ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Hospital Reimbursement Opportunity Remains After CMS Decides Not to Finalize DSH Payment Calculation Changes
December 30, 2021
Read time: 6 min
On December 17, 2021, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released the fiscal year (FY) 2022 inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) final rule. In light of the significant volume of comments, CMS declined to adopt any modifications to the current disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment regulations. In the FY 2022 IPPS proposed rule and in response to several recent court cases, CMS had proposed modifications to its regulations that would explicitly exclude Medicaid patient days associated with state section 1115 waiver programs from the Medicare DSH payment calculation. This change, in effect, would reduce the number of patient days that are utilized in the DSH payment calculation. CMS’s decision not to finalize the changes to its current regulations may open the door for hospitals to include patient days associated with approved state Medicaid section 1115 waiver programs on their Medicare cost reports. This in turn may qualify hospitals for a DSH payment adjustment or increase a hospital’s Medicare DSH payment adjustment.
Background
Hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of low-income patients are eligible for increased Medicare reimbursement. There are several methods by which a hospital may qualify for the Medicare DSH adjustment. The most common method for a hospital to qualify for a DSH adjustment is through a complex statutory formula that is based on the hospital’s disproportionate patient percentage, calculated using two separate fractions: the Medicare fraction and the Medicaid fraction.
The DSH Medicaid fraction is calculated by dividing the hospital’s patient days furnished to patients eligible for Medicaid but not entitled to Medicare Part A by the total number of patient days in the same period. For purposes of the Medicaid DSH fraction calculation, the patient must be “eligible for inpatient hospital services” under either an approved state Medicaid plan or under a section 1115 waiver.
States may choose to extend medical coverage benefits to populations that are not eligible for medical assistance under the state’s Medicaid plan through section 1115(a) demonstration projects (referred to as section 1115 waivers). In the past several years, states have used section 1115 waivers to establish uncompensated care pools that provide funding to hospitals to offset the burden of treating uninsured patients. The uncompensated care pools do not provide inpatient health coverage directly to patients, but rather provide funding directly to hospitals to compensate the providers for furnishing care to uninsured and underinsured patients. Similarly, CMS has approved other section 1115 waivers that enable states to provide premium assistance to individuals that can be used to purchase private health insurance.
Analysis
CMS has historically taken the position that it is authorized by statute to include patient days associated with patients who receive benefits through a section 1115 demonstration project that are comparable to traditional Medicaid benefits. Accordingly, CMS interpreted its regulations to prevent hospitals from including patient days associated with section 1115 waivers in their Medicaid fraction for DSH payment purposes unless the section 1115 waiver authorizes health coverage that is comparable to an approved state Medicaid plan that furnishes inpatient hospital services coverage to patients on a particular day.
In several recent court cases, hospitals have challenged CMS’s interpretation of its regulations for the DSH payment calculation. CMS is authorized by statute to include patient days of patients who are eligible to receive benefits under a section 1115 waiver by the Social Security Act. In several recent cases, courts have ruled that hospitals are permitted by the clear language of the regulation, which specifies only that the patients must be eligible for “inpatient hospital services,” to include patient days associated with section 1115 waivers in the Medicaid fraction for purposes of the DSH payment adjustment. Recent court cases have extended this reasoning to encompass section 1115 waivers that provide for both (1) uncompensated care pools that provide compensation to providers for under- or uninsured patients, and (2) premium assistance for individuals who are not eligible for either Medicare or Medicaid.
In Forrest General Hospital v. Azar, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mississippi hospitals were entitled to include in the Medicaid fraction for DSH calculation purposes patient days associated with inpatient services furnished to Hurricane Katrina evacuees and reimbursed through an uncompensated care pool authorized under an approved section 1115 waiver. Forrest General Hospital v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2019). Similarly, in Bethesda Health v. Azar, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and concluded that hospitals that received reimbursement for days of care from Florida’s section 1115 waiver (a low income pool that reimbursed providers for care provided to uninsured and underinsured patients) were permitted to include the patient days in the hospitals’ Medicaid fraction. Bethesda Health v. Azar, 980 F.3d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Finally, the court held in HealthAlliance Hospitals, Inc. v. Azar that Massachusetts hospitals were entitled to include patient days associated with patients who received health insurance premium assistance through a Massachusetts program partially funded by the federal government through a section 1115 waiver in the DSH payment calculation.
In light of these rulings, CMS proposed to revise the regulatory language to clarify that only section 1115 waiver days associated with inpatient hospital insurance coverage benefits furnished directly to patients may be included in hospitals’ Medicaid fraction for purposes of the Medicare DSH payment adjustment. The proposed regulatory language, included in the IPPS proposed rule, would have clarified that patients are deemed eligible for Medicaid, for purposes of the DSH calculation, only if the patient is eligible for inpatient hospital services under a state Medicaid program that either includes coverage for inpatient hospital care on that patient day or directly receives inpatient hospital insurance on that patient day under a section 1115 waiver.
CMS ultimately declined to finalize the proposed changes to the DSH payment calculation related to the Medicaid fraction. CMS indicated that its decision was due to the volume of comments received on the subject, and that CMS will revisit the issue of how to count section 1115 waiver days in future rulemaking. CMS also invited stakeholders to submit comments on the proposed changes.
Practical Implications
Because of the recent litigation and CMS’s decision not to modify the current regulatory language, hospitals that receive reimbursement for under- or uninsured patients through state Medicaid demonstration projects authorized under section 1115 waivers may be permitted by the current regulation to include patient days associated with these programs on the hospital’s Medicare cost report. Inclusion of these patient days will improve hospitals’ DSH percentage. Because a hospital’s DSH eligibility has implications for 340B program eligibility, this may be an important consideration. Inclusion of additional patient days in the Medicaid fraction also may ultimately improve a hospital’s Medicare DSH payment adjustment.

CMS Issues Detailed Guidance to Surveyors on Assessing Compliance with Omnibus COVID-19 Healthcare Staff Vaccination Mandate
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
CMS Issues Detailed Guidance to Surveyors on Assessing Compliance with Omnibus COVID-19 Healthcare Staff Vaccination Mandate
December 29, 2021
Read time: 11 min
On December 28, 2021, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Quality, Safety and Oversight Group released a memorandum (QSO-22-07-ALL) providing guidance and details on survey procedures for assessing and maintaining compliance with CMS’s November 5, 2021, interim final rule with comment period (IFR) healthcare provider vaccination mandate in those states where it may be enforced. This move toward enforcement came as a surprise to some, given ongoing controversy regarding the IFR: a series of court decisions resulted in a stay of the IFR’s implementation in 25 states and oral arguments are expected to occur before the Supreme Court of the United States on January 7, 2022, regarding the fate of lower court injunctions. Regardless of the Supreme Court review, and that enforcement may only be undertaken in about half of all states, CMS has now identified updated deadlines for IFR compliance, as well as specific compliance thresholds and tiered enforcement levels for each of the specific CMS-enrolled provider types covered by the IFR.
