ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
EU Competition Law: New Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations and Horizontal Guidelines
June 14, 2023
Read time: 11 min
European Commission adopts the final version of the much-anticipated Research & Development Block Exemption Regulation and Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation, as well as the Horizontal Guidelines.
On 1 June 2023, the European Commission (Commission) adopted and published the revised Research and Development Block Exemption Regulation (R&D BER) and Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation (Specialisation BER), together referred to as the Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations (HBERs), accompanied by the revised Horizontal Guidelines (HGLs).
The adoption of the new HBERs and HGLs comes after the conduct of a similar review process and adoption of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and Vertical Guidelines in May 2022, which we discussed in our European Competition Review 2022.
This revised horizontal package aims at providing businesses with clearer and up-to-date guidance to help them self-assess the compatibility of their horizontal cooperation agreements with EU competition law. As the current horizontal rules and guidelines are due to expire on 30 June 2023, the revised HBERs will apply from 1 July 2023, while the revised HGLs will enter into force following their publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, which should take place in the course of July 2023.
Background
Horizontal agreements are entered into between actual or potential competitors. While these types of agreements can lead to substantial benefits, they can also reduce competition and may potentially infringe Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits agreements between companies that restrict competition.
Adopted in 2010 and 2011 respectively, the current horizontal regulations and guidelines exempt research and development and specialisation agreements, as well as other types of agreements (such as production, purchasing, commercialisation, standardisation and information exchange) that meet specific thresholds and certain conditions under Article 101(1) TFEU, thus falling within the scope of the safe harbour.
Following different public consultations processes conducted over several months, the Commission has considered the suggestions for improvements made during these public consultations and adopted the final version of the regulations and guidelines, which have been adapted in line with the Commission’s policies on digital and green transitions. Below, we highlight the main changes in the revised HBERs and HGLs and provide key takeaways for businesses.
Overview of the Main Changes in the Revised HBERs and HGLs
Clarification of Key Competition Law Concepts
With the aim of providing clearer guidance, the revised HGLs provide definitions and clarifications of key competition law concepts used in the application of Article 101 TFEU. The following notions are now defined in line with recent EU case law: undertaking, concerted practice, actual and potential competition, restrictions by object and by effect, and ancillary restraints (see Chapter 1 HGLs).
The HGLs also reflect developments in EU case law in their guidance on the application of Article 101 TFEU to agreements between joint ventures and their parent companies (see Chapter 1 HGLs).
Expanded Scope of the Horizontal Block Exemption and Further Clarification
The revised HBERs and HGLs introduce significant changes regarding their scope of application and guidance clarification:
| Type of Agreement | Key Changes |
| R&D Agreements |
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| Specialisation Agreements |
|
| Purchasing Agreements |
|
| Commercialisation Agreements |
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| Standardisation Agreements and Standards Terms |
|
New Agreements Covered by the HBERs and HGLs
The HGLs introduce a new section within the Chapter on Production Agreements that focuses on mobile telecommunications infrastructure sharing agreements, also referred to as network sharing agreements (NSAs). NSAs are defined as agreements under which mobile telecommunications network operators share the use of parts of their network infrastructure, operating costs, and the cost of subsequent upgrades and maintenance.
The Commission considers NSAs as unlikely to restrict competition by object unless they are used to engage in a cartel. However, NSAs can have restrictive effects on competition, and the guidelines subsequently set out the relevant factors for the case-by-case competitive assessment: characteristics of the mobile infrastructure sharing, scope of the shared services and technologies, geographic scope and market coverage, characteristics of the markets in question, and number of agreements and identity of participating operators. The HGLs further provide minimum cumulative requirements, so that NSAs are not considered, prima facie, as likely to have restrictive effects (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6 HGLs).
Also focusing on its green transition, the Commission included a whole new chapter on sustainability agreements, which are broadly defined and based on the UN Sustainable Development Goals. They refer to any horizontal cooperation agreement that pursues a sustainability objective, irrespective of the form of the cooperation, with further additional examples. Guidance is also included on the relationship between sustainability agreements and other chapters of the HGLs (e.g., joint purchasing agreements, commercialisation agreements and purchasing agreements), as there may be important overlap. The HGLs emphasize that sustainability agreements do not constitute a distinct category of horizontal agreement but must be assessed following guidance of all relevant chapters of the guidelines, in addition to the sustainability agreements guidance provided in Chapter 9.
More importantly, the HGLs clarify that agreements that restrict competition cannot escape the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) simply by referring to a sustainability objective. To benefit from an exemption, sustainability agreements restricting competition – and therefore falling within the scope of article 101 TFEU – must satisfy four cumulative conditions set out in article 101(3) TFEU, for which the HGLs provide assessment guidance.
The HGLs also introduce a soft safe harbour for sustainability standardisation agreements meeting six cumulative conditions (see Chapter 9, Section 9.3 HGLs). The objective is to ensure that the sustainability standard does not lead to an appreciable restriction of competition.
Additional Guidance on Information Exchange
The expanded guidance on information exchange is a cornerstone of the new horizontal package. The new rules and guidelines now deliver accurate and up-to-date practical guidance, through an entirely rewritten chapter, to reflect significant recent EU case law.
For the purpose of the guidance, information exchange is defined as including the exchange of (i) raw, unorganised digital content that may need processing in order to make it useful (raw data); (ii) pre-processed data, that has already been prepared and validated; (iii) data that has been manipulated in order to produce meaningful information of any form, as well as (iv) any other type of information, including non-digital information. It includes physical information sharing and digital data sharing between actual or potential competitors.
While the Commission does not provide a safe harbour for information exchange, it aims at properly defining commercially sensitive information and the context in which the information exchange can or cannot occur, with additional practical examples (see Chapter 6 HGLs for more details).
To this extent, the revised guidance considers the following: (i) the concept of commercially sensitive information, (ii) the types of information exchange that may constitute restrictions of competition by object, (iii) potential pro-competitive effects of data pools, (iv) indirect forms of information exchange, including hub-and-spoke arrangements or shared algorithms, (v) anti-competitive signalling via public announcements, and (vi) practical measures that companies can take to avoid infringements, such as limiting the scope of the exchange, using clean teams or independent trustees and public distancing.
More specifically, the HGLs provide new specific developments on data sharing and indirect forms of information exchange (i.e., when taking place via third party, a case-by-case analysis would be required to establish whether the exchange constitutes an anti-competitive agreement). This extension reflects a surge in recent years of such exchanges, which can be pro-competitive unless companies use the information to coordinate. The guidelines emphasize in different examples that data and algorithms can generate efficiencies, as they can reduce costs and barriers to entry. The HGLs nevertheless consider the risk incurred, where the data shared is of strategic importance.
