Content Type: Article

  • Digital Health Laws & Regulations 2022: Germany

    Digital Health Laws & Regulations 2022: Germany

    ARTICLE

    Digital Health Laws & Regulations 2022: Germany

    March 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    ICLG’s unmissable, comprehensive guide to the field of Digital Health contains everything you need to know about digital health and healthcare, including regulatory issues, data use, data sharing, health technology, health IP, commercial agreements and AI & machine learning.

    Our German healthcare team contributed the Germany chapter of the guide, which covers everything businesses should know to place themselves strategically within the sector, and look ahead to burgeoning opportunities.

    Read the full chapter, “Digital Health Laws and Regulations Germany 2025.”

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Digital Health Laws & Regulations 2022: France

    Digital Health Laws & Regulations 2022: France

    ARTICLE

    Digital Health Laws & Regulations 2022: France

    March 2022

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    ICLG’s unmissable, comprehensive guide to the field of Digital Health contains everything you need to know about digital health and healthcare, including regulatory issues, data use, data sharing, health technology, health IP, commercial agreements and AI & machine learning.

    Our French healthcare team contributed the France chapter of the guide, which covers everything businesses should know to place themselves strategically within the sector, and look ahead to burgeoning opportunities.

    Read the full chapter, “Digital Health Laws and Regulations France 2025.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Caroline Noyrez

    Associate

    Paris

    More insights

  • Ukraine Crisis: European Union Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia and Belarus

    Ukraine Crisis: European Union Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia and Belarus

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ukraine Crisis: European Union Imposes Additional Sanctions on Russia and Belarus

    February 28, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On 24 and 25 February 2022, the European Union (EU) imposed additional extensive sanctions on Russia—and new ones on Belarus—in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this On the Subject, our trade and sanctions team provides an update on the newly imposed sanctions as well as a brief overview of existing EU sanctions against Russia. For more information on the global response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, please see our previous client alert, “Russian invasion of Ukraine triggers global sanctions: What businesses need to know.”

    In depth

    Further Financial and Economic Restrictions on Russia

    On 25 February 2022, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/328. Regulation (EU) 2022/328 amends Regulation (EU) 833/2014 and expands the existing financial and economic restrictions, imposing wide-ranging sanctions aimed at cutting off Russian access to the most important capital markets and economic restrictions targeting the Russian defence, energy and aviation sectors. Specifically, the new measures include:

    • A prohibition of listing and provision of services in relation to shares of 12 additional Russian state-owned entities (Alfa Bank, Bank Otkritie, Bank Rossiya, Promsvyazbank, Almaz-Antey, Kamaz, Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port, Rostec (Russian Technologies State Corporation), Russian Railways, JSC PO Sevmash, Sovcomflot and United Shipbuilding Corporation) on EU trading venues;
    • A prohibition on the provision of financial assistance for trade with, or investment in, Russia, with limited exceptions such as in relation to financial commitments established before 26 February 2022; financial assistance for up to €10,000,000 to EU small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); or financing trade in food, agricultural, medical or humanitarian purposes;
    • A ban on the acceptance of deposits exceeding a total value of €100,000 from Russian nationals or residents, subject to certain exceptions. Without prejudice to the rules on reporting, confidentiality and professional secrecy, credit institutions will also be required to supply competent Member State authorities with a list of all deposits exceeding €100,000 held by Russian nationals or residents by 27 May 2022 and provide updates on the amounts of such deposits every 12 months;
    • A prohibition of holding accounts of Russian clients by the EU Central Securities Depositories;
    • A ban on selling Euro-denominated securities issued after 12 April 2022 to Russian individual or entities;
    • Further restrictions on the exports of dual-use goods and technologies and on the provision of related services, as well as restrictions on exports of certain goods and technologies which might contribute to Russia’s technological enhancement of its defence and security sectors;
    • A prohibition on the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of specific goods and technologies for use in oil refining, together with restrictions on the provision of related services. These prohibitions will not apply to the execution until 27 May 2022 of contracts concluded before 26 February 2022 (as well as ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts); and
    • An export ban on goods and technologies suited for use in the aviation and space industry, and prohibition on the provision of technical and financial assistance, insurance, reinsurance and maintenance services in relation to those goods and technologies. However, these prohibitions will not apply to the execution until 28 March 2022 of contracts for the provision of certain goods concluded before 26 February 2022 (as well as ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts).

    Targeted Sanctions on Russian Entities and Individuals

    The European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/330 and Regulation (EU) 2022/332, amending Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and imposing individual sanctions targeting:

    • Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov;
    • Members of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation who supported Russia’s immediate recognition of the two non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine as independent entities; and
    • The remaining members of the Russian State Duma who were not already subject to sanctions.

    The targeted sanctions freeze the assets of listed individuals and prohibit EU operators from making economic resources available to or for the benefit of listed persons. The prohibitions are broad in scope; the European Commission issued an opinion clarifying that making payments to third-country intermediaries for goods originating from a non-listed entity that is controlled by a listed individual can be considered as making funds indirectly available to the designated person.

    All sanctions announced on 25 February 2022 have been be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and have taken immediate effect.

    Further Developments

    In a joint press statement on 26 February 2022, the leaders of the European Commission, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States announced their intention to implement additional restrictive economic measures, including removing selected Russian banks from the SWIFT messaging system. This would result in Russian banks being disconnected from the international financial system, harming their ability to operate globally.

    European Sanctions Against Belarus

    On 24 February 2022, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/300, which amends Regulation (EU) 765/2006. The restrictive measures set out therein include a visa ban and asset freezes of President Alexander Lukashenko and certain officials of Belarus. Likewise, on 24 February 2022, the European Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/307, which amends Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012. This Decision included:

    • A ban of sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related material of all types;
    • An EU-wide travel ban for the listed individuals; and
    • An asset freeze and a prohibition of making funds available to the listed individuals and entities.

    The Council decided that the targeted sanctions detailed above should be renewed until 28 February 2023. Regulation (EU) 2022/300 and Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/307 are not direct reactions to Belarus’ involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, they must be considered in the current situation.

    On 17 February 2022, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2022/212, which amends Regulation (EU) 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus. Originally, this regulation was issued in response to the forced landing of a Ryanair flight in Minsk on 23 May 2021 for the arrest of journalist Raman Pratasevich by Belarusian authorities. The decree is thus not a direct reaction to Belarus’ involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, it must be considered in the current situation.

    The financial and economic sanctions against Belarus set out by Regulation (EU) 765/2006 (as amended) include:

    • A prohibition to sell, supply, transfer or export—directly or indirectly—equipment, technology or software primarily intended for the monitoring or interception of internet and telephone communications, as well as dual-use goods and technology for military use, to certain persons, entities or bodies in Belarus;
    • A prohibition to purchase, import or transfer petroleum products and gaseous hydrocarbon products directly or indirectly from Belarus;
    • A restriction of access to the EU-capital markets; and
    • A prohibition on providing insurance and reinsurance to the Belarusian government and Belarusian public institutions and agencies.

    ***

    HOW WE CAN HELP

    If you have assets in Russia or business dealings with Russian entities or individuals (even if they are not listed as “designated persons”), or are concerned about the impact of new sanctions against Russia, please reach out to our lawyers for advice.

    Raminta Dereskeviciute (London); Sabine Naugès (Paris); Alexa Ningelgen (Düsseldorf); David J. Levine (Washington, DC); Alan Kashdan (Washington, DC); Raymond Paretzky (Washington, DC)

    Authors

    Ludovica Rabitti

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Raminta Dereskeviciute

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Dr. Alexa Ningelgen

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Protects Registrations against Unknown Inaccuracies of Facts or Law

    Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Protects Registrations against Unknown Inaccuracies of Facts or Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Copyright Act’s Safe Harbor Protects Registrations against Unknown Inaccuracies of Facts or Law

    February 28, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Supreme Court of the United States held that lack of factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under a safe harbor contained in the Copyright Act. As a result, an applicant’s inadvertent mistake of fact or law in applying for a copyright does not render the subsequent copyright registration invalid. Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., No. 20-915 (Feb. 24, 2022). Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, with a dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas in which Justice Alito joined in full and Justice Gorsuch joined in part.

    In depth

    BACKGROUND

    The copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A-B), states that a certificate of registration is valid regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information unless:

    • The inaccurate information was included on the application with knowledge that it was inaccurate.
    • The inaccuracy of the information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse registration.

    Unicolors obtained a jury verdict against H&M for copyright infringement. After the trial, H&M filed for judgment as a matter of law that the copyright registration was invalid because Unicolors failed to comply with certain requirements of copyright law. Specifically, H&M argued that Unicolors did not meet the US Copyright Office’s regulation that a single application may cover multiple works only if they were “included in the same unit of publication” because Unicolors filed a single application seeking registration for 31 separate designs. H&M asserted that Unicolors did not meet this requirement because Unicolors initially made some of the 31 designs available for sale exclusively to certain customers while offering the rest to the general public. The district court denied the motion, finding that Unicolors did not know of the inaccuracies when it submitted the application. H&M appealed.

    On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a decision overturning the district court. The appellate court rejected the district court’s requirement that H&M demonstrate that Unicolors intended to defraud the Copyright Office at the time of its application filing. The appellate court held that once a defendant alleges that (1) a plaintiff’s certificate of registration contains inaccurate information, (2) “the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration” and (3) the inaccurate information was included on the application “with knowledge that it was inaccurate,” a district court is required to submit a request to the Register of Copyrights “to advise the court whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused [it] to refuse registration.” Unicolors petitioned for certiorari.

