Content Type: Article

  • Qualcomm: CFIUS Halts Board of Directors Proxy Fight, Blocks Foreign Company Effort to Acquire a US-Based Semiconductor Company

    Qualcomm: CFIUS Halts Board of Directors Proxy Fight, Blocks Foreign Company Effort to Acquire a US-Based Semiconductor Company

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Qualcomm: CFIUS Halts Board of Directors Proxy Fight, Blocks Foreign Company Effort to Acquire a US-Based Semiconductor Company

    March 29, 2018

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The President issued an executive order on March 12, 2018, blocking Singaporean company Broadcom Ltd. from pursuing its planned takeover of Qualcomm Inc., acting on a recommendation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), which reviews the national security implications of acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign investors. In what appears to be a first, CFIUS intervened just prior to the shareholder meeting of a public company based on a concern that, if elected, certain board candidates would vote to approve a merger with a foreign suitor.

    Qualcomm management effectively used the CFIUS process as a winning defense, as the CFIUS decision decisively halts Broadcom’s five month, $117-billion takeover attempt. At Qualcomm’s behest, CFIUS had earlier launched an investigation into the national security implications of the proposed acquisition, including concern that a foreign acquisition of Qualcomm would hamper U.S. efforts to develop 5G wireless networks and other emerging technologies.

    CFIUS History of Blocking Foreign Acquisitions of US Semiconductor Companies

    Contrary to some press accounts attributing the Qualcomm action to be part of a broader policy turn toward protectionism, the CFIUS decision is consistent with recent Trump and Obama administration enforcement policy that has treated semiconductor technology as critical infrastructure important to national security.

    In the past few years, CFIUS has repeatedly blocked foreign acquisition of U.S. chipmakers. In February, Xcerra Corp., which makes equipment used to test chips during the manufacturing process, called off its acquisition by a Chinese entity amid CFIUS resistance. Last September, CFIUS blocked the sale of Lattice Semiconductor Corp. to a Chinese-backed investor. CFIUS also blocked German company Infineon AG’s attempt to purchase U.S. chip maker Cree’s Wolfspeed division in February 2017, and blocked Philips’ 2016 attempt to sell an 80 percent stake in its California-based Lumileds lighting components division to a consortium that involved several Chinese firms. (The Cree and Philips transactions involved LED (light-emitting diode) technology, which is a type of semiconductor that can be used in defense applications.)

    Qualcomm Management and CFIUS as a Successful Takeover Defense

    Given a consistent track record by CFIUS in the semiconductor industry, the more remarkable aspect of the Qualcomm decision is its timing prior to a board of directors vote and how Qualcomm management used CFIUS as a weapon in thwarting Broadcom’s takeover efforts.

    CFIUS review ordinarily begins once the parties to a merger have signed an agreement to go forward with a transaction. It is highly unusual for CFIUS to intervene at an earlier stage in the process, such as a public company proxy contest. In this case, a contest in which a potential foreign acquirer, in coordination with supportive U.S. private equity investors, is attempting to replace a majority of a recalcitrant target’s board.

    In company statements, Broadcom alleged “that Qualcomm failed to disclose to its own stockholders and to Broadcom that it secretly filed a voluntary unilateral request for CFIUS review on January 29, 2018”[1] and characterized the action as “a blatant, desperate act by Qualcomm to entrench its incumbent board of directors and prevent its own stockholders from voting for Broadcom’s independent director nominees.”[2]

    Prior to CFIUS action, Broadcom appeared to be on course to win all six of the seats it had sought on Qualcomm’s board, giving it a majority. But on March 5, CFIUS ordered the planned March 6 Qualcomm board of directors election to be postponed, and on March 12, the President issued the order that finally killed Broadcom’s acquisition hopes.