As a result, covered facilities in states where the IFR may be enforced (roughly half of the country) find themselves again working with a short timeline for compliance, compounded by a new survey and enforcement regimen. Note that at this time, surveyors are not permitted to implement or enforce the IFR in the states where a stay of enforcement of the IFR remains in effect.
New Compliance Dates
As outlined in its December 28, 2021, memo to surveyors and in updated FAQs for the IFR, CMS has adjusted the compliance date for Phase 1 of the mandate to January 27, 2022 (30 days after release of the memo), and the Phase 2 compliance date to February 28, 2022 (60 days after release of the memo). Generally speaking, Phase 1 entails covered staff having received the first dose of a multi-dose vaccine or requesting a federally recognized exemption, and Phase 2 involves covered staff receiving the second dose of a multi-dose vaccine (or a single dose of a single-dose vaccine) or having received a federally recognized exemption. For details on what is contemplated to be completed within each phase of the IFR’s implementation, see below and our prior On the Subject.
Who Assesses Compliance?
The memo specifies that federal, state, accrediting organization (e.g., The Joint Commission) and “CMS-contracted surveyors” will assess compliance upon survey. It is not clear whether the last category of surveyors mentioned in that list references state agencies conducting surveys on behalf of CMS, or separate survey staff provided directly by CMS.
Assessing Compliance on Survey
The memo describes the general compliance assessment process applicable to all covered provider types and defers specific details for each type to a series of 14 attachments, one for each covered provider type. Surveyors will apply the general guidance in the memo and the specific guidance for the surveyed provider types during any initial certification, standard recertification, reaccreditation or complaint survey starting January 27, 2022 (30 days after issuance of the memo).
While there is some variation in the details depending upon provider type, the memo and attachments provide that a covered facility with a vaccination rate under 100% (accounting for federally recognized exemptions and delayed dosing recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)) is out of compliance with the IFR. Depending upon the type of provider and the level of noncompliance, the potential ramifications of noncompliance could include monetary penalties, denial of admissions, required plans of correction and other actions ultimately including termination of the provider agreement with CMS. CMS states in the memo and FAQ, as it had in calls at the time the IFR was published, that noncompliance will not necessarily lead to termination, and that covered facilities will generally be given opportunities to return to compliance prior to such actions being undertaken.
By the new Phase 1 date, in order to be considered compliant with the IFR, each covered provider must develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure staff vaccination, and 100% of covered staff must have received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine or have requested or received a federally recognized exemption from vaccination (or have a temporary delay as recommended by the CDC). Facilities that are not in full compliance will receive written notice of their noncompliance via a Form 2567, and those with a compliance level at or above 80% with a plan to achieve 100% compliance within 60 days will not be subject to additional enforcement action. Facilities with a lesser level of compliance could be subject to additional enforcement action, depending upon provider type.
As of the updated Phase 2 date, compliance with the IFR requires each covered provider to develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure staff vaccination, and requires that 100% of covered staff have received the doses necessary to complete their vaccination series or have received a federally recognized exemption or temporary delay as recommended by the CDC. Facilities that are not in full compliance will receive written notice of their noncompliance via a Form 2567, and those with a compliance level at or above 90% with a plan to achieve 100% compliance within 30 days will not be subject to additional enforcement action. Facilities that fail to meet these thresholds will be subject to additional enforcement action, as described under Phase 1.
After the Phase 2 date has passed, any covered provider that fails to maintain 100% compliance as described above may be subject to enforcement action.
The survey impact of noncompliance is further addressed in the provider-specific attachments to the memo.
Provider-Specific Information and Compliance Thresholds
The provider-specific attachments to the memo detail both the changes to the applicable conditions of participation or coverage, or other requirements under which covered facilities must operate pursuant to their provider agreement or enrollment agreement with CMS, and specific survey guidelines for the various elements of the IFR as applied to covered facilities.
For example, for hospitals, Attachment D to the memo outlines specific expectations in relation to the required policies and procedures regarding staff vaccination, and details the information that each hospital is required to track and securely document regarding staff vaccination, including:
- Each staff member’s vaccination status (including the specific vaccine received and the dates of each dose received, or the date of the next scheduled dose for a multidose vaccine)
- Any staff member who has obtained any booster doses (including the specific vaccine booster received and the date of the administration of the booster)
- Staff who have been granted an exemption from vaccination requirements by the hospital (including the type of exemption and supporting documentation)
- Staff for whom COVID-19 vaccination must be temporarily delayed, including the tracking of when the identified staff can safely resume their vaccination.
For hospitals that began gathering vaccination information prior to the release of the memo, certain of these data points may not have been part of their tracking. Hospitals may need to restructure their tracking processes and obtain more information from staff to ensure their records are complete.
The provider-specific attachments also detail the survey process that will be followed to evaluate compliance with the IFR. The process will be intensive and detailed, including staff interviews and questioning; validating documents; and pressure-testing exemptions, exemption processes and contingency plans. Covered facilities need to be prepared for this level of scrutiny.
For illustrative purposes, in the context of a hospital survey, the surveyors are guided to take the following actions:
For vaccinated staff:
- Review hospital records to verify vaccination status and validate the evidence provided.
- Conduct follow-up interviews with staff and administration if any discrepancies are identified or if any additional doses were provided.
For unvaccinated staff:
- Review hospital records.
- Determine if such staff have been educated and offered vaccination.
- Interview staff and ask if they plan to get vaccinated if they have declined to get vaccinated, and if they have a medical contraindication or religious exemption.
- Request and review documentation of the medical contraindication.
- Request to see employee record of the staff education on the hospital policy and procedure regarding unvaccinated individuals.
- Observe staff providing care to determine compliance with current standards of practice with infection control and prevention.
For each individual identified by the hospital as unvaccinated due to a medical contraindication:
- Review and verify that all required documentation is fully executed, sufficiently detailed and in order.
Hospitals are expected to provide a list off all staff, their position/role and their vaccination status, including newly hired staff within the last 60 days.
The above is only a partial list of the detailed surveyor responsibilities for assessing a hospital’s compliance with the IFR on survey. Similar survey process expectations are in place for the other covered provider types in their respective attachments to the memo. The additional work required on the part of the survey team, and the resources required of the hospital to respond to these detailed expectations, seem almost certain to complicate and prolong the survey process.
Levels of Deficiency and Plans of Correction
The attachments to the memo also articulate how surveyors are to determine the level of deficiency in cases where a covered provider is found to be out of compliance with the IFR. As noted above, from 30 to 60 days following issuance of the memo, the expected minimum threshold for compliance is 80%, and from 60 to 90 days following issuance of the memo, the expected minimum compliance threshold is be 90%. After the 90-day point, the expected minimum threshold is 100% compliance. Noncompliance outside of these parameters may be cited within a range of severity, including by way of example, for hospitals:
- Immediate Jeopardy where 40% or more of covered staff remain unvaccinated, or where the covered facility failed to meet the 100% threshold and had noncompliant infection control practices and one or more undeveloped or unimplemented policies and procedures
- Condition Level where the covered facility did not meet the 100% threshold and one or more components of the policies and procedures were not developed and implemented or 21-39% of covered staff remain unvaccinated
- Standard Level where 100% of staff are vaccinated and all new staff have received at least one dose but one or more components of the policies and procedures were not developed and implemented, or where the provider did not meet the 100% threshold but is “making good faith efforts” toward compliance.
