Content Type: Article

  • FATF Releases Anticipated Guidance for Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, Survey Results on Cross-Border Payments and Proposed Revisions to Beneficial Ownership Standard

    FATF Releases Anticipated Guidance for Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, Survey Results on Cross-Border Payments and Proposed Revisions to Beneficial Ownership Standard

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FATF Releases Anticipated Guidance for Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers, Survey Results on Cross-Border Payments and Proposed Revisions to Beneficial Ownership Standard

    November 30, 2021

    Read time: 19 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Oct. 21, 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), an intergovernmental body that sets international standards and recommendations to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing (“ML/TF”), concluded its October plenary meeting and issued three notable publications.[1] First, and most importantly, FATF released a much-anticipated updated version of its guidance on a risk-based approach to virtual assets (“VAs”) and virtual asset service providers (“VASPs”) (“Guidance”),[2] which revises and elaborates on FATF’s original guidance related to VAs and VASPs published in 2019.[3] In addition, FATF (1) finalized a report on survey results regarding implementation of the FATF standards on cross-border payments (“Survey Results”),[4] and (2) proposed revisions to its standards regarding beneficial ownership for legal persons (“Proposed UBO Revisions”).[5] Although FATF’s publications, including its standards and recommendations, are not binding on member countries, they are influential for government authorities and may affect laws and policy in local jurisdictions.

    VASP Guidance

    The Guidance revises FATF’s original guidance in the following ways: (1) clarification of the definitions of VA and VASP; (2) guidance on how FATF’s standards and recommendations apply to stablecoins; (3) additional guidance on money laundering and terrorist financing (“ML/TF”) risks for peer-to-peer (“P2P”) transactions and the resources available to countries to address them; (4) updated guidance on the licensing and registration of VASPs; (5) further clarification for the public and private sectors relating to implementation of the “Travel Rule”; and (6) guiding principles for information sharing and cooperation between supervisory authorities of VASPs.[6]

    Below are our key takeaways.

    1. Clarification of the Definitions of “VA” and “VASP”

    FATF defines “VA” as a “digital representation of value that can be digitally traded or transferred and can be used for payment or investment purposes.”[7] The Guidance notes that member countries should interpret the definition broadly, “with jurisdictions relying on the fundamental concepts contained in it to take a functional approach that can accommodate technological advancements and innovative business models.”[8] FATF clarifies that VAs must be digital and must present themselves as digitally traded or transferred and “be capable of being used for payment or investment purposes,”[9] and that VAs cannot simply be digital representations of fiat currency, securities, or other financial assets elsewhere defined in FATF’s Standards and Recommendations.[10] The Guidance also notes that digital assets that are “used as collectibles rather than as payment or investment instruments,” such as non-fungible tokens or crypto-collectibles, are generally not considered to be VAs under FATF’s definition, but cautions authorities to examine the characteristics of such digital assets when making such determinations.[11]

    FATF defines a “VASP” as:

    any natural or legal person who is not covered elsewhere under the Recommendations and as a business conducts one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of another natural or legal person: (i) Exchange between virtual assets and fiat currencies; (ii) Exchange between one or more forms of virtual assets; (iii) Transfer of virtual assets; (iv) Safekeeping and/or administration of virtual assets or instruments enabling control over virtual assets; and (v) Participation in and provision of financial services related to an issuer’s offer and/or sale of a virtual asset.[12]

    The Guidance similarly stresses that this definition should be interpreted broadly but does not apply to entities covered elsewhere under the Recommendations, such as financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (e.g., casinos, real estate agents, precious metal/precious stone dealers, lawyers, notaries, and other independent professionals, such as accountants and trust company service providers).[13] Notably, the Guidance clarifies that a decentralized finance (“DeFi”) application (i.e., applications used to exchange virtual currency that operates outside of a central service) is not considered a “VASP” under FATF’s Standards because DeFi applications are software or technology and the FATF Standards do not apply to underlying software or technology. DeFi creators, owners, operators, and other persons who maintain control or influence in DeFi arrangements, however, “may fall under the FATF definition of a VASP where they are providing or actively facilitating VASP services.”[14] With respect to the regulatory treatment of DeFi projects, the Guidance urges member countries to “evaluate the facts and circumstances of each individual situation to determine whether there is an identifiable person(s), whether legal or natural, providing a covered service [under the FATF Standards].”[15]

    In addition, the Guidance confirms that the “VASP” definition covers activities related to initial coin offerings (“ICOs”).[16] The Guidance stresses that, when authorities are determining how the VASP definition applies to entities in an ICO, the “facts and circumstances underlying an asset, activity or service” should determine its categorization, “rather than any labels or terminology used by market participants.”[17]

    Finally, the Guidance clarifies that FATF “does not seek to regulate, as VASPs, natural or legal persons that provide ancillary services or products to a VA network, to the extent that they do not provide or actively facilitate as a business any covered VA activities or operations on behalf of their customers.”[18]

    2. Guidance on How FATF’s Standards Apply to Stablecoins

    Addressing the larger topic of the scope of the FATF’s Standards’ application, the Guidance sets forth additional guidance on how FATF members should treat stablecoins in the ML/TF context. Noting that the features of a stablecoin “will also impact the extent to which ML/TF risks materiali[z]e,” the Guidance warns that certain design choices of stablecoins—namely whether they are centralized or decentralized—can have implications for ML/TF risks.[19] Accordingly, the Guidance advises FATF countries, VASPs, and other “obliged entities” to “identify and assess ML/TF risks relating to stablecoins before launch and in an ongoing and forward-looking manner, and take appropriate measures to manage and mitigate the risks before launch.”[20] The Guidance lists a variety of considerations in determining whether a stablecoin, or any service providers associated with its development and management, is a VA or VASP subject to FATF Standards,[21] as well as providing a hypothetical case study of a stablecoin arrangement and the application of the FATF Standards.[22]

    In the United States, the President’s Working Group[23] on Financial Markets, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) recently released an interagency report (“Report”)[24] concerning “payment stablecoins,” which the Report defined as “stablecoins that are designed to maintain a stable value relative to a fiat currency and, therefore, have the potential to be used as a widespread means of payment.”[25] The Report focused on the risks stablecoins pose to the safety and efficiency of the financial market, along with three recommended actions that Congress, as well as the Agencies, could take to address those risks:[26] (1) require stablecoin issuers be insured depository institutions; (2) subject digital wallet providers to appropriate federal oversight; and (3) require affiliation and user data restrictions.

