Content Type: Article

  • The Employee Retention Credit: A court challenge to IRS guidance

    The Employee Retention Credit: A court challenge to IRS guidance

    ARTICLE

    The Employee Retention Credit: A court challenge to IRS guidance

    Jul 8, 2025

    Read time: 7 min

    Case: Stenson Tamaddon LLC v. IRS, No. CV-24-01123-PHX-SPL, 2025 WL 1725942 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2025)

    On June 20, 2025, the US District Court for the District of Arizona denied a motion for summary judgment that was filed by Stenson Tamaddon LLC (StenTam). The tax advisory firm argued that IRS Notice 2021-20, which provided informal guidance on claiming the Employee Retention Credit (ERC), was invalid because it was a “legislative rule” that was not promulgated through notice and comment rulemaking as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court ruled that while StenTam had standing to challenge the validity of the notice, the notice was an “interpretive rule” and its issuance as such did not violate the APA. The court also addressed StenTam’s arguments that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the notice and that it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

    Background on the Employee Retention Credit

    The ERC was enacted in 2020 as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act to provide financial relief to businesses affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Congress’s goal was to incentivize businesses experiencing significant disruptions because of COVID-19-related government orders or a substantial decline in gross receipts to retain employees on payroll and rehire displaced workers. The ERC is calculated as a percentage of qualified wages paid to employees during periods in 2020 and 2021.

    Millions of employers have filed refund claims seeking ERC. Since the enactment of the CARES Act, the IRS has issued roughly $269 billion in ERC. However, more than 200,000 claims have been disallowed, reversed, or recaptured, and another 592,000 remain pending as of late April 2025. To the frustration of many, taxpayers whose claims have been processed in 2025 waited an average of more than 18 months before the IRS took action. According to a recent report from the Taxpayer Advocate Service, the IRS will need until at least the end of 2025 to process all remaining ERC claims. However, the IRS may still seek to recapture refunds relating to ERC claims well into the future.

    IRS Notice 2021-20

    A 102-page document presented in “question-and-answer” format, the IRS published Notice 2021-20 in March 2021 with the intention to “provide[ ] guidance on the [ERC] . . . .” In its suit, StenTam alleged that the notice “defined various terms in Section 3134 [providing for the ERC], identified factors or elements necessary to claim the credit, set minimum thresholds for recovery of ERC, and imposed new, related record-keeping requirements—all of which resulted in the ERC being restricted to a lesser number of businesses than originally contemplated by Congress.” The parties disputed whether the notice created substantive duties and restrictions that carry the force of law. Under the APA, agencies are generally required to follow notice and comment rulemaking procedures before issuing guidance that creates such duties or restrictions.

    StenTam’s challenge to Notice 2021-20

    StenTam is a tax services firm that advises clients claiming ERC. The firm contended that its business was harmed as a result of Notice 2021-20 and filed a motion for summary judgment asking that the notice be set aside.

    StenTam argued that the notice was a “legislative rule” that the IRS issued without following notice and comment rulemaking procedures as required by the APA. In its motion, StenTam discussed three ways in which the notice imposed substantive duties or restrictions. First, the notice imposed limits on the types of businesses that qualify as “eligible employer[s].” Second, the notice narrowed the scope of governmental suspension orders whose issuance would create eligibility for a taxpayer to claim ERC. And third, the notice imposed recordkeeping requirements to claim and prove eligibility for the credit.

    • Eligible employers. Section 3134 requires that an eligible employer operate a “trade or business.” The notice excludes household employers from this definition because, according to the IRS, they do not operate a “trade or business” as the statute requires. StenTam argued that this requirement was a substantive provision that rendered the notice legislative (as opposed to interpretive) in nature.
    • Governmental suspension orders. Section 3134 provides that an employer is eligible for the ERC only if its business operations were “fully or partially suspended . . . due to orders from an appropriate governmental authority.” The notice stated that a business had suffered a partial suspension of operations if the disruption resulting from a COVID-19 governmental order affected “more than a nominal portion” of its operations. The notice introduced a safe harbor whereby businesses could meet the partial suspension test if the order caused a 10% reduction in either gross receipts or employee service hours. The notice defines “orders from an appropriate governmental authority” to mean orders from the federal government or a state or local government with jurisdiction over an employer’s operations. StenTam argued that the IRS’s selection of a 10% threshold for the “partially suspended” safe harbor and its attempt to define “orders from an appropriate governmental authority” were inconsistent with Congress’s intent and in any event imposed the sorts of restrictions on ERC claims that required the IRS to have first engaged in notice and comment rulemaking procedures (which it did not).
    • Recordkeeping requirements. StenTam also argued that the notice imposed additional recordkeeping requirements on businesses claiming ERC and that these supposed requirements lacked basis in the legislation that was enacted.

    Opportunities for employers and their tax advisers

    While the case generally affirmed the IRS’s position, the court left several paths open to businesses whose interests are hampered by the notice. First, the court noted that, because the notice is an interpretive rule, it does not have a binding effect on taxpayers. Thus, if a taxpayer were to litigate its claim for ERC, the notice’s provisions do not have precedential effect when the IRS argues against allowance of a claim.

    Second, the court characterized the notice’s “nominal portion” standard as flexible. In its interpretation of that standard, the notice introduced the 10% safe harbor. Although the court upheld the safe harbor, the court emphasized that a taxpayer may still qualify for ERC even if it did not meet the 10% threshold, and that the IRS’s determination of eligibility in a given case depends on an analysis of the prevailing facts and circumstances. The court also noted that if the IRS were to consistently disallow taxpayers’ claims that did not meet the safe harbor, future taxpayers (or their advisers) might be successful in arguing that the IRS is effectively treating the safe harbor as a binding rule instead of an interpretive one.

    Third, the court noted that the case was “a close call” because of the difficulty of distinguishing between legislative and interpretive rules. It also acknowledged that the IRS’s administrative management of the ERC had effected a “financial toll” on taxpayers. Such commentary by the court may be helpful for StenTam’s potential arguments on appeal. It may also create an opening for courts outside of the District of Arizona to reach different conclusions about the validity of the notice and/or its individual provisions.

    Practice point:

    Congress enacted tax-based relief, including enacting the ERC, to mitigate the worst financial effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The IRS quickly issued guidance to clarify the program’s rules. But as the court’s opinion in StenTam suggests, certain applications of this guidance may be inconsistent with other laws that serve to protect taxpayers. Consequently, taxpayers still seeking ERC, as well as those whose claims have been disallowed or are subject to recapture, and the firms advising them should be prepared to litigate their individual claims and/or challenge agency guidance that does not comport with the statute and Congress’s goals of providing relief to COVID-19-affected businesses.

    Carolyn Daly, a former summer associate in the Washington, DC, office, also contributed to this blog post.

    In depth
    Authors

    Shawn O'Brien

    Partner

    Houston

    Michael J. Scarduzio

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Samuel F. Hamer

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Action on New York consent to payment law unlikely before 2026

    Action on New York consent to payment law unlikely before 2026

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Action on New York consent to payment law unlikely before 2026

    July 7, 2025

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    NY Public Health Law (PHL) § 18-c, regarding consent for payment of certain medical services, was enacted as part of the 2025 New York State budget. As drafted, it requires patient consent to payment for treatment costs. The New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) is not currently enforcing the statute, however, pending additional guidance. Despite proposed legislative changes, the statute remains unchanged in 2025, and any changes are very unlikely until the next legislative session, which begins in 2026.