Other covered provider types (i.e., long-term care facilities) include patient/resident infection information as part of the determination of severity and scope of the noncompliance.
Provisions regarding how covered providers can clear citations and demonstrate substantial compliance in plans of correction provide little flexibility, focusing on coming into 100% compliance as quickly as possible. Achieving compliance and clearing a citation requires a showing that all staff are fully vaccinated (through measures such as obtaining vaccine doses for staff or “replacing unvaccinated staff with vaccinated staff”), and even achieving substantial compliance with a continuing citation presumes that unvaccinated staff have obtained a first dose and are scheduled for a second dose.
Many of the corrective actions are presented in a matter-of-fact manner, as though they could be achieved quickly and easily, which may come as a surprise to providers presently dealing with nurse and other staff shortages (e.g., “obtaining temporary vaccinated staff until permanent vaccinated replacements can be found” as a component of a contingency plan). Perhaps recognizing this, in the case of hospitals, CMS provides that the citation level and/or enforcement action may be lowered if it is identified that prior to the survey, the covered provider had no or limited access to vaccines, despite documented attempts to obtain access, or if the hospital provides evidence that it has taken aggressive steps to have all staff vaccinated, such as advertising for new staff or hosting vaccine clinics. To what extent these “good-faith” efforts to achieve compliance will be weighed in the survey process remains to be seen.
Key Takeaways
The memo and provider-specific attachments provide detailed, actionable information for covered providers in anticipation of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 deadlines. With oral arguments on the ability to enforce the IFR scheduled at the Supreme Court on January 7, 2022, and an unknown timeline for a decision to be issued thereafter, providers in all states—including those where enforcement is currently enjoined—would be well advised to determine how this new survey guidance may apply to them in the future, if not now.
Covered facilities should carefully review the memo and relevant attachment for their provider type in advance of the Phase 1 and Phase 2 dates, familiarize themselves with the new guidance and survey processes as applied to their facilities, and consider making changes to processes where the current state is not in alignment with the guidance. Links to each of the provider-specific attachments are provided below.
| Attachment A – Long Term Care and Skilled Nursing Facilities | Attachment B – Ambulatory Surgery Centers |
|---|---|
| Attachment C – Hospice | Attachment D – Hospital |
| Attachment E – Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facilities | Attachment F – Intermediate Care Facilities for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities |
| Attachment G – Home Health Agencies | Attachment H – Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation Facilities |
| Attachment I – Critical Access Hospitals | Attachment J – Outpatient Physical Therapy |
| Attachment K – Community Mental Health Centers | Attachment L – Home Infusion Therapy |
| Attachment M – Rural Health Centers/Federally Qualified Health Clinics | Attachment N – End-Stage Rental Disease Facilities |
Providers who still wish to comment on the IFR may do so under the existing comment period, which closes January 4, 2022.
European Sovereignty: How Brussels Defends the Economic Interests of Member States
ARTICLE
European Sovereignty: How Brussels Defends the Economic Interests of Member States
December 23, 2021
Read time: 2 min
The COVID-19 crisis has accelerated awareness of the need to defend Europe’s economic and industrial sovereignty through better control of foreign investments and foreign subsidies, as well as through adoption of a mechanism to combat certain coercive measures adopted by non-Member States.
In total, no less than three European mechanisms will make it possible to defend the economic interests of the Member States. Sabine Naugès delves deeper and explores this issue in an in-depth article for La Tribune.
To read the full article, please click here.

US Supreme Court to Review Whether PAGA Claim Can Be Arbitrated
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
US Supreme Court to Review Whether PAGA Claim Can Be Arbitrated
December 28, 2021
Read time: 4 min
California’s Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) has so far evaded arbitration agreements. Now, the Supreme Court of the United States will take up Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.”
PAGA is a private enforcement mechanism that deputizes “aggrieved employees” to bring lawsuits to recover civil penalties for California Labor Code violations on behalf of themselves, other employees and the State of California. PAGA “representative actions” allow plaintiffs’ counsel to bring the claims of hundreds or thousands of employees in one action without having to satisfy the class certification standards.
This sweep is significant because PAGA provides for penalties calculated on a per pay period basis for each employee. Thus, technical violations of the California Labor Code quickly translate into seven-figure exposures. For example, the PAGA penalty for wage statement violations is $250 per employee per pay period for the initial violation and $1,000 for each subsequent violation, which nets over $6 million in penalties for a workforce of 250 employees.
California’s Supreme Court held in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014) that PAGA claims are not covered by the FAA because such claims are law enforcement actions brought on behalf of the State. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has concurred.
In Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, the employer sought review from the Supreme Court, contending that the holding in Iskanian directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holdings in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 US 333 (2011) and Epic Systems Corp v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018). There, and elsewhere, the Supreme Court has held that, under the FAA, courts must enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that provide for individualized proceedings and waive representative or class proceedings.
TAKEAWAY
A favorable ruling for California employers could change the landscape by allowing employers to implement and enforce arbitration agreements with PAGA waivers. In short, it would allow arbitration agreements to control PAGA claims on parity with all other statutory employment claims under state and federal law. A decision from the Supreme Court is expected by June 2022.
Government prosecutions, of course, cannot be compelled into arbitration. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 US 279 (2002). But, PAGA seeks to end-run that narrow exception—a device that, if permitted, would permit every state to carve out claims from arbitration by similar legislation. So far, the Supreme Court has had zero tolerance for such public policy exceptions to the broad sweep of the FAA. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 US 530 (2012).
California courts struggle in accepting the FAA’s sweep. This is likewise evident in Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Bonta, 13 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2021) where the Ninth Circuit held that California’s law attempting to ban mandatory employment arbitration agreements is not entirely preempted by the FAA. En banc review by the full Ninth Circuit has been requested; if denied, Supreme Court review can be expected to follow.
McDermott Will & Emery lawyers not only know how to draft arbitration agreements but also how to sell their enforcement in court.

Log4j: Enforcement Risk for Public Companies
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Log4j: Enforcement Risk for Public Companies
December 23, 2021
Read time: 6 min
The Apache Log4j vulnerability continues to command significant attention throughout the public and private sectors. In a recent interview, the director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) described Log4j as the “most serious vulnerability” she has seen in her decades-long career. On December 22, 2021, CISA, along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA) and international law enforcement partners, issued a joint advisory cautioning that malicious cyber actors are already scanning and exploiting some of the many thousands of vulnerable systems around the world.
Security researchers predict that organizations will be contending with the vulnerability (and its fallout) for months to come. CISA created a dedicated Log4j webpage to provide an authoritative, up-to-date resource with mitigation guidance and resources for network defenders as well as a community-sourced GitHub repository of affected devices and services. These government resources are setting the baseline on reasonable security for Log4j response and, in essence, providing a potential roadmap for legal compliance.
