Content Type: Article

  • Past Political Contributions Matter: Recent SEC Settlement Highlights the “Look-Back” Provision and Strict Liability Nature of the SEC’s Pay-to-Play Rule

    Past Political Contributions Matter: Recent SEC Settlement Highlights the “Look-Back” Provision and Strict Liability Nature of the SEC’s Pay-to-Play Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Past Political Contributions Matter: Recent SEC Settlement Highlights the “Look-Back” Provision and Strict Liability Nature of the SEC’s Pay-to-Play Rule

    September 5, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Aug. 19, 2024, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) charged Obra Capital Management, LLC (“Obra Capital”) with violations of Rule 206(4)-5 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, otherwise known as the “Pay-to-Play Rule” (the “Rule”), arising out of a $7,150 campaign contribution made by an individual prior to joining Obra Capital.[1] This campaign contribution was made to a government official in Michigan who had influence over hiring investment advisers for the Michigan Public Employees’ Retirement Fund (the “Michigan Pension Fund”), which was an investor in a fund managed by Obra Capital (the “Obra Fund”). Notably, the Michigan Pension Fund had been an investor in the Obra Fund for several years prior to the hiring of the individual who made the contribution. And perhaps even more notably, this campaign contribution was made several months prior to the individual becoming a “Covered Associate” (as defined by the Rule[2]) of Obra Capital. By virtue of Obra Capital continuing to provide investment advisory services for compensation to the Obra Fund in which the Michigan Pension Fund was invested after hiring the individual, Obra Capital violated the Rule and agreed to pay a $95,000 fine to settle the charges.

    As the momentum of the 2024 election season accelerates, and a record number of campaign contributions are made, this case serves as a very timely reminder to investment advisers (registered advisers and exempt reporting advisers alike) that the Rule includes a “look-back” provision that brings into scope contributions made by an individual prior to becoming a Covered Associate of an adviser. Additionally, this case reminds investment advisers that the SEC will bring actions entirely devoid of any intent to influence state or local pension plan investment decisions.

    New Hires and Internal Job Changes

    The Rule includes a “look-back” provision that attributes contributions made by an individual within two years of becoming a Covered Associate to the investment advisory firm, regardless of whether the individual was associated with the investment adviser at the time the contribution was made. This “look-back” period is reduced to six months for those Covered Associates who are not involved in the solicitation of investors.[3]

    If an adviser learns of a problematic political contribution prior to the commencement of an individual’s employment, the adviser may need to delay the hiring of the individual, change the job function, or worse, rescind the offer of employment in order to continue to earn compensation from the relevant state pension plan investor. In the event the adviser is not aware of this contribution until after employment of the individual commences, and the adviser continues to earn a fee from the relevant state pension plan investor, the adviser has violated the Rule – regardless of the adviser’s knowledge of the contribution, or intent to influence the investor.

    As an example, if a newly hired employee makes a contribution to the Harris/Walz campaign a month before employment commences as a Covered Associate at an investment adviser, and the adviser manages a fund with Minnesota pension plan investors, the firm and the employee would find themselves in an unfortunate position of having to either delay the start of employment, terminate the employment offer or forego receiving compensation associated with the Minnesota pension plan’s investment.

    Importantly, this “look-back” applies not only to new employees who become Covered Associates once hired but also to existing employees who become Covered Associates during the course of their employment.[4] If an employee was previously not a Covered Associate, but later becomes a Covered Associate, the “look-back” period would apply to all political contributions made by the individual in the prior six months, or two years (as the case may be).

    Key Takeaways

    Investment advisers should consider building political contributions diligence into their new hire onboarding process to avoid the surprise pitfalls that the “look-back” provision can create when hiring new employees.

    In addition, as a means to reduce the pitfalls of the “look-back” provision that can result in the context of internal promotions and changes in job functions of existing employees, managers should consider requiring all employees to pre-clear their political contributions regardless of whether or not the employee is technically a Covered Associate at the time the contribution is made. Managers should also maintain a list of the employees the adviser considers to be Covered Associates under the Rule, as required by the corresponding recordkeeping requirements.[5]

    For a more in-depth political contributions rule overview, please see Schulte’s “SEC Political Contributions Rule Refresher” Alert published earlier this summer.[6]

    Authored by Christopher S. Avellaneda, Allison Scher Bernbach, Michael S. Didiuk, Marc E. Elovitz and Kelly Koscuiszka.  

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    [1] See Press Release, US Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Investment Adviser for Pay-To-Play Violation Involving a Campaign Contribution (Aug. 19, 2024), available at link.

    [2] See 17 CFR § 275.206(4)-5(f)(2).

    [3] See 17 CFR § 275.206(4)-5(a)(1) and 17 CFR § 275.206(4)-5(b)(2).

    [4] See US Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Political Contributions by Certain Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-3043; (July 1, 2010) at 59 n.203, available at link. (“The ‘look back’ applies to any person who becomes a covered associate, including a current employee who has been transferred or promoted to a position covered by the rule. A person becomes a covered associate for purposes of the rule’s look-back provision at the time he or she is hired or promoted to a position that meets the definition of ‘covered associate’ in rule 206(4)-5(f)(2).”)

    [5] See 17 CFR § 275.204-2(a)(18)(i)(A).

    [6] Schulte Roth & Zabel, Alert: SEC Political Contributions Rule Refresher (July 9, 2024), available at link.

    In depth
    Authors

    Christopher S. Avellaneda

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • California State Legislature Passes Assembly Bill 3129

    California State Legislature Passes Assembly Bill 3129

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California State Legislature Passes Assembly Bill 3129

    September 4, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The California State Senate and State Assembly passed Assembly Bill (AB) 3129 on August 31, 2024, immediately prior to the end of the state’s legislative session. The bill now heads to the desk of Governor Gavin Newsom as a final step toward enactment. If signed by Governor Newsom, AB 3129 would take effect January 1, 2025, and would materially impact certain private equity and hedge fund acquisitions of health facilities, provider organizations, and provider groups in California.

    We summarized earlier versions of AB 3129 in our On the Subject articles “California AB 3129 Targets the Health Facility Transactions Approval Process” and “Pending California Law Undermines Growth of Digital Health Companies and Patient Access to Virtual Care.” As described in those articles, AB 3129 targets healthcare consolidations involving private equity groups and hedge funds, requiring them to obtain consent from the California attorney general prior to acquiring or affiliating with certain healthcare facilities or provider groups. AB 3129 reiterates California’s corporate practice doctrine by expressly prohibiting private equity groups, hedge funds, and their affiliates from entering into agreements with physician, psychiatric, or dental practices that would enable these lay entities to interfere with the professional judgment of physicians, psychiatrists, or dentists. If AB 3129 is signed into law, private-equity-backed management services organizations should review their corporate structures and the agreements they have in place with physician, psychiatric, or dental practices to ensure they remain compliant with all applicable law.

    Since its introduction, AB 3129 has undergone several material amendments, such as:

    • Excluding transactions with for-profit hospitals and dermatology practices from the California attorney general review requirement;
    • Carving out certain transactions involving health plans, insurance companies, counties, healthcare districts, and the University of California from the California attorney general review requirement;
    • Establishing a 15% standard for determining whether a transaction involves a “material amount of the assets or operations” and increasing certain other materiality thresholds;
    • Removing the prohibition on management services agreements between physician, psychiatric, or dental practices and private equity groups or hedge funds; and
    • Establishing an alternative evidentiary hearing process for private equity funds and hedge funds on the question of whether a transaction subject to California attorney general review presents a substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects or creates a significant effect on the access or availability of healthcare services.