    With regard to the Guidance, the Report noted that the U.S. Department of the Treasury is continuing to lead efforts at the organization to ensure stablecoins are not facilitating money laundering and terrorism financing, and that such efforts are especially important due to the potential rapid increase in cross-border stablecoin payments, which could amplify risks of money laundering and terrorism financing as governments unevenly implement suggested FATF standards.[27] The Report further made two interim recommendations: (1) existing federal agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), should use their oversight power to exercise regulatory authority over stablecoins, where appropriate;[28] and (2) in the absence of congressional action, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) should designate certain activities conducted within stablecoin arrangements as, or as likely to become, systemically important payment, clearing, and settlement (“PCS”) activities.[29]

    3. Additional Guidance on the Risks and Resources Available to Countries to Address ML/TF Risks for P2P transactions

    Although the Guidance notes that P2P transactions are “not explicitly subject to AML/CFT controls under the FATF Standards … because the Standards generally place obligations on intermediaries, rather than on individuals,” it warns that P2P transactions could be used for illicit activity by avoiding the FATF Standards’ AML/CFT controls.[30] FATF members and VASPs should therefore “seek to understand what types of P2P transactions pose higher or lower risk and understand drivers of P2P transactions and their different risk profiles.”[31] The Guidance outlines several factors that could affect the extent to which users engage in P2P transactions, including “the VA’s accessibility and protocols that control the VA’s privacy, transparency, security and associated transaction fees.”[32]

    4. Updated Guidance on the Licensing and Registration of VASPs

    Under the Guidance, FATF member countries have flexibility in applying licensing or registration to VASPs.[33] FATF encourages member countries to “take action to identify natural or legal persons that carry out VA activities or operations without the requisite license or registration and apply appropriate sanctions, including in the context of traditional obliged entities that may engage in VA activities or operations (e.g., a bank that provides VAs to its customers).”[34] In addition, VASPs that are licensed or registered in a given jurisdiction “should be required to meet appropriate licensing and registration criteria set by relevant authorities,” and authorities processing applications for VASP licensure and registration should be prepared to take appropriate legal and regulatory measures to prevent bad actors from holding such a license.[35] Further, the Guidance requires VASPs to implement AML/CFT compliance prior to launching a new product or service.[36]

    The United States already has an established framework for requiring the licensing and registration of VASPs. For example, FinCEN requires all “exchangers” and “administrators” of convertible virtual currency (“CVC”) to register as money services business (“MSB”) and, as such, comply with the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), its implementing regulations, and additional anti-money laundering laws applicable to MSBs.[37] Such entities may also have licensing and registration requirements imposed by various states depending on where the entity is located or where the entity’s consumers are located.[38] Additionally, as reinforced in the Report, the SEC and CFTC can exercise regulatory authority over the relevant VASPs to the extent that the VAs they deal in, develop or administer function as securities, commodities, or derivatives.[39]

    5. Further Guidance for the Public and Private Sectors on the Implementation of the “Travel Rule”

    The Guidance sets forth several recommendations for how the Travel Rule would specifically apply to transmittals of VAs or transmittals between VASPs. Specifically, FATF recommends that the Travel Rule ensure that originating VASPs “obtain and hold required and accurate originator information and required beneficiary information on virtual asset transfers.”[40] The Guidance includes a table (replicated in the attached PDF) detailing the specific information originating and beneficiary institutions should obtain, hold, send to each other, and submit before or simultaneously with the transfer[41].

    The Guidance also clarifies that a VA transfer’s transaction fees (i.e., the amounts of VA that may be collected by a miner who includes the transaction in a block) are not within the scope of the Travel Rule.[42] Moreover, automatic refunds would also not be within the scope of the Travel Rule.[43]

    In the United States, FinCEN has already issued guidance applying the U.S. recordkeeping and travel rules to CVC transactions.[44] In addition, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and FinCEN recently issued a proposed rule to more clearly delineate the requirements of the U.S. recordkeeping and travel rules to certain CVC transactions. If this rule is finalized as proposed, transactions involving CVCs would explicitly be subject to U.S. travel rules.[45]

    In addition, the Guidance recommends that member countries require VASPs to conduct proper due diligence on a counterparty VASP before engaging in their first transaction with that counterparty in order to avoid dealing with illicit actors and fraudulent schemes.[46] When a VASP is receiving or transferring a customer’s VA to an unhosted wallet, the VASP does not need to send the required information to the unhosted wallet, but the VASP still needs to collect the required originator and beneficiary information from its customer.[47]

    In the United States, a notice of proposed rulemaking issued by FinCEN late last year would, if adopted as proposed, similarly require banks and money services businesses (“MSBs”) to (1) submit reports for transactions exceeding $10,000 USD involving CVCs or digital assets with legal tender status (“LTDA”); (2) maintain records of customers’ CVC and LTDA transactions exceeding $3,000 USD; and (3) verify the identity of those customers engaging in CVC or LTDA transactions exceeding $3,000 USD with counterparties using wallets that are either (i) not hosted by a financial institution, i.e., unhosted or self-hosted wallets, or (ii) hosted by a financial institution, but located in a jurisdiction listed on FinCEN’s Foreign Jurisdictions List, which FinCEN is proposing to establish.[48]

    6. Guiding Principles for Information Sharing and Cooperation Between Supervisors of VASPs

    The Guidance urges member countries to designate at least one “competent authority” (e.g., tax authorities, securities authorities, or a specially designated VASP supervisor) to supervise VASPs within their jurisdiction and encourages supervisors to share certain information with supervisors in other jurisdictions.[49] FATF also suggests that supervisors create mechanisms to ensure cooperation among themselves, including entering into Memoranda of Understanding and potentially designating one supervisor as the focal point of information on a given VASP if that VASP conducts most of its activity within that supervisor’s jurisdiction.[50]

    FinCEN serves as the United States’ financial intelligence unit and has taken a lead role in coordinating information-sharing and cooperation activity relating to the virtual currency and digital asset industry. Broadly, as mandated under the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN has adopted regulations and issued guidance encouraging information sharing among financial institutions and with law enforcement.[51] More recently, FinCEN has participated in several intergovernmental working groups focused on the risks posed by digital currencies, and has established a Chief Digital Currency Advisor position that will “work[] across internal and external partners toward strategic and innovative solutions to prevent and mitigate illicit financial practices and exploitation.”[52]

    Cross-Border Payment Survey Results

    Alongside the Guidance, FATF also released Survey Results, which detail the findings of an industry survey to “identify areas where divergent AML/CFT rules or their implementation cause friction for cross-border payments.”[53] Among other conclusions, the Survey Results note that the “lack of risk-based approach and inconsistent implementation of the AML/CFT requirements increases cost, reduces speed, limits access and reduces transparency.”[54] Accordingly, FATF notes that it will take a “holistic view on the challenges identified” and stresses that any solution should “result in meaningful improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of national measures, processes, procedures and practices, without compromising AML/CFT safeguards.”[55]

    Beneficial Ownership Standards Proposed Revisions

    Finally, FATF released for public comment the Proposed UBO Revisions to Recommendation 24, its beneficial ownership standard. Notably, the Proposed UBO Revisions would amend the Recommendation to require member countries to retain beneficial ownership information in a particular mechanism (e.g., “either a register … or an alternative mechanism”).[56] In addition, the Proposed UBO Revisions would clarify that beneficial ownership information should be “adequate, accurate, and up-to-date”[57]; FATF indicates that such information would have to be “sufficient to identify the natural person(s) who are the beneficial owner(s),” verifiable to confirm the identity and status of the beneficial owner using “reliable, independent source documents, data or information,” and as current as possible.[58] FATF notes that the Proposed UBO Revisions are designed to “reinforce the Recommendation to ensure greater transparency about the beneficial ownership of legal persons, and take action to mitigate the [associated] risks.”[59]

    In the United States, under the Corporate Transparency Act enacted last year, certain companies created or registered to do business in the United States must report identifying information, including their beneficial ownership information of 25% or more, as well as certain control persons, to FinCEN.[60] The reporting requirements of the bill will only become effective once FinCEN finalizes a regulation to implement these statutory requirements, which FinCEN must do by Jan. 1, 2022. In April 2021, FinCEN issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (“ANPRM”), commencing the rulemaking process to implement these statutory requirements.[61] The ANPRM would require covered entities to disclose information regarding (1) its beneficial owners and control persons, (2) individuals who register the entity or file the application necessary for the entity to do business in the United States, and (3) other identifying information of the entity itself.[62]