While the wolf at the door may be the technical challenge of identifying and remediating the vulnerability, public companies need to monitor the application of internal controls and procedures in the response. Companies should also assess the impact that the Log4j vulnerability may have on their business, financial condition and results of operations. These inquiries will feed into whether a public company has any disclosure obligations under US securities law. Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has emphasized that public companies must take “all required actions” to inform investors about material cybersecurity risks and incidents1 in a timely fashion. Covered risks and incidents can include those that have not yet matured to a cyberattack.
A public company can have the best policies and procedures on paper, but if they are not applied properly and there is not the appropriate flow of information, enforcement risk abounds. This is particularly true where, as here, the vulnerability is so widespread (reportedly upwards of 100 million devices and servers are affected by the security flaw) and it is actively being exploited by malign actors, including those associated with nation states.
The SEC has a demonstrated track record of bringing enforcement actions against public companies for deficient disclosure and controls related to cybersecurity risks and incidents; these actions include instances where management failed to properly investigate and adequately consider whether a breach needed to be disclosed to investors as well as a cybersecurity incident that was not remediated in accordance with company policy or properly escalated to senior executives.
If past is prelude, the SEC could send out requests for information to companies that have downloaded a compromised version of Log4j and ask them to provide further detail about software usage as well as other compromises by external actors, regardless of materiality or access to material non-public information. Although Log4j is open-source software and does not have a ready list of companies that installed it, the US government monitors a continually updated list of known vulnerable vendors/applications involving Log4j. And, Log4j is on regulators’ radar; for example, the SEC has spotlighted it on its website.
As the Log4j issue continues to unfold, company personnel responsible for developing and overseeing disclosure controls and procedures should have a line of sight into the technical response and ensure that company controls and procedures are being applied properly. They also need to be vigilant, in a dynamic threat environment, about obtaining sufficient information to meaningfully evaluate disclosure obligations, including asking:
- Has the company conducted a vulnerability assessment to identify if it has potentially been impacted by Log4j?
- If so, what is the assessed impact on reputation, financial performance, and customer and vendor relationships?
- What, if anything, is impeding such an assessment?
- If the company has systems or applications utilizing vulnerable versions of Log4j, what is the remediation plan to address those systems or applications, and how long will it take to effectively remediate?
- Is there any deviation between the company’s existing policies and procedures on security incident response and vulnerability management and how Log4j is being handled?
- Has the company discovered any Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) related to Log4j within its environment?
- Has the company conducted diligence of its vendors, particularly those with access to company data and/or systems, to determine whether they have been impacted by Log4j?
- Has the company had any previous cybersecurity incidents, and if so, were they disclosed to investors?
- If they were not disclosed, what were the reasons they were determined to not be material?
In preparing a disclosure, public companies must give sufficient details of a material cybersecurity risk or incident so as not to overgeneralize; at the same time, companies should avoid details that could enable threat actors to target the exploitable software running on company systems.2 Finally, companies must be mindful of the prohibition against corporate insiders’ trading the company’s securities while in possession of material nonpublic information, which may include knowledge regarding Log4j impact.3
1A “cybersecurity incident” is “[a]n occurrence that actually or potentially results in adverse consequences to … an information system or the information that the system processes, stores, or transmits and that may require a response action to mitigate the consequences.” US Computer Emergency Readiness Team website, available at https://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary#I.
2In its February 2018 guidance, the SEC noted that it does not expect companies to make detailed disclosures that could compromise the company’s cybersecurity efforts—for example, by providing a “roadmap” for those who seek to penetrate a company’s security protections; nor does the SEC expect companies to publicly disclose specific, technical information about their cybersecurity systems, the related networks and devices, or potential system vulnerabilities in such detail as would make such systems, networks and devices more susceptible to a cybersecurity incident. Nevertheless, the SEC does expect companies to disclose cybersecurity risks and incidents that are material to investors, including the concomitant financial, legal or reputational consequences.
3In 2018, the SEC charged a number of now former employees at Equifax with insider trading in advance of the company’s September 2017 announcement of an extensive data breach that exposed Social Security numbers and other personal information of approximately 148 million US customers. See Former Equifax Executive Charged With Insider Trading, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-40; https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-115; Former Equifax Manager Charged With Insider Trading, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-115.

Cal/OSHA Issues New ETS of Its Own: Here Are the Details for California Employers
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Cal/OSHA Issues New ETS of Its Own: Here Are the Details for California Employers
December 23, 2021
Read time: 8 min
On December 16, 2021, the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health’s (Cal/OSHA) Standards Board voted to approve the second readoption of the California COVID-19 Prevention Emergency Temporary Standards (Second Readopted ETS), which contains a few material changes, including to COVID-19 testing and exclusion requirements and return to work criteria, and additional details concerning face coverings, accommodations and COVID-19 vaccination. The majority of the Cal/OSHA ETS employer obligations, however, are extended as-is by the Second Readopted ETS. The Second Readopted ETS will take effect on January 14, 2022.
It is important to note that this new Second Readopted ETS is not related to the federal OSHA ETS vaccination or testing requirement. The Cal/OSHA ETS was first adopted by Cal/OSHA in November 2020 while this Second Readopted ETS is an update to that existing standard that does not address the federal OSHA ETS at this time.
When federal OSHA implements an ETS, state plans like Cal/OSHA are required to either adopt the federal OSHA ETS standard or implement an additional ETS intended to be at least as effective—if not more protective—than the federal OSHA ETS. With the recent development in the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which dissolved the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s stay on enforcement of the federal OSHA ETS, it is anticipated that Cal/OSHA—along with the 21 other states with state OSHA plans—will soon adopt an additional ETS intended to comply with this requirement. That is, unless the Supreme Court of the United States reinstates a stay after the oral argument set on the federal OSHA ETS for January 7, 2022.
We highlight the forthcoming revisions to the Cal/OSHA Second Readopted ETS as compared with the current Cal/OSHA ETS in the following chart.
