main proceeding” in the Southern District of New York. The bankruptcy court entered an order of recognition of the Sentry case on July 22, 2010, enabling the Liquidator to use the U.S. bankruptcy court to protect and administer Sentry’s assets in the United States (e.g., automatic stay, injunctive relief, sale of property and operation of debtor’s business). Sentry I, 768 F.3d at 243.

    Auction of Sentry’s SIPA Claim

    The Sentry Liquidator auctioned off the Sentry SIPA Claim during the summer of 2010. The successful bidder (the “Buyer”) offered to buy it for roughly 32 percent of the it’s allowed amount, a bid that was “several percentage points higher than the other bids,” and was accepted by the Liquidator, subject only to later court approval. Id. at 242.

    The Liquidator and the Buyer negotiated, documented and signed a trade confirmation (the “Confirm”) setting forth the material terms of the sale. Among other things, the Confirm was to be governed by New York law and was expressly “subject to approval by both the U.S. bankruptcy court and the BVI Court,” with a requirement that the Liquidator “promptly [seek] the approval of the BVI Court of the terms and conditions of [the Confirm].” Id.

    Increase in Value of SIPA Claim

    Three days after the parties signed the Confirm, the Madoff trustee entered into a settlement agreement with an unrelated third party that materially “increased the value of Sentry’s SIPA Claim from 32% to more than 50% of the … allowed amount of the claim (an increase of approximately $40 million).” Id.

    BVI Court Approval of Confirm Subject to U.S. Bankruptcy Court Approval

    As a result of changed circumstances, the Liquidator declined to seek BVI Court approval of the Confirm, causing the Buyer to move in the BVI Court for an order compelling performance by the Liquidator to comply. In response, the Liquidator asked the BVI Court “not to approve the transfer to [the Buyer] at the bid price because, given the sudden increase in the value of the SIPA Claim, it was not in the best interests of the Sentry estate.” Id. The Liquidator also argued that U.S. bankruptcy court approval was required under Code § § 1520(a)(2) and 363. Id.

    The BVI Court approved the sale of the SIPA Claim under the Confirm despite the Liquidator’s objection, subject to further approval of the U.S. bankruptcy court. Id. In doing so, it stressed that the U.S. bankruptcy court had “a choice whether or not to approve” the proposed sale. Id. at 243.

    U.S. Bankruptcy Court’s Refusal to Review Contracts

    The Liquidator moved in the U.S. bankruptcy court seeking review of the Confirm and, more important, “an order disapproving” the sale (emphasis added). Denying the Liquidator’s motion, the bankruptcy court described it as “seller’s remorse” and a “last-ditch effort” to undo the sale. It also declined to review the transaction because it reasoned that the “[s]ale does not involve the transfer of an interest in property within the United States.” In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 484 B.R. 615, 617, 618 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). In its view, “comity dictates that [the U.S. bankruptcy court] defer to the BVI judgment” by approving the sale. Id. at 628. On the first round of appeal, the district court questioned whether Code § 363 even applied, but agreed that the bankruptcy court’s denial of the Liquidator’s challenge to the sale was proper because “[c]ourts should be loath to interfere with corporate decisions absent a showing of bad faith, self-interest, or gross negligence.” In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., No. 13 Civ. 1524(AKH) at *1, 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013).

    Sentry I

    Chapter 15 Requires Full Bankruptcy Court Review

    The BVI liquidation was a “foreign main proceeding” as defined in Chapter 15 of the Code, noted the Second Circuit. Sentry I, 768 F. 3d at 243. According to the court, the Chapter 15 proceeding protected “Sentry’s United States assets from creditor action and [allowed the Liquidator] to obtain the rights and benefits of Chapter 15.” Id. A U.S. bankruptcy court must therefore fully review any proposed “transfer of an interest of the debtor in property that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id., quoting Code § 1520(a)(2). More important, § 1520(a)(2) provides that the U.S. bankruptcy court must conduct its review “to the same extent that [§ 363] would apply to property of an estate” in a domestic bankruptcy case. Id. at 244, quoting Code § 1520(a)(2).

    SIPA Claim Is Property

    The Second Circuit rejected the parties’ technical arguments over the nature of the SIPA Claim, holding that it was “property” and that Sentry was selling its “rights, title and interest in and to [its] claims against” Madoff in the Madoff SIPA liquidation. “In other words, the SIPA Claim is a ‘chose in action.’” Id. at 244.

