ARTICLE
Prepare for Global Collaboration in Crypto Tax Enforcement
April 16, 2021
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Check out the full Law360 article.

ARTICLE
April 16, 2021
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Check out the full Law360 article.

ARTICLE
April 16, 2021
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
April 15, 2021
Read time: 11 min
Antitrust cartel and related collusive scheme enforcement is poised to increase. Several factors support this: (1) the Antitrust Division (the Division) has a 10% budget increase for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021; (2) proposed legislation that would increase its budget by $300 million; (3) Democratic administrations have traditionally been more aggressive in enforcing antitrust laws; (4) according to the US Department of Justice (DOJ), last year the Division opened the most grand jury investigations in almost 20 years and by the end of 2020 had the most open grand jury investigations in a decade; (5) increased coordination with international law enforcement agencies, including the Division recently signing a number of cross-border agreements, maintaining active memberships in multilateral organizations dedicated to cross-border antitrust enforcement cooperation and a DOJ official recently noting they have been working at strengthening their relationships with international law enforcement agencies during the pandemic and they expect this to benefit international coordination on investigations and (6) as pandemic limitations on in-person investigative tactics subside (including search warrants and knock and talk interviews, among others), expect a return to overt tactics related to open grand jury investigations.
Historically, cartel enforcement has increased following economic downturns and substantial federal stimulus packages. For example, after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2009 Recovery Act, the DOJ filed 60% more criminal cases than in prior years. We expect this trend to continue in the wake of the unprecedented government stimulus packages passed in 2020 and 2021 and additional potential government spending on infrastructure. In addition to the increased resources, the Division has stepped up its criminal enforcement program with the creation and recent expansion of the Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF), the expansion of criminal investigations and prosecutions into labor markets, higher expectations for corporate cooperators and new potential benefits for corporate entities with compliance programs addressing antitrust violations.
Below we discuss the sectors most likely to be implicated by increased criminal antitrust enforcement, the PCSF and what steps can be taken to prepare and minimize risk in this environment.
EXPECTED INDUSTRY FOCUS
Based on the trends described above and our recent experience at the DOJ, we expect antitrust criminal enforcement to focus in at least the following industries:
THE PCSF WILL AFFECT MANY INDUSTRIES
Investigations and prosecutions relating to procurement are not just about traditional government defense contractors, rather, the PCSF is active in a broad array of industries that contract with the government, including construction, healthcare, defense and energy. The PCSF leads the DOJ’s coordinated national response to combating antitrust crimes and related schemes in government procurement, grant and program funding fraud at the federal, state and local government level. The PCSF has prioritized trainings on recognizing antitrust crimes and red flags of collusion and to date has trained over 10,000 law enforcement agents, analysts, auditors, lawyers and procurement officers from over 500 offices and agencies that investigate a broad swath of conduct in numerous industries. The PCSF recently expanded its domestic reach and in 2021, we expect the PCSF to (1) further expand its platform with PCSF Global; (2) further build out its data analytics program and mine available procurement data, among others, to identify patterns that indicate or suggest collusion and (3) advance some of its dozens of open investigations to the charging stage, where appropriate.
Companies doing business with government agencies – even if it’s only a small percentage of their business – should expect increased scrutiny for bids and the bid award process, including potential changes to the bid award process. Companies should be attentive in ensuring their compliance with the antitrust and government procurement laws, particularly in light of the DOJ’s compliance program guidance (discussed below). Based on our recent experience with the PCSF, companies can minimize their risks in the following ways:
The DOJ’s recently charged cases provide insight into the breadth of future conduct the PCSF will investigate and pursue, both domestically and abroad and against individuals and corporations. For example, the Division has aggressively investigated and prosecuted individuals for allegedly defrauding the SBA for more than $250 million, as well as bid-rigging at General Services Administration (GSA) Auctions where the alleged loss (less than $70,000) is miniscule in comparison. The DOJ has shown its willingness to step into regional corporate conduct allegedly defrauding the government (See the following articles for more information: “Engineering Firm And Its Former Executive Indicted On Antitrust And Fraud Charges” and “Ready-Mix Concrete Company Admits to Fixing Prices and Rigging Bids in Violation of Antitrust Laws.”), as well as aggressively pursuing allegedly fraudulent conduct on an international scale. (See the following articles for more information: “Three South Korean Companies Agree to Plead Guilty and to Enter into Civil Settlements for Rigging Bids on United States Department of Defense Fuel Supply Contracts,” “More Charges Announced in Ongoing Investigation into Bid Rigging and Fraud Targeting Defense Department Fuel Supply Contracts for U.S. Military Bases in South Korea” and “South Korean National Pleads Guilty to Scheme to Defraud U.S. Department of Defense.”) Simply put, the PCSF is not limited to only large-scale or domestic investigations. The emergence from a global pandemic and the unprecedented government stimulus spending just as the PCSF is expanding its reach should bolster the PCSF’s efforts in the coming year.