| Currently, under the Cal/OSHA ETS… | Effective January 14, 2022, under the Second Readopted ETS… | |
|---|---|---|
| COVID-19 Testing After Workplace Exposure | Employers are required to make COVID-19 testing available at no cost to employees who were exposed to COVID-19 in the workplace. However, there is an exception for employees who are fully vaccinated (definition below) before the close contact and asymptomatic. | Employers are required to make COVID-19 testing available at no cost to employees who were exposed to COVID-19 in the workplace, irrespective of vaccination status. |
| Testing Options | Limited guidance was provided regarding COVID-19 testing, stating only that a COVID-19 test means a viral test for SARS-CoV-2 that is approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or has an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) from the FDA to diagnose current infection with the virus. | Additional detail is provided, in line with the federal OSHA ETS testing specifics, which defines a COVID-19 test as a cleared, approved or authorized test, including an EUA by the FDA, to detect current infection that is administered in accordance with the instructions and is “not both self-administered and self-read unless observed by the employer or an authorized telehealth proctor.” |
| Face Covering Requirements | A surgical mask, medical procedure mask, voluntarily worn respirator or a tightly woven fabric or non-woven material of at least two layers with no visible holes or openings and that covers the nose and mouth. This does not include a scarf, ski mask, balaclava, bandana, turtleneck, collar or single layer of fabric. | In addition to the current Cal/OSHA ETS description, a face covering also must not let light pass through when held up to a light source, completely cover the nose and mouth, be secured to the head with ties, ear loops or elastic bands that go behind the head, have no slits or punctures and fit snugly over the mouth, nose and chin with no large gaps on the outside of the face. If gaiters are worn, they shall have two layers of fabric or be folded to make two layers. The definition now explicitly includes clear face coverings or cloth face coverings with clear plastic panels that, despite the non-cloth material allowing light to pass through, otherwise meets the definition and which may be used to facilitate communication with people who are deaf or hard-of-hearing or others who need to see a speaker’s mouth or facial expression to understand speech or sign language respectively. |
| Mask Accommodations | For all employees not fully vaccinated, they generally must wear masks except for limited exceptions, which includes employees who cannot wear a face covering due to a medical condition, mental health condition or disability. In such case, the employee must wear an effective non-restrictive alternative, such as a face shield with a drape on the bottom, if the condition or disability permits it. | In addition to the current Cal/OSHA ETS standard, extra detail has been added that if the employee’s medical or mental health condition or disability does not permit the employee to wear a non-restrictive alternative, the employee must be at least six feet apart from all other persons and either fully vaccinated or tested at least weekly for COVID-19 during paid time and at no cost to the employee. |
| Rules for Excluding Employees from the Workplace After “Close Contact” with a COVID-19 Positive Individual |
|
|
| Definition of Fully Vaccinated | “Fully vaccinated” means the person has received, at least 14 days prior, either the second dose in a two-dose COVID-19 vaccine series, a single dose COVID-19 vaccine that was FDA approved, an EUA from FDA or, for those vaccinated outside of the United States, listed for emergency use by the World Health Organization (WHO). | The definition of “fully vaccinated” has been updated to acknowledge that those receiving “mix-and-match” vaccines may still qualify. “Fully vaccinated” now means:
|
The Second Readopted ETS also maintains the majority of the Cal/OSHA ETS requirements in place. California employers must continue to maintain a COVID-19 prevention program that is effective, addresses, identifies and evaluates COVID-19 health hazards, provides for employee training on COVID-19 and other safety matters.
California employers should review their current Cal/OSHA ETS safety policies to ensure that their policy is updated with these latest changes by the January 14, 2022, implementation date. For assistance with these updates, you may contact the authors of this article or your McDermott lawyer for more information.
McDermott Will & Emery Law Clerk Paulina Chau contributed to this article.

Taxation of Pooled Cryptocurrency Investment Vehicles
ARTICLE
Taxation of Pooled Cryptocurrency Investment Vehicles
December 2021
Read time: 2 min
Partner, Andrea Kramer describes and exams the taxation of direct investments in cryptocurrency, derivatives and pooled investment vehicles that invest in cryptocurrency in Taxes – The Tax Magazine.

Validity of Non-Consensual Third-Party Releases Called into Question in Purdue Bankruptcy — But for How Long?
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Validity of Non-Consensual Third-Party Releases Called into Question in Purdue Bankruptcy — But for How Long?
December 22, 2021
Read time: 9 min
On Dec. 16, 2021, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon in the Southern District of New York vacated Purdue Pharma’s confirmed plan of reorganization after finding that the Bankruptcy Court below did not have statutory authority to issue a confirmation order granting non-consensual third-party releases — namely for the benefit of the Sackler family who owns Purdue. In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., Case No. 7:21-cv-08566 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2021).
Unlike the discharge of debts in chapter 11, a third-party release extinguishes claims between non-debtor entities to prevent post-confirmation claims from being asserted against the released party. Although third-party releases can be granted upon the consent of the releasing party, the propriety of non-consensual third-party releases has long been controversial and resulted in diverging precedent in various jurisdictions.
While the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have ruled that such releases are impermissible, they are often permitted in other Circuits including in the Southern District of New York and the District of Delaware. Even in those districts, however, bankruptcy judges have questioned the propriety and breadth of non-consensual third-party releases at times.
In this case, the District Court’s decision departs from many rulings in Bankruptcy Courts in the Southern District of New York, which have held that the Second Circuit generally permits non-consensual third-party releases upon the consideration of several factors. As discussed further below, Judge McMahon’s decision will not likely be the last word on the subject and may serve as the impetus for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue definitively.
Purdue Bankruptcy and Sackler Family Releases
Purdue is a privately held Delaware limited partnership that operates a branded prescription pharmaceutical business known for exacerbating the opioid crisis by falsely marketing OxyContin as non-addictive. In the aftermath of the crises, Purdue faced a litany of litigation that culminated in its chapter 11 bankruptcy. Purdue’s owners, some members of the Sackler family, also faced potential exposure to personal liability over OxyContin’s marketing. Between 2008 and 2017, some members of the Sackler family were alleged to have upstreamed approximately $10.4 billion from Purdue into spendthrift trusts and offshore companies to protect their personal finances.
As part of Purdue’s bankruptcy discussions, some members of the Sackler family agreed to contribute toward Purdue’s bankruptcy estate if each member received blanket releases discharging them of liability for all fraudulent transfer and other civil claims.
After a lengthy confirmation hearing, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Drain confirmed Purdue’s proposed plan, which included a provision releasing, discharging and enjoining all claims against, among others, Sackler family members that are “based on or related to the Debtors, their estates, or chapter 11 cases” and where the “conduct, omission or liability of any Debtor or any Estate is the legal cause or is otherwise a legally relevant factor” with respect to such claims. In exchange for these releases, some members of the Sackler family agreed to contribute $4.325 billion to resolve public and private claims against Purdue and to fund civil and criminal settlements with the federal government. In re Purdue Pharma L.P., 2021 WL 4240974, at *25.
Summary
The U.S. Trustee, attorneys general from several states and other parties appealed and attacked the legality of the plan’s non-consensual release of third-party claims against non-debtors by arguing on appeal to the District Court that the Bankruptcy Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and statutory authority to approve such releases.
As an initial matter, the District Court Judge Colleen McMahon held that the Bankruptcy Court had subject matter jurisdiction to approve the release. The District Court found that the release of claims against members of the Sackler family clearly affects Purdue’s estate because such a release may alter the distribution of estate assets, may alter estate liabilities, is interconnected with lawsuits against Purdue, and could deplete estate assets if Purdue is required to indemnify Sackler family members.
The District Court then turned to the permissibility of the release of direct third-party claims. Judge McMahon began this discussion with a caveat, distinguishing between “derivative” claims – those that “would render the Sacklers liable because of Purdues’ actions [as the Debtor],” because they seek to recover from the estate indirectly on the basis of the Debtor’s conduct – and direct claims, like the ones at issue on appeal – that “are not derivative of Purdue’s liability, but are based on the Sacklers’ own, individual liability, predicated on their own alleged misconduct and the breach of duties owed to claimants other than Purdue.” The District Court limited its discussion to the permissibility of non-consensual release of “direct” third-party claims arising out of the Sacklers’ own conduct.
