ARTICLE
The New Salary Transparency Law
June 26, 2017
Read time: 1 min
Dr. Volker Teigelkötter with details about the new Salary Transparency Law In Germany.
ARTICLE
June 26, 2017
Read time: 1 min
Dr. Volker Teigelkötter with details about the new Salary Transparency Law In Germany.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
June 23, 2017
Read time: 10 min
The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “requires the use of replacement value rather than a hypothetical [foreclosure] value … that the reorganization is designed to avoid,” held a divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 26, 2017. In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. Partnership, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9198, *5 (9th Cir. May 26, 2017) (en banc) (8-3) (Sunnyslope II)). The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of the Chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization plan that had valued a lender’s collateral (an apartment complex) based on the debtor’s “continued use after reorganization as low-income housing.” Id. The lender had unsuccessfully argued for a higher foreclosure value that would have eliminated restrictive use covenants, which depressed the collateral’s value.
The Ninth Circuit en banc panel reversed an earlier three-judge panel’s divided opinion. In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. Partnership, 818 F.3d, 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2016) (2-1) (Sunnyslope I) (“Under [Code] §506(a)(1),” replacement cost “is a measure of what it would cost to produce or acquire an equivalent piece of property;” “replacement value of … apartment complex does not take into account … a restriction on the use of the complex.”). In Sunnyslope II, the three-judge dissent also argued that “the appropriate value is the market price of the building without restrictive covenants.” 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9198, at *23 (Kozinski, J.). As the Sunnyslope II dissent stressed, the “majority’s valuation falls well below what the secured creditor would obtain from an immediate sale.” Id. at *25.
Relevance
“Cramdown is messy … . Valuation in bankruptcy, in turn, is also messy. Courts are often placed in the position of assigning a monetary value to an asset for which there is either no seller or no buyer, and often no market.” Bruce A. Markell, “Fair Equivalents and Market of Prices: Bankruptcy Cramdown Interest Rates,” 33 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 91, 92 (2016).
The so-called “cramdown” power enables a bankruptcy court to confirm a reorganization plan when a secured creditor class dissents from its treatment under the plan. Because of the Code’s “absolute priority” rule, the court may not confirm the plan unless the dissenting secured creditor class is paid in full. Markell, at 94, citing 7 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶1129.03 [4][a][ii], at 1129-83 (16th rev. ed 2009). For a secured lender to be fully paid does not require a cash payment, but may consist of a promise to pay. Markell, at 94. As the Supreme Court noted 20 years ago, the cramdown power poses “double risks” for lenders: “The debtor may again default and the property may deteriorate from extended use.” Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 962 (1997).
Facts
The debtor owned an apartment complex subject to secured loans from a lender $8.5 million (first priority), the City of Phoenix (second priority) and the State of Arizona (third priority). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development guaranteed the lender’s loan.
The secured financing and tax benefits associated with the apartment complex required that it be used for low-income housing. When the debtor defaulted on the lender’s first priority $8.5-million loan, another institution (“Bank”) bought the loan for $5.03 million subject to “covenants, conditions and restrictions” requiring the complex to be used for low-income housing. 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 9198, at *6-*7. If the Bank were to foreclose, however, the restrictions would end.
The debtor’s filing of a Chapter 11 petition stayed the Bank’s pending foreclosure proceeding. The debtor later proposed a cramdown plan providing for it to retain the apartment complex, treating the Bank’s claim as secured “to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest” in the collateral, consistent with Code § 506(a)(1). Id. at *8. When the debtor argued that the apartment complex should be valued as low-income housing with its pre-existing use restrictions, the Bank countered that the low-income housing restriction should be disregarded for purposes of valuation under Code § 506(a)(1), reasoning that its collateral would have a much higher value if the property were not subject to these restrictions.
The bankruptcy court valued the apartment complex as low-income housing, id. at *8-*9, and declined to include tax credits available to the debtor in valuing the property. The court later confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan, “which provided for payment in full of the [Bank’s] claim over 40 years, at an interest rate of 4.4%.” Id. at *9. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s valuation with the low-income housing restrictions, but held that the tax credits should have been included in the analysis. Id. at *10.
A split panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order in Sunnyslope I. It held that the court should have valued the apartment complex based on its foreclosure value, i.e., without the restrictive “affordable housing requirements,” which lowered the property’s value. Id. at *11. The Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion in Sunnyslope I when it granted the debtor’s petition for rehearing en banc.
