Content Type: Article

  • FDA Oversight of Booming CBD Market: What Can Businesses Expect?

    FDA Oversight of Booming CBD Market: What Can Businesses Expect?

    ARTICLE

    FDA Oversight of Booming CBD Market: What Can Businesses Expect?

    May 29, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Robert Kline and Khelin Aiken authored this bylined article discussing the need for additional guidance from the FDA on legally selling and marketing CBD and what businesses should expect from the agency following the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill.

    In depth
    Authors

    Robert M. Kline

    Counsel

    Miami

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  • Yearly Review of Developments in European State Aid

    Yearly Review of Developments in European State Aid

    ARTICLE

    Yearly Review of Developments in European State Aid

    May 2019

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The yearly review has been written by the French Regulatory team of McDermott Will & Emery – led by Sabine Naugès and Laurent Ayache – and published in one of the most prestigious publications in France, the European Union Law Review. The review focuses on developments in state aid law through the last 12 months and is invaluable to those interested in the case law surrounding State aid, as well as the applicability and legality of such State aid.

    The review comments on legal decisions laid down in both European (73) and French (17) jurisdictions regarding EU State aid law throughout 2018.

    In 2018, several interesting decisions were handed down regarding the qualification of a tax regime as a State aid, the application of the “Market Economy Operator test” and the compatibility of the State aid financing public infrastructure.

    Furthermore, the review comments on the very first decisions recognizing in the responsibility of Member States towards the competitors of illegal State aids beneficiaries.

    EU law strictly limits the scope by which Member States can give aid to companies.

    This aid may either take the form of subsidies (aid for the establishment of a business, aid for innovation, aid for the restructuring of a company in difficulty, etc.), tax exemption or reduction, and more broadly any intervention by a Member State (as well as any bodies controlled by a Member State) on a market (as a buyer, a seller, a lender, a company shareholder, etc.) which do not match the behaviour of a private company acting in accordance with free-market conditions.

    Within the EU, the principle is the general prohibition of State aid, except if the European Commission has authorized it beforehand, after assessing the compatibility of the aid with the internal market. As a result, each Member State has to notify all State aid projects.

    If the first objective pursued by EU State aid law is to ensure fair competition on the European market, it currently tends to hold an indirect budgetary control over the public expenditures of each Member State.

    Get a preview of the review.

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  • US Supreme Court Refines Impossibility Preemption Doctrine, Changes Litigation Dynamics

    US Supreme Court Refines Impossibility Preemption Doctrine, Changes Litigation Dynamics

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Supreme Court Refines Impossibility Preemption Doctrine, Changes Litigation Dynamics

    May 28, 2019

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Following confusion from a 2009 decision, the US Supreme Court on May 20, 2019, decided a significant impossibility preemption case. This new decision will change the dynamics of litigation involving the impossibility defense, and will introduce new litigation uncertainty due to a shift in the decision maker for impossibility preemption.

    In depth

    On May 20, 2019, in a unanimous judgment, the US Supreme Court decided Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, No. 17-290, an important impossibility preemption case, and held that the judge, not the jury, must decide whether a state-law failure-to-warn claim is preempted because there is “clear evidence” that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) would not have approved a change to a drug’s label to include the warning.

    The Court’s decision in Albrecht comes on the heels of its decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 US 555 (2009), which held that a pharmaceutical manufacturer could escape liability under state-law failure-to-warn claims if the manufacturer could provide “clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change to [the drug’s] label.” Confusion blossomed after Wyeth in the lower courts as to how to apply the “clear evidence” standard and, importantly, whether the “clear evidence” decision was for the judge or the jury.

    The Fosamax Litigation

    Albrecht involved state-law claims for Merck’s alleged failure-to-warn about “atypical” femur fractures in consumers taking Fosamax, a drug that treats osteoporosis in postmenopausal women. In 2008, Merck sought FDA approval through the Prior Approval Supplement (“PAS”) process to add warnings to Fosamax’s label about “atypical” femur fractures in patients. The FDA did not approve Merck’s label change, and stated that there was “inadequate” justification for the new warning. Eventually, in 2011, the FDA did agree to the labeling change. But the interim years provided fertile ground for plaintiffs to sue Merck for failing to warn about the risk of “atypical” femur fractures.