After determining that the Bankruptcy Court had subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court held that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code allows bankruptcy courts to approve non-consensual releases of third-party claims against non-debtors.
Judge McMahon disagreed with Judge Drain’s reasoning that Bankruptcy Code sections 105(a), 1123(a)(5), 1123(b)(6) and 1129, together with residual authority under the Bankruptcy Code, give him the statutory authority to approve non-consensual third-party releases when necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Judge McMahon held that none of these sections create a substantive right to grant non-consensual third-party releases nor do they create a residual authority that authorizes a bankruptcy court to take such action.
Bankruptcy Code sections 1123(a) and (b) dictate what a plan of reorganization must and may contain. Section 1123(a)(5) provides that a plan must “provide adequate means for [its] implementation.” Judge McMahon noted that, while section 1123(a)(5) contains a laundry list of things that a plan can include to make sure resources are available for its implementation, “[i]njunctions against the prosecution of third-party claims against non-debtors, and the release of such claims, are nowhere to be found on that list.” Section 1123(b)(6) provides that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.”
However, Judge McMahon found that the non-consensual third-party releases contained in Purdue’s plan were inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code because they “discharge[] a non-debtor from debts that Congress specifically said could not be discharged by a debtor in bankruptcy,” namely claims for fraud, willful and/or malicious conduct. Thus, section 1123 did not grant the Bankruptcy Court authority to approve such releases. For the same reason, Judge McMahon found that section 1129(a)(1) did not provide any substantive authority for approving the releases under section 105(a) because it provides that a bankruptcy court “shall confirm a plan only if . . . the plan complies with the applicable provisions of this title.”
Consistent with this analysis, Judge McMahon also dismissed Purdue’s argument that non-consensual third-party releases are permissible so long as no provision of the Bankruptcy Code expressly prohibits them because the Court should not deem congressional silence as consent to expand what is allowable under the Bankruptcy Code.
It is important to note that, in her ruling, Judge McMahon finally noted that non-consensual third-party releases may be granted under “rare” circumstances; but that is not the case in practice because such releases are imbedded within almost all chapter 11 plans.
Takeaways and Implications
- In the immediate future, this decision will likely create uncertainty for all financial institutions and other regular bankruptcy participants that often rely on securing a release of third-party claims in exchange for their cooperation and/or funding of a debtor’s bankruptcy case. The ruling may also impact prospective debtors because, without the global finality that releases represent, there may be little reason for equity sponsors and lenders to contribute funds towards a settlement or other resolution of a bankruptcy.
- The District Court’s criticism, and ultimate rejection, of similar releases embedded in Purdue’s opioid settlement calls into question whether such relief is permissible in the Southern District of New York and potentially other jurisdictions that do not have controlling Circuit-level precedent. Accordingly, companies that are negotiating the structure of a bankruptcy with their existing creditors may (if venue is appropriate) seek to commence a chapter 11 case in a jurisdiction with greater certainty.
- Judge McMahon all but openly invited the Second Circuit and even the Supreme Court to weigh in by highlighting the long-standing conflict among the Circuits that have ruled on the permissibility of non-consensual third-party releases, a matter that Judge McMahon states “ought to be uniform throughout the country.” Judge McMahon dedicated a substantial portion of her 142-page ruling to assessing the text of the Bankruptcy Code, legislative history and conflicting case law from the Circuit courts in an attempt to synthesize some definitive guidance on this issue. While Judge McMahon concluded that no provision of the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes courts to grant non-consensual third-party releases, the decision also recognized that “the lower courts desperately need a clear answer” on this issue.
- Bankruptcy practitioners should keep a close eye on the progression of this appeal. Deutsche Bank A.G. v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.), 416 F. 3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Metromedia”) is often cited to justify a bankruptcy court’s authority to approve non-consensual third-party releases. However, the District Court observed that the Second Circuit failed to approve any third-party releases in Metromedia, and did not resolve the question of whether these releases are consistent with or authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.
- The release provision in Purdue’s plan did not contain a carve-out provision to preserve causes of action against members of the Sackler family for fraud or willfully malicious conduct, claims from which a debtor cannot be discharged in its own bankruptcy. The District Court could have ended the decision by requiring the addition of such a carve-out, which is standard practice. However, Judge McMahon took her decision one step further, deciding to address the propriety of non-consensual third-party releases generally.
Authored by Douglas S. Mintz, Kristine Manoukian, Peter J. Amend and Kelly (Bucky) Knight.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

Implications of the Sixth Circuit’s Whirlpool Opinion
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Implications of the Sixth Circuit’s Whirlpool Opinion
December 21, 2021
Read time: 12 min
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently issued its opinion in Whirlpool Financial Corporation & Consolidated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner,1 affirming the decision made by the US Tax Court. The Tax Court held that income derived by a controlled foreign corporation (CFC) was foreign base company sales income (FBCSalesI) under the regulatory manufacturing branch rule.2 While the Sixth Circuit’s majority decision would significantly expand the scope of the Subpart F branch rule, the opinion is best viewed as only affirming the Tax Court’s legal conclusion under the particular facts, and thus, the broad implications of the Court’s analysis are best viewed as dicta.
BACKGROUND
Under the facts, Whirlpool owned a Luxembourg CFC (Lux CFC) that had one administrative employee located in Luxembourg. Lux CFC owned a Mexican disregarded entity (Mex DE) that manufactured products for the Lux CFC pursuant to a toll manufacturing services arrangement using seconded employees of a related Mexican CFC. Lux CFC sold the products to related persons. Lux CFC owned the raw materials, work-in-process and finished goods, as well as the machinery and equipment used to manufacture the products—all of which were located in Mexico.
Mexico taxed the manufacturing service fee earned by the Mex DE. Under a Mexican Maquiladora incentive regime, Lux CFC was deemed to not have a taxable permanent establishment (PE) in Mexico, and thus, its income was not subject to taxation in Mexico. Luxembourg viewed Lux CFC as deriving its sales income through a Mexican PE, and under the income tax treaty with Mexico, taxed only income derived in Luxembourg for administrative services.
The Tax Court addressed the application of the manufacturing branch rule to the income derived by Lux CFC. For this purpose, the Tax Court treated Lux CFC’s income from selling products to related persons as not FBCSalesI under the general rule of Section 954(d)(1) because it assumed that the manufacturing exception applied. The Tax Court, however, granted summary judgment to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), holding that the income of Lux CFC not derived by the Mex DE was FBCSalesI under the regulatory manufacturing branch rule.
