ARTICLE
The Law of Digital Health
March 2018
Read time: 3 min
Published by AHLA, New Book Provides Overview and Insights on Balancing Digital Health Opportunities with Legal Realities
Designed to provide business leaders and their key advisors with the knowledge and insight they need to grow and sustain successful digital health initiatives, we are pleased to present The Law of Digital Health, a new book edited and authored by McDermott’s team of distinguished digital health lawyers, and published by AHLA.
Visit www.mwe.com/lawofdigitalhealth to order this comprehensive legal and regulatory analysis, coupled with practical planning and implementation strategies. You can also download the Executive Summary and hear more about how Digital Health is quickly and dynamically changing the health care landscape.
About the Authors
Bernadette Broccolo has been counseling health industry organizations for more than 38 years on health industry innovation strategies, with a particular emphasis on data and technology strategy development and implementation. Lisa Schmitz Mazur advises health care providers, technology companies and investors on digital health matters, ranging from telehealth and mobile health to consumer wellness tools.
In addition to Broccolo and Mazur, book authors include the following members of the McDermott Will & Emery Digital Health team, working across multiple offices: Shelby Buettner, Vanessa K. Burrows, Jiayan Chen, Amanda Enyeart, Ryan S. Higgins, Sarah Hogan, Marshall E. Jackson, Jr., Ryan B. Marcus, Anisa Mohanty, Amy C. Pimentel, Michael W. Ryan, Dale C. Van Demark, Christine M. Wahr, and Scott A. Weinstein.

New York Department of Financial Services Guidance Complicates a Crowded Virtual Currency Regulatory Landscape
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
New York Department of Financial Services Guidance Complicates a Crowded Virtual Currency Regulatory Landscape
March 7, 2018
Read time: 9 min
On February 7, 2018, the New York Department of Financial Services issued “Guidance on Prevention of Market Manipulation and Other Wrongful Activity” imposing stringent reporting requirements of which virtual currency companies should be aware. While it is unclear how the Guidance will be enforced, the regulatory landscape for virtual currency businesses continues to become more complex.
The New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) issued Guidance on Prevention of Market Manipulation and Other Wrongful Activity (Guidance) on February 7, 2018, imposing stringent reporting requirements on companies already subject to regulatory overview and reporting to a number of other regulatory bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodities Futures and Trading Commission (CFTC), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), or the Department of Justice (DOJ). Virtual currency companies should be aware of the latest regulatory guidance within the web of often-overlapping regulatory regimes by state and federal agencies.
Guidance on Prevention of Market Manipulation and Other Wrongful Activity
On February 7, 2018, DFS issued the Guidance to all “virtual currency business entities that are either licensed under 23 NYCRR Part 200 [BitLicense] or chartered as a limited purpose trust company under the New York Banking Law” which the Guidance refers to as “VC Entities.” According to DFS, the Guidance also applies to VC Entities which hold a New York money transmitter license.
To prevent market manipulation and other wrongful activities, the Guidance emphasizes the following:
- VC Entities are required to implement measures designed to effectively detect, prevent and respond to fraud, attempted fraud and similar wrongdoing; and
- VC Entities must be especially vigilant about market manipulation.
The Guidance stressed that under the BitLicense requirements, VC Entities must implement effective measures to detect, prevent and respond to wrongful activities based on the specific risks that VC Entities are exposed to. The measures must include an effective implementation of a written policy that:
- Identifies and assesses the full range of fraud-related and similar risk areas, including market manipulation;
- Provides effective procedures and controls to protect against identified risks;
- Allocates responsibility for monitoring risks; and
- Provides for periodic evaluation and revision of the procedures, controls and monitoring mechanisms in order to ensure continuing effectiveness, including continuing compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
The Guidance then highlights the following reporting requirements applicable to VC Entities. Immediately upon the discovery of any wrongdoing, a VC Entity must submit to DFS:
- A report stating all pertinent details known;
- A further report or reports of any material developments relating to the originally reported events;
- A statement of the actions taken (or proposed to be taken) with respect to such developments; and
- A statement of changes, if any, in the VC Entity’s operations that have been put in place, or are planned, in order to avoid repetition of similar events.
DFS expects that, in most cases, it will be practicable for a VC Entity to submit the first such further report of material developments, along with the previously noted statements, within 48 hours following submission of the original report of wrongdoing. Also, a VC Entity must maintain, for examination by DFS, records of each incident of wrongdoing.