Practice Note: In the Division’s ongoing North Carolina Drainage public works contract investigation, the indictment alleged bid-rigging between a manufacturer and its supplier, which is typically a vertical relationship and generally subject to the Rule of Reason rather than per se criminal analysis. However, the DOJ alleged the manufacturer and its supplier held themselves out as competitors when submitting the bids in question over a 10-year period. In a recent ruling on a motion to dismiss, the US District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (EDNC) held that the allegations were subject to per se criminal analysis. This prosecution demonstrates that the DOJ is willing to aggressively investigate and prosecute competitor relationships that are traditionally examined under a Rule of Reason analysis and instead focus on the specific, alleged transaction(s) between vertical entities. Such prosecutions may be more common where joint ventures or similar teaming agreements are not in place.
WHAT CAN YOU DO TO PREPARE FOR THIS ENVIRONMENT AND MINIMIZE RISK?
Historically, the Division provided no credit to corporate entities for their compliance programs at the charging recommendation stage in criminal antitrust investigations. In a substantial shift, the DOJ announced it would consider corporate compliance programs at the charging and penalty recommendation stages and published its guidance for prosecutors to evaluate such compliance programs. (See the following article for more information: “Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks at the New York University School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement.”) More importantly, the DOJ now allows criminal antitrust violations to be resolved with deferred prosecution agreements (DPA).
This is a significant development and opportunity for companies to proactively consider and reevaluate their antitrust compliance programs. An antitrust violation can be costly – it may result in substantial criminal fines, potential suspension or debarment, the criminal investigation and/or prosecution of corporate executives, up to treble damages in parallel civil proceedings and reputational damage. An effective antitrust compliance program may entirely avoid, significantly avoid or lessen these costs. It may also allow detection of potential violations and provide an opportunity to seek leniency or ultimately receive a DPA if leniency is not available.
Based on our recent experience at the DOJ, the following corporate compliance considerations are critical:
With appropriately tailored antitrust compliance programs that will identify and detect potential violations, companies should be well-positioned to avoid or minimize risks from the expected DOJ increase in domestic and international criminal antitrust enforcement.
ARTICLE
April 15, 2021
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
April 15, 2021
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Now that the Covid 19 pandemic has led more and more companies to relocate their employees to the home office or to introduce mobile work, the current Corona occupational health and safety regulations now also require employers to allow their employees to work from the home office as far as possible.
Nevertheless, there is uncertainty about which requirements have to be observed from the point of view of labor law and data protection. Bettina Holzberger and Dr. Philipp Uecker will show you the most important points that, from our point of view, must be observed when organizing home office and mobile work.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
April 14, 2021
Read time: 9 min
The American Recovery Plan Act of 2021 (“ARPA”), which President Biden signed into law on March 11, 2021, requires the federal government to fully subsidize the COBRA premiums for certain COBRA-eligible individuals for coverage periods between April 1, 2021 and Sept. 30, 2021. While the federal government will bear the ultimate financial burden of the subsidy, employers and plan sponsors will need to grapple with the logistics of administering the subsidy, including notifying eligible individuals and fronting the cost of the monthly premium. On April 7, 2021, the DOL released a series of FAQs to help guide employers and plan sponsors with implementation of the subsidy.
The COBRA subsidy, which is 100% of the monthly premium in addition to the 2% administration fee, applies to employer-sponsored group health plans, multiemployer plans, government plans and plans subject only to state “mini-COBRA” laws (i.e., based on their size). The subsidy does not apply to coverage under a health flexible spending arrangement (“FSA”), which means that participants can elect to continue contributions to their FSA but will be responsible for making such contributions.
The subsidy is available only to “Assistance Eligible Individuals,” which ARPA defines as COBRA qualified beneficiaries who:
As discussed below, former employees who have individual coverage, such as through a Health Insurance Marketplace (or “Exchange”) may be eligible for the subsidy. Former employees who terminated their employment for any other reason (i.e., voluntary quit or termination for gross misconduct), are not eligible for the subsidy.
