Content Type: Article

  • Board Motives Matter: Delaware Supreme Court Remands Dilutive Stock Sale Case

    Board Motives Matter: Delaware Supreme Court Remands Dilutive Stock Sale Case

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Board Motives Matter: Delaware Supreme Court Remands Dilutive Stock Sale Case

    July 7, 2021

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The following case (link) should serve as a cautionary tale for directors of Delaware corporations when taking actions that may disenfranchise stockholders, especially in the election of directors.

    The Delaware Supreme Court (the Court) held in Marion Coster v. UIP Companies, Inc., No. 49, 2020 (Del. June 28, 2021) that even if an interested board satisfies its burden of proving that a dilutive stock issuance is entirely fair (Delaware’s most onerous standard of review), such issuance may still be subject to judicial review for breach of fiduciary duty if it was allegedly approved (i) for inequitable reasons or (ii) in good faith but for the primary purpose of interfering with corporate democracy without a compelling justification to do so—in which case such issuance may be subject to cancellation.

    In depth

    The plaintiff in the case on appeal, Marion Coster (Coster), was the holder of 50% of the stock in UIP Companies, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Corporation), with the other 50% owned by Steven Schwat, a director of the Corporation (Schwat). After failing to finalize terms for a buyout of Coster’s stock by Peter Bonnell (Bonnell), an employee and director of the Corporation and a friend of Schwat, Coster called for a special meeting of stockholders in order to elect new directors. The board of directors was composed of Schwat, Bonnell and Stephen Cox (Cox), also an employee of the Corporation.

    Due to the equal stock ownership, the stockholders deadlocked on the vote to elect directors, leaving Schwat, Bonnell and Cox to continue as holdover directors. Coster then petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery to appoint a custodian to break the deadlock, pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 226(a)(1) (the Custodian Action). As the Custodian Action was pending, Schwat obtained a third-party valuation of the Corporation, which valued the Corporation at $123,869—significantly less than the approximately $4,250,000 valuation ascribed during the Coster buyout negotiations. The board of directors then approved, by unanimous written consent, a stock sale to an entity owned by Bonnell, amounting to one-third of all outstanding stock of the Corporation (the Stock Sale), in exchange for $41,289.67—thereby ending the stockholder deadlock and mooting the Custodian Action. In response, Coster filed a second action to cancel the Stock Sale, alleging that the dilutive Stock Sale interfered with her voting rights and impeded her statutory right to seek court appointment of a custodian.

    The Court of Chancery found that the Stock Sale was significantly motivated by a desire to moot the Custodian Action, but that such motives were “beside the point” in reviewing the Stock Sale. The Court reasoned that, since a majority of the board (Schwat and Connell) were interested in the Stock Sale, the only relevant inquiry was whether the defendant carried its burden of proving that the Stock Sale was entirely fair to Coster in terms of price and process—Delaware’s most onerous standard of review. The Court of Chancery held that the price had been set after a fair (but less than optimal) process and that the price, based on the third-party valuation, was fair. Having determined that the Stock Sale was entirely fair, the Court of Chancery declined to reach Coster’s argument that the Stock Sale was approved for inequitable reasons or, alternatively, in good faith but for the primary purpose of interfering with her voting rights without a compelling reason to do so. The Court of Chancery dismissed the Custodian Action.

    On appeal to the Court, Coster argued that the Court of Chancery should have reviewed not just the fairness of the Stock Sale, but also the context in which the Stock Sale occurred—a conflicted board approving a dilutive stock issuance for the purpose of defeating Coster’s voting rights (and the leverage that came from the exercise of those rights), entrenching the existing board and interfering with her statutory right to petition for court appointment of a custodian. The Court agreed.

    The Court held that a determination that the Stock Sale was entirely fair did not end judicial review. Rather, the Court of Chancery should have considered Coster’s alternative arguments that the board approved the Stock Sale for inequitable reasons (under the Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) line of cases) or in good faith but for the primary purpose of interfering with Coster’s voting rights and leverage as an equal stockholder without a compelling reason to do so (under the Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) line of cases).

    As the Court explained, Delaware law has long recognized that inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible. Therefore, director action affecting the stockholder franchise is twice-tested—first for legal authorization and second for equity. Since the stockholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directors’ managerial power rests, Delaware courts will carefully review board actions designed to interfere with the effective exercise of corporate democracy by stockholders, especially in director elections.

    The Schnell line of cases stand for the proposition that directors may not act to frustrate the efforts of stockholders to elect new directors by engaging in transactions that are designed and pursued for the primary purpose of diluting the votes held by the insurgent stockholders. According to the Court, if Coster’s allegations prove true—that an interested board approved the Stock Sale to disenfranchise her rights as a stockholder and to entrench themselves in office by thwarting the Custodian Action—under Schnell, the Court of Chancery need not go any further to find a breach of fiduciary duty.

    However, under the Blasius line of cases, even if the board acted in good faith (in which case Schnell would not apply), if the Stock Sale was approved for the primary purpose of interfering with Coster’s rights as a stockholder, it will survive judicial scrutiny only if the board can demonstrate a compelling justification for its actions.