    Earlier this year, the 2026 New York State budget included proposed changes to NY PHL § 18-c. Those provisions, however, were removed from the final version of the budget, leaving NY PHL § 18-c unaltered. A standalone bill to amend (A06773) was introduced and later amended significantly from its original form. A06773 would have introduced significant changes to NY PHL § 18-c that reflected provider feedback on the current iteration of NY PHL § 18-c. The bill was not brought to a floor vote before the end of the legislative session, however.

    Legislative update

    A06773 proposed to:

    • Remove the requirement that consent for payment of certain medical services be obtained after the services are administered.
    • Require the superintendent of financial services and the commissioner of health to develop a uniform consent form.
    • Allow patients to request a “good faith estimate” of the cost of services to be provided during the patient visit.

    Despite the failure to modify NY PHL § 18-c, NYSDOH has not issued any update to its previous guidance on the enforcement of it as the statute.

    In depth

    NY PHL § 18-c provides that a patient’s consent to pay for healthcare services must be obtained separately from the informed consent for such healthcare services, and that consent to payment may only be obtained after the patient has received the applicable services and discussed treatment costs. Although NY PHL § 18-c was effective October 20, 2024, the next day the Medical Society of the State of New York (MSSNY) announced that it had received a copy of guidance that NYSDOH issued to hospital CEOs indicating that implementation of the consent-related requirements was on hold pending further guidance. To date, no guidance or regulations have been issued or proposed on how to implement the law, and significant ambiguities remain.

    The MSSNY, several medical specialty organizations, and other stakeholders raised concerns regarding the logistical and operational challenges of requiring that consent to payment be obtained after healthcare services are rendered. Stakeholders noted that obtaining consent to payment after services are rendered is inconsistent with typical medical practice workflows, where consents and necessary paperwork are completed upon arrival. Stakeholders also raised concerns about whether a patient could receive services and then simply refuse to consent to payment.

    There were multiple attempts in the 2025 New York legislative session to address those concerns through changes to the statute. The executive budget initial draft would have removed the requirement that the consent to payment be obtained after the patient received the applicable services (i.e., only discussion of treatment costs must occur before consent to payment is obtained). The proposed revisions also would have clarified that the restriction is applicable only to nonemergency healthcare services. As discussed above, A06773 similarly would have clarified that consent could be obtained prior to rendering the services and would have placed the consent on a uniform document that likely would have removed ambiguity regarding the consent requirements. No changes are expected, however, prior to 2026.

    Next steps

    We will continue to monitor and track any updates to New York patient consent requirements, including any changes to the enforcement landscape. Please contact the authors of this article or your regular McDermott lawyer with any questions.

    Authors

    Gregory R. Mitchell

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Amanda Enyeart

    Partner

    Chicago

    Grayson I. Dimick

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    Tyler Barton

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • California Senate amends AB 1415 to reinsert MSO reporting requirements

    California Senate amends AB 1415 to reinsert MSO reporting requirements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California Senate amends AB 1415 to reinsert MSO reporting requirements

    July 2, 2025

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 27, 2025, the California Senate amended Assembly Bill (AB) 1415 to add back in a reporting requirement for management services organizations (MSOs) undergoing a sale of a material amount of assets or change of control. The amendments to AB 1415 also include changes to the definitions of “management services organization” and “provider.”

    Stakeholders should continue to monitor the progress of AB 1415 and its potential impact on the Office of Health Care Affordability (OHCA) transaction review process. If signed into law, AB 1415 would likely take effect on January 1, 2026.

    In depth

    AB 1415 is intended to expand the scope of the current OHCA review process to apply more directly to private equity groups and hedge funds. Previous amendments to the bill removed MSOs from the definition of healthcare entity, which would make MSO sales less likely to be reportable to OHCA. AB 1415 then passed a vote in the California Assembly and was referred to the California Senate.

    The June 27 amendment to the bill in the California Senate Health Committee includes the following material changes.

    Stricter reporting requirements for MSO changes

    The amended bill would again require notice to be provided to OHCA for transactions involving the sale of a material amount of assets or change of control of an MSO. Such notice would be submitted by the MSO undergoing the sale of assets or change of control, as well as any counterparties to the transaction if they are:

    • A private equity group or hedge fund.
    • A newly created business entity for the purpose of entering into agreements or transactions with a healthcare entity.
    • An MSO.
    • An entity that owns, operates, or controls a provider, regardless of whether the provider is currently operating, providing healthcare services, or has a pending or suspended license.

    Updated definition of MSO

    The prior versions of AB 1415 defined an MSO as “an entity that provides administrative services or support for a provider, not including the direct provision of health care services.” The amendment to AB 1415 now defines an MSO as “an entity that provides management and administrative services for a provider in support of the delivery of health care services.” The amended bill specifies that “management and administrative support services shall include provider rate negotiation, revenue cycle management, or both,” and may also include “utilization management, claims handling, customer service, or network development.”

    Reversion to exhaustive list of “providers”

    The initial iteration of AB 1415 changed the definition of provider from an exhaustive list (“any of the following that delivers or furnishes health care services”) to a more open-ended set of providers (“a private or public health care provider, including all of the following”). The most recent amendment would maintain the language currently set forth in the statute to clarify ambiguities about who is considered a “provider.”

    Key takeaways

    MSO acquisitions: Under the prior version of AB 1415, an MSO sale was unlikely to be reportable as long as no assets or control of another healthcare entity were transferred. Although this new amended version does not add MSOs back to the definition of “health care entity,” it would create a requirement wherein a sale of assets or change of control of the MSO itself would need to be reported to OHCA by the MSO and by other counterparties if they fall into certain definitions, including private equity groups and hedge funds. All submitters to OHCA would be required to provide a substantial amount of information regarding themselves and their operations. If the current version of AB 1415 becomes law, OHCA’s oversight of MSOs in California would significantly expand.

    Definition of MSO: AB 1415’s initial definition of MSO was extremely broad and was likely to inadvertently capture entities that provide administrative services and lack the ability to substantially influence healthcare operations. Under the new definition of MSO, an MSO must be involved in either provider rate negotiation or revenue cycle management, or both. While this definition remains broad, it has narrowed from its initial iteration.

    Authors

    Travis Jackson

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Cathy Ren

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Matthew David

    Associate

    Los Angeles

    More insights

  • Oregon considers revisions to expansive corporate practice of medicine law

    Oregon considers revisions to expansive corporate practice of medicine law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Oregon considers revisions to expansive corporate practice of medicine law

    July 2, 2025

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 20, 2025, the Oregon legislature passed House Bill (HB) 3410, which amends portions of the corporate practice of medicine law, Senate Bill (SB) 951, enacted on June 9, 2025. As we previously reported, SB 951 prohibits professional medical entities from relinquishing control over their “assets, business operations, clinical practices or decisions or the clinical practices or decisions of a physician.” If signed into law by the governor, HB 3410 would allow greater structural flexibility for management structures but would not amend the central prohibitions on management services organizations (MSOs) interfering in the clinical operations of professional medical entities (professional corporations, or PCs).