However, the Guidance does not include detail as to what constitutes “discovery of any wrongdoing.” Also, an immediate report and DFS’s expectation that a “further report of material developments” should be submitted 48 hours after the immediate report imposes a fairly onerous burden, especially given the coinciding regulations and reporting requirements placed upon these same entities by other regulators such as FinCEN, the CFTC and the SEC.
Regulatory Overlap
In the Guidance, DFS further regulates virtual currency companies already subject to other regulatory oversight. Federal and state regulators continue to claim jurisdiction over regulating virtual currency businesses which has resulted in some confusion and regulatory overlap.
Determining whether a certain regulatory body has authority over virtual currency and related companies is largely dependent on the definition of virtual currency. A survey of various regulatory guidance, public statements, settlement agreements and legal proceedings, reveals that each interested government agency has argued for the definition of virtual currency which gives it the most regulatory authority.
The CFTC has argued that virtual currency is a commodity within its purview and has imposed significant penalties on certain market participants for engaging in virtual currency businesses without registering with the CFTC and otherwise violating the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) and corresponding regulations. See In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept. 17, 2015); In re TeraExchange LLC, CFTC No. 15-33, at 4-5, n. 3 (Sept. 25, 2015); In re BFXNA Inc. d/b/a BITFINEX, CFTC No. 16-19, 2016 WL 3137612, at *5 (June 2, 2016); see also CFTC, Customer Advisory: Beware Virtual Currency Pump-and-Dump Schemes, Feb. 15, 2018 (stating that “the CFTC maintains general anti-fraud and manipulation enforcement authority over virtual currency cash markets as a commodity in interstate commerce”).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently agreed with the CFTC, holding that “virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a commodity.” CFTC v. McDonnell, et al., No. 18-cv-361, ECF No. 29 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018) (holding that virtual currencies “fall well-within the common definition of ‘commodity’ as well as the CEA’s definition of ‘commodities’”)(citing 7 USC § 1(a)(9)).
It could be argued that the Guidance is preempted by the CFTC for certain of the VC Entities because the Guidance regulates activity already regulated by the CFTC. 7 USC § 2(a)(1)(A) (2015) (the CFTC “shall have exclusive jurisdiction” providing for exclusive CFTC jurisdiction over commodities); CFTC v. Schor, 478 US 833, 836 (1986) (describing the “sweeping authority” entrusted to the CFTC to implement the CEA). In fact, before the BitLicense regulation had been adopted, certain market participants voiced concerns about overlapping regulations. For example, one virtual currency options exchange called LedgerX requested that DFS explicitly exclude companies already subject to the CEA from BitLicense requirements. See Letter from LedgerX to Superintendent Benjamin M. Lawsky, New York State Department of Financial Services, (Mar. 27, 2015), (citing 7 USC § 2(a)(1)(A)). DFS did not adopt language to that effect in its final BitLicense regulations. There is some decisional authority indicating that New York is not preempted from having some regulatory authority over commodities transactions, despite the general role of the CFTC to regulate commodities transactions under the CEA. See, e.g., Bishop v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Strax v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). At least one plaintiff sued DFS in an Article 78 proceeding arguing that the BitLicense was preempted by federal law, but the court held that the plaintiff had no standing to assert such a claim. See Chino v. New York Department of Financial Services, No. 101880/2015, 2017 NY Misc. LEXIS 5153 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 21, 2017).
Regulation of virtual currency extends beyond DFS and the CFTC. The SEC has made public statements asserting its authority over some initial coin offerings. In its efforts to bring enforcement actions in Federal Court, the SEC successfully argued, that investments with virtual currency can constitute an “investment contract” and thus, a security. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
The IRS takes the position that virtual currency is “property.” IRS Notice 2014-21.
The DOJ has taken the position that virtual currency is “money” or “funds” under 18 USC § 1960, the unlicensed money transmitter statute, and has convicted some and arrested others for operating certain virtual currency businesses without a money transmitter license. See United States v. Murgio, 209 F.3d 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); United States v. Budovsky, No. 13-cr-368, 2015 US Dist. LEXIS 127717 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015); United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. Stetkiw, No. 17-mj-30566, ECF No. 1 (filed on Oct. 25, 2017) (Complaint). The “money” or “funds” definition argued by the DOJ also lands virtual currency companies within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury, and FinCEN has asserted itself as one of the key regulators over virtual currency businesses. More specifically, FinCEN has issued guidance on whether such virtual currency businesses are required to be licensed as a money transmitter, e.g., Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’S Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies, FIN-2013-G001 (Mar. 18, 2013); Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations, FIN-2014-R001 (Jan. 30, 2014); Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Software Development and Certain Investment Activity, FIN-2014-R002, Jan. 30, 2014).
