ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
New Zero-Day Vulnerability for Log4j Is the Next Cybersecurity Nightmare
December 10, 2021
Read time: 4 min
On December 10, 2021, multiple media outlets, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA), and the director of cybersecurity at the National Security Agency (NSA) began alerting to a significant vulnerability in an open source Apache logging library called “Log4j.” According to multiple sources, software has been publicly released that exploits this vulnerability and allows an attacker to gain full control of affected servers. Log4j is widely used and will take some time to patch and remediate, making many corporate systems and cloud environments vulnerable to attack.
Apache Log4j is a java-based logging utility that is incorporated into numerous frameworks and applications, and used by many major cloud services. On December 6, 2021, Apache announced version 2.15.0 of Log4j, noting that it corrects a critical remote code execution vulnerability, CVE-2021-44228. On December 9, 2021, several cybersecurity- and technical-focused media outlets began reporting that the vulnerability was being actively exploited and could result in a full system takeover.
The seriousness of the vulnerability combined with the widespread adoption of Log4j has resulted in alerts from CISA and the NSA. NSA Cybersecurity Director Rob Joyce tweeted that “[t]he log4j vulnerability is a significant threat for exploitation due to the widespread inclusion in software frameworks, even NSA’s GHIDRA.” Joyce also noted that this vulnerability underscores the need for increased adoption of software bill-of-materials (BOM) practices.
Practical Next Steps
Companies will need to work quickly to assess whether, and to what extent, they or their service providers are using Log4j. The following are questions and considerations for corporate counsel:
- Are we at risk? Ask IT and security personnel whether any software used in the company’s environment uses Log4j. In particular, inquire whether the company uses the vulnerable version of Apache.
- Do our products use Log4j? Your company’s software products may use Log4j. If so, assess the exposure and establish a plan for upgrading to the latest safe version. Your customers will likely be asking, and you should have a response.
- Ask your service providers whether their products or environment use Log4j. If so, ask whether they have patched to the latest version of Log4j, and have them provide a patch road map if they haven’t patched already.
- Ready your incident response team and confirm that after-hours contact information for your incident response team is up to date.
- Confirm your security operations are monitoring Internet-facing systems for indicators of compromise and are prepared to execute your incident response plan.
- Some public threat intel outlets have identified malicious IP addresses that are actively scanning Internet-facing systems for this vulnerability. Consider blacklisting those malicious IPs.
- If patching is not an immediate option, consider other containment measures to limit the potential impact of this vulnerability (e.g., sandboxing, air gapping, taking offline).
- Finally, if involved in a corporate acquisition, query the target entity with similar steps and questions as outlined above, and evaluate the risk accordingly.

FDA Issues Draft Guidance on the Use and Curation of Real-World Data in Registries
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
FDA Issues Draft Guidance on the Use and Curation of Real-World Data in Registries
December 10, 2021
Read time: 10 min
The US Food and Drug Administration has issued draft guidance outlining the agency’s recommendations for using real-world data from (and curating such data in) registries to support regulatory decision-making. Pharmaceutical manufacturers and other life-sciences industry stakeholders, as well as registry developers, should review the guidance and consider submitting comments before the February 28, 2022, deadline.
On November 30, 2021, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced the availability of its draft Real-World Data: Assessing Registries to Support Regulatory Decision-Making for Drug and Biological Products Guidance for Industry (Draft Guidance). The Draft Guidance outlines the agency’s recommendations for using real-world data (RWD) from registries and curating RWD in registries to support regulatory decision making. Specifically, the Draft Guidance describes relevant considerations for evaluating the reliability and utility of data from registries in supporting clinical trials, observational studies, and approvals for new indications for drugs and biological products under certain circumstances.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and other stakeholders from the life sciences industry, as well as entities that may develop or maintain registries, should consider the Draft Guidance for insights into how registries may be leveraged for regulatory decision making and consider submitting comments. FDA recommends that stakeholders submit any comments to the Draft Guidance by February 28, 2022.
Background
The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) established section 505F of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), requiring FDA to establish a program to evaluate the potential use of real-world evidence (RWE) as well as a framework for the RWE Program. The Draft Guidance is the most recent guidance FDA has issued under the RWE Program. The RWE Program is an important element in FDA’s ongoing efforts to integrate more information regarding the patient experience with medical products into its regulatory decision making. The program recognizes that sources of RWD, including electronic health records (EHRs), medical claims, pharmacy and laboratory databases, and medical device outputs may contain valuable insights regarding patient and user experiences with regulated products. Stakeholders, including researchers manufacturers, professional associations, disease advocacy organizations, contract research organizations (CROs) and technology companies, use data from these external sources to develop registries that collect standardized clinical and other data for a defined population, a particular disease or condition, or a particular product. The purposes of registries vary and may include, for example, monitoring of adverse events and outcomes for certain patient populations, satisfying FDA postmarket surveillance obligations, or supporting provider quality improvement and quality assessment activities.
The Draft Guidance sets out specific considerations for stakeholders regarding (i) a registry’s fitness for use in regulatory decision making, (ii) points to consider when linking a registry to another data source (e.g., EHRs or technologies such as wearables and biosensors), and (iii) specific considerations for regulatory review of registry data to support approvals. These considerations are also informative for developers who may be interested in providing registry data to sponsors or their CROs.
Fitness for Use in Regulatory Decision Making
The suitability of registry data may vary based on myriad factors, such as how the population is enrolled, general data quality, and how a registry is created and maintained (e.g., entirely retrospective or prospective, or a hybrid). Consistent with prior guidance that it has issued under the RWE Program, FDA recommends that sponsors consider the relevance and reliability of data before using it as RWD for regulatory decision-making purposes.
Relevance
To assess relevance, sponsors should confirm that registry data includes key data elements for the intended use (e.g., patient characteristics, exposures, outcomes) and a sufficient number of representative patients. Additionally, FDA suggests that objective endpoints (e.g., death or hospitalization) captured in a registry are often more useful in the regulatory context than subjective endpoints (e.g., pain), as subjective endpoints are difficult to meaningfully quantify.
The Draft Guidance notes that the method for selecting the individuals whose data will be included in a registry may impact the relevance of the data for a sponsor’s regulatory purposes. For example, the characteristics of an individual who (i) meets the inclusion and exclusion criteria for a registry that was established for a purpose distinct from the sponsor’s regulatory purposes, or (ii) is more likely to remain enrolled in a registry after agreeing to participate, may influence the nature of the registry data. Sponsors and registry developers alike should consider the impact of these factors on the relevance of registry data that they are considering using to support regulatory purposes.
Reliability
To demonstrate the reliability of registry data, sponsors should implement processes and procedures to help assure the quality of the registry data and oversee the registry’s operation.
FDA stated it will consider the following factors to assess whether registry data is reliable:
- Data accrual (i.e., how the data were collected)
- Whether processes and personnel in place at the time of data collection provide assurance that data integrity is upheld and errors are minimized
- Whether there are privacy controls to preserve confidentiality and security, and
- Whether any patient-reported outcomes (PROs) are appropriately captured, taking into consideration the recommendations in FDA’s December 2009 guidance, Patient-Reported Outcome Measures: Use in Medical Product Development to Support Labeling Changes
FDA recommends that sponsors establish and train registry staff on procedures and policies and engage in resource planning. The Draft Guidance suggests several areas for specific policies and procedures, such as the establishment of a data dictionary (which should establish data elements, ranges and allowable values, and source-data references); rules for validating queries; a process for data collection, curation, management and storage; compliance with 21 C.F.R. Part 11; and methods to capture and account for human error (e.g., coding, interpretation and transformation errors). Sponsors should review established policies and procedures on a regular basis to ensure data consistency, and they should perform routine descriptive statistical analyses to detect any missing or inconsistent data.
