Content Type: Article

  • Trump Can Help Farmers by Improving Two-Way Trade with Cuba

    ARTICLE

    Trump Can Help Farmers by Improving Two-Way Trade with Cuba

    May 26, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jim Moran and Jeff Miller wrote this bylined article urging revision of “outdated laws and regulations” that govern US agricultural trade with Cuba. The authors called Cuba “a multibillion-dollar agriculture market just 90 miles away,” and asserted that “an improved two-way trade framework could enable American agriculture to leverage its solid advantage in shipping costs and shorter delivery times” to take a lead market position in Cuba.

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  • Analysis of Energy and Tax Proposals in the 2018 Budget Proposal

    ARTICLE

    Analysis of Energy and Tax Proposals in the 2018 Budget Proposal

    May 26, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Gale Chan, Heather Cooper, Martha Groves Pugh and Philip Tingle wrote this bylined article on President Trump’s budget Proposal for FY 2018. The authors noted that “the Budget Proposal is silent regarding energy-related tax provisions such as the production tax credit (PTC) and the investment tax credit (ITC), as well as the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Heather Cooper

    Partner

    Miami

    Philip Tingle

    Partner

    Miami

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  • Rewarding Long-Term Shareholders: The Use of European and U.S. Loyalty Share Programs

    Rewarding Long-Term Shareholders: The Use of European and U.S. Loyalty Share Programs

    ARTICLE

    Rewarding Long-Term Shareholders: The Use of European and U.S. Loyalty Share Programs

    May 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Thomas Conaghan, Lionel Lesur, Lindsey Reighard and Louis Leroy wrote this bylined article on the use of loyalty shares that give shareholders a reward (additional shares or dividends) if they hold their shares for a certain period of time. Although popular in Europe and making their way into the US, the authors wrote that “because of the lack of regulatory guidance in the United States (unlike in Europe), companies should tread carefully if they decide to proceed with such a program in this country.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Lindsey Reighard

    Partner

    Dallas

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  • View from McDermott: The Quandary of Publicly-Traded Employer Stock in a 401(k) Plan

    ARTICLE

    View from McDermott: The Quandary of Publicly-Traded Employer Stock in a 401(k) Plan

    May 25, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Erin Turley and Emily Rickard wrote this bylined article on issues involved when employer stock is offered as a company 401(k) plan investment. Due to high-profile employee lawsuits under ERISA, the authors wrote that “the propriety of including employer stock in a plan’s investment menu ultimately can depend on the unique character of that plan’s population, as well as the diligence and documentation of that plan’s decision-makers.”

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  • FY 2018 President’s Budget May Signal Challenges for Health Programs on the Horizon

    ARTICLE

    FY 2018 President’s Budget May Signal Challenges for Health Programs on the Horizon

    May 25, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Eric Zimmerman, along with McDermott+Consulting Vice Presidents Adaeze Enekwechi and Piper Su, wrote this +Insights publication detailing the possible effects of the Trump Administration’s 2018 budget on health programs and what can be inferred about the administration’s priorities for the sector going forward.

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    Authors

    Eric Zimmerman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 5

    IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 5

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 5

    May 2017

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
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    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Last but Not Least, Texas Takes the Final Steps to Embrace Telemedicine

    Last but Not Least, Texas Takes the Final Steps to Embrace Telemedicine

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Last but Not Least, Texas Takes the Final Steps to Embrace Telemedicine

    May 24, 2017

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As one of the last states to retain highly restrictive (and arguably anti-competitive) telemedicine practice standards, health care providers, regulatory boards, technology companies, payors and other stakeholders have been actively monitoring Texas’ approach to telemedicine regulation and the related Teladoc case. Senate Bill 1107, a bill that significantly eases the delivery of care via telemedicine in the state of Texas, was passed on May 11, 2017, and the House added an amendment in passing Senate Bill 1107, which was approved in the Senate on May 18—it is anticipated that Governor Abbott will sign the bill into law shortly.

    In depth

    On May 11, 2017, the Texas House of Representatives passed Senate Bill 1107, a bill designed to expand the delivery of care via telemedicine in the state of Texas. The House added an amendment in passing Senate Bill 1107, which was approved in the Senate on May 18. The bill was sent to Governor Greg Abbott’s desk for signature on May 19, and it is anticipated that he will sign the bill into law shortly. As one of the last states to retain highly restrictive (and arguably anti-competitive) telemedicine practice standards, health care providers, regulatory boards, technology companies, payors and other stakeholders located across the US have been actively monitoring Texas’ approach to telemedicine regulation and the related Teladoc case, waiting for this day to come.

