Content Type: Article

  • US Trade Representative Publishes List of Chinese Products Subject to Retaliatory Tariffs

    US Trade Representative Publishes List of Chinese Products Subject to Retaliatory Tariffs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Trade Representative Publishes List of Chinese Products Subject to Retaliatory Tariffs

    April 6, 2018

    Read time: 17 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) published a list of 1,300 Chinese products, valued at $50 billion, on which it intends to impose an additional 25 percent tariff in retaliation for the “harm to the US economy” resulting from certain Chinese industrial policies. USTR also announced a public comment period to enable interested parties to request that products be removed from the list. In response to this April 3 announcement, China announced its own retaliatory import tariffs on 106 US products.

     

    In depth

    On April 3, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) published a list of 1,300 Chinese products, valued at $50 billion, on which it intends to impose a 25 percent tariff on top of any existing US tariff in retaliation for the “harm to the US economy” resulting from certain Chinese industrial policies. The full US retaliation list includes products from the chapters listed in Annex I below.

    In conjunction with its list, USTR announced a public comment period to enable interested parties to request that products be removed from, or added to, the list. Comments must be filed by May 11, 2018. The agency will also hold a public hearing on May 15, 2018, for parties wishing to comment further on the list. USTR has not set a specific deadline for implementing the new tariffs, but said it will provide “final options” to President Trump after the comment and hearing process conclude.

    In addition to the proposed retaliatory tariffs, President Trump has also directed the Secretary of the Treasury to develop new restrictions on inbound Chinese investments aimed at preventing Chinese-controlled companies and funds from acquiring US firms with sensitive technologies. The US Treasury Department has until May 21, 2018, to develop these restrictions, which will be in addition to the restrictions already imposed by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

    In response to the administration’s April 3 announcement, China announced its own retaliatory import tariffs on 106 US products. Its retaliation products, listed below in Annex II, will face 25 percent tariffs should the Trump administration move forward with its announced tariffs.

    After China issued its retaliatory tariff list, President Trump directed USTR on April 5 to assemble an additional $100 billion worth of retaliatory tariffs against Chinese goods on the grounds that China had unfairly retaliated against American farmers and manufacturers rather than addressing its own “misconduct.” The specific additional tariffs, once announced by USTR, will be subject to a review and public comment period similar to the one now underway for USTR’s initial $50 billion list.

    McDermott is actively engaged in this issue and can assist Firm clients and contacts affected by the announcement, including with the preparation of comments and other advocacy efforts to influence products on the list. Please contact any of the authors to seek assistance or learn more.

    Annex I

    HTS Chapters Represented on the USTR Retaliatory List*

     

    HTS Chapter

    Product

    28

    Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes

    29

    Organic chemicals

    30

    Pharmaceutical products

    38

    Miscellaneous chemical products

    40

    Rubber and articles thereof

    72

    Iron and steel

    73

    Articles of iron or steel

    76

    Aluminum and articles thereof

    83

    Miscellaneous articles of base metal

    84

    Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof

    85

    Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles

    86

    Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signaling equipment of all kinds

    87

    Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof

    88

    Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof

    89

    Ships, boats and floating structures

    90

    Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments, and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof

    91

    Clocks and watches and parts thereof

    93

    Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof

    94

    Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated sign illuminated nameplates and the like; prefabricated buildings

     

    * Not all products contained in each chapter are represented.  View the complete list

    Annex II

    Unofficial Translation of China’s Retaliation List

     

    No.

    Product

    HTS Code

    1.

    Yellow soybean

    12019010

    2.

    Black soybean

    12019020

    3.

    Corn

    10059000

    4.

    Cornflour

    11022000

    5.

    Uncombed cotton

    52010000

    6.

    Cotton linters

    14042000

    7.

    Sorghum

    10079000

    8.

    Brewing or distilling dregs and waste

    23033000

    9.

    Other durum wheat

    10011900

    10.

    Other wheat and mixed wheat

    10019900

    11.

    Whole and half head fresh and cold beef

    02011000

    12.

    Fresh and cold beef with bones

    02012000

    13.

    Fresh and cold boneless beef

    02013000

    14.

    Frozen beef with bones

    02021000

    15.

    Frozen boneless beef

    02022000

    16.

    Frozen boneless meat

    02023000

    17.

    Other frozen beef chops

    02062900

    18.

    Dried cranberries

    20089300

    19.

    Frozen orange juice

    20091100

    20.

    Non-frozen orange juice

    20091200

    21.

    Whiskies

    22083000

    22.

    Unstemmed flue-cured tobacco

    24011010

    23.

    Other unstemmed tobacco

    24011090

    24.

    Flue-cured tobacco partially or totally removed

    24012010

    25.

    Partially or totally deterred tobacco stems

    24012090

    26.

    Tobacco waste

    24013000

    27.

    Tobacco cigars

    24021000

    28.

    Tobacco cigarettes

    24022000

    29.

    Cigars and cigarettes, tobacco substitutes

    24029000

    30.

    Hookah tobacco

    24031100

    31.

    Other tobacco for smoking

    24031900

    32.

    Reconstituted tobacco

    24039100

    33.

    Other tobacco and tobacco substitute products

    24039900

    34.

    SUVs with discharge capacity of 2.5L to 3L

    87032362

    35.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2500ml, but not exceeding 3000ml for SUVs (4 wheel drive)

    87034052

    36.

    Vehicles with discharge capacity of 1.5L to 2L

    87032342

    37.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 1000ml, but not exceeding 1500ml for SUVs (4 wheel drive)

    87034032

    38.

    Passenger cars with discharge capacity 1.5L to 2L, 9 seats or less

    87032343

    39.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 1000ml, but not exceeding 1500ml for 9 passenger cars and below

    87034033

    40.

    Passenger cars with discharge capacity of 3L to 4L, 9 seats or less

    87032413

    41.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 3000ml, but not exceeding 4000ml for 9 passenger cars and below

    87034063

    42.

    Off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of 2L to 2.5L

    87032352

    43.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2000ml, but not exceeding 2500ml for off-road vehicles

    87034042

    44.

    Passenger cars with discharge capacity of 2L to 2.5L, 9 seats or less

    87032353

    45.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2000ml, but not exceeding 2500ml for 9 passenger cars and below

    87034043

    46.

    Off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of 3L to 4L

    87032412

    47.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 3000ml, but not exceeding 4000ml for off-road vehicles

    87034062

    48.

    Diesel-powered off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of 2.5L to 3L

    87033312

    49.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2500ml, but not exceeding 3000ml for diesel-powered off-road vehicles

    87035052

    50.

    Passenger cars with discharge capacity of 2.5L to 3L, 9 seats or less

    87032363

    51.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement exceeding 2500ml, but not exceeding 3000ml for 9 passenger cars and below

    87034053

    52.