    Implications for Potential Acquisitions of US Businesses by Foreign Purchasers

    The Qualcomm action reaffirms the CFIUS view that advanced U.S. semiconductor technology R&D is critical U.S. infrastructure that should remain free of foreign ownership and control. It also highlights that CFIUS review can be a significant hurdle in takeover contests involving foreign buyers, and that even acquisitions by companies domiciled in friendly countries will be carefully reviewed for potential effects on future U.S. technological superiority.

    Accordingly, foreign investors and funds that take positions in potential U.S. acquisition targets need to carefully evaluate the risk of CFIUS action, and may find it helpful to consult with CFIUS experts in formulating their investment strategies.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Gregory L. Kinzelman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.[3]


    [1] Press Release, Broadcom Reiterates Qualcomm Did Not Inform Its Own Stockholders or Broadcom of Its Secret, Voluntary Unilateral Request Filed on Jan. 29, 2018 (March 5, 2018), available here.

    [2] Financial News Release, Broadcom Disappointed Will of Qualcomm Stockholders to be Deferred (March 5, 2018), available here.

    [3] SRZ attorneys have represented U.S. Companies, Chinese and other foreign buyers and third parties in CFIUS investigations. In the interest of disclosure, one of the authors of this Alert represented a party before CFIUS that sought to block the Infineon/Cree acquisition.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Charitable Funds and the Disallowance of Federal Income Tax Deductions for State and Local Taxes

    Charitable Funds and the Disallowance of Federal Income Tax Deductions for State and Local Taxes

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Charitable Funds and the Disallowance of Federal Income Tax Deductions for State and Local Taxes

    March 29, 2018

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The 2017 Federal Tax Reform Act contains a provision that generally limits the annual income tax deduction for state and local income and property taxes to $10,000. In reaction to this, states and localities have been considering strategies to mitigate that effect, including a work-around in which “voluntary” contributions are made to state and local governments and are credited against state and local taxes in hopes that they would be classified as charitable contributions, rather than payments of taxes.

    In depth

    States and localities have been considering strategies for avoiding the effect of the provision in the recently adopted federal tax reform that generally limits the income tax deduction for state and local income and property taxes to $10,000. One of the approaches that has been suggested is for a state or locality to create a separate fund to which individuals could make voluntary contributions to be used to finance state or local government operations. The donor would get a complete or partial credit against income or property taxes for the contribution. The theory is: the payment would be deductible as a charitable contribution under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, even though it would effectively be in lieu of taxes that would otherwise have to be paid. It is well established that a voluntary contribution to a state or local government can be deductible as a charitable contribution. The question is whether a payment to a state or local government that is creditable against a person’s tax liability is a “voluntary” contribution within the meaning of section 170.

    A group of economists and academics have drafted a long paper arguing that the charitable contribution/credit mechanism would get around the disallowance of a deduction for state and local taxes. While their analysis is thoughtful, it is not conclusive.

    The authors rely on an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Chief Counsel Advice from 2011 (CCA 201105010) but that is not precedential and does not necessarily state the IRS’s official position. Indeed, the CCA specifically indicates that the IRS did not contemplate issuing published guidance and it acknowledges that there may be circumstances in which a contribution to a state that is creditable against the state income tax may be viewed as a payment of tax and not as a charitable contribution.

    I don’t think that anyone, including the authors of the paper, would seriously contend that a direct payment to a state’s general fund for its general purposes that reduced the person’s state income tax liability dollar-for-dollar could be viewed as anything other than an advance payment of tax. It would not be “voluntary” in any sense of the word and it is well established that a contribution to a charity must be voluntary to be deductible. Making the credit less than 100 percent would probably not change the result. Bills using this approach have been introduced in California, New Jersey and Illinois.

    The authors of the paper point out that there is a “full deduction rule” under which a charitable contribution is deductible without reduction for state tax benefits that may result from making the contribution. It is well-established that the fact that a voluntary charitable deduction produces tax benefits does not make it less of a voluntary contribution, but that is not the same as saying that a “contribution” to or for the benefit of a government agency that reduces one’s personal income tax liability dollar-for-dollar (or close to that) should be treated as a voluntary contribution. In the latter situation, the taxpayer has paid an amount to finance a state function and would be in exactly the same position as he or she would be in if the amount had been paid as taxes for which the taxpayer would otherwise have been liable.