    Accordingly, the Court of Chancery’s holding that the Stock Sale was entirely fair was no substitute for further equitable review based on Coster’s allegations that an interested board approved the Stock Sale to interfere with her voting rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

    Additional Note: In a footnote, the Court explained that it was not considering or ruling on whether the “reasonableness and proportionality test” of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) applied in this case since it was not argued by the parties. This may be a signal to the parties and the Court of Chancery that the board may also have to satisfy its burden under Unocal enhanced scrutiny given the facts of this case. The Court held in Unocal that when a board’s action is a defensive measure taken in response to a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness which touches upon issues of control, the board must prove that such action is proportionate and reasonable in relation to the threat posed. In MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003), the Court held that if, in the context of such a hostile contest for control, the primary purpose of the board’s action is to interfere with or impede the effective exercise of the stockholder franchise in a contested election for directors, then the board, in addition to its burden under Unocal, must first overcome the burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action. Meaning that in the rare instances where Blasius standard of review applies (rare because a plaintiff must first show that the board action was for the primary purpose of stockholder disenfranchisement), compelling justification will need to be shown either independently, in the absence of a hostile contest for control, or within the Unocal standard of review when the board’s action is taken as a defensive measure (as a condition precedent to any judicial consideration of reasonableness and proportionately).

    TAKEAWAY

    This case was based on its particular facts: the Stock Sale occurred after buyout negotiations failed between two equal stockholders; the stockholders were deadlocked and the defendants desired to eliminate plaintiff’s ability to block stockholder action, including the election of directors, and the leverage that accompanied that blocking power; a majority of the board was interested in the Stock Sale; the Stock Sale was to an employee-director who was also friends with the defendant and was aligned with the defendant on neutralizing the threat to control of the Company, effectively entrenching the holdover board; and the third-party valuation of the Company on which the Stock Sale was based was sought only after the filing of the Custodian Action. According to the Court, these facts alone support a finding of breach of fiduciary duty, but the case was remanded to the Court of Chancery to make its own factual findings in light of the Court’s holding. However, it is less certain that the Court would have reached the same conclusion if the sale were to an unaffiliated and independent party or if the sale would not directly affect the voting control.

    Unique facts notwithstanding, this case serves as another important reminder to boards of directors that simply because an action is legally permissible does not mean that it will avoid equitable review by the courts. Boards should be cautious when proposing an action that may impede a stockholder’s exercise of its statutory rights, especially when facts and circumstances suggest that the primary purpose of that action is to interfere with corporate democracy or entrench the existing board.

    Authors

    Benjamin Strauss

    Partner

    Wilmington

    Nathan E. Barnett

    Partner

    Wilmington

    Kevin M. Regan

    Partner

    Wilmington

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  • July Surprise – Supreme Court Agrees to Review Medicare Payment Cuts to 340B Drugs

    July Surprise – Supreme Court Agrees to Review Medicare Payment Cuts to 340B Drugs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    July Surprise – Supreme Court Agrees to Review Medicare Payment Cuts to 340B Drugs

    July 6, 2021

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Supreme Court has announced that it will take up review of the decision by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upholding Medicare’s 2018 payment cuts to 340B drugs. The case will be closely watched, given its potentially far-reaching impacts on reimbursements to most hospitals that participate in the Medicare program, not just those that participate in the 340B Program.

    In depth

    Coming as a surprise to much of the 340B stakeholder community, the US Supreme Court announced in early July 2021 that during its next term it will take up review of the decision by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upholding Medicare’s 2018 payment cuts to 340B drugs. At issue in American Hospital Assn., et al. v. Becerra is whether the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) exceeded its statutory authority by reducing payments for 340B drugs under the Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) from average sales price (ASP) plus 6% to ASP minus 22.5% beginning in 2018—a reduction of approximately 30%—as well as whether Congress intended to allow review of HHS’ decision to make the payment cut.

    The decision in the case, which is not expected until 2022, will likely have far-reaching implications for hospitals that participate in the Medicare program, both as to the reimbursement impact of the 340B-specific payment cuts and as to whether HHS has the authority to make future changes to payments for drugs under OPPS—and, if so, whether such decisions are subject to judicial review.

    History of the 340B Payment Cuts and Appeals

    Effective January 1, 2018, HHS reduced payments on most 340B drugs that received separate payment from Medicare under OPPS by approximately 30%. Rural Sole Community Hospitals, PPS-excluded Children’s Hospitals, PPS-excluded Cancer Hospitals and Critical Access Hospitals were not subject to the 340B payment cut. Savings to the Medicare program from the payment cut, estimated to be approximately $1.6 billion per year, were redistributed in a budget-neutral manner to all hospitals paid under OPPS through an increase in the payment rate, by approximately 3.2%, for non-drug items and services [1].

    CMS justified the cuts using its authority under 42 USC § 1395l(t)(14)(A)(iii)(II). This statutory provision applies to setting payment rates under OPPS for “specified covered outpatient drugs” (SCODs), including 340B drugs, when hospital acquisition cost survey data is not available. In the absence of such survey data, which was the case in 2018 (and may still be the case), HHS is directed to use average acquisition cost “as calculated and adjusted by the Secretary as necessary for purposes of this paragraph.” For many years, CMS applied this provision to pay for SCODs to all hospitals under OPPS at ASP plus 6%. The 2018 reduction targeting only 340B drugs, and only at a subset of 340B hospitals, marked a significant change in CMS’ interpretation of the statutory provision. At the time it was initially implemented, CMS stated that the 340B payment reduction was necessary to slow growth in the 340B program, shift trends of increasing amounts paid by Medicare for outpatient hospital drugs and reduce Medicare beneficiary out-of-pocket costs.