En Banc Opinion
The Ninth Circuit relied on Rash, where the “Supreme Court adopted a ‘replacement-value standard’ for § 506(a)(1) cram-down valuations,” holding that “replacement value, ‘rather than a foreclosure sale that will not take place, is the proper guide under a prescription hinged to the property’s ‘disposition or use.’” Id. at *4, quoting Rash, 520 U.S. at 963. Agreeing with the dissent in Sunnyslope I, the majority in Sunnyslope II reasoned that Rash “compels valuing [the Bank’s] collateral … in light of [the debtor’s] proposed use of the property in its plan of reorganization as affordable housing.” Id. at *11, quoting Sunnyslope I, 818 F.3d at 950. Thus, it was proper to value “the apartment complex assuming its continued use after reorganization as low-income housing.” Id. at *12.
The court also rejected the argument made by other banks (“amici”) that “valuing the collateral with the low-income restrictions in place would discourage future lending on like projects.” Id. at *17. Protecting creditors’ interests may be important, but “the Supreme Court has made clear that successful debtor reorganization and maximization of the value of the estate are the primary purposes” in Chapter 11 cases. Id. at *17, quoting In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 916 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015). Not only is the debtor able to rehabilitate its business and maximize the value of its estate, but the Bank here “bought the Sunnyslope loan at a substantial discount, knowing of the risk that the property would remain subject to the low-income housing requirements,” subjecting it “to no more risk than it cautiously undertook.” Id. at *17.
“the 4.4% interest rate on the plan payments [to] result in [the Bank’s] receiving the present value of its $3.9 million security over the term of the reorganization plan. The relevant national prime rate was 3.25%, and the bankruptcy court adjusted that rate upward to account for the risk of non-payment. The court also heard testimony that the market loan rate for similar properties was 4.18%. In setting the 4.4% rate, the bankruptcy court carefully explained its reasoning, noting that interest rates had decreased significantly since the [original] loan was made … . [Also,] the risk to the lender had similarly decreased since then because, when the loan was made, the apartment complex had not yet been built.” Id. at *19.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the bankruptcy court followed the Supreme Court’s “formula approach” for calculating the appropriate interest rate. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 478-79 (2004). That approach “begins with the national prime rate and adjusts up or down according to the risk of the plan’s success.” Id. at *18.
Comment
The Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s approach, articulated in Till, when approving the cramdown interest rate in Sunnyslope II. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “the vast majority of bankruptcy courts have taken the Till plurality’s invitation to apply the prime-plus formula under Chapter 11.” In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, LLC, 710 F.3d 324, 333 (5th Cir. 2013). Although lenders have argued against a non-market rate, the Fifth Circuit explained the current rationale for cramdown interest rates:
While [the lender] is undoubtedly correct that no willing lender would have extended credit on the terms it was forced to accept under the §1129(b) cramdown plan, this “absurd result” is the natural consequence of the prime-plus method, which sacrifices market realities in favor of simple and feasible bankruptcy reorganizations.”
Texas Grand Prairie, 710 F.3d at 336. See also Till, 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J. concurring) (“… the use of the prime rate, even with a small risk adjustment, ‘will systematically undercompensate secured creditors for the true risks of default.’ This systematic undercompensation might seem problematic as a matter of policy. But, it raises no problem as a matter of statutory interpretation.”); In re MPM Silicones, LLC 2014 WL 4436335, *23-25 (Bankr. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d 531 B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-1771 (2d Cir. Filed June 1, 2015) (“Congress likely intended bankruptcy judges … to follow essentially the [Till] approach when choosing an appropriate [cramdown] interest rate … The purpose is not to put the creditor in the same position that it would have been in had it arranged a ‘new’ loan.”). Contra, In re American Home Patient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005) (“… the market rate should be applied in Chapter 11 cases where there exists an efficient market.”) Even in Texas Grand Prairie, where the parties “stipulate[d] that the Till plurality’s formula approach govern[ed]” that case, the court declined to require it in future cases. 710 F.3d at 331. Scurria, “Momentive [MPM] Win Shifts Balance of Power In Chapter 11 Process,” Law 360 (May 6, 2015) (MPM “tips the playing field in Chapter 11 away from secured creditors … and toward private equity sponsors eager to preserve equity stakes.”).