    SUPREME COURT DECISION

    The initial question presented to the Supreme Court was whether “the Ninth Circuit erred in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work at issue in the subject copyright registration?” During briefing, however, Unicolors changed the question to “whether the ‘knowledge’ element precludes a challenge to a registration where the inaccuracy resulted from the applicant’s good-faith misunderstanding of a principle of copyright law” (rather than a mistake of fact). Justice Thomas was not pleased with this change, stating in dissent that he “would not reward Unicolors for its legerdemain, and because no other court had, before today, ever addressed whether §411(b)(1)(A) requires “’actual knowledge.’” Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined Justice Thomas in dissent, noting that Unicolors’ arguments were not, as originally presented, meant to resolve a circuit split, but rather presented novel questions of copyright law that no other court had previously addressed. However, the Court found that the petition asked it to decide whether a registration may be invalidated even though there are no “indicia of fraud,” which, in turn, includes an analysis of a “knowing misrepresentation.” The Court found that the “knowledge” question was a “subsidiary question fairly included” in the petition’s question and previously addressed by the Ninth Circuit.

    Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court, beginning with an ornithological analogy. The analogy begins with a birdwatcher mistakenly labeling a scarlet tanager as a northern cardinal. The birdwatcher may not have seen the relevant features, or they may not have known what specific features are different. In either case, it is a labeling mistake. Similarly, Unicolors stated that when it submitted its copyright application, it was not aware that its collection of multiple designs sold separately to different parties did not satisfy the “single unit of publication” legal requirement for including all designs in a single unit copyright registration. Therefore, Unicolors mistakenly labeled its 31 designs as a single publication. The Court found this explanation satisfactory to rely on the safe harbor provided by §411(b)(1)(A) and noted that “if Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered the information in its application inaccurate, it did not include that information in its application with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The Court found nothing in the statute that suggests this conclusion should be any different if the mistake was one of fact or law.

    Conversely, the Supreme Court found ample support in nearby statutory provisions to confirm that the “knowledge” element applies to knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, noting that inaccurate information in a copyright registration is equally likely to arise from a mistake of law as a mistake of fact—particularly where the applicants include creative artists (like poets and painters) without legal training. The Court found further support in numerous provisions contained in the Copyright Act, suggesting that if US Congress intended to impose a scienter standard other than actual knowledge it would have said so explicitly. The Court further pointed to cases decided before Congress enacted §411, where courts overwhelmingly held that inadvertent mistakes on registration certificates did not invalidate a copyright. Legislative history was also persuasive to the Court, noting that Congress intended §411 to make it easier for non-lawyers to obtain valuable copyright registrations, which provide a copyright holder with “important legal advantages, including the right to bring a ‘civil action for infringement’ of the copyrighted work.”

    Addressing H&M’s argument that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute will make it too easy for copyright holders to claim lack of knowledge to avoid the consequences of an inaccurate application, the Court described many factors the lower courts may use to analyze such cases. The Court also explained that no court is required to automatically accept a copyright holder’s claims of lack of knowledge, stating “willful blindness may support a finding of actual knowledge,” as will circumstantial evidence, the significance of the legal error, the complexity of the relevant rule and the applicant’s experience with copyright law. The Court further rejected H&M’s argument that “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” noting that this legal maxim does not apply in a civil case concerning the scope of a statutory safe harbor provision arising from ignorance of collateral legal requirements.

    The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. Following the decision, counsel for H&M stated “[t]he existing testimony shows Unicolors was, at best, willfully blind to the requirement that all works in a group application be published together. H&M appreciates the dissenting justices’ acknowledgement that Unicolors abandoned its original position. On remand, we remain committed to challenging the validity of Unicolors’ copyright, and we are looking ahead to the next phase of litigation.”

    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

    Jodi Benassi

    Partner

    San Francisco

    More insights

  • Sanctions Update: US Imposes Sweeping Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus

    Sanctions Update: US Imposes Sweeping Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: US Imposes Sweeping Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus

    February 28, 2022

    Read time: 25 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Feb. 24, 25 and 28, 2022, President Biden and the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced expansive sanctions on Russia in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[1] In doing so, the United States joins countries and other organizations throughout the world in condemning Russia’s aggression through economic measures. The latest sanctions continue to target Russia’s financial sector and access to capital markets with designations of dozens of individuals and entities, including the Russian Central Bank, several large publicly traded Russian banks and companies, Russia’s sovereign wealth fund and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Along with these actions, President Biden also announced sanctions against Belarus and trade restrictions on Russian exports.

    The Russian sanctions situation remains in flux. Additional sanctions are highly likely. Global leaders reached an agreement over the weekend on removing several Russian banks from the SWIFT payment network and the White House issued a statement confirming that the U.S. is “commit[ted] to ensuring that selected Russian banks are removed from the SWIFT messaging system.”[2]

    The Russian sanctions issued to date are unusually complex. In some instances, OFAC has prohibited all dealings by U.S. persons with designated individuals and entities; in other instances only certain types of dealings are prohibited. Along with the sanctions, OFAC issued a series of General Licenses (“GLs”) creating exceptions to the prohibitions, including, in some instances, giving U.S. persons time to exit relationships with prohibited persons and also released guidance explaining the scope of the sanctions. In light of the rapidly evolving and complex nature of this sanctions program, firms are advised to approach transactions in Russian-related securities or involving Russian persons with caution.  

    Restrictions on Transactions with the Russian Central Bank

    This morning, OFAC issued Directive 4, prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in “any transaction involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russia Federation.”[3] This action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024, which authorizes OFAC to issue sanctions against political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the Russian government.[4]

    Directive 4 does not provide a definition of what a transaction “involving” these entities consists of, nor has OFAC yet issued any guidance concerning the Directive. But Directive 4 does specify that “any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities” is prohibited.[5] At the same time, pursuant to GL 8A, OFAC has exempted from the prohibition in Directive 4 transactions “related to energy” with the Russian Central Bank, up through June 23, 2022.[6] In today’s announcement, OFAC said it will “follow with other authorizations and guidance as needed.”[7]   

    Under this Directive, neither the Russian Central Bank nor the National Wealth Fund or Ministry of Finance has been designated as a Specially Designated National and Blocked Person (“SDN”). Therefore, U.S. persons are not at this time required to block assets of these entities that are in, or may come into, their possession. While U.S. persons are broadly prohibited from engaging in any “transaction involving” these entities, all other activities with these entities, or involving their property or interests in property, are specifically permitted unless otherwise prohibited by law.[8]

    Designation of Russian Financial Institutions as SDNs

    OFAC added several Russian financial institutions to its Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (“SDN List”).[9] The newly designated SDNs include VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company (“VTB Bank”), Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie (“Otkritie”)[10], Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company (“Sovcombank”) and Joint Stock Commercial Bank Novikombank (“Novikombank”).[11] Each has operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy, as determined by OFAC, and is therefore subject to being blocked under E.O. 14024.[12] Together with the Feb. 22, 2022 designation of State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank (“VEB”) and Promsvyazbank Public Joint Stock Company (“PSB”) as SDNs,[13] OFAC has now imposed full blocking sanctions on a total of six Russian banks, as well as numerous of their subsidiaries.

    As a general matter, U.S. persons are prohibited from all transactions with individuals or entities on OFAC’s SDN List, and any property owned by an SDN that is currently possessed or controlled by a U.S. person cannot be “transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in” (i.e., the property is blocked).[14] Under OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule,” this block extends to any entity in which an SDN has a 50% or greater ownership interest, whether direct or indirect.[15] As with most designations, U.S. persons are also prohibited from structuring transactions in a manner designed to circumvent sanctions.[16] 

    However, in conjunction with these designations, OFAC has issued several GLs that permit, for specified periods of time, certain transactions involving certain of these Russian bank SDNs. These GLs authorize transactions only with four of the six SDNs: VEB, VTB, Otkritie and Sovcombank (as well as any entities in which they have a 50% or greater ownership interest).[17] To understand the current impact of the sanctions on these SDNs and trading in their securities, it is necessary to consider these GLs as well.[18]

    Energy-Related Transactions

    GL 8A permits transactions “related to energy” with VEB, VTB, Otkritie and Sovcombank through June 23, 2022.[19] OFAC goes on to provide an expansive definition of “related to energy,” which includes all aspects of petroleum, gas, oil and other similar products.[20]

    It should be noted that GL 8A only permits energy-related transactions with the entities specified in the license — not with any other Russian entities who may be subject to sanctions. For example, pursuant to E.O. 13662 issued by President Obama following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, U.S. persons are prohibited from providing certain forms of support for deep-water, Arctic offshore or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in Russia.[21] Those sanctions remain in place.

    Wind-Down of Transactions with Blocked Entities

    GL 11, together with GL 3 issued on Feb. 22, gives U.S. persons 30 days to engage in transactions “ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions” involving VEB, VTB, Otkritie and Sovcombank.[22] In the case of VEB, this authorization expires on March 23, 2022.[23] In the case of VTB, Otkritie and Sovcombank, the authorization expires on March 25, 2022.[24]

    Additionally, GL 12 allows U.S. persons, during this one-month period, to “reject” transactions with VTB, Otkritie and Sovcombank, instead of “blocking” transactions as is normally required with an SDN. [25] OFAC has not, however, issued any similar GL allowing for transactions with VEB to be rejected rather than blocked.

