Content Type: Article

  • New pay transparency standards from the Federal Labor Court and the EU

    New pay transparency standards from the Federal Labor Court and the EU

    ARTICLE

    New pay transparency standards from the Federal Labor Court and the EU

    December 12, 2025

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    With a recent shift in case law, Germany’s Federal Labor Court has significantly lowered the threshold for asserting pay discrimination through the newly affirmed “pair comparison” approach. At the same time, the EU Pay Transparency Directive introduces far-reaching obligations that employers must implement by 2026. Together, these developments mark a turning point for compensation structures, compliance strategies, and pay-equity processes across organizations. What does the pair comparison entail, why is the Directive so impactful, and what do these changes mean for employers in practice?

    Find out more in the latest HR News blog post by Leonie Herzog.

    Visit the blog or register now for regular HR NEWS updates (in German).

    In depth
    Authors

    Leonie Herzog

    Associate

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • SEC provides two-year extension on short sale reporting and securities lending compliance

    SEC provides two-year extension on short sale reporting and securities lending compliance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC provides two-year extension on short sale reporting and securities lending compliance

    December 11, 2025

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On December 3, 2025, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced additional temporary exemptive relief from compliance with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) Rules 13f-2 and 10c-1a.[1]

    In depth

    Rule 13f-2 and Form SHO

    The exemptive relief provides an additional two-year temporary exemption from compliance with Rule 13f-2 and the associated Form SHO filing requirements, making January 2028 the first Rule 13f-2 reporting period, with the first Form SHO filings due by February 14, 2028.[2]

    Rule 13f-2 requires institutional investment managers that exercise investment discretion over gross short positions in equity securities exceeding certain reporting thresholds to submit a Form SHO filing to the SEC within 14 calendar days of month end.[3] January 2025 was initially set to be the first Rule 13f-2 reporting period, with initial Form SHO filings due by February 14, 2025.[4] However, on February 7, 2025, the SEC announced a one-year temporary exemption from compliance with Rule 13f-2 and accompanying Form SHO filing requirements.[5] This temporary relief made January 2026 the first Rule 13f-2 reporting period, with the first Form SHO filings due by February 17, 2026. As noted above, the exemptive relief extends the compliance date such that January 2028 will be the first Rule 13f-2 reporting period, with initial Form SHO filings due by February 14, 2028.[6]

    Rule 10c-1a

    The exemptive relief also extended the deadline to comply with Rule 10c-1a’s requirement to report information regarding covered securities loans to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)[7] until September 28, 2028, and the requirements under subparts (g) and (h)(3) for FINRA to publicly disseminate this information until March 29, 2029.[8]

    Rule 10c-1a requires, among other things, that any covered person who agrees to a covered securities loan on behalf of itself or another person must report, within designated time periods, certain information to FINRA.[9] The initial deadline for compliance with Rule 10c-1a’s requirement for covered persons to report to FINRA was January 2, 2026, and the initial deadline for FINRA to publicly report was April 2, 2026.[10] On July 28, 2025, the SEC announced a temporary exemption, extending the reporting deadline until September 28, 2026, and the dissemination deadline until March 29, 2027.[11]

    SEC review of the rules

    The exemptive relief was granted following the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision to remand the rules to the SEC for further consideration of the cumulative economic impact of their implementation.[12] The SEC noted that this temporary exemption will give it time to “respond to the Court’s opinion and take any further appropriate actions, which may include proposing amendments to the Rules,”[13] which is consistent with SEC Chairman Paul S. Atkins’s statement following the Court’s decision.[14] Accordingly, the SEC may take further action with respect to Rules 13f-2 and 10c-1a at a later date.

    If you have any questions concerning this article, please contact your regular McDermott Will & Schulte lawyer or one of the authors.

    Authors

    William J. Barbera

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Brynn M. Connell

    Associate

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Hunter Rebetti

    Associate

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC steps back from the shareholder proposal game

    SEC steps back from the shareholder proposal game

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC steps back from the shareholder proposal game

    December 10, 2025

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On November 17, 2025, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Division of Corporation Finance announced that it will not respond to no-action requests by companies to exclude shareholder proposals for the 2026 proxy season (i.e., October 1, 2025, through September 30, 2026) other than under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) (improper subject for shareholder action under state law).

    In making the announcement, the SEC blamed resource and timing constraints following the government shutdown as well as a backlog of registration statements for securities offerings. The SEC also pointed to existing guidance from previous no-action letters, which it said provides ample guidance and support in determining whether a specific proposal is excludable.

    The SEC’s announcement comes on the heels of a challenging year that saw significant budget cuts, staff reductions, early retirements, and a lengthy government shutdown. The SEC simply acknowledged that it does not have the resources to provide substantive review of the hundreds of no-action letter requests that it would ordinarily receive this time of year and asked companies and their counsel to rely on established precedent in making their own decisions this proxy season.

    In depth

    Notices still required via SEC’s online submission portal; companies have a choice

    Companies must still notify the SEC and proponents of plans to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy materials within 80 calendar days before filing a definitive proxy statement, pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j). For the 2026 proxy season, companies now have a choice: They may submit the Rule 14a-8(j) notice, which will be informational only and not elicit any SEC response, or they may request a response from the SEC. Again, a response is not legally required, but the SEC acknowledged that companies may prefer to receive such a response, even if it has limited legal effect on the company. If an SEC response is desired, companies must include “an unqualified representation that the company has a reasonable basis to exclude the proposal based on the provisions of Rule 14a-8, prior published guidance, and/or judicial decisions.” The SEC will respond with a letter indicating that the Division of Corporation Finance will not object to the exclusion, but the SEC will not evaluate the adequacy of or express an opinion on the exclusion.

    It is worth noting that the SEC stated that a company may have a “reasonable basis” to exclude a proposal if there is no precedent no-action guidance on point or even if there is adverse no-action guidance where the staff has been unable to concur with a company’s view to exclude a particular proposal. The ability to revisit prior staff guidance, which is nonbinding and reflects only informal staff views, may embolden companies to exclude shareholder proposals so long as they have a reasonable basis for doing so.

    For an informational only notice, we would not expect companies to include more than the name of the proponent, the date on which the proposal was received, and the company’s procedural and/or substantive bases for exclusion. No further support would be required or expected by the SEC.

    For companies seeking a “no objections” response, we anticipate that practice may differ depending on the company and the level of public scrutiny that exclusion of the shareholder proposal is expected to raise. Companies generally submit lengthy and comprehensive legal analyses to support the position that a proposal may be excluded from a proxy statement under one or more of the substantive bases for exclusion provided in Rule 14a-8. In its November announcement, the SEC made clear that companies seeking a “no objections” response only need to include an “unqualified representation” that they have a reasonable basis to exclude the proposal based on judicial or SEC precedent, including no-action letter precedent. As a result, given that these letters will be made public, the decision to include lengthy legal analyses in these submissions will likely turn on potential litigation and investor relations concerns and not on a desire to persuade the SEC staff.

    SEC will continue to provide substantive review of requests to exclude under Rule 14a-8(i)(1)

    Due to remaining questions about how state law and Rule 14a-8(i)(1) apply to precatory (nonbinding) proposals, the SEC will continue to review and express its views on no-action requests under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) that seek to exclude proposals that are improper under state law. In its November announcement, the SEC explained that this exception is due to recent developments regarding the application of state law and Rule 14a-8(i)(1) to precatory proposals, which are drafted as recommendations to the board and do not require the board to take action even if approved by shareholders.

    In a recent speech, SEC Chair Paul S. Atkins referred to statements by Delaware experts suggesting that Delaware law does not confer on stockholders an inherent right to vote on nonbinding or “precatory” proposals. Chair Atkins expressed that if there is no fundamental right under Delaware law for a company’s stockholders to vote on precatory proposals and the company has not created that right through its governing documents, then there may be an argument that a precatory proposal submitted to a Delaware company is excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). In his speech, Chair Atkins said that if a company obtains an opinion of counsel that precatory proposals are not a proper subject for stockholder action under Delaware state law, then he has “high confidence that the SEC staff will honor that position.”