Finally, the guidelines aim to ensure that companies are able to perform a clear and adequate self-assessment before entering into sensitive information exchange with commercial partners. The HGLs provide a self-assessment flow chart (see Chapter 6, pt. 434 HGLs) and an indicative table to help assess liability for exchanges of commercially sensitive information (see Chapter 6, pt. 435 HGLs). As the HGLs do not include a safe harbour for information exchange, the assessment must be completed by the companies themselves.
How to Navigate the Revised HBERs and HGLs?
Application of the New HBERs and HGLs – Timetable
Long awaited, the new HBERs and HGLs bring welcomed clarity and hopefully more legal certainty.
The revised HBERs will enter into force on 1 July 2023 and apply until 30 June 2035. However, a transitional period of two years (from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2025) is provided by the revised HBERs. During this period, agreements that do not satisfy the conditions for exemption set by the revised HBERs but which meet the condition of one of the previous HBERs will remain block exempted – meaning that the revised HBERs do not apply to contracts in force before 30 June 2023. In practice, contracts currently in line with the existing HBERs will need to comply with the new regulations from 1 July 2025.
Considering that the revised HBERs will enter into force very soon, companies should examine whether their existing agreements are in line with the revised horizontal rules and also see whether there are any new exemption opportunities from which they may benefit.
*Trainee Adrien Barrocas also contributed to this article.

Whistleblower Update – Implementation into German national law (“HinSchG“)
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Whistleblower Update – Implementation into German national law (“HinSchG“)
June 14, 2023
Read time: 6 min
Düsseldorf, June 14, 2023 – The Act Implementing the Whistleblower Directive (“Whistleblower Protec-tion Act” – HinSchG) was promulgated on June 02, 2023 and comes into force one month after promul-gation on July 02, 2023. Companies with 50 or more employees are required to set up whistleblower systems within a specified period. A transitional arrangement applies to companies with up to 250 employees: They do not have to implement the regulations until December 17, 2023.
1. BACKGROUND
The aim of the Whistleblower Protection Act (HinSchG) is to implement the so-called Whistleblower Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of October 23, 2019, for improved whistleblower protection and to create legal certainty when reporting or disclosing wrongdoing in companies and public authorities. The aim of the law is the protection of so-called “whistleblowers”, i.e., natural persons who have obtained information about violations throughout their professional activities and carry this information to designated reporting channels. In addition to persons who report breaches of Union law, the HinSchG also covers whistleblowers who report violations of national law.
2. WHO IS AFFECTED BY THE ACT?
In principle, whistleblower systems must be set up by legal entities in the private sector with at least 50 workers. All enterprises having up to 250 employees must have implemented the requirements of the Whistleblower Protection Act by December 17, 2023 at the latest. Companies with a workforce of more than 250 employees are required to implementation as early as July 02, 2023. The same applies to highly regulated companies pursuant to Section 12 para. 3 HinSchG, regardless of their number of employees, such as capital management companies or insurance companies. For listed companies, A.2 of the German Corporate Governance Code contains a recommendation to set up a whistleblower system, which is independent of the size or number of workers of the company.
3. OBLIGATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COMPANIES
Companies are required to establish and operate internal reporting channels for whistleblowers and to provide access to external reporting channels. Internal reporting channels to which the workers can turn, will be set up and operated by the employer itself or a third party entrusted by the employer (e.g., a law firm), see Section 14 para. 1 HinSchG. In an international group, “third party” may also be another group company. In this case, it must be ensured that that the implementation of a central reporting channel at a company of the group does not lead to any obstacles to access in comparison with a setup of the channel directly in the same company. For example, it must be possible to report in the working language of the entrusting company.
In case of entrusting a third party with the tasks of an internal reporting channel, the obligation to take appropriate measures to remedy any violations remains with the entrusting company, see Section 14 para. 1 sent. 2 HinSchG. At the same time, whistleblowers are encouraged to turn to the internal reporting channel if this is likely to be successful and there is no fear of reprisals. However, whistleblowers have the choice of using an internal reporting channel or reporting their information to an external reporting channel – possibly also due to fears of a lack of anonymity. The act does not provide for any legal consequences for prioritizing the external reporting channel in a manner that deviates from the legislative intent. External reporting channels are competent authorities that are authorized to receive reports. Such an external reporting channel is set up, for example, at the Federal Office of Justice or by the federal states in the respective state and local administrations. Internal and external reporting channels have in common that they are not required to set up anonymous reporting channels. However, anonymous reports must still be taken into account and processed. The Whistleblower Protection Act also prohibits companies from taking reprisals against whistleblowers. Even the threat or attempt to impose sanctions are prohibited. This applies towards suspension, dismissal, salary reduction, non-renewal of a fixedterm employment contract and any intimidation attempts on the part of the employer towards its employees. The Act provides for an employee-protective reversal of the burden of proof, which in practice will not play a major role, at least in the main case of termination, due to the existing distribution of the burden of proof under the Dismissal Protection Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz). Only in the case of terminations outside the scope of the Dismissal Protection Act may bring this reversal of the burden of proof a relevant change. Pursuant to Section 36 para. 2 of the HinSchG, it is presumed that an occupational disadvantage following a report or disclosure is a reprisal. However, the reversal of the burden of proof only occurs if the person providing the information states the possible connection. In the event of a violation by the company, the whistleblower shall be entitled to compensation for the resulting damage. If an employer who is covered by the HinSchG does not set up an internal reporting channel, fails to operate it properly or takes a reprisal, he commits an administrative offense. Violations of this kind can be punished under the HinSchG with a fine up to EUR 50,000.00.
4. RECOMMENDATION TO COMPANIES
Companies covered by the HinSchG should now, at the latest, endeavor to establish appropriate reporting channels within the timeframe set by the legislator. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the Act will enter into force earlier compared to the previous draft. The act enters into force one month after promulgation – on July 02, 2023. In particular, international groups of companies and corporations should review the structure of its whistleblowing system, the arrangement and setup of the individual reporting channel(s) as well as the related documentation against the background of the current legal developments. If group companies exist in different EU Member States, the differences in the implementation of the EU Whistleblower Directive in the respective Member States must be taken into account. We will, of course, be pleased to support you in the legal review and the implementation of technical solutions in compliance with the applicable best practice standards. Sanctions for employers who have not set up an internal reporting channel are only to be feared after the transitional period of six months, but before then there is already a risk that whistleblowers will immediately turn to external reporting channels.