    Transactions Related to Dealings in Debt or Equity

    GL 9 provides a divestment period for otherwise prohibited transactions that are incident and necessary to dealings in debt or equity of VEB, VTB, Otkritie and Sovcombank issued prior to Feb. 24, 2022, “provided that any divestment or transfer of, or facilitation of divestment or transfer of, covered debt or equity must be to a non-U.S. person[.]”[26] The divestment period lasts through May 24, 2022.[27] In addition, to allow the closing of trades initiated before the specified SDNs were blocked, GL 9 explicitly authorizes facilitating, clearing and settling such trades through May 24, 2022, provided that the trade was placed before 4:00 p.m. EST on Feb. 24, 2022, including debits to accounts on the books of U.S. financial institutions of the GL 9 covered entities.[28]

    In an FAQ, OFAC has clarified how these sanctions impact U.S. funds and investors. U.S. funds cannot buy, sell or otherwise engage in transactions related to the debt or equity securities of the Russian bank SDNs and must block such holdings, “unless authorized under GL 9” (or otherwise authorized by OFAC). As long as blocked holdings held by the fund represent “less than a predominant share by value” of debt or equity of the blocked person, then the fund itself is not considered a blocked entity. Thus, U.S. funds may continue to operate, and U.S. persons may continue to invest in funds that hold the blocked securities. To avoid having to block the securities (and file a blocked property report with OFAC), the fund may divest itself of the holdings consistent with GL 9 by selling them to a non-U.S. person by May 24, 2022.[29]

    Notably, OFAC explicitly authorizes U.S. persons, including financial institutions, registered broker-dealers, securities exchanges and other market intermediaries and participants, to rely on information available to them in the ordinary course of business, “including reasonable reliance on information about the underlying transaction provided by the parties.”[30]

    GL 10 provides a wind-down period for transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to wind down derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. EST on Feb. 24, 2022 that either include VEB, VTB, Otkritie or Sovcombank or are linked to debt or equity of VEB, VTB, Otkritie or Sovcombank. This wind-down period also lasts through May 24, 2022.[31] Notably, these activities are only permitted if any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account. Debits to accounts on the books of U.S. financial institutions of blocked entities are authorized to the extent necessary to effect transactions permitted under this GL.[32]

    Similar to GL 9, OFAC permits U.S. persons to rely on reasonable information provided in the ordinary course of business in determining whether transactions are authorized pursuant to GL 10.[33]

    It should be noted that VEB and VTB, as well as numerous of their subsidiaries, have been subject to sanctions since 2014 pursuant to E.O. 13662 and appear on OFAC’s Sectoral Sanctions Identification (“SSI”) List. The 2014 sanctions forbid U.S. persons from engaging in transactions related to new equity or debt of certain maturities issued by VEB or VTB after the date of their designations to the SSI List. Those sanctions remain in effect and the authorizations in the GLs described above only affect VEB’s and VTB’s designations as SDNs under E.O. 14024, not their status as SSIs under E.O. 13662.[34]

    Prohibitions on Debt and Equity Transactions for Other Russian Entities

    In addition, OFAC has issued Directive 3 under E.O. 14024, restricting 13 other Russian companies from accessing the equity and debt markets. Directive 3 prohibits transacting, financing or otherwise dealing in certain new debt and equity of entities listed in Annex 1 to Directive 3.[35] Specifically, U.S. persons are no longer permitted to transact in, finance or deal in new debt of longer than 14 days maturity or new equity of these entities if such debt or equity is issued on or after March 26, 2022.[36] Directive 3 further prohibits “any transaction that evades or avoids, . . . causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any prohibitions” and “any conspiracy formed to violate any the prohibitions of this Directive.”[37]

    Annex 1 of Directive 3 lists 13 major firms, including six financial institutions and companies critical to the Russian economy,[38] determined to “operate or have operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy, or are owned or controlled by . . . the Government of the Russian Federation” (the “Directive 3 Covered Entities”).[39] The companies listed in Annex 1 are:

    • Credit Bank of Moscow Public Joint Stock Company
    • Gazprombank Joint Stock Company
    • Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank
    • Joint Stock Company Russian Agricultural Bank
    • Joint Stock Company Sovcomflot
    • Open Joint Stock Company Russian Railways
    • Public Joint Stock Company Alrosa
    • Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom
    • Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft
    • Public Joint Stock Company Rostelecom
    • Public Joint Stock Company Rushydro
    • Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia
    • Public Joint Stock Company Transneft

    Directive 3 Covered Entities are subject to the 50 Percent Rule, so the restrictions set forth in Directive 3 also apply to those subsidiaries 50% or more owned directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, by one or more of these companies.[40]

    “Debt” as defined for purposes of Directive 3 includes “bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper.” OFAC has also clarified that debt includes the rollover of existing debt, assuming such rollover results in the creation of new debt with a maturity of longer than 14 days. For debt that takes the form of revolving credit facilities or long-term loan agreements, as long as those agreements were entered into prior to the effective date of the sanctions, drawdowns and disbursements are permitted only if they either (1) have repayment terms of 14 days or less or (2) have contractually-agreed terms that pre-dated the sanctions effective date and are not modified thereafter. 

    “Equity” includes “stocks, share issuances, depositary receipts or any other evidence or title or ownership.” 

    Directive 3 leaves open the possibility that additional entities may be named in Annex 1. If so, the same provisions will come into effect 30 days after the date of the additions.  

    The prohibitions in Directive 3 mirror the restrictions on trading newly issued debt or equity of Russian companies previously designated by OFAC on the SSI List under E.O. 13662. Indeed, certain of the 13 firms named in Directive 3 or their affiliates were previously designated on the SSI List. The SSI sanctions remain in effect. As a result, in transacting in the debt or equity securities of any of these companies, consideration should be given both to Directive 3 and to the SSI List.

    Prohibitions on Maintaining Accounts for or Processing Transactions Though Sberbank

    Directive 2 is targeted toward certain banking transactions with Russia’s largest financial institution, the Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia (“Sberbank”), majority-owned by the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as 25 of its subsidiaries.[41] More specifically, Directive 2 prohibits U.S. financial institutions[42] from (i) opening or maintaining a correspondent account or payable-through account for or on behalf of any entity subject to Directive 2 or their property or interests in property; and (ii) processing transactions involving entities subject to Directive 2 or their property or interests in property.[43] OFAC directs U.S. financial institutions to reject such transactions unless exempt or authorized by OFAC.[44] Within 30 days, all U.S. financial institutions must close any Sberbank correspondent or payable-through accounts and reject any future transactions involving Sberbank, its foreign financial institution subsidiaries or their property and interests.[45]

    In addition to Sberbank itself, Annex 1[46] to Directive 2 identifies 25 foreign financial institution subsidiaries that are 50% or more by owned by Sberbank, directly or indirectly, including banks, trusts, insurance companies and other financial companies located in Russia and six other countries (“Directive 2 Covered Entities”).[47] Sberbank and other affiliated entities determined to be subject to Directive 2 have also been added to the OFAC sanctions list entitled “List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions” (“CAPTA List”).[48]

    Directive 2’s prohibitions take effect on March 26, 2022, at which time U.S. financial institutions must have closed any correspondent or payable-through account maintained for the Directive 2 Covered Entities, along with all foreign financial institutions owned 50% or more by the same.[49] Thereafter, U.S. financial institutions must reject such transactions.[50]

    GL 8A, described above, permits, through June 24, 2022, transactions involving Sberbank related to energy that may otherwise be prohibited by Directive 2, but does not authorize opening or maintaining correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of Sberbank and the entities listed in Annex 1.[51]

    Designation of Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund

    In order to “terminat[e] yet another route through which Russia has benefitted from access to the U.S. financial system,” OFAC has designated the Russian Direct Investment Fund (“RDIF”), a Russian sovereign wealth fund, as an SDN subject to blocking sanctions. RDIF operates in a number of industries, such as insurance and financial services. According to OFAC, RDIF is “widely considered a slush fund” for President Putin and is “emblematic of Russia’s broader kleptocracy.”[52]  

    At the same time, OFAC has designated RDIF’s management company, Joint Stock Management Company of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (“JSC RDIF”) and a subsidiary of the management company, Limited Liability Company RVC Management Company, as SDNs as well.[53]

    Russian Individual Designations

    OFAC continues to designate individuals as SDNs in an effort to exact severe costs for Russian aggression. Most significantly, the U.S. took the rare step of designating President Vladimir Putin as an SDN. He is only one of a few heads of state designated by OFAC. Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, was also designated as an SDN. Several other members of the Russian Security Council were also designated.[54]

    Over the last several days, OFAC designated a number of Russian business executives, including Sergei Sergeevich Ivanov (CEO of state-owned mining company Alrosa), Andrey Patrushev (previously of Gazprom Neft, currently working in the energy sector) and Ivan Igorevich Sechin (a top executive at the oil company Rosneft) — all three of whom are sons of high-ranking Russian government officials said to be close allies of Putin who were previously designated by OFAC — as well as Alexander Aleksandrovich Vedyakhin (First Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board of Sberbank), Andrey Sergeyevich Puchkov (a VTB Bank executive),[55] Yuriy Alekseyevich Soloviev (another VTB Bank executive), his wife, Galina Olegovna Ulyutina, and Kirill Aleksandrovich Dmitriev (CEO of RDIF and JSC RDIF, with ties to U.S. firms and universities).[56]

    Still, relatively few Russian oligarchs have been sanctioned to date. At his press conference on Feb. 24, President Biden signaled that more such sanctions are coming, saying: “We will keep up this drumbeat of those designations against corrupt billionaires in the days ahead.”[57]

    Application of Sanctions to Non-U.S. Persons

    As part of the sanctions announced on Feb. 24, OFAC also issued guidance highlighting the “risk” that non-U.S. persons could find themselves subject to sanctions by OFAC if they engage in activity with Russian companies or individuals sanctioned under E.O. 14024. In particular, OFAC explained that, under E.O. 14024, non-U.S. persons may be designated if they have “materially assisted, sponsored or provided financial, material, or technological support for or goods or services to or in support of,” a blocked person or activity hostile to the U.S. or its allies. However, non-U.S. persons “generally do not risk exposure” for engaging in transactions with “persons subject to the prohibitions of the directives under E.O. 14024,” i.e., persons who are not subject to blocking sanctions under E.O. 14024.[58] Non-U.S. persons should still be aware that E.O. 14024 and its related directives prohibit attempts to evade or avoid their prohibitions or cause a violation by a U.S. person.[59] Efforts to comply with sanctions that involve replacing a sanctioned service provider with a non-sanctioned service provider will not be viewed as “evading or avoiding.”[60]

