Content Type: Article

  • SEC Approves NYSE’s Amended ‘Related Party’ and ‘20%’ Stockholder Approval Rules

    SEC Approves NYSE’s Amended ‘Related Party’ and ‘20%’ Stockholder Approval Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    SEC Approves NYSE’s Amended ‘Related Party’ and ‘20%’ Stockholder Approval Rules

    April 9, 2021

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 2, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved, on an accelerated basis, an amended proposal by the NYSE to amend certain of its stockholder approval rules set forth in the NYSE Listed Company Manual (“NYSE Manual”). The formal approval comes after the NYSE instituted a temporary waiver of these rules due to the challenges companies faced during the COVID-19 pandemic. See our Jan. 12, 2021 Alert and Oct. 9, 2020 Alert for more detail.

    Rule 312.03(b) — As amended, the Related Party Stockholder Approval Rule:

    • No longer requires prior stockholder approval for issuances to the subsidiaries, affiliates or other closely related persons of directors, officers and substantial securityholders (“Related Party”) or to entities in which a Related Party has a substantial interest (except where a Related Party has a 5% or greater interest in the counterparty (as described below)).
    • No longer requires stockholder approval of cash sales to a Related Party if the sale meets the NYSE minimum price requirement, even where the number of shares of common stock to be issued (or the number of shares of common stock into which the securities may be convertible or exercisable) exceeds either 1% of the number of shares of common stock or 1% of the voting power outstanding before the issuance.
    • Requires stockholder approval of any transaction or series of related transactions in which any Related Party has a 5% or greater interest (or collectively have a 10% or greater interest), directly or indirectly, in the company or assets to be acquired or in the consideration to be paid in the transaction and the issuance of common stock, or securities convertible into common stock, could increase the outstanding common shares by 5% or more.
    • Deletes now irrelevant provisions relating to (i) cash sales that meet the NYSE minimum price requirement, and where the issuance does not exceed 5% of the shares of common stock or voting power before the issuance, to a Related Party where the Related Party involved in the transaction is classified as a Related Party solely because the person is a substantial security holder; and (ii) an exemption related to early stage companies.

    Rule 312.03(c) — As amended, the 20% Stockholder Approval Rule:

    • Replaces the reference to “bona fide private financing” in the exception from shareholder approval for transactions relating to 20% or more of the company’s outstanding common stock or voting power with “other financing (that is not a public offering for cash) in which the company is selling securities for cash.” This would eliminate the 5% limit for any single purchaser participating in a transaction, thus permitting companies to consummate a financing to a single purchaser.
    • Requires shareholder approval if the securities in a financing are issued in connection with an acquisition of the stock or assets of another company and the issuance of the securities alone or when combined with any other present or potential issuance of common stock, or securities convertible into common stock, is equal to or exceeds either 20% of the number of shares of common stock or of the voting power outstanding before the issuance.

    In addition, amendments to Section 314 of the NYSE Manual requires a company’s audit committee or other independent body of the board of directors to review related party transactions prior to any transaction and prohibit the transaction if it determines the transaction is not consistent with the interests of the company and its shareholders. For purposes of Section 314, related party transactions would mean those transactions required to be disclosed pursuant to Item 404 of Regulation S-K under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (without giving effect to the transaction value threshold of that provision).

    Authored by Ele Klein and Evan A. Berger.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Ele Klein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • FDLI’s Regulatory Agency Transparency for Drugs and Biologics: A Comparative Survey of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the European Medicines Agency, and Health Canada

    ARTICLE

    FDLI’s Regulatory Agency Transparency for Drugs and Biologics: A Comparative Survey of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the European Medicines Agency, and Health Canada

    April 8, 2021

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
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  • Opinion: Internet Access Is a Critical Telehealth, Equity Issue

    Opinion: Internet Access Is a Critical Telehealth, Equity Issue

    ARTICLE

    Opinion: Internet Access Is a Critical Telehealth, Equity Issue

    April 8, 2021

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

     