    Conclusion

    As mentioned above, although FATF’s Standards and Recommendations are not binding on member countries, they are influential in setting regulatory requirements and policy. As such, FATF’s Guidance may be influential on future U.S. regulation affecting the virtual currency and digital asset industry. In its release accompanying the Guidance, FATF notes that it will “closely monitor the virtual assets and VASPs sector for any material changes that necessitate further revision or clarification of the FATF Standards,” including changes relating to stablecoins, P2P transactions, non-fungible tokens, and DeFi.[63] As this statement appears to indicate, we have likely not heard the last of FATF’s influence in the VA regulatory space. Entities affected by the Guidance should be aware of and understand the implications of FATF’s recommendations in order to prepare for any future requirements that may align with the FATF Standards.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel’s lawyers are available to assist you in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact the Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyer with whom you usually work, or any of the following attorneys:

    Donald J. Mosher – New York (+1 212.756.2187, donald.mosher@srz.com)

    Betty Santangelo – New York (+1 212.756.2587, betty.santangelo@srz.com)

    Kara A. Kuchar – New York (+1 212.756.2734, kara.kuchar@srz.com)

    Jessica Sklute – New York (+1 212.756.2180, jessica.sklute@srz.com)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471, melissa.goldstein@srz.com)

    Adam J. Barazani – New York (+1 212.756.2519, adam.barazani@srz.com)

    Jessica Romano – New York (+1 212.756.2205, jessica.romano@srz.com)

    Hadas A. Jacobi – New York (+1 212.756.2055, hadas.jacobi@srz.com)

    Steven T. Cummings – New York (+1 212.756.2251, steven.cummings@srz.com)


    [1] FATF is an international standard-setting body with more than 200 member countries and jurisdictions that develops certain Standards and Recommendations to “ensure a co-ordinated global response to prevent organised crime, corruption and terrorism.” Financial Action Task Force, Who We Are, available here.

    [2] Financial Action Task Force, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (Oct. 2021) [hereinafter Guidance], available here. See also Financial Action Task Force, In Brief, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (Oct. 2021) [hereinafter In Brief], available here (providing a high-level overview of the Guidance).

    [3] Financial Action Task Force, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach, Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (June 2019), available here.

    [4] Financial Action Task Force, Cross-Border Payments: Survey Results on Implementation of the FATF Standards (Oct. 2021) [hereinafter Survey Results], available here.

    [5] Financial Action Task Force, Revisions to Recommendation 24 and Its Interpretive Note – Public Consultation [hereinafter Proposed UBO Revisions], available here.

    [6] Guidance, supra note 2, at 5.

    [7] Id. at 21–22.

    [8] Id.

    [9] Id. at 23.

    [10] Id.

    [11] Id. at 24.

    [12] Id. at 22.

    [13] Id. at 25.

    [14] Id.

    [15] Id.

    [16] Id. at 30.

    [17] Id. at 31.

    [18] In Brief, supra note 2.

    [19] Guidance, supra note 2, at 17.

    [20] Id. at 18.

    [21] Id. at 33.

    [22] Id. at 34.

    [23] The President’s Working Group is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and consists of the chairs of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).

    [24] President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Federal Deposit Insurance Agency & Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Report on Stablecoins (Nov. 2021) [hereinafter Report], available here. For more information about the Report, please see our prior Alert, “President’s Working Group Issues Interagency Risk Assessment of Stablecoins.”

    [25] See Report, supra note 23, at 2.

    [26] See id.

    [27] See id. at 19.

    [28] See id. at 11.

    [29] See Report, supra note 23, at 18.

    [30] Guidance, supra note 2, at 18.

    [31] Id. at 19.

    [32] Id.

    [33] Id. at 43.

    [34] Id. at 44.

    [35] Id. at 45.

    [36] Id. at 46.

    [37] See FinCEN’s Rule for Money Services Businesses, 31 C.F.R. Part 1022. FinCEN defines CVC as a “type of virtual currency [that] either has an equivalent value in real currency, or acts as a substitute for real currency.” FinCEN, FIN-2013-G001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies” (March 18, 2013), available here.

    [38] For example, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), for example, issued its virtual currency regulation in 2015 under the New York Financial Services Law, known as a “BitLicense.” 23 NYCRR Part 200. Under the regulation, engaging in any “Virtual Currency Business Activity” in New York without a DFS license is prohibited. 23 NYCRR 200.3(a).

    [39] See Report, supra note 23, at 11.

    [40] Guidance, supra note 2, at 57.

    [41] This table appears in Guidance, supra note 2, at 59.

    [42] Id. at 56, n.43.

    [43] Id.

    [44] See FIN-2019-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies (May 9, 2019), available here (“Because a transmittal order involving CVC is an instruction to pay ‘a determinable amount of money,’ transactions involving CVC qualify as transmittal of funds, and thus may fall within the Funds Travel Rule [(“FTR”)]. Under the [FTR], a transmittal of funds of $3,000 or more (or its equivalent in CVC) may trigger certain requirements on a money transmitter acting as either the financial institution for the transmittor or recipient, or as an intermediary financial institution. The money transmitter must obtain or provide the required regulatory information either before or at the time of the transmittal of value, regardless of how a money transmitter sets up their system for clearing and settling transactions, including those involving CVC.”)

    [45] See Joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Threshold for the Requirement To Collect, Retain, and Transmit Information on Funds Transfers and Transmittals of Funds That Begin or End Outside the United States, and Clarification of the Requirement to Collect, Retain, and Transmit Information on Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies and Digital Assets with Legal Tender Status, 85 Fed. Reg. 68005 (Oct. 27, 2020), available here.

    [46] Guidance, supra note 2, at 62.

    [47] Id. at 65.

    [48] Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Requirements for Certain Transactions Involving Convertible Virtual Currency or Digital Assets, 86 Fed. Reg. 3,897 (Jan. 15, 2021), available here. For more information about FinCEN’s proposed rule on unhosted and high-risk jurisdiction wallets and the advance notice of proposed rulemaking, please see our prior Alert, “FinCEN Releases Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and FAQs Concerning Convertible Virtual Currency and Legal Tender Digital Asset Transactions.”

    [49] Guidance, supra note 2, at 102.

    [50] Id. at 105.

    [51] USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56 § 314(a)–(b) (2001). See also 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010.520 (implementing FinCEN’s 314a Program; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Section 314(b) Fact Sheet (Dec. 2020), available here.

    [52] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Welcomes First-Ever Chief Digital Currency Advisor and First Director of Strategic Communications (July 6, 2021), available here.

    [53] Press Release, Financial Action Task Force, Cross Border Payments – Survey Results on Implementation of the FATF Standards (Oct. 22, 2021), available here.

    [54] Id.

    [55] Survey Results, supra note 3, at 5.

    [56] Proposed UBO Revision, supra note 4, at 3.

    [57] Id. at 7.

    [58] Id.

    [59] Press Release, Financial Action Task Force, Revisions to Recommendation 24 and Its Interpretive Note – Public Consultation (Oct. 2021), available here.

    [60] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Corporate Transparency Act §§ 6401–03), available here.

    [61] Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements, 86 Fed. Reg. 17,557 (Apr. 5, 2021), available here.

    [62] Id. For more information about the Corporate Transparency Act and FinCEN’s advance notice of proposed rulemaking, please see our prior Alert, “FinCEN Commences Rulemaking Process for Implementation of Corporate Transparency Act Requiring Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership Information.”

    [63] Press Release, Financial Action Task Force, Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers (Oct. 2021), available here.


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    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • In a Nutshell: These Five Topics are at the Top of the Agenda in 2022

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    In a Nutshell: These Five Topics are at the Top of the Agenda in 2022

    November 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Regulating the way out of a pandemic in a legally clean way. An article by Norman Wasse.