    In depth

    Dual compensation and ownership

    HB 3410 expands SB 951’s prohibitions on dual compensation and ownership to include contractors of an MSO. HB 3410 also amends an exception in SB 951 for PC physicians and providers who have less than 10% ownership in the PC so long as such individuals are reimbursed at market rates for provision of their medical services and the services that such individuals may provide to the MSO. Prior to HB 3410, SB 951 included an additional requirement that such individuals could not be a shareholder, director, member, manager, officer, or employee of the MSO.

    SB 951 provides an exception that permits physician shareholders, directors, or officers of a PC to serve as a director or officer of an MSO with which the PC has a contract for management services. Under this exception, the physician must not receive compensation from the MSO for the physician’s services as a director or officer of the MSO (although the physician-owner can be paid for their separate contracted services to the MSO, as set forth above). Additionally, any actions taken by the MSO that materially impact the professional, ownership, or governance interests of the minority owners in the MSO must require a greater than majority vote, including the shares held by PCs with voting rights. Further, the MSO and all PCs with voting rights in the MSO must have been in existence and contracted for the provision of management services prior to January 1, 2026.

    HB 3410 would limit this exception to only physician directors or officers of the MSO who own less than 25% of the PC, and where all of the below criteria are met:

    • The PC owns less than 49% of the voting rights in the MSO.
    • The MSO and the PCs with voting rights were in existence and entered into management agreements before January 1, 2024.
    • The physician, all PCs with voting rights in the MSO, and the actions of the MSO complied with the above requirements prior to and after January 1, 2024.

    Noncompetition and stock transfer restrictions

    HB 3410 also removed the requirement that a PC not have a contract with an MSO, or otherwise qualify for an exemption, to hold a valid noncompetition agreement between a shareholder or member of a PC and the PC. HB 3410 further seeks to modify the prohibition on noncompetition agreements to expand the three-year term to five years where the medical services of the licensee are directly provided in an Oregon county designated as a health professional shortage area.

    Further, HB 3410 clarifies that conditions under which a PC may enter into stock transfer restriction agreements with a shareholder of the PC and an MSO includes a shareholder’s or member’s breach of the management services contract with a PC or MSO on behalf of a PC.

    HB 3410 left intact the exception for entities engaged in the practice of telemedicine that do not have a physical location where patients receive clinical services in the state of Oregon.

    HB 3410 will take effect immediately upon passage. McDermott will continue to monitor the bill’s progression through the state legislature and provide updates.

    Key takeaways

    If HB 3410 is signed into law:

    • The central prohibitions on MSO interference in the clinical operations of the PC in a manner the affects the PC’s clinical decision-making will remain unchanged.
    • Contractors of MSOs will be subject to the prohibition on dual compensation and ownership.
    • SB 951’s prohibition on MSOs and its shareholders, directors, members, managers, officers, and employees from serving as directors, officers, or employees of or receiving compensation from an MSO for the management of a contracted PC will be removed.
    • The circumstances for valid enforcement of noncompetition agreements will be expanded and certain contractual breaches are added as conditions under which a PC may enter into a stock transfer restriction agreement.
    Authors

    Larry C. Guess

    Partner

    Chicago

    Patrick Zanayed

    Partner

    Chicago

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

    Stacey L. Callaghan

    Partner

    Chicago

    Jae Hyun Lee

    Associate

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • Europe’s digital future: eIDAS 2.0’s impact on privacy, anti-money laundering

    Europe’s digital future: eIDAS 2.0’s impact on privacy, anti-money laundering

    ARTICLE / INTERNATIONAL NEWS

    Europe’s digital future: eIDAS 2.0’s impact on privacy, anti-money laundering

    July 1, 2025

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The European Union’s European Digital Identity Framework Regulation (eIDAS 2.0) introduces a standardised framework for digital identity and trust services across all EU Member States, massively benefiting anti-money laundering efforts while still protecting individuals’ personal data.

    In depth

    eIDAS 2.0, which came into effect at the end of 2024, complements the regulatory requirements of the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2), particularly in implementing Strong Customer Authentication, which is a key requirement of PSD2. One of the primary uses of eIDAS 2.0 will be digital Know-Your-Customer (KYC) identification in compliance with relevant Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws. One of the key benefits, therefore, is streamlined and secure customer onboarding, particularly in the financial sector.

    One of the primary uses of eIDAS 2.0 will be digital KYC identification.

    As a direct result, eIDAS 2.0 facilitates the implementation of EUDI-Wallets, which are expected to come into effect from 2027, and will make all online financial services requiring customer identification, easier and more reliable, even across borders. This will reduce friction and improve the user experience by allowing for easy and safe online authentication and verification across the entire European Union, covering services such as bank account opening, qualified electronic signatures, and mobile driving licenses. The introduction of EUDI-Wallets under eIDAS 2.0 aims to provide a unified and secure way for individuals to store and manage their electronic identification data. EUDI-Wallets will enable users to selectively disclose their data, ensuring that only the necessary information is shared with the respective service providers. This selective disclosure mechanism is crucial for maintaining privacy while easily accessing various digital services.

    eIDAS 2.0 will have a material impact on the digitalisation of EU markets and, accordingly, provide for various innovative business opportunities. Digital businesses can develop new services, such as identity-verified digital wallets, automated contract execution, and seamless cross-border payments. The harmonised legal framework will also reduce compliance complexity and operational costs.

    eIDAS 2.0 facilitates the implementation of EUDI-Wallets.

    Electronic Identification and Trust Services

    The primary goals of eIDAS 2.0 are to:

    • Create harmonised conditions under which EU Member States can acknowledge electronic identification to provide for and recognise EUDI-Wallets. eIDAS 2.0 also allows that EUDI-Wallets must be open-source licensed. The rationale is to ensure general transparency so that the software can be scrutinised properly for potential security vulnerabilities, thereby protecting user data from potential breaches. Member States may, however, restrict the disclosure of specific components for justified reasons, balancing transparency with security.
    • Establish rules for trust services, in particular for electronic transactions, to ensure that electronic documents and transactions are tamper-proof and legally binding.
    • Create a legal framework for electronic signatures, seals, time stamps, documents, registered delivery services, archiving, and ledgers, amongst others.

    eIDAS 2.0 promotes interoperability and the standardisation of electronic identification and trust services across the European Union. This ensures that technical as well as privacy and data protection standards are consistently applied, regardless of the Member State in which the services are used. Standardisation in this context is also expected to facilitate the development of secure and privacy-enhancing technologies that can be widely adopted.

    Given the value of the information that will be stored digitally as a result of eIDAS 2.0, it is crucial to examine its privacy and data protection implications.

    eIDAS 2.0 will have a material impact on the digitalisation of EU markets.

    Data Protection Under eIDAS 2.0

    eIDAS 2.0 is designed to ensure that users of electronic identification means and trust services have full control over their personal data. Accordingly, service providers must ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the data processed.

    Under the General Data Protection Regulation ((EU) 2016/679, GDPR), data subjects have the right to access, rectify, and fully erase their data. The GDPR takes precedence over eIDAS 2.0, empowering individuals to securely manage their digital identities.