    In that litigation, Merck won summary judgment at the district court, arguing that the state-law claims were preempted because the FDA did not permit the label change that was at the heart of the failure-to-warn case. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that the “clear evidence” standard from Wyeth was a factual burden of proof and required that Merck show by “clear and convincing” evidence that the FDA would have rejected the proposed warnings, that this determination is a question of fact for the jury and that there were material facts in dispute as to whether Merck could satisfy that standard.

    The Court’s Decision and Concurring Opinions

    In an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Third Circuit’s decision. The Court framed the issue as one of federal preemption and whether it was “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” The state law at issue was the requirement for drug manufacturers to warn about risks of taking a particular drug. The federal law was the FDA’s regulation of the content of drug warning labels.

    The Court explained that after a drug’s initial label is approved by the FDA, there are several ways in which a company can change that label if new or different warnings are needed as time passes. One way is called the “changes being effect” or “CBE” process, which allows a company to change a label without pre-approval by the FDA, though the FDA may review that change after it is made and approve or disapprove of it. Another method, the one used by Merck, is the PAS method, which requires the FDA’s pre-approval before the change can be made.

    The Court explained that, under Wyeth, to succeed on the defense of impossibility preemption, the manufacturer must demonstrate that federal law—that is, the FDA after being fully informed regarding the justification for a label change—prohibited “the drug manufacturer from adding a warning that would satisfy state law.” The Court went on to explain that because the CBE process allows a manufacturer to make a label change without prior FDA approval, “a drug manufacturer will not ordinarily be able to show that there is an actual conflict between state and federal law such that it was impossible to comply with both.”

    After providing that descriptive recitation of Wyeth, the Court proceeded to the normative portion of its decision, stating first that it would not further define Wyeth’s use of “clear evidence” in terms of evidentiary standards because the issue of preemption is one for the judge and not the jury, and the judge must “simply ask himself or herself whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflict.’” In coming to that conclusion on the “determinative question,” the Court relied upon its seminal patent litigation decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., where it concluded that the construction of claims of a patent are for the judge not the jury to decide, to conclude that “judges, rather than lay juries are better equipped to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination” and whether the determination conflicts with state law.  The Court acknowledged, as it did in Markman, that the legal question before the courts may contain contested facts, but those factual questions are “subsumed within an already tightly circumscribed legal analysis.”  The Court then vacated the judgment of the Third Circuit because the Third Circuit incorrectly concluded that the preemption issue was one of fact, not law.

    Although the judgment of the Court was unanimous, its reasoning was not. Justice Clarence Thomas, although he joined in the Court’s opinion, wrote a concurring opinion to explain his “understanding of the relevant pre-emption principles and how they apply to this case.” Justice Thomas explained that he remained “skeptical” that “physical impossibility” is the correct test. Instead, a logical contradiction test between state and federal law is the correct test under the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause. But even under the “physical impossibility” test, Justice Thomas would have concluded that Merck could not prevail because there was nothing that prevented Merck from using the CBE process to change the Fosamax label. And, even if Merck believed that the FDA would have ultimately disapproved of its label change under the CBE process, that “hypothetical” would not have rendered the earlier change impossible; “hypothetical agency action is not ‘Law.’”

    Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh, only concurred in the judgment. Justice Alito explained that he agreed with the Court on the “only question that it actually decides”—namely, whether the preemption question is for the judge or jury. Justice Alito then discussed what he viewed to be critical omissions in both the discussion of the law and facts in the Court’s opinion in an effort to ensure that the Court’s opinion was not “misleading on remand.”

    Key Takeaways

    Much of the Court’s opinion in Albrecht focused on reiterating the Wyeth decision, with only a small portion devoted to answering the question presented: who decides the impossibility preemption question, the judge or jury. But, as can often be the case, the Court’s dictum provides interesting guidance to future litigants. One interesting issue not definitively answered in Albrecht is whether a manufacturer must use the CBE process now whenever it seeks to make a label change in hopes of preserving the impossibility preemption defense. The Court’s opinion does not go that far, however, only saying that because of the CBE process, manufacturers will not “ordinarily be able to show that there is an actual conflict between state and federal law such that it was impossible to comply with both.” Justice Thomas’s view suggests that the CBE process is required to preserve the preemption defense until such time as the FDA provides a final decision on the label change in accordance with its congressionally granted authority. In view of these statements in the Court’s opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurrence, it seems possible, if not likely, that many lower courts will simply default to a bright-line rule that requires manufacturers to use the CBE process—and for the FDA to thereafter disapprove the label warning alleged to be required by state law—to successfully invoke the impossibility defense.