SuperValu: It’s Not Super Bad! A Practical Look at the Supreme Court’s Recent FCA Scienter Ruling
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
SuperValu: It’s Not Super Bad! A Practical Look at the Supreme Court’s Recent FCA Scienter Ruling
June 13, 2023
Read time: 12 min
Two separate lawsuits alleging False Claims Act (FCA) violations by retail drug pharmacies made their way to the Supreme Court of the United States this term. The lawsuits decided whether the pharmacies could defeat these claims based on the FCA’s scienter standard if their lawyers could point to an “objectively reasonable” interpretation of an ambiguous regulation supporting their approach, even if the pharmacies did not believe the interpretation at the time. On June 1, 2023, the Court unanimously said no. This article addresses the Court’s opinion, the limitations on its applicability and practical considerations for healthcare providers and others operating in a world of ambiguous regulatory requirements.
On June 1, 2023, the Supreme Court released its opinion in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., No. 21-1326, and United States ex rel. Proctor v. Safeway, Inc., No. 22-111. The question the Court faced was this: where a complex regulation is ambiguous, does it violate the FCA to submit a claim for reimbursement that is consistent with one reasonable interpretation of the regulation if the party making the claim did not actually believe that interpretation was correct at the time? The Court ruled that this is indeed a violation of the FCA. The required scienter is present when an entity submits a claim that it does not believe is permitted, even if its lawyers can point to another interpretation of the regulation that would allow the claim.
The underlying cases allege that SuperValu’s and Safeway’s retail pharmacies violated the FCA by reporting the full retail price of prescription drugs as their public “usual and customary” price, a data point that Medicare and Medicaid regulations require, when in fact those drugs were provided at a significantly discounted price to many cash-paying patients. The relators (whistleblowers) alleged that not only were the pharmacies required to report the discounted price as their “usual and customary” price, but that the pharmacies in fact knew that they should have reported the discounted prices.
The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit previously ruled, in granting summary judgment in favor of the pharmacies, that they could not have acted “knowingly” if the pharmacies’ actions were consistent with any objectively reasonable interpretation of the phrase “usual and customary”—even if they did not believe that interpretation at the time.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the FCA’s knowledge requirement, positing that this view would require a claim “to be objectively unreasonable, as a legal matter, before a defendant could be held liable for ‘knowingly’ submitting a false claim, no matter what the defendant thought.” Instead, SuperValu holds that a defendant’s subjective knowledge and beliefs are what must be reviewed to determine if they acted “knowingly” under the FCA (a standard that includes reckless disregard). Thus, if a defendant both (1) “correctly interpreted” the relevant phrase and (2) “believed their claims were false” when submitting the claim, then they could have acted knowingly.
One procedural point bears emphasis. No court has yet confirmed which interpretation of the regulation the pharmacies believed and/or held (as the relators allege) that they did not believe the interpretation they acted on. The Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment on the grounds that it did not matter what the pharmacies believed. Rejecting this, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve these disputed questions about knowledge and intent.
WHILE MEANINGFUL, SUPERVALU IS LIMITED
The SuperValu opinion is clear on its limited scope, only touching “one discrete legal issue.” Justice Thomas writes that the only question before the Supreme Court is whether the pharmacies “could have the scienter required by the FCA if they correctly understood that standard and thought that their claims were inaccurate.” In other words, this opinion does not address a scenario where the defendant honestly believed and submitted claims based on an objectively reasonable interpretation of the law, even if a court later rules that the interpretation is wrong (i.e., falsity but no scienter). Nor does it address a scenario where the defendant submitted claims that it believed were false but were actually permitted by the regulation (i.e., scienter but not falsity).
While the opinion is significant, it has limits:
- The opinion did not reach the interplay of ambiguous regulations and “falsity,” a separate (and critical) required element of proof in any FCA case. This is a meaningful limitation. Even if there is evidence that a defendant had doubts about its interpretation of a particular ambiguous regulation at the time of the alleged violation, a defendant is not precluded, by virtue of SuperValu, from later arguing to a court that its claims were not “false” because it did not, in fact, violate the regulation. If a court were to agree in a particular case, SuperValu would be irrelevant as the separate element of “knowledge” would not need to be reached because there was no violation. In other words, if one mistakenly believes they are violating a law that they are not actually violating, there can be no liability. Thus, regulatory ambiguity still has relevance for defensive purposes in FCA cases.
- The opinion is limited to instances where there is evidence that a defendant believed their claims were false in the face of ambiguity. If there is an ambiguous standard that is incorrectly interpreted but a defendant actually believed its incorrect interpretation, then there would be no “knowledge” to support FCA liability.
- The opinion does not touch the element of materiality, which is a key component of proof in any FCA case. Even if a defendant knowingly violated a regulation, an FCA plaintiff still must clear the materiality hurdle by demonstrating that the regulatory violation at issue was meaningful to a government payor’s decision to reimburse claims. If not, then there is no violation. This may be particularly important given some of the opinion’s practical implications concerning reaching out to regulators about ambiguous regulations in real-time (see below for more).
- Unlike many truly ambiguous regulations, “usual and customary” public pricing is a long-standing term of art and standard in the healthcare industry, and thus the ambiguity in these cases is less acute than in other federal healthcare program (FHCP) rules. The evidence was also unfavorable, including emails between SuperValu executives describing the discount program as a “stealthy approach” and cautioning employees away from documenting their discount approach in writing. Here, the pharmacies were not only seemingly told by state Medicaid agencies and pharmacy benefit managers that their position was not reasonably supportable, but they also were alleged to have taken steps to cloak the discount program from reporting. Given the summary judgment procedural posture and the appellate review undertaken by the Supreme Court, this evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to relators.
There is no question that SuperValu is a significant decision that will make it more difficult for some defendants to achieve dismissal or summary judgment on the issue of scienter. With that said, whether a defendant acted knowingly has always been an element of proof that is more difficult than others to eliminate in motion practice because many courts hold that it is bound up in competing facts that a jury should assess.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ISSUES
SuperValu’s effect on FCA litigation will be more limited than relators and the government tout, and the opinion itself also suffers from incorrect assumptions about how the healthcare industry operates. The opinion seems to assume that a healthcare provider will be able to get a clear-cut, authoritative answer from an agency and that there is one agency view of the meaning of every regulation and requirement; however, anyone with experience in healthcare is painfully aware that this is not the case. Further, it’s no secret that different employees within a provider or supplier may also have differing views, both before and after receiving “clarifications” and submitting claims, for example. If some people believe X is the right interpretation and others believe Y is, whose views constitute scienter for the organization? As discussed above, SuperValu may not have been the best vehicle to resolve the knowledge issue because the regulation before it was not particularly ambiguous.