    The last day that Governor Newsom may sign or veto bills is September 30, 2024.

    The McDermott Difference


    McDermott is actively monitoring the status of AB 3129 and will provide additional future updates. For more information related to state regulatory review processes and the impact of AB 3129 on California healthcare consolidations, please consider attending McDermott’s webinar Healthcare Transactions Under the Microscope: State and Federal Legislative Update on September 26, 2024.

    In depth
    Authors

    Travis Jackson

    Partner

    Los Angeles

    Cathy Ren

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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  • Insurers: Climate Risk Disclosures Today, Scenario Testing Tomorrow

    Insurers: Climate Risk Disclosures Today, Scenario Testing Tomorrow

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Insurers: Climate Risk Disclosures Today, Scenario Testing Tomorrow

    September 3, 2024

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    For more than a decade US insurance regulators have required certain insurers to file climate risk disclosure reports. In recent years, financial regulators in Europe have begun climate change scenario testing while still requiring climate risk reporting. US insurance regulators have just voted to utilize scenario testing (at least for an initial three-year trial and for information only) beginning next year. This On the Subject summarizes the current state of play for US insurers with respect to climate reporting and financial risk analysis.

    In May 2024, two sets of financial regulators – the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) and the French insurance regulator Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR) – published the results of their climate change scenario analyses or stress tests. The Fed’s pilot climate scenario analysis (CSA) involved six large banks while the ACPR’s second climate stress test covered 15 insurance groups responsible for roughly 90% of France’s market.

    Also in May 2024, the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), which regulates both banks and insurers, assessed 83 regulated entities’ climate financial risk disclosures that were filed in 2022 and their progress in integrating climate risk considerations into their oversight and management in a report.

    After comparing these three reports, we fast forward to August 2024 with a brief report on a controversial decision to implement a form of climate change scenario testing by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) that was taken during its recent Summer National Meeting in Chicago.

    By way of background, we start this article by providing some international context concerning current and future climate financial risk regulation, particularly disclosure requirements.

    In depth

    Climate Financial Risk Disclosure Reporting

    The Financial Stability Board (FSB) essentially sets policies for global financial systems. The FSB’s membership consists of 23 countries and 13 organizations/regulatory bodies, including the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). In 2015, the FSB created the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which developed a climate financial risk framework consisting of four pillars: governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.

    In 2022, the NAIC’s climate disclosure requirements became TCFD-aligned and many other regulators have either adopted or expressed support for the TCFD framework. However, the TCFD has since been disbanded and its oversight and monitoring duties have been taken up by the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), which published its own disclosure standards that are largely consistent with the TCFD framework.

    In its final status report published in October 2023, the TCFD summarized the state of climate risk disclosure as follows:

    • “The percentage of companies disclosing TCFD-aligned information continues to grow, but more progress is needed. For fiscal year 2022 reporting, 58% of companies disclosed in line with at least five of the eleven recommended disclosures – up from 18% in 2020; however, only 4% of companies disclosed in line with all eleven recommendations.
    • The percentage of companies reporting on climate-related risks or opportunities, board oversight, and climate-related targets increased significantly between fiscal years – by 26, 25, and 24 –percentage points, respectively. Between fiscal years 2020 and 2022.
    • The majority of jurisdictions with final or proposed climate-related disclosure requirements specify that such disclosures be reported in financial filings or annual reports.
    • Over 80% of the largest asset managers and 50% of the largest asset owners reported in line with at least one of the 11 recommended disclosures. Based on a review of publicly available reports, nearly 70% of the top 50 asset managers and 36% of the top 50 asset owners disclosed in line with at least five of the recommended disclosures.”

    The FSB will continue its oversight activities with respect to climate risk disclosure throughout this year. Its 2024 workplan includes publication of at least two more reports:

    • In July 2024, FSB published its “[s]tocktake of regulatory and supervisory initiatives related to the identification and assessment of nature-related financial risks.” This report summarizes the wide variety of approaches among regulators for assessing financial risk stemming from biodiversity damage and other nature-related risks.
    • In November 2024, FSB will “[r]eport on progress in achieving consistent climate-related financial disclosures.”

    Between now and the end of 2024 we can also expect to see climate risk policy statements or reviews of disclosure filings by regulated entities and/or scenario exercises/stress tests results from the UK Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bermuda Monetary Authority, among other regulators. US insurers that must file climate disclosure reports have until August 30, 2024, to do so.

    NYDFS

    NYDFS analyzed responses in each of the four TCFD pillars – governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets during reporting years 2019 to 2021 based on insurer size and market segment (i.e., property and casualty, life, and health). At a high level, “[NY]DFS’s assessment of progress in implementing guidance expectations on a risk-weighted basis reflects that larger insurers have a higher relative impact, and generally have more available resources, than insurers in lower premium ranges. However, viewing the industry solely through a risk-weighted lens could mask the advances or weaknesses of small and medium-sized insurers.” Nevertheless, NYDFS’s report concluded that small- and medium-sized entities may have more concentrated climate risk by product line, geography, or sector.

    NYDFS reported that the biggest improvement across property and casualty, life, and health insurers was with governance. “A key factor in that development was that the Department had set an August 15, 2022 implementation timeline for guidance expectations relating to governance,” NYDFS shared on its website.

    The latest NYDFS assessment of insurers’ TCFD-aligned climate risk disclosures assigned grades using four broad categories: Yet to Start, Early Stage, Making Progress, or Good Progress. Property and casualty and life insurers all showed steady improvement from 2019 to 2021, however, in the strategy, metrics and targets, and risk management pillars, all insurers fell short of their improvement in the governance pillar. Health insurers lagged in all categories.

    While the report ended on a positive note by saying, “[M]ost insurers are integrating consideration of climate risk into their processes to some degree,” it also acknowledged that “insurers still have more work to do to improve their ability to assess, measure and manage climate-related risks.”

    Scenario Testing and the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS)

    In December 2017 eight central banks established the NGFS with the goal of “strengthening the global response required to meet the goals of the Paris agreement and to enhance the role of the financial system to manage risks and to mobilize capital for green and low-carbon investments in the broader context of environmentally sustainable development.” Currently, central bankers vastly outnumber insurance regulators, although multiple bank regulators also regulate insurers, including the Fed and NYDFS. NYDFS is the only member that is also a state insurance regulator, though the Federal Insurance Office and the Fed are also members. The NGFS develops scenarios for use by central banks seeking to support regulated entities in analyzing and understanding the impact of climate change on balance sheets. Several iterations of short- and long-term scenarios have been published, with the most recent set published at the end of 2023. It will be useful to see whether insurance regulators will utilize the NGFS scenarios “as is” without modifying them for use with insurers, regardless of if they are life or non-life insurers.

    Federal Reserve Board

    The Fed’s website explains that it had two objectives in pursuing its pilot CSA: learning about large banks’ “climate risk-management practices and challenges” and improving large banks’ (and financial regulators’) ability “to identify, estimate, monitor and manage climate-related financial risks.” The CSA report began by noting that “[p]articipating banks took a wide range of approaches in this exercise to consider the possible implications of different physical and transition risk scenarios. The exercise highlighted data gaps and modeling challenges that arise when estimating the financial impacts of highly complex and uncertain risks over various time horizons.”