    Conclusion

    The SEC’s November announcement represents its significant withdrawal from the dispute between companies and shareholders over who should have access to the topics for discussion at annual shareholder meetings. Shareholders remain able to bring lawsuits against companies that seek to exclude their proposals in the company’s proxy statements. And they may continue to exert public pressure on companies that refuse to acknowledge shareholder requests. But the question for the 2026 proxy season will be who benefits more from the SEC’s decision to step back from its traditional role of informal arbitrator of these disputes? Does the SEC’s 2026 policy make it easier for companies to ignore shareholders? Or does the lack of traditional SEC no-action letter support make it easier for shareholders to attack companies in court?

    Companies anticipating shareholder proposals for the 2026 proxy season should continue to monitor developments in this space, including any early litigation by proponents, especially with respect to attempts to exclude proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). It will also be critical to watch how this change impacts the settlement strategy of proponents. Will they be inclined to approach companies with more reasonable proposals or to “settle” more quickly with companies? Or will they be emboldened by the absence of the SEC this proxy season to take more aggressive positions?

    If you have any questions about the SEC’s announcement, please reach out to your regular McDermott Will & Schulte lawyer or a member of the firm’s Capital Markets & Public Companies Group.

    Authors

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Eric Orsic

    Partner

    Chicago

    Lexi Evangel

    Associate

    Boston

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  • Major update: Potential refund opportunity for interest and penalty amounts accrued during COVID-19 federally declared disaster

    Major update: Potential refund opportunity for interest and penalty amounts accrued during COVID-19 federally declared disaster

    ARTICLE

    Major update: Potential refund opportunity for interest and penalty amounts accrued during COVID-19 federally declared disaster

    Dec 8, 2025

    Read time: 3 min

    The US Court of Federal Claims’ (CFC) recent decision in Kwong v. United States, No. 23-267 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 25, 2025), provides significant support for the potential refund opportunity we identified in a previous blog post titled, “Refund opportunity for interest and penalty amounts accrued during COVID-19 federally declared disaster.” The refund opportunity applies to taxpayers who made payments to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that included underpayment interest and/or failure-to-file/failure-to-pay penalties that accrued during all or part of the period from January 20, 2020, through July 10, 2023.

    Although the CFC’s holding in Kwong addressed whether Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 7508A provided the taxpayer an extension of the two-year statute of limitations deadline for filing a refund suit (in IRC § 6532(a)) that fell after the COVID-19 disaster was declared, Kwong answered important questions for those taxpayers pursuing refunds for underpayment interest and/or failure-to-file/failure-to-pay penalties that accrued during COVID-19. The CFC held that the 2019 version of IRC § 7508A applies to the COVID-19 federally declared disaster. This is a significant holding because Congress amended IRC § 7508A in 2021 to significantly limit the IRC § 7508A(d) mandatory extension period. The CFC also held that the IRC § 7508A(d) mandatory extension period, as applied to the COVID-19 disaster, commenced on January 20, 2020, and ended on July 10, 2023.

    Kwong has potentially sweeping implications for taxpayers who faced federal tax filing and/or payment deadlines that fell between January 20, 2020, and July 10, 2023. Under the CFC’s Kwong analysis, the deadline for payment of any federal tax falling between these two dates was extended to July 11, 2023. Since the IRS computes underpayment interest and/or failure-to-file/pay penalties from the payment due date, penalties should not accrue from January 20, 2020, through July 10, 2023, and any taxpayers who already paid these amounts may be entitled to a refund. The CFC’s analysis also does not rule out the possibility that taxpayers with payment due dates preceding January 20, 2020, may be entitled to relief to the extent the underpayment interest and/or failure-to-file/failure-to-pay penalties accrued during the COVID-19 disaster period.

    As noted in our previous post, taxpayers considering this refund opportunity should be aware that the statute of limitations to file a refund claim expires three years from the filing deadline of the original tax return or two years from the date on which payment was made, whichever is later (unless the statute of limitations period was otherwise extended). This refund opportunity may apply to underpayment interest and/or penalties paid with respect to federal income, estate, gift, employment, or excise taxes.

    In depth
    Authors

    Shawn O'Brien

    Partner

    Houston

    Samuel F. Hamer

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • New UK Serious Fraud Office guidance on corporate compliance programmes puts spotlight in the boardroom

    New UK Serious Fraud Office guidance on corporate compliance programmes puts spotlight in the boardroom

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New UK Serious Fraud Office guidance on corporate compliance programmes puts spotlight in the boardroom

    December 5, 2025

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On 26 November 2025, the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) published guidance on ‘when, why and how’[1] it will evaluate corporate compliance programmes (the Compliance Guidance).[2] The SFO positioned the Compliance Guidance as part of its efforts to provide transparency and clarity on its expectations of corporates, following its updated guidance on self-reporting and cooperation published in April 2025[3] and the Joint SFO-CPS Corporate Prosecution Guidance published in August 2025.[4] The Compliance Guidance is drafted specifically for an external audience and replaces the internal guidance released by the SFO in 2020 (which was part of its operational handbook for prosecutors).

    This is the first piece of SFO guidance since the corporate ‘failure to prevent fraud’ offence (FTP Fraud) came into force on 1 September 2025 under the provisions of the Economic Crime & Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (ECCTA).[5] In that context, the fact that the SFO has issued guidance in relation to compliance programmes so soon after the provisions came into force may well suggest an area of focus for investigations under the new offence. This is reinforced by the SFO’s press release, which highlights as a ‘key update’ the incorporation of evaluation criteria for the FTP Fraud offence, including the ‘assessment of any potential defences of reasonable procedures’.

    Much of the Compliance Guidance restates the relevant statutory framework and summarises how the SFO already approaches matters in practice. However, as with the Cooperation Guidance, the extra clarity provided by the SFO is welcome. In this alert, we highlight some key points and takeaways from the guidance.

    In depth

    Compliance evaluation scenarios

    The Compliance Guidance confirms that the SFO may need to evaluate a corporate compliance programme in six scenarios – namely to determine whether:

    • a prosecution is in the public interest;
    • a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) is in the public interest;
    • a DPA should include compliance terms and/or a monitorship;
    • an organisation has a defence of ‘adequate procedures’ for the purposes of the ‘failure to prevent bribery’ (FTP Bribery) offence under the UK Bribery Act 2010 (UKBA);
    • an organisation has a defence of ‘reasonable procedures’ for the purposes of the FTP Fraud offence under ECCTA; and
    • the compliance programme presents aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to sentencing considerations.

    Taken as a whole, this means that organisations can expect scrutiny of their compliance programmes at various stages: (i) at the time of any offending, (ii) early in an SFO investigation, and (iii) at the time the SFO determines the appropriate disposal (i.e., prosecution, DPA, or otherwise).

    The SFO will deploy multiple aspects of its investigative armoury to evaluate compliance, including: (i) seeking voluntary disclosures (e.g. in the context of a company seeking cooperation credit); (ii) using its powers to compel the disclosure of documents or information; (iii) interviews of relevant individuals (whether on a voluntary basis, a compelled interview, or a suspect interview); and (iv) putting questions directly to the organisation (e.g. through correspondence or in meetings).

    ‘Reasonable’ and ‘adequate’ procedures defences

    The Compliance Guidance confirms that:

    • the SFO will evaluate the likelihood of an organisation successfully raising the ‘adequate procedures’ defence to the FTP Bribery offence. The SFO will do so proactively and from an early stage in its investigation; and
    • the same approach will be taken in relation to the FTP Fraud offence and the ‘reasonable procedures’ defence. In other words, the SFO will undertake an early ‘assessment of any potential defences of reasonable procedures’.[6]

    Specifically, the guidance recognises that evaluating the prospect of either defence being raised successfully is a key factor when considering the evidential limb of the Full Code Test (FCT) in the Code for Crown Prosecutors. In short, a prosecutor must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, based on the evidence and including the impact of any defence which may be relied on.