    Off-road vehicles with discharge capacity of less than 4L

    87032422

    53.

    Other vehicles equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source. Cylinder capacity displacement not exceeding 4000ml for off-road vehicles

    87034072

    54.

    Other vehicles which are equipped with an ignited reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor and can be charged by plugging in an external power source

    87034090

    55.

    Other vehicles that are equipped with a compression ignition type internal combustion engine (diesel or semi-diesel) and a drive motor, other than vehicles that can be charged by plugging in an external power source

    87035090

    56.

    Other vehicles which are equipped with an ignition reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor and can be charged by plugging in an external power source

    87036000

    57.

    Other vehicles that are equipped with a compression-ignition reciprocating piston internal combustion engine and a drive motor that can be charged by plugging in an external power source

    87037000

    58.

    Other vehicles that only drive the motor

    87038000

    59.

    Other vehicles

    87039000

    60.

    Other gasoline trucks of less than 5 tons

    87043100

    61.

    Transmissions and parts for motor vehicles not classified

    87084099

    62.

    Liquefied Propane

    27111200

    63.

    Primary Shaped Polycarbonate

    39074000

    64.

    Supported catalysts with noble metals and their compounds as actives

    38151200

    65.

    Diagnostic or experimental reagents attached to backings, except for goods of tariff lines 32.02, 32.06

    38220010

    66.

    Chemical products and preparations for the chemical industry and related industries, not elsewhere specified

    38249999

    67.

    Products containing PFOS and its salts, perfluorooctanyl sulfonamide or perfluorooctane sulfonyl chloride in note 3 of this chapter

    38248700

    68.

    Items listed in note 3 of this chapter containing four, five, six, seven or octabromodiphenyl ethers

    38248800

    69.

    Contains 1,2,3,4,5,6-HCH (6,6,6) (ISO), including lindane (ISO, INN)

    38248500

    70.

    Primarily made of dimethyl (5-ethyl-2-methyl-2oxo-1,3,2-dioxaphosphorin-5-yl)methylphosphonate and double [(5-b Mixtures and products of 2-methyl-2-oxo-1,3,2-dioxaphosphorin-5-yl)methyl] methylphosphonate (FRC-1)

    38249100

    71.

    Containing pentachlorobenzene (ISO) or hexachlorobenzene (ISO)

    38248600

    72.

    Containing aldrin (ISO), toxaphene (ISO), chlordane (ISO), chlordecone (ISO), DDT (ISO) [Diptrix (INN), 1,1,1-trichloro-2 ,2-Bis(4-chlorophenyl)ethane], Dieldrin (ISO, INN), Endosulfan (ISO), Endrin (ISO), Heptachlor (ISO) or Mirex (ISO).

    38248400

    73.

    Other carrier catalysts

    38151900

    74.

    Other polyesters

    39079999

    75.

    Reaction initiators, accelerators not elsewhere specified

    38159000

    76.

    Polyethylene with a primary shape specific gravity of less than 0.94

    39011000

    77.

    Acrylonitrile

    29261000

    78.

    Lubricants (without petroleum or oil extracted from bituminous minerals)

    34039900

    79.

    Diagnostic or experimental formulation reagents, whether or not attached to backings, other than those of heading 32.02, 32.06

    38220090

    80.

    Lubricant additives for oils not containing petroleum or extracted from bituminous minerals

    38112900

    81.

    Primary Shaped Epoxy Resin

    39073000

    82.

    Polyethylene Terephthalate Plate Film Foil Strips

    39206200

    83.

    Other self-adhesive plastic plates, sheets, films and other materials

    39199090

    84.

    Other plastic non-foam plastic sheets

    39209990

    85.

    Other plastic products

    39269090

    86.

    Other primary vinyl polymers

    39019090

    87.

    Other ethylene-α-olefin copolymers, specific gravity less than 0.94

    39014090

    88.

    Other primary shapes of acrylic polymers

    39069090

    89.

    Other primary shapes of pure polyvinyl chloride

    39041090

    90.

    Polysiloxane in primary shape

    39100000

    91.

    Other primary polysulphides, polysulfones and other tariff numbers as set forth in note 3 to chapter 39 are not listed.

    39119000

    92.

    Plastic plates, sheets, films, foils and strips, not elsewhere specified

    39219090

    93.

    1,2-Dichloroethane (ISO)

    29031500

    94.

    Halogenated butyl rubber sheets, strips

    40023990

    95.

    Other heterocyclic compounds

    29349990

    96.

    Adhesives based on other rubber or plastics

    35069190

    97.

    Polyamide-6,6 slices

    39081011

    98.

    Other primary-shaped polyethers

    39072090

    99.

    Primary Shaped, Unplasticized Cellulose Acetate

    39121100

    100.

    Aromatic polyamides and their copolymers

    39089010

    101.

    Semi-aromatic polyamides and their copolymers

    39089020

    102.

    Other polyamides of primary shape

    39089090

    103.

    Other vinyl polymer plates, sheets, strips

    39201090

    104.

    Non-ionic organic surfactants

    34021300

    105.

    Lubricants (containing oil or oil extracted from bituminous minerals and less than 70% by weight)

    34031900

    106.

    Aircraft and other aircraft with an empty weight of more than 15,000kg but not exceeding 45,000kg

    88024010

    Authors

    Carolyn B. Gleason

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Hi Ho Silver: Texas Supreme Court Finds Patent Agent Communications Protected

    ARTICLE

    Hi Ho Silver: Texas Supreme Court Finds Patent Agent Communications Protected

    April 5, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    David Mlaver wrote this bylined article on the Texas Supreme Court’s Silver ruling, which held that a client’s communications with a registered patent agent regarding legal services fall within Texas attorney-client privilege (In re Silver). “Although the logic of Silver applies broadly, lawyers should analyze the rules that pertain to their particular venue before making assertions of privilege,” Mr. Mlaver wrote.

    In depth
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  • New BDC Opportunities: How the Passage of the Small Business Credit Availability Act Will Benefit Both New and Existing Business Development Companies

    New BDC Opportunities: How the Passage of the Small Business Credit Availability Act Will Benefit Both New and Existing Business Development Companies

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New BDC Opportunities: How the Passage of the Small Business Credit Availability Act Will Benefit Both New and Existing Business Development Companies

    April 4, 2018

    Read time: 15 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    After years of intense regulatory and legislative efforts, the business development company (“BDC”) industry earned a potentially significant win in the form of the Small Business Credit Availability Act (“SBCAA”), which was included as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (“Omnibus Spending Bill”) passed by Congress on March 23, 2018. The SBCAA enacts a number of meaningful legislative reforms with respect to BDCs — closed-end investment companies regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”), that generally invest in the debt, and to a lesser extent equity, of primarily U.S.-based, nonpublic middle-market issuers.