For registries maintained as electronic databases, FDA recommends specific safeguards, including:
- Maintaining a version control system.
- Employing a process to ensure data are not unintentionally altered when transferred.
- Updating old technology and integrating data maintained in outdated programs or software.
- Accounting for clinical changes over time (e.g., criteria for disease diagnosis; cancer staging).
- Explaining auditing rules and the errors identified based on audit finding.
- Employing a system for correcting errors.
A registry also must comply with applicable human subject protection requirements and privacy and data-security laws. Sponsors and registry developers should be particularly mindful of whether the establishment and maintenance of a registry would fall within the scope of FDA’s good clinical practice regulations, which apply to “clinical investigations.” Even if a registry itself does not fall within the scope of such FDA regulations, a registry developer may wish to consider whether to nonetheless structure the registry to comply with such regulations due to the contemplated recipients of registry data and their likely use cases. Therefore, as sponsors or registry developers are developing a registry they should consult with institutional review boards or independent ethics committees to help assure reliability of the registry data.
Linking Registries to Other Data Sources
One registry may not necessarily provide the entirety of the data that a sponsor requires for a particular regulatory purpose. Fortunately, the proliferation of tokenization software and other technologies that enable, without the disclosure of identifiers, the linking of disparate data sets regarding common individuals has made it easier to obtain a more comprehensive picture of a data subject.
The Draft Guidance provides specific considerations when sponsors seek to link data from multiple sources (e.g., from medical claims, EHRs, digital health technologies (such as wearables) or other registries). FDA encourages using common data elements to promote standardized, consistent and universal data collection among registries for better results when linking registry data.
Appropriateness of Linking Registries to Other Data Sources
Linking data may be useful if a particular registry does not capture all of the necessary data elements to sufficiently address a sponsor’s question. However, sponsors should consider:
- Whether linkage is appropriate for the proposed research question.
- Whether linking databases can be accomplished accurately, and whether the potentially linked data can be appropriately matched to patients in the registry.
- Whether the variables of interest are defined consistently across datasets.
- Whether the data is complete and accurate, such that it meets registry objectives.
Data Integrity Considerations
Sponsors should also consider the potential impact on data integrity of linking data sources, and have ready solutions for common issues such as redundant data, inconsistencies across data sets, and privacy and data security. FDA recommends that sponsors establish a procedure to address adequacy of patient-level linkages (i.e., that the same patient is being matched) and compliance with various jurisdictional requirements when seeking to link patient-level data. Further, sponsors should assess the compatibility and interoperability of data systems (including when there are software updates), that any automated electronic transmission of data elements is consistent and repeatable, and that the linking process accurately, consistently and comprehensively captures the relevant data. Sponsors should be able to make available to FDA during sponsor inspections any documentation of the process used to validate the transfer of data.
FDA Submissions
FDA recommends that sponsors meet with the agency to review their proposed plan to incorporate a registry before conducting an interventional or non-interventional study. The meeting can be used to address issues concerning data integrity, confirmation of data validation, and issues concerning linkage and related protocols (if applicable) and outcomes. In preparation for the meeting, sponsors should also prepare protocols and submit a plan for statistical analysis to FDA for review and comment.
Sponsors should ensure that patient-level data complies with applicable legal and regulatory requirements and that the sponsor can make applicable attestations to FDA. This is particularly relevant when using data from a third-party registry. If a third party owns or otherwise licenses the applicable registry data to the sponsor, the sponsor should ensure its agreement with the third party requires the third party to share patient-level data with FDA as part of the application process and otherwise cooperate with any inspections or reviews of the registry or registry data by FDA.
Takeaways
While randomized, controlled trials remain the gold standard to support clinical decision-making, the way in which stakeholders generate, analyze and use data in the regulatory landscape is evolving. Registries have the potential to allow for expanded studies and more efficient regulatory decision making when used with the proper safeguards. Sponsors, registry developers and other stakeholders involved in the use or generation of RWD and RWE to support regulatory decision making should consider submitting comments to the Draft Guidance (Docket No. FDA– 2021–D–1146). FDA recommends that the public submit comments by February 28, 2022, to ensure the agency considers them before it begins work on the final version of the guidance.

US Expands Sanctions Against Belarus, Barring New Sovereign Debt Transactions
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
US Expands Sanctions Against Belarus, Barring New Sovereign Debt Transactions
December 10, 2021
Read time: 6 min
On Dec. 2, 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) expanded sanctions against the Lukashenka regime in Belarus.[1] The new sanctions are a response to the Lukashenka regime’s anti-democratic practices and human rights violations. U.S. persons are now barred from transactions involving new sovereign debt issued by Belarus. In addition, OFAC has added 20 individuals, 12 entities and three aircraft in Belarus to its Specially Designated Nationals List (“SDN List”).[2] This continues a trend under the Biden Administration of increasing pressure on the Lukashenka regime by widening the scope of persons and entities it targets with economic sanctions.[3]
Background
The new restriction on Belarusian sovereign debt transactions and the latest additions to OFAC’s SDN List come on the heels of Executive Order No. (“E.O.”) 14038, signed by President Joseph R. Biden on Aug. 9, 2021. OFAC’s sanctions program against Belarus was originally established under Executive Order No. 13405, signed by President George W. Bush in 2006.[4] With E.O. 14038, the Biden Administration added to the categories of persons who can be designated on the SDN List.[5] OFAC now has broader authority to impose sanctions against political subdivisions of the Government of Belarus, current and former government officials irrespective of involvement in corruption, entities operating in certain sensitive industries, or any person or entity threatening the peace, security, human rights or democratic integrity of Belarus.[6]
Sovereign Debt Restrictions
Under the authority of E.O. 14038, OFAC issued Directive 1, which prohibits “all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt with a maturity of greater than 90 days issued after December 2, 2021” by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus (“MFRB”) or the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus (“DBRB”).[7] The prohibitions apply to transactions by U.S. persons or within the United States, in both the primary and secondary markets.[8] The term “debt” is defined to encompass any “bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers’ acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper.”[9] OFAC has also expressly prohibited U.S. persons from entering into derivatives contracts “whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes prohibited debt.”[10]
Directive 1 does not prohibit other transactions with MFRB and DBRB,[11] and OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule”[12] does not apply (i.e., transactions with entities owned or controlled by MFRB or DBRB are still permitted).[13] Additionally, transactions in sovereign debt issued before December 2, 2021 are not affected, as long as the terms of such debt (including the repayment period, interest rate and amount) are not modified after that date.[14] This includes revolving credit facilities, long-term loan agreements and related drawdowns and disbursements, as long as all terms were agreed to before Dec. 2, 2021, or the terms of repayment are 90 days or less.[15]
Sanctioned Persons and Industries
Using its expanded authority to designate Lukashenka-connected persons and entities, OFAC has sought to address specific actions of the Lukashenka regime. For example, OFAC designated a state-owned tourism company and several Belarusian border-security officials for their involvement in orchestrating a migrant crisis in Europe by encouraging and facilitating migration to Belarus, and then forcing the migrants to attempt to enter border countries.[16] Similarly, OFAC has designated businesses in the defense and security sectors that supply weapons and ammunition to foreign conflicts, and other industries like the potash industry that funnel profits to the regime.[17] Pursuant to a General License, investors have been given 120 days to wind down their involvement in the two major Belarusian potash-sector companies that were designated as SDNs.[18] Otherwise, U.S. persons are prohibited from all transactions with SDNs, and any property owned by an SDN that is currently possessed or controlled by a U.S. person cannot be “transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.”[19]
Implications for U.S. Investors
U.S. persons who transact in Belarusian sovereign debt should be mindful of the prohibitions imposed by Directive 1, and their broad reach to a variety of instruments as well as derivatives. Additionally, U.S. persons involved in transactions or investments in the Belarus area should ensure that any existing transaction or investment counterparties (and their 50% or greater owners[20]) are checked against the updated SDN List. It also bears emphasis that E.O. 14038 prohibits attempts to circumvent OFAC sanctions with any “deceptive or structured transactions” that directly or indirectly benefit an SDN or the Government of Belarus.[21]
Authored by Gary Stein, Betty Santangelo, Melissa G.R. Goldstein and Hannah M. Thibideau.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Treasury Expands Sanctions Against Belarusian Regime with Partners and Allies” (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[2] Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Belarus Designations; Publication of Belarus Directive 1 and Related Frequently Asked Questions; Issuance of Belarus General License 5” (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[3] See E.O. 14038, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Belarus” (Aug. 9, 2021), available here.