    Would a payment to a special state fund that was used to finance a specific state function that depended on similar contributions for its funding, be viewed as a payment of tax? If a state fund was established to pay the salaries of state legislators and the state made up the difference if contributions to the fund were not sufficient to pay all of the salaries, this would probably be viewed as a payment of tax. Money is fungible and the state is going to spend the same amount of money on the salaries of its legislators regardless of whether part of the money is provided by contributions from the public and the state makes up any deficit in its obligation to the legislators from its general funds.

    The technique might work if contributions were made to a special fund for a particular purpose and that purpose was financed entirely by such contributions, or with a contribution from state funds that was equal to a percentage of the contributions received from the public, so that the ability of the state to carry out that function would be limited by the extent to which the public contributed to the special fund. That might work, but this is not what people are talking about. They are talking about using “voluntary” contributions to finance functions that the state would perform regardless of whether it received such contributions and where the state would make up any deficit if the contributions were not sufficient to finance the function. For example, if New York State set up a special fund to finance the creation of a public park in the City of Rochester and the creation of the park was financed entirely by contributions and would not happen if the contributions to the fund were insufficient to pay for the project, contributions to the fund might be viewed as charitable contributions. But if New York State decided to create the park and would make up any deficit in the funds needed to do so if voluntary contributions were insufficient to pay for the project, this would be questionable.

    It is true that many programs designed to support private schools and other non-governmental activities that credit contributions against state income tax have received non-precedential IRS approval in private letter rulings, but these situations are different from those in which the “contributions” are made to support essential government functions. This is not the same thing as a program designed to pay the salaries of teachers in the public schools. I have not surveyed all of the programs that have received favorable private letter rulings from the Internal Revenue Service but I suspect that most, and, perhaps, all of them are similar in that they are not used to provide funding for programs that the states would fund in full absent private support. Moreover, the IRS rulings were not issued in the context of a systematic attack by a number of states against a clearly prescribed Congressional policy. The IRS might well take a different view in 2018.

    The CCA, as indicated above, is not precedential and it does not discuss the facts presented in any detail. Revenue Ruling 79-315, also cited in the paper, involved an income tax rebate that was not paid in consideration for contributions or any other activity. It simply represented a state tax reduction.

    What if contributions were made to a separate 501(c)(3) organization that was required to turn the money over to the state or local government (or that it was understood by all to be expected to do that)? It is likely that the organization would be treated as a conduit, which would be ignored, or as an agent of the state or local government.

    There is a real question as to whether the IRS would endorse the contribution credit concept. The few authorities that are out there do not involve a systematic effort by many states to do an end run around a federal policy that is reflected in an unambiguous statute. One can sympathize with the efforts that the states are making to mitigate the effects of the federal disallowance of SALT deductions and, in fact, I have been working with the tax authorities in New York State, New York City and New Jersey on a pro bono basis toward that end. In addition, I am chairing an American Bar Association Tax Section task force that will be providing guidance to state revenue departments and legislatures about responses to the federal tax reform. But the law is what it is and any attempt to mitigate its effects must pass muster under established principles of the common law of taxation, including the well-accepted doctrine that the substance of an arrangement prevails over its form.

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  • SEC Previews Its Investment Adviser Agenda

    ARTICLE

    SEC Previews Its Investment Adviser Agenda

    March 27, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Partner Paul Helms authored this article on the recently announced priorities for the Securities & Exchange Commission in the coming year. He highlights that an intensified focus on the Examination Program can directly impact on enforcement. Nonetheless, “with proper attention to these priorities, investment advisers and companies can avoid the most significant consequence of an SEC exam—a referral to the Enforcement Division.”