     

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  • Regulated Investment Companies

    Regulated Investment Companies

    ARTICLE

    Regulated Investment Companies

    April 2021

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

     

     

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  • Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Split on “Autodialer” Definition, Narrowing TCPA Applicability

    Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Split on “Autodialer” Definition, Narrowing TCPA Applicability

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Split on “Autodialer” Definition, Narrowing TCPA Applicability

    April 8, 2021

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On April 1, 2021, the Supreme Court answered a question that has been at the heart of the recent wave of class-action litigation under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) in its long-awaited ruling in Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid. Contrary to decisions from lower courts and expansive rulings from the Federal Communications Commission, the Court adopted a narrow (and caller-friendly) reading of the TCPA that appears to exclude most modern dialing technology (including predictive dialers) that targets known lists of customers from the definition of “automatic telephone dialing system” and instead appears to include only to seldom-used robocalling machines with the capacity to dial numbers randomly or sequentially.

    In depth

    With limited exceptions, the TCPA prohibits calling a wireless phone number using an ATDS unless the caller has obtained either “prior express consent” for informational calls or “prior express written consent” for telemarketing calls.

    The problem is that until the Duguid ruling, no one could agree on what an ATDS actually is. The 1991 statute defines an ATDS opaquely as “equipment which has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”

    The class-action plaintiffs in Duguid—represented by legal-writing professor and lexicographer Bryan Garner—argued that the modifier “using a random or sequential number generator” applied only to the word “produce” and not “store” in the definition’s first clause. But citing Mr. Garner’s treatise (co-authored with the late Justice Scalia), the Court applied the “series-qualifier canon” and ruled that the random/sequential number generator requirement applies to the sentence as a whole. Indeed, the problem with the plaintiffs’ broad argument was its absurd implications, including that even an iPhone would appear to meet the definition of an ATDS and thus apply substantial penalties for ordinary calls made without prior express consent.

    What are the real-world implications of this linguistic tussle? The definition of ATDS is now a narrow one, and it appears to exclude modern dialing technology (including predictive dialers) that targets known lists of customers—and appears to apply only to seldom-used robocalling machines with the capacity to dial numbers randomly or sequentially (e.g., 555-1000; then 555-1001; then 555-1002, and so on). While this ruling may increase the number of calls that we all receive, it appears to be in keeping with the original intent and plain meaning of the statute.

    Next Steps

    For now, this decision is a significant victory for the companies that rely on automatic dialing to communicate with their customers.

    However, we offer three notes of caution:

    • It is too soon to abandon the processes for obtaining and tracking consumer intent when relying on predictive dialing or other similar systems. District and circuit courts may apply Duguid narrowly, making it hard to dodge TCPA cases on a motion to dismiss. Prudence counsels patience here, as we wait to see how Duguid will be applied in a pragmatic way by the lower courts.
    • This decision does not address the TCPA’s parallel restrictions on calls placed using an artificial or pre-recorded voice. Accordingly, callers must still obtain the appropriate level of consent for these calls.
    • The reality is that this decision will lead to all of us receiving more calls and texts from businesses. Some people welcome such messages as an effective way to get an appointment or prescription reminders, post-discharge instructions, account security alerts, or myriad other helpful messages. But an increase in automated calls is likely to be an unpopular outcome. Senator Ed Markey, a co-author of the TCPA in 1991, has already stated that he intends on introducing legislation to amend the TCPA to “fix the Court’s error.” Thus, callers should continue to remain diligent in capturing necessary consent and maintaining adequate documentation of records to demonstrate that they have done so before calling or texting.

    We will continue monitoring these developments in the lower courts along with any proposed legislation.