    SIPA Claim Within the United States

    The SIPA Claim was also within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, held the court. Code § 1502(8) includes the following property “[w]ithin the territorial jurisdiction of the United States: …[I]ntangible property deemed under applicable nonbankruptcy law to be located within that territory, including any property subject to attachment or garnishment that may properly be seized or garnished by an action in a Federal or State court in the United States.”

    The bankruptcy court in Sentry I held that the SIPA Claim was “located with the debtor in the BVI,” but the Second Circuit found that analysis to be “incomplete.” Id., at 244. According to the Second Circuit, the SIPA Claim was “subject to attachment or garnishment and may be properly seized by an action in a Federal or State court in the United States.” Id. Citing New York CPLR §§ 5201(b) and 6202, the court found that “any property which could be assigned or transferred” is subject to attachment and garnishment in New York. The Madoff SIPA trustee was located in New York and was “statutorily obligated to distribute to Sentry its pro rata share of the recovered assets” on the allowed SIPA Claim. Id., at 245.

    Comity Not Applicable

    The Second Circuit in Sentry I also rejected the lower courts’ deference to the BVI Court’s judgment approving the sale. In its view, Code Chapter 15 imposed “certain requirements and considerations that act as a brake or limitation on comity.” Id., quoting In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031, 1054 (5th Cir. 2012). Thus, there is no automatic blanket deference to foreign rulings. Because the “plain” language of Code § 1520(a)(2) directed the U.S. bankruptcy court to apply § 363 “to the same extent” as it would in a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 11 case, the bankruptcy court was “required to conduct” a full review of the proposed sale when, as was the case here, the debtor sought to sell a property interest within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id., at 246 (emphasis in original). As noted, the BVI Court apparently never “expect[ed] or desire[d] deference” here. That court had “expressly declined to rule on whether the [asset sale] required approval under section 363.” Id.

    Sentry II

    The district court in Sentry II affirmed the bankruptcy court’s disapproval of the transaction, on remand from the Second Circuit, because the Liquidator had provided a “sound business reason” for disapproval.[1] 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *2. The Buyer argued that the bankruptcy court had erred in disapproving the asset sale because it had previously entrusted “the administration … of the debtor’s assets within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States to the foreign representative.” It also argued that the bankruptcy court had given “insufficient weight in its section 363(b) analysis to comity values.” Id at *3. Holding that the mandate of Sentry I foreclosed both of these arguments, the Second Circuit declined “to reconsider [its] direction in [Sentry I] that the bankruptcy court was obliged to conduct a § 363(b) review.” Id.

    First, the Buyer “made effectively the same argument in the earlier appeal that it now advances.” Id. at *7. In fact, said the court, “Sentry I … both impliedly rejected the Entrustment Argument [made by the Buyer] and limited the lower courts’ consideration on remand to a traditional section 363(b) analysis.” Id. at *8-*9.

    The Second Circuit also rejected the Buyer’s argument that “comity values should instead have weighed as a dispositive factor in” the bankruptcy court’s review on remand. According to the Second Circuit, “this is effectively the same argument” made by the Buyer in Sentry I, and “is barred by the mandate” in that decision. Id. at *9.

    The Second Circuit also rejected the Buyer’s request for reconsideration of its prior ruling, explaining that it had identified “no clear error.” Id. at *11. First the court rejected the Buyer’s argument that the earlier entrustment order issued by the bankruptcy court gave the Liquidator “unfettered ability to convert the Debtor’s non-cash assets into cash, including by selling them … .” Id. at *11-*12. According to the court, however, “the § 1520(a)(2) specific requirement as to non-ordinary-course property sales governs instead of the general conferral-of-authority language in” another part of the statute. Id. at *13. Moreover, “section 1520(a)(2) is an ‘express statutory command that, in any Chapter 15 ancillary proceeding, the requirements of § 363 apply to the same extent as in Chapter 7 or 11 [cases]. ‘” Id. at *14, quoting Sentry I, 768 F.3d at 245.

    Finally, the court rejected the Buyer’s argument that “in a Chapter 15 proceeding, facilitating transnational cooperation is the most important factor.” Sentry II, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8860, at *15. Aside from the Buyer’s failure to convince the court to reach a “result contrary to that reached in the Sentry I,” the Second Circuit stressed that the “post-sale increase in value of [the SIPA Claim] against [Madoff] still provides a ‘good business reason’ to disapprove the transaction … that is not clearly outweighed by comity, where, as here, the BVI Court’s statements signal that it did not ‘expect … or desire … deference’ to its approval of the Sale.” Id. at *16, quoting Sentry I, 768 F.3d at 246.