    In depth
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    Paul M.G. Helms

    Partner

    Chicago, Washington, DC

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  • IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 3

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 3

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 3

    March 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Rapidly Shifting Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies | Market Participants: Stay Tuned

    Rapidly Shifting Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies | Market Participants: Stay Tuned

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Rapidly Shifting Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies | Market Participants: Stay Tuned

    March 26, 2018

    Read time: 17 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As US regulators have been active in terms of virtual currency regulation, there are three important updates to which attention should be paid. The New York State DFS guidance, the FinCEN letter to Senator Wyden and the recent ruling from the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York all contribute to a developing framework within which virtual currency will operate.

    In depth

    US regulators have been busy of late in virtual currency regulation. We focus on three important virtual currency-related regulatory updates:

    • On February 7, 2018, New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) issued guidance (Guidance) discussing the reporting requirements for all “virtual currency business entities that are either licensed under 23 NYCRR Part 200 (Bitlicense) or chartered as a limited purpose trust company under the New York Banking Law (collectively, “VC Entities”).
    • On February 13, 2018, (publicly released on March 6, 2018) the United States Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) authored a letter (FinCEN Letter) to Senator Ron Wyden, a Ranking Member of the Committee on Finance, which provides that “generally, under existing regulations and interpretations, a developer that sells convertible virtual currency, including in the form of [an] ICO (initial coin offering) [of] coins or tokens, in exchange for another type of value that substitutes for currency, is a money transmitter” and “an exchange that sells ICO coins or tokens, or exchanges them for other virtual currency, fiat currency, or other value that substitutes for currency, would typically also be a money transmitter.”
    • On March 6, 2018, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that “virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a commodity” but left the door open for other regulatory bodies to regulate virtual currency concurrently. CFTC v. McDonnell, et al., No. 18-cv-361, ECF No. 29, at 24 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018).

    Market participants nevertheless continue to seek clarity in determining which regulator(s) and regulatory regime(s) may apply to them.

    DFS Guidance

    DFS issued Guidance requiring expeditious reporting for VC Entities. The Guidance is focused on fraud detection and prevention and requires all VC Entities to “implement measures designed to effectively detect, prevent and respond to fraud, attempted fraud and similar wrongdoing.” The Guidance requires immediate reporting upon “discovery of any wrongdoing” and follow-up reports. The Guidance also states that it expects such follow-up reports to be submitted in 48 hours in most cases.

    While it is not clear how the Guidance will be enforced, it is likely that it will increase the reporting burden on the VC Entities subject to DFS jurisdiction. Any such reporting would be in addition to reports, such as suspicious activity reports, required by other regulators. We encourage VC Entities to have a coordinated internal process.

    FinCEN Letter

    The FinCEN Letter discusses money transmitter issues relating to virtual currency generally, reminding market participants of their obligations if they meet the definition of money services business. Of particular note was the FinCEN Letter’s reference to potential obligations of ICO projects in the event the project engages in money transmission.

    Subject to various exceptions, if a person or entity engages in a “money transmission” it must be a licensed “money transmitter” or “money service business” on both the federal and state levels. Under federal law, “[t]he statute defines ‘money transmitting’ to include ‘transferring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means.’” United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting 18 USC § 1960(b)); see also 31 CFR 100.100(ff)(5) (“The term ‘money transmission services’ means the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means.”). Generally speaking, if a person or entity is in the business of moving money from one place to another, exchanging one sort of currency for another, or issuing a currency while maintaining the ability to withdraw such currency from circulation, then that person or entity likely meets the definition and should register with FinCEN. See Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (March 18, 2013).

    There are several significant exceptions to the money transmitter licensing requirements, such that if a person or entity fits one of the exceptions, it would not need to be licensed, even though it otherwise meets the definition of money transmitter. See 31 CFR 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii); See also Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations, FIN-2014-R001 (Jan. 30, 2014).