    In addition, eIDAS 2.0 emphasises the importance of user consent and transparency in the processing of personal data. Service providers are – in line with and subject to GDPR – required to obtain explicit consent from users before processing their data, and must provide clear and transparent information about how the data will be used. This ensures that users are fully informed and can make confident decisions about their data.

    Trust services under eIDAS 2.0, such as electronic signatures and seals, are designed with data minimisation principles in mind. These services ensure that only the necessary data is processed for the intended purpose, reducing the risk of unnecessary and unwanted data exposure. eIDAS 2.0 facilitates cross-border data transfers by establishing a harmonised framework for electronic identification and trust services across the entire European Union. This is particularly relevant for ensuring that data protection standards are maintained when personal data is transferred between EU Member States and will help reduce the risks associated with cross-border data transfers.

    In the event of a security breach, eIDAS 2.0 requires service providers to notify the relevant supervisory bodies and affected users without undue delay. This prompt notification helps mitigate the impact of breaches on user privacy and ensures that protective and corrective measures are taken swiftly. eIDAS 2.0 also outlines the responsibilities of supervisory bodies in investigating and addressing such breaches. Insofar as this regards financial services, eIDAS 2.0 must be read in conjunction with the Digital Operational Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, DORA).

    In addition, eIDAS 2.0 explicitly promotes the use of pseudonyms, allowing users to engage in certain transactions without revealing their true identities, thereby additionally enhancing privacy. The exception is where the identification of the user is required by EU or national law, as would be the case in most financial services transactions, where stricter rules require a complete set of clear personal data for KYC purposes.

    How eIDAS 2.0 Affects the Future of the EU AML Regime

    The new Regulation on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing ((EU) 2024/1624 Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, AMLR) emphasises the high importance of customer due diligence in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing. eIDAS 2.0 is expected to play a significant role in this context as money laundering and terrorist financing often involve a high number of cross-border transactions involving multiple jurisdictions. The interoperability of electronic identification processes under eIDAS 2.0 enables financial institutions and other entities to verify the identity of customers from different EU Member States seamlessly. This EU-wide standardisation will also likely simplify spotting suspicious customers or activities across borders.

    The AMLR advocates for a risk-based approach to managing financial transactions and correlating AML risks. eIDAS 2.0 provides the necessary tools for implementing this approach smoothly and cost-effectively by using secure electronic identification and trust services. These tools also enable obliged entities to know their clients and assess and effectively mitigate the risks associated with their customers and transactions.

    The Cornerstone of a Trustworthy Digital Environment

    The provisions of eIDAS 2.0 for electronic identification and trust services empower users to control their personal data and engage in secure electronic transactions. By aligning with the GDPR and promoting transparency, user control, and data minimisation, eIDAS 2.0 ensures that privacy and data protection standards are still upheld in this new digital landscape.

    Furthermore, the integration of eIDAS 2.0 with the new AMLR enhances the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures by providing reliable electronic identification means and facilitating cross-border co-operation, while upgrading and simplifying the customer experience of KYC.

    As the reliance on secure digital services continues to grow, the robust privacy, data protection, and AML framework established by and around eIDAS 2.0 will be crucial in maintaining user trust and safeguarding personal data in the European Union’s digital future.

    Authors

    Dr. Cornelius Hille

    Associate

    Frankfurt

    More insights

  • Steer clear of fines: Check your PCI DSS 4.0 compliance

    Steer clear of fines: Check your PCI DSS 4.0 compliance

    ARTICLE

    Steer clear of fines: Check your PCI DSS 4.0 compliance

    July 1, 2025

    Read time: 7 min

    Overview

    Regardless of where you are in the world, if your organisation has not yet achieved compliance with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 4.0.1, prompt action is critical to avoid fines, penalties, and assessments.

    In depth

    As of 1 April 2025, all merchants and third‑party service providers (TPSPs) involved in processing credit or debit card payments must fully adhere to the enhanced security requirements outlined in PCI DSS 4.0.1. PCI DSS applies globally and regardless of where the entity is located. The transition to the new PCI DSS 4.0 controls requires new policies, processes, and technology solutions for card transaction protection.

    PCI DSS 4.0 was developed to reduce card fraud through more robust security and policy standards. During the full rollout of PCI DSS 4.0, the PCI Security Standards Council updated PCI DSS 4.0 to PCI DSS 4.0.1. The 1 April date ended various grace periods tied to the staged roll‑out of PCI DSS 4.0/4.0.1. Requirements previously tagged as “best practice” are now mandatory and must be implemented and tested.

    Requirements previously tagged as “best practice” are now mandatory.

    Understanding PCI DSS and Its Applicability

    PCI DSS is a comprehensive set of security standards designed to ensure that all entities processing, storing, or transmitting payment‑card data maintain a secure environment. PCI DSS applies universally to all merchants and TPSPs, regardless of payment channel (e‑commerce, call center, in‑store terminal, etc.). Even third parties that can affect the security of card processing must comply.

    PCI DSS is a Global Standard

    PCI DSS obligations originate with the international payment‑card brands, including Visa, Mastercard, American Express, Discover, and JCB. Each brand embeds PCI DSS compliance in its network operating regulations and contractually passes those obligations to acquiring banks. Acquirers then flow the same requirements down to merchants and TPSPs through their merchant agreements and service contracts. Because these card-brand rules apply worldwide, any organisation that stores, processes, or transmits cardholder data for the card brands must comply with PCI DSS, no matter where it is located. This effectively makes PCI DSS a de facto global baseline for payment‑card security.

    This effectively makes PCI DSS a de facto global baseline for payment‑card security.

    PCI DSS Compliance with International Regulations and Guidelines

    Several jurisdictions explicitly reference or incorporate PCI DSS within their own statutory or regulatory frameworks. Organisations operating globally should track these references to ensure PCI DSS compliance.

    Japan

    The 2016 revision to the Installment Sales Act instructed merchants to avoid storing card data and to meet PCI DSS as a recognised fraud‑prevention measure. The Security Guideline for Credit Cards (designated under JISA Article 35‑16) was overhauled in March 2025 (Version 6.0). It includes reference to PCI DSS 4.0 and 4.0.1 and provides guidance to businesses to verify and comply with PCI DSS requirements, depending on each business’ type and system/network configuration.

    India

    The Reserve Bank of India Master Direction on Digital Payment Security Controls (18 February 2021) tells regulated entities to follow payment‑card standards, including PCI DSS and the PCI Payment Application Data Security Standard (PA-DSS) when securing card channels.

    Singapore

    The Monetary Authority of Singapore includes guidance to follow PCI DSS as a benchmark that financial institutions should align with when handling cardholder data.

    United Kingdom

    The UK Gambling Commission may accept existing PCI DSS audits as evidence that licensees meet required security controls.

    Saudi Arabia

    The Saudi Central Bank’s Cyber Security Framework states that it is built on global standards, including PCI DSS, and mandates PCI DSS compliance for member organisations.

    United States

    Several states have written PCI DSS directly into their consumer-data statutes or offer liability safe harbors tied to PCI DSS compliance. The following is a small sample.

    Nevada obliges any “data collector” that accepts payment cards to follow the then-current version of PCI DSS for those transactions. NRS 603A.215.