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

ARTICLE
June 21, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Amanda Enyeart and Lisa Schmitz Mazur wrote this bylined article explaining how the HHS Office of Inspector General used a survey by the Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Program run by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to conclude that CMS made $729 million in inappropriate EHR incentive payments to physicians out of some $6 billion in such payments during the review period.
ARTICLE
June 21, 2017
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Jennifer Geetter and Jiayan Chen wrote this bylined article on the Department of Health and Human Services effort to modernize the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, also referred to as The Common Rule, which the authors wrote governs privacy and ethics for “the genomic character of the patient information relevant to clinical care and research.”
ARTICLE
June 21, 2017
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Dr. Nikolaus von Jacobs with a commentary on “Corporate Acquisition: How to Attribute the Knowledge of Target Companies Managing Director to the Buyer.”

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
20 June 2017
Read time: 4 min
On 13 June 2017, the Loan Market Association (the ‘LMA’) released updated Standard Terms and Conditions for Par and Distressed Trade Transactions (Bank Debt/Claims) (‘T&Cs’), that will apply to transactions with a trade date on or after 27 June 2017. The updated T&Cs remove the current ‘Pricing Panel’ mechanism for resolving disputes between parties over the reasonableness of the purchase price for a substitute buy-in or sell-out trade.
Currently, if a par trade does not settle within 60 business days of the trade date, due to either party failing to perform its settlement delivery obligations, the non-defaulting party is entitled to give notice to terminate the trade and seek a substitute transaction elsewhere[1]. The defaulting party then has a further 15-day cure period in which it must perform its obligations in respect of the trade. If the defaulting party’s obligations are not fulfilled by the end of the cure period, the non-defaulting party is entitled to seek a substitute counterparty with whom to settle the trade. The non-defaulting party must send notice to the defaulting party of the purchase price payable under the substitute transaction. Clause 23.3(e) of the current T&Cs provides a dispute resolution mechanism for the defaulting party to challenge the reasonableness of the substitute trade purchase price. In such instances, the LMA Pricing Panel[2] will calculate and determine a conclusive purchase price, as per a predetermined calculation methodology, that is binding on all parties.
The updated T&Cs do not include such a dispute resolution mechanism. Instead, substitute buy-in and sell-out transactions must be conducted at ‘arm’s length … in good faith … [and] at a price which is commercially reasonable in the circumstances’[3]. The effect of this amendment is to remove an independent verification of the purchase price and instead leave it to the parties’ judgement as to whether a substitute transaction is priced fairly. Therefore the parties’ options for redress in cases of a dispute have been restricted, and, if no commercial resolution can be found, parties may be forced to litigate.
SRZ attorney Anthony Lombardi will be speaking on Distressed Debt Trade Issues at the Secondary Training Seminar held by the LMA on 22 June 2017 in London.
Authored by David J. Karp, Alexia Petrou and Anthony Lombardi.
For further information on the amendments to the T&Cs or the LMA event above, please contact the authors.
[1] 23.3(b) of the updated LMA Standard T&Cs.
[2] The LMA Pricing Panel will be made up of members of the LMA.
[3] 1.2 of the updated LMA Standard T&Cs.
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.
ARTICLE
June 15, 2017
Read time: 2 min
The SE has opened up the possibility of a monistic organizational structure in Germany. In addition, the chairman of the board of directors is also chairman of the managing directors, according to the US model. In the US, however, there has been a contrasting trend in recent years, with more and more companies segregating the roles of the Chairman of the Board and the CEO. In this article Dr. Philipp Grenzebach and Joseph S. Adams give an insight into these current developments in the USA.

ARTICLE
June 15, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Matthias Kampshoff co-authored this article with Dr. Jan-Philipp Hoos, LLM, Partner at White & Case, Düsseldorf, Germany.
ARTICLE
June 14, 2017
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J. Christian Nemeth and Daniel Campbell wrote this bylined article on a California federal court decision which used the defendant’s recall of a food product as evidence of a product defect and the offering of a vaccine as evidence of damages. The authors wrote that the court ruling “underscores the importance of working with litigation counsel at the outset to carefully think through the scope of and steps to be taken during a product recall.”
ARTICLE
June 14, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Andrew Roberson wrote this bylined article suggesting that taxpayers facing IRS penalties use an “issue of first impression” defense “where the issue was one not previously considered by the Tax Court and the statutory language was not entirely clear.” Such a defense, Mr. Roberson explained, “may avoid the potential pitfalls associated with the waiver of privilege when other penalty defenses are raised.”