While the maximum subsidy period is six months, Assistance Eligible Individuals will lose the subsidy early if:
Assistance Eligible Individuals are responsible for notifying their former employers if they become eligible for alternative group health plan coverage. Failure to do so could result in a tax penalty.
If an Assistance Eligible Individual receives the COBRA subsidy for the full six months but has not exhausted his or her maximum COBRA coverage period by Sept. 30, 2021, he or she can continue to receive COBRA coverage as long as he or she remits the appropriate COBRA premium (unless the Assistance Eligible Individual is not required to do so pursuant to an agreement with his or her former employer).
In addition to the COBRA subsidy, ARPA also provides an additional election period for COBRA qualified beneficiaries (including family members) who experienced an involuntary termination or reduction in hours prior to April 1, 2021 but either did not elect COBRA coverage at that time or did elect COBRA but are no longer enrolled (for reasons other than reaching the end of their maximum COBRA coverage period). However, this “second bite at the apple” does not extend the maximum COBRA coverage period. For example, an Assistance Eligible Individual who, prior to April 1, 2021, had two months left before reaching the end of her maximum COBRA coverage period will be eligible for only two months of additional coverage and two months of the subsidy. Conversely, an Assistance Eligible Individual who, prior to April 1, 2021, had eight months left before reaching the end of her maximum COBRA coverage period will be eligible for the full eight months of additional coverage but only six months of subsidized coverage (assuming the coverage and subsidy do not end early).
ARPA does permit employers and plan sponsors discretion with respect to one matter — the ability to allow Assistance Eligible Individuals to change their coverage to another coverage option offered by the employer or plan sponsor. For example, if an employer offers three plans for employees to choose from — an HMO, an EPO and a PPO — and an Assistance Eligible Individual was covered under the HMO option at the time of his or her qualifying event, the employer could permit Assistance Eligible Individuals to change to the EPO or PPO option at the time of COBRA enrollment.
Specifically, in its FAQs, the DOL clarified that an individual will lose eligibility for the subsidy if:
Assistance Eligible Individuals are not responsible for paying any COBRA premiums for coverage between April 1, 2021 and Sept. 30, 2021. Employers or plan sponsors pay the full premium directly and then will be reimbursed through quarterly payroll tax credits. If an Assistance Eligible Individual does pay a COBRA premium during the subsidy period, that person’s former employer or plan sponsor must provide reimbursement for the amount paid (or a credit against any future payments after Sept. 30, 2021).
Importantly, because Assistance Eligible Individuals are now entitled under federal law to free COBRA coverage for six months, employers cannot offer COBRA coverage as consideration in a separation agreement for a release from an Assistance Eligible Individual during this time. Additionally, separation agreements cannot provide that Assistance Eligible Individuals will be required to pay for COBRA coverage after their last day of employment, or after the last day of the month in which their reduction in hours or involuntary termination of employment occurred, from now through Sept. 30, 2021. An employer may, however, elect to provide continuation of paid COBRA past the six month subsidy period to provide consideration for a release of claims.
Employers and plan sponsors must now inform Assistance Eligible Individuals of their expanded COBRA rights and eligible for the COBRA subsidy within certain timeframes. Specifically, employers and plan sponsors must provide:
The notices must include:
The DOL has issued model notices that contain sample language that employers and plan sponsors may tailor to their own needs.
Employers and plan sponsors that do not comply with COBRA coverage requirements, including ARPA’s expanded coverage requirements, may be subject to an excise tax of $100 per qualified beneficiary (subject to a maximum of $200 per family).
To comply with ARPA’s expanded COBRA coverage requirements and avoid a potential excise tax, employers and plan sponsors must:
Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Susan E. Bernstein and Melissa J. Sandak.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, or wish to update your plan documents and participant communications to reflect these measures, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP or one of the authors.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
April 13, 2021
Read time: 13 min
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. securities markets have seen an exponential rise in the use of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (“SPACs”) as an alternative to more traditional initial public offering (“IPOs”) and direct listings. SPACs raised over $80 billion in 2020, exceeding the total capital raised by these vehicles during the preceding decade. The number of SPACs going public has continued to accelerate in 2021, with approximately $100 billion raised so far this year. The growth has been fueled by significant interest and demand from investors and, in many cases, an influx of high-profile sponsors. However, the SPAC ecosystem is facing myriad headwinds including increased scrutiny from regulators and the plaintiffs’ bar. While we expect SPACs to remain a popular vehicle with enormous potential to reshape the way private companies enter the public markets, the importance of ensuring that SPAC deals are properly structured and that participants have adequate legal and compliance resources has never been greater.