    Specifically, the SBCAA impacts BDCs in two fundamental ways. First, it significantly increases the ability of BDCs to utilize leverage to acquire investments by modifying the asset coverage requirements applicable to BDCs under the 1940 Act (“Leverage Reform Provisions”). Second, it directs the SEC to implement regulations enabling BDCs to follow the more lenient reporting requirements and communications restrictions under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) applicable to traditional public operating companies, including with respect to incorporation by reference and the use of free writing prospectuses (collectively, “Securities Offering Reform Provisions”).

    These changes will likely have a significant impact on BDCs going forward, though the impact may differ materially between existing publicly traded BDCs and newly formed non-traded BDC structures, including the increasingly popular “private” BDC structure, which mimics a traditional private credit fund capital call model but utilizes a 1940 Act-regulated BDC vehicle. In particular, as a result of certain conditions that must be met under the Leverage Reform Provisions, existing BDCs — particularly publicly traded ones — will likely face some headwinds in taking advantage of the looser leverage limits under the 1940 Act. However, newly formed BDCs, as well as private BDCs that may only have a relatively small number of stockholders, may more easily meet the requirements to permit a reduction in the required asset coverage ratio under the 1940 Act. In contrast, many of the most useful sections of the Securities Offering Reform Provisions, including with respect to incorporation by reference and automatic effectiveness of shelf registration statements, will only apply to publicly traded BDCs.

    Overview of the Leverage Reform Provisions

    Under the 1940 Act, BDCs must generally meet certain levels of asset coverage with respect to their outstanding “senior securities,” which typically consist of outstanding borrowings under credit facilities and other debt instruments, including publicly and privately offered notes. “Asset coverage,” as defined under the 1940 Act, generally refers to the ratio of a BDC’s total assets compared to its aggregate amount of outstanding senior securities.[1] Prior to the passage of the SBCAA, the 1940 Act required that a BDC have asset coverage of at least 200 percent, representing approximately a 1-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio, at the time of any borrowings or other issuances of senior securities.[2] Under the Leverage Reform Provisions of the SBCAA, BDCs that meet certain specified conditions may elect to decrease their effective asset coverage requirement to 150 percent, representing approximately a 2-to-1 debt-to-equity ratio, which substantially increases their ability to deploy leverage to acquire investments.[3] A BDC may elect to be subject to the lower asset coverage requirement in two ways.

    First, the BDC can seek the approval of its board of directors, including a majority of its directors who are not “interested persons” of such BDC, as such term is defined under the 1940 Act (i.e., the BDC’s independent directors), in order to opt in to the lower asset coverage requirement; provided that:

    • The lower asset coverage ratio will not take effect until one year following receipt of such board approval; and
    • If the BDC does not list its shares on a national securities exchange, it must offer to repurchase all of its then-outstanding shares from the holders thereof as of such approval date, with a maximum of 25 percent of such outstanding shares subject to repurchase therefrom in each of the following four quarters.

    Second, the BDC can seek the approval of a majority of the votes cast by its stockholders at an annual or special meeting thereof at which a quorum is present in order to opt in to the lower asset coverage requirement. Notably, if a BDC receives the requisite stockholder approval, the lower asset coverage ratio may take effect immediately following the date of such approval.

    In either case, a BDC must file a current report on Form 8-K within five business days of such approval indicating the receipt of such approval and the effective date of the applicability of the lower asset coverage ratio to the BDC. Thereafter, a notice must be included on such BDC’s website, as well as in its periodic filings with the SEC, indicating:

    • That it has elected to be subject to the reduced asset coverage requirements; and
    • The aggregate value of senior securities issued by such BDC and the asset coverage ratio as of the date of such BDC’s most recent financial statements.

    To the extent a BDC lists its shares on a national securities exchange, it must also include disclosures in its future periodic filings reasonably designed to ensure that stockholders are informed of:

    • The amount of indebtedness and asset coverage ratio of such BDC, determined as of the date of financial statements dated as of or most recently prior to such periodic filing; and
    • The principal risk factors associated with such indebtedness.

    Overview of the Securities Offering Reform Provisions

    Federal securities laws impose various filing and disclosure requirements on public operating companies in connection with public offerings, as well as restrictions on the timing and nature of communications with stockholders or prospective investors. Over the years, however, the SEC has relaxed those requirements and restrictions for certain public operating company issuers, most notably with respect to incorporation by reference in Securities Act filings, as well as with respect to the use of free writing prospectuses in connection with public offerings. Up until now, however, BDCs were unable to avail themselves of the relaxed requirements and restrictions applicable to public operating companies.

    The Securities Offering Reform Provisions set forth in the SBCAA seek to change this by requiring that the SEC — within a year from the passage of the SBCAA — implement regulatory changes designed to provide BDCs with access to the same relaxed requirements and restrictions that are available to public operating companies currently under federal securities laws.[4] Among other things, the Securities Offering Reform Provisions seek to modify a number of existing Securities Act exemptions relating to both oral and written communications to either specifically include BDCs among eligible issuers or, alternately, remove them from the list of excluded issuers in such rules. As a result, BDCs will have essentially the same flexibility as public operating companies in communicating with prospective investors using free writing prospectuses and other means without violating the Securities Act. For example, BDCs will now have access to:

    • Rules 168 and 169 under the Securities Act, which allow reporting and non-reporting operating company issuers, respectively, to disseminate certain factual information about the company and make certain forward-looking statements, subject to certain conditions;
    • Rule 163A under the Securities Act, which permits public operating companies to make certain communications before filing a registration statement, as long as they are made more than 30 days prior to the filing of a registration statement and certain other conditions are met;
    • Rule 163 under the Securities Act, which allows certain large public operating companies, known as well-known seasoned issuers (“WKSIs”), to make certain unrestricted offers prior to filing a formal registration statement, through the use of free writing prospectuses, as long as a certain conditions are met; and
    • Rule 164 under the Securities Act, which provides a safe harbor for the use of free writing prospectuses.

    More importantly for many publicly traded BDCs, the Securities Offering Reform Provisions require that the SEC implement changes to the registration process for BDCs under the Securities Act to permit BDCs to utilize a process similar to that utilized by exchange-listed public operating companies under Forms S-3 and F-3. Specifically, while publicly traded BDCs have historically been permitted to utilize a “shelf” registration process for follow-on equity offerings under existing SEC staff guidance, the Securities Offering Reform Provisions seek to codify that ability, while also enabling publicly traded BDCs with sufficient market capitalization to take full advantage of the “short form” registration process available to certain public operating companies that file shelf registration statements using Forms S-3 and F-3. In particular, BDCs that meet the Form S-3 eligibility requirements should have the ability, at a minimum, to incorporate by reference previously filed Exchange Act reports in lieu of including duplicative disclosure in their shelf registration statements filed on Form N-2. In addition, while the applicable provision of the SBCAA fails to specifically call for the ability to forward-incorporate by reference future Exchange Act filings as permitted under Forms S-3 and F-3, the intent of the language in the SBCAA appears to clearly contemplate applying forward-incorporation by reference to BDCs as well.[5] As a result, once implemented by the SEC, publicly traded BDCs should hopefully enjoy the same ability to incorporate disclosure from both prior — and future — periodic reports in satisfaction of their Securities Act disclosure obligations in connection with public offerings, significantly streamlining the process for conducting follow-on public debt and equity offerings. The Securities Offering Reform Provisions also provide for BDCs that meet the WKSI requirements to file registration statements that become effective automatically — without SEC staff review.