    The CSA report found, among other things, that:

    • Participants’ differing business models, risk perceptions, completion of climate change scenario analyses in other jurisdictions, and differing access to data produced divergent approaches.
    • Most of the banks turned to familiar credit risk models to judge the impact of physical and transition risks on business portfolios, assuming “that historical relationships between model inputs and outputs continue to hold as the climate and the structure of the economy evolve.”
    • Data issues impacted results because there was a lack of reliable and consistent data points (e.g., for “building characteristics, insurance coverage, and counterparties’ plans to manage climate-related risks” (emphasis added).)
    • Insurance plays (or should play) a significant role in risk mitigation for all participants in the economy, however, there are uncertainties as to the availability and affordability of insurance, with varying impacts on businesses and individuals.
    • Assumptions matter when it comes to the scope and severity of shocks, insurance, and balance sheets.
    • Measuring climate-related risks is “highly uncertain and challenging.” This increases the degree of difficulty in incorporating climate-related risks into existing risk management frameworks and produces differing results among participants for the same or similar parts of their business.

    The CSA aims to push big banks to determine the biggest impacts on their businesses when it comes to (i) physical risks (e.g., acute (such as hurricanes and wildfires) and chronic (such as rising sea surface temperatures and sea levels) and (ii) so-called transition risks (i.e., the impact of reactions to climate change by key participants in economic activities, including those associated with reducing levels of greenhouse gas emissions).

    The Fed selected various scenarios for the exercise to give banks “a range of plausible future outcomes.” The Fed then asked banks to apply these scenarios to residential and commercial real estate portfolios, looking at the impact of physical risks in real time and the impact of transition risks between 2023 and 2032, with the latter comparing results assuming current greenhouse gas reduction policies and the NGFS’s assumptions related to policies that would produce a 2050 net-zero environment.

    ACPR

    France’s second climate stress testing exercise focused on both life and non-life insurers. Using a “bottom up” approach, the ACPR (with insurer input) initially used recent NGFS scenarios – one near term (2027) and one longer term (2050) compared to a fictitious reference scenario in which neither physical nor transition risk factors were included – to measure balance sheet impacts (on both underwriting and investment results) of the assumed climate risk developments.

    The short-term scenario assumed a series of “extreme” events, including convective storms and the breach of a dam because of torrential rains falling on drought-affected soils. It was further assumed that insurers would not mitigate balance sheet impacts (i.e., assuming a “static” balance sheet).

    The long-term scenario assumed insurers could – and would – take steps to mitigate balance sheet impacts by raising product prices and taking other actions, such as reducing volumes in certain geographic areas. However, the impact of mitigation steps would differ depending on whether an “orderly” transition occurred (with a temperature increase being held to below 2° C above pre-industrial age levels) or a “disorderly” transition took place.

    Regardless of short- vs. long-term scenarios, balance sheet impacts were substantial. On the short-term side, a 25% drop in solvency ratios contributed to a 28% nosedive in equity prices. On the long-term side, the balance sheet deterioration was more severe. French regulators also noted that insurers did not shift investment allocations materially despite “significant” climate exposure in their businesses.

    The ACPR concludes with a judgment that climate change scenario testing remains a work in progress and the following statement: “…. regarding the scenarios used, the delayed transition scenario, although being the most disordered of the NGFS scenarios, still remains insufficiently adverse to generate changes in strategy or sufficient awareness, and undoubtedly leads to underestimating the potential impacts of climate change on financial stability.”

    Two recent news reports might be relevant to this point. BloombergNEF recently reported that as much as $215 trillion will be needed between now and 2050 to meet the Paris Agreement’s global warming target of not exceeding 2 °C above pre-industrial temperatures. With the capital needs of the energy transition in mind, will other sectors (insurance included) have access to capital in line with historical levels to pay claims arising from catastrophe events and augment capital accounts after doing so? It is not certain whether current NGFS scenarios, particularly the longer-term disorderly transition scenarios, will capture possible climate-related capital market stresses that may impact the insurance industry. This leads us to a recent The Economist report that explained the negative feedback loop that has been created by lengthening fire seasons with more extreme wildfires worsened by climate changes (in turn adding massive amounts of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere). For example, wildfires in Canada in 2023 produced three times as much as the country’s industrial greenhouse gas emissions that year. Do the NGFS scenarios capture this developing dynamic?

    Finally, from a societal point of view, assessing the impact of climate change on insurers’ balance sheets falls far short of assessing the impact of climate change on the US economy as a whole. A partial answer as to why this might be the case consists of the various, well-publicized “coverage gaps” regardless of peril (hurricane, flood, quake, wildfire, etc.). If take-up rates for floods in particular continue to hover around the high single digits or low double digits, depending upon the state the impact of climate change-induced flooding will not materially impact insurers. Instead, all insurers will be impacted by financial aid packages and higher taxes. And if more insurers cut back on property coverage in wind-prone coastal areas or in wildfire-prone zip codes, the remaining insurers will face rising costs because of their mandatory participation in state-run Fair Access to Insurance Requirements plans. More drastic regulatory changes could hinder capacity reductions but such actions risk prompting insurer exits from unfriendly state insurance markets. At the same time, as insurers continue to increase pricing in catastrophe-prone locales, take-up rates could fall, even for basic property protection, thus reducing insurer premium revenue. Do NGFS scenarios recognize these insurer-specific possibilities as the world warms?

    NAIC: New Climate-Related Financial Risk Analysis

    Throughout 2024, the NAIC has been considering whether and how to require property and casualty insurers to provide regulators with some indication of how and to what extent climate change scenarios, particularly for windstorms and wildfires, might impact current insurance portfolios. Earlier this month in Chicago the full NAIC membership voted to move ahead with physical risk scenario testing, but the vote was contested, with 12 states voting no and one state abstaining. The proposal that the regulators approved will require property and casualty insurers to use either commercially available “Climate Conditioned Catalogs” developed by modelling vendors or customized factors developed in-house by insurers. They then must choose one of two disclosure scenario options – time-based or frequency-based – to show the potential impact of hurricane and wildfire risks in 2040 and 2050 (assuming no changes in insurers’ portfolios of business, no changes in total insured values, no changes in reinsurance arrangements, and without adjusting for inflation). Reporting will begin in 2025 and conclude in 2027. Regulators said that the disclosures will be used for informational purposes only, not to develop new risk-based capital standards.

    Moving From Scenario Analysis to Prescriptive Climate Change-Related Regulation

    Presumably to forestall criticism from anti-environmental, social, and governance (ESG) proponents, the Fed’s CSA executive summary includes this noteworthy disclaimer:

    The Federal Reserve neither prohibits nor discourages financial institutions from providing banking services to customers of any specific class or type, as permitted by law or regulation. The decision regarding whether to make a loan or to open, close, or maintain an account rests with the financial institution, so long as the financial institution complies with applicable laws and regulations.

    Climate change activists have long called on banks and insurers to commit to reducing credit and/or insurance protection for various energy industry participants, specifically those involved with the production, transportation, and use of coal. Leaders and legislators in states that produce fossil fuels have reacted negatively to such advocacy and, as a result, during the past several years we have seen (and will likely continue to see) many different types of anti-ESG legislation proposed or adopted in some 20 states around the country.

    We have not seen explicit statements from US insurance regulators like the one by the Fed in its CSA report. Indeed, the NAIC’s National Climate Resilience Strategy, adopted in March 2024, stops short of calling on insurers to curtail coverage for energy companies, transportation industry users of fossil fuels, or heavy emitters of greenhouse gases, focusing instead on closing coverage gaps, reducing losses from natural catastrophes, and improving resilience. Additionally, nothing the NAIC said in Chicago during the debate about moving ahead with a limited climate risk scenario analysis suggests that the NAIC is about to grab onto a third rail of US climate change policymaking, despite being urged to do so by climate change activists and lobbyists.