    If you have questions about the decision or its implications for your calling or text messaging programs, please contact any of the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

    Matthew L. Knowles

    Partner

    Boston

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  • LIBOR Transition Update: New York State Legislature Passes LIBOR Transition Bill

    LIBOR Transition Update: New York State Legislature Passes LIBOR Transition Bill

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    LIBOR Transition Update: New York State Legislature Passes LIBOR Transition Bill

    April 7, 2021

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 24, the New York State Legislature passed Senate Bill 297B/Assembly Bill 164B (“Bill”)[1] which addresses the legal uncertainty and potential adverse impacts associated with the transition away from the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) due to its upcoming cessation. This Bill is closely based on the legislation proposed by the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (“ARRC”) on March 1, 2021.[2] The Bill will next be delivered to Governor Cuomo for his consideration and signature or veto.

    If signed into law by Governor Cuomo,* the Bill would provide a statutory replacement benchmark rate for agreements governed by New York law that use LIBOR but which contain no fallback provisions or which contain fallback provisions which result in replacement rates that are based on LIBOR in some way. The Bill would also prohibit parties to such agreements from refusing to perform contractual obligations or declaring a breach of contract as a result of the discontinuance of LIBOR or use of a “recommended benchmark replacement,” as well as establish that the selection or use of the recommended benchmark replacement constitutes a commercially reasonable replacement for, and a commercially substantial equivalent to, LIBOR. The Bill also provides a safe harbor from litigation for the use of the recommended benchmark replacement. The Bill will not override contracts which either fall back expressly to a non-LIBOR based rate or which give a determining person the right to exercise discretion or judgement regarding fallback language.

    The Bill would convert the interest rate in such contracts from LIBOR to the new recommended benchmark replacement selected or recommended by a “relevant recommending body” (defined as the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the ARRC, or any successors to any of them) following the occurrence of a “LIBOR discontinuance event” (defined as a statement or publication by or on behalf of the administrator or regulators of LIBOR that the administrator has ceased or will cease to provide LIBOR, and no successor administrator will continue to provide LIBOR, or announcing that LIBOR will no longer be representative).[3] The recommended benchmark replacement selected by the ARRC is the Secured Overnight Financing Rate, and would include any “recommended spread adjustment” and any “benchmark replacement conforming changes” (which include any technical, administrative or operation changes that are reasonably necessary) recommended by the relevant recommending body.

    The ARRC has noted that there may still be a significant portion of contracts that will mature after the respective Dec. 31, 2021 and June 30, 2023 cessation dates which have no other effective means to replace LIBOR upon its cessation, and that the Bill would address such contracts written under New York law, which governs many of the financial products and agreements referencing LIBOR. For further information on the upcoming cessation dates for all LIBOR settings announced by LIBOR’s administrator and regulator, see our March 8, 2021 Alert.[4]

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Taleah E. Jennings, Douglas I. Koff, Anna Maleva-Otto, Andi Mandell, Polly O’Brien, Daniel Oshinsky, Craig Stein and Atul Joshi.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    For the latest information on preparing for the transition from LIBOR, visit SRZ’s LIBOR Transition Resource Center.


    * The Bill was signed into law on April 7, 2021.

    [1] View the Bill text and status.

    [2] View the ARRC’s proposed legislation.

    [3] This occurred on March 5, 2021. See “FCA announcement on future cessation and loss of representativeness of the LIBOR benchmarks.” See “ARRC Confirms a ‘Benchmark Transition Event’ has occurred under ARRC Fallback Language.”

    [4] “FCA Announces Dates LIBOR Settings Will Cease to Be Provided or Be Representative; ISDA Declares Index Cessation Event and Fixing of Spread Adjustment,” SRZ Alert, March 8, 2021, available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

     

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Taleah E. Baez

    Senior Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Douglas I. Koff

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Daniel V. Oshinsky

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Recent Developments in Tax Law: Draft of the Deduction Tax Relief Modernization Act

    ARTICLE

    Recent Developments in Tax Law: Draft of the Deduction Tax Relief Modernization Act

    March 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Gero Burwitz authored the article “Recent Development in Tax Law: Draft of the Deduction Tax Relief Modernization Act”, featured in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), p. 416-418 in March, 2021.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Gero Burwitz