    The 2018 payment cut was subject to immediate challenge in federal court by 340B hospitals and hospital groups representing 340B hospitals. Following dismissal of their original lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds (and a subsequent unsuccessful appeal), the hospitals and associations prevailed in the US District Court for District of Columbia in late 2018 on their claims that HHS overstepped its statutory authority in cutting OPPS payments for 340B drugs. The district court permanently enjoined HHS from applying the payment cuts and found that “the [approximately 30%] reduction’s magnitude and its wide applicability inexorably lead to the conclusion that the Secretary fundamentally altered the statutory scheme established by Congress for determining [SCOD] reimbursement rates, thereby exceeding the Secretary’s authority to ‘adjust[]’ SCOD rates under § (t)(14)(A)(iii)(II).” However, in its opinion, the district court noted that retroactively increasing 340B OPPS reimbursement rates for 2018 could create “havoc” due to the budget neutrality component, which had increased payments for all other items and services.

    Ultimately, CMS and hospitals paid under OPPS did not have to contend with such “havoc,” because the district court’s decision was reversed in July 2020 on appeal by HHS to the DC Circuit. Unlike the district court, the circuit court found that HHS was within the bounds of its statutory authority in using § (t)(14)(A)(iii)(II) to cut payments for 340B drugs by almost 30%. Specifically, the circuit court found that HHS was entitled to deference, under the principles established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, to interpret the statute to allow it to cut OPPS payments for 340B drugs in order to better approximate the actual acquisition costs of 340B drugs.

    Both the district court and the circuit court also addressed the threshold matter of whether Congress intended for judicial review of the payment cuts. A separate statutory provision, 42 USC § 1395l(t)(12), precludes judicial review of certain categories of OPPS payment rates. HHS argued that the 340B payment cuts fell within two of these precluded categories. As evidenced by the judicial review of the cuts, the courts disagreed with HHS and concluded that the payment provisions at § (t)(14)(A)(iii) were outside of the scope of payment decisions subject to preclusion of judicial review under § (t)(12).

    Following the DC Circuit’s decision, the hospitals and hospital associations petitioned to the Supreme Court to hear their arguments in support of overturning the OPPS payment cuts, arguing that the circuit court erred in its decision that Chevron deference permits HHS to interpret the statute to allow it to make the cuts. Although not included in petition to the Supreme Court, in agreeing to take up the question of the applicability of Chevron deference to HHS’ interpretation of § (t)(14)(A)(iii)(II), the Supreme Court has also requested that the parties present arguments as to whether judicial review of the payment reduction is precluded by the Social Security Act.

    Additional analysis of the history of the OPPS payment cuts to 340B drugs and the related litigation is available in our previous client alerts: “CMS cuts payments for most 340B drugs,” “Court issues permanent injunction blocking Medicare 340B payment cuts” and “DC Circuit upholds OPPS reimbursement reductions for 340B drugs.”

    Analysis

    The 340B payment cuts have gained significant attention, due to financial impact across all hospitals paid under OPPS, as well as the potential implications for HHS authority to make future “adjustments” to payments for SCODs under OPPS—and whether OPPS SCOD payment policies are subject to judicial review.

    The 340B cuts are notable in that the budget neutral implementation of the cuts results in uneven outcomes across hospitals, particularly between 340B and non-340B hospitals. The cuts in payments are applied only to 340B-particpating hospitals (with exemptions for certain categories of 340-participating hospitals), such that no non-340B hospital is subject to the cuts. Because the “savings” to Medicare generated by the cuts are then distributed back to all OPPS hospitals, the hospitals that are not subject to the cuts receive a net benefit. In other words, due to the payment cut, all non-340B hospitals (and some 340B hospitals) receive more OPPS payments than they would in the absence of the cut. Further, because of the increase in reimbursements to these hospitals since 2018, any decision overturning the payment cuts and applying a retroactive remedy could result in recoupment of the additional payments made under the budget neutrality adjustment.

    An important point—one that should not be lost in the focus on the 340B impacts of the case—is that the underlying questions before the Supreme Court are not specific to rates for 340B drugs. The Supreme Court has been asked to review the scope of HHS authority to set payments rates for SCODs based on average acquisition costs for specific groups of hospitals. Therefore, the opinion issued in this case could have much more significant implications for all hospitals paid under OPPS.

    The Supreme Court could, for example, determine that Chevron deference grants HHS authority to interpret § (t)(14)(A)(iii)(II) to allow it to establish payment rates for SCODs based on varying average acquisition cost by virtually unlimited classifications of hospitals and data sources, resulting in authority to reduce OPPS rates for non-340B hospitals. In addition, because the Supreme Court has requested additional briefing and arguments as to whether CMS payment decisions related to rates for SCODs are subject to judicial review, the case has the potential to result in granting expansive authority to HHS to make future OPPS payment changes to SCODs without opportunity for any adversely affected hospitals to seek review or relief from the courts.

    Oral arguments in the case are expected to take place in late 2021, with a decision issued in the first half of 2022.