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  • NIST Publishes Draft Security Criteria for Consumer Software

    NIST Publishes Draft Security Criteria for Consumer Software

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    NIST Publishes Draft Security Criteria for Consumer Software

    November 23, 2021

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Consumer software providers will soon have the option to label their software as compliant with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for software security. On November 1, 2021, NIST published its initial draft of this standard in a white paper titled “DRAFT Baseline Criteria for Consumer Software Cybersecurity Labeling” (the White Paper). The White Paper defines the security-related information that would have to be disclosed on the label and the specific security practices a software provider would have to follow. It was developed in coordination with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and will likely inform future FTC guidance and enforcement activity. NIST has requested public comments on the White Paper by December 16, 2021. The final version is expected to be published by February 6, 2022.

    In depth

    President Joe Biden’s May 12, 2021, Executive Order (EO) 14028 directs NIST to initiate pilot programs for cybersecurity labeling “to educate the public on the security capabilities of Internet of things (IoT) devices and software development practices.” Under the EO, NIST, in coordination with the FTC and other agencies, “shall identify secure software development practices or criteria for a consumer software labeling program.” The criteria shall “reflect a baseline level of secure practices” as well as “increasingly comprehensive levels of testing and assessment that a product may have undergone.”

    The White Paper addresses the need to develop appropriate cybersecurity criteria for consumer software, which means software primarily used for personal, family or household purposes. It is intended to inform “the development and use of a label for consumer software,” which would “improve consumers’ awareness, information, and ability to make purchasing decisions while taking cybersecurity considerations into account.” It is not intended to “describe how a cybersecurity label should be explicitly represented” or “detail how a labeling program should be owned or operated.”

    The White Paper has three primary elements: (i) it defines baseline technical criteria for the label; (ii) it details a proposed approach for conformity assessment; and (iii) it describes criteria for the labelling approach. It also enumerates specific issues on which NIST requests comment.

    BASELINE TECHNICAL CRITERIA

    The White Paper defines a series of outcome-based attestations (i.e., claims) that software providers would make about their product on the NIST label. It also provides criteria for satisfying each attestation.

    To meet the baseline technical criteria, software providers will need to implement the following practices:

    • Follow the NIST Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF).
    • Provide a mechanism for reporting vulnerabilities.
    • Provide support at least until the published end-of-support date.
    • Remediate all known vulnerabilities before the label date.
    • Cryptographically sign the software and any updates.
    • If user authentication is required, implement multifactor authentication or participate in an identity federation ecosystem that supports multifactor authentication.
    • Remove passwords, encryption keys or other secrets from source code (i.e., no hard-coded secrets).
    • Follow NIST cryptographic standards for all encryption.
    • Inventory the types of data stored, processed or transmitted by the software, and the safeguards applicable to each data type.

    CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

    The White Paper defines criteria for a Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity. The declaration of conformity is intended to “provide written assurance of conformity to the specified requirements.”

    To meet the conformity assessment criteria, software providers will need to implement the following practices:

    • Maintain procedures for issuing, maintaining, extending, reducing, suspending or withdrawing the declaration and the label attestations.
    • Maintain procedures to ensure “continued conformity” with the label attestations.
    • Separation of responsibilities and roles between the person conducting the review of the attestation and the signatory of the consumer software attestation.
    • If the declaration was issued by an accredited laboratory or inspection body, maintain the results of the assessment and other supporting documentation that identifies the third-party and its qualifications, including accreditation status.

    LABELING CRITERIA

    The White Paper recommends a single, consumer-tested label which indicates that the software has met the technical and conformity assessment criteria. The label may also provide a means for consumers to access additional online information, including:

    • Consumer-focused information about the labeling program;
    • The declaration of conformity; and
    • Descriptions supporting the data inventory and protection attestations.

    AREAS FOR COMMENT

    NIST requests comments on “all aspects of the criteria,” including:

    • Whether the criteria will achieve the goals of the EO by increasing consumer awareness and improving the cybersecurity of consumer software.
    • Whether the criteria will enable and encourage software providers to improve the cybersecurity of their products and the information they make available to consumers.
    • Whether the label should include a definitive statement that “the software product meets the NIST baseline technical criteria.”
    • Whether the software label approach and design should be similar to the forthcoming IoT product label “to facilitate brand recognition.”
    • Whether to include “more details on evidence required to support assertions.”
    • Whether to provide a template Declaration of Conformity.
    • Whether the technical baseline criteria are appropriate, including the “feasibility, clarity, completeness, and appropriateness of attestations.”

    PRACTICE NOTES

    Consumer software providers should consider whether they would benefit from labeling their software as NIST-compliant, and, if so, whether they could meet the requirements for secure development, information disclosure and conformity declaration. NIST is accepting comments on the draft through December 16, 2021.

    Authors

    Shawn C. Helms

    Partner

    Dallas

    Robert Duffy

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Tax Reform: What’s In and What’s Out (For Now)

    Tax Reform: What’s In and What’s Out (For Now)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Tax Reform: What’s In and What’s Out (For Now)

    November 22, 2021

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    After more than two months of negotiations in the US Congress, a slimmed-down version of the “Build Back Better Act” narrowly passed the US House of Representatives on November 19, 2021. All but one House Democrat voted for the measure, which united Republicans in opposition. Compared to the initial set of proposed revenue raisers that was released by the House Ways and Means Committee on September 13, 2021, the revenue-raising provisions in the legislation that passed the House are more modest in scope and result in only a few changes to the way individual taxpayers and family wealth are taxed. The summary below describes provisions in the House-passed bill that are most likely to affect individual taxpayers and also discusses portions of the original proposal that were cut from the legislation that passed the House. The US Senate is expected to make changes in order to capture the votes needed for passage.

    In depth

    NOTABLE INCLUSIONS

    Income Tax

    The legislation contains two surcharges on high income individuals, estates and trusts effective after December 31, 2021. A 5% surcharge will be imposed on an individual’s modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) that exceeds $10 million ($5 million for a married individual filing separately; $200,000 for estates and trusts) and an additional 3% surcharge will be imposed on MAGI that exceeds $25 million ($12.5 million for a married individual filing separately; $500,000 for estates and trusts).

    All trade or business income earned by taxpayers earning more than $400,000 ($500,000 for married filing jointly; $13,050 for trusts) will be subject to the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax (NIIT). The NIIT does not apply to income that is subject to self-employment tax. Under prior law, active business income earned through pass through entities was not subject to NIIT.

    The cap on the state and local tax (SALT) deduction will be raised from $10,000 to $80,000 through 2030. Trusts and estates will be limited to $40,000. This provision applies for the 2021 tax year.

    The capital gain exclusion rates for qualified small business stock (QSBS) will be limited to a 50% exclusion (down from 75% and 100%) for individuals earning more than $400,000 and for trusts and estates regardless of income. This rule is effective for sales after September 13, 2021, unless the seller had a binding contract entered into on or before that date and if the sale occurs by year-end.

    Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)

    Taxpayers with an adjusted gross income above $400,000 ($450,000 for married filing jointly) will be prohibited from completing Roth conversions starting in 2032. In addition, the legislation also includes a general prohibition on “backdoor” Roth conversion of amounts held in qualified retirement plans, if any portion of the distribution that is being converted consists of after-tax contributions. This provision is effective starting in 2022.

    Taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes above $400,000 ($450,000 for married filing jointly) will be prohibited from making contributions to retirement accounts (other than SEP and SIMPLE IRAs) when the total value of all defined contribution accounts and IRAs (including inherited accounts) is $10 million or greater. Those taxpayers will also be required to receive mandatory distributions of 50% of the excess over $10 million held in retirement accounts (other than Roth accounts) and mandatory distributions of the entire excess over $20 million held in Roth accounts. Each of these provisions come into effect for tax years beginning after December 31, 2028.