[4] E.O. 13405, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Undermining Democratic Processes or Institutions in Belarus” (June 16, 2006), available here.
[5] E.O. 14038, supra note 3.
[6] Id.
[7] See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Directive 1 Under Executive Order 14038” (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[8] Press Release, Treasury, supra note 1.
[9] OFAC FAQ 944 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[10] OFAC FAQ 948 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[11] OFAC FAQ 945 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[12] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in Property are Blocked” (Aug. 13, 2014), available here.
[13] OFAC FAQ 943 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[14] OFAC FAQ 942 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[15] OFAC FAQ 947 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[16] Press Release, Treasury, supra note 1.
[17] Id.
[18] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, General License No. 5, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Open Joint Stock Company Belarusian Potash Company or Agrorozkvit LLC” (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.
[19] E.O. 14038, supra note 3. Note that while the 50 Percent Rule does not apply to the Directive 1 sanctions, it does apply to the SDN List. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Revised Guidance, supra note 12.
[20] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Revised Guidance, supra note 12.
[21] E.O. 14038, supra 3.
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President Biden Signs Executive Order, Federal Government to Procure More Than 10 Gigawatts of Renewable Energy by 2030
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
President Biden Signs Executive Order, Federal Government to Procure More Than 10 Gigawatts of Renewable Energy by 2030
December 9, 2021
Read time: 10 min
On December 8, 2021, US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that directs the federal government to become carbon neutral by 2050. Due to the procurement power of the federal government, this executive order aims to transform clean energy markets while achieving ambitious climate goals. Those goals include:
- 100% carbon pollution-free electricity by 2030 (at least half of which will be locally supplied clean energy to meet 24/7 demand)
- 100% zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100% zero-emission light duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027
- Net zero emissions from federal procurement no later than 2050, including a Buy Clean policy to promote use of construction materials with lower embodied emissions
- A net zero emissions building portfolio by 2045, including a 50% emissions reduction by 2032.
The executive order and the administration’s procurement plans are a potential bonanza for clean energy companies and electric vehicle companies. The federal government buys $650 billion in goods and services annually in addition to a real estate portfolio of more than 300,000 buildings and a fleet of more than 600,000 cars and trucks.
To achieve the 100% carbon pollution-free electricity goal, the federal government will buy power directly from utilities, enter into power purchase agreements with generators and develop onsite generation on federal real property. Meeting this goal will spur the development of more than 10 gigawatts of new clean electricity production by 2030.
At least 50% of that power must come from locally sourced “24/7 carbon pollution-free electricity,” which the order said must “match actual electricity consumption on an hourly basis and [be] produced within the same regional grid where the energy is consumed.”
The McDermott energy team has seen such calls for “around the clock” clean power supply grow in recent years—particularly from large corporate energy buyers—including a number of leading technology companies. Those same technology companies have urged the federal government to procure clean energy on a 24/7 basis.
The executive order’s 100% zero-emission vehicle goal also builds upon President Biden’s commitment to expanding the electric vehicle market in the United States. Replacing the federal government’s fleet of more than 600,000 vehicles and building out more charging infrastructure will support the growth of the domestic manufacturing sector.
To meet the net zero procurement goal, the federal government will expand its consideration of embodied emissions in construction materials and launch a Buy Clean policy to promote the acquisition of materials with lower embodied emissions. Within six months of the executive order, a working group will develop a list of priority pollutants to target and the materials that will be covered by the Buy Clean policy. The federal government will also require its major contractors to publicly report their greenhouse gas emissions, plans to reduce emissions and risks faced by climate change.
The federal government will also electrify equipment and deploy onsite clean electricity generation as it constructs new buildings and retrofits its existing 318,000. In addition to decarbonizing buildings, agencies will also increase water efficiency and minimize the use of toxic and hazardous chemicals when accomplishing this goal.
Based on the prior experience of McDermott’s Energy and Project Finance Practice Group, which is well-versed in advising on federal government led renewable energy projects, the executive order and subsequent implementation could be transformative for the industry.
The federal government is the largest landowner and energy consumer in the United States. As advisors to a leading renewable energy developer on one of the first federal government utility scale installations at Fort Hood (which involves the US army’s largest single renewable energy project to date), we have seen firsthand how the Fort Hood project not only provides Fort Hood with greater security and resiliency through localized renewable energy, but could also save the US Department of Defense about $168 million compared to what it would pay for power from the traditional electricity grid over the course of the project’s offtake agreement. And that is just a single project at a single military base.
On December 8, 2021, US President Joe Biden signed an executive order that directs the federal government to become carbon neutral by 2050. Due to the procurement power of the federal government, this executive order aims to transform clean energy markets while achieving ambitious climate goals. Those goals include:
- 100% carbon pollution-free electricity by 2030 (at least half of which will be locally supplied clean energy to meet 24/7 demand)
- 100% zero-emission vehicle acquisitions by 2035, including 100% zero-emission light duty vehicle acquisitions by 2027
- Net zero emissions from federal procurement no later than 2050, including a Buy Clean policy to promote use of construction materials with lower embodied emissions
- A net zero emissions building portfolio by 2045, including a 50% emissions reduction by 2032.
The executive order and the administration’s procurement plans are a potential bonanza for clean energy companies and electric vehicle companies. The federal government buys $650 billion in goods and services annually in addition to a real estate portfolio of more than 300,000 buildings and a fleet of more than 600,000 cars and trucks.
To achieve the 100% carbon pollution-free electricity goal, the federal government will buy power directly from utilities, enter into power purchase agreements with generators and develop onsite generation on federal real property. Meeting this goal will spur the development of more than 10 gigawatts of new clean electricity production by 2030.
At least 50% of that power must come from locally sourced “24/7 carbon pollution-free electricity,” which the order said must “match actual electricity consumption on an hourly basis and [be] produced within the same regional grid where the energy is consumed.”
The McDermott energy team has seen such calls for “around the clock” clean power supply grow in recent years—particularly from large corporate energy buyers—including a number of leading technology companies. Those same technology companies have urged the federal government to procure clean energy on a 24/7 basis.
The executive order’s 100% zero-emission vehicle goal also builds upon President Biden’s commitment to expanding the electric vehicle market in the United States. Replacing the federal government’s fleet of more than 600,000 vehicles and building out more charging infrastructure will support the growth of the domestic manufacturing sector.