    Trade Export Restrictions

    In concert with international allies, the U.S. also took major steps to limit exports of sensitive technology and equipment to Russia.[61] Under the authority of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,[62] the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) promulgated a Final Rule[63] on Feb. 24, 2022, that it describes as “the most comprehensive application of Commerce’s export authorities on U.S. items . . . targeting a single nation.”[64] The Final Rule includes an expansion of license requirements for electronics, navigation equipment, avionics and marine equipment; changes the review policy for denial of export licenses; creates new controls on the export to Russia of foreign-produced items that are the direct product of U.S.-origin software or technology; and expands controls on exports that would reach Russian military end-users.[65]

    Belarus Sanctions: Defense and Finance Sectors

    In connection with its sanctions against Russia, OFAC has also designated 24 Belarusian individuals and entities pursuant to its authority under E.O. 14038.[66] The Belarus sanctions program has been fairly limited up until this point, previously targeting Belarusian sovereign debt in response to human rights abuses and anti-democratic activity.[67] The newly-announced measures focus on Belarus’s ties to Russia and its support for the invasion of Ukraine.[68]

    Among the targeted entities are two state-owned banks that conduct direct and indirect financial activity for the Government of Belarus: the Belarussian Bank of Development and Reconstruction Belinvestbank Joint Stock Company and Bank Dabrabyt Joint Stock Company (previously known as Bank Moscow Minsk JSC).[69] Additionally, a real-estate firm, Limited Liability Company Belinvest-Engineering and a financial leasing company, CJSC Belbizneslizing, were also designated.[70] The other 20 designated individuals and entities are all tied to the Belarusian defense sector, including manufacturers, industry executives, state agencies and government defense officials. Each has operated in or contributed to the defense sector or was a leader or official of the Government of Belarus. U.S. international partners, including the UK and Canada, have also sanctioned several of these new designees.[71]

    However, under GLs 6 and 7 pursuant to E.O. 14038, otherwise prohibited transactions are permitted for conducting official U.S. government business or official business of certain international organizations.[72]

    OFAC also revised its guidance concerning Belarusian sovereign debt. [73] Last December, OFAC released Directive 1, which prohibits U.S. persons dealing in new debt issued on or after Dec. 2, 2021 by certain Belarusian banks.[74] While debt agreements that existed before Dec. 2, 2021 are not sanctioned, previous guidance from OFAC indicates that it views changes to contractual terms of pre-existing debt as prohibited dealing.[75] However, because the United Kingdom ceased use of LIBOR benchmark rates, debt agreements that are modified to replace LIBOR with another reference rate “will not be treated as new debt for OFAC sanctions purposes.”[76]

    Authored by Gary Stein, Betty Santangelo, Melissa Goldstein, Hannah Thibideau, Angela Garcia and Hadas Jacobi.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs” (Feb. 24, 2022), available here (“2/24/22 Treasury  Press Release”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov” (Feb. 25, 2022), available here (“2/25/22 Treasury Press Release”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Treasury Prohibits Transactions with Central Bank of Russia and Imposes Sanctions on Key Sources of Russia’s Wealth” (Feb. 28, 2022), available here (“2/28/22 Treasury Press Release”).

    [2] White House, Joint Statement on Further Restrictive Economic Measures (Feb. 26, 2022), available here; Laurence Norman et al., EU, U.K., Canada, U.S. Plan to Cut Some Russian Banks From Swift, Wall. St. J. (Feb. 26, 2022), available here.

    [3] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Directive 4 Under E.O. 14024 (Feb. 28, 2022), available here.

    [4] E.O. 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect to Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation” (April 15, 2021), available here.

    [5] Directive 4 at 1.

    [6] Specifically, 12:01 AM EDT on June 24, 2022. GL 8A, available here.  GL 8A, issued on Feb. 28, 2022, replaced and superseded GL 8 which was issued on Feb. 24, 2022, available here.

    [7] 2/28/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [8] Directive 4 at 1.

    [9] 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release. See also OFAC, SDN List (changes since Jan. 1, 2022), available here.

    [10] Alternatively, “Otkrytie.” See SDN List.

    [11] 2/24/22 Treasury  Press Release.

    [12] E.O. 14024. VTB Bank and Otkritie have also been determined to be “owned or controlled by, or have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.” Id.; 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [13] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Imposes Immediate Economic Costs in Response to Actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” (Feb. 22, 2022), available here.

    [14] E.O. 14024.

    [15] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Revised Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in Property are Blocked” (Aug. 13, 2014), available here (“Revised Guidance” or “50 Percent Rule”).

    [16] E.O. 14024.

    [17] No transactions are authorized with Novikombank or PSB, both of which operate in the Russian defense sector. 

    [18] OFAC also issued other General Licenses that do not specifically reference or apply to the Russian banks designated as SDNs.  E.g., GL 5, available here (permitting official business of certain international organizations and entities);  GL 6, available here (permitting certain transactions related to agriculture, medicine and medical devices or their replacement parts and software, and COVID-19 related items); GL 7, available here (authorizing transactions incidental to overflights, emergency landings, and air ambulance services).

    [19] Specifically, 12:01 AM EDT on June 24, 2022. GL 8A.

    [20] Id.

    [21] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Directive 4 Under Executive Order 13662 (as amended on Oct. 31, 2017), available here; E.O. 13662, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine” (Mar. 20, 2014), available here.

    [22] GL 11, available here; GL 3, available here.

    [23] Specifically, 12:01 AM EDT, Mar. 24, 2022. GL 3.

    [24] Specifically, 12:01 AM EDT, Mar. 26, 2022. GL 11.

    [25] This period lasts until 12:01 AM EST on March 26, 2022. GL 12, available here. See also OFAC FAQ 975, available here.

    [26] GL 9, available here.

    [27] Specifically, 12:01 AM EDT on May 25, 2022.  GL 9.

    [28] Id. GL 9 also excludes certain actions from this wind-down period, including: (1) selling a covered debt or equity to a blocked person; (2) investing in a covered debt or equity, “other than purchases of or investments in covered debt or equity that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer of covered debt or equity”; (3) opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or payable-through account for an entity subject to Directive 2 (discussed below); and (4) “[a]ny transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 other than the blocked persons described” in paragraph a of GL 9 “unless separately authorized.”

    [29] OFAC FAQ No. 982 (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [30] OFAC FAQ No. 981 (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [31] Specifically, 12:01 AM EDT on May 25, 2022.  GL 10, available here.

    [32] Id.  GL 10 specifically excludes any conduct that would otherwise be permitted by GL 10 that relates to (1) the opening or maintaining of a correspondent or payable through account for an entity subject to Directive 2 or (2) transactions involving blocked persons other than those specifically named in GL 10.

    [33] OFAC FAQ No. 981.

    [34] See, e.g., GL 9 (authorizing certain transactions “prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024” without indicating that any transactions prohibited by E.O. 13662 are authorized). See also OFAC FAQ 886 (updated Feb. 24, 2022), available here (describing E.O. 14024 as addressing a separate national emergency from previous E.O.s including 13662).

    [35] 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release; see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Directive 3 Under Executive Order 14024 (Feb. 24, 2022), available here (“Directive 3”).

    [36] See Directive 3; OFAC FAQ No. 984 (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [37] Directive 3 at 2; see also OFAC FAQ No. 984.

    [38] 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [39] Directive 3 at 1.

    [40] Treasury, Revised Guidance.

    [41] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Directive 2 under Executive Order 14024, (Feb. 24, 2022), available here (“Directive 2”).

    [42] Directive 2 utilizes the same definition of “U.S. financial institution” as Directive 1A (Feb. 22, 2022). See SRZ Client Alert, “Sanctions Update: US Begins to Roll Out Sanctions Against Russia” (Feb. 23, 2022), available here. See also OFAC FAQ 676 (updated Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [43] See 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [44] Id.

    [45] Id.

    [46] Directive 2 at 3-4.

    [47] See 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [48] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions (CAPTA List) (Updated Feb. 24, 2022), available here. The CAPTA list is “a reference tool that provides actual notice of OFAC actions with respect to foreign financial institutions for which the opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a payable-through account in the United States is prohibited or subject to one or more strict conditions.” 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release. All foreign financial institutions owned 50% or more, directly or indirectly, by Sberbank are covered by Directive 2’s prohibitions, even if not identified on OFAC’s CAPTA List. Id. Transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new equity instruments of persons subject to Directive 2 is permissible, however—U.S. financial institutions may continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for persons subject to Directives 2 and 3 as long as those activities:  (i) do not involve transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in transaction types prohibited by these Directives; and (ii) are not prohibited by other sanctions authorities. OFAC FAQ 371 (updated Feb. 24, 2022), available here. See also, e.g., OFAC FAQ 964 (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [49] See 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [50] Id.

    [51] GL 8. GLs 9 and 10, which as discussed above authorize certain dealings in equity, debt and derivatives involving Russian banks designated as SDNs, also name Sberbank.  But, since Sberbank has not been designated as an SDN, it is not clear how these licenses apply to Sberbank.

    [52] 2/28/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [53] Id.

    [54] 2/25/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [55] Puchkov has interests in Limited Liability Company Atlant S and Limited Liability Company Inspira Invest A, which OFAC also designated. 2/24/22 Treasury Press Release.

    [56] Id; 2/28/22 Treasury Press Release. For further identifying information on these individuals and a complete list of other individuals added to the SDN List, see U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Russia-related Designations; Belarus Designations; Issuance of Russia-related Directive 2 and 3; Issuance of Russia-related and Belarus General Licenses; Publication of new and updated Frequently Asked Questions” (Feb. 24, 2022), available here, and U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Specially Designated Nationals List Update” (Feb. 25, 2022), available here.