    Relevant Background

    As McDermott Will & Emery reported on March 8, 2017, Senate Bill 1107, and the companion House Bill 2697 (together, the Bill), mark a rapid and necessary move forward for the Texas legislature, and by implication, the Texas Medical Board. The Texas Medical Board has been embroiled in litigation with Teladoc, Inc. for two years concerning its regulation of telemedicine. In addition, in September 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and US Department of Justice (DOJ) advocated in support of Teladoc and the broad use and adoption of telehealth, which we previously analyzed here.

    At the center of the dispute has been the Texas Medical Board’s requirement that a face-to-face encounter take place at an “established medical site”—a site with licensed or certified health care professionals, sufficient technology and medical equipment to allow for physical evaluation, and of sufficient size to accommodate patient privacy and presentation of the patient to the provider—between the patient and provider prior to delivering care via telemedicine, unless a very limited exception applies.

    By implication, a patient in Zavala County might have to travel an hour and a half to San Antonio to establish a provider-patient relationship with a specialist prior to using telemedicine to get treatment from them in the future. For that hypothetical patient, who may be amongst the poorest in the nation with some of the worst access to health care, this face-to-face requirement could prevent them from receiving the right type of health care services at the right time using telemedicine, as telemedicine might be the only feasible option due to provider shortages (resulting in long wait times for appointments), costs associated with patient travel (including lost wages from missed work) and other considerations. Many have argued that Texas’ continued requirement of the initial face-to-face encounter has stunted the growth of telemedicine in a state that is well positioned to benefit from telemedicine’s ability to connect patients in underserved or rural areas without immediate access to the right health care providers that the patient needs the most.

    Key Aspects of the Bill

    Defining Telemedicine and Telehealth

    The Bill redefines or adds definitions to expand on several concepts. First, the Bill adds a definition of store and forward technology that is consistent with what many states have adopted: “technology that stores and transmits or grants access to a person’s clinical information for a review by a health professional at a different physical location than the person.” The Bill also distinguishes between telehealth services and telemedicine medical services. A telehealth service is defined as “a health service, other than a telemedicine medical service, delivered by a health professional licensed, certified, or otherwise entitled to practice in Texas and acting within the scope of the professional’s license, certificate, or entitlement to a patient at a different physical location than the health professional using telecommunications or information technology.”

    Comparatively, a telemedicine medical service is defined as “a health care service delivered by a physician licensed in Texas, or a health professional acting under the delegation and supervision of a physician licensed in Texas, and acting within the scope of the physician’s or health professional’s license to a patient at a different physical location than the physician or health professional using a valid telecommunications or information technology.”

    Redefining Practitioner-Patient Relationship and Standard of Care

    Importantly, the Bill removes the requirement that a face-to-face encounter take place prior to the use of telemedicine.

    Perhaps recognizing the contentious history of telemedicine’s entry into Texas, the Bill provides that “an agency with regulatory authority over a health professional may not adopt rules pertaining to telemedicine medical services or telehealth services that would impose a higher standard of care than the in-person standard of care.” A valid practitioner-patient relationship may be formed using telemedicine as long as the practitioner complies with the in-person standard of care and the practitioner either (1) has a preexisting practitioner-patient relationship with the patient established in accordance with the rules that are authorized to be adopted under a section designed to coordinate the adoption of rules to determine a valid prescription; (2) communicates, regardless of the method of the communication, with the patient pursuant to a call coverage agreement established in accordance with Texas Medical Board rules with a physician requesting coverage of medical care for the patient; or (3) provides the telemedicine medical services through the use of synchronous audiovisual interaction or asynchronous store and forward technology, including store and forward technology in conjunction with synchronous audio interaction.

    The use of asynchronous store and forward technology must allow the practitioner to use clinical information from (1) clinically relevant photographic or video images including diagnostic images; (2) the patient’s relevant medical records, such as the relevant medical history, laboratory and pathology results, and prescriptive histories; or (3) another form of audiovisual telecommunication technology that allows the practitioner to comply with the in-person standard of care.

    If a practitioner uses synchronous audiovisual interaction or asynchronous store and forward technology, the practitioner is required to provide the patient with guidance on appropriate follow-up care. Additionally, if the patient has a primary care physician and the patient consents, the practitioner must provide to the patient’s primary care physician a medical record or other report explaining the treatment provided by the practitioner to the patient, as well as the practitioner’s evaluation or diagnosis of the patient’s conditions, within 72 hours of a telehealth service or telemedicine medical service being provided.