Among the regulators, courts and the legislature, there does not appear to be a consensus as to how virtual currency is best characterized. It is unknown whether there will ever be uniformity among the regulators. According to the various regulatory guidance, legal proceedings and public statements, each regulatory body’s characterization of virtual currency has been largely consistent with whatever characterization would provide that regulatory body the most jurisdiction. The recent decision from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York indicates that courts may accept some overlapping jurisdictional authority by multiple regulatory agencies. CFTC v. McDonnell, et al., No. 18-cv-361, ECF No. 29, at 24 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018). The court ruled that while the CFTC has jurisdiction over virtual currency because it is a commodity, “the jurisdictional authority of CFTC to regulate virtual currencies as commodities does not preclude other agencies from exercising their regulatory power when virtual currencies function differently than derivative commodities.” Id.
Conclusion
It is unclear how DFS will enforce the Guidance. However, the regulatory landscape for virtual currency businesses is becoming increasingly difficult to navigate. There has yet to be a consensus on whether virtual currency is a “commodity” (according to the CFTC), “money” or “funds” (according to the DOJ and FinCEN), “property” (according to the IRS), or whether certain virtual currency-related activity constitutes the purchase and sale of a “security” (according to the SEC). It also has yet to be tested in court whether DFS’s regulatory regime carves out permissible regulatory authority over virtual currency companies, which will likely arise once DFS seeks to actively enforce this Guidance. There is substantial regulatory uncertainty but market participants can be certain that regulators on the federal and state level will continue to focus on virtual currency and may well continue to complicate the regulatory landscape for virtual currency companies.

The Import of a Rapid, Thorough Corporate Response to Allegations of Harassment
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
The Import of a Rapid, Thorough Corporate Response to Allegations of Harassment
March 5, 2018
Read time: 6 min
The increased focus on issues of harassment is putting corporate culture under a microscope. Corporate management and board members—regardless of whether the entity is private, public or charitable—must adjust the way they think about harassment in the workplace and how to respond to allegations of misconduct.
As the #MeToo social responsibility and similar movements continue to gain momentum, it is shining a light not only on alleged misconduct by executives and other individuals in positions of power, but also on the corporate response to allegations of such misconduct. From the US Olympic Committee and USA Gymnastics to leisure companies and even charities, the media, regulators and investors are focusing on the adequacy of the response to complaints raised, including, in some cases, complaints raised many years ago.
An inadequate response can lead not only to bad publicity and reputational harm, but to corporate liability. The complainants are not the only ones seeking to hold corporations liable for unaddressed misconduct. Other stakeholders, including shareholders, are filing suits against corporations based on a drop in stock price following disclosure of allegedly unaddressed misconduct. While the viability of such lawsuits remains to be seen, the filing of such suits is likely to continue, at least for now. In addition, while there are no specific securities law requirements that mandate the reporting of harassment allegations, public companies must at least consider whether the allegations are so significant as to create legal or other financial exposure that rises to the level of a reportable event.
The board of directors, consistent with its fiduciary duty to preserve corporate assets, including corporate reputation, can and should take a leadership role on behalf of the organization in establishing a corporate culture that seeks to identify, eradicate and prevent harassment. Up-to-date compliance policies, appropriate training that includes all levels of an organization, including its board, a confidential reporting system and individual and corporate accountability are all a part of establishing such a culture. Putting such processes in place will have the effect of preventing misconduct, setting the right tone, and allowing for prompt reporting of misconduct when it occurs. Once an allegation of misconduct has been made, however, the response is critical.
In this current environment, an investigation that may previously have been handled by the human resources department may now need to be addressed through an investigation by a special committee of the board, assisted by outside counsel. Increasingly, such investigations are being handled by teams comprised of employment law specialists and members of white collar practice groups, including former prosecutors.