    A case which does not pass the evidential stage must not proceed to prosecution, no matter how serious or sensitive it may be.[7]

    This means that the Compliance Guidance envisages a scenario where the SFO is investigating a potential FTP Fraud offence, deploys its investigative tools to obtain information on the reasonableness of the organisation’s anti-fraud procedures (as at the time of the suspected offending), and concludes that there is no realistic prospect of conviction because the organisation would be able to successfully rely on the reasonable procedures defence. In that case, the evidential limb of the FCT would not be satisfied and the SFO would be precluded from prosecuting (or pursuing a DPA).[8] In essence, this means that effective anti-fraud procedures are capable of disposing of an investigation at an early stage, rather than being deployed as a defence much further down the line. This provides a powerful incentive to invest in proper anti-fraud compliance now.

    What is ‘reasonable’ or ‘adequate’ or ‘effective’?

    All the above begs the question of what makes a compliance programme ‘reasonable’ or ‘adequate’ or ‘effective’. In this respect, the Compliance Guidance acknowledges that there is no formal guidance beyond that set out in the UKBA guidance[9] and the ECCTA guidance.[10] Both documents were issued by other government departments in specific contexts and the SFO simply summarises the six key principles from each.[11] However, stepping back, the SFO does offer some additional colour on the issues it will probe when evaluating a compliance programme in any of the six scenarios:

    • Programme design: The SFO emphasises on multiple occasions that it expects compliance programmes to be tailored to the specifics of each organisation. Corporates are expected to adopt a risk-based approach, tailoring controls to sector-specific risks and geographic exposure.
    • Substance over form: It is not enough for a programme to exist on paper or in corporate messaging; it must be properly implemented, and demonstrably effective. In this respect, the SFO will ‘seek to get behind the pronouncements and determine how policies and procedures translate into conduct on the ground’.
    • Focus on outcomes: Perhaps above all, the guidance indicates that the SFO will focus on outcomes. In this respect, the SFO will look to ‘outcomes or activities that result from the policies and procedures’ as evidence – beyond high level assertions – of whether a compliance programme is effective. This will include considering whether there are sufficient anti-circumvention systems and controls.

    Nevertheless, the discussion is at a relatively high level and the SFO provides little in the way of concrete suggestions on what corporates might do to translate the above principles into practice. Rather, the SFO points towards two non-UK sources which provide some additional meat on the bones – the US Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance on the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs[12] and two documents issued by the French Anti-Corruption Agency in relation to anti-bribery compliance.[13]

    Many practitioners in multinational organisations will be familiar with the DOJ guidance in particular as representing something of a global ‘gold standard’. The DOJ guidance merits review on its own terms, but its contents chime with the SFO’s focus on outcomes and flesh this out in a practical sense, in most cases in greater depth than the UKBA or ECCTA guidance. This includes, for example, heightened focus on the use of data as a powerful tool to (i) prevent and detect misconduct and (ii) empower corporates to measure the success and effectiveness of their compliance programmes.[14]

    Takeaways

    The Compliance Guidance provides a good opportunity for corporates to take stock of the design and implementation of their compliance programmes and to consider whether they measure up to the SFO’s expectations. In doing so, the following aspects may be particularly relevant:

    1. Prepare for scrutiny in investigations: Corporates should anticipate detailed SFO inquiries into compliance programmes at an early stage of (and throughout) an investigation. This means maintaining comprehensive records of things like programme design, implementation, and effectiveness. Evidence such as training logs, monitoring reports, data on internal investigation outcomes, and documented remedial actions will be critical in demonstrating substance over form.
    2. Embed compliance as a living framework: Corporates should ensure that compliance programmes are not static documents but dynamic frameworks that evolve with the business and its risk profile. Regular risk assessments are essential, particularly in light of legislative developments such as the FTP Fraud offence. These assessments should be documented (with appropriate consideration of privilege risk[15]) and demonstrably linked to programme enhancements.
    3. Monitoring and review: Dynamic monitoring is another priority. Programmes should be regularly reviewed and adapted to reflect evolving risks, with documented evidence of updates. The growing role of technology is particularly relevant in this context: organisations should leverage data analytics and monitoring tools to prevent and detect misconduct and test the effectiveness of their compliance measures.
    4. Demonstrate senior leadership commitment: Visible and sustained engagement from senior management is critical. Boards and executives should actively champion compliance initiatives, allocate adequate and proportionate resources, and maintain clear lines of accountability. Evidence of leadership involvement, such as minutes of compliance-focused board discussions, will be relevant in any SFO evaluation. In this respect, it is notable that the SFO’s press release highlights culture as a cornerstone of compliance:

      ‘[e]ffective compliance is not a tick-box exercise – it’s about creating genuine cultures that prevent fraud, bribery and corruption’.[16]

    Conclusion

    The SFO signals a clear expectation: compliance must be embedded, demonstrable, and outcome driven. It must not be seen as a box-ticking exercise – as the guidance makes clear, compliance is a strategic imperative that can influence prosecutorial decisions, the negotiation of DPAs, and sentencing outcomes.

    It is also evident from the guidance that there is a clear alignment with global standards and expectations. However, the SFO has emphasised that it requires tailored and proactively effective compliance programmes for the purposes of the relevant UK law offences, and that it will scrutinise them through a UK lens using all the powers at its disposal.

    Bearing in mind the broad ambit of the offences under the relevant legislation and their extensive extra-territorial application, combined with a clear appetite for prosecution, companies that under-invest in compliance do so at their peril. Only robust, properly designed and implemented compliance programmes will pass muster. Without that, there is no entitlement to the corporate defence and a prosecution is considerably more likely. It is also clear that the proper resourcing and supervision of compliance is considered to be an issue of governance, which both starts and ends in the boardroom. Indeed, it is highly likely that initial subpoenas and investigations will focus on board deliberations and the actions (or inaction) of board members and executives.[17]

    Authors

    Simon Airey

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Andrew Butel

    Counsel

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Declan McLoughlin

    Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • California market-based sourcing rules to impact asset managers

    California market-based sourcing rules to impact asset managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California market-based sourcing rules to impact asset managers

    December 4, 2025

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Under a regulation recently finalized by the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB), fees received by asset managers may be subject to income tax in California based on the domicile of a fund’s underlying investors or beneficial owners. Consequently, an asset manager may be subject to tax in California even if neither the asset manager nor the fund operates in the state and even if the asset manager operates exclusively outside the United States. The final regulation, which has been years in development, became effective on October 1, 2025, and will apply to tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2026.

    In depth

    Background

    On September 10, 2025, the California FTB announced that it formally adopted a final regulation addressing the sourcing rules for sales other than sales of tangible personal property, including the sourcing of receipts from “asset management services.”[1]

    Under California law, sales from services are sourced to the state to the extent the purchaser receives the benefit of the service in California. With respect to asset management services, determining where the purchaser receives the benefit of the service has been the source of ambiguity and debate. In a typical fund structure, the asset manager receives fees from the fund entities with which the asset manager has an investment management agreement, rather than from the fund’s underlying investors directly.

    The California FTB has taken the position that asset management fees are sourced to the location of the ultimate investor, rather than to the fund entity paying the asset management fee. However, the prior regulation did not provide specific guidance regarding asset management services other than with respect to mutual fund service providers.