    [57] White House, Remarks by President Biden on Russia’s Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [58] OFAC FAQ 980, available here.

    [59] E.O. 14024.

    [60] OFAC FAQ 980.

    [61] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, “Commerce Implements Sweeping Restrictions on Exports to Russia in Response to Further Invasion of Ukraine” (Feb. 24, 2022), available here (“Restrictions on Exports to Russia”).

    [62] 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801 et seq., available here.

    [63] U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Implementation of Sanctions Against Russia Under the Export Administration Regulations, Final Rule (Feb. 24, 2022) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746, and 772), prepublication version available here (“Final Rule, Russia Sanctions”).

    [64] Press Release, Restrictions on Exports to Russia.

    [65] Final Rule, Russia Sanctions; see also U.S. Department of Commerce & Bureau of Industry and Security Russia Rule Fact Sheet (Feb. 24, 2022), available here. Exceptions to tighter exporter licensing requirements are limited to situations involving, among others, items used for news media, certain government activities, software updates for civil use, and consumer products not “destined for government end users or certain individuals associated with the government.” Id.

    [66] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “U.S. Treasury Targets Belarusian Support for Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” (Feb. 24, 2022), available here (“U.S. Targets Belarus”); E.O. 14038, “Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Belarus” (Aug. 9, 2021), available here.

    [67] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Treasury Expands Sanctions Against Belarusian Regime with Partners and Allies” (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.

    [68] U.S. Targets Belarus Press Release.

    [69] Id.

    [70] Id.

    [71] Id. For a complete list of the newly designated entities, see U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Russia-related Designations; Belarus Designations; Issuance of Russia-related Directive 2 and 3; Issuance of Russia-related and Belarus General Licenses; Publication of new and updated Frequently Asked Questions,” (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [72] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, GL 6, Belarus Sanctions Regulations 31 CFR part 548, Official Business of the United States Government (Feb. 24, 2022), available here; U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, GL. 7, Belarus Sanctions Regulations 31 CFR part 548, Official Business of Certain International Organizations and Entities (Feb. 24, 2022), available here.

    [73] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Directive 1 Under Executive Order 14038 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.

    [74] Directive 1. For more information on Directive 1, see SRZ Alert, “U.S. Expands Sanctions Against Belarus, Barring New Sovereign Debt Transactions” (Dec. 10, 2021), available here.

    [75] OFAC FAQ 942 (Dec. 2, 2021), available here.

    [76] OFAC FAQ 956 (updated Feb. 24, 2022), available here.  This same authorization applies to debt issued under Directive 3.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
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    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Fifth Circuit Gives Commercial Lessees Likely Protection in Bankruptcy Court Free and Clear Asset Sales

    Fifth Circuit Gives Commercial Lessees Likely Protection in Bankruptcy Court Free and Clear Asset Sales

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Gives Commercial Lessees Likely Protection in Bankruptcy Court Free and Clear Asset Sales

    February 25, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy court gave “unnecessary and likely incorrect” reasoning to support its “excessively broad proposition that sales free and clear under [Bankruptcy Code (“Code”)] Section 363 override, and essentially render nugatory, the critical lessee protections against a debtor-lessor under [Code] 365(h),” said the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Feb. 16, 2022. In re Royal Bistro, LLC, 2022 WL 499938, *1-*2 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022). The court still denied the lessees’ “motion for a writ of mandamus” to “compel the district court to stay pending appeal” from a bankruptcy court order authorizing the trustee’s sale of “the debtor’s real property… free and clear” of the lessees’ interests. Id. at *1. In essence, the Fifth Circuit signaled that it would not approve in later cases a bankruptcy court asset sale of real property that summarily cuts off the rights of the debtor’s lessees.

    The Court of Appeals stressed that the lower courts “made the mistake of relying on” the Seventh Circuit’s heavily criticized decision in Precision Indus Inc. v. Qualitech Steel S.B. Q., 327 F.3d 537, 547 (7th Cir. 2003) (Section 365(h) lessee protections against a debtor-lessor do not supersede the free and clear sale terms of Section 363(f)). On the facts of the limited motion before it, the Fifth Circuit rejected the lower courts’ “overstatement of their reasoning,” based on their “serious misinterpretation of law or facts.” 2022 WL 499938, at *2. Because the “essential state law rights of the tenants in this case [were] limited by the senior mortgagee’s prior lien on the” property being sold, however, “neither [Code] Section 363(e) nor 365(h)(A)(ii) offers [the lessee-appellants] protection.” Id. “[S]tate law [was] all that the bankruptcy court needed to decide this case” against the lessees. Id.

    Relevance

    The Third Circuit stressed in another similar case that a bankruptcy trustee or Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession cannot summarily use a free and clear sale under Code § 363(f) to sell property subject to a lease free and clear of the lease and thus extinguish a tenant’s possessory interest. In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 564, 573 (3d Cir. 2015) (2-1) (lessee sought stay pending appeal from sale order that would “wipe out” the lessee’s interest; stay granted because, among other things, “success to it on the merits was assured”). It stressed that Code § 365(h) protects the lessee’s interest after the trustee’s rejection of the lease when the interest is not disputed in good faith. Id. Although the Fifth Circuit in Royal Bistro did not cite Revel, it noted the heavy criticism of Qualitech by other courts and commentators. Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, 510 B.R. 696, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (criticizing Qualitech); In re Samaritan Alliance LLC, 2007 WL 4162918, *4 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2007); In re Haskell L.P., 321 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); Michael S. Patrick Baxter, “Section 363 Sales Free and Clear of Interests: Why The Seventh Circuit Erred in Qualitech,” 59 Bus. Law. 475 (2004) (Qualitech had “the potential to profoundly impact the bankruptcy world”); Robert M. Zimman, “Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and the Sad History of § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code,” 38 John Marshall L. Rev. 97 (2004) (acknowledging turmoil created by Qualitech).

    The Ninth Circuit followed Qualitech, though, in holding that a debtor’s real property leased to a third party could be sold free of the lessee’s interest, reasoning that a sale is not the rejection of the debtor’s lease. In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, 875 F.3d 892, 899, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A sale… is not the same thing as… ‘rejection’ contemplated by Section 365”). According to the Ninth Circuit, Code § 365(h), which protects a real property lessee from the debtor-lessor’s rejection of its lease, applies only when the debtor rejects the lease and remains in possession of the property. Id. (“Since the trustee did not reject the leases, section 365 was not implicated.”) A lessee in that situation has a right to adequate protection under Code § 363(e) if the lessee asks for such relief, but had failed to do so in Spanish Peaks. Id., at 900.

    The Fifth Circuit’s Nuanced Analysis

    The Fifth Circuit’s dicta in Royal Bistro focused on the particular facts of the case before it. Two lessees of the debtor’s property had objected to the sale of the property and alternatively sought “either adequate protection under Section 363(e) or rejection of the leases, all of which the bankruptcy court denied.” 2022 WL 499938, at *1. The lessees, “insiders of the debtor company,” have leases “junior to the rights of the mortgagee” on the property. Id. “Had there been no bankruptcy,” the mortgagee “could have foreclosed under state law and wiped out the junior interests.” Id. The leases also had no “non-disturbance clauses that would have protected the lessees from” foreclosure. Id. For that reason, the bankruptcy court rejected the insider-lessees’ objection to the sale. According to the Court of Appeals, “state law is all that the bankruptcy court needed to decide” the case. Id.

    Both § § 363(f)(1) and 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) limit the debtor’s options, subject to applicable state law. First, under § 363(f) the debtor may sell free and clear if “applicable non-bankruptcy law permits,” subject to providing “adequate protection” to the lessee under § 363(e). Because the lessees here had no residual value after the lender’s prior mortgage debt was satisfied, the trustee had no “duty to provide adequate protection.” Id.

    The lessees may have had the further right to remain on the debtor’s property for the term of their leases had the trustee rejected their leases “to the extent that such rights are enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law,” according to § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).

    “Bankruptcy law, in other words, recognizes and defers to state law in these provisions.” Id., citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-57 (1979) (except when Code overrides state law, the Code enforces applicable state law property rights).

    State law governed the bankruptcy court’s first reason for denying relief to the insider lessees in Royal Bistro. Aside from the leases being subject to rights of the mortgagee, one of the lessees had “not paid any rent in many months… and was … in default.” 2022 WL 499938 at *1. Because state law drove the result, there was thus no reason for the lower courts to rely on Qualitech. Id. In the Ninth Circuit’s Spanish Peaks case, too, the leases “were legally subordinated to a senior mortgagee interest in the real property.” Id., at *2.

    Comment

    The lower courts overstated “their reasoning” in Royal Bistro but reached the right result. Id. According to the Fifth Circuit, courts “must be cautioned… against blithely accepting Qualitech’s reasoning and textual exegesis.” Id. State law thus remains relevant in federal bankruptcy cases. It must be read together with the Code, particularly when the Code explicitly refers to it.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte

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  • Reasonably Prudent Operator or Good and Workmanlike Manner: Does Your Contract Have the Right Standard of Care?

    Reasonably Prudent Operator or Good and Workmanlike Manner: Does Your Contract Have the Right Standard of Care?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reasonably Prudent Operator or Good and Workmanlike Manner: Does Your Contract Have the Right Standard of Care?

    February 24, 2022

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The standard of care is an important provision in any operating, management or services agreement because it sets forth the expectations of the parties as to how the contract should be carried out. It also functions as the benchmark by which the service provider’s performance under the contract will be measured. Parties on both sides of the table should have a clear understanding of what the standard of performance is under the contract and how it applies to the services provided.