Another limitation is that SuperValu suggests that companies can easily learn the “correct” meaning of an ambiguous rule. There is often not a clear pathway for providers and suppliers to seek definitive guidance quickly. The various agencies involved in regulating healthcare, such as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Office of Inspector General, state Medicaid agencies, state medical boards and licensing agencies, take different approaches to handling questions, including declining to answer or never responding. Even if providers or suppliers secure a response, as noted above, the interpretations and answers they receive can, and often do, differ from person to person.
SuperValu also leaves the question of what exactly creates an awareness of an “unjustifiably high risk” of falsity unanswered, something Justice Thomas suggests could qualify as scienter in his reasonable driver “speed limit” analogy. The phrase “unjustifiably high risk” conveys that there should be a high evidentiary bar to proving this standard. Justice Thomas’s rather simple analogy does not provide much insight into how providers and suppliers can seek clarification of complex ambiguous rules in the healthcare industry, who can meaningfully opine ambiguous rules, and what kind of data (and how much) is required for providers and suppliers to have ascertained the “correct” meaning of a rule (therefore creating an “unjust risk” if they act contrary to that meaning). Is it one regulator at an agency telling you their interpretation of an ambiguous rule? A written response from a Medicare contractor’s help desk? Two Medicare contractors’ auditors that seemingly agree on an interpretation? A formal published document (e.g., an FAQ or advisory opinion) that the agency labels non-binding and did not go through notice and comment rulemaking? Which of these is enough to defeat summary judgment and which is enough for the relator or government to prevail at trial?
This inquiry into agency interpretation and guidance raises two intersecting issues that affect FCA litigation and compliance advice: the role of sub-regulatory guidance in demonstrating falsity and materiality under the FCA and the potential future of the Chevron doctrine in light of the Supreme Court’s decision to review Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo next term. Is informal or other sub-regulatory guidance enough to defeat any defense that a defendant honestly believed the incorrect interpretation of the law, contrary to the informal guidance? Organizations and courts will continue to grapple with these questions.
So where does this leave an industry faced with ambiguous rules? When it comes to a healthcare organization’s overarching compliance approach, perhaps SuperValu’s impact is somewhat minimal. Providers, suppliers, manufacturers and other companies operating in the highly regulated environment of healthcare should continue to take the appropriate steps to ensure they have an awareness of applicable rules, use reasonable safeguards to promote compliance and help minimize risk in the face of ambiguity and obtain legal advice from competent healthcare regulatory counsel. Organizations may also consider taking additional steps when faced with a truly ambiguous rule including (1) formalizing their interpretation, (2) making the government aware of that interpretation and, if warranted by the underlying facts and nature of the ambiguity, (3) challenging the government’s interpretation:
- Formalizing the interpretation internally, either through written legal advice or after consulting with competent healthcare legal counsel, can address the potential for differing views that create confusion as to the organization’s official interpretation. Relying on a privileged document for this purpose may result in a request by the government to waive privilege, so it may be useful to consider creating non-privileged documents that reflect the organization’s position on a particular issue. This process may also help to develop organizational consensus on the official position on a particular issue in the face of differing internal views. Individuals who feel their voice is not being heard, even if their views are wrong, can turn into relators.
- It can be useful to consider ways to make the government aware of an organization’s interpretation or position, which would be helpful for both scienter and materiality. This approach is not limited to asking the agency if the interpretation is correct. As discussed above, oftentimes one does not receive an answer to the question, or the answer may not come from a source that is authoritative. Also, asking the agency about each interpretative question in healthcare is not practical, feasible or even advisable. There are other ways to document an organization’s views, such as submitting comments to proposed rules or requests for information issued by agencies, sending correspondence to CMS or a Medicare contractor explaining a position in an overpayment refund (or why a refund is not necessary), or otherwise documenting an organization’s stance through letters and audit responses. Organizations wishing to maintain some level of anonymity can also use their trade associations and legal counsel to document industry views and interpretations in both the formal comment submitting process and informal agency outreach.
- Organizations may also want to consider the legal challenges to agency actions or interpretations more often. Organizations typically limit agency legal challenges to appealing claims denials. However, the cost versus benefit analysis of appealing claims denials oftentimes results in a decision to not appeal, even if the organization disagrees with the denial reason. In certain circumstances, pursuing some level of appeal may be a pathway to documenting the organization’s position on an ambiguous standard, which would show a subjective belief in that position. If the appeal is not successful, it would be useful to have healthcare legal counsel advise as to the reliability of that decision in formulating the organizational position on the issue going forward. Beyond appealing claims denials, many organizations are reluctant to sue an agency because they are afraid of jeopardizing its relationship with the regulator. That fear is not justified in many circumstances, as some organizations have sued CMS and won those lawsuits.
In short, SuperValu is a significant decision, but its true reach is more limited than some would suggest. Finding practical ways to manage risk in the face of ambiguous rules will be critical, particularly for those in an industry like healthcare where ambiguous rules abound.

Deadlines for the Adoption of Clawback Policies Extended
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Deadlines for the Adoption of Clawback Policies Extended
June 13, 2023
Read time: 2 min
On June 9, 2023, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved amendments to clawback policy listing standards proposed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (Nasdaq) that extend the effective date of the exchanges’ respective listing standards to October 2, 2023. Under the amended listing standards, issuers listed on the NYSE and Nasdaq now have until December 1, 2023 (60 days from the new effective date) to comply with their respective exchange’s listing standards.
In addition to extending the effective and compliance dates for clawback policies, the NYSE’s amendment also updates its proposed delisting procedures for noncompliance to provide issuers a cure period of up to 12 months instead of immediate suspension of trading in such issuer’s securities and commencement of delisting. The NYSE’s updated delisting procedure is consistent with Nasdaq’s delisting procedure, which also allows for a cure period for noncompliance. The NYSE and Nasdaq proposed clawback policy listing standards that were originally expected to take effect on June 9, 2023, with a compliance date of August 8, 2023. Issuers listed on these exchanges will now have a few extra months to consider, discuss and adopt clawback policies before the revised deadlines.

Second Circuit Assesses Propriety of Third-Party Releases in Purdue
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Second Circuit Assesses Propriety of Third-Party Releases in Purdue
June 12, 2023
Read time: 9 min
On May 30, 2023, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit released its long-awaited opinion addressing Purdue Pharma’s confirmed chapter 11 bankruptcy plan. Although the appeal challenged more than one aspect of the plan, the Court’s decision was highly anticipated for its discussion of one topic in particular: nonconsensual third-party releases.