    Minnesota implements some of the PCI DSS storage prohibitions by banning retention of card security code data, PIN, or full track data beyond 48 hours after authorisation. The Plastic Card Security Act, Minn. Stat. § 325E.64.

    Washington requires large retailers and processors to reimburse financial institutions after a card-data breach unless the entity’s PCI DSS compliance had been validated within the prior year, effectively incorporating PCI DSS as a safe harbour. RCW 19.255.020.

    Even where PCI DSS is not written into law, regulators often point to it as the baseline. Multinational merchants and service providers should treat PCI DSS 4.0 as a minimum wherever card data is present, and then build local add‑on requirements on top of PCI DSS.

    Even where PCI DSS is not written into law, regulators often point to it as the baseline.

    Key Obligations Under PCI DSS 4.0.1

    PCI DSS 4.0.1 introduces significant changes, including longer and more detailed Self-Assessment Questionnaire forms.

    One major difference is the increased focus on targeted risk analysis and organisational maturity. Additionally, the new version introduces a customised approach to PCI assessments, allowing businesses to implement alternative technical and administrative controls that address the customised approach.

    As the enforcement date is already in effect, organisations must ensure now that they have implemented critical requirements, such as

    • Defining the scope of the PCI DSS: This must be done annually (or every six months for TPSPs) and include defining and documenting the assessment scope; identifying all system components, people, and processes that handle card data; and recording all roles and responsibilities.
    • Controlling payment page scripts: All client-side payment page scripts must be controlled to block unauthorised changes.
    • Automating technical solutions: Automated tools must be deployed for public facing web applications to detect and prevent web-based attacks.
    • Monitoring TPSPs and responding to incidents: Monitoring procedures must be strengthened in accordance with PCI DSS requirements, and documentation is required from TPSPs to verify compliance and support incident response.
    • Undertaking targeted risk analyses: These are required to address specific vulnerabilities in the card data environment.
    • Enhancing encryption requirements: Stronger encryption protections must be applied (as specified in PCI DSS), especially where whole disk encryption is used.

    Bear in mind that outsourcing card functions does not remove PCI duties — this is a common misconception for merchants who outsource card processing functions. Merchants that outsource processing must still complete an annual Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Attestation of Compliance.

    Impact on Third-Party Vendors and Service Providers

    PCI DSS 4.0.1 raises expectations for the security of TPSPs. Besides updating several of the controls required to comply with the PCI DSS, organisations must conduct due diligence, embed compliance clauses in contracts, obtain third party Attestations of Compliance and review vendor security practices regularly.

    Noncompliance Risks

    Noncompliance can lead to financial penalties, legal exposure, and reputational harm. It can also lead to fines, higher interchange fees, or even termination of the ability to accept card payments.

    PCI DSS compliance requires cross departmental co-operation; legal, compliance, procurement, vendor management, and IT security teams all have vital roles to play. Entities subject to PCI DSS 4.0 should run a gap analysis, update security policies, implement required controls, and train staff to align with PCI DSS 4.0.1.

    Authors

    Mark E. Schreiber

    Counsel

    Boston

    Brian Long

    Associate

    Dallas

    More insights

  • New US Data Security Program limits sensitive data transfers

    New US Data Security Program limits sensitive data transfers

    ARTICLE / INTERNATIONAL NEWS

    New US Data Security Program limits sensitive data transfers

    July 1, 2025

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Data Security Program (DSP) represents a significant regulatory undertaking by the US government to control the flow of bulk sensitive data to specific foreign countries, for national security purposes.

    In depth

    The DSP came into effect 8 April 2025, operationalised through a Final Rule promulgated by the US Department of Justice (DOJ), which introduced a framework of prohibitions and restrictions on certain data transactions. Specifically, the DSP regulates the transfer of, or provision of access to, bulk US sensitive personal data and US government-related data to “countries of concern.”

    US Data Security Program Scope

    A key aspect of the Program is its designation of “countries of concern,” which the US government has identified as presenting heightened risks to national security.

    The current list names China (including Hong Kong and Macao), Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. However, the scope of the DSP extends beyond these countries to apply to “covered persons,” a category defined within the DSP to encompass specific individuals and entities sufficiently connected to these countries, such as by a foreign individual residing in a country of concern or a foreign entity organised under the laws of a country of concern.

    To ensure the Program’s adaptability to evolving threats, the DSP empowers the US Attorney General to designate, on a case-by-case basis, any individual or entity, regardless of location, as a “covered person.” Such designations will be made public through official announcements in the Federal Register, maintaining a transparent record within the National Security Division’s list of covered persons.
    The establishment of the DSP and the implementation of the DOJ Final Rule is rooted in a national emergency declared by Former President Biden in a 2019 Executive Order. The declaration acknowledged the “…unusual and extraordinary threat… to the national security and foreign policy of the United States…” posed by the access of foreign adversaries to “…vast amounts of sensitive information…” pertaining to Americans.

    The DOJ has specifically addressed the national security risks associated with “countries of concern” exploiting advanced technologies. Of particular concern is the potential use of technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) to analyse and manipulate bulk sensitive personal data, which the government fears could enable foreign adversaries to engage in activities detrimental to US interests, such as espionage, influence campaigns, and kinetic or cyber operations, and could lead to the pursuit of other strategic advantages.

    Of particular concern is the potential use of technologies like artificial intelligence.

    Sensitive Data Covered by the DSP

    Under the DSP, US businesses are prohibited from engaging in “data brokerage,” which is defined to include the sale or licensing of access to certain bulk data. The DSP establishes specific thresholds for determining what constitutes “bulk” sensitive personal data, and these thresholds vary depending on the level of sensitivity the US government associates with each data type. Thresholds for all sensitive data, including health, biometric, financial, and location data, especially for multinational companies with a large corporate presence, are fairly low and reflect the government’s fears regarding how such data, even at low thresholds, can be leveraged against the United States and its residents.

    Under the DSP, US businesses are prohibited from engaging in “data brokerage.”

    The types of “sensitive personal data” covered by the DSP are similar to those set forth in regulations issued by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency body responsible for reviewing foreign investments in US businesses for potential national security concerns. The DSP, however, has a broader scope of what constitutes “sensitive personal data” compared with CFIUS, and has much lower thresholds as CFIUS generally focuses on investments in businesses that collect the sensitive personal data of one million or more US persons.

    The DSP’s prohibitions and restrictions on data transfers to countries of concern are intentionally broad and industry-agnostic. The DSP provides a limited set of narrow exemptions for certain transactions, including, but not limited to, those typically associated with business operations, or required or authorised by law; investment agreements; and drug, biological product, and medical device authorisations. Because of the wide scope of the DSP and its narrow exemptions, the DSP will have a particularly outsized impact on healthcare and health-related data transactions, financial services and financial-related data transactions, and intercompany and vendor data transactions.

    Companies engaging in prohibited data transactions must cease those practices, while those engaging in similar transactions subject to vendor, employee, and investment agreements, which intend to continue engaging in such transfers, must utilise system and data-level protections outlined by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Companies seeking to engage in restricted transactions by leveraging CISA’s requirements may find that, in implementing these strict security controls, the resulting end data may be impractical or unhelpful to the intended data recipient.

    Companies engaging in prohibited data transactions must cease those practices.