To meet the net zero procurement goal, the federal government will expand its consideration of embodied emissions in construction materials and launch a Buy Clean policy to promote the acquisition of materials with lower embodied emissions. Within six months of the executive order, a working group will develop a list of priority pollutants to target and the materials that will be covered by the Buy Clean policy. The federal government will also require its major contractors to publicly report their greenhouse gas emissions, plans to reduce emissions and risks faced by climate change.
The federal government will also electrify equipment and deploy onsite clean electricity generation as it constructs new buildings and retrofits its existing 318,000. In addition to decarbonizing buildings, agencies will also increase water efficiency and minimize the use of toxic and hazardous chemicals when accomplishing this goal.
Based on the prior experience of McDermott’s Energy and Project Finance Practice Group, which is well-versed in advising on federal government led renewable energy projects, the executive order and subsequent implementation could be transformative for the industry.
The federal government is the largest landowner and energy consumer in the United States. As advisors to a leading renewable energy developer on one of the first federal government utility scale installations at Fort Hood (which involves the US army’s largest single renewable energy project to date), we have seen firsthand how the Fort Hood project not only provides Fort Hood with greater security and resiliency through localized renewable energy, but could also save the US Department of Defense about $168 million compared to what it would pay for power from the traditional electricity grid over the course of the project’s offtake agreement. And that is just a single project at a single military base.
Andrew Klimaszewski, a law clerk in the Los Angeles office, also contributed to this article.

Federal Data Breach Reporting Requirements Continue to Evolve
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Federal Data Breach Reporting Requirements Continue to Evolve
December 9, 2021
Read time: 7 min
Complementing the patchwork of state data breach notification laws, a number of federal agencies recently have promulgated sector-specific reporting rules affecting a variety of companies, both directly and indirectly, with varying definitions of triggering incident and requirements on submission content. These include:
- Effective April 1, 2022, with a compliance date of May 1, 2022, federally regulated banking organizations must notify their primary federal regulator of any “computer-security incident” that rises to the level of a “notification incident”1 within 36 hours after the banking organization determines that an incident has occurred. In addition, federally regulated bank service providers must notify each affected bank organizations of such an incident “as soon as possible” after determining it has experienced such an incident.
- Effective December 31, 2021, covered freight railroads, passenger rail and rail transit systems must report a “cybersecurity incident”2 to the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within 24 hours of identifying a covered incident.
- Effective September 15, 2021, health apps and connected devices that collect or use consumers’ health information must notify affected consumers when their health data is breached,3 as well as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), within 60 days of discovering the incident.
- Effective May 28, 2021, designated critical pipeline owners and operators must report a “cybersecurity incident”4 to CISA within 12 hours of incident identification.
In addition, President Joe Biden’s May 12, 2021, Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity (14028) contains provisions that could affect data breach reporting requirements for Information Technology (IT), Operational Technology (OT) and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) service providers providing such services to the federal government. The Executive Order provides that:
- Within 60 days of the Executive Order’s date, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security and Director of National Intelligence, shall review the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement contract requirements and language for contracting with IT and OT service providers and recommend updates to such requirements and language to the FAR Council and other appropriate agencies. This includes recommending contract language designed to ensure appropriate reporting of cyber incidents and potential incidents relevant to any agency with which an IT/OT service provider has contracted—directly with such agency, as well as any other agency deemed appropriate.5
- Within 45 days of the Executive Order’s date, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense acting through the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Attorney General, and the Director of OMB, shall recommend to the FAR Council contract language that identifies, among other things, the time periods within which ICT service providers must report cyber incidents6 to the contracting federal agencies. The reporting timeline is to be based on a graduated scale of severity, with reporting on the most severe cyber incidents not to exceed three days after initial detection.7
Congress also has been considering a variety of data breach notification bills. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) had contained a provision that would have required critical infrastructure companies to report “cyber incidents” to CISA within 24 or 72 hours, but that provision did not survive the legislative process.
Based on the above, as well as other measures and messaging from the federal government, ever-increasing cybersecurity oversight of the private sector seems inevitable. The recent rules are also expected to have a cascading effect on other industries. For example, many of the companies covered by the recent rules provide products and services to—and receive products and services from—an array of other companies. The expectation for timely reporting of data breaches—at the very least contractually—is likely to accelerate greatly.
Facing this shifting landscape, it is important for organizations, regardless of sector, to take a fresh look at their cybersecurity programs, including breach reporting and incident response, and third-party contractual arrangements to ensure they are in harmony with these rising expectations and increasing obligations.
1 Under the federal banking data breach notification rule, a “computer-security incident” is defined as “an occurrence that results in actual harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system or the information that the system processes, stores, or transmits.” See 12 C.F.R. § 53.2(b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 225.301(b)(4); 12 C.F.R. § 304.22(b)(4). A “notification incident” is “a computer-security incident that has material disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to materially disrupt or degrade, a banking organization’s – (i) Ability to carry out banking operations, activities, or processes, or deliver banking products and services to a material portion of its customer base, in the ordinary course of business; (ii) Business line(s), including associated operations, services, functions, and support, that upon failure would result in a material loss of revenue, profit, or franchise value; or (iii) Operations, including associated services, functions and support, as applicable, the failure or discontinuance of which would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” See 12 C.F.R. § 53.2(b)(7); 12 C.F.R. § 225.301(b)(7); 12 C.F.R. § 304.22(b)(7).
2 The rail system Security Directives broadly define a “cybersecurity incident” to mean an unauthorized event that “jeopardizes, disrupts or otherwise impacts, or is reasonably likely to jeopardize, disrupt or otherwise impact, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or communications systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident on the system.” A covered cybersecurity incident includes an event that is under investigation as a possible cybersecurity incident without final determination of the event’s root cause or nature (such as malicious, suspicious or benign).
3 Under the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule, “breach of security” means “with respect to unsecured PHR identifiable health information of an individual in a personal health record, acquisition of such information without the authorization of the individual. Unauthorized acquisition will be presumed to include unauthorized access to unsecured PHR identifiable health information unless the vendor of personal health records, PHR related entity, or third party service provider that experienced the breach has reliable evidence showing that there has not been, or could not reasonably have been, unauthorized acquisition of such information.” 16 CFR § 318.2(a).
4 The critical pipeline Security Directive broadly defines a “cybersecurity incident” to mean “an event that, without lawful authority, actually, imminently, or potentially jeopardizes, disrupts or otherwise impacts the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or communications systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident on the system.” This includes an event that: “(1). Is under investigation as a possible cybersecurity incident without successful determination of the event’s root cause or nature (such as malicious, suspicious, benign); and (2). May affect the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or communications systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident on the system.”
5 EO 14028 § 2(b). Within 90 days of receipt of such recommendations, the FAR Council shall review the proposed contract language and conditions and, as appropriate, shall publish for public comment proposed updates to the FAR. Id. at § 2(d).
6 Covered incidents are those involving a software product or service provided to the agencies or involving a support system for a software product or service provided to such agencies. Id. at § 2(g)(i)(D).
7 Id. (emphasis added).

Turning up the Magnification: Regulators Have PE-Controlled Insurers under the Microscope (Again)
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Turning up the Magnification: Regulators Have PE-Controlled Insurers under the Microscope (Again)
December 9, 2021
Read time: 8 min
For much of the past 10 years, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and individual state insurance regulators have highlighted their awareness of the increasing number of insurers controlled by private equity (PE) funds. The NAIC’s Capital Markets Bureau publishes an annual report about those insurers it considers to be controlled by PE funds, and the year-end 2020 report.