    NOTABLE EXCLUSIONS

    As discussed in our September 17, 2021, On the Subject, the initial set of proposed revenue raisers would have had a profound impact on the way wealth would have been taxed in the United States. Some of the most impactful provisions included in the original proposal were the following:

    1. An earlier than scheduled 50% reduction to the estate and gift tax exclusion amount and the generation skipping transfer tax exemption;
    2. Fundamental changes to the grantor trust rules, which would have resulted in gain recognition on previously tax-free transactions and the application of the estate and gift taxes to assets held in and distributed from grantor trusts covered by the post-enactment rules;
    3. The elimination of traditional valuation discounts that are often utilized when valuing an interest in an entity that holds non-business assets;
    4. The imposition of investment restrictions on IRAs that would prevent retirement accounts from holding certain assets, such as private placement investments and investments in entities in which the account holder owns substantial interests either directly or constructively;
    5. The increase in the top marginal rate on ordinary income; and
    6. The increase in the top long-term capital gains rate for taxpayers in the highest ordinary income tax bracket.

    While each of the above provisions were not included in the legislation that passed the House, the proposed legislation signals that lawmakers are looking closely at ways to raise revenue by assessing taxes on family wealth. Clients should be aware that similar provisions could surface in future legislation.

    Although the Build Back Better Act was significantly altered before House passage in order to make it more palatable to key Senate Democrats, the legislation does not yet have the support it needs for passage from all 50 Senate Democrats. Multiple Democratic Senators are advocating changes to both the spending and revenue raising portions of the Act; thus, individuals should expect changes. Should the Senate manage to pass its own version of the Build Back Better Act, that Senate-passed version of the legislation would return to the House for passage before heading to President Joe Biden’s desk for signature.

    Authors

    Max P. Biedermann

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Carlyn S. McCaffrey

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • Insurance Industry Expected to Play Major Role in Addressing Climate Change Following COP26

    Insurance Industry Expected to Play Major Role in Addressing Climate Change Following COP26

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Insurance Industry Expected to Play Major Role in Addressing Climate Change Following COP26

    November 19, 2021

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The insurance industry was front and center before, during and after the first days of the United Nations’ (UN) climate change summit, Conference of the Parties (COP26), in Glasgow, Scotland, which concluded earlier this month. The UN’s Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Climate Action Selwin Hart called on insurers to lead the way to greater resilience by increasing solutions for the poor and expanding coverage to fill protection gaps. Eric Usher, the head of the UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative, elaborated, saying, “The insurance industry plays a three-part role as risk managers, insurers and investors which uniquely positions the industry to help support the building of climate-resilient economies.” Simultaneously, there appears to be an understanding that the industry cannot address all climate change issues—principally “slow onset” conditions—but also recognizes that the industry will play a major role in handling “loss and damage” from extreme events and the lengthy period of financing adaptation efforts, particularly in countries with limited resources.

    Members of the Net-Zero Insurance Alliance spoke of the desire for the insurance industry to serve as an enabler of the great transition toward a decarbonized economy, one that will likely require a $100 trillion investment.

    Mark Carney, the former governor of the Bank of England, announced that 450 firms representing $130 trillion in assets have signed on to the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, which requires signatories to establish interim goals for 2030 and commit to net zero carbon emissions by 2050.

    The UN-sponsored Insurance Development Forum unveiled the Global Risk Modelling Alliance, which was designed to enable developing countries to better understand the physical risks that climate change is and will continue to impose. Advances in modelling will benefit the entire planet as climate change contributes to more and more extreme events.

    In depth

    THE EVOLUTION FROM VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES TO MANDATORY REPORTING, STANDARD SETTING AND NET ZERO PLANS

    The short era of voluntary climate change risk disclosures in the form of Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) reports seems to be drawing to a close. The United Kingdom is the first Group of Twenty (G20) country to require its largest companies and major banks and insurers to file climate disclosures, beginning in the spring of 2022. While applauding the progress made using TCFD disclosure templates, Dutch Central Banker and President of De Nederlandsche Bank Klaas Knot was quoted as saying, “The TCFD recommendations have gained enormous traction over the years…but the exercise now is reaching the limits of what can be achieved through a purely industry-led and voluntary framework. The time has come to take it to the next level, and the next level, in our view, is the development of the global minimum standard.”

    UK Prudential Regulation Authority CEO Sam Woods commented on the Bank of England’s second climate adaptation report released shortly before COP26 began, noting that regulators may need to consider capital loading as part of their climate change insurance regulatory toolkits. “Under the existing regulatory capital framework, there is scope to use capital requirements to address certain aspects of climate-related financial risks,” Woods said.

    In the Lloyd’s of London insurance market, managing agents will be required to prepare and submit “progress to net zero” plans, with pilot activity in 2022 and full-scale plans to be filed and approved by the market in 2023. On a parallel track, the UK Financial Conduct Authority will require insurers to submit plans to achieve net zero by 2050.

    HEADED TOWARD A COMMON SUSTAINABILITY LANGUAGE?

    Perhaps the biggest news for the financial sector (insurance included) at COP26 was the introduction of the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), which was incubated over the last year by the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation and designed to operate alongside the International Accounting Standards Board with a degree of governance independence. The ambition is to flesh out a “new baseline for sustainability disclosures” for investors. For most of this year, organization after organization, company after company, regulator after regulator—particularly US banking and securities regulators—have been decrying the lack of common standards, metrics and data to use in connection with describing and disclosing climate change risks. Whether financial services industry regulators internationally and, particularly, in the United States sign on to the ISSB or go their own way remains to be seen. It may not be surprising if US regulators and standard setters develop a US-centric language for disclosure of climate change risks for investors since we now have two financial accounting languages—the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)—in use worldwide, with more-or-less acceptance by each of the other’s “equivalence.”

    Also announced this month was the Common Ground Taxonomy, a joint effort by the European Union and China that’s still in early form and with many hurdles still to clear. Items such as developing a common set of industrial classifications still need to be negotiated, but the effort to make taxonomies “mutually intelligible” and to ultimately harmonize them should complement the development of common sustainability standards.

    US DEVELOPMENTS

    NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES (DFS) FINALIZES “GUIDANCE FOR NEW YORK DOMESTIC INSURERS ON MANAGING THE FINANCIAL RISKS FROM CLIMATE CHANGE”

    Two fundamentally important points about the DFS’ recently finalized climate change guidance (the Guidance) are in the title of the document. First, this work product is neither legislation nor a regulation promulgated to implement legislation. (The DFS website notes that no such regulation is contemplated at this time.) Second, while the Guidance applies to New York “domestic insurers” only, the DFS amended its enterprise risk management in Regulation 203 in August 2021 to add climate change to the list of risks that insurance holding companies and certain insurers should address in annual enterprise risk management (ERM) filings. Since holding companies can include non-New York domestic insurers that are merely “authorized” in the state, the Guidance is more broadly applicable than the title suggests. Domestics are insurers that are New York-chartered (i.e., insurers whose primary solvency and market conduct regulator is New York)—regardless if they are “licensed” or “admitted” in other states or not.

    To the McDermott insurance group’s knowledge, no other state is developing anything similar to the Guidance or undertaking the kind of year-long development process that the DFS started last year around this time. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has created a Climate and Resiliency Task Force with multiple “workstreams,” but it has not been made aware that NAIC leadership is pushing for it to follow in the footsteps of New York. Putting aside the possibility that catastrophic weather events could change political and regulatory positions in certain states, the outcomes of state, national and local elections next year and in 2024 will go a long way to clarify whether more states will emulate New York and whether the DFS, under new leadership, will continue down this path.