    Authors

    Thomas M. Dawson

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Illumina/GRAIL: European Court of Justice Annuls the Commission’s Approach

    Illumina/GRAIL: European Court of Justice Annuls the Commission’s Approach

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Illumina/GRAIL: European Court of Justice Annuls the Commission’s Approach

    September 3, 2024

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a spectacular turn, on September 3, 2024, the Court of Justice (CJEU), constituted as the grand chamber, overturned the ruling of the General Court (GC) and annulled the decision made by the Commission to accept referrals from national competition authorities to review the contemplated acquisition by Illumina of Grail under article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation, irrespective of whether that transaction falls within the national merger control rules of the referring member states.

    In depth

    The CJEU conducted the same four interpretations undertook by the GC, while reaching an opposite conclusion in each of them. The historical and contextual interpretations do not support the conclusion that Article 22 EUMR confers on the Commission the competence to examine a concentration which does not meet the turnover threshold, irrespective of whether a given transaction falls within the merger rules of the Member State making the referral request.

    From the teleological interpretation, the CJEU stressed that the EUMR introduced the “one-stop-shop” principle to take into account the need for legal certainty for the companies concerned. While the historical interpretation of the EUMR reveals, according to the CJEU, that the referral mechanism, known as the “Dutch clause” was to permit scrutiny of concentration that could distort competition locally, where the Member State in question did not have any national merger control system. Hence, that mechanism was not intended to be regarded as a ‘corrective mechanism’ to remedy deficiencies in the merger control system based principally on turnover thresholds.

    In the end, the CJEU determined that the Commission’s interpretation of article 22 EUMR has the potential to disrupt the equilibrium between the different objectives of the merger regulation, especially by undermining the effectiveness, predictability and legal certainty that must be guaranteed to the parties to a concentration.

    The CJEU also mentioned an alternative mechanism to review transactions that do not have a European dimension under the EUMR by referring to the Towercast jurisprudence and the possibility to enforce, for example, article 102 TFEU to these transactions.

    Last, the CJEU also surprisingly suggested that if the Member States are concerned about some market developments involving innovative companies, they could revise downwards their own merger thresholds to capture transactions involving these companies.

    I. What remains from the Article 22 Ashes?

    This judgment is certainly one of these landmark rulings which will be remembered for a long time. The CJEU has given final judgment, i.e. the matter will not be referred back to the General Court.

    As regards Illumina and Grail, the CJEU ordered the Commission to pay their legal costs (which however are typically capped way below the legal fees incurred). More importantly, since the “Commission could not rely on Article 22 of Regulation No 139/2004 to examine the concentration” of Illumina and Grail, the Commission also did not have the competence to prohibit the concentration and to impose a gun-jumping fine of EUR 432 million (which represented 10% of Illumina’s annual turnover and hence the maximum fine possible). Illumina will ask the Commission to reimburse this amount, plus interest; Illumina may also ask the Commission to pay damages for the fact that it had to unwind the transaction (though the FTC also prohibited it).

    Three other transactions were caught by the EC under Article 22 EUMR where national merger filing in the EU were not triggered: the acquisition of Autotalks by Qualcomm which would combine two suppliers of V2X semiconductors in the EEA; the acquisition of Nasdaq Power by EEX, which would combine two providers of services facilitating the on-exchange trading and clearing of Nordic power contracts and Luxembourg’s Brasserie Nationale’s acquisition of Boissons Heintz, both based in Luxembourg.

    Qualcomm and Nasdaq abandoned their transaction in light of the opposition from the Commission, but may reconsider their position (provided the deals can be revived); they may also consider asking damages from the Commission. Brasserie National appealed to the General Court the Commission’s decision to accept an Article 22 referral from Luxemburg – which is the only member state without a merger control system, making it a “Dutch clause” type of referral.

    The Commission was quick in downplaying the importance of the judgment by pointing out that a few Member States had recently amended their merger control rules to call in certain transactions that fall outside the ordinary filing thresholds. And once member states have jurisdiction over a transaction, they can refer it to the Commission under Article 22 EUMR.

    However, as so often, the devil lies in the detail: the Irish antitrust authority, for example, has publicly stated that it anticipates utilising its call-in power only to examine deals which have a specific impact on the Irish market and not to transactions which have the potential to impact competition on a wider (e.g., European-wide) scale – yet, one of the conditions for an Article 22 referral is that a transaction “affects trade between member states”; other member states require that a certain market share threshold is met – given that Grail had no turnover in the EU, it also had no market share which would have triggered such national call-in rules. Hence, the reliance on broader national jurisdictional rules to keep Article 22 referrals seems to require further adjustments.

    In fact, as mentioned above, the judgment refers to the possibility for member states to amend their national merger control rules to catch more transactions, as well as to the possibility to review transactions ex-post under the Towercast jurisprudence.

    For the Commission, there is another reason as to why Article 22 is so important: under Article 14 of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), gatekeepers are required to inform the Commission of any intended acquisition involving digital services. The EC cannot review such deals under the DMA, but it can ask members states to refer them to the EC under Art. 22 EUMR, provided they have jurisdiction.

    II. Background

    Back in 2016, the European Commission (EC) had come to the view that the European Merger Control Regulation (EUMR) suffered from an enforcement gap and announced that it was considering whether the current turnover-based thresholds under EU merger control law should be complemented by a value-based threshold. At the time, Commissioner Vestager stated that “it’s not always turnover that makes a company an attractive merger partner … In the pharmaceutical sector, it might be a new drug that’s been developed but not yet approved for sale. …”. From October 2016 until January 2017, the EC conducted a public consultation, but ultimately decided not to pursue the value-based threshold route to capture transactions that do not meet EU merger thresholds. Instead, the EC looked for alternative avenues to review such transactions and in 2017 the Commission publicly commented that Article 22 EUMR was adopted to make up for the total absence of merger control in a Member State and therefore was no longer fit for purpose in a time when almost all Member States have merger control based on the triggering of thresholds. The EC therefore discouraged national competition authorities (NCAs) from referring transactions which did not meet the national thresholds.

    In September 2020, Commissioner Vestager announced that the EC would start accepting referrals from national competition authorities of mergers that are worthy of review at the EU level – whether or not those same authorities had the power to review the case themselves, and guidance would be published to lay out the rules of this new referral system. To that end, on March 26, 2021, the EC published Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in the Article 22 of the EC Merger Regulation. This Guidance changed the EC’s policy regarding mergers falling below national thresholds by encouraging referrals of transactions below the national merger filing thresholds.

    A. The First Referral Under the New Interpretation – Illumina/GRAIL

    On September 21, 2020, Illumina, a US pharma company which specializes in genomic sequencing (a method of determining the DNA sequence of an organism or a cell) announced its intention to acquire sole control of GRAIL, a US biotechnology company which develops cancer screening tests based on genomic sequencing (hereafter referred to as “the Transaction”).

    The Transaction did not trigger the thresholds of the EUMR or any other EU or EFTA Member State thresholds. Therefore, it was not notified to the EC nor any of the EU or EFTA Member States.