Earlier this week, during a meeting of the Financial Stability (E) Task Force (the Task Force), it became apparent that the NAIC and state regulators are about to take a deeper look, assigning the task of coordinating said project to the Task Force’s subsidiary committee, the Macroprudential (E) Working Group. The Task Force is not the only NAIC committee that is looking at PE funds’ ownership or the control of insurers as the list of “regulatory considerations” below indicates. While PE funds control both property-casualty and life-annuity insurers, based on discussions during recent Task Force meetings, as well as several of the regulatory considerations below, it appears that regulators are most concerned with life and annuity insurers. Regardless, any and all types of re/insurers owned or controlled by PE funds should be paying attention.
At the same meeting, Superintendent of the Maine Bureau of Insurance Eric Cioppa (the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) insurance regulator representative) indicated in his report to the NAIC committee that the FSOC is aware that both state and federal regulators are monitoring PE fund investments in, and control of, life insurers. The Federal Insurance Office’s (FIO) Annual Report on the Insurance Industry (September 2021) confirms that the FIO has been monitoring—and will continue to monitor—the impact that PE fund control has on investment policies and practices of certain life and annuity insurers, as well as considering various management agreements with advisors of all kinds (including advisors that are fellow portfolio companies) and fee structures involved in these relationships.
As to the “deeper look” that the NAIC’s Macroprudential (E) Working Group will be taking, a list of topics to be considered was released during the Task Force’s session on December 7, 2021. The list makes clear that the considerations are not exclusive to PE-controlled insurers, but rather are generally applicable to any insurer whose holding company structure and affiliate relationships exhibit similar characteristics. Comments are due to NAIC staff by January 18, 2022.
Below is the list verbatim:
Regulatory Considerations Applicable (But Not Exclusive) to Private Equity (PE) Owned Insurers
A summary of currently identified regulatory considerations follows with no consideration of priority or importance …. Most of these considerations are not limited to PE owned insurers and are applicable to any insurers demonstrating the respective activities.
- Regulators may not be obtaining clear pictures of risk due to holding companies structuring contractual agreements in a manner to avoid regulatory disclosures and requirements. Additionally, affiliated/related party agreements impacting the insurer’s risks may be structured to avoid disclosure (for example, by not including the insurer as a party to the agreement).
- Control is presumed to exist where ownership is >=10%, but control considerations may exist with less than 10% ownership. For example, a party may exercise a controlling influence over an insurer through Board and management representation or contractual arrangements, including non-customary minority shareholder rights or covenants, investment management agreement (IMA) provisions such as onerous or costly IMA termination provisions, or excessive control or discretion given over the investment strategy and its implementation.
- The material terms of the IMA and whether they are arm’s length —including the amount and types of investment management fees paid by the insurer, the termination provisions (how difficult or costly it would be for the insurer to terminate the IMA) and the degree of discretion or control of the investment manager over investment guidelines, allocation, and decisions.
- Owners of insurers may be focused on short-term results which may not be in alignment with the long-term nature of liabilities in life products. For example, excessive investment management fees paid to an affiliate of the owner of an insurer may effectively act as a form of unauthorized dividend in addition to reducing the insurer’s overall investment returns. Similarly, owners of insurers may not be willing to transfer capital to a troubled insurer.
- Operational, governance and market conduct practices being impacted by the different priorities and level of insurance experience possessed by entrants into the insurance market without prior insurance experience, including, but not limited to, PE owners. For example, a reliance on [third party administrators] TPAs due to the acquiring firm’s lack of expertise may not be sufficient to administer the business. Such practices could lead to lapse, early surrender, and/or exchanges of contracts with in-the-money guarantees and other important policyholder coverage and benefits.
- No uniform or widely accepted definition of PE and challenges in maintaining a complete list of insurers’ material relationships with PE firms. (UCAA (National Treatment WG) dealt with some items related to PE.) This definition may not be required as the considerations included in this document are applicable across insurance ownership types.
- The lack of identification of related party-originated investments (including structured securities). For example, this may create potential conflicts of interests and excessive and/or hidden fees in the portfolio structure. Assets created and managed by affiliates may include fees at different levels of the value chain. Regulatory disclosures may be required to identify underlying related party/affiliated investments and/or collateral within structured security investments. (An agenda item and blanks proposal are being developed by [Statutory Accounting Principles (E) Working Group] SAPWG.)
- Though the blanks include affiliated investment disclosures, it is not easy to identify underlying affiliated investments and/or collateral within structured security investments.
- Broader considerations exist around asset manager affiliates (not just PE owners) and disclaimers of affiliation avoiding current affiliate investment disclosures. (A new Schedule Y, Part 3, has been adopted and will be in effect for year-end 2021. This schedule will identify all entities with greater than 10% ownership—regardless of any disclaimer of affiliation—and whether there is a disclaimer of control/disclaimer of affiliation. It will also identify the ultimate controlling party. Additionally, SAPWG is developing a proposal to revamp Schedule D reporting, with primary concepts to determine what reflects a qualifying bond and to identify different types of investments more clearly, including asset-backed securities.)
- The material increases in privately structured securities (both by affiliated and non-affiliated asset managers), which introduce other sources of risk or increase traditional credit risk, such as complexity risk and illiquidity risk, and involve a lack of transparency. (The NAIC Capital Markets Bureau continues to monitor this and issue regular reports, but much of the work is complex and time-intensive with a lot of manual research required. The NAIC Securities Valuation Office will begin receiving private rating rationale reports in 2022; these will offer some transparency into these private securities.)
- The level of reliance on rating agency ratings and their appropriateness for regulatory purposes (e.g., accuracy, consistency, comparability, applicability, interchangeability, and transparency). ([Valuation of Securities (E) Task Force] VOSTF has previously addressed and will continue to address this issue.)
- The trend of life insurers in pension risk transfer (PRT) business and supporting such business with the more complex investments outlined above ([Life Actuarial (A) Task Force] LATF has exposed questions aimed at determining if an Actuarial Guideline is needed to achieve a primary goal of ensuring claims-paying ability even if the complex assets (often private equity-related) did not perform as the company expects, and a secondary goal to require stress testing and best practices related to valuation of non-publicly traded assets. Additionally, enhanced reporting in 2021 Separate Accounts blank will specifically identify assets backing PRT liabilities.) Considerations have also been raised regarding the [risk-based capital] RBC treatment of PRT business:
- Review applicability of Department of Labor protections resulting for pension beneficiaries in a PRT transaction.
- Review state guaranty associations’ coverage for group annuity certificate holders (pension beneficiaries) in receivership compared to Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protection.
- Insurers’ use of offshore reinsurers (including captives) and complex affiliated sidecar vehicles to maximize capital efficiency and introduce complexities into the group structure.”
As indicated above, this is not the first time that the NAIC will be scrutinizing these issues, including in connection with PE funds’ control of insurers. It’s also not the first time that regulators in individual states have done so. For example, in 2013, in connection with Form A change of control proceedings, the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS) acted to enhance policyholder protection in connection with the acquisition of three New York-domiciled life-annuity insurers. In two cases, the DFS imposed higher capital standards and required funding of backstop trust accounts, along with mandating stronger financial disclosures, more frequent financial reporting and increased scrutiny of reinsurance transactions, investments and dividends. In another case, the DFS acted to ban a prominent PE fund principal from exercising control or serving as an officer or director of insurers for seven years.
The McDermott insurance team will continue to monitor these state and federal regulatory developments. Should you have any questions, please reach out to your customary contact(s) at the Firm.