    Development of climate change guidance at the federal level is another story. With federal financial regulators, banking, commodities and securities, as well as the Federal Insurance Office, all moving with deliberate speed to develop climate change regulatory frameworks, how much of that activity will apply to insurers or influence state insurance regulators will be an interesting plotline to follow next year.

    Back to New York: In late March 2021, we summarized the key points regarding the first iteration of New York regulators’ expectations as to managing the financial risks of climate change as follows:

    • “…a general expectation that insurers should consider both current and future risks and plan to mitigate them in a manner that is proportionate to each insurer’s nature, scale and complexity.”
    • “Integrate the consideration of climate risks into its governance structure. The insurer’s board should understand and be responsible for managing climate risks, which should be reflected in the company’s risk appetite and organizational structure.”
    • “When making strategic and business decisions, consider the current and forward-looking impact of climate-related factors on its business environment in the short-, medium- and long-term.”
    • “Incorporate climate risks into the insurer’s existing financial risk management, including by embedding climate risks in its risk management framework and analyzing the impact of climate risks on existing risk factors. Climate risks should be considered in the company’s [own risk and solvency assessment] ORSA.”
    • “Use scenario analysis to inform business strategies and risk assessment and identification. Scenarios should consider physical and transition risks, multiple carbon emissions and temperature pathways, and short-, medium- and long-time horizons.”
    • “Disclose its climate risks and consider the TCFD and other initiatives when developing its disclosure approaches. DFS intends to monitor compliance with these expectations as part of its supervisory activities.”
    • “The DFS is aware of course that regulators in the European Union and the United Kingdom are much more advanced in the development of their climate change risk regulatory frameworks. The DFS says it will continue to work with international counterparts to ‘ensure consistency’ and ‘reduce the compliance burden.’”
    • “The DFS says it is aware that over time insurers’ approaches to managing climate change risk will ‘mature’—starting with qualitative assessments using simple models but progressing to more quantitative analyses using more advanced models, incorporating more factors or variables and extending over longer time horizons. As to physical risks (i.e., on the  underwriting side), the maturation process will hinge in part on the development of better and better models by the usual vendors, as well as insurers’ internal models, perhaps augmented by public climate change models.”
    • “On the transition risk side (i.e., investing), the proliferation of green standards makes comparability and consistency difficult to realize. Debate on this topic is widespread and intense. Stress testing and scenario analyses also seem to be at an early stage of development, and while the DFS is cognizant that some insurers may not be ‘ready to conduct a comprehensive and quantitative scenario analysis’ nevertheless the exercise is valuable for all insurers.”

    Having reviewed the final version of the Guidance, the foregoing summary remains as valid as it was eight months ago, but the following points in the final version of the Guidance are worth mentioning:

    • The final version seeks to reassure readers, if not senior managements, that climate risk is another risk that insurers must manage while also acknowledging the “unique challenges” presented by it.
    • It also lists out all the climate change regulatory guidance and precedents from Europe but does not include US precedents.
    • The final version repeats an environmental justice clarion call for insurers to “do their part to contribute to the low-carbon transition and climate adaptation efforts; support communities’ resilience to climate change, especially in disadvantaged communities that would be even more vulnerable to climate change if insurers stop insuring or investing in these communities; and work with the public sector to find ways to close the protection gap and ensure that insurance is available and affordable throughout the state.”
    • “Materiality” of climate change risks should be consistent with materiality of other risks on which insurance regulators focus. The Guidance provides that insurers may consider as “material” a risk that involves 5% of policyholder surplus or .50% of total assets as set forth in the NAIC’s Financial Condition Examiners Handbook or, borrowed from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, where “knowledge of the risk could influence the decisions of an insurer’s board, management, regulators, or other relevant stakeholders.” It is worth remembering, however, that that climate change risk is an “enterprise risk” and defined in various New York insurance law sections as “…any activity, circumstance, event, or series of events involving the insurer that, if not remedied promptly, is likely to have a material adverse effect upon the financial condition or liquidity of the insurer [or holding company or parent corporation], including anything that would cause the insurer’s risk-based capital to fall into company action level [in New York insurance laws], or that would cause further transaction of business to be hazardous to the insurer’s policyholders or creditors or the public.” Regardless, insurers should revisit materiality assumptions at least annually or whenever “significant changes” occur. It will be interesting to see whether other financial services regulators (e.g., the US Securities and Exchange Commission) or federal bank regulators view “materiality” through the same lenses.
    • Timing: The DFS now says that by August 15, 2022, insurers need to 1) identify a board member to be responsible for the “oversight of the insurer’s management of climate risks” (and also identify at least one senior manager to handle such management) and 2) have “specific plans in place to implement the [DFS’] expectations relating to organizational structure.”
    • “Expectations relating to organizational structure” include at least the following seven items:
    1. Manage climate risks via existing ERM “control” functions (e.g., risk assessment, compliance, internal control, internal audit and actuarial);
    2. Ensure accountability in “risk-based decision-making” vis-à-vis “climate risk limits and overseeing their implementation” by clearly defining/articulating management roles and responsibilities;
    3. Integrate climate risk into all risk management processes in all “lines of business, operations and control functions”;
    4. “Explicitly consider” climate change risks in ERM and ORSA reports (as Regulation 203 now requires);
    5. “Conduct objective, independent, and regular internal reviews” on climate change risk management processes and report results to the Board;
    6. “Develop the skill, expertise, and knowledge” needed to assess and manage climate risk—hiring new talent, expanding internal training or using outside consultants as necessary; and
    7. Consider modifying management compensation policies and “align incentives with the strategy for managing climate risks and with performance against climate metrics.”

    Two or three years from now, the DFS expects that insurers will refine their assessments of material climate risks, paying attention to both internal and external factors. The DFS also expects that insurers will publicly disclose material climate risks, including “related figures, metrics, and targets as well as the methodologies, definitions, and criteria used to make [the materiality] determination.”

    Assuming Governor Kathy Hochul (D-NY) or another Democratic candidate is elected New York’s new governor next year, we will see how the “longer term” plays out for the implementation of the DFS’ wide-ranging plan to ensure that all New York domestic insurers weave climate risk management into the fabric of their organizations.

    The DFS is set to host an informational presentation on the final Guidance on Monday, November 22. The McDermott insurance team will keep you updated on noteworthy items shared during the presentation.

    Authors

    Thomas M. Dawson

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights

  • CMS Leaves Hospitals Guessing on Expectations for Compliant Co-Location Arrangements

    CMS Leaves Hospitals Guessing on Expectations for Compliant Co-Location Arrangements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Leaves Hospitals Guessing on Expectations for Compliant Co-Location Arrangements

    November 16, 2021

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On November 12, 2021, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released an updated version of its Quality, Safety and Oversight Group memorandum, QSO-19-13-Hospital, containing much-anticipated final guidance on how state surveyors are to evaluate hospital compliance with Medicare hospital conditions of participation (CoPs) in connection with hospital co-location arrangements with other hospitals and “healthcare providers.” Co-location arrangements refer to any arrangement under which a hospital shares space, services, staff or emergency response services with another healthcare entity. The final guidance removes most examples of compliant and noncompliant co-location arrangements from the draft guidance and instead provides only general statements that hospitals are expected to ensure that any co-location arrangements in which they are engaged, comply with the requirements of 42 CFR Part 482. Adding further uncertainty to the post-guidance requirements, CMS explicitly excluded critical access hospitals and private physician offices from the definition of “healthcare providers” for purposes of the guidance, but did not explain whether this exclusion means that co-location arrangements with these entities are prohibited or that the final guidance should not be used to evaluate co-location arrangements with these entities.