    [1] Effective January 1, 2020, CMS implemented a separate reduction to 340B drugs paid under the “site neutral” payment methodology applicable to hospital off-campus outpatient departments that first billed Medicare after November 1, 2015. The 2020 reduction was justified based on a different statutory provision and is not within the scope of the litigation discussed in this article.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

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  • Requirements Related to Surprise Billing; Part 1: Policy Update

    Requirements Related to Surprise Billing; Part 1: Policy Update

    ARTICLE

    Requirements Related to Surprise Billing; Part 1: Policy Update

    July 6, 2021

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Eric Zimmerman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Emily R. Curran

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Germany–FORCE MAJEURE

    Germany–FORCE MAJEURE

    ARTICLE

    Germany–FORCE MAJEURE

    July 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This country-specific Q&A provides an overview of Force Majeure laws and regulations applicable in Germany, written by Dr. Thomas Hauss, Lisa Nassi and Matthias Distler.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Hauss

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    Matthias Distler

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • To be Fair, the Supreme Court Grants Assignor Estoppel a Reprieve but Limits its Scope

    To be Fair, the Supreme Court Grants Assignor Estoppel a Reprieve but Limits its Scope

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    To be Fair, the Supreme Court Grants Assignor Estoppel a Reprieve but Limits its Scope

    July 1, 2021

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the validity of doctrine of assignor estoppel but concluded that the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit failed to recognize the boundaries of the doctrine. Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. Case No. 20-440 (Supr. Ct., June 29, 2021)(Kagan, Justice)(Barrett, Justice, dissenting)(Alito, Justice, dissenting). With the Court’s concern to maintain the underlying principle of fairness and the limits of doctrine of assignor estoppel in Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., the Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and remanded. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court with dissenting opinions from Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett.

    In depth

    BACKGROUND

    Csaba Truckai filed a patent application for a device that was designed with a moisture permeable head in order to treat abnormal uterine bleeding while avoiding unintended burning or ablation. Truckai assigned the pending patent application to his company, Novacept, which was later acquired by Hologic. Truckai then founded a new company, Minerva Surgical, and developed a new device that used moisture impermeability to avoid the unwanted ablation. Hologic subsequently filed a continuation application to expand the scope of its claims to encompass applicator heads in general, regardless of moisture permeability. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a patent on the expanded claims in 2015, and Hologic subsequently sued Minerva for patent infringement.

    Minerva argued that Hologic’s patent was invalid, as the new, broader claims did not match the invention’s description. However, the district court agreed with Hologic that assignor estoppel barred Minerva’s invalidity defense and ruled that Minerva infringed Hologic’s patent. The Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, noting that it was “irrelevant that, at the time of the assignment, the inventor’s patent application[] w[as] still pending,” even if the assignee “may have later amended the claims” without the inventor’s input.

    Minerva appealed the Federal Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court. The issue on appeal was whether the doctrine of assignor estoppel remained valid and, if so, the appropriate scope of the doctrine.

    THE DOCTRINE OF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL LIVES

    At the outset of Justice Kagan’s opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Brett Kavanaugh, she explained that assignor estoppel was a “well settled rule” that had been accepted by a unanimous Court in Westinghouse.

    The doctrine of assignor estoppel is rooted in the idea of fairness in that an “inventor’s ability to assign a patent to another for value” should limit their ability to “later contend in litigation that the patent is invalid.” When the inventor assigns his patent rights, there is an implicit representation to a buyer that the patent is valid, which “give[s] the buyer his sought-for monopoly.” If that assignor later raises an invalidity defense, “the assignor disavows that implied warranty. And he does so in service of regaining access to the invention he has just sold.” Therefore, an inventor could unfairly profit from both the price of assignment and the continued right to use the invention.

    In challenging the doctrine, Minerva set forth three main arguments. In the first two arguments, Minerva contended that Congress’s repudiation of the doctrine in the Patent Act of 1952 and the Court’s post-Westinghouse rulings left “no room for the doctrine to continue.” In the third argument, Minerva claimed assignor estoppel keeps bad patents alive by “impos[ing] too high a barrier to invalidity challenges.”

    Ultimately, the Court was unpersuaded by Minerva’s challenges to the continued validity of assignor estoppel. First, the Court pointed out that Minerva’s position of congressional repudiation of the doctrine in the Patent Act of 1952 was overly broad and untenable, as Minerva’s interpretation would “foreclose applying . . . a whole host of common-law preclusion doctrines” including equitable estoppel, collateral estoppel, res judicata and law of the case. The Court found that assignor estoppel was “just such a background principle of patent adjudication, and Congress gave no indication of wanting to terminate it or disturb its development.”

    Regarding Minerva’s second argument that the Court’s rulings in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. and Lear, Inc. v. Adkins left no room for the continued existence of assignor estoppel, the Court pointed out that neither case abolished the Westinghouse holding. These cases were distinct from Westinghouse and did not apply to the case at hand. In Scott Paper, the Court declined to carry the doctrine “too far” by extending assignor estoppel to the novel and extreme circumstance—invalidating based on a patent’s expiration.

    Similarly, the Court distinguished in Lear that the estoppel in question was licensee estoppel, not assignor estoppel. The Court distinguished these two doctrines, explaining that in assignor estoppel, an assignor makes a representation about a patent’s validity and receives some payment in return. In contrast, a licensee purchases the right to use a patented device without the same assurance of the patent’s worth. If the patent is invalid, they would not have needed the license. Thus, the Court concluded that its rulings in Scott Paper and Lear did not “eviscerate” the Westinghouse rule as Minerva contended but rather showed “only the kind of doctrinal evolution typical of common-law rules.”