    Partner

    Munich

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  • Data Privacy Update for Private Fund Managers — Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act

    Data Privacy Update for Private Fund Managers — Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Data Privacy Update for Private Fund Managers — Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act

    April 6, 2021

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 2, 2021, Virginia enacted the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (“CDPA”)[1] — a comprehensive data privacy law that is only the second state statute of its kind.[2] The requirements of the CDPA resemble aspects of both the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”). However, unlike the CCPA and GDPR, most private fund managers will be exempted from the CDPA because (1) it includes a broad exemption for financial institutions that are subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) and, in any event, (2) it would only apply to a fund manager that, during a calendar year, processes personal data of at least 100,000 Virginia consumers.[3] One context in which the CDPA may be relevant to private fund managers that use “alternative data” as part of the investment research process. Personal information may be part of the underlying data utilized, and managers should take steps to seek to ensure that potential vendors collect and license data consistent with applicable privacy laws.

    What Is the CDPA?

    The CDPA, a privacy law that takes effect on Jan. 1, 2023, provides Virginia residents various rights to access and control their personal data. Like the CCPA and GDPR, the CDPA will impose requirements on businesses to make certain disclosures concerning the collection and use of personal information, inform consumers about their rights and establish and implement reasonable data security practices to protect personal data. The CDPA will be enforced by the Virginia Attorney General, who may seek damages of up to $7,500 for each violation.[4] The statute, however, does not provide a private right of action.[5]

    Most Private Fund Managers are Not Subject to the CDPA

    The CDPA will apply to “personal data,” which it defines broadly as “any information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable natural person.” However, most private fund managers will not be required to comply with the requirements of the CDPA for two reasons.

    First, the CDPA exempts financial institutions or data subject to Title V of GLBA.[6] Notably, the GLBA exemption in the CDPA is much broader than the GLBA exemption in the CCPA, which is limited only to information subject to GLBA. 

    Second, the CDPA only applies to businesses that, during a calendar year, control or process (i) personal data of at least 100,000 Virginia consumers or (ii) personal data of at least 25,000 Virginia consumers and derive over 50% of gross revenue from the sale of personal data. “Consumers” is defined as a “natural person” who resides in Virginia “acting only in an individual or household context.”[7] This is also a departure from the approach taken by the CCPA, which broadly covers any business that collects personal information from a California resident, without regard to the number of California residents.[8]

    Considerations for Fund Managers that Use Alternative Data

    Although most fund managers will themselves be exempt from the CDPA, managers that purchase alternative data from vendors will need to take account of the CDPA for data that will be collected after the CDPA goes into effect. While the full range of compliance issues associated with the use of alternative data are beyond the scope of this Alert, these are some examples of how the CDPA may be relevant to a compliance review:

    • During the due diligence process, as part of confirming that a vendor is not obtaining personal data in breach of any of its duties or in breach of any applicable laws, fund managers will need to ensure that the vendor complies (or, if applicable, the sources of its data comply) with the CDPA if it collects (or, if applicable, its sources of data collect) data from at least 100,000 Virginia consumers (or 25,000 Virginia consumers in the case of a business that derives over 50% of gross revenue from the sale of personal data).
    • Alternative data licensed by fund managers is typically “de-identified,” meaning it does not contain data identifying specific natural persons. However, it can be important to scratch below the surface of what this means to ensure compliance with law. Under the CDPA, a controller that possesses “de-identified data” must (i) take reasonable measures to ensure that the data cannot be associated with a natural person, (ii) “publicly commit”[9] to maintaining and using de-identified data without attempting to re-identify the data and (iii) contractually require any recipients of the de-identified data to comply with the CDPA.[10]
    • The CDPA excludes information that a business “has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made available to the general public through widely distributed media, by the consumer, or by a person to whom the consumer has disclosed the information unless the consumer has restricted the information to a specific audience.” This is significant for private fund managers that ingest Twitter, Reddit and certain web scraped data that may include an individual’s name or other information and would be considered personal information under certain privacy laws.