A special committee and outside counsel provide protections to a corporation, its management and its board that an internal investigation cannot. As an initial matter, the involvement of counsel can provide privilege protections to the investigation, which may be particularly important if outside parties, whether they be private litigants or even regulators, initiate their own investigation or file suit. Perhaps more importantly, however, bringing in outside counsel reporting to independent board members brings independence and neutrality to an investigation that may not be as easily achieved through an internal investigation conducted by other employees. Members of white collar investigative practices with experience responding to, and in many cases conducting, government investigations also bring expertise in interviewing potentially reluctant witnesses and, where necessary, making credibility determinations. Having outside counsel, as opposed to a human resources officer who may be known to the relevant employees, also emphasizes the import of the investigation to the interviewees who may be more forthcoming in a more formal setting and with interviewers they are not going to see in the hallway the next day. Outside counsel can then prepare a privileged report summarizing factual findings.
Once the investigative members of the team have completed their report, the employment experts can take the information and provide substantive recommendations regarding whether there were any policy violations and what, if any, disciplinary or other corrective action should be taken. Bi-furcating the response in this way provides a further layer of neutrality—the employment lawyer rendering the advice has been shielded from interactions with the employees involved and cannot be accused of bias towards any of them. This is also an opportunity for employment counsel to review the policies and procedures in place and make any recommendations for revisions to those processes.
Armed with an investigative report and advice from outside counsel, the board can make the decision as to whether to share any or all of the results of the investigation in response to inquiries from the media, regulators or private litigants. Given the privileged nature of the report and recommendations, it generally will not be discoverable by third-parties absent a board decision that it is in the best interests of the corporation to waive the privilege. Moreover, the mere fact that the corporation conducted an independent inquiry, supervised by independent board members and conducted by outside counsel, demonstrates a commitment to addressing misconduct allegations that, in and of itself, provides both legal and reputational protections to the corporation.
The increased focus on issues of harassment is putting corporate culture under a microscope. Corporate management and board members—regardless of whether the entity is private, public or charitable—must adjust the way they think about harassment in the workplace and how to respond to allegations of misconduct. In addition to having appropriate policies and procedures in place for preventing, identifying and reporting misconduct, corporations must consider how to adequately respond to allegations. Corporate management and board members must be counseled by the right team, be it employment counsel alone or a combination of employment experts and trained investigators who can conduct a neutral, thorough and privileged investigation and then provide recommendations and advice based on the results of that investigation.
McDermott Perspectives
McDermott’s employment, white collar and securities lawyers are experienced in working together to investigate harassment allegations, advising clients on the appropriate response and potential disclosure obligations, and any subsequent regulatory inquiry. Our team has developed materials, template policies and tools to assist clients in workplace policies, procedures and trainings. For more information, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.
No Protection against Dismissal for Board Members
ARTICLE
No Protection against Dismissal for Board Members
March 2, 2018
Read time: 2 min
In this case before the German Federal Labor Court (BAG), the defendant (a large management consultancy) employed the plaintiff since 1996 and named him managing director in 2011. In 2014 the defendant properly terminated the contractual relationship with the plaintiff, but initially did not remove him from his position as managing director. A few months later, the plaintiff resigned as managing director before the end of the termination notice period. The plaintiff sued on the ground that he was actually a worker entitled to protection despite the appointment as managing director. The lawsuit was dismissed in the lower courts and the BAG rejected an appeal, making it clear that the employment protection law’s provision against dismissal does not apply to executive board members.
The Antitrust Issues of Establishing and Operating a Joint Venture
ARTICLE
The Antitrust Issues of Establishing and Operating a Joint Venture
March 2018
Read time: 2 min
Daniel von Brevern discusses in the article the antitrust issues of establishing and operating a joint venture.

US Supreme Court Limits Securities Safe Harbor Protection From Bankruptcy Clawback Suits
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
US Supreme Court Limits Securities Safe Harbor Protection From Bankruptcy Clawback Suits
March 1, 2018
Read time: 8 min
The securities safe harbor protection of Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(e) does not protect allegedly fraudulent “transfers in which financial institutions served as mere conduits,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on Feb. 27, 2018. Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 WL 1054879, *7 (2018). Affirming the Seventh Circuit’s reinstatement of the bankruptcy trustee’s complaint alleging the insolvent debtor’s overpayment for a stock interest, the Court found the payment not covered by §546(e) and thus recoverable. The district court had dismissed the trustee’s claim. See FTI Consulting Inc. v. Merit Management Group LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016), reversing 541 B.R. 850 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
Code § 546(e) provides a defense to constructive fraudulent transfer and preference claims arising out of securities transactions. Defendants often assert the defense when bankruptcy trustees seek to recover pre-bankruptcy payments by a corporation to its shareholders in a leveraged buyout. The defense requires, among other things, that the payment be made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” certain qualified transferees, including a “financial institution.” Because security trades are commonly settled through financial institutions, most appellate courts had found the presence of a financial institution, even if it had no beneficial interest in the underlying transaction, to be sufficient to meet the Code’s requirement that the transfer be “made by or to” a financial institution.