    Finally, the Court addressed Minerva’s contention that contemporary patent policy to weed out bad patents supported overthrowing assignor estoppel. In dismissing the argument, the Court rested its decision on the fundamental premise that assignor estoppel is based on fairness and fair dealing. As the Court noted, in raising an invalidity defense, “the assignor disavows [the] implied warranty” they granted in the assignment, and “he does so in service of regaining access to the invention he has just sold” to “profit doubly.” The Court found that preventing such unfair dealing was “enough to outweigh any loss to the public from leaving an invalidity defense to someone other than the assignor.”

    LIMITATIONS TO THE SCOPE OF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL

    The Court then turned to the question of the appropriate scope of the doctrine, particularly when the assignment occurs before a patent issue. While Westinghouse solidified the validity of assignor estoppel, it left open the question of whether the doctrine should operate differently if the assignment was not of a granted patent but of a patent application. This doctrine applies “when, but only when, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations he made in assigning the patent.”

    The Court explained that assignor estoppel should apply “only when its underlying principle of fair dealing comes into play,” which “demands consistency in representations about a patent’s validity.” Contradiction would create unfairness. Because the assignment of a patent carries an implied assurance of validity with it, an assignor who later denies the patent’s validity (contradicting their earlier assertion) has “breache[d] norms of equitable dealing.” Conversely, as the Court noted, “when the assignor has made neither explicit nor implicit representations in conflict with an invalidity defense, then there is no unfairness in its assertion.”

    The Court provided several examples where the warranty implied by assignment might not contradict with an invalidity defense. The first was where the assignment occurs before the inventor could make a warranty of validity (i.e., in a common employment arrangement). The second related to later legal developments that would render the warranty given at the time of assignment irrelevant. However, third and most relevant to the case at hand, is when the assignee changes the patent claims after an assignment. As the Court explained, “the new claims resulting from that process may go beyond what ‘the assignor intended’ to claim as patentable.” When the claims are “materially broader than the old claims, the assignor did not warrant to the new claims’ validity.” If no such representation was made, the assignor can challenge the new claims; there is no estoppel “because there is no inconsistency in his position.”

    THE DISSENTS

    Justice Barrett’s dissent, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, disagreed with the Court’s decision to uphold the doctrine. She also disagreed with the Court that assignor estoppel was already part of well settled common law, writing that the issue was whether the Patent Act of 1952 incorporated the assignor estoppel doctrine.

    In deciding if Congress ratified this judicial interpretation in the Patent Act of 1952, Justice Barrett analyzed if (1) the interpretation was so well settled that they could presume Congress knew and endorsed it at the time of reenactment and (2) the statute was reenacted without material change. First, Justice Barrett explained that in 1952, assignor estoppel was “far from well settled–if anything it was on life support,” and she could not presume Congress knew about the doctrine. Second, she considered a change from Westinghouse material. Under Westinghouse, patents were akin to real property, although when Congress reenacted the assignment provision, patents had the attributes of personal property.

    Justice Alito alone wrote a dissent explaining that there was a baseline question that remained unanswered by both the Court and the principal dissent, which was whether the Court should overrule Westinghouse. This consequently meant that one could not answer if the doctrine of assignor estoppel bars petitioner from challenging the validity of a patent indirectly assigned to respondents.

    Practice Note: Patent assignees should be aware when expanding the scope of assigned patents that are still pending before the PTO that the assignors could invalidate the broader claims. Assignees may want to consider confirmatory assignments at issuance when appropriate and possible. Patent assignors, in turn, should continue to be aware that after they assign their patents, they may be barred from attempting to invalidate them under the doctrine of assignor estoppel when the basis for invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations made in assigning the patent.

    Rodney Swartz, a summer associate in the San Francisco office, also contributed to this article.

    Authors

    Cecilia Choy PhD

    Associate

    Silicon Valley

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Qualified Client “Assets-Under-Management” and “Net Worth” Test Amounts Increased to $1.1 and $2.2 Million, Respectively

    Qualified Client “Assets-Under-Management” and “Net Worth” Test Amounts Increased to $1.1 and $2.2 Million, Respectively

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Qualified Client “Assets-Under-Management” and “Net Worth” Test Amounts Increased to $1.1 and $2.2 Million, Respectively

    July 1, 2021

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Section 205(a)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (“Advisers Act”), generally prohibits registered investment advisers (“RIAs”) from entering into any investment advisory contract that provides for compensation to the RIA “on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds of” a client. Rule 205-3 promulgated under the Advisers Act (“Rule”) provides an exemption from this “performance fee” prohibition, allowing RIAs to enter into otherwise prohibited advisory contracts if each client entering into such a contract is a “qualified client,” as defined in Rule 205-3(d)(1). As written, Rule 205-3 currently codifies a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission order from 2011[1] (subject to subsequent adjusting orders, as noted below), under which the definition of qualified client incorporates an “assets-under-management” test and a “net worth” test. Respectively, these include as a qualified client (a) “a natural person who, or a company that, immediately after entering into the contract has at least $1,000,000 under the management of the investment adviser” or (b) “a natural person who, or a company that, the investment adviser entering into the contract (and any person acting on his behalf) reasonably believes, immediately prior to entering into the contract … has a net worth (together, in the case of a natural person, with assets held jointly with a spouse) of more than $2,000,000.”[2] Under the Rule, the SEC is required to adjust for inflation the “assets-under-management” and “net worth” tests every five years.[3] Subsequently, in 2016, the SEC promulgated an order[4] that revised the threshold figure of the “net worth” test to $2,100,000 (the “assets-under-management” test was left undisturbed). On June 17, 2021, the SEC once again issued an order (“Order”)[5] updating the qualified client definition, this time revising both the “assets-under-management” and “net worth” tests so as to take into account the effects of inflation since the dollar amounts were last reviewed by the SEC in 2016.