    Penalties for Violating the DSP

    US persons and entities in violation of the DSP may find themselves subject to both civil and criminal penalties, with penalties for wilful violations of up to US $1 million (subject to inflation adjustment) and 20 years in prison. The severity of the penalties is a clear message that the US government is serious about protecting sensitive data, and companies must take proactive and comprehensive measures to ensure compliance.

    The Big Picture on Handling Sensitive Data

    While the United States is implementing these new restrictions, numerous other countries have already established their own regulations governing cross-border data transfers and the interplay of data protection and national security. For instance, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into effect in 2018, includes stringent rules on transferring personal data outside the European Economic Area (EEA), requiring specific safeguards or adequacy decisions for companies intent on transferring European personal data outside the EEA. Similarly, countries like China and Russia have implemented data localisation laws, mandating that certain types of personal data must be stored and processed within their national borders.

    These examples highlight a global trend towards greater scrutiny and control over the international movement of personal information. Alongside the DSP, they underscore the delicate balance every government is attempting to strike between fostering international commerce and safeguarding its national security interests.

    For US businesses or foreign businesses with a US presence, the DSP signals a more protectionist stance on data, potentially influencing future international data transfer agreements and raising questions about reciprocity from the targeted countries. It necessitates a fundamental reassessment of international data handling practices, impacting everything from vendor relationships and employment agreements to investment strategies, research collaborations, and the location of operations.

    The restrictions and the accompanying cybersecurity and compliance obligations will likely lead to increased operational complexities and costs for businesses with ties to these nations.

    Authors

    Katelyn N. Ringrose

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Protecting LGBTQ+ online privacy in the digital age protects everyone

    Protecting LGBTQ+ online privacy in the digital age protects everyone

    ARTICLE / INTERNATIONAL NEWS

    Protecting LGBTQ+ online privacy in the digital age protects everyone

    July 1, 2025

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A recent amicus brief filed by LGBT Tech, with the support of a coalition of LGBTQ+ advocacy organisations and legal counsel from McDermott Will & Emery, carries significant weight in ongoing jurisprudence regarding online privacy.

    In depth

    The brief urges the California Supreme Court to overturn the Court of Appeal’s decision in Snap, Inc. v. The Superior Court of San Diego County, which would erode the protections of the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The California Court’s decision will determine whether hundreds of millions of social media users, including countless LGBTQ+ individuals, will continue to enjoy the privacy protections over their electronic communications set forth in the SCA.

    The Importance of LGBTQ+ Advocacy for Online Privacy

    The LGBTQ+ community utilises digital spaces at significantly higher rates than their peers. For many, online environments serve as vital conduits for community building, identity exploration, access to crucial support networks, and the acquisition of information, which is particularly important for those residing in unaccepting households. Weakening of online privacy safeguards would disproportionately impact this community, potentially severing these essential digital lifelines.

    In addition to relying on online services at heightened rates, LGBTQ+ individuals may face amplified harms when their private data is exposed. Across the world, and within the United States, LGBTQ+ individuals remain susceptible to discrimination, harassment, and violence. The disclosure of sensitive online communications or personal affiliations could precipitate severe repercussions and discriminatory practices in critical domains such as housing, employment, and healthcare.

    LGBTQ+ individuals may face amplified harms when their private data is exposed.

    The SCA, which mandates warrants or court orders for the disclosure of stored electronic communications, functions as a crucial guardrail against such unwarranted intrusions and potential harms. It attempts to strike a careful balance between allowing for compelled and voluntary disclosures in the interests of public safety, and ensuring against overly broad or otherwise inappropriate disclosure. Importantly, the SCA safeguards operate to protect not only the individual user whose messages are subject to disclosure but also the numerous individuals with whom that person communicates. Weakening the SCA would pose significant risks to the privacy of all social media users.

    Weakening the SCA would pose significant risks to the privacy of all social media users.

    Global Effects of the Stored Communications Act

    The SCA has long had significant global effects. While the United States has entered into co-operative agreements with countries around the world regarding the exchange of digital information in criminal matters, from Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) to Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD) agreements, the SCA serves as the most critical barrier to foreign governments in their attempts to seek user information from US companies. As both a sword and shield, the SCA is particularly important for US companies seeking to guard user information against improper intrusion from foreign governments. In short, bi- or multi-lateral agreements with the United States strike the very careful balance of lifting the SCA’s barriers as to certain crimes, allowing access to digital information by certain countries, while the California Courts’ decision stands to take a much less targeted approach — putting all social media users, not just members of the LGBTQ+ community, at risk of having their personal communications disclosed.

    Demonstrating a unified and powerful stance within the LGBTQ+ community on this critical issue, LGBT Tech was joined by a number of prominent LGBTQ+ advocacy organisations, including Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Hacking the Workforce, the National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance, the Trevor Project, and Advocates for Trans Equality.

    Authors

    Sagar K. Ravi

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Katelyn N. Ringrose

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • US healthcare offshoring: Navigating patient data privacy laws and regulations

    US healthcare offshoring: Navigating patient data privacy laws and regulations

    ARTICLE

    US healthcare offshoring: Navigating patient data privacy laws and regulations

    July 1, 2025

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Unlike other sectors, US healthcare businesses must reconcile cost-saving strategies with stringent compliance obligations, especially when patient data crosses national borders or is accessed overseas.

    In depth

    As healthcare companies in the United States seek sustainable strategies to reduce administrative costs, offshoring administrative, non-clinical functions has emerged as an increasingly attractive option. Global labour markets offer access to skilled professionals at wages that may be lower than in the US, which enables cost efficiencies for US providers and health plans.

    However, because of patient data privacy concerns, healthcare offshoring presents a unique legal and regulatory challenge. Companies must navigate the web of US state restrictions on the access or storage of patient data outside the US.

    HIPAA’s Extraterritorial Flexibility

    The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) is the primary federal law that protects patients’ health information. HIPAA establishes standards for the privacy and security of a patient’s health and related information, known as protected health information or PHI, by healthcare providers, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses and their subcontractors who provide services on behalf of healthcare providers or health plans involving PHI. These subcontractors, known as “business associates”, are required to enter in Business Associate Agreements that contain provisions designed to protect PHI, and have independent obligations to protect PHI under HIPAA.

    HIPAA doesn’t prohibit PHI from being accessed or stored outside the US, despite the potential risks. If a foreign vendor violates HIPAA or experiences a data breach, there is limited recourse unless there are strong, binding, international arbitration provisions, or the foreign vendor maintains a substantial US-based presence.

    If a foreign vendor violates HIPAA or experiences a data breach, there is limited recourse.

    In light of this risk, many US state governments, healthcare providers, and health plans have sought to limit or prohibit the offshoring of US patient data.

    Data Localisation Clauses

    The most common means by which states seek to control risk is through data localisation provisions within contracts with state agencies, and through Medicaid regulatory restrictions.

    In some cases, these contractual provisions require both the storage of patient data and the performance of the services to occur in the US. For example, Wisconsin prohibits contractors and subcontractors from performing work outside the US that involves access to or disclosure of patient health and related information. Similarly, Texas’ Uniform Managed Care Contract requires Managed Care Organisations (MCOs) to provide all services within the US. It further requires that all information obtained by the MCO or a subcontractor pursuant to the Managed Care Contract be “stored and maintained within the United States”.
    Examples of other states with regulatory or executive order restrictions that prohibit offshoring include Arizona’s Health Care Cost Containment System programme, and executive orders in Ohio, Missouri, and New Jersey.