    The California FTB’s final regulation

    The final regulation largely adheres to the approach taken in the proposed regulations by sourcing receipts from asset management services (e.g., management fees and incentive fees) to the domiciles of the investors unless the investor is holding title to the assets for a beneficial owner, in which case receipts from asset management services are sourced to the domicile of the “beneficial owner” of the assets. Thus, asset managers may be subject to California income tax if the fund’s underlying investors or beneficial owners are domiciled in the state, even if the asset manager and the fund otherwise have no connection to California and even if the asset manager operates exclusively outside the US.

    For these purposes, a “beneficial owner” is any person who made an independent decision to invest assets. Importantly, such term does not include master funds, feeder funds, or other similar entities that are required by agreement with their investors to invest the assets. As a result, the final regulation requires looking through fund entities to determine beneficial ownership for purposes of sourcing receipts from asset management services.

    Receipts from asset management services will be assigned to California in proportion to “the average value of interest in the assets” held by the asset’s investors or beneficial owners domiciled in California. An investor or beneficial owner’s domicile is presumed to be the investor or beneficial owner’s billing address unless the asset manager has actual knowledge that the investor or beneficial owner’s primary residence or principal place of business is different than the billing address.

    Next steps

    Asset managers should discuss planning considerations with their tax advisors in light of the final regulations, such as:

    • Whether to request additional information from investors to validate the domicile of investors or beneficial owners (e.g., for asset managers with a non-California (or non-US) investor base, it may be prudent to substantiate that investors or beneficial owners are not domiciled in California)
    • To what extent it is necessary to look through certain investors to determine beneficial ownership (e.g., fund of funds investors, access vehicles, and other entity investors)
    • How existing fee arrangements (e.g., investor-specific fee reductions) may impact amounts allocated to California and whether to explore alternative fund structures or compensation arrangements
    • Whether to make a “pass-through entity tax” election in California

    Sales of management company interests also may be subject to California taxation. Asset managers considering sales of interests should consult with their advisors regarding the tax impact of such sales.

    Authors

    Charles Moll III

    Partner

    San Francisco

    Philippe Benedict

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David S. Wermuth

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Michael J. Hilkin

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Michael S. Jaroslawicz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Italy is reshaping sanctions enforcement and corporate criminal liability

    Italy is reshaping sanctions enforcement and corporate criminal liability

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Italy is reshaping sanctions enforcement and corporate criminal liability

    December 4, 2025

    Read time: 17 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Two major legislative initiatives, currently under parliamentary review, will reshape the compliance landscape for companies operating in Italy:

    • The implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 (Directive), introducing criminal offenses for breaches of EU restrictive measures and integrating them into the framework of corporate criminal liability
    • The comprehensive reform of Legislative Decree 231/2001 (231 Decree), aimed at revising the regime governing the liability of legal entities for crimes committed by their managers or employees in the interest or for the benefit of the company

    Taken together, these developments will significantly change the Italian corporate compliance environment. On one side, compliance with international sanctions would become even more critical, not only because the scope of restrictive measures continues to expand but also because breaches may now trigger criminal liability for both individuals and companies. This also makes sanctions compliance a key component of any effective organizational model under the 231 Decree. On the other side, companies expect the upcoming reform of the 231 Decree to realign corporate criminal liability with international standards, enhancing its preventive and dissuasive function rather than its purely repressive dimension. As a result, the structure of organizational models, the role of supervisory bodies, and the conditions for excluding corporate liability are all likely to be reshaped.

    In depth

    EU sanctions enforcement reform and corporate criminal liability

    Italy is now implementing the Directive through Draft Legislative Decree no. 317/2025 (Draft Decree), introducing, for the first time, specific criminal offenses and related corporate liability for breaches of EU restrictive measures.

    The Directive aims to reduce the fragmentation and discretion that have long characterized Member States’ enforcement systems, differences that not only determined whether a violation amounted to an administrative or criminal offense but also led to significant variations in the type and severity of applicable penalties, creating a concrete risk of forum shopping by individuals and businesses. By setting minimum rules on the criminalization of violations and circumvention, the Directive seeks to ensure a more uniform level of deterrence and a harmonized enforcement response across the EU.

    The Draft Decree marks a structural shift in the Italian framework, replacing the long-standing hybrid model. While export-control violations were already punishable under both criminal and administrative law (notably under Law 185/1990 on military items and Legislative Decree 221/2017 on dual-use items, as amended by Decree 69/2023), violations of EU financial sanctions were subject to administrative fines, primarily under Legislative Decree 109/2007, unless the conduct simultaneously amounted to another crime (e.g., money laundering or false declarations).

    Now, by introducing harmonized criminal offenses for the violation and circumvention of any EU restrictive measure and extending corporate liability under the 231 Decree, this legislative initiative aligns Italy with EU sanctions’ enforcement objectives. The timing of the reform, which preceded the adoption of the EU’s 19th sanctions package on October 23, 2025, further underscores Italy’s intention to ensure full consistency between domestic implementation and the evolving EU sanctions landscape.

    To give effect to this alignment, the Draft Decree proposes the addition of a new chapter within the Italian Criminal Code (ICC) – Chapter I-bis of Title I of Book II, titled “Crimes Affecting the European Union’s Foreign Policy and Security.” The chapter sets out the core offenses underpinning the new regime, including:

    • Violation of EU restrictive measures: Anyone who breaches a prohibition, obligation, or restriction imposed by an EU sanctions measure may face two to six years’ imprisonment and fines up to EUR 250,000. The provision identifies a broad set of punishable conducts, including the following:
      • Making funds or economic resources available to sanctioned individuals or entities

        This covers anyone who directly or indirectly provides funds or economic resources to a designated person, entity, body, or group or who allocates funds or economic resources for their benefit. For example, this includes releasing or transferring money, granting credit, providing guarantees or performance bonds, and providing assets, goods, or any resource (whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable) that may be used to obtain funds, goods, or services.

      • Failing to freeze funds or economic resources

        This criminalizes the omission to freeze funds or economic resources that belong to or are owned, held, or controlled (even indirectly) by a designated person, entity, body, or group.

      • Engaging at any title in any economic, commercial, or financial transactions with certain third-country actors

        This makes it an offense to enter into any kind of economic, commercial or financial transaction with:

        • A third country
        • Its public bodies
        • Entities or bodies directly owned or controlled by that third country or its bodies

        The phrase at any title suggests that the scope of this provision is extremely broad. It includes concluding, continuing, or executing contracts, including public procurement and concession contracts.

      • Importing, exporting, trading, selling, purchasing, transferring, or transporting goods (including intangible goods) or providing related services

        This point covers all operations involving goods – tangible or intangible – whether moving them into or out of Italy, trading them, transferring ownership of them, or transporting them. It also includes providing related services, such as brokerage services and technical assistance.

        This provision captures many typical sanctions-circumvention attempts, including the use of intermediaries or providers of technical services.

      • Providing any type of services – including financial ones – or carrying out financial operations

        This clause establishes a residual and extremely broad category. It criminalizes the provision of any service whatsoever (not only financial), as well as undertaking any financial operation, when these conducts breach EU restrictive measures.

      The penalties provided for the basic offense (two to six years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR 25,000 to EUR 250,000) also apply to anyone who circumvents the implementation of an EU restrictive measure by: i) using, transferring to third parties, or otherwise disposing of designated persons’ frozen funds or economic resources or ii) submitting or using false statements or documents intended to obscure the beneficial ownership or ultimate beneficiary of frozen funds or economic resources.

      Paragraph 5 of Article 275-bis of the ICC extends the applicability of the previous provisions to situations in which the prohibited conduct is carried out without the required authorization or on the basis of an authorization obtained through false statements or falsified documentation. In other words, the same penalties apply when:

      • An individual performs an operation that would normally require a license or exemption under EU restrictive measures but does so without obtaining such authorization
      • The individual deceitfully obtains such authorization by submitting false information or documents and then carries out the activity

      The rule therefore ensures that fraudulent licensing practices are punished as severely as direct violations or circumventions.