THIRD-PARTY RELEASES
No subject in modern bankruptcy law is more hotly debated than third-party releases. The power of bankruptcy lies in its ability to discharge a debtor’s pre-bankruptcy debts and thereby provide the debtor with a coveted “fresh start.” However, bankruptcy has also been used to resolve the liabilities of third parties who share an interest with the debtor (e.g., equity holders, directors, officers and lenders). This quasi-discharge is effectuated by including provisions in a chapter 11 plan that bar creditors and other interested parties from asserting their direct claims against specified third parties once the plan is confirmed.
In most cases, third-party releases are consensual (e.g., where parties must affirmatively opt into the release) or at least deemed consensual (e.g., where parties receive the option to opt out). Although there is some disagreement regarding what constitutes “consent” for purposes of a consensual release, a plan’s inclusion of consensual releases is relatively uncontroversial. The real controversy arises when a plan imposes third-party releases and provides no ability to opt out. In such a case, a party would be precluded from asserting its own claims against the third parties following plan confirmation. That was the situation in Purdue.
Case law recognizes that nonconsensual third-party releases are problematic. These releases conflict with the notion that bankruptcy’s benefits are reserved for parties who file for bankruptcy and, in doing so, subject themselves to the bankruptcy process and everything it legally entails. Accordingly, in some jurisdictions, nonconsensual third-party releases are strictly forbidden. Other jurisdictions permit such releases, but even those courts acknowledge that they represent the exception, not the rule, and are only appropriate in limited circumstances.
PURDUE’S CHAPTER 11 PLAN
One jurisdiction that has historically permitted nonconsensual third-party releases is the Second Circuit, which encompasses courts in the Southern District of New York (where Purdue filed its chapter 11 case). Purdue’s financial troubles stemmed from its production and sale of OxyContin, a powerful painkiller that has been cited as a major cause of the opiate epidemic. In the wake of this public health emergency, innumerable lawsuits were filed against Purdue for its role in the crisis. Significantly, though, this litigation implicated not only Purdue itself but also the Sackler family, who owned and operated the company for decades.
After filing for bankruptcy, Purdue submitted and the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ultimately confirmed a chapter 11 plan that comprehensively addressed the company’s opiate-related liabilities. The plan, however, went a step further and released certain civil claims against the Sackler family as well. In exchange for receiving this release, the Sacklers agreed to contribute billions of dollars to the bankruptcy as part of a global settlement. Despite the unprecedented size of the Sacklers’ contribution, the plan was opposed by the US Trustee, certain Canadian municipalities and indigenous tribes and various individual creditors.
After the bankruptcy court confirmed the plan and its release of the Sacklers, the bankruptcy court’s ruling was appealed to the district court. In that initial appeal, the district court held that bankruptcy courts have subject matter jurisdiction to approve third-party releases but lack statutory authority to do so under the US Bankruptcy Code. On that basis, the district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order.
THE SECOND CIRCUIT OPINION
The district court’s ruling was then appealed to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit found that the outcome of the appeal turned on two questions:
- Does the Bankruptcy Code permit nonconsensual releases of claims against non-debtor third parties through a chapter 11 plan?
- If so, were the releases proper given the facts and circumstances of Purdue’s case?
The Court held that the answer to both questions was “yes.”
The Second Circuit first considered whether the bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction over the released claims. A bankruptcy court has broad jurisdiction over matters that might have a “conceivable effect” on the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. The Court found that the released claims were likely to affect the bankruptcy estate because the claims were closely related to claims that the bankruptcy estate itself possessed against the Sacklers and subject to an agreement requiring Purdue to indemnify the Sacklers. This nexus between the released claims and the bankruptcy estate was sufficient to confer jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court.
Next, the Second Circuit considered whether the releases were statutorily authorized by the Bankruptcy Code. The Court pointed to two Bankruptcy Code provisions as supporting the inclusion of third-party releases in a plan: Sections 105(a) and 1123(b)(6). Section 105(a) codifies a bankruptcy court’s equitable authority to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1123(b)(6) allows a chapter 11 plan to “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions” of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court determined that these two broadly worded provisions, working in tandem, provided the necessary statutory basis for a plan’s inclusion of third-party releases. The Court bolstered its ruling by reference to prior Second Circuit case law and the decisions of its sister circuits.
After concluding that the Bankruptcy Code does permit third-party releases in plans, the Second Circuit turned to the issue of when such releases are appropriate. On this question, the Court articulated seven non-exclusive factors for courts to consider when determining whether to approve a nonconsensual third-party release:
- Whether there is an identity of interest between the debtor and the to-be-released party (such as an indemnification relationship) such that a suit against the non-debtor is tantamount to a suit against the bankruptcy estate
- Whether claims against the debtor and non-debtor are “factually and legally intertwined”
- Whether the scope of the release is appropriate (e., whether its “breadth” is “necessary to the Plan”)
- Whether the releases are essential to the reorganization and not an attempt by the third party to manipulate the process for its own advantage
- Whether the non-debtor party receiving the release contributed substantial assets to the reorganization
- Whether the impacted class of creditors “overwhelmingly” support the plan and its releases
- Whether the plan provides for the fair payment of enjoined claims.
The Second Circuit derived these factors from its own case law as well as several leading cases from other jurisdictions, including the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the Dow Corning Corporation bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri’s “widely cited” decision in In re Master Mortgage Investment Fund. Finding that these newly articulated factors supported the Sackler release, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that the bankruptcy court properly approved the plan and releases.
Circuit Judge Richard C. Wesley filed his own opinion, which is best described as a reluctant concurrence. He found that the outcome was dictated by existing Second Circuit case law that had not been overruled by either the full Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. After acknowledging that the majority opinion aligned with existing precedent, Judge Wesley proceeded to explain the myriad of issues with nonconsensual third-party releases that have led some courts to disallow them entirely.
Judge Wesley found that the “statutory footing” for third-party releases was questionable and emphasized that third-party releases deviated from bankruptcy’s general purpose: to modify the debtor-creditor relationship, not the relationships between third parties. He also pointed out two important aspects of the releases in the Purdue plan that he viewed as troubling. First, the releases provided to the Sacklers were even broader than the discharge a bankruptcy debtor could receive because the Bankruptcy Code prohibits debts arising out of fraud from ever being discharged, but the third-party releases in the Purdue case had no carveout for fraud. Second, Judge Wesley highlighted that under the terms of the Purdue plan, claimants are not entitled to any recovery on account of the release of third-party claims—claimants are receiving a recovery only on account of claims against the debtors.