    The Texas Medical Board continues to maintain jurisdiction to adopt rules to (1) ensure patients receive appropriate, quality care through telemedicine; (2) prevent fraud and abuse in telemedicine medical services; (3) ensure adequate supervision of health professionals who are not physicians and provide telemedicine medical services; and (4) establish the maximum number of health professionals who are not physicians that a physician may supervise through a telemedicine medical service.

    Prescribing Rules

    The new valid prescription requirement instructs the Texas Medical Board, Texas Board of Nursing, Texas Physician Assistant Board and Texas State Board of Pharmacy to jointly adopt rules that establish the determination of a valid prescription. The boards are additionally required to jointly develop and publish on each respective board’s website responses to FAQs relating to the determination of a valid prescription issued in the course of the provision of telemedicine medical services.

    The Bill additionally includes a restriction on the prescription of any abortion-inducing drugs or devices. Specifically, the Bill states that no practitioner-provider relationship occurs if a practitioner prescribes an abortifacient or any other drug or device that terminates a pregnancy. Practically speaking, this means that any practitioner who prescribes a drug or device that may induce an abortion will likely violate the rules to be adopted by the Texas Medical Board, and will be subject to discipline. Once signed into law, Texas will become the twentieth state to pass such a restriction. Given Utah’s recent withdrawal of a similar provision due to potential litigation and general controversy, and Planned Parenthood’s lawsuit settlement with Idaho in 2015, it would be unsurprising to see the provision generate further litigation.

    Amends Current Coverage Parity Requirement for Telemedicine Services

    Texas law currently has a telehealth and telemedicine “coverage parity law.” The Texas Insurance Code provides that (1) a health benefit plan may not exclude a telemedicine or a telehealth service from coverage under the plan solely because the service is not provided through a face-to-face consultation and (2) the health benefit plan may require a deductible, a copayment or coinsurance for a telemedicine medical service or a telehealth service, which may not exceed the amount of the deductible, copayment or coinsurance required for a comparable medical service provided through a face-to-face consultation.

    The Bill further narrows Texas’ limited coverage parity law by excluding coverage for a telemedicine or a telehealth service provided by only synchronous or asynchronous audio interaction or a facsimile. Notably, the Texas Insurance Code currently lacks a “payment parity” requirement (i.e., a requirement that the amount paid to the provider for rendering the telehealth or telemedicine services be the same as or similar to the amount paid for a service delivered through a face-to-face consultation), and the Bill does not present a solution to address its absence.

    Key Takeaways

    Overall, the Bill provides a much needed restart for Texas’ regulation of telemedicine. Key takeaways from the Bill are:

    • Providers treating patients using telemedicine are held to an in-person standard of care;
    • The various medical and allied-professions boards cannot adopt any rule imposing a higher standard of care on practitioners utilizing telemedicine than the in-person standard of care;
    • The Texas Medical Board maintains a great deal of supervision on practices using telemedicine through its rule-making power;
    • Providers cannot prescribe abortion-inducing drugs or devices using telemedicine;
    • Claims for reimbursement for services provided using telemedicine or telehealth cannot be rejected solely on the basis that the service was provided using telemedicine, but notably, audio-only or visual-only interactions do not gain this benefit;
    • Providers can receive reimbursement for services provided through telemedicine from the Medicaid program without prior approval;
    • The Bill does not apply to mental health services; and
    • Rules on what constitutes a valid prescription are forthcoming.

    We thank the efforts of Shelby Buettner, Marshall E. Jackson, Jr. and Dale C. Van Demark in preparing Texas to Take a Leap Forward in Telehealth – A Proposed Bill Drops the Controversial In-Person Evaluation Requirement.

    Authors

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Coordinating the Effective Date of Mergers in a Global Post-Acquisition Integration

    ARTICLE

    Coordinating the Effective Date of Mergers in a Global Post-Acquisition Integration

    May 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Thomas Conaghan and Anna Steudner wrote this bylined article on integrating acquirer and target company operations in a global business combination. The integration “must begin as soon as possible,” the authors wrote, because “global companies that acquire other global companies must often navigate through a host of very different legal regimes when trying to achieve their integration goals.”

    In depth
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    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Sixth Circuit Upholds Assignment of Rents to Secured Lender

    Sixth Circuit Upholds Assignment of Rents to Secured Lender

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sixth Circuit Upholds Assignment of Rents to Secured Lender

    May 23, 2017

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “[T]he debtor … did not retain sufficient rights in the assigned rents under Michigan law for those rents to be included in the bankruptcy estate,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on May 2, 2017. In re Town Center Flats LLC, 201 U.S. App. LEXIS 7733, *2 (6th Cir. May 2, 2017). Relying on Michigan law and the language of the relevant documents, the court reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding that gave the Chapter 11 debtor access to the assigned rents as operating funds during its reorganization.