HHS-OIG Invites Participation in Modernization Initiative: RFI Comment Deadline Approaching
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
HHS-OIG Invites Participation in Modernization Initiative: RFI Comment Deadline Approaching
December 9, 2021
Read time: 9 min
On September 24, 2021, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) published a request for information (RFI) to advance its guidance modernization initiative. The RFI seeks industry perspective to assist HHS-OIG with updating its publicly available resources, including program integrity tools, guidance and datasets, to make largescale improvements to compliance efforts. While the RFI primarily expresses HHS-OIG’s intention to update and expand on existing resources, certain suggested policy changes, such as imposing expiration dates on HHS-OIG’s advisory opinions, may present additional hurdles and uncertainty for industry when developing compliance programs or planning business arrangements.
The RFI presents an opportunity to influence HHS-OIG’s compliance resources and priorities for the coming years. Comments to the RFI should be submitted electronically no later than January 31, 2022, for consideration.
The RFI, issued by Acting Inspector General Christi Grimm on September 22, 2021, and published in the Federal Register on September 24, 2021, announced a new “modernization initiative” that involves HHS-OIG examining its historical sub-regulatory guidance practices and eliciting feedback from the healthcare community to help inform that examination. The purpose of this initiative is to modernize the accessibility and usability of HHS-OIG’s publicly available resources, including guidance, program integrity resources, publicly available data and advisory opinions. HHS-OIG’s stated goal is to continue producing useful and timely resources that, among other things, advance the healthcare industry’s voluntary compliance and help prevent fraud, waste and abuse. To that end, HHS-OIG requests that stakeholders suggest ways to improve the usefulness, timeliness, accessibility and usability of HHS-OIG’s resources by:
- Providing insights into how stakeholders use HHS-OIG resources
- Identifying the successes and challenges organizations have had using HHS-OIG resources
- Identifying other potential opportunities for HHS-OIG to provide information to the public and other stakeholders.
In addition to expanding resources, HHS-OIG is considering new mediums through which it will provide guidance, including podcasts and video trainings. Acknowledging that data analytics and automated compliance functions are increasingly valuable to stakeholders, the RFI also requests feedback on the accessibility of HHS-OIG datasets and insight into how industry utilizes the available data to develop automated compliance program features, including application programming interfaces.
HHS-OIG states that feedback received will inform its consideration and prioritization of potential updates to existing resources, modifications of processes for developing resources, changes in how data and information are provided to the public, and development of new materials or datasets, as appropriate. While the RFI indicates that HHS-OIG’s modernization initiative will consist of a multi-step, multi-year process, comments on the RFI will likely impact the trajectory of the initiative and HHS-OIG’s reform priorities.
HHS-OIG Resource Overhaul
The RFI presents both general questions and resource-specific questions for consideration. In its “general questions” to industry, HHS-OIG requests feedback across resource categories to determine which are most useful to particular organizations and which areas would benefit from reform. HHS-OIG asks for comments on the types of arrangements, topical areas and industry sectors that could benefit from improved compliance guidance. HHS-OIG seeks suggestions on both formal and informal mechanisms that could be implemented to solicit regular comments from stakeholders in the future. Suggestions on ways to improve resource accessibility for individuals with disabilities and alternate content formats are welcomed. HHS-OIG also seeks to better understand how the healthcare community uses software, technology systems and OIG data for internal compliance programs.
In addition to seeking general feedback, the RFI targets specific resources, such as advisory opinions, fraud alerts, special advisory bulletins, compliance program guidance, frequently asked questions, other compliance guidance and resources, corporate integrity agreements, searchable databases such as the list of excluded individuals and entities, and audits and evaluations. HHS-OIG presents the following questions and suggestions for public comment:
- Advisory Opinions
HHS-OIG implemented its advisory opinion process in 1997, and since then the process has resulted in the submission of more than 1,200 requests and the issuance of almost 400 advisory opinions regarding compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute and its safe harbors, the prohibition on beneficiary inducement, and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law and exclusion statute.
In the RFI, HHS-OIG recognizes and seeks commentary on the balance between providing thorough and detailed analyses and engaging in a more expeditious process. HHS-OIG also invites industry stakeholders to provide feedback on potential reforms to the advisory opinion process related to the complexity of the requests. For example, HHS-OIG suggests introducing a “short-form” opinion that would have less analysis but could potentially be produced faster, or creating a “frequently asked questions” process. Perhaps most importantly, HHS-OIG is considering whether to set “expiration dates” for advisory opinions or require periodic factual recertifications from the requestor. If adopted, this change could redefine the methods by which industry stakeholders rely on advisory opinions as a resource to structure arrangements and analyze risk.
- Fraud Alerts
HHS-OIG invites industry stakeholders to comment on its special fraud alert process. Currently, any person may request at any time that HHS-OIG issue a special fraud alert to inform the public of practices that are of particular concern under Medicare or a state healthcare program. HHS-OIG’s special fraud alerts have focused on national fraud and abuse trends that may violate the Anti-Kickback Statute and the prohibition against beneficiary inducements. HHS-OIG relies on its Office of Evaluation and Inspections, as well as other experts at HHS-OIG, other HHS agencies, other federal and state agencies, and others in the healthcare industry, to generate fraud alerts.
HHS-OIG invites healthcare stakeholders to comment on their experiences with special fraud alerts and make suggestions on what could be done to make these alerts more meaningful.
- Special Advisory Bulletins
If HHS-OIG lacks the enforcement experience necessary to issue a special fraud alert, it may choose to publish instead a special advisory bulletin covering potentially abusive healthcare practices. Special advisory bulletins may also cover certain compliance measures as applied to specific arrangements, warn against arrangements that may violate the Anti-Kickback Statute, or comment on the scope and effect of certain legal prohibitions.
HHS-OIG seeks comments from stakeholders about their experiences with special advisory bulletins and suggestions on ways to make them more meaningful, useful or timely.
- Compliance Program Guidance
Beginning in 1998, HHS-OIG’s compliance program guidance (CPG) documents have outlined positions on the fundamental principles of healthcare compliance programs. They are intended to encourage the voluntary development of compliance programs.
HHS-OIG asks stakeholders to comment on the benefits of CPGs, considerations for publishing additional CPGs and potential improvements to format, such as a web-based document that could be updated more frequently.
- Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
The RFI requests feedback on the value of published FAQs and insight into industry’s implementation of this guidance, using the FAQs process that HHS-OIG has employed to address stakeholder questions throughout the COVID-19 pandemic as a model. While HHS-OIG emphasizes that the published FAQs serve as informal, time-limited guidance for mitigating general compliance risks through the COVID-19 regulatory flexibilities, HHS-OIG acknowledges that FAQs allow for expedited responses to complex industry questions.
HHS-OIG seeks comment on how it could improve this process for future health emergencies and how it could implement a similar FAQs process that would continue beyond the context of the pandemic.
- Other Compliance Guidance and Resources
In general, HHS-OIG seeks to understand how industry uses targeted resources developed to aid specific segments of the healthcare industry, such as resources developed specifically for healthcare boards or resources jointly published by HHS-OIG and other agencies or professional associations. HHS-OIG is open to considering alternate delivery models, such as podcasts and videos, depending on the method that will be most valuable.
- Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs)
While CIAs are only binding for the individuals or entities that are parties to such agreements, the RFI highlights several CIA resources available on HHS-OIG’s website, such as postings of open CIAs, listings of closed CIAs and FAQs.
HHS-OIG seeks to understand how stakeholders utilize publicly available information relating to CIAs to refine internal compliance programs.
- List of Excluded Individuals/Entities (LEIE)
HHS-OIG publishes a list of individuals and entities currently excluded from participation in federally funded healthcare programs, Medicare or state healthcare programs. The list is available in spreadsheet format or through a searchable database on the LEIE website. The LEIE provides an important safeguard to liability, because an individual who hires a listed person or entity may be subject to civil monetary penalties.