    Is Compliance with the CCPA and GDPR Sufficient to Comply with the CDPA?

    Virginia legislators modeled the CDPA on the CCPA, the California Privacy Rights Act (which builds on the CCPA and also takes effect on Jan. 1, 2023), and the GDPR. For companies that are subject to the CDPA, including alternative data vendors and consumer-facing portfolio companies, and already have a privacy program that complies with the CCPA and GDPR, compliance with the CDPA will be easier. However, CDPA compliance may require further steps. For example, the CDPA requires covered entities to undertake data protection assessments[11] and enter into vendor agreements with certain required language.[12] As another example, attention may also need to be paid to the process for “de-identification” of data, as discussed above in the context of alternative vendor due diligence.

    Looking Ahead

    The CDPA underscores that privacy continues to be a focus for legislators and has implications for fund managers even when an exemption applies. Similar privacy bills have been introduced in at least eighteen other states, the result of which could be an unwieldly patchwork of state law privacy requirements. It remains to be seen whether federal legislation will preempt the CDPA and other such contemplated laws. On March 10, 2021, the first comprehensive federal privacy bill, the Information Transparency and Personal Data Control Act,[13] was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. If passed, the bill would create a more unified national standard by preempting conflicting state law. We will continue to update you as this dynamic area of the law evolves.

    Authored by Edward H. Sadtler, Kelly Koscuiszka, Jennifer A. Gordon and Angela Garcia.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Consumer Data Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-571—59.1-581 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).

    [2] The first and most significant enacted privacy legislation applicable to private fund managers is the CCPA. Our previous Alerts, including our December 2019 Alert and our June 2020 Alert, provide further information on how the CCPA applies to private fund managers.

    [3] The CDPA also applies to entities that process personal data on behalf of a the data controller, although their obligations are more limited.

    [4] Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-579(B).

    [5] By comparison, the CCPA provides a limited private right of action provided solely to consumers whose personal information (defined more narrowly for these purposes) has been subject to unauthorized access or disclosure as a result of the covered business’ failure to maintain reasonable security procedures.

    [6] Most fund managers are subject to Title V of the GLBA, as financial institutions that collect “nonpublic personal information” about natural persons to provide a financial product or service. Fund managers that are not subject to, or are uncertain whether they are subject to Title V will want to consult legal counsel to determine what requirements they may have under the CDPA.

    [7] Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-571.

    [8] See generally California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145.

    [9] The CDPA does not elaborate on what this means.

    [10] Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-577.

    [11] While the GDPR also requires data protection assessments, the CDPA’s requirement differs. Specifically, the CDPA requires controllers to conduct data protection assessments to evaluate the risks associated with a range of activities, including processing of “sensitive personal data” (e.g., personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, mental or physical health diagnosis, sexual orientation or citizenship or immigration status; the processing of genetic or biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person; the personal data collected from a known child; or precise geolocation data.) and processing that leads to a “heightened risk of harm to consumers.” Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-576(A).

    [12] The CDPA requires that agreements between controllers and data processors delineate clear instructions for processing personal data, specify what types of personal data will be processed and how long it will be processed, specify each parties’ rights and/or obligations and guarantee that data processors are subject to a duty of confidentiality. While the CCPA and GDPR also have requirements with respect to vendor agreements, they are somewhat different.