Specifically, on April 8, 2021, John Coates, Acting Director of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance,[1] signaled in the most direct terms yet that the SEC intends to apply an unprecedented level of scrutiny to disclosures accompanying either the initial issuance of the SPAC securities or a follow-on transaction funded — at least in part — by a SPAC structure. Director Coates’ statement came on the coattails of a near-constant stream of investor alerts, bulletins and other warnings that began in late 2020.
On Dec. 10, 2020, the SECs Office of Investor Education and Advocacy (“OIEA”) issued a bulletin for retail investors that explained the basic mechanics and key risks of SPACs.[2] Shortly thereafter, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance warned participants in SPAC transactions about the importance of complete, clear and accurate disclosures regarding potential conflicts of interest between SPAC investors and, among others, sponsors, targets, advisors and their affiliates.[3]
On March 10, 2021, the OIEA issued an investor alert highlighting the unique risks that SPACs pose to investors, including how they differ from traditional IPOs, and expressing caution about the increasing prevalence of celebrity SPAC sponsors.[4] A few weeks later, on March 31, 2021, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant issued separate statements reminding SPAC targets and their officers and directors about the importance of regulatory and financial reporting requirements associated with becoming a public company.[5] The Division of Corporation Finance’s statement noted that, as shell companies, SPACs are subject to certain limitations, including that the combined company will not be eligible to incorporate by reference information in Exchange Act reports on Form S-1 until three years after the completion of a merger.[6] It also detailed books and records and internal control requirements, as well as exchange listing standards that private target companies need to understand before merging with a shell company (commonly referred to as a “de-SPAC transaction”).[7] The Chief Accountant’s statement addressed the enhanced timing, financial reporting and governance issues inherent in a “de-SPAC” transaction, in which the SPAC puts its funds to work in an acquisition, and reminded auditors and audit committee members of their oversight responsibilities.
It was therefore no surprise that, in a statement released on April 8, 2021 by the SEC’s Acting Director of Corporation Finance (“SEC Director’s Statement”), the SEC strongly affirmed that it intends to use every tool in its arsenal to apply the protections of the federal securities laws to SPACs, and, in particular, the process by which a SPAC merges with a target to take a private company public. Regardless of whether in the context of registration statements,[8] proxy solicitations[9] or tender offers,[10] the SEC Director’s Statement signaled that the SEC will be carefully evaluating participants’ statements and disclosures at all stages of the SPAC lifecycle for potential violations of the federal securities laws.
Director Coates made clear that material misstatements or omissions relating to any de-SPAC transaction will be subject to liability under Sections 11 and 14(e) of the Exchange Act, respectively. Similarly, any material misstatement or omission in connection with a proxy solicitation would also be subject to liability under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 thereunder. Additionally, any material misstatement or omission about the target company could give rise to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 based on trading in securities of the pre-merger SPAC and/or the post-merger company. For example, in September 2020, the SEC filed a complaint against Akazoo S.A. that included Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims based on false statements that were allegedly made in public reports while its shares traded publicly on the Nasdaq.[11]
The SEC Director’s Statement challenges the assumption that the SPAC process offers protection from civil liability for forward-looking proxy statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (“PSLRA”) safe harbor.[12] By way of background, the PSLRA includes a safe-harbor for certain forward-looking statements[13] that are identified as such and “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement; or immaterial … “[14] The PSLRA, however, contains three enumerated exclusions from the statutory safe harbor for statements made in connection with (i) offerings by “blank check companies,” (ii) offerings made by “penny stock” issuers and (iii) IPOs. The SEC Director’s Statement notes that the PSLRA references the SEC’s rules defining blank check companies and the Exchange Act’s definition of penny stock, but does not refer to any definition of “initial public offering,” and therefore posits a theory that all de-SPAC transactions may be excluded from the PSLRA safe harbor under the IPO exception.[15]
Accordingly, participants in SPAC and de-SPAC transactions should carefully consider the limitations of any perceived liability differences afforded to this structure. Following Director Coates’ comments, the plaintiffs’ bar will almost certainly take the position that de-SPAC transactions are not subject to the PSLRA safe-harbor. Moreover, even if de-SPAC transactions fall within the protections of the PSLRA safe-harbor, Director Coates reminds targets, and by extension the plaintiffs’ bar, that the PSLRA does not protect against false or misleading statements made with actual knowledge that the statement was false or misleading.[16] Finally, Director Coates points out that there are additional causes of action that can be brought under state law and could subject issuers, targets and their investors and directors to civil liability in connection with de-SPAC transactions.