The taxpayer argued that the regulatory manufacturing branch rule was invalid because it was not provided for in Section 954(d)(2). The language of Section 954(d)(2) applies only to income derived by a foreign branch from purchasing or selling products and does not apply to income derived by the CFC in its home country. Nevertheless, the Tax Court concluded that the manufacturing branch rule in the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) regulations, which treats purchasing or selling income derived by a CFC’s home office as FBCSalesI, was a valid exercise of the Treasury’s authority in carrying out the Court’s view of the purpose of Section 954(d)(2) by providing a mirror rule to the purchasing or selling branch rule set forth in the Code. This conclusion is not surprising but nevertheless open to question under Supreme Court of the United States precedent, which holds that administrative regulations that go beyond the plain meaning of the statute are not entitled to deference.3
The taxpayer also argued that Lux CFC’s income was not subject to the regulatory manufacturing branch rule because Lux CFC did not carry on purchasing or selling activities in Luxembourg through its single administrative employee as required by the regulations.4
Without explicitly addressing the regulatory requirement that a CFC’s home office engage in “purchasing or selling activities,” the Tax Court concluded that because Lux CFC derived income from selling products, the regulatory manufacturing branch regulations applied. This conclusion is questionable because in addition to departing from the plain language of the regulations, it is inconsistent with the long-held view of the IRS and tax professionals that having purchasing or selling activities of employees in the home country (or another branch) is a requirement for the regulatory manufacturing branch rule to apply.5
The regulatory manufacturing branch rule applies only to income derived outside the branch’s country. While the Tax Court opinion acknowledges this rule, a critical factual question not addressed by the Tax Court in granting summary judgment was the amount of Lux CFC’s income that was derived by the home office in Luxembourg, and thus, was FBCSalesI under the manufacturing branch rule. The IRS has indicated that this determination is made under US arm’s length transfer pricing principles.6 All of Lux CFC’s value-driving functions were performed, and assets located, in Mexico, not Luxembourg, and thus, only a small portion of Lux CFC’s income might be FBCSalesI under the regulatory manufacturing branch rule (which would be consistent with the conclusion of the Luxembourg tax authorities).7
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S RULING
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s opinion, with a two-judge majority and one dissenting opinion which would have held for the taxpayer. However, the Sixth Circuit, based its conclusion solely on its interpretation of Section 954(d)(2) and not on the regulations. As a result, the opinion does not address the validity of the manufacturing branch regulations, nor the requirements in the regulations that must be met for a CFC to have FBCSalesI.
Section 954(d)(2) provides that if a CFC carries on activities through a foreign branch, the branch rule applies if the arrangement has “substantially the same effect as if such branch or similar establishment were a wholly owned subsidiary,” deriving the income attributable to the branch’s activities. The Sixth Circuit interprets that language as applying when the CFC’s income is subject to deferral (which would be the case with the income of any CFC branch structure that is not reported as FBCSalesI). The opinion then states that the amount of a CFC’s FBCSalesI income is not determined by reapplying the general definition of Section 954(d)(1) treating the branch as a separate CFC but rather that 100% of the CFC’s income, including the income of the manufacturing branch, would be FBCSalesI under Section 954(d)(2).
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Section 954(d)(2) is inconsistent with the uniform interpretation of that provision by the Treasury, the IRS, the Tax Court and tax professionals for over 50 years (as discussed in the dissenting opinion) and is not supported by the legislative history discussing the branch rule. Importantly, the majority’s interpretation is fundamentally contrary to the manufacturing branch regulations.
Under the manufacturing branch regulations, if a CFC manufactures products in a foreign branch, the arrangement is treated as having “substantially the same tax effect as if such branch or similar establishment were a wholly owned subsidiary” only if the income derived by the home office from purchasing or selling activities meets a tax rate disparity test (i.e., is subject to a materially lower tax rate than if the income were subject to tax in the branch’s country). In addition, the regulations provide that income derived by the CFC in the manufacturing branch’s country is not FBCSalesI under the regulations because, if such income had been derived by a separate CFC, it would qualify for the manufacturing exception or same-country-of-manufacture exception. Furthermore, while purchasing or selling income derived by the home office of a CFC generally would be FBCSalesI, it is not FBCSalesI if the home office also satisfies the manufacturing exception or the products are sold for use in the CFC’s country. While the majority opinion acknowledges these limiting rules in the regulations—and that Section 954(d)(2) states that the consequences of Section 954(d)(2) are to be prescribed by regulations—the majority opinion indicates that, to the extent the regulations would narrow the majority’s new interpretation of Section 954(d)(2), they are invalid.
The Sixth Circuit majority seemed particularly offended by the fact that no current tax was paid on income not derived by the Mex DE. This is far from an unusual result for US multinationals operating outside the United States, and, for many years, CFC structures providing zero or low-taxed income have been recognized by US Congress, the Treasury and the IRS, and upheld by the courts, as entirely permissible under Subpart F.8 The obvious truth is that when Congress enacted the FBCSalesI rules in 1962, it could not have contemplated all of the planning structures that would develop over the next 50 years. The courts have consistently stated that Congress needs to amend the law to subject to taxation zero-taxed or low-taxed income of CFCs that falls outside the plain meaning definition of Subpart F income.9 In the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Congress changed the law in response to such structures, subjecting essentially all of a CFC’s income to current US taxation under a new current-inclusion regime.10
The dissenting opinion would have held for the taxpayer. The dissenting judge would apply the rules in the regulations and hold that, once it is concluded that the branch rule applies, the amount of FBCSalesI would be determined by reapplying Section 954(d)(1), treating the branch as a separate CFC. The dissent concluded that the income of Lux CFC was derived from the manufacture of the products (or at least there was a question of material fact precluding summary judgment), and therefore, no portion of Lux CFC’s income would be FBCSalesI under the manufacturing exception.
WHAT’S NEXT
The Sixth Circuit’s decision may not be the last word on the Whirlpool case. The taxpayer has an option to file a petition for rehearing en banc, which may be entertained by the entire Sixth Circuit in light of the split panel. The taxpayer may also petition the Supreme Court to hear the case, which is unlikely.
The Sixth Circuit’s majority opinion in Whirlpool should not have implications for the application of the branch rule provided by Section 954(d)(2) beyond the specific facts of the case and the Tax Court’s opinion applying the regulatory manufacturing branch rule. McDermott’s Tax team is unaware of a court ever denying a taxpayer the ability to rely on final Treasury regulations, let alone ones that have been in effect for over 50 years. Taxpayers operating through branches of CFCs should be able to rely on the rules in the branch regulations, including the tax rate disparity requirement, the manufacturing exception and the same-country exceptions, and that only the amount of purchasing or selling income derived outside a manufacturing branch’s country is potentially FBCSalesI. Taxpayers outside the Sixth Circuit (or taxpayers in the Sixth Circuit filing in the Court of Federal Claims) with facts similar to Whirlpool might consider challenging an IRS proposed adjustment because the Tax Court’s decision is questionable in (1) upholding the validity of the manufacturing branch regulations, (2) eviscerating the requirement in the regulations that the CFC’s home office carry on purchasing or selling activities with respect to products manufactured by the branch and (3) not attributing any portion of the income, other than the amount derived by the Mex DE, to the manufacturing branch’s country, where all of the CFC’s value-driving functions were performed and assets were located.
1 Nos. 20-1899/1900 (6th Cir. 2021), aff’g 154 T.C. 142 (2020).
2 Treas. Reg. §1.954-3(b).
3 See, e.g., Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9 (1984); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–227 (2001). Courts have applied this principle specifically to tax regulations. See, e.g., Walton v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 589, 598–599 (2000); Iglesias v. United States, 848 F.2d 362, 366–367 (2d Cir. 1988).