    However, on December 7, 2020, the EC received a complaint concerning the Transaction and on review, came to the conclusion that the Transaction satisfies the conditions of Article 22 EUMR. On February 19, 2021, the EC sent a letter to the Member States concerned to inform them of the Transaction and to invite them to submit a referral request under Article 22. The French Competition Authority (FCA) made a referral request, followed by the Competition Authorities of Belgium, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Norway.

    On March 11, 2021, the EC informed Illumina and GRAIL of the referral request, stating that the merger at issue could not be implemented whilst the standstill obligation laid down in the EUMR was applicable.

    On April 19, 2021, the EC accepted the FCA’s referral request, along with the requests by the five aforementioned Member States (Contested Decisions) on the basis that the combined entity could restrict access to, or increase prices of, next-generation sequencers and reagents to the detriment of GRAIL’s rivals active in genomic cancer tests. In particular, the EC considered that referral of the transaction was appropriate because GRAIL’s competitive significance is not reflected in its turnover despite the fact that the deal is valued at $7.1 billion.

    As a result, Illumina, supported by GRAIL, filed a suit before the General Court (GC), against the Contested Decisions. Illumina argued that the EC lacked the authority Article 22 EUMR to initiate an investigation into a transaction which does not satisfy the conditions enabling the Member State which has requested its referral to the EC to examine it under its national merger control rules.

    On July 13, 2022, the GC upheld the EC’s decision to accept the referral request and dismissed Illumina’s action in its entirety. In its judgement, the GC confirmed the EC’s authority under Article 22 EUMR to examine a transaction that does not have a European dimension but is the subject of a referral request made by a Member State, even if the transaction is not notifiable in that Member State.

    Following the GC’s judgment, Illumina filed for an Appeal.

    B. Interim Measures and Gun Jumping Proceedings

    In parallel to the case deciding on the correct application of Article 22 EUMR, on June 16 2021, Illumina and GRAIL notified the proposed acquisition to the EC, which opened an in-depth investigation on July 22, 2021 to assess the transaction.

    However, on August 18, 2021, Illumina publicly announced that it had completed the acquisition of GRAIL during the Commission’s in-depth investigation in order to comply with its obligations under the purchase agreement, through which action allegedly breaching the EUMR. As a result, the EC opened a parallel gun-jumping investigation into Illumina’s alleged breach of the standstill obligation under the EUMR.

    This led the EC to adopt binding interim measures in October 2021, to prevent the transaction from having potentially irreparable adverse effects on competition. This intervention was the first of its kind since the entry into force of the EUMR in 2004.

    On September 6, 2022, the EC prohibited the Transaction. The EC based its Decision on input foreclosure concerns i.e. that the merger would stifle innovation and reduce choice in the emerging market for blood-based early cancer detection tests. According to the EC Illumina did not offer sufficient remedies to address these concerns. On July 12, 2023, the EC fined Illumina and GRAIL approximately EUR 432 million and EUR 1,000 respectively, for implementing their proposed merger before approval by the Commission.

    The culmination of the EC’s scrutiny occurred in October 2023, when the EC ordered Illumina to divest GRAIL, effectively undoing the merger. The divestiture marked a significant enforcement action under Article 22 EUMR, as it is the first time the EC has ordered the reversal of an acquisition. On April 12, 2024, the EC approved Illumina’s plan to divest GRAIL. Finally, on June 24, 2024, Illumina announced the successful completion of GRAIL’s divestiture, through the distribution of 85.5% of GRAIL’s total stock to holders of Illumina common stock. In addition, Illumina shareholders received one share of GRAIL common stock for every six shares of Illumina stock held as of June 13, 2024. GRAIL is now a public and independent company, as independent legally and financially as it was from Illumina before the acquisition.

    III. The Views of the General Court and the Advocate General’s Opinion

    On July 13, 2022, the General Court fully supported the approach of the EC in relation to Article 22 EUMR. It ruled that the EC can review mergers even if they do not meet national thresholds, and affirmed that a deal is “made known” to a Member State only when it receives sufficient material for it to be able to assess whether the merger satisfies conditions to qualify for a referral, and not just through publicly available information. In addition, the GC acknowledged the EC’s delay in sending the Invitation Letter to Member States but stated that that did not have an impact on the parties’ ability to defend themselves effectively. Lastly, the GC confirmed that the EC did not violate legal certainty or legitimate expectations. For more details on the GC’s judgment, see our previous client alert.

    By contrast, in an already twisted series of events, on March 21, 2024, the Advocate General (AG) of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered his opinion concluding that the GC erred in its interpretation and application of Article 22 EUMR.

    The AG considered that the EC does not have the jurisdiction to examine nor prohibit mergers which are not on referral notifiable under national law. The main question to be answered by the AG was whether Article 22 EUMR enables the Commission to review a merger referred to it by a Member State’s authorities, where the latter lack any competence to review it, since the merger in question falls below the thresholds set out in their national legislation on merger control.

    According to the AG, interpreting Article 22 EUMR demands meticulous analysis encompassing its wording, origin, context, and purpose alongside fundamental EU legal principles and the logic of merger control. The AG argued that Article 22 EUMR was originally designed as a complementary tool for countries without merger control regimes, and its use should not be extended to cases that fall outside the national merger control systems of Member States. The AG emphasized that neither the legislative history nor the textual interpretation of Article 22 supports the broad interpretation adopted by the GC.

    The AG expressed concern that a broad interpretation of Article 22 would result in less legal certainty and stressed that merger threshold reforms should be left to the EU legislature rather than the Commission. So-called killer-acquisition could be reviewed a posteriori under Article 102 TFEU, and member states could adopt value-based thresholds as Austria and Germany did.

    Thus, in the AG’s view, Article 22 EUMR does not empower the EC to adopt decisions such as those challenged by the applicants in the present proceedings. Therefore, those decisions should be annulled.

    Authors

    Stéphane Dionnet

    Partner

    Brussels

    More insights

  • Maine updates ownership disclosure requirements

    Maine updates ownership disclosure requirements

    ARTICLE

    Maine updates ownership disclosure requirements

    Aug 30, 2024

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 9, 2024, the new Public Law 2023, ch. 633 (L.D. 2069) from Maine’s Bureau of Alcoholic Beverages and Lottery Operations (BABLO) formally went into effect, bringing an end to the previous burdensome “entire ownership” disclosure requirement that disrupted the industry in 2023.

    This legislation establishes new ownership disclosure requirement related to alcohol licensing in Maine. It amends Sec. 1. 28-A MRSA § 651 to require the disclosure of any person holding an ownership interest of 10% or more in the license or certificate holder in the state of Maine. Additionally, if a business meets this threshold of ownership in the licensee, that business must also disclose any individual or entity which holds 10% or more in said business; if no one meets this threshold, the license holder may submit an affidavit which attests that no individual or entity holds such ownership interest in the licensee or applicant.

    The new legislation also requires in Sec. 2. 28-A MRSA § 651 that the licensee or applicant disclose any individual or entity holding indirect financial interest in the license holder, with “indirect financial interest” including (a) an option or right to acquire equity interest in the licensee or (b) a right to payment of or based upon all or any portion of revenues, profits, or losses from the operation of the licensee.

    In connection with the implementation of these new disclosure requirements, BABLO has issued a new Supplemental Ownership Form for convenience of industry members to identify the information required from the necessary stakeholders. With many licenses operating on temporary extensions for the last year as BABLO updated these requirements, industry members are now working diligently to complete the necessary documents for renewal of their existing licenses.

    McDermott’s alcohol team is ready to guide you through the new requirements. For questions or assistance with Maine’s disclosure requirements, please contact Alva Mather or the alcohol team.