    Adjustment of the Assets-Under-Management Test

    Effective Aug. 16, 2021, the dollar amount of the assets-under-management test is $1.1 million.

    Adjustment of the Net Worth Test

    Effective Aug. 16, 2021, the dollar amount of the net worth test is $2.2 million.

    Existing Advisory Contracts and Identification of the Client

    Like the SEC’s 2016 order, the Order notes that the dollar amount adjustment will not apply retroactively, subject to the Rule’s transition rules, including Rule 205-3(c)(1), which deems a RIA to have satisfied the conditions of the Rule if such RIA satisfied the conditions in effect at the time the relevant advisory contract was entered into. Accordingly, existing clients of an adviser that were qualified clients at the time they originally entered into an investment advisory contract need not meet the new threshold amount.

    Notably, neither the transition rules, nor the Order, grant any relief to fund-of-fund managers with respect to investments in trading funds. Under Rule 205-3(b), an equity owner (i.e., an investor) of a private investment company is considered a client of a RIA for purposes of the Rule. The requirement to “look through” a private investment fund client applies to both the RIA’s trading hedge funds and any funds-of-funds that invest in such trading hedge funds.[6] As a result, the RIA of a trading hedge fund must ensure that both the direct investors in the trading hedge fund and the indirect investors in any fund-of-funds that is an investor in the trading hedge fund are qualified clients. In practice, this means that any private fund that relies on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (“Company Act”), and that invests in another Section 3(c)(1) fund (that is advised by a RIA) must ensure that its investors satisfy the requirements of the Rule in effect at the time of the initial investment with the target fund.

    Timing and Actions to Consider

    The Order will become effective as of Aug. 16, 2021. Accordingly, for those RIAs entering into performance-based compensation arrangements with clients on or after Aug. 16, 2021, any such prospective client will need to have assets under management of at least $1.1 million, have a net worth of at least $2.2 million, or otherwise satisfy the definition of qualified client, or another exemption from the performance fee prohibition will need to be satisfied. Managers will need to update the subscription agreements of 3(c)(1) funds to ensure that any new investor that intends to satisfy the definition of qualified client by meeting the assets-under-management or net worth test does so by meeting the new threshold amount. Funds of funds that rely on 3(c)(1) and expect to invest in other 3(c)(1) funds should consider obtaining new certifications from existing investors (especially investors that previously satisfied the qualified client definition based on the old threshold amounts).

    No action is necessary for funds that rely on Section 3(c)(7) of the Company Act. The definition of qualified client includes qualified purchasers, as defined in Section 2(a)(51)(A) of the Company Act. Accordingly, private funds that rely on Section 3(c)(7), and their investors, generally satisfy the qualified client requirement by definition.

    Authored by Patrick Dundas and Joshua B. Wright.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1]   See Order Approving Adjustment for Inflation of the Dollar Amount Tests in Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 76 FR 41838 (July 15, 2011), available here.

    [2]   Investment Advisers Act Rule 205-3(d)(1)(2)(A), available here.

    [3]   See Investment Adviser Performance Compensation, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3372 (Feb. 15, 2012), available here.

    [4]   See Order Approving Adjustment for Inflation of the Dollar Amount Tests in Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. IA-4421 (June 14, 2016), available here.

    [5]   See Order Approving Adjustment for Inflation of the Dollar Amount Tests in Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 5756 (June 17, 2021), available here.

    [6]   See Exemption To Allow Investment Advisers To Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of Capital Gains Upon or Capital Appreciation of a Client’s Account, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1731 (July 15, 1998), note 7, at Section II.C., available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • SEC Looking to Update Rules on Schedule 13D Disclosures

    SEC Looking to Update Rules on Schedule 13D Disclosures

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Looking to Update Rules on Schedule 13D Disclosures

    June 29, 2021

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 23, 2021, US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Gary Gensler announced that, to foster market “transparency,” he has requested the SEC staff propose changes to the 50-year-old Section 13(d) beneficial ownership requirements. Specifically, Chairman Gensler requested that the staff consider accelerating the deadline for investors to alert the market when they acquire beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a public company’s stock. In an address to the London City Week’s annual international financial services forum, Chairman Gensler expressed doubt as to whether the current rules “make sense given the rapidity of current markets and technologies.”

    In depth

    The long-standing rules require investors to file a Schedule 13D within 10 days of acquiring a stake of more than 5% along with a statement on the “purpose” of the acquisition, such as exerting influence over the public company by seeking board seats or otherwise exploring a possible acquisition or restructuring of the public company. Accelerating this timeline would require activist investors to disclose their stakes more quickly, giving potential targets more time to prepare in response.