    [13] H.R. 2013, 117th Cong. (2021).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Surge in SPACtivity Leads to Litigation and Regulatory Risks

    Surge in SPACtivity Leads to Litigation and Regulatory Risks

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Surge in SPACtivity Leads to Litigation and Regulatory Risks

    April 5, 2021

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    INTRODUCTION

    Not far behind the dramatic increase in the use of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) is a corresponding increase in the number of shareholder lawsuits and increased activity at the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In recent days, Reuters reported that the SEC opened an inquiry seeking information on how underwriters are managing the risks involved in SPACs,[i] and the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance (Corp Fin) and acting chief accountant have issued two separate public statements on certain accounting, financial reporting and governance issues that should be considered in connection with SPAC-related mergers.[ii] This increase in activity by SEC staff comes on the heels of nearly two dozen federal securities class action filings, several SEC investor alerts and earlier guidance from Corp Fin.[iii] The surge in litigation and regulatory interest is likely to continue and expand throughout 2021 and beyond.

    In depth

    A SPAC is a company with no operations that raises funds from public investors through an initial public offering (IPO). The proceeds from the IPO are placed in a trust or escrow account for future use in the acquisition of one or more companies. A SPAC will typically have a two-year period to identify and complete a business transaction. If the SPAC fails to do so during the specified period, then it must return the funds in the account to its public shareholders on a pro rata basis and then dissolve.

    Although SPACs have been used for decades as alternative investment vehicles, they have recently increased in popularity as a way to transition private companies into public companies in a manner that mitigates the increased market volatility risk of a traditional IPO. Indeed, 2020 was a record-breaking year for SPAC IPOs and 2021 has already crushed that record. According to spacinsider.com, SPACs completed 46 IPOs in 2018 and 59 IPOS in 2019.[i] These numbers increased dramatically over the last 15 months, with spacinsider.com reporting a total of 248 IPOs in 2020 and 298 IPOs so far in 2021 – a stark contrast to the 121 total SPAC IPOs from 2009 through 2017.

    With this extraordinary increase in the use of SPACs comes an increase in SPAC shareholder lawsuits filed soon after announcements of mergers between SPACs and their target companies. According to data compiled by Stanford University, shareholders have filed 21 securities class actions lawsuits involving SPACs since 2019, with eight of these filings occurring in 2021.[ii]

    Why the Increase in Litigation and Regulatory Interest?

    There are a number of issues associated with SPACs that make them a prime target for potential litigation and enforcement action under the federal securities laws. The SPAC IPO is a public offering from which liability arises under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). After the SPAC goes public, it is subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act). Liability (including liability under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act) can arise from material misstatements or omissions in the SPAC’s periodic filings, as well as proxy statements filed in connection with proposed acquisitions.

    On December 22, 2020, Corp Fin issued guidance that describes some of the issues specific to SPACs.[iii] These issues are echoed in many of the allegations in the class actions filed to date. Corp Fin highlights the possible conflicts of interest between the entity or management team that forms the SPAC (known as the sponsor(s)), as well as the SPAC’s officers, directors and affiliates and the shareholders who invest in the SPAC. Corp Fin asks SPACs to carefully consider their disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws. For example, the sponsor has a limited period of time to identify an acquisition target and complete a business combination. Corp Fin notes that, “[a]s a SPAC nears the end of that timeframe, its options may narrow, giving acquisition targets significant leverage in negotiating the terms of a business combination transaction.”[iv] This may cause a significant divide between the economic interests of the sponsor, which are to close the deal quickly, and the economic interests of the shareholders, which may be better served by waiting to close the right deal at the right price. Corp Fin asks SPACs to consider whether they have clearly described the financial incentives of the SPAC sponsors, directors and officers to complete a business combination transaction and how these incentives may differ from the interests of the shareholders. Further, Corp Fin suggests that SPACs consider disclosing whether it is possible to extend the time to complete the business combination. Relatedly, Corp Fin asks SPACs to consider whether they clearly disclose the financial impact on the sponsor, directors, officers and affiliates if the SPAC ultimately fails to complete any business combination transaction.

    Another example of potential conflicts highlighted by Corp Fin are those associated with any additional financing that may become necessary to complete the business combination transaction. Corp Fin suggests potential disclosures about how the terms of the additional financing may impact the public shareholders and, if the additional financing involves issuing securities, how the price and terms of those securities compare to and differ from the terms of the securities sold in the IPO.