HHS-OIG acknowledges that the presentation and accessibility of these data may be improved, and seeks feedback regarding software applications and how the LEIE may be integrated into onboarding processes for new hires.
- Audits and Evaluations
Audits and evaluations are a significant part of HHS-OIG’s work in assessing HHS programs and the performance of contractors and grantees. HHS-OIG generates and publishes reports of its audits and evaluations, which may include datasets and recommendations. Published reports may include toolkits and recommendations to assist other similarly situated entities or providers. In addition to publishing reports, HHS-OIG also summarizes forthcoming and completed evaluations. HHS-OIG’s Work Plan priorities and ongoing audits are available on its Active Work Plan Items webpage, and its Semiannual Report to Congress is also publicly available.
The RFI notes that HHS-OIG is in the process of upgrading its audit and evaluation resources to include a repository of recommendations. As HHS-OIG builds this database, it requests comments on functionalities that would be most useful to industry and stakeholders. In addition to requesting general end-user feedback, HHS-OIG is considering releasing the methodologies it employs for generating data and programing codes in specific audits to grant industry added perspective into HHS-OIG’s assessments.
Industry Impact
HHS-OIG’s modernization initiative RFI presents stakeholders with an opportunity to influence its compliance resources and priorities for the coming years. HHS-OIG has used the RFI mechanism in the past as a precursor to major changes, such as revamping the self-disclosure protocol in 2013 and as the start of the Sprint rulemaking process. Therefore, we can expect that HHS-OIG intends to embark on a significant, multi-year effort to change its guidance practices. This effort could include different vehicles and formats for guidance, but also guidance on new topics and industries. Some of HHS-OIG’s suggestions could impact long-term reliability of current resources, such as advisory opinions. Healthcare organizations and others operating in the healthcare industry should consider submitting comments to address HHS-OIG’s questions and express any concerns with potential changes.
Comments are due by January 31, 2022. As HHS-OIG’s modernization initiative progresses, we will continue to provide updates and inform stakeholders of the latest developments.

TSA Issues Cybersecurity Rules for Transportation Sector
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
TSA Issues Cybersecurity Rules for Transportation Sector
December 8, 2021
Read time: 4 min
On December 2, 2021, the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced two new Security Directives and additional guidance for voluntary measures to strengthen cybersecurity across the transportation sector. These follow a pair of Security Directives from TSA, on May 28, 2021, and July 26, 2021, imposing a variety of cybersecurity requirements (technical and administrative) on the 100 TSA-designated “most critical” pipeline owners/operators. The Biden administration does not appear to be taking its foot off the gas any time soon, particularly when it comes to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. Media reports indicate a draft blueprint is currently being circulated by the White House seeking to enhance the cybersecurity of US water utilities, too.
The December 2 TSA Security Directives target higher-risk freight railroads, passenger rail and rail transit. They require covered owners and operators to do the following:
- [effective December 31, 2021] report “cybersecurity incidents” to DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) within 24 hours of identifying them, with specifications on what must be included in the submitted report;
- [by January 6, 2022] designate a cybersecurity coordinator and alternate, who must meet certain eligibility requirements and are “required to be available” to CISA “at all times (all hours/all days) to coordinate implementation of cybersecurity practices, and manage security incidents, and serve as a principal point of contact with TSA and CISA for cybersecurity-related matters”;
- [by March 30, 2022] conduct a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment to identify potential gaps and vulnerabilities in their systems, using the form provided by TSA, and submit the completed form to TSA; and
- [by June 28, 2022] develop and implement a cybersecurity incident response plan to reduce the risk of an operational disruption should Information Technology (IT) and/or Operational Technology (OT) be affected by a cybersecurity incident.
The Directives broadly define a cybersecurity incident to mean an unauthorized event that “jeopardizes, disrupts or otherwise impacts, or is reasonably likely to jeopardize, disrupt or otherwise impact, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or communications systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or information systems, or information resident on the system.” Notably, a covered cybersecurity incident includes an event that is under investigation as a possible cybersecurity incident without final determination of the event’s root cause or nature (such as malicious, suspicious or benign).
The Directives require owners/operators to submit their completed vulnerability assessment form and remediation plan to TSA by March 30, 2022. The Directives also require the cybersecurity coordinator or “other accountable executive” to submit a statement to TSA certifying compliance with the cybersecurity incident response plan requirements within seven days of completing the plan. Documentation of compliance must be provided to TSA upon request and without a subpoena.
Given the Directives’ detailed requirements, including certifications and submissions to the government, as well as tight implementation deadlines, covered owners/operators should promptly assess their cybersecurity programs. The most pressing deadline is designating a cybersecurity coordinator and alternate. Organizations must be thoughtful about whom they choose; they should be mindful of the gating criteria as well as the individual’s role and responsibility within the organization. The coordinator and the alternate must be US citizens who are eligible for security clearances; entrusted to serve as the primary contact for cyber-related intelligence information and cybersecurity-related activities and communications with TSA and CISA, as well as work with appropriate law enforcement and emergency response agencies; accessible to TSA and CISA 24 hours a day, seven days a week; and empowered to coordinate cyber and related security practices and procedures internally.

New Vaccination Requirements for New York City Private Schools
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
New Vaccination Requirements for New York City Private Schools
December 8, 2021
Read time: 4 min
On Dec. 2, 2021, the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene issued an emergency order requiring all staff members of New York City nonpublic schools to be vaccinated against COVID-19, with limited exceptions (“Order”). The Order follows a similar vaccine mandate previously issued for all New York City public school employees.
Vaccination Reporting and Record-Keeping Requirements
Nonpublic schools are defined as schools that provide instruction or related services to students from preschool through grade 12, or any portion thereof, including private and religious schools. Nonpublic schools do not include charter schools, child care programs or early intervention providers, which are subject to other vaccine mandates. To comply with the Order, all “nonpublic school staff” must provide proof of at least a first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by Dec. 20, 2021. “Nonpublic school staff” is defined as “staff serving students in nonpublic schools,” including full-time employees, part-time employees, and unpaid adults serving in nonpublic school settings, such as student teachers and volunteers (collectively, “Staff Members”). After Dec. 20, 2021, all nonpublic schools must exclude from school premises any Staff Member who has not provided such proof of vaccination. This Order is subject to reasonable accommodations under applicable laws for individuals with religious or medical exemptions to the COVID-19 vaccines.[1]
Schools must securely maintain a record of each Staff Member’s vaccination status and make such records immediately available to New York City’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“Department”) upon request. Records must include:
- Each Staff Member’s name and start date;
- The date the Staff Member submitted proof of his or her vaccination;
- The type of proof the Staff Member submitted (and a copy of such proof); and
- Whether the Staff Member is fully vaccinated[2]; or
- If a Staff Member has only received the first dose of a two-dose vaccine by Dec. 20, 2021, the date by which the Staff Member must submit proof of a second dose, which must be no later than 45 days after the Staff Member submitted proof of the first dose; or
- If a Staff Member is unvaccinated because of a reasonable accommodation, the School must record that it has granted such accommodation, the basis for the accommodation, and supporting documents.
All records related to vaccination and reasonable accommodations must be stored separately from employees’ personnel files.
Newly Hired Staff Members
Beginning Dec. 2, 2021, all newly hired Staff Members must submit proof of vaccination to their school on or before their start date. Nonpublic schools that have hired Staff Members on or after Dec. 2, 2021 should promptly collect such Staff Members’ vaccination records.