    In commercial contracts for energy industry operations, two different standards of care appear most often: The “reasonably prudent operator” standard and the “good and workmanlike manner” standard. We are seeing cases where there is (1) an interchangeability of a “reasonably prudent operator” standard with a “good and workmanlike” standard (or a redundancy of the two) and (2) a general lack of understanding as to what those standards mean. In this article, we explain the difference between the two standards and why they should not be viewed as interchangeable or redundant across all energy industry commercial contracts.

    Given the high concentration of commercial contracts providing operations and services related to oil and gas, heavy infrastructure, petrochemicals and, increasingly, renewable energy projects located in Texas and Louisiana, we’ve chosen the body of law from those two states as the lens through which to examine these competing standards.

    In depth

    WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS OF CARE?

    1. Good and Workmanlike Manner

    In the general sense, “good and workmanlike manner” means the quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge, training or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner that is generally considered proficient by those capable of judging such work. “Workmanlike” may also be defined as the degree of care that a skilled workman (gender inclusive) would exercise under similar circumstances in the community in which the work is done. Whether work is completed in a good and workmanlike manner is a determination for the factfinder to decide in any litigation.

    2. Reasonably Prudent Operator

    The “reasonably prudent operator” standard is seen most commonly in cases involving the development or operation of an oil and gas or mineral lease. As an objective standard, it establishes not only the performance of the obligations, but also whether there is an obligation to begin with (e.g., a lessee’s decision to drill or not to drill). Under the reasonably prudent operator standard, the lessee or operator is obligated to make reasonable efforts to develop the interest for the common advantage of both the lessor and lessee. However, some courts have recognized that a lessee or operator’s obligation to develop is not unlimited in the sense that it is not mandated to undertake development operations that are unprofitable.

    Generally speaking, the implied covenants of a reasonably prudent operator standard include the duty to develop, the duty to protect against drainage, the duty to market and the duty to conduct operations with reasonable care and due diligence. The consideration as to whether someone is acting as a reasonably prudent operator requires the factfinder to consider the cost of development operations and the economic viability therefrom and whether an ordinarily prudent person would have done the same in similar circumstances. Courts look to the totality of the circumstances and various factors to determine whether an operator has met its development duty, including geological data, the number and location of wells, productive capacity of wells, costs of drilling compared to the profit reasonably expected, time intervals between completion of the last well and demand for additional operations and lease acreage.

    TEXAS LAW

    1. Good and Workmanlike Manner

    “Texas law ‘define[s] good and workmanlike as that quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally considered proficient by those capable of judging such work.’”[1]

    The good and workmanlike manner is treated as an implied warranty, which is “created by operation of law and are grounded more in tort than in contract.”[2] The implied warranty of “good and workmanlike manner” does not require the repairmen to “guarantee the results of their work,” but rather only “perform those services in a good and workmanlike manner.”[3]

    This standard is also treated as a “gap filler” warranty that implies terms into a contract that fails to describe how the party or service is to perform. Although the parties cannot disclaim this warranty outright, an express warranty in their contract can fill the gaps covered by the implied warranty “and supersede it if the express warranty specifically describes the manner, performance or quality of the services.”[4]

    For example, in Gonzalez,

    “the parties agreed that [Southwest] Olshan [Foundation Repair Co., LLC] would perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner, would use the Cable Lock foundation repair system, and would adjust the foundation for the life of the home if the foundation settled. This express warranty sufficiently describes the manner, performance and quality of the services so as to supersede the implied warranty.”[5]

    Based on this precedent set by the Supreme Court of Texas, even if an agreement utilizes the term “good and workmanlike standard,” if the underlying agreement “sufficiently describes” the manner, performance and quality of the services, the terms of the agreement supersede the implied warranty of the good and workmanlike standard and instead becomes an express warranty.[6]

    In a Texas agreement, if the parties wish to establish a standard of care different from that of the “knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally considered proficient by those capable of judging such work,” they may find it advantageous to set forth the specific manner, performance and quality of the services that are to be provided. In such an instance, by sufficiently setting forth the manner, performance and quality of the services that will be provided under an agreement, the parties can eliminate ambiguity that may arise in any future litigation between. If the parties elect to include such language, it should be clear, measurable and directly applicable to the services performed under the agreement if such language is to have a meaningful impact.

    2. Reasonably Prudent Operator

    In Texas, a reasonably prudent operator is an objective standard where the factfinder will decide whether the operator’s acts or omissions are like that of a reasonably prudent operator under the same or similar circumstances. The reasonably prudent operator, having an expectation of profit, must act in good faith, with competence and with due regard to the interests of the lessor and its own interests.[7]

    In reviewing Texas case law, the reasonably prudent operator standard appears to be applied in the context of mineral leases most of the time. In fact, “[e]very claim of improper operation by a lessor against a lessee should be tested against the general duty of the lessee to conduct operations as a reasonably prudent operator in order to carry out the purpose of the oil and gas lease.”[8] Although the following cases analyze mineral lease agreements, the same can be analogized to assume that a court would apply the reasonably prudent operator standard to similar industries.[9]

    Where a lease agreement includes a requirement, “‘to drill such offset well or wells on said lands … as a reasonably prudent operator would drill under the same or similar circumstances’ – expressly adopts the reasonably prudent operator standard.”[10]

    In Grayson v. Crescendo Resources, L.P., 104 S.W.3d 736 (Tx. App. – Amarillo 2003), the plaintiffs filed suit based upon the defendant’s alleged failure to act as a reasonably prudent operator in developing an oil and gas lease. The court recognized that where a lessee’s obligation to develop is not specifically addressed, the law implies a covenant to reasonably develop the premises.[11] “The lessee’s duty under that covenant is to act as a reasonably prudent operator under the same or similar circumstances.”[12]

    In conjunction with the reasonably prudent operator analysis, Texas courts are expected to use this standard to determine whether an exculpatory clause in an agreement should bar or limit a plaintiff’s claim. Where a contract’s exculpatory clause specifies that the operator “shall conduct and direct and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area” and “shall conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike manner….” Texas intermediate appellate courts have uniformly found the phrase “all such operations” referred back to “operations on the Contract Area,” and held that the exculpatory clause was limited to the operator’s activities at the wellsite and did not extend to other breaches of the agreement.[13] “The operator’s limitation of liability is linked directly to imposition of the duty to act as a prudent operator, which strictly concerns the manner in which the operator conducts drilling operations on the lease,” explained a Texas appellate court.[14]

    More recently, in March 2021, a Texas Court of Appeals similarly held that an exculpatory clause,[15] and those comparable to it, “exempt[ ] the operator from liability for its activities unless its liability-causing conduct is due to gross negligence or willful misconduct.”[16]

    LOUISIANA LAW

    1. Good and Workmanlike Manner

    While Louisiana courts have not adopted a universal definition for the term “workmanlike,” courts have applied an objective industry standard. “As a general rule, there is implied in every contract for work or services that the work will be performed in a skillful, careful, diligent and good workmanlike manner.”[17]

    Significantly, a contractor is not responsible for defects caused by faulty or insufficient specifications furnished to the contractor.[18] “If the defect in construction is caused by faulty or insufficient plans or specifications, the contractor is immune from liability upon constructing compliance therewith, provided the specifications are not provided by him.”[19]

    In Louisiana, “implicit in every building contract is the requirement that the work shall be performed in a good, workmanlike manner, free from defects in material and workmanship.”[20] “The contractor is liable for failure to perform properly.”[21]

    Louisiana statute § 2771 provides that,

    “No contractor, including but not limited to a residential building contractor as defined in R.S. 37:2150.1(9), shall be liable for destruction or deterioration of or defects in any work constructed, or under construction, by him if he constructed, or is constructing, the work according to plans or specifications furnished to him which he did not make or cause to be made and if the destruction, deterioration, or defect was due to any fault or insufficient of the plans or specifications. This provision shall apply regardless of whether the destruction, deterioration, or defect occurs or becomes evident prior to or after delivery of the work to the owner or prior to or after acceptance of the work by the owner. The provisions of this Section shall not be subject to waiver by the contractor.”[22]

    The good and workmanlike standard is more general than the statute. In Louisiana, “[a] contractor is obligated to perform the work in a good and workmanlike manner so that the work is suitable for its intended purpose and free from defects in material and workmanship.”[23]

    2. Reasonably Prudent Operator

    Similar to the case law review in Texas, the concept of a reasonably prudent operator appears in the context of oil and gas and mineral leases. Louisiana Mineral Code 31:122 “requires the lessee to act as a ‘reasonably prudent operator’ based upon the totality of the facts” and allows parties to stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.[24] The implied duty imposed on a mineral lessee by La. R.S. 31:122 is also imposed on assignees or sublessees.[25]

    In determining whether a lessee is acting as a reasonably prudent operator, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances bearing on the lessee’s overall operations….”[26] Significantly, the mineral code in Louisiana is applicable to all materials. “Thus, because the same code article governs the duties to operate under any mineral lease, be it brine or hydrocarbons, we [Louisiana Supreme Court] find that the interpretation of those duties, should likewise be the same, whether it be for operators of brine or hydrocarbon mines.”[27]

    The Louisiana Supreme Court explained that “develop and operate” as related to a lessee’s actions as a prudent operator are terms of art within the oil and gas industry. ‘“Develop,’ as used in the industry, ‘contemplates any step taken in the search for, capture, production and marketing of hydrocarbons.’ ‘Operate’ can be defined as any activity leading to the production of oil and gas.”[28]

    Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeal has held that even though a company was not the “operator” of the facility, the company had a duty to act in a reasonable and prudent manner because it assumed a “hands-on” role in the milling, pressurization and plugging of the well. Thus, even if a company does not hold the title of “operator,” it will be required to act in a reasonable and prudent manner should its actions equate to that of an operator.