    Authors

    Alva C. Mather

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michelle L. Draper

    Senior Alcohol Regulatory Specialist

    Wilmington

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Dubai and Abu Dhabi Firms Involved in Crypto: Regulatory Pitfalls to Avoid When Dealing with EU or UK Clients

    Dubai and Abu Dhabi Firms Involved in Crypto: Regulatory Pitfalls to Avoid When Dealing with EU or UK Clients

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Dubai and Abu Dhabi Firms Involved in Crypto: Regulatory Pitfalls to Avoid When Dealing with EU or UK Clients

    September 26, 2024

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Continuing developments in the crypto regulatory sphere have significantly increased the attractiveness of Dubai and Abu Dhabi for crypto firms with global ambitions. Firms should remember, however, that they may also need to comply with the EU or UK crypto regulatory regimes, especially when engaging with clients or investors from these jurisdictions.

    In this article, we summarise recent crypto developments in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), and discuss the pitfalls crypto firms should avoid when dealing with EU or UK clients.

    In depth

    Recent Crypto Developments in Dubai and Abu Dhabi

    Both DIFC and ADGM have historically been very active in the crypto sphere.

    Most recently, on 13 March 2024, DIFC released its DIFC Law No. 2 of 2024 (Digital Assets Law) providing for a comprehensive set of rules relating to crypto-assets.  Among other things, the Digital Assets Law defined a ‘Digital Asset’ as an asset which:

    “(a) exists as a notional quantitative unit manifested through the combination of the active operation of software by a network of participants and network-created data; 

    (b) exists independently of any particular person and legal system; and 

    (c) is not duplicable and the use or consumption of the thing by one person or a specific group of persons necessarily prejudices the use or consumption of the thing by one or more other persons”.

    In response to diverging case law on how crypto-assets should be qualified, the Digital Assets Law clarified that they should be considered as intangible property that is neither a thing in possession nor a thing in action. Specific rules have been introduced relating to the change of control, the transfer of legal title, the exercise of rights upon insolvency and the recovery of crypto-assets.1

    On the ADGM side, on 18 December 2023, its Financial Services Regulatory Authority released updated Guidance on Regulation of Virtual Asset Activities (Guidance).2 Among other things, the Guidance sets out the legal framework for crypto firms willing to operate as multilateral trading facilities for crypto-assets, which have recently proven to be increasingly popular amongst investors.3

    Providing Crypto Services to EU Clients

    Dubai and Abu Dhabi-based firms willing to engage with clients based in the EU should carefully assess the applicable regulatory regime. Depending on the type of crypto products and services they offer, firms may fall within the scope of EU Regulation 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) or under the regime of EU Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II).

    Under MiCA, non-EU firms providing crypto products or services to EU clients will require an authorisation unless such products or services are provided at the own initiative of the EU client.4 As clarified by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), this so-called “reverse solicitation” exemption is, however, “very narrowly framed and as such must be regarded as the exception; and it cannot be assumed, nor exploited to circumvent MiCA.”5 Indeed, the reverse solicitation rule under the MiCA regime is much stricter than in other regulations so far. In addition, ESMA reiterated that (in practice usually used) standardised contractual clauses or disclaimers in which clients declare that the products or services are provided at their own initiative are not relevant for assessing whether the activity falls within the scope of exemption or not.6

    For the purposes of MiCA, “solicitation” includes the promotion, advertisement or offer of crypto-assets or services by any means, including social media platforms or mobile applications as well as “promotions, advertisements and offers of a general nature and addressed to the public (with a broad and large reach) such as, for instance, brand advertisements by way of sponsorship deals.”7 This also includes the promotion of a crypto product or service by a third party, which may also be attributed to the provider and accordingly requires a license. Additionally, the reverse solicitation exception also no longer applies to pre-existing customers of the crypto service provider. This means that the (also individual) offering of products and services to pre-existing EU customers requires permission, as does the offering of services to the market in general.

    Learn more by watching our webinar, Are You Ready for MiCAR?

    Providing Crypto Services to UK Clients

    Crypto firms should assess the applicable regulatory regime even more carefully when engaging with UK clients, given that they will unlikely be able to rely on the “reverse solicitation” exemption.

    Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, non-UK firms may not provide regulated services to clients based in the UK unless they are authorised, or rely on an exclusion. Although the UK Government is still working on how to incorporate crypto-assets into the existing UK financial regulatory regime (noting that derivatives referencing crypto-assets are already covered by specific rules),8 it has indicated that the Overseas Persons Exclusion (which is the UK equivalent of the “reverse solicitation” exemption) will not be available to non-UK firms providing crypto services to UK clients.9

    Non-UK firms may not engage in the marketing of investment activity relating to specific crypto-assets to UK clients without an authorisation, approval of such marketing by an authorised person, or reliance on an exemption. Here, although the Overseas Communicator Exemptions (which are the UK equivalents of the “reverse solicitation” exemption for marketing activities) would generally be available, a number of other exemptions will not be available to non-UK crypto firms (such as the high-net-worth individuals or self-certified sophisticated investors exemptions).10

    Please do not hesitate to call with any questions you may have. Our experienced team are here to help you to navigate through the complexities of EU and UK crypto regulatory regimes.

    Authors

    Vlad Maly

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • Jury Trial on Legal Issue Denied, But No Harm Done

    Jury Trial on Legal Issue Denied, But No Harm Done

    ARTICLE

    Jury Trial on Legal Issue Denied, But No Harm Done

    Aug 29, 2024

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a jury trial, concluding it was harmless error because the defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict regardless. Overwell Harvest Ltd. v. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc., Case No. 23-2150 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 2024) (Kirsch, Pryor, Kolar, JJ.)

    Overwell Harvest was established to invest in Neurensic, a company specializing in market surveillance technology. Despite Overwell’s investment of millions of dollars, Neurensic faced significant financial distress, leading its management to pursue a sale. Neurensic’s CEO and COO accepted an offer from Trading Technologies, which subsequently hired former Neurensic employees with the CEO and COO’s approval. Prior to the sale, Overwell submitted a competing bid, to which Trading Technologies responded by raising its offer. Neurensic chose to accept Trading Technologies’ offer.

    Overwell sued Trading Technologies for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties by Neurensic’s leadership. The district court dismissed Overwell’s jury demand and ruled that the claim was equitable despite the damages sought. In a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Trading Technologies, determining that Overwell waived its claims that Trading Technologies had aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by Neurensic’s leadership. The district court’s decision was based on Overwell’s failure to advance arguments concerning improper notice to shareholders regarding the vote on Trading Technologies’ offer. Overwell appealed.

    The Seventh Circuit decided that Overwell had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because the case involved legal relief in addition to equitable relief. While the Court agreed that Overwell’s claim for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty under Delaware law was historically equitable, the request for compensatory and punitive damages constituted legal relief. The Court emphasized that even if a claim is equitable, the pursuit of legal relief (such as money damages) entitles a party to a jury trial. The Seventh Circuit determined that the district court erred by denying Overwell this right because determining legal relief is traditionally the role of a jury.

    The Seventh Circuit concluded that this error was harmless, however, because under Delaware law Trading Technologies would have been entitled to a directed verdict. The Court explained that a directed verdict is appropriate when no reasonable jury could find for the losing party based on the evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the losing party.