    Also important for litigants to understand is how the shift in the decision maker for impossibility preemption changes the dynamics of litigation involving that defense. Because impossibility preemption is now a question of law, with factual underpinnings, it will be subject to de novo review on appeal, making any decision by a district court on the issue much more susceptible to reversal. In the analogous context of construing patent claims as a matter of law under Markman, district court decisions are routinely reversed by the Federal Circuit. This specter of reversal of any district court decision in impossibility preemption brings litigation uncertainty to all the parties. We will closely be watching how these issues ultimately play out in the lower courts.

    Find out more about the implications of this decision for your business by contacting the author.

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  • US Supreme Court: Licensor Can’t Revoke a Trademark License in Bankruptcy

    US Supreme Court: Licensor Can’t Revoke a Trademark License in Bankruptcy

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Supreme Court: Licensor Can’t Revoke a Trademark License in Bankruptcy

    May 23, 2019

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling of key significance for trademark licensing and for acquisitions, investments, financings and other transactions in which trademark licenses are a key value driver. In Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,[1] the Court held, 8-1, that where the licensor of a trademark rejects a trademark license in bankruptcy, the rejection does not deprive the licensee of its rights to use the licensed trademark(s). By setting aside the so-called “rejection-as-rescission” approach in favor of the “rejection-as-breach” approach, the Court’s holding resolves a legal issue that had been outstanding for decades in favor of protecting a trademark licensee’s rights.

    Background

    The origin of the conflict resolved by the May 2019 decision goes back to 1985, when the Fourth Circuit adopted the “rejection-as-rescission” approach in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, holding that a debtor’s rejection of an executory contract (i.e., a contract under which neither party has completed performance) worked to revoke its grant of a patent license.[2] In response to this decision, which was widely criticized by commentators, in 1988, Congress added Section 365(n) to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 365(n) provides that a licensee “of a right to intellectual property” may elect to retain its rights under a license, notwithstanding the debtor’s rejection of the license.[3]

    The definition of “intellectual property” in Chapter 11 does not, however, expressly mention “trademarks.”[4] Due to this omission, Section 365(n) was often construed by commentators to mean that, when a licensor rejects a trademark license in bankruptcy, the licensee loses the right to use the licensed trademark(s). Yet, for 30 years, whether or not this interpretation was correct was left unresolved. In fact, in its amicus brief, the International Trademark Association characterized the question at hand for the Court as “the most significant unresolved legal issue in trademark licensing.”

    Circuit Split
    In 2012, in Sunbeam, the Seventh Circuit declined to adopt the “rejection-as-rescission” approach, finding that Section 365(g) provides only that the rejection of a contract “constitutes a breach,” and that nowhere under the Bankruptcy Code or applicable contract law does it follow that the licensor has the right to “vaporize” the counterparty’s rights.[5] In 2018, the First Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit’s view and instead endorsed the view that Section 365(n), and certain special features of trademark law, weigh against permitting a licensee to retain its rights after a trademark license has been rejected.[6] The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

    Supreme Court Decision

    In an opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit, finding that “Section 365’s text and fundamental principles of bankruptcy law command” that the rejection of a contract in bankruptcy operates only as a breach, and not as a rescission, of the contract. The Court flatly rejected the First Circuit’s reading of Section 365, based on a negative inference flowing from the omission of “trademarks” from the definition of “intellectual property,” that “by specifically enabling the counterparties in some contracts to retain rights after rejection, Congress showed that it wanted the counterparties in all other contracts to lose their rights.” The Court found that, based on the plain text of Section 365, general principles of contract law, and the Bankruptcy Code’s stringent limits on avoidance actions (i.e., cases in which debtors may unwind pre-bankruptcy transactions), the general rule set out in Section 365(g), rejection-as-breach, applies to trademark licenses. The Court rejected the view that special features of trademark law (in particular, a licensor’s duty to exercise quality control over the goods and services sold under a license) mandate ignoring what 365(a) and 365(g) direct.

    Having found that rejection of a contract “breaches a contract but does not rescind it,” the Court observed that, as a practical matter, the licensee (not the licensor) is faced with a choice: it “can continue to do whatever the license authorizes” or consider the license to be terminated and walk away.

    Implications for Corporate Transactions

    Prior to the May 2019 decision, for a trademark licensee, there was a looming possibility that its rights could be revoked if the licensor went bankrupt. The loss of such license rights could, of course, have serious consequences, such as requiring a licensee to re-brand an entire line of goods or services for which the licensee had invested significant resources to develop the brand or preventing the marketing and sale of a large inventory of branded products.