4 Treas. Reg. §1.954-3(b)(1)(ii)(b) and (c), (2)(i)(c) and (ii)(c) (1964); Treas. Reg. §1.954-3(b)(1)(i) and (ii) and (2) (2009).
5 See, e.g., TAM 8509004.
6 AM 2015-002 (Feb. 13, 2015), n. 19.
7 The dissenting opinion to the Sixth Circuit majority opinion may have arrived at a similar view and therefore would have held that Lux CFC’s income qualified for the manufacturing exception provided in the branch regulations. See also Treas. Reg. §1.954-3(b)(4), Ex. 3 (where all manufacturing and selling activities occurred in the country where the CFC operated through a foreign branch, none of the branch’s income was FBCSalesI because it qualified for the manufacturing exception, even though 90% of the income was not subject to tax).
8 See, e.g., Ashland Oil v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 348, 357-58 (1990); Vetco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 579 (1990). In Vetco, the sales income was earned by a Swiss CFC that hired a related U.K. CFC to engage in all of the supply chain activities, and the Swiss CFC itself had no employees. The Tax Court refused the IRS’s exhortations to “look past [the taxpayer’s] ‘contractual wizardry’ and apply the branch rule as a loophole-closing device to circumvent [the taxpayer’s] attempted tax avoidance,” because the government’s arguments lacked a basis in the language of the Code or regulations. See also Brown Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 1996), vacating and remanding 104 T.C. 105 (1995) (sales income derived by a Cayman Islands CFC—that was not subject to tax in any country—was not Subpart F income because the income did not fall within the statutory or regulatory definition of foreign base company sales income).
9 In Lovett v. United States, 621 F.2d 1130 (Ct. Cl. 1980), the taxpayer argued that a regulation issued under Subpart F was invalid because it lacked support from the language of the Code. The government argued that the Subpart F regulation was “necessary to avoid the ‘absurd’ results which flow from a literal application of the language of §951(d).” The court rejected the government’s argument and held the regulation invalid, stating that: “Neither we nor the Commissioner may rewrite the statute simply because we may feel that the scheme it creates could be improved upon.” Id. at 1140 (quoting United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 357 (1957)).
10 Sections 951A and 250.

Regulated Funds: SEC Final Rule Declines to Apply Universal Proxy Card Mandate to Regulated Funds
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Regulated Funds: SEC Final Rule Declines to Apply Universal Proxy Card Mandate to Regulated Funds
December 21, 2021
Read time: 6 min
On Nov. 17, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted final rules requiring participants in contested director elections to use universal proxy cards that include all director nominees presented for election at a shareholder meeting (“Rules”).[1] The Rules allow for shareholders voting by proxy to vote for a combination of director nominees from competing slates, just as they could at an in-person meeting. Notably, consistent with the 2016 Proposing Release,[2] the Rules as adopted do not apply to solicitations for contested elections involving registered investment companies registered under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) or business development companies as defined by Section 2(a)(48) of the 1940 Act (“BDCs,” together with registered investment companies, “Regulated Funds”).[3]
The SEC noted in the Adopting Release that it continues to consider whether the Rules should apply to some or all Regulated Funds.[4] In reaching its decision to exclude Regulated Funds from the Rules, the SEC considered various comments, many of which focused on the differences between Regulated Funds and operating companies, the unique governance structures of funds, and the different structures of open and closed-ended funds.[5] The below outlines significant areas of attention for commenters observed in the Adopting Release[6]:
- A significant number of commenters supported excluding Regulated Funds from the mandate in view of purported differences between Regulated Funds and operating companies, mainly relating to the protections those commenters believed investors in such Regulated Funds enjoyed under federal securities laws, including the 1940 Act, and various state corporate law provisions that provide shareholders the right to approve certain fundamental fund features in certain cases.
- In contrast, other commenters supported the application of the mandate to Regulated Funds, in the manner suggested in the Reopening Release, on the basis that excluding Regulated Funds would continue to make it difficult for investors to enact change when necessary. Such commenters focused particularly on the large number of retail investors in these funds.
- Several commenters also argued that split-ticket voting would disrupt the unitary and cluster board structures that are commonly utilized by funds, resulting in additional administrative complexities, the cost of which would ultimately fall to fund shareholders. In contrast, one commenter in favor of applying the mandate to Regulated Funds called into question whether the use of unitary and cluster board structures actually benefits Regulated Funds and their shareholders, while another argued that allowing shareholders to promote the nominees of their choosing should be considered before any purported administrative efficiency.
- Finally, other commenters pointed out that, given the organizational complexities of and the rarity of contested elections involving open-ended registered funds, universal proxies were not necessary for those types of Regulated Funds.
The SEC’s decision to not apply the Rules to Regulated Funds, despite suggesting it may do so in the Reopening Release, continues an apparent trend at the SEC away from regulatory positions that may tend to encourage activism within the Regulated Fund space, particularly with respect to registered closed-end funds and BDCs. Notably, the SEC’s withdrawal of the Boulder no-action letter in 2020,[7] which opened the door towards the adoption of a wider scope of anti-takeover provisions at Regulated Funds, continues to impact the scope and nature of shareholder activism within the Regulated Fund space generally. While the language included in the Reopening Release suggested that the pendulum may be swinging back towards a more neutral position, the SEC’s determination to omit Regulated Funds from the universal proxy mandate set forth in the Rules likely means that the Regulated Fund space will continue to remain challenging for less sophisticated shareholder activists in the short term. Those trends do not foreclose opportunities for activism in the Regulated Funds space, however, but rather emphasize the need for sophisticated counsel to navigate both potential regulatory hurdles and opportunities.
Authored by Shaina L. Maldonado.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] See “Universal Proxy,” Exchange Act Release No. 34-93596 (Nov. 17, 2021), available here (“Adopting Release”).
[2] In 2016, the SEC proposed rule amendments to mandate the use of universal proxy cards in contested director elections (“Proposing Release”). See “Universal Proxy,” Exchange Act Release No. 34-79164 (Nov. 10, 2016), available here. In 2021, in light of developments since the publication of the Proposing Release, the SEC reopened the comment period for the Proposing Release allowing commentators to provide additional comments and analysis, including on, among other topics, the desirability of extending the universal proxy mandate applicable to Regulated Funds (the “Reopening Release”). See “Reopening of Comment Period for Universal Proxy,” Exchange Act Release No. 34-91603 (May 6, 2021), available here.
[3] See Exchange Act Release No. 34-93596 at 10-11 and 67.
[4] See id. at 67.
[5] See id. at 65-67.
[6] See id.
[7] In 2010, the SEC released a no-action letter to Boulder Total Return Fund (“Boulder Letter”), stating that by opting into a state statute that limits the voting rights of control shares, a closed-end fund would be operating in a manner inconsistent with Section 18(i) of the 1940 Act. See Boulder Letter, SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 15, 2010) (withdrawn May 27, 2020), available here. In 2020, the SEC withdrew the Boulder Letter, taking the position, that under certain circumstances, a closed-end fund may opt into a state control share statute without risking an enforcement action against the fund under Section 18(i).
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.