    In addition, Congress has specifically instructed the SEC to grant BDCs other rights permitted to those public operating companies filing registration statements on Form S-3, namely:

    • Restricting the SEC from asking such companies for certain broad reports about their business, under Rule 418;
    • Granting BDCs, which would otherwise be allowed to file on Form S-3, the same latitude as public operating companies in connection with certain proxy statement filings;
    • Mitigating certain of the adverse effects of not complying with Regulation FD, which requires public companies to disclose information when such information is released selectively; and
    • Precluding BDCs from making “undertakings” on Form N-2 that are more restrictive than those which filers on Form S-3 are required to make.

    Potential Impact of the BDC Leverage and Securities Offering Reforms

    The passage of the SBCAA will undoubtedly have lasting impacts on both existing and future BDCs, though the nature, timing and extent of the actual impact on any particular BDC will vary widely depending on a number of factors, including:

    • Whether the BDC has been formed and currently has third-party investors;
    • Whether the BDC is publicly traded, non-traded or operates in a “private” BDC structure; and
    • The nature and specific wording of any leverage restrictions or covenants included in the BDC’s outstanding leverage facilities and debt instruments, if any.

    For example, depending on these factors, certain BDCs that trade publicly or have more restrictive existing leverage covenants may need significant time and effort to avail themselves of the benefits of increased leverage available under the Leverage Reform Provisions of the SBCAA. For example, in addition to seeking approval to opt in to the new more flexible leverage requirements, existing BDCs may need to have detailed discussions with existing lenders, as well as with rating agencies for those BDCs with rated debt.

    Newly formed BDCs, however, will likely opt in to the lower asset coverage ratio requirement and negotiate corresponding leverage covenants from day one, absent market pressure not to do so. In short, the more immediate impact of the Leverage Reform Provisions may be seen in newly formed BDCs, including new “private” BDCs, which will likely seek to take full advantage of the additional leverage afforded to them. The availability of increased leverage may also lead to further growth in BDCs — including private BDCs — with a focus on lower-yielding liquid credit instruments, as opposed to directly originated credit instruments that BDCs have historically targeted. Existing BDCs may also adopt liquid credit strategies as part of their overall investment portfolio, given the ability to apply higher leverage on their portfolio as a whole.

    In addition, publicly traded BDCs will have full access to the benefits set forth in the Securities Offering Reform Provisions once implemented by the SEC, as opposed to non-traded or “private” BDCs, which will continue to lack the public market capitalization necessary to satisfy Form S-3 eligibility requirements. Notably, the ability to file automatically effective shelf registration statements for BDCs that qualify as WKSIs, coupled with the availability of incorporation by reference from Exchange Act reports, will likely significantly reduce the burden associated with the shelf registration process for the larger publicly traded BDCs. While those continued restrictions will likely do little to stop the growth of private BDCs — which are offered privately rather than through public offerings — they may continue to highlight the trend away from publicly offered “non-traded” BDCs towards more flexible 1940 Act offering structures, such as interval funds.

    What Should BDCs Do Now?

    First, all existing BDCs should evaluate their current public disclosure, including in any existing registration statements on Form N-2 and their most recent Exchange Act filings, for any required changes reflecting the impact — or potential impact — of the implementation of the SBCAA. Such areas may include any discussion of regulatory requirements under the 1940 Act, the BDC’s use of leverage or risk factors relating to either. In particular, BDCs contemplating seeking approval to utilize the higher level of leverage afforded under the Leverage Reform Provisions should consider updates to applicable risk factor disclosure to note the potential impact of such additional leverage in their next Securities Act filing or Exchange Act periodic report.

    Second, existing BDCs contemplating adopting the reduced asset coverage requirement under the Leverage Reform Provisions should carefully evaluate the language of any leverage covenants contained in their existing credit agreements or debt instruments to determine how opting in to that lower asset coverage ratio may impact those covenants. Specifically, in certain cases, the language of such leverage covenants may cross-reference to the asset coverage requirements set forth in the 1940 Act, or otherwise operate in a manner that would permit a BDC to lever up to the maximum permitted under the 1940 Act without violating the applicable covenant. In many other cases, though, BDC credit agreements will instead mirror the existing 200 percent asset coverage requirement without taking into account subsequent changes in applicable 1940 Act leverage restrictions.

    Third, any manager contemplating a new BDC — whether a private BDC or one that intends to publicly trade — should take steps to ensure that the new BDC vehicle has properly “opted in” to the relaxed leverage restrictions available under the Leverage Reform Provisions of the SBCAA. Specifically, even if a manager is unsure whether its newly formed BDC will actually utilize the increased leverage, failing to opt in upfront will subject that BDC to significant time and expense to seek the appropriate approval for the lower asset coverage ratio in the future. In addition, a BDC can continue to use disclosure to signal to investors whether or not it currently intends to use the additional leverage available to it under the Leverage Reform Provisions, even after “opting in” to the lower asset coverage requirement.

    Fourth, any BDC negotiating a new credit agreement or debt instrument should carefully consider whether to include language contemplating the usage of the additional leverage available under the Leverage Reform Provisions. For example, many BDCs already include language in their credit agreements regarding the exclusion of leverage incurred by any small business investment company subsidiaries for which they have received corresponding exemptive relief from the SEC. Similarly, BDCs may wish to explore including a similar carve-out for additional leverage they may incur after opting in to the lower asset coverage requirement under the Leverage Reform Provisions.

    Finally, once the SEC adopts the reforms mandated by the Securities Offering Reform Provisions of the SBCAA, publicly traded BDCs may wish to consider filing either a new shelf registration statement on Form N-2 or, alternatively, a post-effective amendment to an existing shelf registration statement, to take advantage of the inclusion of the ability to incorporate by reference from prior (and, hopefully, future) Exchange Act filings. Specifically, the ability for larger BDCs to incorporate by reference Exchange Act filings, while taking advantage of the automatic shelf registration process available to WKSIs, will likely significantly reduce the time, effort and expense associated with conducting public follow-on debt and equity offerings. In particular, the prospectuses prepared for those public offerings will likely shrink dramatically, along with the time and expense associated with their preparation.