    The “within 10 days” filing requirement is embedded in Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), but the statute explicitly provides that the SEC may shorten the time by rule. Currently, Rule 13d-1 (Rule) mirrors the “within 10 days” requirement under the Act, but the Rule may be amended by the SEC. It would not be surprising if the staff also weighs changing existing rules to compress the deadline for amendments after an initial Schedule 13D is filed. Rule 13d-2(a) requires a Schedule 13D to be amended “promptly” in the event of any “material change” in the information disclosed. However, “promptly” is not defined under the rules and a rule change could codify the generally understood two business days deadline (or shorten it to one business day) rather than allow for a facts and circumstances determination.

    A proposed rule to shorten the 10-day disclosure period is likely to trigger a vigorous response from two competing forces: (1) activists claiming that a shorter window deprives them of the necessary time to accumulate their stakes without market forces ratcheting up the share price to complete their investment and (2) public companies claiming that the 10-day window is an archaic measure that unnecessarily deprives the market of material information and leaves insufficient time for them to respond to potential efforts to exert influence over the public company.

    Chairman Gensler’s keen interest in Section 13(d) also signals that the SEC may look to bring additional actions to enforce Section 13(d) disclosure obligations. For example, the SEC may more aggressively charge investors who violate Rule 13d-2(a) by not “promptly” amending their Schedule 13Ds when there is a material change in investment intent or in circumstances where an investor increases or decreases its beneficial ownership by 1% or more. Our Corporate Advisory and White-Collar teams recommend Schedule 13D filers review their compliance procedures to ensure they are able to effectively monitor changes in beneficial ownership or investment intent to ensure their filings are made and updated in a timely manner.

    Authors

    Eric Orsic

    Partner

    Chicago

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • The Home Office Obligation is History: What You Need to Know Now

    The Home Office Obligation is History: What You Need to Know Now

    ARTICLE

    The Home Office Obligation is History: What You Need to Know Now

    June 28, 2021

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • Sidecar Deals – Private Equity Secondary Market Transactions as an Option in the Corona Crisis

    Sidecar Deals – Private Equity Secondary Market Transactions as an Option in the Corona Crisis

    ARTICLE

    Sidecar Deals – Private Equity Secondary Market Transactions as an Option in the Corona Crisis

    July 25, 2021

    Read time: 1 min

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    Overview
    In depth
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  • The SEC Continues to Target Cryptocurrencies and Other Digital Assets

    The SEC Continues to Target Cryptocurrencies and Other Digital Assets

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The SEC Continues to Target Cryptocurrencies and Other Digital Assets

    June 28, 2021

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Digital asset adoption is at an all-time high. The two largest cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin (“BTC”) and Ethereum (“ETH”), hit record prices during the first quarter of 2021 and multiple Fortune 500 companies, including Microsoft,[1] AT&T[2] and PayPal,[3] have either added Bitcoin to their balance sheets or expressed a willingness to accept it in lieu of fiat currencies. Large investment banks, asset managers and insurance companies also have entered the digital asset ecosystem. The recent enthusiasm surrounding digital assets enabled Coinbase, the largest U.S. cryptocurrency exchange, to go public with an initial $86-billion valuation.[4]

    Notwithstanding the popularity and acceptance of digital assets in the financial industry, U.S. legal and regulatory guidance regarding digital assets remains limited.[5] This is expected to change, however, as Gary Gensler settles into his position as Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Chairman Gensler joined the SEC with considerable knowledge of both financial technology and digital assets, having previously been a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where his teaching and research focused on blockchain technology and digital currencies.[6] It is anticipated that digital asset guidance may come in the form of new regulations, specifically, registration requirements for digital asset exchanges as well as a host of other measures aimed at preventing both fraud and manipulation.[7] Indeed, in a June 9, 2021 interview with CNBC, Chairman Gensler cautioned investors about the risks of trading Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, stating that “investors don’t have the full protections that they have in the equity markets or in the commodity futures markets . . . Bitcoin and these other cryptocurrencies do not have those full protections.”[8] He went on to comment on the SEC’s enforcement actions related to digital assets and indicated that the SEC will be keeping a close eye on the space, explaining that “[t]he SEC has brought, I think, six to seven dozen enforcement actions over the last few years, but of course there’s hundreds of other tokens. I think there’s 1,600 tokens that purportedly have a market value of over a million and 70 or 80 over a billion. So we’re going to keep trying to protect investors as best we can under the authorities.”[9]

    It was perhaps surprising, then, when, on June 11, 2021, the SEC released its Spring 2021 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (“Agenda”)[10] and digital assets were not the subject of any of the proposed and final SEC rulemaking areas. This did not go unnoticed by SEC Commissioners Hester M. Peirce and Elad L. Roisman, who issued a joint statement on June 14, 2021, noting that “the Agenda is missing some other important rulemakings, including rules to provide clarity for digital assets.”[11] It remains to be seen what place digital assets will have in Chairman Gensler’s regulatory agenda moving forward.

    Despite the limited regulatory guidance regarding digital assets, the SEC continues to pursue enforcement actions in the space. The high-profile lawsuit the SEC filed against Ripple Labs Inc. (“Ripple”)[12] and a similar lawsuit the SEC brought against LBRY, Inc. (“LBRY”),[13] alleging that that those companies’ digital tokens are unregistered securities, illustrate the evolving theories under which the SEC is pursuing cryptocurrency companies.