    Comment

    The Liquidator was a fiduciary who had a duty to withdraw from the Confirm once the SIPA Claim dramatically increased in value before any court approved the sale. The U.S. bankruptcy court had an obligation to approve only the highest or best bid. It had no “good business reason” and no valid legal reason for deferring to the BVI Court’s misjudgment. As the Second Circuit noted in 1983, a court must consider “whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value” in order to find “a good business reason” to approve an asset sale. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] In finding that the Liquidator had provided a “sound business reason” for disapproval of the asset sale, Judge Bernstein gave substantial weight to the SIPA Claim’s increase in value. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 539 B.R. 658, 669 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) ([T]he most important factor and the one factor the Second Circuit specifically directed this Court to consider [(whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in value)] plainly weighs against the approval of the sale.).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • The Ban on Consignment Sales

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    The Ban on Consignment Sales

    May/June 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Marc Sorini wrote this bylined article on the laws prohibiting consignment sales in the alcohol beverage industry. In light of recent costly brewer settlements with the government, Mr. Sorini warned that “craft brewers should know and understand the consignment sale rules and ensure that they do not inadvertently cross the line from legitimate business transaction to illegal consignment sale.”

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  • Crossing the Pond – Using a “Flip” for Financial and Strategic Benefit

    Crossing the Pond – Using a “Flip” for Financial and Strategic Benefit

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    Crossing the Pond – Using a “Flip” for Financial and Strategic Benefit

    May 2017

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    Albert Sokol co-authored this paper presented in Paris at the May 2017 BioEquity Conference. Mr. Sokol described a cross border “flip” of a corporate structure for a non-US company, in which a new US company acts as the parent company of an existing operation. He noted that in the right situations, such a move can generate strategic and financial benefits for a company group, without fundamentally changing corporate operations.

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    Albert Sokol

    Counsel

    Boston

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  • The French Administration Implements the EU Directive 2014/104 on Antitrust Damages Actions

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    The French Administration Implements the EU Directive 2014/104 on Antitrust Damages Actions

    May 2017

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    Lionel Lesur, Louise Astrid Aberg and Aymeric Discours wrote this bylined article on France’s implementation of the new EU Directive on antitrust damages actions. France’s provisions “faithfully transpose the EU Directive and bring clarity to victims and perpetrators of antitrust infringements,” the authors wrote, adding that “the attractiveness of France within the European Union for damages actions and, in particular, follow-on actions could be improved” compared to other EU countries.

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  • Crossborder Transformations: Requirement of a Harmonized European Legal Regime

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    Crossborder Transformations: Requirement of a Harmonized European Legal Regime

    May 29, 2017

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    The requirement of a harmonized European legal regime for cross-border changes of corporate forms and other cross-border transformations.

    Dr. Germar Enders, commenting on the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt a.M. on a German GmbH changing its legal form in a cross-border transaction (here: into an Italien S.r.l.) (OLG Frankfurt a.M., 3 January 2017 – 20 W 88/15)

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  • New CFTC Rules Formalize Whistleblower Protections for Employees of Hedge Fund Managers and Other Registrants

    New CFTC Rules Formalize Whistleblower Protections for Employees of Hedge Fund Managers and Other Registrants

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New CFTC Rules Formalize Whistleblower Protections for Employees of Hedge Fund Managers and Other Registrants

    May 26, 2017

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 22, 2017, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission amended and supplemented several CFTC regulations to strengthen anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers under the Commodity Exchange Act. These amendments, in general, make the CFTC’s whistleblower protections consistent with those afforded by Securities and Exchange Commission rules and reinforce the need for private fund managers that are registered as commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisors to take affirmative steps to avoid violating federal regulations regarding whistleblowing.

    Section 748 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act amended the Commodity Exchange Act by adding a new Section 23, titled “Commodity Whistleblower Incentives and Protection,”[1] which directed the CFTC to establish an incentive program that would reward whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the CFTC with information leading to successful enforcement actions for violations of the CEA. The CFTC subsequently adopted whistleblower protection provisions, in Part 165 of the CFTC Rules, as part of a broader rulemaking effort to implement the bounty program envisioned in Section 23 of the CEA.