    The Seventh Circuit rejected Overwell’s breach of fiduciary duty claims, finding that the alleged breaches lacked merit under the Delaware standard for aiding and abetting fiduciary breaches. First, the Court held that Overwell failed to show that Trading Technologies knowingly participated in a fiduciary breach, as the continued servicing of Neurensic’s customers by former employees benefitted Neurensic, not Trading Technologies.

    Second, the Seventh Circuit determined that Overwell’s claim of blocking competitive bids could not succeed as Neurensic still held its most valuable asset – its source code – and could have repossessed its servers. Trading Technologies’ negotiation tactics were permissible under Delaware law, which allows for hard bargaining in arm’s-length transactions.

    Finally, Overwell’s claim regarding deficiencies in shareholder notice was dismissed because it was raised too late.

    Practice Note: When dealing with fiduciary duty claims, it is crucial to thoroughly establish all necessary elements, including clear proof of knowing participation in any breach. Mere aggressive negotiation or strategic decisions in business dealings likely will not cross legal lines if the negotiating positions are within permissible standards. Timely raising arguments and preserving issues is also essential, as delayed claims will likely be quickly dismissed.

    Authors

    Keval Amin

    Associate

    Chicago

    More insights
    Endnotes

  • Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | August 2024

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | August 2024

    ARTICLE

    Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court | August 2024

    August 2024

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Unified Patent Court (UPC) is revolutionizing the way patents are enforced in Europe, and McDermott’s intellectual property team is here to help you navigate this dynamic landscape. Our Legal Lens on the Unified Patent Court newsletter is designed to keep patent holders and legal departments well-informed. And with an on-the-ground team in Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, we offer a unique cross-border perspective.


    In depth
    Authors

    Diana Pisani

    European Patent Attorney

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Brennen Baylor

    Associate

    Washington, DC

    Aashish Kapadia

    Partner

    Austin

    More insights

  • CMS Revives, Expands Proposed Changes to Medicare Overpayment Rule

    CMS Revives, Expands Proposed Changes to Medicare Overpayment Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Revives, Expands Proposed Changes to Medicare Overpayment Rule

    August 23, 2024

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In response to comments on the 2022 proposed changes to the overpayments regulation, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed additional changes to the overpayment rule to clarify that the obligation to report and return requires quantification of the overpayment as part of identification. However, CMS proposed a strict time period for conducting reviews of overpayment issues. Under the proposed rule, the statutory 60-day clock would start to run either on the date of completion of the investigation or 180 days from the date on which the initial overpayment was identified, whichever is earlier. This proposal raises several questions and appears contrary to the overpayment statute.

    In depth

    Background and Prior Proposed Rule

    On July 31, 2024, CMS published the calendar year 2025 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule proposed rule, which contains an important proposal related to potential changes to the regulations for reporting and returning Medicare Part A and Part B overpayments. For a discussion of additional topics in this 2024 proposed rule, see this article by our McDermott+ colleagues.

    Following changes made by the Affordable Care Act, Section 1128J(d) of the Social Security Act requires a person who has received an overpayment to report and return the overpayment, as appropriate, and to report the reason for the overpayment. Overpayments are required by statute to be reported and returned by the later of:

    • 60 days after the date on which the overpayment is identified or
    • The date any corresponding cost report is due, if any.

    The current regulations provide a definition for when a provider has “identified” an overpayment at 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(a)(2). An overpayment has been “identified” when a provider “has, or should have through the exercise of reasonable diligence, determined that the person has received an overpayment and quantified the amount of the overpayment.” The regulation further clarifies that a provider will be deemed to have identified an overpayment if the provider “fails to exercise reasonable diligence and the [provider] in fact received an overpayment.”

    In December 2022, CMS first proposed to amend its overpayment regulations to revise the “identified” definition, specifying when a provider has “knowingly receives or retains an overpayment.” This 2022 proposed rule would define the terms “knowing” and “knowingly” to have the same meaning as under the federal False Claims Act (FCA). 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7k(a)(d)(4)(A). The 2022 proposal would remove the current “reasonable diligence” standard and instead would adopt by reference the definitions of “knowing” and “knowingly” established by the FCA. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A). We previously analyzed the 2022 proposed rule in the client alert, “Back to the drawing board: CMS proposes changing the overpayment rule’s ‘identified’ definition.”

    CMS has not yet finalized the proposals set forth in the 2022 proposed rule with respect to Medicare overpayments under Parts A and B. After reviewing (and while continuing to review) the public comments received in response to the 2022 proposed rule, CMS retained its original proposals to modify the regulations for Medicare Parts A and B as set forth in the 2022 proposed rule and added further proposed changes in the 2024 proposed rule. CMS plans to respond to the comments received in response to both the 2022 proposed rule and the 2024 proposed rule in a final rule.

    CMS proposed to modify its regulations in part to respond to a ruling from the US District Court for the District of Columbia, which held that, as applied to Medicare Part C plans, the “reasonable diligence” standard in the current overpayment regulations promulgated by CMS impermissibly established FCA liability for mere negligence. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Azar, 330 F. Supp. 3d 173, 191 (D.D.C. 2018), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co. v. Becerra, 16 F. 4th 867, cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 2851. Although the ruling in that case applied only to Part C plans, CMS issued the 2022 proposed rule in an effort to align the Part A and Part B overpayment rules with the district court’s decision, which CMS views “as having invalidated the definition of ‘identified’ set out at 42 C.F.R. § 442.326(c).”

    2024 Proposed Rule: Potential Changes to Deadline to Report and Return Overpayments

    In addition to the 2022 proposals, which CMS emphasized remain under consideration, CMS proposed further changes to the deadline for reporting and returning overpayments, and clarified certain circumstances that will extend the deadline for a provider who has identified an overpayment.

    If finalized, in addition to the existing reasons that the deadline to report and return an overpayment would be suspended, the deadline would be suspended if:

    • “[A] person has identified an overpayment but has not yet completed a good-faith investigation to determine the existence of related overpayments that may arise from the same or similar cause or reason as the initially identified overpayment” and
    • “[T]he person conducts a timely, good-faith investigation to determine whether related overpayments exist.” 42 C.F.R. § 401.305(b)(3)(i)(A).

    The 2024 proposed rule would add a new deadline at Section 401.305(b)(3)(ii) if the conditions at proposed new Section 401.305(b)(3)(i) are satisfied. A provider would have up to 180 days to investigate whether there are the “same or similar” overpayments. If the conditions are satisfied, then the deadline for reporting and returning the initially identified overpayment and related overpayments that arise from the same or similar cause or reason would remain suspended until the earlier of:

    • The date that the investigation of related overpayments concludes and the aggregate amount of the initially identified overpayments and related overpayments is calculated or
    • The date that is 180 days after the date on which the initial identified overpayment was

    CMS stated that these proposals are in response to comments received on the 2022 proposed rule that expressed concern regarding CMS’s proposals to remove the term “quantified” from the original regulatory text and to remove the ability for providers to investigate whether an “overpayment” has been received. This commentary was included in the 2016 Federal Register preamble to the original overpayment regulations. CMS believes that the 2024 proposals, especially proposed Section 401.305(b)(3)(ii)(A), would address these concerns.