    Conclusion

    The Leverage Reform Provisions and the Securities Offering Reform Provisions set forth in the SBCAA and adopted as part of the passage of the Omnibus Spending Bill will likely have both long-lasting and significant impacts on the BDC industry as a whole. In particular, the lowering of the asset coverage requirement will allow BDCs to potentially utilize greater leverage, which may encourage new and existing BDCs to invest in more liquid — but lower yielding — debt investments and similar instruments. In addition, the availability of a true shelf registration and offering process for publicly traded BDCs, including the use of incorporation by reference from Exchange Act filings and the ability to file automatically effective registration statements under the Securities Act, should meaningfully streamline the public debt and equity offering process going forward, once the SEC has fully implemented the mandated changes. Both existing and prospective BDCs should, however, be mindful of the impact of these reforms on their existing and contemplated operations and related public disclosure moving forward.

    Authored by Karen Spiegel and Yehuda T. Ness.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.


    [1] See Section 18(h) under the 1940 Act.

    [2] See Section 61(a) under the 1940 Act. Notably, the 200 percent asset coverage requirement already permits BDCs to utilize twice as much leverage as traditional registered closed-end funds. See, e.g., Section 18 under the 1940 Act.

    [3] See Section 802 of the SBCAA, amending Section 61(a)(2) of the 1940 Act.

    [4] See Section 803 of the SBCAA.

    [5] See Section 803(b)(1) of the SBCAA.

    In depth
    Authors

    Yehuda T. Ness

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Second Circuit Rejects Arbitration of Debtor’s Asserted Discharge Violation

    Second Circuit Rejects Arbitration of Debtor’s Asserted Discharge Violation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Rejects Arbitration of Debtor’s Asserted Discharge Violation

    April 3, 2018

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy court properly denied a bank’s motion to compel arbitration of a debtor’s asserted violation of the court’s discharge injunction, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 7, 2018. In re Anderson, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 5703, *20 (2d Cir. March 7, 2018). Finding a purported “inherent conflict between arbitration of [the debtor’s] claim and the Bankruptcy Code,” the Second Circuit reasoned that the bankruptcy court “properly considered the conflicting policies in accordance with law.” Id. quoting In re United States Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631, 641 (2d Cir. 1999). To reach its extraordinary result, the court strained to distinguish Anderson from its earlier decision in MBNA America Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2006) (held, arbitration of debtor’s “automatic stay claim would not necessarily jeopardize or inherently conflict with the Bankruptcy Code”). The court also ignored Supreme Court precedent as well as the text of the Bankruptcy Code, the Judiciary Code and the legislative history. Most important, the Anderson decision may have significant consequences for lenders in business reorganization cases when they have bargained for arbitration agreements.

    Relevance

    Courts have disagreed on a clear test for determining whether a bankruptcy court must refer a dispute to binding arbitration. According to the Supreme Court, “the [Federal Arbitration] Act . . . mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). As the Court stressed, “passage of the [Arbitration] Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered.” Id. Moreover, an agreement to arbitrate requires no relinquishment of substantive rights, but is, instead, a “trade [of] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). The Arbitration Act thus “establishes a ‘federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’ and mandates the enforcement of contractual arbitration provisions.” Hill, 436 F.3d at 107. Accord, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309-2310 (2013) (arbitration “a matter of contract” and courts must “rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms”).

    The bankruptcy process centralizes the resolution of disputes in the bankruptcy court. That centralization is not absolute, though. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (district court has “original, but not exclusive jurisdiction” over proceedings “arising under” Code, or “arising in or related to” bankruptcy cases). The bankruptcy jurisdiction scheme thus gives the bankruptcy judge discretion to determine whether a “core” proceeding should be referred to arbitration. “Bankruptcy courts are more likely to have discretion to refuse to compel arbitration of core bankruptcy matters.” Hill, 436 F.3d at 108. That jurisdictional scheme, however, gives the bankruptcy judge less power with respect to related non-core proceedings when the parties do not consent to a bankruptcy court adjudication. In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d 631, 637-37 (2d Cir. 1999).

    The issues in Anderson turned on whether the debtor’s discharge violation claim against the bank was subject to arbitration and whether that claim presented “the sort of inherent conflict with the Bankruptcy Code that would overcome the strong congressional preference for arbitration.” Anderson, at *6. Because the Arbitration Act removes disputes from the judicial system, the Second Circuit had previously recognized that arbitration can conflict with the policy of centralized dispute resolution in bankruptcy cases. “Disputes that involve both the Bankruptcy Code and the Arbitration Act often present conflicts of ‘near polar extremes: bankruptcy policy exerts an inexorable pull towards centralization while arbitration policy advocates a decentralized approach toward dispute resolution.’” Hill, 436 F.3d at 108, quoting U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d at 640. As the Second Circuit stressed in Hill, the purposes of the Code are “seriously jeopardized” only when arbitration would interfere with the bankruptcy court’s ability “to centralize disputes concerning the estate.” Id. at 109.

    Facts

    The debtor, Anderson, opened a credit card account in 2002 with the bank. That agreement contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitration of any controversy or dispute, including those related to “credit reporting,” “collections matters” as well as claims for “injunctive or declaratory relief.” Also, the arbitrator hearing the case had to be an experienced lawyer or a “former judge who must apply applicable substantive law consistent with the Arbitration Act.” That arbitrator could award a party damages or other relief provided for under applicable law.

    Anderson defaulted on his credit card account and failed to repay the bank for more than 180 days. The bank was therefore required to “charge off” the account — i.e., reclassify the account from a receivable to a loss under applicable law. Consistent with industry practice and federal regulatory guidelines, the bank noted the charge-off to the national credit reporting agencies and later sold the Anderson account to a third-party debt buyer. Following industry practice, the bank also told the credit reporting agencies that Anderson’s debt had been charged off and sold to another lender.

    Anderson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition two years later in the Southern District of New York, and shortly obtained a standard form discharge order. He told the bank of his bankruptcy discharge and asked it to direct the credit reporting agencies to remove from his credit report any notation that his loan had been charged off. Because the bank’s charge-off was accurate, regardless of Anderson’s bankruptcy discharge, the bank declined. Federal regulators overseeing credit providers do not expect a bank to update the current status of an account after selling it to a third party. Instead, the bank need only provide information to a credit bureau that the account has been sold.

    Anderson obtained the re-opening of his bankruptcy case several months later. He then sued the bank on behalf of himself and a putative class, challenging the bank’s credit reporting practices with respect to the charged off credit card debt that had been discharged in his bankruptcy case. Essentially, he alleged that by failing to furnish updates to the credit reporting agencies reflecting post-sale bankruptcy discharges on its former credit card accounts, the bank intended to coerce payment on a discharged debt, purportedly violating the bankruptcy court’s discharge injunction.