    While deal structures have been developed to protect licensees against this seemingly harsh result (e.g., by putting the brand in a bankruptcy remote entity or having the licensee take a security interest in the trademarks to secure the obligations under the license), the uncertainty in the law imposed an added layer of complexity — and with it greater time and expense — to deals involving material trademark license rights.

    By creating greater certainty as to what happens to a trademark license in the event of the licensor’s bankruptcy, the Court’s holding should, in many respects, lessen the challenges in getting to the finish line on a deal involving material trademark licenses. However, dealmakers should bear in mind that with greater certainty for the licensee comes less optionality for the licensor and factor that into their assessment of what rights a trademark licensor will or should insist on when negotiating the terms of trademark license agreements after this decision.

    Questions Remain

    Because it only addresses whether a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license deprives the licensee of its rights under a trademark license, the Court’s holding leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, what remedies does a licensee have against a debtor who rejects a license and subsequently refuses to perform? While Section 365(g) provides that the licensee has a breach claim, the breach is viewed as arising immediately before the bankruptcy filing. This means that a licensee seeking to recover damages must get in line with the other unsecured parties, and is likely to see only pennies on the dollar. Likewise, if the license requires the licensor to maintain registrations for a trademark, and the licensor fails to do so, might an exclusive or nonexclusive licensee be able to step in to preserve the trademarks itself? Or is the licensee left with only a breach claim? Similarly, what happens if a licensor fails to enforce its rights against infringers who are selling products in competition with the licensee?

    From a licensor’s perspective, the decision suggests that if a rejecting debtor-licensor also ceases to perform, it does so at its peril. In particular, failure to exercise quality control over the goods and services sold under the licensed trademark(s) could result in the loss of its rights in the trademark to the extent the trademark ceases to serve its function of representing the quality of the goods or services sold under the trademark.

    In negotiating trademark licenses, it will be important to consider whether language addressing these issues should be added to accomplish your objectives.

    Authored by Edward H. Sadtler and Scott M. Kareff.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] 587 U.S. ___, No. 17-1657, Slip op. (May 20, 2019).

    [2] 756 F.2d 1043, 1045-1048 (4th Cir. 1985).

    [3] 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).

    [4] 11 U.S.C. § 101. According to relevant legislative history, the omission of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” in Chapter 11 did not reflect an intent by Congress to endorse Lubrizol in the context of a trademark license, but rather to allow “more time for study,” because trademarks involve certain considerations (such as the licensor’s duty to exercise quality control over the goods and services in connection with which the licensee uses its trademarks) that do not apply to other forms of intellectual property, such as patents and copyrights. See Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d. 372 (7th Cir. 2012).

    [5] 686 F.3d at 377.

    [6] 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
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    Scott M. Kareff

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: Economic Theory Challenged by Facts and Antitrust Law

    Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: Economic Theory Challenged by Facts and Antitrust Law

    ARTICLE

    Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: Economic Theory Challenged by Facts and Antitrust Law

    May 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jeffrey Brennan authored this bylined article examining a new economic theory around the price effects of cross-market hospital mergers and potential shortcomings of this idea and its impact on merger policy.

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  • Federal Judge Finds Qualcomm Violated the FTC Act through Monopolistic and Exclusionary Conduct

    Federal Judge Finds Qualcomm Violated the FTC Act through Monopolistic and Exclusionary Conduct

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Judge Finds Qualcomm Violated the FTC Act through Monopolistic and Exclusionary Conduct

    May 22, 2019

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Yesterday, a California federal judge ruled in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its suit against Qualcomm in a much-anticipated decision, concluding that Qualcomm violated the FTC Act by maintaining its monopoly position as a modem chip supplier through a number of exclusionary practices, including refusing to license standard essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Qualcomm likely will appeal the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but in the meantime, the court’s sweeping decision is likely to affect the course of dealing between SEP-holders and licensees. The decision is likely to substantially affect the ways in which SEP-holders take their technology and associated components that they manufacture to market.

    In depth

    On May 21, a California federal judge ruled in favor of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in its suit against Qualcomm in a much-anticipated decision. Following a 10-day bench trial in January, the court concluded that Qualcomm violated the FTC Act by maintaining its monopoly position as a modem chip supplier through a number of exclusionary practices, including refusing to license standard essential patents (SEPs) on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The court ordered extensive injunctive relief and required Qualcomm to submit to ongoing compliance and monitoring procedures.