    Relevance

    The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the debtor’s asserted “policy concern that excluding the assigned rents from the estate would effectively foreclose Chapter 11 relief for companies like [the debtor here] that own single property and receive their sole stream of revenue from rents of that property.” Id. at *16. Courts continue to debate the issue.

    Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(a) defines “cash collateral” to include not only “cash,” but also “rents, … subject to a security interest as provided in § 552(b) … whether existing before or after the commencement of a [bankruptcy] case … .” (emphasis added). Although Code § 552(a) generally provides that property acquired by the debtor after the commencement of a bankruptcy case is not subject to a lender’s pre-bankruptcy security interest or mortgage, § 552(b)(2) allows a lender’s pre-bankruptcy lien on rents to extend to post-bankruptcy rents. When the lender’s security interest or mortgage (i.e., lien) extends to post-bankruptcy rents, Code § 363(c)(2) bars the debtor or the trustee from using that “cash collateral” unless the lender “consents” or the court, after appropriate notice and hearing, “authorizes such use … .” The court may condition that use, though, on the debtor’s providing the lender with “adequate protection … against diminution in value of its collateral … .”). In re SCOPAC, 624 F.3d 274, 278 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010), relying on Code § 363(e).

    Lenders often hold an absolute assignment of rents, however, not a mere lien. In so-called “title theory” states, the lender may have title to and exclusive ownership of post-bankruptcy rents depending on the terms of the assignment and the applicable state law. The Third Circuit, for example, has held that a debtor’s absolute assignment of rents transferred all rights and interests in the rents to the lender under New Jersey law. In re Jason Realty, L.P. 59 F. 3d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that Chapter 11 debtor had no interest in any post-bankruptcy rents under New Jersey law and could not use them to fund its reorganization, even under the limitations imposed for the use of cash collateral; the U.S. Supreme Court has mandated “that we interpret the assignment as New Jersey courts would construe it outside the bankruptcy context”). First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex Assocs., 190 B.R. 510, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Sotomayor, D.J.) (“assignments granted to the lenders absolute title to the rents under New Jersey law, not merely a security interest”; assignment was “virtually a carbon copy” of the assignment considered in Jason Realty); Sovereign Bank v. Schwab, 414 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Pennsylvania law, bank that enforced its rights under mortgage gained legal title to rents; rents were thus not part of debtor’s estate). Thus, when a court construes the assignment of rents to be absolute, neither the debtor nor a trustee will be able to use the rents, for the rents belong exclusively to the lender. See generally, K.R. Heidt, “The Effect of the 1994 Amendments on Commercial Secured Creditors,” 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 395, 404 (1995).

    In a “lien theory” state, however, a lender will not be entitled to possession of rents even if it holds legal title to the property. In re Millette, 186 F.3d 638, 644 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999) (In “title theory” states, mortgagee holds title to land from outset alone until debt satisfied; in “lien theory” states, the borrower holds title to land and mortgagee has lien; in “intermediate theory” states, the borrower maintains title to the property, but once the loan is in default, the mortgagee immediately receives title and right to possess the property); Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The title theory [in Pennsylvania] permits the creditor to enter the land upon default, but in lien states, the creditor is required to foreclose or have a receiver appointed”). See In re Buttermilk Towne Center, LLC, 442 B.R. 558, 567 (BAP 6th Cir. 2010) (rents are part of debtor’s estate under Kentucky law; rent assignment language “isolated” in context of entire agreement; rents served only as “additional security”; assignment ended when underlying debt satisfied). In re Guardian Realty Group, 205 B.R. 1, 4 (D.D C. 1997) (in dicta, court disagreed with Jason Realty, and noted that in determining whether mortgages “constitute a mere security interest, or instead, ownership,” under Delaware law, courts “must look to the substance of state law rights, not merely the label that state law places on them.”); In re Princeton Square Associates, 201 B.R. 90, 95-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (in single-asset Chapter 11 real estate cases, debtor in possession should be permitted to use rents to maintain property even though rents had been assigned to lender prior to bankruptcy, constituting an absolute transfer of title under New Jersey law). Recent cases decided under New York law are split. Compare In re Loco Realty Corp., 2009 WL 2883050 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2009) (held, when debtor signed assignment of rent under New York law, debtor prevented from spending rent) and In re Soho 25 Retail, LLC, 2011 WL 1333084 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (held, rent not property of estate under New York law because debtor at most had revocable license to rent; thus unavailable to debtor); with In re South Side House, Inc., 474 B.R. 391 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012) (held, assignment of rent under New York law was in nature of pledge for additional security only; debtor retained sufficient pre-bankruptcy interest sufficient to bring rent within estate).