    The FinCEN Letter appears to focus specifically on Initial Coin Offerings. In the FinCEN Letter, FinCEN states that it is “working closely with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to clarify and enforce the [anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism] obligations of businesses engaged in Initial Coin Offering (ICO) activities that implicate the regulatory authorities of these agencies.” The SEC and CFTC previously indicated that those agencies were working in tandem to regulate ICOs and had a meeting on February 6, 2018, to discuss such regulation. See Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, (Feb. 6, 2018); see also US Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017); US Commodities Futures Trading Commission, A CFTC Primer on Virtual Currencies (Oct. 17, 2017).

    The FinCEN Letter further complicates the regulatory landscape for ICOs in that it appears to indicate that most companies engaging in ICOs may be engaged in money transmission:

    Generally, under existing regulations and interpretations, a developer that sells convertible virtual currency, including in the form of ICO coins or tokens, in exchange for another type of value that substitutes for currency is a money transmitter and must comply with AML/CFT requirements that apply to this type of [money service business]. An exchange that sells ICO coins or tokens, or exchanges them for virtual currency, fiat currency, or other value that substitutes for currency, would typically also be a money transmitter.

    The FinCEN Letter, however, does reference FinCEN’s prior guidance on the subject, so presumably that guidance, including relevant exceptions, remains intact.

    There is no discussion in the FinCEN Letter of any of the exceptions, despite the fact that prior FinCEN Guidances specifically discussed such exceptions and determined that such exceptions applied to certain virtual currency companies. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-2014-R012, Request for Administrative Ruling on the Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to a Virtual Currency Payment System, at 4 (Oct. 27, 2014); Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FIN-2014-R012, Request for Administrative Ruling on the Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to a Virtual Currency Payment System (Oct. 27, 2014); Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Mining Operations, FIN-2014-R001 (Jan. 30, 2014); Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Virtual Currency Software Development and Certain Investment Activity, FIN-2014-R002 (Jan. 30, 2014).

    Nevertheless, entities engaging in ICOs should be aware that FinCEN has taken the position “generally” that such activity “typically” constitutes money transmission.

    CFTC v. McDonnell, et al.

    The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that virtual currency is a “commodity” subject to the CFTC’s regulatory authority. See CFTC v. McDonnell, et al., No. 18-cv-361, ECF No. 29, at 24 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018).

    The CFTC sued defendant Patrick McDonnell for his role in a company called Coin Drop Markets, which the CFTC claims was operating a “deceptive and fraudulent virtual currency scheme . . . for purported trading advice” and “for virtual currency purchases and trading . . . and simply misappropriated investor funds.” Id. at 3. The defendant argued that the CFTC does not have standing because virtual currency is not a commodity and the CFTC does not have jurisdiction over fraud that does not directly involve the sale of future or derivatives contracts. The court soundly rejected both arguments. The court held that “a ‘commodity’ encompasses virtual currency both in economic function and in the language of the statute.” Id. at 4 (citing 7 USC § 1(a)(9)). And that “CFTC’s broad authority extends to fraud or manipulation in derivatives markets and underlying spot markets.” Id. at 4 (citing 7 USC § 9(1)).

    The court went through a detailed description of the history of virtual currency and blockchain. Id. at 4-7. It described what the court referred to as “increased fraud and criminal activity” in connection with virtual currency and referenced various criminal cases and reports of hacking and theft. Id. at 8-9.

    There was also a discussion of the often overlapping regulations currently in place concerning virtual currency companies. The court notes that “Congress has yet to authorize a system to regulate virtual currency.” Id. at 9. “The CFTC, and other agencies, claim concurrent regulatory power over virtual currency in certain settings, but concede their jurisdiction is incomplete.” Id. Interestingly, the court sets forth nine options concerning which regulatory body should be regulating virtual currency: (1) none; (2) Department of Justice (DOJ); (3) CFTC; (4) SEC; (5); FinCEN; (6) IRS; (7) private exchanges; (8) state regulators; and (9) a combination of any of the above. Id. at 10-12.