Consistent with Director Coates’ warning, we are already seeing civil suits alleging both perceived misstatements by parties under the federal securities laws and breaches of fiduciary duties by sponsors and directors in connection with de-SPAC transactions. As an example, in Zuod v. Lordstown Motors,[17] plaintiffs alleged that a SPAC target company, Lordstown Motors, misled SPAC investors into approving a combination by, among other things, including fictitious pre-orders, making false claims concerning time-to-market and failing to disclose the CEO’s termination for misconduct and mismanagement from the separate company developing Lordstown’s electric truck.[18] While the plaintiff’s civil allegations against Lordstown have yet to be adjudicated, Lordstown disclosed during a March 17, 2021 conference call that the company had also received a request for information from the SEC.[19]
In addition to claims of misrepresentation, plaintiffs are also using state corporate governance law to bring actions against officers, directors and sponsors for breaching their fiduciary duties in connection with de-SPAC transactions. Specifically, on March 25, 2021, in Kwame Amo v. MultiPlan Corp.,[20] plaintiff brought a putative class action under Delaware state law alleging that MultiPlan’s directors and sponsors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to adequately mitigate certain inherent conflicts of interest.[21] The MultiPlan plaintiff alleged that the “entire fairness” standard, which is onerous and would require the defendants to demonstrate that the transaction was both procedurally and substantively fair, should apply to the de-SPAC acquisition, as the directors and sponsors approved the consolidated transaction through “a deeply flawed and unfair process.”[22]
Given the flurry of new SPACs and the recent comments from Director Coates, we expect to see many more civil suits filed against sponsors and directors. Indeed, on April 9, 2021, a second and substantially-similar class-action complaint was filed against MultiPlan in the Delaware Court of Chancery on behalf of a second class of plaintiffs.[23]
Traditionally, emerging market trends have resulted in enhanced regulatory scrutiny and a flurry of civil litigation. While the recent unprecedented interest by investors in SPACs provides enormous potential to capital market participants, the structure can present complicated conflicts and other novel issues and has become an attractive target for securities regulators and the plaintiffs’ bar. Recent developments reflecting aggressive enforcement by the SEC and securities industry SROs, likely suggests that if 2020 was the “Year of the SPAC,” then 2021 may well be a year of unprecedented regulatory scrutiny and private securities litigation against SPAC sponsors, targets, advisors and their affiliates for deals that are improperly structured or where the participants fail to adequately address the legal and compliance issues inherent in the structure.
This is part of a series of SRZ Alerts regarding SPAC litigation. In addition to our robust SPAC transactions practice, which advises clients on SPAC IPOs and business combination transactions, SPAC sponsor investments, SPAC PIPEs and trading in SPACs generally, SRZ has a SPAC litigation task force advising, monitoring and advocating on SPAC litigation and regulatory developments. If you have any questions, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
Authored by Charles J. Clark, Douglas I. Koff, Gayle R. Klein, Michael E. Swartz, Andrew J. Fadale, William H. Gussman, Jr., Eleazer Klein, Derek N. Lacarrubba and J. Eric Prather.
[1] Securities and Exchange Commission, Acting Director of Division of Corporation Finance, SPACS, IPOs, and Liability Risk under the Securities Laws (April 8, 2021), available here.
[2] See Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, SPACs – What You Need To Know (Dec. 10, 2020), available here.
[3] Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 11: Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Dec. 22, 2020), available here.
[4] Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, Celebrity Involvement with SPACs — Investor Alert (Mar. 10, 2021), available here; Note that the SEC has issued similar warnings focused on celebrity promotions associated with cryptocurrency offerings, resulting in enforcement actions being brought against certain celebrity promoters. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement and Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, SEC Statement Urging Caution Around Celebrity Backed ICOs (Nov. 1, 2017) available here; Two Celebrities Charged With Unlawfully Touting Coin Offerings, SEC Press Release 2018-268 (Nov. 29, 2018), available here.
[5] Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Statement on Select Issues Pertaining to Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (March 31, 2021), available here; Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the Chief Accountant, Financial Reporting and Auditing Considerations of Companies Merging with SPACs (March 31, 2021), available here.