    The FTC sued Qualcomm in January 2017, alleging that the company violated Section 5 of the FTC Act through a number of practices related to its patent licensing. Qualcomm sells modem chips that are incorporated into cellular handsets (i.e. smartphones) made by companies such as Samsung, Huawei, Apple and others. The chips enable smartphones to communicate with each other across cellular networks. Qualcomm also holds a number of patents implemented by modem chips that are essential to cellular communication standards. The FTC alleged that Qualcomm violated the FTC Act by refusing to supply modem chips to smartphone makers unless they first signed a separate patent license agreement. The FTC also alleged that Qualcomm violated the law by refusing to license its SEPs to rival modem chip suppliers, and by entering into de facto exclusive dealing arrangements with Apple and other smartphone makers. Through these practices, the FTC argued, Qualcomm was able to maintain its monopoly position as a modem chip supplier.

    The FTC Act prohibits “unfair methods of competition,” including conduct that violates the Sherman Act. In this case, the FTC alleged that Qualcomm violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To prove a violation of Section 2, the government must demonstrate that the defendant has monopoly power in a market, and that the defendant maintained that power through “exclusionary” conduct. If the government makes this showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a procompetitive justification for its conduct. Finally, if the defendant makes this showing, the government has the ultimate burden of rebutting the defendant’s justification or showing that anticompetitive harm outweighs the claimed procompetitive benefit.

    The court found that Qualcomm had monopoly power in certain modem chip markets and that Qualcomm engaged in a wide array of exclusionary conduct that caused anticompetitive harm to rivals.

    First, Qualcomm refused to sell its modem chip components exhaustively to an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) until the OEM signed a patent license agreement. Without patent exhaustion, patent rights to the product are not terminated at the initial authorized sale of the item to a customer. The court thus found that Qualcomm’s refusal to sell its modem chips exhaustively coerced OEMs into signing separate patent license agreements that allowed Qualcomm to maintain its monopoly power and extract higher royalty rates for its patents. Given Qualcomm’s dominant share in certain modem chip markets, the court held the following conduct was anticompetitive:

    • Requiring OEMs to enter into contracts that required the OEM to effectively purchase all of its modem chip components from Qualcomm thereby creating exclusivity. The contracts contained substantial incentives for the OEM to purchase all modem chips from Qualcomm through the use of incentive funding, large rebates, and price discounts.
    • Imposing substantial penalties if the OEM purchased rivals’ products. These penalties included automatic termination of the agreement, forfeiture of future payments or incentives, and the potential clawback of any incentives previously earned.
    • Mandating that the OEM agree to a patent grant-back whereby Qualcomm had the right to license any of the OEM’s patents royalty-free.
    • Charging OEMs higher royalty rates for Qualcomm technology used with rivals’ modem chips.
    • Cutting off an OEM’s modem chip supply or threatening to cut off an OEM’s modem chip supply.
    • Withholding samples until the OEM executed the license agreement.
    • Delaying software or threatening to require the return of software or the withholding of technical support.
    • Refusing to provide patent claim charts or patent lists.

    Second, the court found that Qualcomm intended to maintain its monopoly through its refusal to license its SEPs to rivals. Previously, at summary judgment the court found that Qualcomm’s commitments to two standard-setting organizations required it to license its SEPs to all comers on FRAND terms. Here, the court found Qualcomm had an antitrust duty to license its SEP to rivals. Qualcomm voluntarily abandoned its prior, profitable course of licensing rivals in order to deal exclusively with OEMs to extract more lucrative royalty rates. The court found Qualcomm’s ordinary course documents and other evidence showed the change of course was motived by an anticompetitive intent to exclude competition.

    Taken together, Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct allowed the company to maintain its monopoly power, extract higher royalty rates and foreclose a substantial share of the market from competitors in violation Section 2 of the Sherman Act and thereby Section 5 of the FTC Act.

    Notably, the court set forth remedies to address Qualcomm’s anticompetitive behavior:

    • Qualcomm must not condition supply of its modem chips on a customer’s patent license status. It must also negotiate or renegotiate licenses without the threat of lack of access or supply to Qualcomm’s products, technical support or software.
    • Qualcomm must license its SEPs to any willing licensee, including rivals, on FRAND terms.
    • Qualcomm must not enter into exclusive or de facto exclusive dealing contracts for the supply of modem chips.
    • Qualcomm may not interfere with the ability of any customer to communicate to any government agency regarding potential enforcement or regulatory matters.
    • Qualcomm must submit annual compliance reports to the FTC for seven years.