    Further, Corp Fin emphasizes potential conflicts associated with evaluating other acquisition candidates. Corp Fin suggests that SPACs provide, among other things, detailed information about how and why a targeted company was selected over alternative candidates, how the nature and amount of consideration the SPAC will pay to acquire the operating company was determined and what material factors the board of directors considered in its determination to approve the transaction.

    An Active Plaintiffs’ Bar

    The potential issues that Corp Fin raises in its guidance are echoed in the allegations investors have raised in shareholder class action complaints. For example, Immunovant, Inc. is a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company that develops monoclonal antibodies for the treatment of autoimmune diseases. In December 2019, it became a publicly traded company through a reverse merger with Health Sciences Acquisitions Corporation (Health Sciences), a SPAC. Immunovant is developing a novel fully human antibody, IMVT-1401, which is in Phase IIa clinical trials. Investors filed a securities class action in the Eastern District of New York on February 19, 2021, alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.[v] According to the complaint, when the company announced the pending merger, it touted the commercial prospects of IMVT-1401. The complaint further alleges that after the merger, the company continued to tout IMVT-1401 in its public filings, announcing the initial results from the treatment phase of its ongoing trial and making positive statements about IMVT-1401’s safety record. However, on February 2, 2021, Immunovant issued a press release announcing a voluntary pause of dosing in IMVT-1401’s ongoing clinical trials because the company had become aware of possible safety concerns. On this news, the complaint alleges that Immunovant’s stock price fell $18.22 per share, or 42.08%, to close at $25.08 per share. The complaint further alleges that defendants made materially false and/or misleading statements and failed to disclose to investors that: (1) Health Sciences performed inadequate due diligence into the target before the merger and/or ignored or failed to disclose safety issues associated with IMVT-1401; (2) IMVT-1401 was less safe than investors were led to believe; (3) these facts foreseeably diminished IMVT-1401’s prospects for regulatory approval, commercial viability and profitability and (4) as a result, Immunovant’s public statements were materially false and misleading.

    SPAC-related lawsuits are not limited to allegations of violations of the federal securities laws. Investors have also filed claims in state court alleging breaches of fiduciary duty. For example, on March 25, 2021, investors in a SPAC that acquired MultiPlan Corp. filed a class action in Delaware’s Chancery Court asserting breach of fiduciary against Churchill Capital Corp. III (the SPAC) and its directors, officers and affiliates.[vi] The complaint alleges that the structure of the SPAC “gave the Company’s board of directors incentives to get a deal done – any deal – without regard to whether it is truly in the best interest of the SPAC’s outside investors (i.e., whether the target private company is actually a good investment).”[vii] The complaint further alleges that the defendants failed to disclose serious weaknesses in MultiPlan’s business, including that its largest customer was in the process of leaving MultiPlan because it was creating a competing business unit. According to the complaint, after the merger closed, a market research report publicly disclosed the loss of the customer’s business and the effect of MultiPlan’s financial position, causing the company’s stock price drop to $6.27 per share, or 37.3% below the IPO price of $10 per share.

    Notably, the complaint appears to be criticizing all SPACs – not just Churchill Capital Corp. III. The complaint describes the typical structure of a SPACs as “conflict-laden and practically invit[ing] fiduciary misconduct.”[viii] The complaint further alleges that “[t]he currently common SPAC structure creates problematic incentives for their founders, whose interests are not directly aligned with those of the public investors.”[ix] Indeed, the complaint explicitly asks the court to make clear that “the boards of SPACs like the one at issue here are subject to the same level of fiduciary duty review applicable to any other Delaware corporation,” alleging that this will cause sponsors of future SPACs to adapt and “easily choose to mitigate avoidable conflicts by structuring entities that better protect public stockholders.”[x]

    An Active SEC

    The SEC’s Division of Enforcement has also shown an interest in SPACs and appears to have opened several inquiries/investigations. For example, Nikola Corporation is an electric truck maker that was acquired in June 2020 by a SPAC called VectoIQ Acquisition. In September, Nikola’s stock price dropped more than 30% after a short seller issued a report accusing the company of fraud. Nikola disclosed that on September 14, 2020, the company and five of its officers and employees received subpoenas from the SEC relating to, among other things, certain matters described in the short seller’s report and issued additional subpoenas to Nikola’s officers, employees and directors later that same month.[xi] Further, the company disclosed that it had received grand jury subpoenas from the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the NY County District Attorney’s Office.