    The most common means by which states seek to control risk is through data localisation provisions.

    Legislative Prohibitions on US Healthcare Offshoring

    The most direct manner in which regulation has sought to prevent the storage of patient data outside the US is state legislation that simply prohibits it.

    Florida’s Electronic Health Records Exchange Act, for example, requires healthcare providers that are using certified electronic health record technology to ensure that patient information in qualified electronic health records stored in an offsite physical or virtual environment is physically maintained in the continental US, its territories, or Canada. A healthcare provider’s license is conditioned on submission of an affidavit regarding compliance with this requirement, and a failure to maintain compliance could result in professional discipline.

    In Texas, Senate Bill 1188 has passed the Senate and, if enacted, will require that certain medical facilities, healthcare providers, and governmental entities ensure that electronic health record information of Texas residents is stored in the US.

    Both states are attempting to balance the risks associated with exporting US patient data to other jurisdictions while also permitting access to that information abroad, as long as the storage or physical maintenance of the information remains inside the US.

    Comprehensive Consumer Privacy Laws Impacting Healthcare Offshoring

    A growing number of US states have enacted, or are in the process of enacting, broad-based consumer privacy laws that, although not focused on the offshoring of patient data, could spill over to prohibit or restrict those sorts of data transfers. These comprehensive privacy laws may be broad enough to encompass practices relating to the treatment of patient health information and, in some cases, specifically provide that health information is within scope.

    California Civil Code Section 1798.140(ae)(2), for example, defines “sensitive personal information” to include “personal information collected and analyzed concerning a consumer’s health”. Recent bills in Connecticut, Iowa, and Montana reflect the wave of broad privacy protections that states have enacted, and the trend includes more than 20 other states.

    Healthcare companies should therefore consider the applicability of comprehensive state privacy regimes to the potential offshoring of patient information.

    CMS Guidance and Federal Contractual Oversight Relating to Medicare Advantage Plans

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has not prohibited offshoring but has issued guidance that increases compliance expectations for federal healthcare contractors and Medicare Advantage Plans.

    CMS requires Medicare Advantage Organisations (MAOs) to obtain from healthcare providers who use offshore vendors detailed information regarding the offshore vendors’ safeguards protecting patient information. The provider must submit a signed attestation certificate to the MAO, to meet CMS requirements under 42 C.F.R. § 422.503. CMS maintains the authority to audit compliance and may penalise MAOs for failing to manage offshore risks adequately. These provisions are included in downstream contracts with healthcare providers and require the healthcare providers to ensure their downstream subcontractors or business associates comply with them.

    Contractual Barriers to Healthcare Offshoring

    Even where HIPAA and state law permit offshoring, many healthcare providers’ and health plans’ contracts include restrictions on their business associates. Payers and provider networks may include terms that prohibit PHI from leaving US territory or accessing PHI outside the US, or require that subcontractors meet specific additional security requirements. Such contract clauses often impose stricter obligations than those otherwise mandated by law.

    Healthcare providers’ and health plans’ contracts include restrictions on their business associates.

    Best Practices for Offshoring Patient Data

    US healthcare companies can mitigate risk and maximise value from offshore operations by adopting the following best practices.

    Adopt an Offshore Policy

    Healthcare organisations and their vendors should adopt measures to collect, document, and maintain relevant information to identify offshore arrangements, impose appropriate measures in a consistent and orderly way, monitor compliance, and take action if problems arise.

    Enter Into an Offshore Business Associate Agreement

    Healthcare businesses should enter into a Business Associate Agreement with any offshore vendors that will access or store patient information, and develop and implement appropriate measures to address privacy and security issues not addressed by HIPAA that are unique to offshore entities.

    In addition to the standard Business Associate Agreement requirements, healthcare businesses should consider including robust international arbitration clauses and requirements around cyber liability insurance coverage.

    Establish Minimum Necessary Access, Encryption, and Data Retention Policies

    Offshore contracting arrangements should prohibit the offshore contractor’s access to data not required to perform its services, essentially extending HIPAA’s minimum necessary rule to a broader range of protected information, and limiting the ability of offshore personnel to print and archive data locally.

    Additionally, healthcare companies should confirm that data retention periods by the offshore entity are set forth in the contract and do not involve the offshore entity storing data for longer than needed. Healthcare providers may consider requiring the offshore entity to encrypt data at rest or in transit at appropriate encryption levels.

    Prepare for Data Breaches

    Offshoring contracts should include policies and procedures to address the offshore organisation’s response to data breaches or other matters of non-compliance. These should cover, for example, the time frame for reporting, the level of co-operation, and identifying who is responsible for determining if a reportable data breach has occurred.

    HIPAA requires that a Business Associate contract be subject to termination if the business associate violates a material contractual term. US healthcare organisations should consider whether further or not expanded termination rights are appropriate when offshoring is involved, such as permitting termination following a data breach, even absent proof that a violation of the Business Associate contract caused the breach.

    Comply With All Applicable Laws

    Contracts with offshore vendors should include all language required by applicable laws and regulations, including the HIPAA Privacy and Security rules and, if applicable, the Medicare Advantage downstream provider requirements and state Medicaid requirements for offshoring. Healthcare companies should include a broad indemnity to cover non-compliance with applicable law and make sure the indemnity is not subject to low limitations of liability.

    Undertake Annual Audits

    US healthcare organisations should audit offshore subcontracts at least annually, and use those audit results to evaluate whether to continue their relationship with the vendor or take corrective action or other measures if appropriate.

    Considerations for Non-US Vendors

    Offshore vendors seeking to work with US healthcare companies must adapt to this fragmented and evolving landscape.

    Vendors should conduct jurisdictional analyses to identify states and client types, e.g., commercial versus Medicare/Medicaid, where offshoring is viable. Proposals by vendors to US healthcare companies should be tailored to reflect this legal context and should appropriately consider the type of information being offshored, as well as the payor type.

    Offshore vendors must be able to demonstrate HIPAA compliance via documented policies and training, robust security, and experience working within multi-jurisdictional legal environments.

    In higher-risk jurisdictions, vendors might consider establishing US-based operations or collaborating with domestic intermediaries to minimise risk. Many offshore vendors have obtained third party certifications such as through the Health Information Trust Alliance as a means of demonstrating their commitment to the appropriate handling of patient information.

    Authors

    Spencer Green

    Partner

    Nashville

    Stephen L. Page

    Partner

    Nashville

    More insights

  • What ICO guidance on anonymisation means for health and life sciences companies

    What ICO guidance on anonymisation means for health and life sciences companies

    ARTICLE / INTERNATIONAL NEWS

    What ICO guidance on anonymisation means for health and life sciences companies

    July 1, 2025

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    What new guidance on anonymisation from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) means for healthcare and life sciences companies.

    In depth

    Harnessing health data is a key priority for life sciences companies as it enables more effective scientific research, better tailored clinical trials and investigations, and targeted drug development and commercial access. One of the key tools for health research is anonymised and pseudonymised data. In recent years, there has been significant debate in the United Kingdom and Europe about how, and even if, health data can be effectively anonymised.