    • Breach of information obligations: Designated persons or representatives of sanctioned entities who fail to report to the competent administrative authorities any funds or economic resources owned, held, or controlled within the Italian territory may face six months to two years’ imprisonment and fines up to EUR 50,000. The same penalties apply to anyone who fails to provide the competent administrative authorities with information – acquired by reason of their office or professional capacity – concerning funds or economic resources located in Italy that belong to or are owned, held, or controlled by designated persons, entities, organizations, or groups. Therefore, professional secrecy cannot constitute a shield that prevents the identification of assets covered by restrictive measures.
    • Breach of the conditions of an authorization to carry out activities: Carrying out activities in a way that does not comply with the obligations or conditions set out in an authorization issued by the competent authority when such authorization is required under an EU restrictive measure could lead to two to five years’ imprisonment and fines up to EUR 150,000.
    • Negligent violation of EU restrictive measures: Gross negligence in importing, exporting, selling, purchasing, transferring, or transporting military or dual-use products (listed in Annexes I and IV of Regulation (EU) 2021/821) or providing related services (including brokering, technical assistance, or other support services) is punishable by six months to three years’ imprisonment and fines up to EUR 90,000.

    The Draft Decree also introduces special aggravating circumstances, increasing the penalties by one-third to one-half. These apply in the situations where the offense is committed:

    • Within a criminal association
    • Through the use or submission of false statements or falsified documents
    • In the course of a professional, commercial, banking, or financial activity
    • Through abuse of powers or breach of duties connected with a public office or public service
    • Where the offense results in a substantial profit or significant advantage
    • Where the offender destroys, conceals, alters, or damages documents or objects that could serve as evidence or assist in detecting or proving the offense

    Special mitigating measures are established as well. If the offender proactively cooperates with the authorities – by preventing further consequences of the offense, facilitating the gathering of evidence, identifying other participants, or enabling the seizure of funds or economic resources – the penalty may be reduced from one-third to two-thirds. The provision is clearly designed to incentivize cooperation and enhance the effectiveness of enforcement by encouraging individuals to support the authorities in uncovering violations and identifying other perpetrators.

    Severe offenses trigger 1) mandatory assets confiscation, in direct form (confiscation of items used or intended to be used to commit the offense or that constitute the price, product, or profit of the offense) or by equivalent (seizure of assets available to the offender – even indirectly or through intermediaries – up to an amount equivalent to the price, product, or profit of the offense) and 2) publication of judgments (Article 275-novies ICC), thus reinforcing transparency and deterrence. Notably, these rules apply even to offenses committed abroad by Italian citizens.

    From a corporate standpoint, the Draft Decree incorporates the newly defined offenses into the 231 Decree (Article 25-octies.2) as new predicate crimes, triggering:

    • Pecuniary sanctions ranging from 1% to 5% of global turnover (or a fixed fine between EUR 3 million and EUR 40 million when turnover cannot be determined) for i) violation of EU restrictive measures and ii) violation of the conditions set under a granted authorization, and from 0.5% to 1% of global turnover (or a fixed fine between EUR 1 million and EUR 8 million when turnover cannot be determined) in case of violation of information obligations.

      In cases of repeated offenses, these financial penalties are further increased by one-third.

    • Disqualification sanctions – such as suspension from business activities or revocation of authorizations or licenses, as well as exclusion from financial benefits and funds – for periods ranging from two to six years when senior management is involved or one to three years for employee-level offenses.

    These measures represent a significant departure from the ordinary regime under the 231 Decree, which caps both pecuniary fines and disqualification periods at substantially lower levels (up to EUR 1.5 million and two years, respectively). The enhanced framework clearly reflects the legislator’s intention to assign greater punitive weight to sanctions-related offenses and strengthen corporate accountability and deterrence in the context of EU sanctions violations.

    The Draft Decree is currently subject to the competent parliamentary committees for review and opinion (the committees may make observations in light of the guidance given with the delegating law), thus there may be further adjustments before the final text is approved.

    Proposed reform of the 231 Decree: Key developments in corporate criminal liability

    Back in 2001, the 231 Decree introduced corporate liability, formally qualified as “administrative liability,” for a wide range of criminal offenses (regularly updated) committed by managers or employees in the interest or for the benefit of the company. A company may be held liable when it fails to implement an adequate compliance program or internal control system suitable to prevent the commission of such offenses. In particular, if the predicate offense is committed by an employee, the company can avoid liability by demonstrating that it had put in place a compliance program designed to effectively prevent that category of offenses. However, where the offense is committed by senior executives, the burden on the company is higher. Liability can be excluded only if the company provides sufficient evidence of the following:

    • It implemented an adequate and effective organizational model (MOG)
    • The Supervisory Body (Organismo di Vigilanza, or OdV) had autonomous powers of initiative and control and exercised adequate and effective oversight over the functioning, enforcement, and updating of the MOG
    • The senior manager committed the offense by fraudulently circumventing the company’s internal controls

    On September 29, 2025, Italian Parliament started discussing an extensive proposal for the reform of the 231 Decree (the Proposal). If approved, the Proposal will revise the foundations of corporate liability, further aligning Italy with EU and international standards, enhancing the preventive function of MOGs.

    Below are the key features of the Proposal:

    • Corporate “administrative liability” would be expressly redefined as “liability from crime”, more accurately reflecting the criminal nature of 231 offenses and reinforcing the autonomy of the entity’s liability.
    • The revised 231 Decree would apply only to collective entities, excluding sole proprietorships and small entities. Small entities would be excluded based on two cumulative criteria:
      • The absence of organizational and managerial autonomy of the administrative body from individuals who, even de facto, exercise control
      • Simultaneous concurrence of three restrictive thresholds: annual assets not exceeding EUR 220,000, annual revenues not exceeding EUR 440,000, and an average workforce of no more than 10 employees

      The exclusion would not apply where the entity exercises direction and coordination over a group of companies.

    • Jurisdiction is extended to entities operating in Italy through permanent establishments or structures without legal personality, regardless of their registered office (EU or non-EU).
    • The Proposal introduces a transnational ne bis in idem mechanism, which prevents dual proceedings for the same conduct where an entity has been definitively acquitted or convicted in the country where it is headquartered. A distinction is made between entities based in the EU, for which recognition of the foreign decision is automatic, and those based outside the EU, for which a standard recognition procedure is required.
    • The revised Article 5 of the 231 Decree refines how interest or advantage need to be assessed, particularly for negligent predicate offenses. Liability must derive from a breach of precautionary rules aimed at achieving cost savings, productivity gains, or other economic benefits. Moreover, parent companies may face liability for offenses committed at subsidiaries’ level, where the conduct serves a specific interest or advantage of the controlling company.
    • The Proposal removes the distinction between top management and employees. An entity would be liable if:
      • It fails to implement an effective MOG
      • It fails to assign the OdV adequate oversight duties on the functioning, enforcement, and updating of the MOG
      • The OdV does not properly perform its monitoring duties. The Proposal confirms the applicability of confiscation – even in the absence of liability – if the entity has nonetheless benefited from the offense

      In line with the proposed changes reflecting the criminal nature of corporate liability, the presumption of liability for acts committed by senior management would be abolished, thereby aligning 231 Decree’s system with the fundamental principles of criminal law.

    • The revised Article 7 of the 231 Decree establishes a new structure for MOGs, with three core components:
      • A general section (governance structure, ethics code, disciplinary system, whistleblowing channels)
      • A special section (risk mapping and predicate offenses)
      • Operational protocols (monitoring segregation of duties, reporting flows)

      MOGs must also be periodically updated and supported by mandatory, continuous training.