Relevance
The Court had granted certiorari in FTI to “resolve a conflict among the Circuit Courts as to the proper application of the § 546(e) safe harbor.” 2018 WL 1054879 at *7. Appellate courts had generally agreed on the vitality and breadth of the safe harbor defense contained in § 546(e). It insulates from the trustee’s fraudulent transfer or preference attack a “settlement payment,” “margin payment” or transfer related to a “securities contract . . . made by or to (or for the benefit of)” certain protected parties, including “financial institutions,” except when the debtor makes the payment with “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud” creditors under Code § 548(a)(1)(A). As the Seventh Circuit noted below, neither the debtor nor the debtor transferee in FTI had been “parties in the securities industry,” but were simply corporations that wanted to exchange money for privately held stock. 830 F.3d at 696.
The Seventh Circuit in FTI had refused to “interpret the safe harbor so expansively that it covers any transaction involving securities that uses a financial institution . . . as a conduit for funds.” 830 F.3d at 697, agreeing with In re Munford Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (2-1) (Code § 546(e) inapplicable to payments made by debtor to shareholders when financial institutions acted as mere conduits). As the Seventh Circuit stressed, Congress never said “that acting as a conduit for a transaction between non-named entities is enough to qualify for the safe harbor . . . .” 830 F.3d at 697. The Seventh Circuit, of course, recognized that it was “taking a different position from the one adopted by five of our sister circuits, which have interpreted § 546(e) to include the conduit situation.” Id.
Facts
“Buyer” (the debtor here) agreed to buy all of the shares of an entity known as B from certain entities, including “Seller,” a 30 percent shareholder of B, for a total of $55 million, borrowing the funds from a group of lenders, with the transfer of the funds flowing through “Bank.” Thus, Buyer and Seller were corporate entities “that wanted to exchange money for privately held stock.” Id. at 696.
After Buyer later filed a Chapter 11 petition, its litigation trustee sued Seller under Code § 548 and applicable state law to recover $16.5 million, representing Seller’s 30 percent equity interest paid by Buyer to Seller. Seller argued that the transfer was “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” an entity named in Code § 546(e), namely, a “financial institution” (i.e., Bank), and was, therefore, protected by the safe harbor. Because the funds passed through Bank, the district court dismissed the trustee’s complaint, agreeing with Seller that the transfer had passed through a financial institution. Seller “did not rely on its own status, because neither Buyer nor Seller contended that either [of them] is a ‘financial institution’ or other covered entity . . .” 2018 WL at *12. Rather, Seller argued that the safe harbor applied because “the component parts [of the stock sale] include transactions by and to financial institutions.” Id., at *7.
Analysis
The Supreme Court examined “the language of § 546(e), the specific context in which that language is used, and [its] broader statutory structure . . .” Id., at *8. In its view, “the relevant transfer . . . is the overarching transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid under one of the [Code’s] substantive avoidance provisions”. Here, “the only relevant transfer for . . . the safe harbor inquiry is the overarching transfer between [Buyer] and [Seller] of $16.5 million for purchase of the stock [—] the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid . . . . [T]hat transfer was not made by, to, or for the benefit of a financial institution.” Id. at *7.
Statutory Language
First, said the Court, the “text reminds us that the focus of the inquiry is the transfer that the trustee seeks to avoid.” Id. at *8. Because Code § 548 refers to the avoidance of transfers to or for the benefit of entities subject to fraudulent transfer liability, “Congress signaled that the [§ 546(e)] exception applies to the [challenged] overarching transfer . . ., not any component part of that transfer.” Id. Thus, the “safe harbor provides that ‘the trustee may not avoid’ certain transfers.” Id., at *9. The “trustee may not avoid . . . a transfer that is,” said the Court, “either a ‘settlement payment’ or made ‘in connection with a securities contract’.” Id. According to the Court, § 546(e) applies only to a transfer that is a covered “securities transaction”; “Not a transfer that involves. Not a transfer that comprises.” Id. The “otherwise avoidable transfer [must] itself be a transfer that meets the safe-harbor criteria.” Id.