    Facts

    The debtor owned a residential complex in Michigan subject to a $5.3-million mortgage “and an agreement to assign rents to the [mortgagee] in the event of default.” Id. at *2. Specifically, the debtor “irrevocably, absolutely, and unconditionally [agreed to] transfer, sell, assign, pledge and convey to [lender], its successors and assigns, all of the right title and interest of [the debtor] in … income of every nature of and from the [property], including, without limitation, minimum rents [and] additional
    rents … .” Id. at *2-*3. The assignment purported to be a “present, absolute and executed grant of the powers herein granted to [lender],” while “granting a license to [the debtor] to collect and retain rents until an event of default, at which point the license would ‘automatically terminate without notice to [the debtor].’” Id. at *3. Of course, the rents were the debtor’s “only source of income.” Id.

    When the debtor later defaulted, the lender sued in the Michigan State Court, seeking, among other things, foreclosure and the “appointment of a receiver to take possession of” the debtor’s property. Id. at *4. The debtor then filed a Chapter 11 petition, causing the lender to move for an order preventing the debtor “from using rents collected after the [Chapter 11] petition was filed.” In response, the debtor argued that it “would have no income to work with in its Chapter 11 reorganization plan if the rents were not part of the bankruptcy estate.” The bankruptcy court agreed, denied the lender’s motion, finding that the rents constituted cash collateral. Id. at *5. After the district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit agreed to dispose of the debtor’s appeal on the merits.

    Analysis

    Federal courts, explained the Court of Appeals, must rely on state law to determine property rights and the extent to which a property interest is included within the debtor’s estate. Id. at *4-*5.

    Assignment of Rents in Michigan

    A relevant Michigan statute provides in pertinent part that an “assignment of rent shall be binding upon [the debtor] only in the event of default in the terms and conditions of [the] mortgage … .” Id. at *5. The Michigan statute also provides that the assignment of rents, “when so made, shall be a good and valid assignment of the rents to accrue under any lease or leases in existence or coming into existence during the period the mortgage is in effect … .” Id. at *6.

    The Michigan Supreme Court, when construing this statute in another case, held that the lender stands “in the shoes of the mortgagor until the debt is paid, with all his rights to the rents and profits, as long as he, under the general law of mortgages could enjoy them.” Id. at *9, quoting Smith v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 362 Mich. 114, 520 (1960). Moreover, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a “prior perfected interest in assigned rents had priority over an interest held by a judgment creditor who sought to garnish rents.” Id. at *9, citing Otis Elevator Co. v. Mid-America Realty Investors, 206 Mich. App. 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).

    “Michigan courts have generally treated the assignment of rents as a transfer of ownership once the agreement has been completed and recorded and a default has occurred.” Id. at *9-*10. Relying on its analysis of Michigan law, therefore, the court found “that the Michigan Supreme Court would treat a completed assignment of rents as a transfer of ownership.” Id. at *10.

    No Security Interest

    The circuit court also rejected the debtor’s argument that the Michigan statute only gave the lender a security interest in the assigned rents. Id. at *11. The language of the underlying agreements broadly confirmed the irrevocable, absolute and unconditional transfer of the rents to the lender. The debtor clearly had “assigned the rents to the maximum extent permitted by Michigan law.” Therefore, reasoned the court, the debtor had transferred ownership “in the assigned rents to [the lender] before the bankruptcy petition was filed.” Id. at *12.

    No Residual Interest

    The court further rejected the debtor’s argument that it had retained a residual interest in the rents. Any restriction on the lender’s use of the rents did not give the debtor any vested rights, for the Michigan appellate courts have held that a debtor has no interest in the rents after the assignment, depriving the debtor-assignor of any residual property rights. Id. at *14.

    Finally, the court’s holding “is in line with the majority of bankruptcy court decisions that have addressed this issue.” Id. at *15. Despite the negative impact of its holding on single-asset real estate debtors, the Sixth Circuit stressed that “Michigan law … is clear on the matter and governs despite other policy concerns.” Id. at *16.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Liability of a Terminations Provocateur in Consumer Lending

    ARTICLE

    Liability of a Terminations Provocateur in Consumer Lending

    May 23, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sebastion Keding makes a critical remark with respect to the judgement of the Federal Supreme Court dated 22 November 2016.

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