    On May 22, 2017, the CFTC adopted several amendments to Part 165, including several changes intended to prevent frustration of the CFTC’s promotion of whistleblower reporting efforts through employer enforcement of confidentiality and similar agreements.[2] The main changes resulting from these amendments are:

    • Non-Waiver. Rule 165.19 was amended to state that the CFTC’s whistleblower protections “may not be waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of employment, including by a predispute arbitration agreement.” It goes on expressly to invalidate any predispute arbitration agreement that requires arbitration of a dispute relating to a whistleblower report.
    • Protected Communications. Rule 165.19 also was amended to prohibit any person (not only CFTC registrants) from taking any action “to impede an individual from communicating directly with the [CFTC’s] staff about a possible violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, including by enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement or predispute arbitration agreement with respect to such communications.”
    • Enforcement Authority and Standing. New Rule 165.20 and Appendix A to Part 165 make it clear that both the CFTC and private litigants have the authority to bring an action against an employer who retaliates against a whistleblower (which anti-retaliation sanction applies even if the whistleblower does not qualify for a bounty under the CFTC whistleblower incentive program).

    The Release points out that these amendments reverse earlier CFTC positions regarding the ability of the Commission to bring an action for a retaliatory employer’s actions against a whistleblower:

    By adopting proposed Rule 165.20(b), the Commission is confirming its decision to revise its 2011 interpretation that it lacks the statutory authority to bring an enforcement case against an employer that violates the anti-retaliation prohibition in Section 23(h)(1) [of the Commodity Exchange Act]. The 2011 interpretation failed to fully consider the statutory context of Section 23 and other CEA provisions. … Although Section 23(h)(1)(B) provides a private right of action, nothing in that sub-section purports to limit the Commission’s general enforcement authority or suggests that the private right of action is exclusive.[3]

    The CFTC stated that one of its goals is to “encourage whistleblowers to report [evidence of corporate wrongdoing] internally,” noting that the CFTC whistleblower rules: (i) allow a whistleblower to retain eligibility for a bounty after reporting internally and (ii) include, as factors that may increase the amount of an award, whether and the extent to which a whistleblower reported the possible violations through internal legal or compliance procedures or assisted any internal investigation concerning the reported violation; however, the CFTC adopted these new and amended rules because it felt that it would be inconsistent for the Commission to encourage internal reporting by whistleblowers and not extend to them anti-retaliation protections to the extent the CEA permits. To do so would place whistleblowers who report internally in a worse position than whistleblowers who do not report internally prior to reporting to the Commission, forcing whistleblowers to choose between reporting internally first in the hopes of increasing any award or foregoing reporting internally in order to preserve anti-retaliation protections.

    The applicability of these amendments to private fund managers that are registered with the CFTC as commodity pool operators or commodity trading advisors is clear, and the steps that these registrants should take are substantially similar to the steps recommended under recent whistleblowing cases involving investment advisers registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    In In re KBR, Inc.,[4] KBR, as part of its settlement with the SEC, agreed to pay a $130,000 fine and, as a remedial measure, agreed to amend its confidentiality agreements to add the following carve-out:

    Nothing in this Confidentiality Statement prohibits me from reporting possible violations of federal law or regulation to any governmental agency or entity, including but not limited to the Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Congress, and any agency Inspector General, or making other disclosures that are protected under the whistleblower provisions of federal law or regulation. I do not need the prior authorization of the Law Department to make any such reports or disclosures and I am not required to notify the company that I have made such reports or disclosures[.][5]

    The SEC later brought a series of enforcement actions against companies for including provisions in severance agreements that the SEC determined could be interpreted to impede employee whistleblowing activity. Provisions the SEC indicated were problematic included non-disparagement and confidentiality provisions, provisions requiring an employee to waive the right to any monetary recovery in connection with filing a charge with a government agency, and provisions requiring an employee notify the company before providing information to the SEC.[6]

    In the wake of the CFTC rulemaking, managers registered with the CFTC should review (to the extent they have not yet done so as a result of SEC enforcement actions and guidance) employment, separation and settlement agreements; employment and compliance polices; and codes of conduct and amend any provisions in these agreements and policies that could be read to be a waiver of or an impediment to a whistleblowing report to the CFTC. These agreements and policies should make clear that whistleblowing activity is permitted without notice to or authorization by the manager. In addition, managers should ensure that their internal reporting procedures are robust.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly and Holly H. Weiss.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26.

    [2] Whistleblower Awards Process, RIN 3038-AE50 (May 22, 2017) (the “Release”).

    [3] Release, at page 26.

    [4] See, e.g., In re KBR, Inc., Exch. Act Release No. 74619 (April 1, 2015).

    [5] In re KBR, Inc., at 3.

    [6] See SRZ Client Alert, “SEC Whistleblower Update: New Enforcement Actions for ‘Chilling’ Language in Severance Agreements” (Dec. 22, 2016).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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