[6] See General Instruction VII.D.1(b) to Form S-1.
[7] Note that the SPAC lifecycle consists of two distinct phases. First, a shell company is formed (the SPAC), which registers a securities offering and sells shares to investors to fund the future acquisition of one or more private companies. The proceeds from that sale are held in a trust until the eventual acquisition. In the second stage, the SPAC combines with a private company (i.e., the “de-SPAC” transaction), upon which the target, in effect, becomes a public company.
[8] Subject to liability under Securities Exchange Act Section 11.
[9] Director Coates also reminded participants that liability under section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 are generally subject to a “negligence” standard. See, e.g., Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2009) (“There is no required state of mind for a violation of section 14(a); a proxy solicitation that contains a misleading misrepresentation or omission violates the section even if the issuer believed in perfect good faith that there was nothing misleading in the proxy materials”); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on Potential Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Section 14(a) Liability, Exchange Act Release No. 51283 (Mar. 1, 2005) (“Where the failure to make such disclosure is negligent, an issuer would violate Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 thereunder…”).
[10] Subject to liability under Securities Exchange Act Section 14(e).
[11] Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Akazoo S.A., Docket No. 1:20-cv-08101 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sep. 30, 2020); In September 2020, shareholders also filed suit against Akazoo S.A., Modern Media Acquisition Corp. (“MMAC”), a SPAC, and its directors and officers alleging material misstatements about Akazoo’s user base and competitive advantages in Akazoo’s registration and proxy statements. See Amended Complaint, In re Akazoo S.A. Securities Litigation, Docket No. 1:20-cv-01900 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 08, 2020).
[12] Note, that the SEC Director’s Statement emphasizes that the safe-harbor applies only to private litigation and does not thwart SEC prosecution.
[13] Note that the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have all held that PSLRA’s safe harbor does not apply to non-forward-looking statements, even when contained within mixed statements made by defendants that contain both forward looking and non-forward-looking statements. See In re Stone & Webster, Inc., Securities Litigation, 414 F.3d 187, 211-13 (1st Circ. 2005); In re Vivendi, S.A., Securities Litigation, 838 F.3d 223, 246 (2d Cir. 2016); Institutional Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 255 (3d. 2009); Spitzberg v. Houston American Energy Corp., 758 F.3d 676, 691-92 (5th Cir. 2014); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2008); City of Miami Fire Fighters’ & Police Officers’ Ret. Tr. v. Quality Sys., Inc. (In re Quality Sys., Inc.), 865 F.3d 1130, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017).
[14] 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
[15] The Director suggests that given the PSLRA’s legislative history, and that the result of a de-SPAC transaction is the public offering of a private company, de-SPAC transactions may be excluded from the safe harbor by the PSLRA’s IPO exclusion.
[16] See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (the safe harbor does not apply where a plaintiff proves that the forward looking statement “was made with actual knowledge [by the maker or approver] that the statement was false or misleading”). The SEC Director’s Statement provides an example where, assuming arguendo that the PSLRA safe harbor applies, a target that possesses multiple sets of projections and only presents the most favorable one and omitting the less favorable ones would still be subject to civil liability for a knowing misstatement. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that while Section 11 liability does not apply in the case of “a sincere statement of pure opinion … regardless of whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong,” liability will attach where the speaker does not actually hold the stated opinion, if the opinion contains “embedded statements of untrue facts,” or if an excluded fact “shows that the [Defendant] lacked the basis” for the stated opinion that a reasonable investor would expect. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1326, 1333 (2015); see also Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 214 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that so long as an issuer has conducted a “meaningful inquiry” into and sincerely believed the stated opinion in question, the statement is not actionable under Section 11).
[17] Complaint, Zuod v. Lordstown Motors Corp. et al, Docket No. 4:21-cv-00720 (N.D. Ohio filed Apr. 02, 2021).
[18] Id. at 2-3.
[19] Id. at 3.
[20] Complaint, Kwame Amo v. MultiPlan Corp., C.A. No. 2021-0258 (Del. Ch. filed Mar. 25, 2021).
[21] Id. at 1-2.
[22] Id. ¶ 3.
[23] Complaint, Anthony Franchi v. MultiPlan Corp., C.A. No. 2021-0300 (Del. Ch. filed Apr. 09, 2021).
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
ARTICLE
April 12, 2021
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ARTICLE
April 2021
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ARTICLE
April 9, 2021
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