    • The Proposal strengthens the OdV by giving it greater autonomy and continuous oversight duties, along with full access to corporate information and adequate resources, proportionate to the size of the company. It also requires a collegial body of at least three qualified members, except for entities with fewer than 30 employees, which may appoint a single nonmanagerial internal member who meets the necessary independence and expertise requirements.
    • The Proposal reinforces the autonomy of the entity’s liability from that of the individual perpetrator when the latter remains unidentified or is not guilty. Under the new Article 8, the entity would be liable only if the offense results from a failure to adopt or implement an effective MOG. In such cases, the entity must prove under the general principles of causation in criminal law that it could have prevented the offense with the proper adoption and implementation of the MOG.
    • A new provision excludes liability for minor offenses, punishable solely with a limited pecuniary sanction, provided that a MOG was adopted prior to the commission of the offense. However, this exemption does not apply to more serious offenses (e.g., corruption, terrorism, organized crime) or in cases of repeated violations.
    • The Proposal significantly reforms the sanctions regime to enhance proportionality and deterrence:
      • When determining penalties, courts must consider the entity’s overall financial situation, in addition to its economic and asset conditions
      • Disqualification sanctions must be applied in a targeted manner, limited to the business area in which the predicate offense originated
      • Entities that voluntarily hand over illicit profits may obtain a penalties reduction
    • The Proposal also aims to strengthen the reward-based dimension of the 231 Decree. Currently, incentives for cooperation are incomplete and widely considered as insufficient; self-disclosure of violations to authorities may even imply higher risks of harsher consequences, providing companies with little motivation to disclose breaches. The Proposal introduces several innovations to this:
      • Codified nonpunishability clauses, complementing existing reductions of pecuniary sanctions and exclusions of disqualification measures, conditional upon prior adoption of a MOG
      • Introduction, for the first time, of a cause of nonpunishability based on active cooperation and timely remediation of organizational deficiencies. Specifically, nonpunishability would require:
        • That the entity, before having formal knowledge of criminal proceedings, provides the judicial authority with decisive evidence enabling the discovery of facts (e.g., with an internal investigation) or the identification of perpetrators and takes steps to prevent further consequences, provided that the entity had previously adopted a MOG (even if inadequate). Thus, procedural cooperation becomes truly effective only if preceded by a genuine commitment by the entity, prior to the offense, to foster disclosure – including through targeted internal investigations – without the risk of sanctions
        • The elimination, before trial, of the organizational gaps that facilitated the offense through the adoption of effective corrective measures suitable to mitigate the risk of similar offenses in the future
        • The alignment of the exclusion of liability for entities with that for individuals, ensuring nonpunishability when the predicate offense is extinguished for reasons not strictly personal or when the perpetrator is not punishable due to objective circumstances. This benefit applies on the condition that the entity had previously adopted a MOG and has remedied its organizational deficiencies before trial
    • A new probation mechanism for legal entities (applicable only to offenses punishable by a pecuniary sanction not exceeding, at its maximum, 500 units), combined with a dedicated procedural framework, to encourage cooperation and organizational remediation. Access to this mechanism is possible on the entity’s initiative or upon the public prosecutor’s proposal, within defined time limits. If granted, the judge would set an implementation period and actively coordinate with the OdV to ensure transparency and continuity of internal controls. Successful completion of the probation mechanism would result in the extinction of the entity’s liability; otherwise, the proceedings resume, and any actions already undertaken are considered for the determination of sanctions.

      The probation program must include a “reorganization and accountability program” that satisfies four specific conditions:

      • Adoption of a MOG
      • Assignment to the OdV of responsibility for monitoring the functioning, compliance, and updating of the MOG
      • Elimination of harmful or dangerous consequences of the offense, offering full compensation where possible and making available any additional profit obtained, including by equivalent
      • Performance of a social utility activity agreed with a territorial public entity or a noneconomic public body where the competent judicial authority is located. Social utility activity refers to a business activity of general interest, carried out without profit and for civic and solidarity purposes, carried out in the exclusive interest of a local public body or noneconomic public body

      This system reflects a paradigm shift: cooperation and remediation are no longer merely mitigating factors but, under strict conditions, can lead to full exemption from liability, thereby promoting a culture of compliance and proactive risk management.

    The Proposal will be preliminarily reviewed by the competent parliamentary committee and then discussed and approved (with possible changes) by each one of the chambers of the Italian Parliament. Considering the average duration of the legislative process, final approval is expected by mid-2026, but the timing could be significantly impacted by a number of factors.

    A converging framework: What businesses need to know

    Although driven by different policy objectives, both the proposed reform of the 231 Decree and the introduction of sanctions-related offenses under the Draft Decree will have a significant impact on corporate risk management. Together, they entail:

    • Higher compliance expectations for the corporate sector
    • Broader criminal exposure for entities
    • Enhanced oversight duties for parent companies
    • Higher standards for MOGs and OdVs
    • Harsher pecuniary and disqualification sanctions, balanced by stronger incentives for cooperation, remediation, and self-disclosure
    • The inclusion of sanctions compliance as a mandatory component of 231 Decree risk analysis

    This dual reform will need careful monitoring, since it would ultimately reshape Italy’s compliance landscape, requiring companies to revisit their governance structures and internal controls and recalibrate their approach to risk. Strengthening compliance systems ahead of these changes will enable businesses to operate with greater certainty and better mitigate both legal and reputational exposure.

    *Trainee Valeria Kiseleva also contributed to this article.

    Authors

    Fabio Cozzi

    Partner

    Milan

    Arcangela Gerbino

    Associate

    Milan

    More insights

  • SFDR 2.0 for fund managers – a step in the right direction?

    SFDR 2.0 for fund managers – a step in the right direction?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SFDR 2.0 for fund managers – a step in the right direction?

    December 4, 2025

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On 22 November 2025, the European Commission published its long-awaited legislative proposal to ‘simplify’ the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (Draft SFDR 2.0), which will transform the existing disclosure regime into a more streamlined categorisation regime.

    The Draft SFDR comes hot on the heels of an earlier ‘leaked version’ of SFDR 2.0 and just over 4 years since the original SFDR came into force. Draft SFDR 2.0 has been submitted to the European Parliament and Council for their consideration. The new regime is unlikely to apply before late 2027/early 2028.

    In depth

    Product categorisation changes

    The most significant proposal in SFDR 2.0 relates to the deletion and replacement of the existing Article 6, 8 and 9 requirements, with three new product categories known as:

    • Transition (Article 7): For funds that invest in companies and projects that are on a credible transition path, or investments that contribute towards such transition;
    • ESG Basics (Article 8): For funds that integrate sustainability factors into their investment strategy beyond consideration of sustainability risks that form part of risk management considerations; and
    • Sustainable (Article 9): For funds that invest in sustainable undertakings, sustainable economic activities, or other sustainable assets or contributes to sustainability.

    The qualifying criteria for the new product categories consist of a) a mandatory 70% binding commitment minimum investment threshold, subject to a ramp up period (the Mandatory Threshold); b) mandatory exclusions (e.g., for tobacco, prohibited weapons and fossil fuels above certain limits); and c) certain permitted investments. The European Commission has been empowered to develop criteria and provide additional colour on both the methodology for calculating the Mandatory Threshold and the assets that will qualify as permitted investments.

    Interestingly, the Draft SFDR 2.0 provides a shortcut of sorts, as funds that hold 15% or more investments in economic activities aligned with the EU Taxonomy will be deemed to have met the 70% investment threshold.

    In addition, Articles 7 and 9 must identify and disclose the principal adverse impacts (PAI) of their investments on sustainability factors and explain how these will be mitigated.

    Whilst the removal of the ‘do no significant harm’ principal and the ‘good governance’ concept from the product category criteria may be welcomed by some managers, the inclusion of certain assets and sectors in the ‘mandatory exclusions’ list may pose significant challenges for managers and sponsors seeking to target both EU and US investors or investors with conflicting and competing sustainability expectations.  This issue will need to be discussed and addressed as part of the initial fund design and marketing process. Early engagement with investors may assist in this regard.