    The bank moved for an order compelling arbitration of the debtor’s claim. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, reasoning, among other things, that because the debtor’s “fresh start” was implicated, Congress intended to preclude arbitration and that the arbitrator would probably be unable to grant injunctive relief. The district court affirmed for the same reasons but also explained that the debtor’s claims arose from a discharge injunction, an affirmative order of the bankruptcy court. It thus found that arbitration would interfere with the bankruptcy court’s authority to enforce its own orders.

    The Second Circuit

    The Second Circuit also affirmed, stressing that “the discharge is the foundation upon which all other portions of the . . . Code are built.” Id. at *14. “The ‘fresh start’ is only possible if the discharge and injunction crafted by Congress and issued by the bankruptcy court is fully heeded by creditors and prevents their further collection efforts. Violations of the injunction damage the foundation on which the debtor’s fresh start is built.” Id. Citing United States Lines and Hill, the court found “that arbitration of a claim based on an alleged violation of [Code] Section 524(a)(2) would seriously jeopardize a particular core bankruptcy proceeding.” Id. at *14-15. A discharge violation claim, in the words of the court, requires continuing “supervision; and . . . the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court [are required] to enforce its own injunctions. . . .” Id. at *15.

    First, reasoned the court, because of the primary importance of a bankruptcy discharge to the debtor, “arbitration of Anderson’s claim presents an inherent conflict with the . . . Code.” Id. at *15. Second, “Anderson’s claims center on alleged violations of a discharge injunction that was still eligible for active enforcement.” Id. at *16. To distinguish this case from its earlier decision in Hill, the court said that “the discharge injunction is likely to be central to bankruptcy long after the close of proceedings,” in contrast to the automatic stay violation in Hill. The automatic stay, reasoned the court, “exists only while bankruptcy proceedings continue to ensure the status quo ante,” but “the integrity of the discharge must be protected indefinitely.” Id. at *16.

    Third, the court said, a discharge injunction requires the “unique expertise” of the bankruptcy court “in interpreting its own injunctions and determining when they have been violated.” Id. at *17. Only “the bankruptcy court . . . possesses the power and unique expertise to enforce” the discharge injunction. Id. at *18.

    Finally, the court was not concerned with Anderson’s class action. Although the class action issue was relevant in Hill, “the putative class members [in Anderson] are all allegedly victims of willful violations of the discharge injunction issued by the bankruptcy court . . . . [These debtors face] a continuing disruption of [their] ability to obtain their fresh starts.” Id. at *20. Because the bankruptcy court, in the Second Circuit’s view, considered “the conflicting policies,” it had “properly” exercised its discretion. Id.

    Comments

      1. The Second Circuit in Anderson failed to cite a significant contrary district court decision. Belton v. GE Capital Consumer Lending Bank, 2015 WL 6163083, *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2015) (Congress never “intended to preclude arbitration of [§] 524 claims”; Congress gave federal district courts non-exclusive jurisdiction over § 524 claims; no “inherent conflict” between arbitrating such claims and underlying purpose of Bankruptcy Code; debtor’s rights could be vindicated in arbitration; discharge injunction a “national form”; nothing suggested that “bankruptcy court . . . more qualified than an arbitrator to adjudicate [§ 524] claim[s]”). Belton is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit.
      2. The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Anderson is superficial, at best. Nothing in the text or legislative history of the Code suggests that Congress intended bankruptcy courts to have exclusive jurisdiction over discharge violation claims. In fact, Congress enacted the Arbitration Act “to reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-226 (1987). The Second Circuit conceded in Hill that when “arbitration would not interfere with or affect the distribution of the estate” or “affect an ongoing reorganization,” a bankruptcy court lacks discretion to deny arbitration. 463 F.3d at 109-110, citing Bigelow v. Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp., 2000 WL 3359 6476, *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2000) (compelled arbitration of § 524 claim). The Anderson case, of course, was closed and the debtor had his discharge — i.e., no effect on reorganization or distributions to creditors.

         

        Most important, Congress provided exclusive federal court jurisdiction over specific bankruptcy-related claims (e.g., § 327), but not § 524 claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 (a) & (e). Congress gave bankruptcy courts non-exclusive jurisdiction over § 524 claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“. . . original but not exclusive jurisdiction . . .”). Resolution of a discharge violation claim hardly requires unique bankruptcy expertise, for the issue turns on whether the alleged act merely sought “to collect” a discharged debt. In Anderson, the arbitrator would be a lawyer or former judge.

      3. Courts should “rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements according to their terms, consistent with the intent of Congress when it enacted the Arbitration Act. Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2309-10. This duty to enforce arbitration agreements is unflagging, and “holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal statute.” Id.; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 at 24-25 (1991) (“[S]tatutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the” Arbitration Act); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (“duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights”). In other words, the Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).

         

        The Supreme Court has consistently rejected arguments that federal statutory claims are not arbitrable. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 634, 637 (enforced agreement to arbitrate claims brought under Sherman Anti-Trust Act, finding no evidence in text or legislative history of anti-trust laws evincing congressional intent to preclude arbitration of anti-trust claims; rejected notion that “fundamental importance” of anti-trust laws justified a departure from Arbitration Act; “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function”; no reason to “assume” that arbitration would not “provide an adequate mechanism” for enforcing anti-trust laws; “absent such a showing,” arbitration provision had to be enforced; “we decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-25, 27-30 (enforced agreement to arbitrate claims brought under Age Discrimination Employment Act (“ADEA”); neither text nor legislative history evinced congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial remedies; “Congress . . . did not explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments”; “arbitration is consistent with Congress’ grant of concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and federal courts”; no “inherent conflict” between arbitration and ADEA’s underlying purposes; although ADEA designed to “further important social policies,” no “inherent inconsistency between those policies . . . and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims”; the Court also peremptorily rejected unsubstantiated “challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures” — including, the competency of arbitrators and availability of equitable relief in arbitration — explaining that “[s]uch generalized attacks on arbitration ‘res[t] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,’ and, as such, they are ‘far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.’”); Greentree Fin’l Corp – Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000) (claims under Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act held arbitrable; refused to invalidate arbitration agreement); Compu Credit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2012) (claims under Credit Repair Organizations Act held arbitrable; neither text nor legislative history showed intent to override Arbitration Act).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Client Update: OFAC “May” Include Virtual Currency Wallet Addresses on the SDN List

    Client Update: OFAC “May” Include Virtual Currency Wallet Addresses on the SDN List

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Client Update: OFAC “May” Include Virtual Currency Wallet Addresses on the SDN List

    April 2, 2018

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Office of Foreign Asset Control of the Department of Treasury (OFAC) forecasted that it “may include as identifiers on the SDN List specific digital currency addresses associated with blocked persons.”