    The new ICO guidance on anonymisation, issued on 28 March, sets out helpful guidance about how to approach this challenge in the United Kingdom. The guidance diverges from the approach taken by some regulators in Europe, which appear to be taking a more cautious approach to both anonymisation and pseudonymisation, and the sector is eagerly awaiting the appeal decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Single Resolution Board (SRB) v European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).

    ICO guidance diverges from the approach taken by some regulators in Europe.

    The ICO’s guidance is not statutory code but contains advice on how to interpret UK law and a series of good practice recommendations.

    Whilst there is no penalty for not following these recommendations, the ICO says it will take its guidance into account and is less likely to carry out enforcement action, including financial penalties, if an organisation can demonstrate that it made a serious effort to comply with data protection law, and had a genuine reason to believe that the information was not personal data.

    Over recent years, there has been significant academic and legal debate about the status of data when it is transferred to third parties. At the heart of this wrangling is the question of whether data can be anonymous in the hands of one person, but personal (or pseudonymous) data in the hands of another.

    Anonymisation Absolutists Versus Relativists

    The legal debate focuses on terminology in Recital 26 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which states: “To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly.” (Emphasis added.)

    Proponents of absolute anonymisation argue that the words “or by another person” mean that if any person is able to identify the data subject, including the original controller who applied the anonymisation techniques and who may retain the means to re-identify the data subject, the data can never be anonymous, even in the hands of a recipient who does not have access to reasonable means of re-identifying the data.
    This absolute approach may have significant adverse implications for health and life sciences companies that, as part of health research or post market activities, often use pseudonymised health datasets without access to other directly identifiable information, such as names, cohort data, medical images, biological samples, etc.

    An absolute approach treats this type of data as never being anonymised if directly identifiable information, such as a code or table that corresponds the identity of the patient or research participant with the random ID assigned to the corresponding dataset, is held by one of the actors in the chain. The relativists argue that personal data can be anonymous in the hands of the other actors in that chain, who don’t have access to identifiable information, provided certain conditions are met.

    The Position in Europe

    This was the legal issue at stake in SRB v EDPS, where the European General Court (GC) decided on 26 April 2023 in favour of a relative approach. In this case, SRB transmitted non-directly identifying data to a consulting firm and faced complaints from individuals regarding a breach of data protection laws. The GC considered that the EDPS should have verified whether or not individuals were re-identifiable from the consulting firm’s perspective, through reasonable means, and not solely from the SRB’s perspective.

    The case is currently under appeal by the EDPS, joined by the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), to the ECJ. SRB, joined in the appeal by the EU Commission, argues that a relative approach applies and that pseudonymised data may remain personal data for the data controller who pseudonymised it, but it is necessary to examine the actual identifiability of the data subjects in the hands of the recipient. Adopting an absolute approach, the EDPS argues that data is anonymous only where the risk of re-identification is non-existent or insignificant.

    On 6 February 2025, the Advocate General published his opinion, which, whilst adopting a slightly different interpretation, reaches a relativist conclusion that where pseudonymisation is sufficiently robust, it may be possible for data to be not reasonably identifiable. Pseudonymised data can, therefore, be anonymous. This not only confirms a relative approach to anonymisation, but goes one step further, allowing for pseudonymisation techniques to render data anonymous, a position that the European data protection authorities have, so far, been very reluctant to adopt.

    The ECJ’s decision is eagerly awaited not least because, in January 2025, the EDPB issued draft guidelines on pseudonymisation that take a more absolutist view. These guidelines say that pseudonymised data remains personal data even in the hands of a third party.

    In addition, the EDPB guidelines seem to create a two-tier vision of pseudonymisation. There could be a limited level of pseudonymisation, for example, removing direct identifiers to mask the identity, but also a higher level of pseudonymisation, which would meet the legal definition of pseudonymisation under GDPR. Only pseudonymisation procedures that effectively reduce the risk of data being attributed to a specific person could thus benefit from the favourable regime identified by the guidelines regarding pseudonymised data. The EDPB therefore appears to not only reject a relative approach to anonymisation, but seems to be moving towards a stricter approach to pseudonymisation.

    The EDPB guidelines seem to create a two-tier vision of pseudonymisation.

    “Whose Hands?” the ICO’s Contextual Test for Anonymisation

    The ICO applies a “whose hands?” test, which means data could be personal in the hands of one person, but not another. The ICO makes it clear that there is a spectrum of identifiability that depends on a number of factors; on one end, it is impossible for data to be re-identified, and at the other data is clearly personal.

    The ICO’s approach is that it does not need to be impossible to identify an individual for the data to be considered anonymised. Data can instead be considered “effectively anonymised” if the possibility of identification is “sufficiently remote”.

    Along this spectrum, it is important to assess the identifiability risk, taking into account the motivated intruder test as well as a series of other practical steps in assessing whether or not data can be re-identified. Motivation in this context can vary, but for healthcare and life sciences companies handling valuable information in the form of health data, the likelihood of sophisticated and capable intruders is high.

    The ICO makes it clear that there is a spectrum of identifiability.

    The ICO makes it clear that the context for the data disclosure is important. The ICO draws the distinction between the “release model”, for example, release to the public at large or release to a limited group of defined people for a particular purpose. The standards for anonymisation for public release are higher because they carry more risk: the anonymising party loses control of the data, and it may be impossible to retract the information. By contrast, limited release models may be easier to assess and control, despite some risk remaining. The ICO recommends that any risk assessment take into account the persons to whom the data is being released, and any legal or other prohibitions on re-identification, including confidentiality or professional limitations, such as those that apply to clinicians, as well as contractual controls.

    Finally, the ICO sets out some helpful and practical guidance about anonymisation techniques, illustrated with worked examples.

    ICO Guidance Action Points for UK Health and Life Sciences Companies

    Companies that anonymise personal data should consider how they follow the ICO’s recommendations and be able to point to internal governance and accountability measures.

    At a minimum, these should include:

    • Reviewing transparency information: The ICO makes it clear that privacy notices should explain what data is being anonymised and why, set out the risk mitigation measures in place, and explain the type of release model.
    • Ensuring a legal basis is in place for anonymisation.
    • Risk assessments: Appropriate Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) specifically tailored to anonymisation as a processing activity should be conducted. Companies that anonymise data on an ongoing basis should consider developing and implementing a re-identifiability risk assessment process tailored to the company’s activities and objectives. These should be reviewed regularly, particularly for sensitive data such as health data, and be updated if technology changes or there are:
      • Changes to what data is publicly available
      • New releases, e.g., to new recipients
      • Attacks or vulnerabilities that may affect the anonymisation or other measures in place.
    • Recipient diligence: The ICO emphasises that the anonymising party must work with the recipient, who should also assess the identifiability risk in their hands.
    • Governance programmes: Data governance policies, staff training, board reporting structures and procedures to identify and respond to re-identification incidents should be reviewed and updated if necessary. These standards must be flowed down to third parties as contractual safeguards and as part of regular audits.
    • Wider legal obligations: Be mindful of legal frameworks and rules that apply alongside data privacy laws, such as the common law duty of confidentiality.
    Authors

    Sharon Lamb

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Bella North

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    More insights