Finally, Judge Wesley pointed out that because federal circuits are split on this issue, whether a non-debtor can be released nonconsensually under a plan is currently determined by geography. This state of affairs conflicts with the US Constitution’s directive that Congress establish “uniform” bankruptcy laws. Given the magnitude of this issue, which has divided courts for decades, Judge Wesley observed that the question is ripe for review by the Supreme Court.
TAKEAWAYS
In one sense, the Purdue opinion is not particularly groundbreaking. Nonconsensual third-party releases were permissible in the Second Circuit before this decision, and they remain permissible after it. Yet, despite not fundamentally shifting the landscape, this opinion is a critical addition to case law because the Court established a clear framework for evaluating nonconsensual third-party releases. Bankruptcy courts have received minimal guidance from appellate courts regarding how to analyze such releases. This lack of circuit-level precedent makes the Second Circuit’s articulation of specific relevant factors especially important. And although the decision is not binding outside the Second Circuit, it is safe to say that courts in other jurisdictions will look to this decision as persuasive authority.
The significance of this decision is magnified by the fact that bankruptcy courts have become the go-to venue for resolving mass tort liabilities, as was the case in Purdue. Mass tort bankruptcies almost invariably involve significant claims against non-debtor third parties, making the propriety of third-party releases a critical inflection point. The Second Circuit’s analysis of third-party releases will undoubtedly be front of mind as parties in similar cases try to craft solutions to comprehensively resolve these types of complex and multifaceted disputes.

NLRB Targets Noncompete Agreements at Union and Nonunion Companies
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
NLRB Targets Noncompete Agreements at Union and Nonunion Companies
June 12, 2023
Read time: 7 min
In Memorandum GC 23-08 (Memo), Jennifer A. Abruzzo, General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), announced that her office would target for prosecution both union and nonunion employers for offering, maintaining or enforcing noncompete agreements. The Memo does not carry the force of law but signals the General Counsel’s prosecutorial intent.
There is, however, no reason to scrap all post-employment covenants.
BACKGROUND
Noncompetes have received substantial attention of late, much of it negative. This includes a proposed rule from the Federal Trade Commission and a slew of state laws, most recently in Minnesota, which just banned noncompetes in a new statute effective July 1, 2023.
Noncompete contracts ban working for a defined universe of “competing companies” for a certain period of time after leaving the employment. Nonsolicitation contracts are distinct types of agreements that ban soliciting either customers or coworkers for a certain period of time after leaving the employment.
As a matter of common law, post-employment agreements typically require three key elements to be enforceable: (1) a protectable business interest warranting post-employment protection; (2) a limitation that is reasonable in time given that interest; and (3) a limitation that is reasonable in scope (geographic and otherwise) given that interest.
ANALYSIS
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) became law in 1935. In the ensuing 88 years, that statute has not been applied to regulate noncompetes. So, the NLRB is late to the party on noncompetes and—perhaps as a result—the Memo criticizes noncompetes in general but proposes only hyper-limited regulation of those agreements.
First, the Memo stands entirely silent on nonsolicitation agreements, tacitly accepting without mentioning the current state of the law on those agreements. So, nonsolicitation agreements that are properly drafted to be enforceable under state law lie outside the realm of the NLRB’s current prosecutorial interests.
Second, the Memo accepts that noncompetes “narrowly tailored to special circumstances justifying the infringement on employee rights” are perfectly proper, citing “Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 cmt. b (1981) (post-employment restraint on competition ‘must usually be justified on the ground that the employer has a legitimate interest in restraining the employee from appropriating valuable trade information and customer relationships to which he has had access in the course of his employment’)” to illustrate and define what is proper.
This acceptance of the Restatement is huge because it cabins the scope of the NLRB’s interest to “overbroad non-compete” agreements. This is re-emphasized in the very next paragraph of the Memo where the General Counsel asserts that her prosecution targets are those noncompetes lacking a protectable business interest (i.e., those already unenforceable under state law):
It is unlikely an employer’s justification would be considered reasonable in common situations where overbroad non-compete provisions are imposed on low-wage or middle-wage workers who lack access to trade secrets or other protectible interests, or in states where non-compete provisions are unenforceable.
If it seems curious for the NLRB’s General Counsel to threaten to prosecute only noncompetes that cannot be enforced anywhere at all, that may be due to failing to read the General Counsel’s memos and Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland concurrently because both embrace parallel thinking in prosecutorial theories:
“Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to leave the court.” Everybody looked at Alice. “I’m not a mile high,” said Alice. “You are,” said the King. “Nearly two miles high,” added the Queen. “Well, I sha’n’t go, at any rate,” said Alice; “besides, that’s not a regular rule: you invented it just now.” “It’s the oldest rule in the book,” said the King. “Then it ought to be Number One,” said Alice.
Here, the General Counsel aims to broaden the scope of what constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA by applying the General Counsel’s flexible theory of “chilling” employee rights. According to the Memo, noncompete provisions may chill employees’ exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the NLRA by inhibiting their ability to:
- Concertedly threaten to resign to demand better working conditions;
- Carry out those threats to resign or otherwise concertedly resigning to secure improved working conditions;
- Concertedly seek or accept employment with a local competitor to obtain better working conditions;
- Solicit their coworkers to go work for a local competitor as part of a broader course of protected concerted activity; or
- Seek employment, at least in part, to specifically engage in protected activity with other workers at an employer’s workplace.
But that “chill” is merely the first step in the proper analysis and oversimplifies the NLRA—a critical defect that the federal appellate courts will likely, in time, correct upon reviewing cases employing this new interpretation (if the NLRB actually adopts this theory being advocated by its General Counsel).
Rights under the NLRA are not unlimited, and so the required analysis must include balancing all countervailing employer interests. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) (“[I]t is only when the interference with [Section] 7 rights outweighs the business justification for the employer’s action that [Section] 8(a)(1) is violated.”).
The Memo is yet another in a series that seeks to change business behavior merely by announcing that prosecutions may be coming. Such memos are not self-executing. And, apart from the internal flaws that make this a threat of limited force, there is also pending litigation challenging these memos on constitutional grounds. Associated Builders and Contractors of Michigan v. Abruzzo, No. 1:23-cv-00277 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2023), ECF No. 1.
NEXT STEPS
The Memo is applicable to noncompete agreements involving employees as that term is defined under the NLRA. Managers and supervisors are excluded from that definition but included are many high-paying positions, such as physicians or salespersons in nonsupervisory or nonmanagerial jobs. In addition, “true independent-contractor relationships” are also excluded.