    WORDS HAVE MEANING

    As an increasing number of oil and gas professionals, investors and contract drafters find themselves working in different parts of the energy industry, there are cases where concepts historically specific to oil and gas development activities are copied in an attempt to apply them more broadly. This seems to be the case with the use of a “reasonably prudent operator” standard in commercial contracts for petrochemical facilities and renewable energy projects. As noted above, the “reasonably prudent operator” standard is historically a specific term of art to describe the lessee’s obligations to the lessor under the terms of an oil and gas or mineral lease. The parties should ask themselves what standard of care is appropriate for the particular services being provided.

    Even within oil and gas-related agreements, such as gathering and transportation services agreements, management services agreements or transition services agreements, does it make sense to apply a “reasonably prudent operator” standard, which is historically tied to the obligations of a lessee under an oil and gas lease to a party providing services to non-operated properties? Would it be clearer to specifically state what the service provider’s obligations are than to leave it to a judge to import a “reasonably prudent operator” standard onto non-operated properties? Or should it be both? The form AAPL 1989 Operating Agreement provides that, “[o]perator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonably prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with applicable law and regulation…”

    Where a “good and workmanlike manner” standard of care is applied, the parties should think critically before adding modifying terms. Do the parties really want services to be performed at a different standard than the “knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally considered proficient by those capable of judging such work?” If so, should that change the consideration due to the service provider?

    When drafting commercial contracts for energy industry operations, management or services, parties should focus on the services being provided and the assets those services relate to, negotiate the proper standard of care in an informed manner and clearly describe that standard in a way that matches up with terms of art under the governing body of law.


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  • Russian Invasion of Ukraine Triggers Global Sanctions: What Businesses Need to Know

    Russian Invasion of Ukraine Triggers Global Sanctions: What Businesses Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Russian Invasion of Ukraine Triggers Global Sanctions: What Businesses Need to Know

    February 24, 2022

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered swift international retribution. Global powers—including the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US)—have announced sanctions as the crisis in Europe escalates. As governments expand these sanctions, businesses dealing in Russia or with the Russian government are urged to take immediate steps to ensure compliance. This On the Subject outlines the scope and applicability of these sanctions in each major jurisdiction.

    In depth

    EUROPEAN UNION

    Targeted Sanctions on Entities and Individuals

    In addition to the sanctions against Russia already in place following its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, cyberattacks and human rights abuses (which were extended until 31 July 2022, and will likely be extended again), the Council of the European Union imposed restrictive measures on 21 February 2022, on five additional individuals (Aleksei Yurievich Cherniak, Leonid Ivanovich Babashov, Tatiana Georgievna Lobach, Nina Sergeevna Faustova and Aleksandr Evgenevich Chmyhalov) for actively supporting actions and implementing policies that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The designated persons are members of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, and they were elected to represent the illegally annexed Crimean Peninsula and the City of Sevastopol on 19 September 2021, as well as the head and deputy head of the Sevastopol electoral commission.

    On 23 February 2022, following a joint press statement of the Presidents of the European Commission and Council, the European Union extended the existing sanctions framework to cover all of the 351 members of the Russian State Duma who voted for the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent entities. The European Union also extended sanctions on an additional 27 high-profile individuals and entities who have played a role in undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

    The restrictive measures include asset freezes, a European Union-wide travel ban and a prohibition from making funds available to the listed individuals and entities. Pursuant to European Union asset freezes, all funds and economic resources that belong to, are owned, held or controlled by a designated person are frozen. “Ownership” is triggered by a party holding more than 50% of proprietary rights in an entity or a majority interest in that entity. Therefore, entities owned by designated individuals will also be affected by the targeted sanctions.

    Economic Restrictions

    The European Union also imposed various economic restrictions on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, specifically:

    • An import ban on goods from those regions;
    • An export ban on certain goods and technologies;
    • A prohibition on tourism services; and
    • A restriction on trade investments related to certain economic sectors.

    Financial Restrictions

    Notably, the European Union also imposed a sectoral prohibition to finance the Russian Federation, its government and its Central Bank in the hope of limiting the financing of escalatory and aggressive policies.

    Germany also put on halt the certification process for the North Stream 2 pipeline, which is meant to deliver natural gas directly from Russia to Germany. The pipeline is owned by a subsidiary of Gazprom.

    Applicability of EU Sanctions

    The sanctions announced on 21 February and 23 February have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union and take effect immediately. New sanctions are directly applicable in all EU Member States, with existing penalties in place at a Member State level in relation to any breaches.

    EU sanctions are broad in scope and apply to any person inside or outside the territory of the European Union who is a national or is incorporated under the laws of a Member State, as well as any legal person in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the European Union. Likewise, any events taking place within the territory of the European Union, including its airspace and on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State, would be subject to the EU sanctions.

    Further Developments

    In a statement on 24 February, EU President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Union will present a further “package of massive, targeted sanctions” aimed at strategic sectors of the Russian economy in response to Russia’s continued escalation of the conflict. The new measures will block Russia’s access to technologies and markets that are key for Russia, freeze Russian assets in the European Union and stop the access of Russian banks to European financial markets. The further measures could include Russia being removed from SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), which is the worldwide communication system used by banks.

    The European Union may also expand the sanctions to target those who “provide support or benefit from the Russian government” as a response to Belarus support for Russia.

    UNITED KINGDOM

    UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a “first barrage” of sanctions against Russia with the designation of five Russian banks and three high-net-worth Russian individuals. The sanctions have been imposed pursuant to the recently amended Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/855).

    • Designated entities: IS Bank, Rossiya Bank, PJSC Promsvyazbank, JSC Genbank and JSC Black Sea Bank Development and Reconstruction.
    • Designated individuals: Gennady Timchenko, Boris Rotenberg and Igor Rotenberg.

    Similar to the EU sanctions, any assets held in the United Kingdom by the individuals concerned will be frozen, and the individuals will also be banned from travelling to the United Kingdom. There will also be a prohibition on all UK individuals and entities from having any dealings with the designated entities and individuals.

    Further Developments

    The UK government stated it will further extend targeted sanctions to the Russian politicians who voted to recognise the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk and economic restrictions currently applicable to the Crimean Peninsula to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. On 23 February, Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned London bank chiefs to expect tougher sanctions on Russia if the crisis in Ukraine escalates.

    The UK government is likely to follow the European Union lead with respect to additional and broader sanctions (i) seeking to curtail Russia’s ability to raise funds in UK markets, prohibiting a range of high-tech exports and further isolating Russian banks from the global economy; (ii) targeting the Russian financial sector and trade; and (iii) prohibiting Russia from issuing foreign debt on UK markets.

    In line with previous statements from the UK government, on 24 February Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced it will take measures to exclude Russian Banks from London’s financial system “stopping them from accessing sterling and clearing payments through the UK” and limiting the amount of money the Russian nationals will be able to deposit in their UK bank accounts.

    UNITED STATES

    The US sanctions announced immediately after the beginning of the current crisis effectively prohibit US persons from engaging in any economic activity with the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk “republics.” This includes investment, exports to and imports from these regions. US President Joe Biden subsequently announced a new set of sanctions aimed at cutting off Russia from western financing and targeting high-net-worth Russian individuals.

    Targeted Sanctions

    The United States imposed new sanctions against two banks and three individuals who are the sons of three previously sanctioned President Putin inner circle members.

    • Sanctioned entities: Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank (VEB) and Promsvyazbank Public Joint Stock Company (PSB), along with 42 of their subsidiaries.
    • Sanctioned individuals: Denis Aleksandrovich Bortnikov, Petr Mikhailovich Fradkov and Vladimir Sergeevich Kiriyenko.

    As mentioned above, the fathers of the newly sanctioned individuals are already subject to US sanctions. These new sanctions aim to prevent the previously sanctioned individuals from transferring their assets to family members to evade sanctions. Any entities owned 50% or more by sanctioned individuals will also be sanctioned entities.

    The United States has also subjected Nord Stream 2 AG, the Swiss company building the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, to sanctions.

    Financial Restrictions

    In addition to targeted sanctions, the United States adopted Directive 1A under Executive Order 14024. This directive expands existing sovereign debt prohibitions applying to “US financial institutions” to cover participation in the secondary market for bonds issued after 1 March 2022, by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. These restrictions previously applied only to participation in the primary market for this debt.

    “US financial institutions” is defined broadly and includes all US entities and their foreign branches which engage in activities as “depository institutions, banks, savings banks, money services businesses, operators of credit card systems, trust companies, insurance companies, securities brokers and dealers, futures and options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, clearing corporations, investment companies, employee benefit plans, dealers in precious metals, stones, or jewels, and US holding companies, US affiliates, or US subsidiaries of any of the foregoing.”

    Further Developments

    During his speech on 22 February, President Biden announced that more measures would be imposed in the event of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including additional sanctions targeting Russia’s biggest banks and export control measures. Considering President Putin’s launch of military operations in Ukraine, it is expected that the United States and its allies will announce “further consequences” for Russia on 24 February.

    GLOBAL

    Canada, Japan and Australia have also announced sanctions against Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis, including targeted sanctions against Russian individuals and financial institutions, and an import/export ban of goods on the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Canada and Japan also implemented new prohibitions on dealings in Russian sovereign debt.

    IMPACT ON BUSINESS 

    If you or your company have dealings with Russian entities or individuals:

    • Immediately conduct a thorough review of your business agreements to ensure you have no dealings directly or indirectly with designated individuals or entities, and if there is any connection to designated people, promptly seek out legal advice;
    • Ensure you have robust sanction compliance measures to screen third parties which may be subject to sanctions; and
    • Monitor the developing situation and seek out legal advice if concerned about potential breaches.

    ***

    HOW WE CAN HELP

    If you have assets in Russia or business dealings with Russian entities or individuals (even if they are not listed as “designated persons”), or are concerned about the impact of new sanctions against Russia, please reach out to our lawyers for advice.