    There is a new combination category, Article 9a, which appears to be designed for fund of funds and other indirect investment vehicles that hold investments in products that qualify as Article 7, 8 or 9, subject to compliance with certain requirements. Such funds will be allowed to rely on disclosures produced by the provider of the underlying fund or product that qualifies under the new product categorisation regime. That said, the criteria in the combination category may be difficult to comply with in practice if funds of funds are unable to obtain guarantees from the underlying fund or product provider that they will comply with the exclusion criteria in SFDR 2.0.

    Finally, the Draft SFDR 2.0 also introduces an ‘impact’ category as a sub-category of Article 7 and 9 funds that have ‘an objective of making a pre-defined positive and measurable social or environmental impact.’  In this regard, the use of the term ‘impact’ will generally be limited to such products and funds.

    Article 6a

    Funds other than those categorised as Articles 7, 8, 9 and 9a funds will still be able to disclose whether and how they consider sustainability factors in the Article 23 pre-contractual disclosures (similar to the current Article 6 requirements under SFDR 1.0), subject to compliance with certain requirements (Article 6a funds) including:

    • Compliance with the ‘fair, clear and not misleading rule’;
    • Ensuring that sustainability references do not feature in the fund’s name or marketing material; and
    • Ensuring that sustainability references are not a prominent part of disclosure (meaning it should account for less than 10% of the space taken up in describing the investment strategy of the fund).

    In addition, Draft SFDR 2.0 warns managers that care must also be taken to ensure that any sustainability references in marketing or other external facing materials do not include a claim that would result in or suggest that the fund is an Article 7, 8, 9, or 9a fund. In the absence of more prescriptive guidance, managers and sponsors may find these requirements difficult to navigate in practice. This perhaps represents a real ‘greenwashing risk’ for funds.

    No professional investors AIF opt out, but relief for portfolio managers and advisers

    Whilst the leaked version of SFDR 2.0 teased the possibility of an opt out of SFDR 2.0 for funds that only market to professional investors (almost akin to the UK approach under SDR), this has not been carried forward in the Draft SFDR 2.0. That said, there is still time for market participants and industry bodies to engage with relevant stakeholders at the EU legislative-level in a bid to have this provision reinstated in the final version.

    In better news, portfolio managers and financial advisers will be taken outside the scope of SFDR 2.0, which is a sensible approach as they do not manufacture or manage the underlying assets or products and thus have limited impact on the design of such products. This means that unless they qualify as an AIF, it should be possible for funds of one and separately managed accounts structures to fall outside the scope of SFDR 2.0.

    Disclosures

    The SFDR 2.0 has proposed significant changes to the product and entity disclosure requirements as follows:

    • Managers will no longer be required to publish and maintain information on: (a) the principal adverse impacts (PAI) of their investments decisions on sustainability factors; or (b) how their remuneration policies are consistent with the integration of sustainability risks. However, transition (Article 7) and sustainable (Article 9) funds will still have to make PAI disclosures.
    • Taxonomy eligibility and alignment disclosure will no longer be mandatory for all managers although this will still be required for transition (Article 7) and sustainable (Article 9) funds that pursue an environmental objective.
    • Fund disclosures will be significantly shortened and simplified with pre-contractual ESG disclosures capped at two pages, and periodic ESG disclosures capped at one page – although transition (Article 7) and sustainable (Article 9) funds will be required to publish an additional page which should include details of the intended impact and metrics data. It is important to note that the specific content requirements will be developed further by the European Commission at Level 2.

    Finally, managers will still be required to publish and maintain information on their websites, but this can take the form of a web link to the pre-contractual and periodic ESG disclosures.

    Data analytics

    The Draft SFDR 2.0 includes new requirements on the use of data and estimates. This will require managers to ensure that such data is based on formalised and documented arrangements and methodologies. In addition, information on sources of data and methodologies used will have to be made available to clients upon request.

    Grandfathering

    Unhelpfully, there is no transitional relief for compliance with SFDR 2.0 for open ended funds or closed ended funds that are still raising capital from investors when SFDR 2.0 enters into force.

    Whilst SFDR 2.0 will not apply until 18 months after it is published in the official journal, it is currently unclear when the Level 2 technical standards will be published by the European Commission. It is hoped that they will be published in a timely manner before the requirements in SFDR 2.0 apply to avoid any unpleasant surprises for managers and funds, which has been an unhelpful feature of SFDR 1.0.

    Commentary

    SFDR 2.0 is certainly a step in the right direction with the current vague and imprecise product disclosure tests being replaced with more prescriptive category specific criteria. The introduction of the transition category is expected to be welcomed by managers who have struggled to categorise their transition funds under the current regime. In this regard, transition funds’ strategies that focus on making an impact at the asset level are more likely to qualify for Article 7 categorisation than those with a strategy, which focuses on supporting the transition. That said, based on the nature of existing funds’ strategies, the expectation is that Article 7 funds will be a relatively niche segment of the overall fund market in the EU.

    The changes to the disclosure regime should help alleviate some of the challenges faced by funds and managers in obtaining the necessary data to support their ESG disclosures, and the removal of certain entity level disclosure requirements may further assist in reducing the overall administrative burden of compliance.

    Further, the deletion of the ‘do no significant harm’ and ‘good governance’ concepts are likely to be welcomed in particular by private credit funds and managers, who have struggled to disclose under Articles 8 and 9 due to the limited governance control and influence that they have over borrowers and the associated difficulties in plugging data gaps.

    Notwithstanding the many improvements in SFDR 2.0 text, some challenges remain, including that existing (light green) Article 8 funds may find it harder to qualify for the new product category without making material changes to their investment processes and asset selection to reflect the narrowing of the qualifying criteria. The explicit exclusion of investments in companies that derive 1% or more of their income from fossil fuels activities may also make it difficult for funds that market to US and EU investors. Additionally, the costs associated with compliance under the new regime may still be viewed as prohibitive for some funds and managers who have a limited footprint or investor base in the EU.

    Next steps

    Given the extent of the proposed changes, managers may need to start planning for implementation well ahead of the go-live date. Actions that managers may wish to consider include:

    • Assessing how existing fund strategies map across to the new product categories;
    • Identifying which changes, if any, are required to be made to existing fund documents, and whether this will require investor consent;
    • Deciding how to position, categorise, and market any new funds including in relation to Article 6a funds;
    • Engaging with investors and stakeholders to ensure that funds continue to meet expectations in relation to their sustainability features and assessing how to address any competing and conflicting investor expectations; and
    • Identifying data sources and requirements, which will now focus on exclusions, transition plans of underlying products, projects and portfolio companies, taxonomy alignments (in certain respects), and engagement data. Managers will need to take steps to ensure that data gaps and challenges are adequately plugged and accounted for prior to launching the fund.

    Feel free to reach out to our team if you would like to discuss SFDR 2.0 or understand how the proposed changes may affect your fund structures and disclosure obligations.

    Our team includes Karen Butler, Josh Dambacher and Christopher Hilditch.