While the Memo aspires to induce employers into abandoning all post-employment restrictions on their employees to avoid having to litigate charges before the NLRB, there are other and better options given the hyper-limited regulation of such agreements proposed by the Memo. Those better options include the following:
- Employers should ensure that post-employment covenants comply with any applicable state-specific requirements;
- Employers should determine which post-employment covenants (nonsolicits versus noncompetes versus confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements) are needed;
- Employers should ensure that post-employment covenants are reasonably tailored in time and scope (e.g., a hedge fund has a legitimate business interest in preventing a financial analyst from performing identical work for a rival hedge fund, but no such interest in preventing that analyst from working for a competitor as a janitor); and
- Employers should seek post-employment covenants only where there is a legally protectable interest in doing so (and should typically identify such interests in the written documents incorporating those post-employment covenants).
Post-employment covenants remain alive and well for those who understand the applicable laws.

Top Takeaways | PPM, ASC and Health System Collaborations and Innovation
ARTICLE
Top Takeaways | PPM, ASC and Health System Collaborations and Innovation
June 12, 2023
Read time: 3 min
In this moderated session, panelists discuss how physician practice management companies (PPMs), ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) and health systems are both competing and collaborating in the evolving healthcare environment.
Session panelists included:
- Lexa Heinz, Vice President, Iron Path Capital
- Chris Kehres, Chief Growth Officer, executive vice president of finance, GI Alliance
- Andy McCawley, Chief Development Officer, United Surgery Partners International
- Gary Ruff, Vice President, Ambulatory Surgery Centers, CHRISTUS Health
- Moderator: Jay Greathouse, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery
Top takeaways included:
- Physicians are looking for three key items: (1) partnerships with ASC operators or health systems that can bring higher and/or better rates, (2) assistance with recruitment that ensures older physicians will get their buyout at retirement and younger physicians are not saddled with operations or debt of a center, and (3) management responsibility for ensuring that centers are operating efficiently.
- Since the COVID-19 pandemic, health system partners are being more proactive versus reactive to volume leaving a hospital setting. For example, more health system partners are willing to have employed physicians invest in its surgery centers and are using it as a recruitment and retention tool for employed physicians.
- Physician consolidation is helpful because it creates more value in the form of higher rates or ancillaries, which are income drivers, and assists with recruitment. Physician consolidation also is helpful in expanding geographic footprints, as a larger practice may be present in multiple markets.
- Certificate of need (CON) requirements are a big challenge to bringing health systems into an outpatient environment. From an investment perspective, in states with a CON program it is best to expand by acquiring an existing ASC versus developing a de novo ASC.

Top Takeaways | Specialty Spotlight: Gastroenterology
ARTICLE
Top Takeaways | Specialty Spotlight: Gastroenterology
June 12, 2023
Read time: 3 min
In this moderated session featuring perspectives from top gastroenterology (GI) executives, panelists explored the thriving state of marketing and dealmaking in this field.
Session panelists included:
- Robbie Allen, Chief Executive Officer, One GI
- Matt Devine, Chief Executive Officer, Allied Digestive Health
- Michael Kroin, Chief Executive Officer and managing partner, Physician Growth Partners
- Samuel Vaill, Chief Development Officer, United Digestive
- Moderator: Amanda Jester, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery
Top takeaways included:
- Gastroenterology continues to be an attractive specialty for investment. This is due to a number of factors, including gastroenterology’s diverse revenue streams that can provide income repair for physicians and generate alignment among stakeholders. The increased push for outpatient surgical care to lower costs of care and the decreasing age of patients seeking colonoscopies and other gastroenterology procedures provide investors with significant runways to drive growth.
- As labor costs increase and challenges in the healthcare industry continue, physician practice management organizations provide gastroenterology groups with economies of scale, the ability to develop ancillaries and strong recruiting programs, as well as leverage against disruption by payors, hospital systems and competitors. Other advantages include access to expansive clinical data for research and development and improved point-of-care support.
- Culture is an oft-overlooked factor in gastroenterology transactions. Because transactions are intended to foster long-term arrangements, ensuring cultural alignment is key for the future success of a platform. Physicians should also consider the ways in which the platform focuses on the physician and the support of their practice as well as the role of physician leadership and governance.
- Hospitals can serve as critical partners for gastroenterology platforms on outpatient services. Platforms should expect more interest from hospitals as they look to participate in the continuum of care outside the hospital.

Top Takeaways | 2023 Physician Practice Management & ASC Symposium | Maximizing Managed Practice Value & Operations
ARTICLE
Top Takeaways | 2023 Physician Practice Management & ASC Symposium | Maximizing Managed Practice Value & Operations
June 12, 2023
Read time: 3 min
In this moderated session, a panel of senior executives and stakeholders with significant experience in optimizing physician practice management valuations discussed how managed practices can add substantial value by improving the efficiency of revenue cycle performance, implementing innovative managed care strategies and developing ancillary service lines.
Session panelists included:
- Roy Bejarano, Co-Founder and Chief Executive Officer, SCALE Healthcare
- Katy Dettman, Managing Director, Ankura
- Danielle Duke, Chief Operating Officer, MSO, Unified Women’s Healthcare
- Moderator: Larry C. Guess, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery
Top takeaways included:
- Healthcare management organizations can assist physician practices in improving their revenue cycle performance by implementing automated billing systems and using data analytics to identify potential billing errors.
- One strategy for addressing the labor shortage in healthcare is to look beyond traditional physician roles. By allowing physicians to operate at the top of their license, organizations can ensure that physicians are maximizing their expertise and using their skills to the fullest extent. Additionally, hiring advanced practice providers can help fill gaps in care and improve access to services.
- Other recruitment and retention strategies include building relationships with medical residents earlier in their training to create a pipeline of physicians. Organizations can offer training programs and incentives that encourage residents to stay within the organization or community after completing their training. In addition, clinical governance models that empower physician shareholder decision-making creates a sense of loyalty and stickiness that can help retain talent.
- Healthcare organizations may add more value by focusing on internal marketing measures, such as regularly collecting honest feedback from clinical and back-office staff to uncover areas of improvement.
- Internal billing and finance departments should communicate early and often to analyze data and ensure that practice entities are actually collecting the negotiated amount in payor agreements.

FTC Proposes Health Breach Notification Rule Amendments
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
FTC Proposes Health Breach Notification Rule Amendments
June 9, 2023
Read time: 8 min
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), at its May 18, 2023, open Commission meeting, voted unanimously to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to amend the Health Breach Notification Rule (HBNR). The FTC’s proposed amendment aims to codify the HBNR’s application to digital health and mobile technologies, as the FTC initially set forth in its 2021 policy statement. The FTC published its proposed amendment in the Federal Register on Friday, June 9, 2023 (88 FR 37819). Interested parties should consider submitting comments by August 8, 2023.