    For example, the SEC complaint against Ripple alleges that Ripple’s digital token, XRP, is an “investment contract” under Section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act, and is therefore a security and subject to regulation as such. Whether something is an investment contract is determined by the four-pronged “Howey test” announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.[14] Ripple is contesting the charges, claiming they never offered or sold XRP as an investment, that XRP holders have no control or ownership over Ripple, and that XRP holders are not entitled to share in any profits generated by Ripple.[15] Defendants also offered facts about XRP to help differentiate it from traditional securities, stating that XRP is decentralized, functions as a cryptocurrency, and that its price rises and falls in correlation with other cryptocurrencies and is not dependent on the actions taken by Ripple.[16] Those assertions, if proven true, would help Ripple negate all four prongs of the Howey test.

    Notably, in the Ripple lawsuit, Ripple has asserted as an affirmative defense that the SEC failed to provide “fair notice” that its conduct violated U.S. securities laws, amounting to what Ripple contends is a violation of due process.[17] Ripple asserts that there is a lack of clarity regarding the SEC’s position on digital assets due to the SEC’s lack of formal guidance on the matter for the past several years.[18] If successful, this fair notice defense could have wide-ranging implications for future SEC enforcement actions against other cryptocurrency companies, who could raise a similar defense.

    Beyond the Ripple and LBRY lawsuits, the SEC also continues to pursue enforcement actions under more traditional theories, including a recent lawsuit in connection with a digital asset lending program (akin to a stock loan desk, except participants allegedly loaned digital tokens instead of stock), which are becoming increasingly common.[19] In addition to alleging that certain defendants offered and sold unregistered securities in the lending program, the SEC also charged the same defendants with failing to register with the SEC as broker-dealers.[20] Specifically, on May 28, 2021, the SEC filed an action against five individuals, alleging that they “conduct[ed] an unregistered offering and sale of securities in the form of investments into” a digital asset lending program offered by defunct cryptocurrency company BitConnect, raising over $2 billion.[21]

    It is evident that the SEC’s enforcement efforts remain focused on the digital asset space despite the lack of formal rulemaking. Accordingly, any market participants involved with digital assets should carefully evaluate the regulatory risks associated with their investments, including risks that the SEC and other regulators may take the position that they constitute unregistered securities. Furthermore, those involved with crypto lending programs specifically should be knowledgeable of the relevant laws and regulations which may require crypto lending programs to be registered as securities and also require those who offer and sell such securities to register with the SEC as broker-dealers.

    Authored by Craig S. Warkol, Michael E. Swartz, Charles J. Clark, Melissa G.R. Goldstein and George H. Rowe.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.


    [1] “Microsoft to Accept Payments Made In Bitcoins,” BBC, Dec. 11, 2014, available here.

    [2] “AT&T Now Accepts Crypto Payments for Phone Bills Via Bitpay,” Yahoo! Finance, May 29, 2019.

    [3] “More Companies, Including Paypal And Xbox, Are Accepting Bitcoin and Other Cryptocurrencies as Payment, Despite Volatility Warnings,” Business Insider, April 3, 2021, available here.

    [4] “Coinbase soars in market debute, valued near $86 billion,” Associated Press News, April 14, 2021, available here.

    [5] See, e.g., FIN-2019-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies,” May 9, 2019, available here (consolidating current FinCEN regulations, related administrative rulings and guidance issued since 2011, to common business models involving convertible virtual currency).

    [6] “Biden SEC pick Gary Gensler on fintech, regulation, and blockchain,” MIT Management; Thinking Forward Newsletter, Jan. 21, 2021, available at here.

    [7] “Gary Gensler has a full agenda as he gets set to take over the SEC,” CNBC, Apr. 14, 2021, available here.

    [8] “Gensler on cryptocurrencies: Investors do not have full protection,” CNBC, June 9, 2021, available here.

    [9] Id.

    [10] SEC Press Release No. 2021-99, “SEC Announces Annual Regulatory Agenda,” June 11, 2021, available here.

    [11] SEC Public Statement, “Moving Forward or Falling Back? Statement on Chair Gensler’s Regulatory Agenda,” June 14, 2021, available here.

    [12] SEC Press Release No. 2020-338, “SEC Charges Ripple and Two Executives with Conducting $1.3 Billion Unregistered Securities Offering,” Dec. 22, 2020, available here.

    [13] SEC Litigation Release No. 25060, “SEC Charges New Hampshire Issuer of Digital Asset Securities with Registration Violations,” Mar. 29, 2021, available here.

    [14] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Howey test asks whether the instrument in question is (1) an investment in (2) a common enterprise with (3) the expectation of profits (4) based on the efforts of a promotor or a third party. See id at 297–300.

    [15] Answer of Def. Ripple Labs, Inc. to Pl’s. First Am. Compl. (“Ripple Answer”), 5–8, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc. et al., No. 20 Civ. 10832 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2021).

    [16] Id. at 6.

    [17] Id. at 91.

    [18] Id.

    [19] SEC Press Release 2021-90, “SEC Charges U.S. Promoters of $2 Billion Global Crypto Lending Securities Offering,” May 28, 2021, available here.

    [20] Id.

    [21] Complaint, SEC v. Brown et al., Case No. 1:21-cv-04791, ¶¶ 1–2 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2021).

    In depth
    Authors

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    George H. Rowe

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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