    With the release of the final guidance, hospitals should take the opportunity to evaluate their co-location arrangements and develop documentation supporting their interpretation of the CoPs governing co-location arrangements generally, and specific support and analysis for each co-location arrangement in which they participate.

    In depth

    Background

    Hospitals that participate in the Medicare program are required to comply with the Medicare hospital CoPs. The hospital CoPs are certification standards that a hospital must meet in order to participate in the Medicare program. The CoPs are typically interpreted by CMS, but accrediting organizations (AOs) such as The Joint Commission have accreditation standards that align with the CMS requirements. Compliance with hospital CoPs is typically assessed during surveys by state agencies or, for accredited hospitals, through The Joint Commission or other AO surveys. Surveys may also be performed following certain types of patient safety complaints or alleged EMTALA violations. Continued noncompliance with the CoPs and failure to take corrective action to the satisfaction of CMS can result in termination from the Medicare program.

    Beginning in 2015, CMS staff publicly presented CMS’s views on how certain hospital co-location arrangements may result in noncompliance with the CoPs. The presentations, memorialized in PowerPoint slide decks rather than more formal guidance documents, established principles of co-location such as “hospital space must be hospital space 24/7” and “hospitals must demonstrate ‘independent compliance’ with the CoPs.” These served as the basis for hospitals’ understanding of the general guardrails for establishing compliant co-location arrangements. Hospitals and other stakeholders expressed concerns that CMS should not “regulate by PowerPoint” and argued that if CMS intended to take enforcement action under the CoPs against hospitals engaging in co-location arrangements, it needed to more formally issue its interpretation of how the CoPs should be applied to co-location arrangements.

    In May 2019, CMS released more formal draft co-location guidance in the form of a Quality, Safety and Oversight Group memorandum, addressed to state survey agency directors. These memos provide guidance and instructions to state survey agencies that are tasked with overseeing hospital compliance with the CoPs, but also are relied on by hospitals to understand CMS compliance expectations. The draft co-location guidance was generally consistent with the preceding PowerPoint guidance. Click here for our summary and analysis of the draft co-location guidance, including specific examples of permitted and prohibited co-location arrangements. CMS sought public comment on the draft co-location guidance.

    Final Co-Location Guidance

    The final co-location guidance incorporates many material changes from the draft co-location guidance. At a high level, the final guidance eliminates many of the specific examples of prohibited or permitted arrangements provided in the draft guidance and replaces the examples with a hospital’s general requirement to comply with the hospital CoP regulations, as well as any other statutory or regulatory requirements that may apply (without identifying what those may be). The final guidance also excludes critical access hospitals and private physician offices from the definition of “healthcare providers” as used in the final guidance, rendering the guidance unclear as to whether co-location arrangements with these entities are regulated, and if so, how they should be assessed under the CoPs.

    Space

    Prior to the issuance of the final guidance, CMS articulated specific examples of hospital locations that could and could not be shared. The final guidance removes the examples and requires hospitals to consider whether the co-located space results in risks to compliance with the CoPs. The final guidance suggests that hospitals evaluate CoPs related to patient rights, infection prevention and control, governing body and/or physical environments, “among others.” However, CMS does not articulate how these CoP requirements should be applied to shared space, other than to indicate that hospitals should “demonstrate their compliance to protect and provide a safe environment for their patients, including but not limited to, their right to personal privacy and to receive care in a safe environment . . . and right to confidentiality of patient records.” This is a departure from the draft guidance, which included specific information on which spaces would be considered clinical space (and therefore not able to be shared) and nonclinical space (which generally could be shared).

    Contracted Services

    CMS made the most limited changes between the draft and final guidance in the contracted services section and retained all of the examples of services that a hospital may obtain under contract from the draft guidance. Hospitals are permitted to obtain services under contract and many of the most commonly-contracted services are included in the examples. Consistent with the general principles under the CoPs, but not explicitly stated in the draft guidance, the final guidance requires that a hospital evaluate all contracted services under the “governing body” CoP to ensure that the services are provided under the oversight of the hospital’s governing body.

    Staffing

    CMS made material changes to the staffing requirements in the final guidance, including removal of references to hospitals being required to “independently” meet staffing CoPs and deletion of the restriction on hospital staff “floating” between the hospital and another entity. This change appears to open up opportunities for significantly more flexible staffing arrangements, so long as the arrangements are supported by “evidence that the hospital’s staff are meeting the needs of the patients for whom they are providing care.”

    Emergency Services

    The final guidance removes references in the draft guidance to restrictions on hospitals using staff from a co-located hospital to respond to emergencies and replaces these references with more general statements about a hospital’s obligation to ensure that policies and procedures are in place to address potential emergency scenarios typical of the patient population. The final guidance reiterates that hospitals that provide emergency services are required to comply with EMTALA.

    Analysis

    The final guidance will come as a relief to many hospitals, while simultaneously creating frustration and confusion. Although many hospitals and stakeholders viewed the bright lines provided in the draft guidance (and preceding PowerPoint guidance) as overly prescriptive, burdensome and outside of CMS’s authority to implement through sub-regulatory guidance, the final guidance generally refers back to the CoP regulations, without additional insight into how these requirements may be applied by CMS or state surveyors. Surveyors and AOs retain discretion with respect to how to apply this final guidance to hospitals, and the guidance does not significantly clarify how hospitals should comply with the CoPs for co-location arrangements. This could lead to inconsistent results where co-location concerns are identified as part of a survey.

    In particular, the clarification that the final guidance does not apply to critical access hospitals or private physician offices creates confusion about how co-location arrangements that involve, for example, a hospital outpatient department that is co-located with an affiliated physician practice will be evaluated. The final guidance suggests, but does not confirm, that CMS is more concerned with arrangements where two separately enrolled facilities, such as two separately enrolled hospitals, or a hospital and another facility such as an ambulatory surgery center or rural health clinic, are co-located or share services. The few remaining examples included in the guidance focus on co-location arrangements with separately enrolled hospitals, as opposed to arrangements involving a hospital and a physician practice group.

    The final guidance appears to remove many of the most controversial aspects of the draft guidance, including the restrictions on comingling of hospital space with space used by other healthcare providers, “floating” nursing staffing arrangements between a hospital and another healthcare provider, and use of staff from a co-located hospital to provide rarely needed services (e.g., “code teams”). Notably, however, the final guidance also appears to place the burden on hospitals to demonstrate how their co-location arrangements meet the applicable CoPs, including the CoPs related to nursing services and emergency services. The final guidance also removes necessary insight into how CMS may interpret the CoPs with respect to co-location arrangements and does not provide guidance on how surveyors may apply the CoPs.

    Hospitals should be aware that statutes, regulations and guidance outside of the CoPs may be implicated by co-location arrangements. For example, although CMS removed references to specific co-located space arrangements from the final guidance, many of the arrangements that were previously restricted under the draft guidance may remain prohibited by state licensure laws or other Medicare program rules, such as the Medicare provider-based rules.