    Ultimately, the court determined that “virtual currencies can be regulated by CFTC as a commodity” and that it “fall[s] well-within the common definition of ‘commodity’ as well as the CEA’s definition of ‘commodities.’” Id. at 24. However, the court specifically stated that the CFTC does not have exclusive jurisdiction. It stated that “the jurisdictional authority of CFTC to regulate virtual currencies as commodities does not preclude other agencies from exercising their regulatory power when virtual currencies function differently than derivative commodities.” Id. at 24. As such, the decision does not choose amongst the nine agencies it listed.

    Conclusion

    Navigating virtual currency regulation in the United States is complex. Without any controlling guidance as to which regulation or regulator is most applicable to any given business, it is increasingly difficult for market participants to comply. As Judge Weinstein writes: “until Congress clarifies the matter, the CFTC has concurrent authority, along with other state and federal administrative agencies, and civil and criminal courts, over dealings in virtual currency.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). We have argued that the context in which blockchain technology is implemented should dictate which regulation applies. Market participants must tread carefully and stay abreast of regulatory news as the regulatory environment continues to shift.

    Authors

    David L. Taub

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Warning: Discovery Misconduct Can Cost More Than Just Your Case

    ARTICLE

    Warning: Discovery Misconduct Can Cost More Than Just Your Case

    March 23, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Matthew Girgenti wrote this bylined article on the Second Circuit ruling in Klipsch Group Inc v ePRO E-Commerce Ltd, which upheld discovery sanctions imposed by the district court against plaintiff ePRO. “ePRO’ s conduct not only resulted in needless additional discovery and litigation, but damaged its credibility with the court and ultimately cost the company far more than it stood to lose in the underlying litigation,” Mr. Girgenti summarized.

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  • Mergers and Acquisitions of Privately Held Companies: Analysis, Forms, and Agreements

    Mergers and Acquisitions of Privately Held Companies: Analysis, Forms, and Agreements

    ARTICLE

    Mergers and Acquisitions of Privately Held Companies: Analysis, Forms, and Agreements

    March 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    David Lipkin co-authored, with Richard Harroch and Richard Smith, a new book about the legal and business issues associated with acquisitions of privately held companies. The treatise, published by Bloomberg BNA, features commentary and analysis as well as examples of the forms and agreements involved in a successful M&A transaction.

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    Authors

    David A. Lipkin

    Counsel

    Silicon Valley

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  • Protect Yourself Against IRS Audit Complacency Disease

    ARTICLE

    Protect Yourself Against IRS Audit Complacency Disease

    March 22, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Robin Greenhouse and Kevin Spencer wrote this bylined article on how the new tax law increases the risk of IRS audits because “tax professionals are scratching their heads over what the law means and how to implement it. As the Treasury and the IRS scramble to release much needed guidance, the environment is ripe for creative interpretations and inventive strategies,” particularly with regard to accelerated expenses and forced repatriation of foreign earnings.

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  • Protect Yourself Against IRS Audit Complacency Disease

    ARTICLE

    Protect Yourself Against IRS Audit Complacency Disease

    March 22, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Robin Greenhouse and Kevin Spencer wrote this bylined article on how the new tax law increases the risk of IRS audits because “tax professionals are scratching their heads over what the law means and how to implement it. As the Treasury and the IRS scramble to release much needed guidance, the environment is ripe for creative interpretations and inventive strategies,” particularly with regard to accelerated expenses and forced repatriation of foreign earnings.

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  • McDermott Partner Recounts His Firsts as a Sikh Lawyer and the Wave of Diversity in the Profession

    ARTICLE

    McDermott Partner Recounts His Firsts as a Sikh Lawyer and the Wave of Diversity in the Profession

    March 21, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Amandeep Sidhu wrote this bylined article reviewing his career growth. When Mr. Sidhu became a McDermott partner in 2013 he was the first turbaned Sikh ever to achieve that recognition at an AmLaw 100 firm, and he wrote that “getting to this level has not been easy and did not happen by chance. It’s taken a personal commitment and willingness to work twice as hard as my nondiverse peers, mentors to guide me and sponsors who put their credibility on the line to support my success.”

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