Affirmation of Compliance
All nonpublic schools must electronically submit to the Department an affirmation of compliance in the form prescribed by the Department by Dec. 28, 2021, affirming the schools’ compliance with this Order’s requirements. Subsequently, by Feb. 17, 2022, all nonpublic schools must also send a follow-up affirmation, demonstrating that all Staff Members are fully vaccinated (or have an applicable exception to the COVID-19 vaccines).
Please contact Mark E. Brossman, Scott A. Gold, Donna K. Lazarus or Abdulrahman Alwattar if you have any questions about the order.
[1] The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued guidance on reasonable accommodations with respect to COVID-19 vaccines.
[2] A Staff Member is “fully vaccinated” once at least two weeks have passed after the Staff Member received (i) a second dose of a two-dose vaccine series, such as the Pfizer or Moderna vaccines; or (ii) a single dose of a vaccine that only requires one-dose, such as the Johnson & Johnson vaccine.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

President Biden’s Multiagency Countering Corruption Strategy Signals Increased Enforcement, Potentially Significant Expansion of AML Compliance Requirements
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
President Biden’s Multiagency Countering Corruption Strategy Signals Increased Enforcement, Potentially Significant Expansion of AML Compliance Requirements
December 7, 2021
Read time: 7 min
On December 6, 2021, the Biden administration unveiled its “Strategy on Countering Corruption” (Strategy), which includes far more detailed guidance on how the administration plans to fund, implement and enforce US President Joe Biden’s Anti-Corruption Initiative.
The Strategy, which is the result of a multimonth, interagency collaboration, details the administration’s plans to pour resources into anti-corruption enforcement, further promote the use of data analytics across government agencies, enhance and enforce anti-money laundering (AML) laws and regulations and provide assistance to foreign governments combating corruption.
Of particular significance, the Strategy specifically calls for new legislation and regulations to “address deficiencies in the U.S. anti-money laundering regime” and signals, for the first time, the administration’s support for the Establishing New Authorities for Business Laundering and Enabling Risks to Security (ENABLERS) Act, proposed legislation that would extend said regime and impose significant AML requirements on those who facilitate transactions or create corporate structures, including non-financial institutions such as accountants, investment advisors and lawyers.
THE FIVE PILLARS
Fifteen federal agencies worked together to develop the Strategy in coordination with the White House. It was a major, collaborative undertaking, motivated by President Biden’s focus on anti-corruption as critical to national security. As set forth in the Strategy, the United States will organize its anti-corruption efforts around five “mutually reinforcing pillars of work,” specifically:
- Modernizing, Coordinating and Resourcing US Government Efforts to Fight Corruption
- Curbing Illicit Finance
- Holding Corrupt Actors Accountable
- Preserving and Strengthening Multilateral Anti-Corruption Architecture
- Improving Diplomatic Engagement and Leveraging Foreign Assistance Resources to Advance Policy Goals.
Within these different pillars are specific objectives, including efforts to improve multinational cooperation through diplomacy, a surge of resources to combat corruption and increased focus on individual accountability—which is consistent with recent statements made by top Department of Justice (DOJ) officials. Of greatest import, the Strategy creates mechanisms for enhanced information gathering and sharing and—very explicitly—calls for efforts to improve financial transparency and impose increased focus and responsibilities on “gatekeepers to the financial system.”
INFORMATION GATHERING AND SHARING
The Strategy’s first objective is to enhance corruption-related research, data collection and analysis so that the government can more effectively map corruption networks, proceeds and dynamics. The federal government plans to bolster information sharing between the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies and agencies dealing with foreign commerce and trade, which will allow for prompt access to broad swaths of data by investigators. A key component of this is the government’s investment in, and reliance on, sophisticated data analytics tools. In addition to building and enhancing the federal government’s own technological resources, the United States is planning to engage with the private sector to collaborate on tracking, developing, improving and applying new and existing technological solutions to systemic challenges in preventing and detecting corruption.
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ENHANCEMENTS
A key underlying goal of many of the administration’s strategic objectives is to significantly boost existing AML laws and enforcement tools. The focus on AML enforcement comes on the heels of significant changes brought about by the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) announcement in June 2021 of core enforcement priorities, including anti-corruption. The Strategy offers several detailed objectives which, taken as a whole, signal a plan for aggressive enforcement.
In particular, the administration appears to be signaling support for the ENABLERS Act, a sweeping piece of proposed legislation that seeks to impose AML requirements on gatekeepers and so-called “middlemen” who assist on transactions, provide investment and financial advice and facilitate the creation of corporate structures. The ENABLERS Act, as currently drafted, would substantially extend the reach of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing of regulations by imposing BSA requirements, including requirements to maintain an effective AML program, have a designated compliance officer and file suspicious activity reports (SARs), among others – on accountants, law firms, investment advisors, art galleries, public relations and marketing firms and registered agents. According to the Strategy, the administration is committed to “working with the Congress . . . to make sure that key gatekeepers to the financial system—including lawyers, accountants, and trust and company service providers—cannot evade scrutiny.”
The administration has also indicated that it plans to bolster AML enforcement resources by, among other things, substantially increasing funding for FinCEN and building a database of the beneficial owners of certain companies in order to help domestic and international partners identify bad actors.
IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The Strategy seeks to enhance the US government’s visibility well beyond US markets and borders. Even organizations which largely or exclusively operate outside of the United States may see some effects from these objectives. Through engaging the US State Department, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other foreign policy agencies, the administration has pledged to “deepen cooperation with and assistance to countries with the political will for meaningful anti-corruption efforts . . . including, where appropriate, partnering with countries in joint investigations and prosecutions.”
The Strategy also outlines a series of specific initiatives aimed at improving international cooperation, including efforts to support existing anti-corruption “architecture” already in place at various non-governmental organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Organization of American States, and placing US prosecutors in foreign countries to assist in anti-corruption efforts. The State Department is also leading an interagency initiative to engage partner countries to coordinate law enforcement actions, enforce sanctions, assist in visa restriction implementation and detect and disrupt kleptocracy and foreign bribery.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The Strategy helps to flesh out how the Biden administration plans to execute on its promise to make anti-corruption efforts a law enforcement priority. In addition to broad statements of policy, the Strategy sets forth several specific initiatives that are likely to impact enforcement activities in the coming months.
First, the Strategy’s focus on data-driven investigations (and the need to collect and mine data as part of anti-corruption enforcement efforts) only further underscores the need for organizations to incorporate data analytics into their own compliance programs, and the importance of using data analysis as part of routine and ongoing monitoring efforts. Organizations should consider how they are leveraging data analytics tools in their own corporate compliance efforts.
Second, the administration’s continued focus on AML efforts (and the promised surge of resources to FinCEN) makes clear that financial transactions intended to facilitate and promote bribery schemes will be a core focus. Moreover, even without passage of the ENABLERS Act, the Strategy suggests that scrutiny will extend far beyond traditional banks to accountants, investment advisors and even lawyers involved in helping clients move funds or structure financial transactions. Accounting firms, investment advisory firms and the like may want to review existing AML policies and the sufficiency of any existing compliance and monitoring programs.
Third, organizations worldwide should expect to see the results of the administration’s push for greater global anti-corruption enforcement. In 2020 alone, the United States announced multiple resolutions in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) space in which foreign law enforcement participated, and the Strategy makes clear that the administration seeks to build on and bolster those efforts. While US regulators have been cooperating and collaborating with foreign regulators for years, the Strategy is explicit that the United States will not just be working with foreign regulators but will be working to improve anti-corruption enforcement abroad through diplomatic channels as well. Global companies, even those with little or no footprint in the United States, should consider US standards when designing their own compliance programs as the United States intends to implement those standards on a global scale.