Overview
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) charged the FTC with developing a breach notification rule that applied to entities not covered under HIPAA’s breach notification rule, which was also created under ARRA. In other words, the FTC was tasked with addressing consumer-facing entities that are not “covered entities” or “business associates” under HIPAA. Congress granted rulemaking authority to the FTC to issue regulations requiring vendors of personal health records (PHRs) and “PHR related entities” to notify consumers in the event of an information security breach.
In response, the FTC issued its HBNR in 2009, which requires PHRs and PHR related entities to notify their impacted customers, the FTC and in some instances the media in the event of a breach of individually identifiable health information (74 Fed. Reg. 42962). The HBNR requires notice to affected consumers and the FTC when there has been an unauthorized acquisition of unsecured identifiable health information from PHRs, and notice to the media if the breach affects 500 or more consumers in a particular state or jurisdiction. The HBNR defines PHRs as electronic records of individually identifiable health information that can be drawn from multiple sources and that are managed, shared and controlled by or primarily for individuals (unlike, for example, the electronic medical records maintained by healthcare providers in rendering healthcare services to individuals). PHR related entities are companies that offer products or services through PHR websites, access information in PHRs or send information to PHRs.
At the time the FTC issued the HBNR, the rule’s reach was limited. Few PHRs existed on the market, and the general understanding was that the “multiple sources” referenced in the definition of a PHR excluded information entered by the consumer.
In fall 2021, the FTC signaled its intention to take a more expansive interpretation of its authority. It approved a policy statement entitled “On Breaches by Health Apps and Other Connected Devices” in order to “clarify the scope of” the HBNR by stating that the rule applies to health apps and connected devices that are not subject to HIPAA but are capable of drawing information from multiple sources “even if the health information comes from only one source” (for example, through a combination of consumer inputs and application programming interfaces). This policy statement effectively reclassified most healthcare apps not already regulated by HIPAA as arguably within the FTC’s jurisdictional reach. We described the 2021 HBNR policy statement in the following prior client alert, “FTC issues policy statement expanding interpretation of health breach notification rule’s scope.”
The FTC exercised its enforcement under the HBNR, as interpreted by the 2021 guidance, for the first time in settlements against GoodRx and Easy Healthcare Corporation (which publishes a fertility tracking app called Premom) in February and May 2023. These settlements, in their breadth, allegations and disciplinary approach, resolve any questions about the FTC’s intended intense focus on consumer privacy in the healthcare space.
Building on these settlements, the FTC now turns to amending the HBNR to reflect the posture of the current Commission. The FTC stated that it proposes to amend the HBNR to ensure that health applications provide consumers and the FTC with notice in the event of a breach of consumer health information. The proposed amendment offers the following changes, among others:
- Multiple Source Rule: Would define that a product is a PHR if it has the technical capacity to draw information from multiple sources (e.g., through an application programming interface), even if the consumer or entity elects not to connect the product to more than one source. The FTC’s 2021 policy statement and the proposed amendment highlight the agency’s position that the HBNR covers virtually all non-HIPAA-regulated online services, including websites, apps and internet-connected devices, that provide healthcare services or supplies.
- Authorization Requirement: Would require health apps, including fitness, sleep, mental health and nutrition applications, to obtain authorization from consumers to share their information with third parties. Health apps would also be required to notify consumers if their information is accessed by third parties without their authorization.
- Breach of Security Definition: Would enshrine the FTC’s position taken in the GoodRx and Premom settlements that a “breach of security” under the HBNR includes an unauthorized acquisition of identifiable health information that occurs because of a data security breach or an unauthorized disclosure to a third party. In other words, a breach is not limited to third-party hacking or intrusion into a health app’s systems, but occurs when a health app discloses sensitive health information without the user’ authorization.
- PHR Related Entities: Would clarify that only entities that access or send unsecured PHR identifiable health information to a PHR qualify as PHR related entities.
- Modernized Method of Notice: Would authorize the expanded use of email and other electronic means to provide consumers with clear and effective notice of a breach.
- Expanded Notice Content Requirements: Would expand the information that must be included in the notice to consumers—for example, requiring an explanation about the potential harm stemming from the breach and the names of any third parties that might have acquired the information.
- Penalties for Non-Compliance: Would clearly state that entities that fail to comply with the HBNR are subject to penalties of up to $50,120 per violation per day (increased annually for inflation).
Analysis
Several aspects of the proposed amendment lack clarity and are likely to cause confusion within the regulated community unless further clarified through the ongoing rulemaking process. Entities considering submitting comments may want to explore some or all of the following areas:
- The FTC’s position that consent and privacy policies are necessary (but not always sufficient) tools for obtaining consumer permission for data disclosures may leave some entities feeling uncertain as to how a health app should obtain the required authorization from a consumer. The agency considered defining the term “authorization” in the proposed amendment, but ultimately chose not to do so. The proposed rule seeks public comment on whether the HBNR should define the term. The FTC references commentary from the original HBNR stating that “[b]uried disclosures in lengthy privacy policies do not satisfy the standard of ‘meaningful choice,’” (74 FR 42967) but does not provide a safe harbor or other parameters for the method and format of appropriate consent. Although much of the proposed amendment is framed as an effort to “clarify” the HBNR’s longstanding intent, without additional guidance on what the FTC considers to be a compliant consumer authorization, a significant point of uncertainty will persist.
- The FTC suggests that PHR vendors could avoid breaches by de-identifying health information before sharing it with a service provider; however, the FTC does not provide a definition of, or guidelines related to, de-identification.
- The FTC proposes to amend the individual breach notification content requirements to include additional information about what the regulated entity can offer to protect affected individuals. The agency offers the example of informing impacted individuals about credit monitoring, identity restoration services and identity theft protection services. In practice, impacted individuals are always made aware of these services because they need to opt in to access the offered services. However, these services may not be offered in circumstances where the breached data does not place affected individuals at risk of identity theft, financial or other harm that these services are designed to protect. In these situations, it’s unclear what the regulated entity should include in the notice to comply with the proposed amendment, and whether the absence of a disclosure in circumstances where such services are not offered would be considered a violation of the HBNR.
- The proposed amendment may create reluctance on the part of vendors and connected healthcare devices to integrate with PHR related entities. For example, without a clear understanding of how a user can authorize data sharing between entities, connected devices and vendors may not share PHR identifiable health information with a PHR related entity.