    In depth

    SDN stands for “Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” and the “SDN List” is a list of persons and entities, designated by OFAC, whose “assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from doing business with them.” Persons and entities on the SDN List are commonly referred to as sanctioned persons or entities.

    OFAC recently posted “Questions on Virtual Currency,” a section of their frequently asked questions, which indicates that OFAC may be adding virtual currency wallet addresses to the SDN List. According to OFAC, when it comes to OFAC compliance the “obligations are the same” whether operating in virtual currency or fiat. Persons or entities “are responsible for ensuring that they do not engage in unauthorized transactions prohibited by OFAC sanctions, such as dealings with blocked persons or property.” OFAC notes that “there is no single compliance program or solution suitable for every circumstance” but reiterates that there must be in place a “tailored, risk-based compliance program, which generally should include sanctions list screening and other appropriate measures.”

    Perhaps most importantly, OFAC pledged to increase its regulatory presence within the existing framework as follows: “[t]o strengthen our efforts to combat the illicit use of digital currency transactions under our existing authorities, OFAC may include as identifiers on the SDN List specific digital currency addresses associated with blocked persons.”

    The inclusion of wallet addresses to the SDN List could potentially prohibit virtual currency users from doing business with that wallet address as well as its direct and indirect owners. According to OFAC, “U.S. persons (and persons otherwise subject to OFAC jurisdiction) must ensure that they block the property and interests in property of persons named on OFAC’s SDN List or any entity owned in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons, and that they do not engage in trade or other transactions with such persons.” (emphasis added). It is difficult enough to determine the ownership of a private entity “directly or indirectly” but it would be even more difficult to determine whether an entity is “indirectly” owned by the owner of a virtual currency wallet.

    It remains to be seen whether OFAC will actually place any virtual currency wallet addresses on the SDN List or if this posting is more of a warning shot. If OFAC actually designates wallet addresses on the SDN List it could alter compliance and “Know Your Customer” requirements for market participants.

    McDermott Will & Emery law clerk Michael Wasenius also contributed to this article.

    Authors

    Todd Harrison

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    David L. Taub

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Deference Provided to Regulations When There’s a Drafting Error

    Deference Provided to Regulations When There’s a Drafting Error

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Deference Provided to Regulations When There’s a Drafting Error

    April 2, 2018

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Tax Act created two new foreign tax credit limitation baskets – one for foreign branch income (new section 904(d)(1)(B)) and one for any amount includible in gross income under section 951A (i.e., GILTI) – however, it failed to amend section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) to reflect these changes to section 904(d)(1). As a result of this oversight, section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) currently instructs the taxpayer to treat foreign taxes imposed on amounts that do not constitute income under US principles as imposed on income described in the foreign branch income basket. In light of legislative history and Treasury regulations, such a failure to amend the Code appears to be a drafting error. This article addresses the relevant case law that, on balance, supports applying section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) as if its language and cross-reference had been properly amended.

    In depth

    The recently enacted tax reform legislation, Pub. L. No. 115-97 (the Tax Act), created two new foreign tax credit limitation baskets – one for foreign branch income (new section 904(d)(1)(B)) and one for any amount includible in gross income under section 951A (i.e., GILTI) (new section 904(d)(1)(C)). However the Tax Act failed to amend section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) to reflect these changes to section 904(d)(1). Section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) has historically treated foreign taxes on amounts that do not constitute income under US principles as imposed on income described in the general category income basket by cross-referencing “paragraph (1)(B).” Congress did not change the cross-reference in section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) to properly cross-reference “paragraph (1)(D)” (which is now the “general category income” basket). As a result of this oversight, section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) currently instructs the taxpayer to treat foreign taxes imposed on amounts that do not constitute income under US principles as imposed on income described in the foreign branch income basket.

    The legislative history and relevant Treasury regulations suggest that the failure to amend this Code section was inadvertent, and the current cross-reference is a result of a drafting error. However, it is unclear at this time when or if Congress or the Treasury will address this error through either a technical correction or regulations. In the meantime, taxpayers are left wondering how to proceed. As discussed in detail below, the answer that we believe is most supported by case law is to apply section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) as if its language and cross-reference had been properly amended.

    Creditability of Foreign Taxes with No Associated Income for US Federal Income Tax Purposes

    Section 901 allows taxpayers to credit foreign income taxes paid against US tax, subject to the limitations of section 904. In general, section 904 limits the amount of foreign tax credit to the amount of potential US tax on the taxpayer’s aggregated foreign source income within separate limitation categories. Neither section 901 nor section 904 requires that a taxpayer receive US income associated with foreign taxes in order to claim a foreign tax credit. That is, even where a foreign tax is imposed on income of a foreign taxpayer that would not constitute taxable income in the United States, a foreign tax credit is allowed, subject to the section 904 limitation.

    The regulations under section 904 support this interpretation. Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) provides, in relevant part:

    If, under the law of a foreign country or possession of the United States, a tax is imposed on an item of income that does not constitute income under United States tax principles, that tax shall be treated as imposed with respect to general limitation income.

    This “base difference rule” under Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) was codified in 2004 to section 904(d)(2)(H)(i). Section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) provides that “In the case of taxable years beginning after December 31, 2006, tax imposed under the law of a foreign country or possession of the United States on an amount which does not constitute income under United States tax principles shall be treated as imposed on income described in paragraph (1)(B).”

    When Section 904(d)(21)(H)(i) was enacted, Section 904(d)(1)(B) historically was the general income basket. Section 14201 (GILTI) and section 14302 (establishment of foreign branch income category for purposes of section 904) of the Tax Act each amended section 904(d)(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as subparagraphs (C) and (D) and inserting as (A) “any amount includible in gross income under section 951A (other than passive income)” and inserting as (B) “foreign branch income.” Therefore, section 904(d)(2)(H) now cross-references to the “foreign branch income” basket. As discussed below, section 904(d)(2)(H) is now in direct conflict with Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv), which makes clear that “If, under the law of a foreign country or possession of the United States, a tax is imposed on an item of income that does not constitute income under United States tax principles, that tax shall be treated as imposed with respect to general limitation income.” (Emphasis added).

    Statutory Interpretation

    There are a number of statutory interpretation canons that may be applied to determine whether taxpayers may rely on Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) that now conflicts with section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) or if taxpayers should read section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) as we believe it was intended to be amended.

    First and foremost, statutory interpretation begins with the “plain language” of the statute. If the statutory language is unambiguous, no further inquiry is necessary and the statute is enforced according to its terms. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 (2010). The courts generally will not look to the legislative history to help interpret the statute if it is unambiguous, and they will not apply the agency’s interpretation of the statute (here, Treasury Regulations) if the agency’s interpretation is in conflict with the unambiguous language. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984); U. S. v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 US 16, 26 (1982).