    The issuance of the final guidance provides an opportunity for hospitals to review and evaluate their current co-location policies and arrangements. In light of the issuance of the final guidance, hospitals should implement (or update) policies and procedures for co-location arrangements that are consistent with the final guidance, including developing and maintaining documentation of all co-location arrangements and the legal support for how a hospital’s co-location arrangements comply with the CoPs.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Sandra M. DiVarco

    Partner

    Chicago

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • OIG Revises Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OIG Revises Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol

    November 15, 2021

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On November 8, 2021, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued an update to the Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol (SDP). This update revises and renames the Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol last updated by OIG in 2013. The changes are mostly procedural in nature and update the SDP based on legislative adjustments to penalty amounts.

    In depth

    OIG recently posted revisions to the SDP, which was first published in the 1998 Federal Register as a process through which healthcare providers, suppliers and other entities subject to civil monetary penalties can voluntarily self-disclose matters involving potential fraud stemming from participation in federal healthcare programs. Pursuant to the SDP, examples of what can be appropriately disclosed include, but are not limited to, submissions of improper claims to federal healthcare programs, potential violations of the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the physician self-referral law (otherwise known as the Stark law), and employment or contracting with excluded individuals on OIG’s List of Excluded Individuals and Entities.

    The SDP’s goal is to facilitate compliance with federal healthcare program requirements by offering entities subject to civil monetary penalties the opportunity to make good faith disclosures of potential fraud and avoid the costs and disruptions associated with government-directed investigations and civil or administrative litigation.

    The timelines, content requirements and methods used to calculate damages are consistent between the 2013 and 2021 versions of the SDP. The 2021 SDP changes are as follows:

    • OIG increased the minimum amounts required to settle under the SDP to match new statutory minimum penalty amounts as set forth under the amendments to Section 50412 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, which increased maximum civil monetary penalties in section 1128A(a) of the Social Security Act (42 USC 1320a-7a) for false claims from $10,000 to $20,000, and for Anti-Kickback Statute-related conduct from $50,000 to $100,000.
    • OIG now requires SDP submissions to be made through the OIG’s web page and online portal, rather than by sending a letter to OIG.
    • OIG clarified that the SDP is not the appropriate mechanism to report grant- or government-contract-related conduct. In 2019, OIG created the Grant Self-Disclosure Program for grant recipients to use for grant-related issues. In 2014, OIG issued guidance to HHS contractors to disclose compliance issues using the Contractor Self-Disclosure Program.
    • OIG clarified that a reporting party must indicate in its disclosure whether it is subject to a corporate integrity agreement. OIG also clarifies that reportable events (as defined by the corporate integrity agreement) can be disclosed under the SDP.
    • OIG made clarifying revisions to the existing language that confirmed that in some instances, the US Department of Justice may choose to participate in the settlement of SDP cases and resolve the matter under the False Claims Act.
    • OIG clarified that a party disclosing under the SDP must include damages to each affected federal healthcare program separately and the sum of all damages to all affected federal healthcare programs.

    The latest revisions to the SDP are part of OIG’s ongoing evaluation of the disclosure process. OIG previously issued Open Letters to Health Care Providers in 2006, 2008 and 2009 and solicited public comment prior to the 2013 version of the SDP, which amended and replaced the 1998 Federal Register Notice and Open Letters.

    The SDP has been active since its inception. OIG stated that it has resolved more than 2,200 disclosures between 1998 and 2020, resulting in recoveries of more than $870 million to the federal healthcare programs. Between 2016 and 2020, OIG resolved more than 330 settlements through the SDP. According to OIG’s web page, OIG has entered into more than 600 settlements since 2013 with organizations that self-disclosed conduct through the SDP, with settlements as high as $20.9 million.

    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Monica Wallace

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • The Plot Plot Thickens: Trade Secret, Tortious Interference, Fiduciary Duty Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss

    The Plot Plot Thickens: Trade Secret, Tortious Interference, Fiduciary Duty Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss

    ARTICLE

    The Plot Plot Thickens: Trade Secret, Tortious Interference, Fiduciary Duty Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss

    November 11, 2021

    Read time: 5 min

    A judge from the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sitting by designation in the US District Court for the District of Delaware denied a motion to dismiss claims of misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference and breach of fiduciary duty, finding that the plaintiff plausibly pled facts supporting each claim. Park Lawn Corp. v. PlotBox Inc., Case No. 20-cv-01484-SB (D. Del. Oct. 29, 2021) (Bibas, J., sitting by designation).

    Park Lawn and PlotBox are competitors in the cemetery business. In 2018, Park Lawn began developing software to automate various cemetery management tasks to cut costs. Park Lawn also hoped to generate revenue by licensing the software to competitors. Park Lawn’s CEO, however, had been leaking information to PlotBox about the software, its unique features and Park Lawn’s strategy for licensing. The CEO also helped PlotBox in its efforts to recruit Park Lawn’s chief technology officer, who had been overseeing the software project. The CEO acted despite having signed confidentiality, non-compete and non-solicitation agreements. Park Lawn ultimately discovered the CEO’s involvement with PlotBox and fired him. Soon after, the CEO became PlotBox’s chairman. Park Lawn sued PlotBox for stealing its trade secrets, interfering with the CEO’s employment agreements and helping the CEO breach his fiduciary duty to Park Lawn. PlotBox moved to dismiss.

    The district court denied the motion. As to the trade secret claims, PlotBox argued that it did not misappropriate any trade secrets since the CEO never actually gave PlotBox any information. The court found that the complaint alleged otherwise. In particular, the court noted the complaint alleged:

    • The CEO and PlotBox exchanged compromising emails discussing the “status,” “developments in ‘death-tech,’” and the CEO’s interest in becoming PlotBox’s chairman.
    • The CEO invited PlotBox executives to his home to discuss a “Park Lawn Update” and “Technical Presentation.”

    The court found that these allegations plausibly alleged that the CEO could have disclosed a trade secret.

    PlotBox argued that even if it did learn something from the CEO, it never knew that the CEO obtained that information through improper means. The district court again disagreed, finding that PlotBox should have known something was amiss since the CEO broke a promise to keep quiet. While the court acknowledged that PlotBox may have never read the CEO’s confidentiality agreement, PlotBox should have reasonably inferred that it was improper for the CEO of a competitor to disclose his company’s innovations.

    PlotBox also argued for dismissal because any information it received from the CEO did not count as a trade secret under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Once again, the district court disagreed, explaining that Park Lawn alleged that the information provided was technical in nature (e.g., unique features of software and strategy of selling it to rivals), Park Lawn took adequate measures to protect the information by only allowing a few employees who signed confidentiality agreements to access the software and the information was valuable because it was secret. The court thus permitted the trade secret claim to proceed.

    The district court found that while the tortious interference claim could not proceed based on the CEO’s non-compete agreement, it could proceed based on his other employment agreements. With respect to the non-compete agreement, the court found that the employment contract was governed by Canadian law, which states that non-compete agreements are valid only in “exceptional circumstances,” which were not present in this case. As to the non-solicitation agreement, the court found Park Lawn plausibly pled breach of the agreement by virtue of the CEO soliciting its chief technology officer despite the CEO’s promise he would not “solicit the employment . . . of any” Park Lawn employee with whom he dealt. As to the confidentiality agreement, the court found Park Lawn adequately pled that its CEO provided confidential information relating to projects and strategies to PlotBox.

    Regarding the claim for aiding breach of fiduciary duties, PlotBox argued that it was not liable because the CEO never breached any fiduciary duty since PlotBox never knew the CEO owed any fiduciary duty and never recruited Park Lawn’s chief technology officer. The district court rejected these arguments, finding that a CEO has fiduciary duties, PlotBox knew it was dealing with a CEO and PlotBox also knew that the CEO did not act loyally since he tried to recruit the chief technology officer. The court thus found the fiduciary duty claim survived.

    Authors

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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