    Authors

    Karen Butler

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

    Josh Dambacher

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

    Christopher Hilditch

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

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  • Tax consulting firm permitted to challenge final micro-captive reporting regulations

    Tax consulting firm permitted to challenge final micro-captive reporting regulations

    ARTICLE

    Tax consulting firm permitted to challenge final micro-captive reporting regulations

    Dec 2, 2025

    Read time: 6 min

    Ryan, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service[1] is the latest example of success in overcoming procedural hurdles to challenge the validity of a US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) regulation. In a recent opinion, the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that:

    • Ryan has standing to challenge the validity of the Treasury’s final regulations[2] that require disclosure of certain transactions engaged in by businesses and their “micro-captive insurance companies” (MCICs).
    • Ryan sufficiently pleaded its claim that the final regulations under challenge were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” and must be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).[3]
    • The court’s opinion confirms that nontaxpayer actors may have standing to challenge Treasury regulations. The case is also another example of a plaintiff reaching the merits stage of a challenge to a Treasury regulation in the aftermath of Loper Bright v. Raimondo.[4]

    Background

    Ryan is an advisor to businesses seeking to establish and maintain MCICs. “Captive” insurance companies are specialized insurance companies that exist to insure the entities that own them. When the owning entities make premium payments to the captive, the premiums do not need to include commissions or other fees associated with traditional insurers, making captives an attractive option especially when coverage is unavailable or costly through traditional insurers. Certain small captive insurance companies, commonly called MCICs, qualify for favorable tax treatment. Under section 831(b), MCICs are not taxed on the first $2.2 million in premiums paid by their owner-insured. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has increased its scrutiny of the captive insurance industry because of concerns that these arrangements may be exploited for fraud and abuse.

    The Treasury’s new regulations

    Section 6707A requires the disclosure of certain “reportable transactions,” defined as transactions that, in the IRS’s determination, have a “potential for tax avoidance or evasion.” A “listed transaction” is a type of reportable transaction in which the taxpayer is presumed to have engaged in the transaction for the purpose of tax avoidance or evasion.[5] A “transaction of interest” is a reportable transaction designated by the IRS as having a potential for abuse but is not presumed abusive.[6] These designations create heavy reporting requirements by taxpayers and their advisors (e.g., Ryan).

    Under the Treasury’s new regulations, a micro-captive insurance transaction is defined based on a loss ratio factor and a financing factor. The loss ratio factor is the ratio of the captive insurance company’s cumulative insured losses to the cumulative premiums earned over a specified period, typically the most recent 10 taxable years (or all years if less than 10). The financing factor refers to whether the captive insurance company participated in certain related-party financing arrangements within the most recent five taxable years, such as making loans or other transfers of funds to insureds, owners, or related parties. A transaction is classified as a “listed transaction” if the MCIC’s loss ratio is below 30% for the previous 10 taxable years and it provided related-party financing during the previous five taxable years. A transaction is classified as a “transaction of interest” if the MCIC’s loss ratio is below 60% for the previous 10 taxable years or it provided related-party financing during the previous five taxable years.

    A review of the Ryan, LLC v. IRS timeline

    Ryan filed its complaint in January 2025, seeking to have the final regulations set aside on the grounds that they are substantively and procedurally invalid. On April 28, 2025, the government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that Ryan lacked standing to challenge the regulations’ validity and had otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

    On November 5, 2025, the district court denied in part the government’s motion to dismiss and issued an opinion. Therein, the court ruled that Ryan did have standing to challenge the regulations. The court rejected the government’s contention that Ryan lacked the “zone of interests” required to state a claim under the APA, in part because it found that the final regulations would discourage potential clients from engaging Ryan, thus hampering its profitability.

    Following its ruling on standing, the court rejected the government’s contention that Ryan had failed to state a claim under section 706 of the APA. The crux of Ryan’s allegation was that the final regulations are arbitrary and capricious because the Treasury issued the rules without justifying to the interested public how the relevant facts and data supported its view that MCICs pose a heightened risk of tax avoidance or evasion. In Ryan’s view, the Treasury also neglected to explain why the criteria used for making its determinations that particular transactions should be “listed transactions” or “transactions of interest” (i.e., loss ratios and related-party financing) are effective in distinguishing abusive transactions from legitimate ones. Ryan will now have the opportunity to litigate its contention on the merits in the next phase of the litigation.

    Practice point:

    In 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the doctrine of regulatory deference set forth in Chevron. Ryan is now the latest case since Loper Bright in which a federal court has permitted a regulatory challenge to proceed on its merits. The Northern District of Texas, like several other courts before it, has recognized the responsibility federal courts have under Loper Bright to exercise their independent judgment when deciding statutory meaning. Ryan also underscores how taxpayers and their allies who are negatively affected by a regulation should carefully consider whether the Treasury engaged in due reasoning and consideration, as such regulations may be susceptible to invalidation on the ground that they were issued without adherence to the procedural safeguards provided under the APA.

    In depth
    Authors

    Samuel F. Hamer

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    Suzanne Golshanara

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights
    Endnotes

    [1] No. 3:25-CV-0078-B, 2025 BL 396822 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2025).

    [2] Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-10 and -11.

    [3] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

    [4] 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

    [5] See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(2).

    [6] See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(6).


  • IRS roundup: November 7 – November 24, 2025

    IRS roundup: November 7 – November 24, 2025

    ARTICLE

    IRS roundup: November 7 – November 24, 2025

    Dec 2, 2025

    Read time: 4 min

    Check out our summary of significant Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidance and relevant tax matters for November 7, 2025 – November 24, 2025.

    November 10, 2025: The IRS released Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2025-46, which includes proposed regulations 109742-25. The proposed regulations would remove a rule in previous final regulations that uses the shareholders of certain domestic corporations to determine whether foreign persons hold – directly or indirectly – stock in a domestically controlled qualified investment entity (QIE). If a QIE was not domestically controlled following the changes from the proposed regulations, stock owned by foreign persons in a QIE would qualify as a US real property interest.

    November 10, 2025: The IRS released Revenue Procedure 2025-31, providing guidance on a safe harbor that allows trusts qualifying as investment trusts under Section 301.7701-4(c) and as grantor trusts to stake digital assets without losing their tax status and offering a limited period for existing trusts to amend their governing instruments to meet the safe harbor requirements.

    November 13, 2025: The IRS released Notice 2025-67, which announces the annual cost-of-living adjustments to the limits on benefits and contributions for qualified retirement plans under Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). These adjustments, required by Section 415(d), follow procedures similar to those used for Social Security benefit updates and apply to certain amounts under deferred compensation plans.

    November 13, 2025: The IRS released Revenue Ruling 2025-22, announcing that interest rates will remain unchanged for the calendar quarter beginning January 1, 2026. The rates are as follows:

    • 7% for individual overpayments and 6% for corporate overpayments
    • 5% on the portion of a corporate overpayment exceeding $10,000
    • 7% for underpayments and 9% for large corporate underpayments

    Under the Code, these rates are recalculated quarterly based on the federal short-term rate. For noncorporate taxpayers, both overpayment and underpayment rates equal the federal short-term rate plus three percentage points. For corporations, the underpayment rate is also the short-term rate plus three points while the overpayment rate is the short-term rate plus two points. Large corporate underpayments add five points, and corporate overpayments exceeding $10,000 add 0.5 points. The current rates are based on the federal short-term rate determined in October 2025.

    November 19, 2025: The IRS announced that it would resume its regular activities following the 2025 lapse in appropriations during the government shutdown. In its announcement, the IRS included specific frequently asked questions regarding the resumption of regular activities for audits, collections, and appeals and stated that determination letter applications for tax exempt and government entities would resume.

    Recent court decisions

    November 5, 2025: The US District Court for the Northern District of Texas issued an opinion in Ryan, LLC v. IRS. Check out our recent insight on the case, including an analysis of the district court’s holdings and practice points for taxpayers.

    November 12, 2025: The US Tax Court issued its opinion in Patel v. Commissioner. The case has been closely followed for the Tax Court’s analysis of the penalty imposed under Code § 6662(i) for undisclosed transactions lacking economic substance. Check out our recent insight on Patel, including an analysis of the Tax Court’s holdings and practice points for taxpayers.

    The IRS also released its weekly list of written determinations (e.g., Private Letter Rulings, Technical Advice Memorandums, and Chief Counsel Advice).

    In depth
    Authors

    Evan Walters

    Partner

    Chicago

    Samuel F. Hamer

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    Edward L. Froelich

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Scarduzio

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Suzanne Golshanara

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights
    Endnotes