    If the statute is ambiguous, then the courts continue on to a second step. In analyzing the statute itself, they may look to the legislative history to determine Congressional intent. U. S. v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 US 16, 26 (1982). In analyzing an agency’s interpretation of the statute, the court will determine if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).

    Plain Language

    Under the first step, determining whether the language of a statute is ambiguous requires the court to examine “the language itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 US 337, 341 (1997). On its face the “plain language” of section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) states foreign income taxes imposed on income that is not income for US tax purposes “shall be treated as imposed on income described in paragraph (1)(B).” As a result of other amendments made by the Tax Act “paragraph (1)(B)” is now foreign branch income.

    Under this first step, the courts have explicitly noted that a statute is not ambiguous just because it contains on obvious scrivener’s or drafting error. In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) (superseded by legislation) (“Ambiguity does not arise merely because a particular provision can, in isolation, be read in several ways or because a statute contains an obvious scrivener’s error.”) (citing Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 US 526 (2004)). In the event of an obvious drafting error, the US Tax Court and the US Court of Federal Claims have simply applied the law as if the error had not been made. See Adkison v. Commissioner, 129 TC 97 (2007), aff’d 592 F3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (Tax Court assumed the failure to make an obvious conforming adjustment was inadvertent and applied the law as if the amendment had been made.); see also Fed. Natl. Mortgage Ass. v. US 56 Fed. Cl. 228 (2003), rev’d on other grounds 379 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also King, et al. v. Burwell, et al., 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2505 (2015) (Scalia Dissent) (“Only when it is patently obvious to a reasonable reader that a drafting mistake has occurred may a court correct the mistake. The occurrence of a misprint may be apparent from the face of the law, as it is where the Affordable Care Act ‘creates three separate Section 1563s.’”). An example of a misprint apparent from the face of the Tax Act is under new section 951A(d) which includes two separate section 951A(d)(3)s.

    Drafting errors raise an interesting problem: If an obvious scrivener’s error does not make the statute ambiguous, and courts generally do not look beyond the statute when it is unambiguous, how do you determine if the statute actually contains a scrivener’s error? Like most issues involving statutory interpretation, the courts (and even specific judges within the courts) are split on the issue. A number of courts look at the legislative history to determine if there is an error in the drafting of the statute. However, there are just as many courts that end the inquiry after reading the plain language of the statute and determining that it is clear as written, instruct the litigant to petition Congress to fix the legislation.

    In US v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that when the plain language expresses congressional intent then “reference to legislative history and to pre-Code practice is hardly necessary.” 489 US 235 (1989). Nevertheless, in that case, after the Supreme Court had determined that the plain language expressed congressional intent, it also analyzed the legislative history and bankruptcy practice prior to the enactment of the new statute. Id. at 242 (“The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.’ Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 US 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”); see also Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 US 526, 539 (2004) (“Though we find it unnecessary to rely on the legislative history behind the 1994 enactment of § 330(a)(1), we find it instructive that the history creates more confusion than clarity about the congressional intent. History and policy considerations lend support both to petitioner’s interpretation and to the holding we reach based on the plain language of the statute.”).

    Many other courts have also looked to congressional intent to determine whether there had been a drafting error. See Adkison v. Commissioner, 129 TC 97 (2007) (“By all appearances, Congress simply overlooked the reference to section 6013(e) contained in section 6230(a)(3)(A) and failed to make a conforming amendment to that section. In any event, both provisions reflect congressional intent that the spouse of a partner may initiate a claim for relief from joint and several liability…”); Fed. Natl. Mortgage Ass. v. US 56 Fed. Cl. 228 (2003), rev’d on other grounds 379 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There is no reason, however, to believe that the omission was anything but inadvertent. The legislative history reveals no discussion about the missing proviso between the final conference report and the enactment of section 6621(d), and the clause was reinserted without fanfare a few months later, via technical correction.”); Fitzpatrick v. Morgan Southern, Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 978 (W.D. TN 2003) (“Examination of whether 49 USC. § 14704 contains an error requires a discussion of the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the passage of the statute.”); In re American Home Mortg., Inc. 379 B.R. 503 (2008); but see In re Jr. Hale Contracting Co, Inc. 465 B.R. 218 (2011) (The Bankruptcy Court acknowledged a drafting error and then applied the statute as drafted. “That leads to what the Court concedes is an anomalous result in this instance: an interpretation and application of the statute that honors its literal (and reasonable) wording while almost certainly running contrary to what Congress actually intended when it was rewriting the statute.”).

    The legislative history to section 904(d)(2)(H) clearly provides that “Creditable foreign taxes that are imposed on amounts that do not constitute income under US tax principles are treated as imposed on general limitation income.” See House Committee Report, American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, PL 108-357, 10/22/2004. Additionally, the section of the Conference Committee Report addressing the provision requiring foreign branch income to be allocated to a specific foreign tax credit basket makes no reference to the special base difference rule under section 902(d)(2)(H). H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 503 (Conf. Rep.). Further evidence of the drafting error is provided by what the legislative history omitted. There is no reference to requiring creditable foreign taxes imposed on amounts that do not constitute income for US purposes to be recategorized to the foreign branch income basket.

    Based on the legislative history of section 904(d)(2)(H), we believe that the failure of section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) to cross-reference “paragraph (1)(D)” (the “general category income” basket) rather than “paragraph (1)(B)” (“foreign branch income”) was the result of an inadvertent drafting error.

    Treasury Regulations

    Generally, when a regulation conflicts with a subsequently enacted Code section the statute controls. Farrell v. U.S., 313 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2002); see also see also Scofield v. Lewis, 251 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1958) (“A Regulation, valid when promulgated, becomes invalid upon the enactment of a statute in conflict with the Regulation.”). If the courts find that the subsequent statute is ambiguous, then the courts may apply the Chevron analysis in order to determine if the agency’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.

    Under the analysis discussed above, an obvious drafting error does not make a statute ambiguous for purposes of reaching step-two of the Chevron analysis. Because we believe that section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) is to be read as if it references “paragraph (1)(D),” Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) is not in conflict with the statute and thus the typical rule from Farrell does not apply. Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) applies and “the tax shall be treated as imposed with respect to general limitation income.”

    Conclusion

    Section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) contains an inadvertent drafting error. In order to determine that this Code section is unambiguous, but contains a drafting error the courts may look to the legislative history of section 904. That legislative history makes clear that section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) was meant to reference the general category income basket no matter where it actually winds up in the Code. Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) is not in conflict with how section 904(d)(2)(H)(i) should have been amended and therefore lends support that foreign taxes imposed on an amount that does not constitute income for US purposes belong in the general limitation category basket.

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