    Qualcomm likely will appeal the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the interim, the court’s sweeping decision is likely to affect the course of dealing between SEP-holders and licensees. The decision is likely to substantially affect the ways in which SEP-holders take their technology and associated components that they manufacture to market. SEP-holders will need to carefully consider supply agreements, including whether provisions in those agreements result in significant incentives or penalties for the customer so as to effectively create exclusivity. They will also need to reassess royalty rates for their licenses to ensure they comport with FRAND terms. Further, the court found that other major SEP-holders mimicked Qualcomm’s practices. Thus, other SEP-holders may need to make similar adjustments to their course of dealing. Finally, the decision may have broader antitrust implications regarding exclusionary business practices by market participants with monopoly or near-monopoly power.

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  • Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing – High Court’s Ongoing Interpretation of the Data Protection Act

    Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing – High Court’s Ongoing Interpretation of the Data Protection Act

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing – High Court’s Ongoing Interpretation of the Data Protection Act

    May 22, 2019

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In the latest round in the ongoing saga of Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing, a landmark victory has been secured for Dawson-Damer seeking under the Data Protection Act the release of personal data held by their trustee’s law firm Taylor Wessing.

    In depth

    In the latest development the matter was remitted to the High Court following a landmark decision in the Court of Appeal whereby Taylor Wessing was ordered to review their files and release personal data held on the claimant-beneficiaries. Taylor Wessing reviewed their electronic files but refused to review their paper files on the grounds that these did not constitute a “relevant filing system” under the Data Protection Act (DPA). The High Court rejected that argument and found that:

    • Taylor Wessing’s 35 paper files should be searched and personal data disclosed to the claimants;
    • Under English law, beneficiaries enjoy joint privilege with trustees in respect of advice taken by the trustees for the benefit of the trust; and
    • The searches carried out by Taylor Wessing were insufficient to discharge their duties under the DPA

    In this age of transparency, this case continues to clarify important aspects of the DPA and the rights of individuals to access their personal data. The most recent decision confirms that paper files are not exempt from the scope of the Act and must be searched for personal data. It also confirms that, as a matter of English law, a beneficiary is part of the circle of privilege in relation to legal advice taken by the trustee for the benefit of the trust and in the absence of litigation privilege, trustees and beneficiaries have joint privilege in legal advice.

    Although the DPA 2018 has introduced a provision to protect lawyers from the need to make disclosure of information which is confidential to their clients, this decision will affect other professionals: trustees, company directors and other fiduciaries who must take note and take appropriate steps to disclose personal data upon request. It is also an important one for private individuals who wish to know what data is held on them, by whom and for what purpose. In appropriate cases, individuals have the right to correct erroneous records as well as the right to be forgotten – but those rights can only be exercised if they know what data is being held by the data controller in the first place. This decision goes some way to protect those rights and safeguard the interests of individuals as intended by the DPA.

    For previous reports and background on this case, please click here.

    Ziva Robertson (Partner) and Jennifer Ronz (Associate) of McDermott Will & Emery achieved this key victory for the Claimants, the Dawson-Damer family, in this matter.

    For further information or legal advice, please contact Ziva Robertson.

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  • Nexus: Reports of Its Death Are Clearly Premature

    ARTICLE

    Nexus: Reports of Its Death Are Clearly Premature

    May 21, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Alysse McLoughlin and Katie Quinn authored this bylined article discussing two recent examples that demonstrate that a jurisdiction must address nexus before imposing tax on a person or an entity.

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  • Taxpayers Should Prepare For the Next Penalty Battleground

    Taxpayers Should Prepare For the Next Penalty Battleground

    ARTICLE

    Taxpayers Should Prepare For the Next Penalty Battleground

    May 21, 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrew Roberson, Kevin Spencer and Evan Walters authored this bylined article discussing the increase in IRC Section 6676 penalties for disallowed refund claims and potential defenses for tax payers.

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    Evan Walters

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Typical Antitrust Clauses in Company Purchase Agreements

    ARTICLE

    Typical Antitrust Clauses in Company Purchase Agreements

    May 2019

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Daniel von Brevern authored a bylined article exploring antitrust clauses in corporate purchase agreements and highlighting the importance of ensuring these clauses protect business interests.

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