    Raminta Dereskeviciute (London); Sabine Naugès (Paris); Alexa Ningelgen (Düsseldorf); David J. Levine (Washington, DC); Alan Kashdan (Washington, DC); Raymond Paretzky (Washington, DC)

    Authors

    Raminta Dereskeviciute

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Sabine Naugès

    Partner

    Paris

    Ludovica Rabitti

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    David J. Levine

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • The Extension of FATF’s ‘Travel Rule’ and Implications for Virtual Asset Service Providers in the UK

    The Extension of FATF’s ‘Travel Rule’ and Implications for Virtual Asset Service Providers in the UK

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Extension of FATF’s ‘Travel Rule’ and Implications for Virtual Asset Service Providers in the UK

    February 24, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The extension of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘Travel Rule’ to ‘Virtual Asset Service Providers’ (VAPSs) is emblematic of the continued and growing push to bring crypto businesses into the mainstream of financial services regulation. It is also a way to address the perceived (and real) risk of using virtual assets to facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing and to sidestep the safeguards that have long been in place for traditional financial services.

    The Travel Rule has been the source of considerable attention for the crypto industry as FATF member states are accelerating their plans to implement it. However, despite the high-level attention, the Travel Rule is not well understood. In this article, we aim to bring clarity to the Travel Rule’s purpose and requirements, explain how it is proposed to be addressed in the UK and contrast that with the adoption approaches in the EU and US. [1]

    In depth

    Some Key Terms

    FATF is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering, terrorist financing and financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Its recommendations are recognized as the global standard for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing.

    VASPs broadly constitute crypto-exchanges, digital wallet providers and those who participate in the provision of financial services relating to an issuer’s offer or sale of virtual assets. This includes both natural and legal persons and would capture many of the most critical actors in the crypto ecosystem.

    Virtual Assets are defined by FATF to mean digital representations of value that can be digitally traded, or transferred, and can be used for payment or investment purposes. They would not include Central Bank Digital Currencies or Security Tokens (which are covered by other aspects of FATF Guidelines), but would cover most Exchange Tokens (e.g., Bitcoin or Ethereum).

    The Travel Rule is the common name for FATF recommendation No. 16, which initially applied to cross-border and domestic wire transfers and required financial institutions facilitating such transfers (mainly banks, but also other wire transmitters) to exchange information on the originator and beneficiary of a transfer. In guidance published in July 2019, FATF clarified that the Travel Rule also applies to Virtual Assets and in October 2021 published updated guidance further clarifying the approach. [2]

    Approach to Adoption

    FATF’s guidelines, while setting global standards, are not enforceable until adopted into domestic legislation, and ultimate adoption and standards are left to the participating member states. With regard to the extension of the Travel Rule, global adoption has been critiqued for being too slow, with most member states having failed heretofore to enact the Travel Rule into domestic legislation. This has become a particularly pronounced issue with the vastly increased use of Virtual Assets in the global financial system over the past several years and the greater associated risks; member states are now accelerating their implementation efforts.

    The Travel Rule in the UK

    In July 2021, HM Treasury published its consultation paper on implementation of the Travel Rule into UK law. [3] The approach to adoption has been complicated by Brexit as the aspects of the Travel Rule that apply to wire transfers are enshrined in the Funds Transfer Regulation which is part of retained EU law and not easily amendable. HM Treasury has instead proposed to implement the Travel Rule by amending the Money Laundering Regulations.

    The Travel Rule recommends a de minimis threshold of USD 1000 below which the rule need not apply or less stringent requirements can be met (this is subject to member state implementation). HM Treasury has proposed a GBP 1000 threshold for its domestic implementation. To avoid use of multiple sub-threshold transfers to evade the requirements, multiple linked transfers (i.e., from the same originator to the same beneficiary) will be aggregated for purposes of determining whether the de minimis threshold is met.

    For Virtual Asset transfers, HM Treasury has proposed the following minimum information be exchanged between originators and beneficiaries:

    Information on Originator Information on Beneficiary
    Transfers above de minimis threshold
    • Name
    • Address
    • Account number or unique transaction identifier
    • Personal document number[4]
    • Customer identification number or date and place of birth
    • Name
    • Account number or unique transaction identifier
    Transfers below de minimis threshold
    • Name
    • Account number or unique transaction identifier
    • Name
    • Account number or unique transaction identifier
    Purely UK domestic transfers[5]
    • Name
    • Name

    VASPs are required to implement effective compliance procedures to detect whether any required information is missing from an inbound transfer, and transfers exceeding the de minimis threshold must verify the accuracy of the beneficiary information (e.g., via a check against their KYC data). Where required information is not available, it is proposed that the VASP receiving the transfer (the “Receiving VASP”) take steps to prevent the Virtual Assets from made being available to the beneficiary [6].

    If the VASP originating the transfer (the “Originating VASP”) repeatedly fails to provide required information to a beneficiary, the Receiving VASP must also take appropriate steps to ensure compliance and may be required to reject future Virtual Asset transfers from such Originating VASP or to terminate the relationship. The Receiving VASP is also required to retain the beneficiary and originator information for five years from the date the transaction is complete and to make such information available upon request from relevant regulators.

    Time Frame for Adoption in the UK

    HM Treasury’s consultation process on the proposed Travel Rule adoption closed on 14 October 2021 and the UK government is now analysing feedback with a view to adopting final amendments to the Money Laundering Regulations. Late 2022 is the earliest projected timeframe for implementation of these requirements in the UK.

    Comparing Global Implementation 

    In the US, the extension of the Travel Rule to VASPs has been enshrined in guidance promulgated by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) in May 2019, which clarified that the existing Travel Rule also applied to VASPs and Virtual Assets [7].  Despite the existence of this guidance, enforcement of the Travel Rule to VASPs operating in the US has been limited to date, although this is expected to change.

    The EU published its new proposed regulation to implement the extended Travel Rule in July 2021 [8].  The proposed regulation would amend the Funds Transfer Regulation to extend the existing rules applicable to wire transfers to Virtual Assets and VASPs. As the proposed draft regulation has already been published, it is expected that the EU will implement the revised Travel Rule more quickly than the UK.

    Implications for VASPs and the Crypto Industry

    The adoption of the extended Travel Rule will clearly create new compliance obligations and costs for VASPs and require them to enhance their compliance processes to accommodate the collection, transfer and verification of required originator and beneficiary information. Although the proposed adoption of the Travel Rule in the UK explicitly mentions a grace period for implementation, given the varying approaches to the Travel Rule taken by global regulators and the current existence of these requirements in jurisdictions such as the US (albeit with lax enforcement), VASPs would be well advised to start considering implementation of appropriate compliance processes.

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  • Legislation Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Misconduct Claims

    Legislation Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Misconduct Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Legislation Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Misconduct Claims

    February 24, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Congress has passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“Act”). The Biden Administration previously has indicated the President will sign the Act into law. If enacted, the Act will amend the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to permit an individual with a claim of sexual harassment or sexual assault to invalidate a signed predispute arbitration agreement or a predispute joint-action waiver. The Act does not prevent the parties from agreeing to resolve a dispute by arbitration after a dispute arises.

    Background

    This new legislation comes after the #MeToo movement — a social movement that urges survivors of sexual violence and sexual harassment to speak out about their experiences — placed a spotlight on mandatory arbitration clauses. Under current law, many employers have binding mandatory arbitration contracts for a wide range of matters, including claims of sexual assault and sexual harassment. A mandatory arbitration contract requires the parties to the agreement to resolve their disputes through an arbitration process. Proponents of these contracts argue that arbitration is an efficient means of settling disputes, whereas opponents claim the confidential arbitration system helps wrong-doers evade public accountability, limits an individual’s ability to speak out regarding their experiences, and denies individuals the ability to decide to pursue their claims in court where they may be afforded greater protections.

    The Act

    If enacted, the Act will give individuals with claims of sexual harassment and sexual assault the ability to forgo arbitration and sue the alleged perpetrators in court if they unilaterally choose to do so. All existing and future predispute contracts requiring claims of sexual assault and sexual harassment to be settled through arbitration will be void and unenforceable. The Act also allows individuals to bring sexual harassment or sexual assault claims individually or on behalf of a class.

    For purposes of the Act, “predispute arbitration agreement” refers to any agreement to arbitrate a dispute that has not yet arisen at the time of making the agreement. “Predispute joint-action waiver” refers to any agreement that would prohibit one of the parties to the agreement from participating in a joint, class, or collective action, concerning a dispute that has not yet arisen at the time of making the agreement. The terms “sexual assault dispute” and “sexual harassment dispute” refer to disputes involving a nonconsensual sexual act or contact and to disputes relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment. In the event it is unclear whether a claim constitutes sexual harassment or sexual assault, the Act requires that courts, not arbitrators, decide.

    The pending legislation does not cover predispute arbitration agreements in employment matters other than claims of sexual assault and sexual harassment.

    Prior New York State Legislation

    In 2018, New York State passed similar legislation banning mandatory workplace arbitration of sexual harassment claims, and amended that legislation in 2019 to extend the ban on mandatory workplace arbitration to all workplace claims of discrimination. Several court decisions[1] have found New York’s legislation to be preempted by the FAA based on the federal law’s broad acceptance of arbitration. With respect to claims of sexual harassment, if the Act is enacted then arguments of preemption will no longer be a viable defense. The New York law’s provisions related to broader claims of workplace discrimination are likely to remain preempted by the FAA even after passage of the Act.

    Conclusion

    If enacted, the pending federal legislation will render all mandatory predispute arbitration clauses unenforceable as they relate to claims of sexual harassment and sexual assault, regardless of whether the agreement existed prior to the Act’s enactment. In response, employers should review their current arbitration agreements for revisions if the Act is enacted.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Max Garfield, Scott A. Gold and Donna K. Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 374, 395-401 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); White v. WeWork Cos. Inc., No. 1:20-CV-01800-CM (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2020).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Max Garfield

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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