Statutory Structure
A trustee asserting an avoiding power (e.g., preference, fraudulent transfer) must identify the challenged transfer. But the defendant “is free to argue that the trustee failed to properly identify an avoidable transfer under the Code, including any available arguments concerning the role of component parts of the transfer.” Id., at *10. If the trustee does properly identify an avoidable transfer, though, the court may not “examine the relevance of component parts,” which “are simply irrelevant to the analysis under § 546(e).” Id. Here, Seller argued that the district court could not “ignore” the intermediate Bank “component parts” of Buyer’s payment. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected Seller’s argument “that a transaction ‘by or to’ a financial institution such as [Bank] would meet the requirements of § 546(e) [when] the financial institution is acting as an intermediary without a beneficial interest in the transfer.” Id., at *10. In its view, neither the “Code or legislative history” shows “that Congress sought to abrogate [the Eleventh Circuit’s] Munford” decision. Id.
More important, said the Court, if the challenged transfer “was made ‘by’ or ‘to’ a securities clearing agency . . ., then § 546(e) will bar avoidance . . . without regard to whether the entity acted only as an intermediary . . . [Also] [t]he safe harbor will . . . bar avoidance if the transfer was made ‘for the benefit of’ that securities clearing agency, even if it was not made ‘by’ or to that entity.” Id., at *11 (emphasis added). But the Court did not address “the impact, if any, [Code] § 101(22)(A) would have in the application of the § 546(e) safe harbor,” for neither party claimed to be a “financial institution” due to its “customer” status. Id., at *5n.2.
Legislative Purpose
The Court finally rejected Seller’s reliance on Congress’ “purpose in enacting the safe harbor.” Id., at *12. Declining to address the argument, the Court explained that Seller had, in any event, “failed to support” its argument which “the plain language of the safe harbor” contradicts. Id. Although the safe harbor insulates certain securities transactions “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” covered entities, transfers through a covered entity “appear nowhere in the statute” (emphasis added). Id.
Comment
FTI confirms that, on certain facts, entities defending fraudulent transfer claims will not be able to rely on the § 546(e) securities safe harbor defense solely because of the flow of funds through a “financial institution” intermediary. These defendants will still be able to argue that the § 546(e) safe harbor applies because of their own status as a “financial institution,” “financial participant” or other protected entity, which will leave the safe harbor defense available to many large or active players in the financial markets. FTI also expressly leaves open the possibility that any “customer” of a “financial institution” is also a “financial institution” for purposes of the § 546(e) safe harbor.
Authored by Michael L. Cook, David M. Hillman and William H. Gussman, Jr.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
Representing Your Client Before the IRS, 7th Edition
ARTICLE
Representing Your Client Before the IRS, 7th Edition
March, 2018
Read time: 2 min
Partner Andrew Roberson has contributed to Effectively Representing Your Client Before the IRS, now in its 7thEdition, published by the American Bar Association Section of Taxation. This guide is a comprehensive collection of everything a tax professional should know when dealing with the IRS. This two-volume reference provides an in-depth discussion of the law and is replete with realistic examples and hundreds of practice tips to aid tax practitioners during all stages of representation before the IRS in controversy matters, including exam, appeals, Tax Court, refund actions, and collection matters.

Pre-Bankruptcy Restructuring and Credit Restructuring
ARTICLE / OTHER
Pre-Bankruptcy Restructuring and Credit Restructuring
March 2018
Read time: 3 min
Marc Oberhardt authored this bylined article on how a planned new EU directive could introduce a new restructuring procedure in Germany. One of the main future application areas could be the restructuring of loan liabilities.

Intellectual Property Law Year in Review
ARTICLE / REPORT
Intellectual Property Law Year in Review
March 2018
Read time: 2 min
This Special Report compiles key IP cases from 2017, and provides a comprehensive reference guide for in-house counsel seeking to navigate patent, trademark, trade secret and copyright matters in the year ahead.
This past year the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit redefined and continued to define key aspects of intellectual property (IP) law, and the Court is showing no signs of slowing down in 2018. These cases ranged from:
- Issues regarding proper venue to laches defenses
- Arguments related to whether or not the inter partes review proceedings at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) are constitutional
- Attempts to resolve the clash between longstanding trademark registration rules and the First Amendment
Answers to questions regarding the effects of Trump’s presidency and who would be appointed to the Supreme Court and USPTO are becoming clearer as we launch into 2018.
Investment Opportunities and Risks
ARTICLE
Investment Opportunities and Risks
March 1, 2018
Read time: 2 min
Dr. Sabine Konrad and Arne Fuchs on investments in foreign countries and how to reduce the risks and achieving a sufficient level of protection.