    On March 24, 2021, Reuters reported that the Division of Enforcement had sent letters asking Wall Street banks to voluntarily provide information on their SPAC dealings, including information on SPAC deal fees and volumes and asking questions about compliance, reporting and internal controls.[xii] According to Reuters, the SEC may be concerned about the depth of due diligence that SPACs perform before acquisitions and whether SPACs are fully disclosing large payouts to sponsors and affiliates.

    Other divisions at the SEC have been monitoring SPACs as well. In addition to the investor alerts and Corp Fin’s guidance, SEC staff issued a pair of public statements on March 31, 2021, that focus on, among other things, the accounting, financial reporting and corporate governance challenges associated with mergers between SPACs and private operating companies.[xiii] Specifically, the acting chief accountant highlights the importance of ensuring that the newly merged company is prepared to meet its obligations under the federal securities laws and provide investors with high quality financial reporting. This includes having finance and accounting professionals with sufficient knowledge of the reporting requirements in place and enough resources to meet required current and periodic report deadlines. Further, both Corp Fin and the acting chief accountant warns that target companies need to understand and abide by books and records and internal controls requirements. Further, the acting chief accountant emphasizes the importance of corporate board oversight, including the vital role of the audit committee, as well as the importance of issuing annual financial statements audited in accordance with the standards set forth by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Overall, the staff’s statements emphasize the challenges newly merged companies face as they transition from a private operating company to a public company on an accelerated schedule and the steps SPAC sponsors and target companies can take to make sure they are prepared when the merger closes.

    This is likely only the beginning of the SEC’s increased scrutiny of SPACs. In addition to disclosure-related issues, the nature of SPAC transactions presents heightened risk of insider trading and potential Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) issues. Given the explosion of SPACs over the last 15 months and the risks they present to investors, the Division of Enforcement is likely focused on investigating potential wrongdoing associated with the risks and challenges highlighted by Corp Fin and the acting chief accountant and will move quickly to recommend enforcement actions if necessary.

    Insights for SPAC Sponsors and Target Companies

    SPAC sponsors and target companies should carefully review Corp Fin’s December 22, 2020, guidance, as well as the more recent public statements from Corp Fin and the acting chief accountant. Further, SPAC sponsors should seek to mitigate inherent conflicts of interest wherever possible. This may include obtaining a fairness opinion from an independent third-party financial advisor or delaying financial incentives for the sponsor until after the acquired company meets certain benchmarks. SPAC sponsors should also perform thorough due diligence in evaluating proposed business combinations and disclose all material information in proxy statements, including any potential risks associated with a target company’s ongoing operations or future prospects. Moreover, SPAC sponsors should be mindful of the deadline for completing a business combination because acquisitions completed on the eve of the deadline will face increased scrutiny if shareholders suffer significant losses after the acquisition is complete. Finally, SPAC sponsors and target companies should ensure that they have a comprehensive plan in place to address the reporting and internal control requirements and expectations of a public operating company after the merger is complete.

    Caitlyn M. Campbell recently joined McDermott Will & Emery from the SEC Enforcement Division, where she served as senior counsel to the Co-Directors of Enforcement.

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  • Four Considerations When Selling to a Private Equity Fund

    Four Considerations When Selling to a Private Equity Fund

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    Four Considerations When Selling to a Private Equity Fund

    April 2, 2021

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    William Hadler

    Partner

    Chicago

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