    CMS provided the following example to demonstrate how an overpayment must be reported and returned under the 2024 proposed rule:

    • Day 1: A person identifies an overpayment arising from a physician’s failure to properly document the medical record to support the coding of a specific claim, and the person who identified the overpayment has reason to believe that this may be a common practice of the physician. Therefore, there may be more claims affected by the same issue.
      • Scenario 1: The person has up to 180 days to conduct and conclude a good faith investigation to determine whether related overpayments that arise from the same or similar cause or reason as the initially identified overpayment exist. The suspension ends when the investigation is concluded and the initial overpayment and related overpayments, if any, are calculated, or by day 180, whichever is earlier. The overpayment must be reported and returned within 60 days after either completion of the investigation or day 180, whichever is earlier. CMS notes that the newly proposed suspension period for good faith investigations is not mutually exclusive of other potentially applicable reasons for suspension already promulgated at Section 305(b)(2). CMS provides the example of a person who is reporting the overpayment to the Office of Inspector General self-disclosure protocol, which may further suspend the overpayment report and return requirement in accordance with the provision at Section 401.305(b)(2)(i).
      • Scenario 2: If an investigation is not conducted, or the investigation is not timely or conducted in good faith, then the identified overpayment must be reported and returned no later than 60 days after the identification of the initial overpayment.

    Analysis

    The 2024 proposed rule is intended to address commenters’ concerns over when an overpayment is deemed to have been “identified” in light of the removal of the quantification standard in the 2022 proposed rule and the lack of clarity on having a reasonable period of time to conduct investigations into potential overpayments. However, the 2024 proposed rule could be read to contain a new and stricter timeline for both conducting and completing investigations into potential overpayments, which raises several new interpretative questions as well as serious questions about whether the proposal is consistent with the statute.

    While CMS described commenters’ concerns about a “perceived 6-month time period” in the 2016 preamble, the preamble expressly states that CMS “chose 6 months as the benchmark for timely investigation” into potential overpayments. CMS also recognized in the regulatory preamble that it may reasonably take longer than six months to complete an investigation to determine whether there is an identified overpayment in “extraordinary circumstances.” CMS stated that “[w]hat constitutes extraordinary circumstances is a fact specific question. Extraordinary circumstances may include unusually complex investigations that the provider or supplier reasonably anticipates will require more than six months to investigate, such as physician self-referral law violations . . . natural disasters or a state of emergency.” CMS originally adopted this benchmark time period approach instead of setting a hard deadline in response to commenters’ concerns that the 2012 proposed rule did not address the practical reality that providers and suppliers face in their day-to-day compliance activities. Commenters noted that it often takes a considerable amount of time to investigate credible information of a potential overpayment, confirm that an overpayment exists and then quantify the amount. All of these concerns remain valid.

    The example that CMS provided in the 2024 proposed rule reflects the simplest version of an overpayment investigation. In reality, it may take considerably longer to investigate whether a provider has identified an overpayment or to quantify any related overpayments. This is particularly true in the event of large and complex overpayment matters that may involve multi-year, statistically valid coding and billing audits or matters involving extrapolation. Similarly, this time period may be insufficient to permit a provider to analyze and resolve Stark Law matters.

    The 2024 proposed regulatory language also introduces ambiguity, as it appears to contemplate that the deadline for returning overpayments is suspended before certain overpayments have been “identified” but while an investigation is ongoing. CMS acknowledges in the 2024 proposed rule that overpayment investigations may involve more complicated factual scenarios, such that a provider may now be obligated to refund the “identified” portion of a multipart overpayment while the investigation into any related overpayments is ongoing. For example, if a provider has initially “identified” an overpayment but believes that there may be additional related overpayments (on the same or similar facts), the provider may be obligated to repay the initially identified overpayment while investigating whether there are related overpayments (within the 180-day period).

    As commenters noted in 2012, it often takes the most diligent organization longer than six months to complete an investigation or audit a potential compliance issue and quantify the amount of any resulting overpayment. Generally, if an organization can show a reasonably diligent effort to evaluate the issue and quantify the amount, the amount of time for this review is not solely determined by whether such effort was reasonable. The six-month benchmark has historically served as a useful guidepost in advising organizations on these matters and in structuring compliance reviews. While attempting to provide clarity, CMS’s proposal to establish a bright-line, definitive deadline for investigations to be completed, before the 60-day window to report and return any resulting overpayments begins, does not take into account the concerns described above.

    Finally, the legal support for the proposal is suspect because the proposed rule appears to create a deadline for reporting and returning related overpayments that have not been identified. The statute says the 60 days to report and return starts to run from identification of the overpayment (which, practically, must include quantification). The proposal appears to try to start the 60-day clock for the related, but unidentified, overpayments by Day 180 of the initial overpayment identification. While CMS’s intent is to address the court’s invalidation of the “reasonable diligence” standard, CMS has arguably proposed an even more egregious situation by creating a regulation that is contrary to, and not supported by, the plain statutory language.

    Organizations should consider submitting comments to the 2024 proposed rule. Comments are due on September 9, 2024, by 5:00 pm EDT.

    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Monica Wallace

    Partner

    Chicago

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Dexter Golinghorst

    Associate

    Chicago

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  • Insuring Innovation: Software Code May Be Protected as an Arrangement

    Insuring Innovation: Software Code May Be Protected as an Arrangement

    ARTICLE

    Insuring Innovation: Software Code May Be Protected as an Arrangement

    Aug 22, 2024

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit once again remanded a trade secret and copyright dispute involving software for generating life insurance quotes, finding that the district court erred by failing to consider the copyrightability of the source code’s arrangement. As to the trade secret claim, however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court did not err in finding that the defendants misappropriated the trade secrets at issue and could be held jointly and severally liable, despite varying levels of culpability. Compulife Software, Inc. v. Newman, Case No. 21-14074 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024) (Jordan, Brasher, Abudu, JJ.)

    Compulife’s software generates life insurance quotes using a proprietary database of insurance rates. The software produces a quote by using blocks of code, arranged in a particular manner, that correspond to different data points such as state, birth month, birthday, birth year, sex and smoking status. Compulife licenses its software to customers and offers an online version to the public.

    David Rutstein is a former insurance agent who is permanently barred from the profession. Rutstein misled Compulife into giving him its software by pretending that he worked with someone who had a license to use it. Rutstein then created and registered several websites in his son’s name using Compulife’s software in connection with the sites. One of the websites was later owned by Aaron Levy. Rutstein and Levy directed an employee, Moses Newman, to launch a scraping attack on Compulife’s website to get millions of quotes, which they used for their own websites. Compulife’s sales declined as a result.

    Compulife sued Rutstein, Rutstein’s son, Levy and Newman for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims. After a bench trial, the parties appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit directed the district court to make more specific findings. After a second bench trial, the district court determined that the defendants did not infringe Compulife’s software by copying it and using it for their own website, but they did misappropriate Compulife’s trade secrets. The defendants were held jointly and severally liable despite differing degrees of culpability. All parties appealed.

    Compulife argued that the district court erred in concluding that the defendants did not infringe its copyright. The Eleventh Circuit agreed in part, finding that the district court incorrectly applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison test used in software copyright infringement analyses. Compulife claimed that the arrangement of its various source code elements (e.g., state, birth month, birthday, birth year and sex) was a creative and therefore protectable form of expression. The Court agreed that the arrangement was potentially protectable, similar to its holding in another case that the arrangement of yacht listings in a boat guide could be protectable. BUC Int’l v. Int’l Yacht Council (11th Cir. 2007). The Court remanded the copyright infringement analysis to the district court, finding that it erred in the abstraction step because it “never identified the entire arrangement of these variables in the code as a constituent component of the code.” The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, with Compulife’s assertion that the district court erred in finding that other aspects of its code were not protectable forms of expression, including the names Compulife gave its variables, its use of camel case when naming them, and its use of radio buttons for making certain selections.

    The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s ruling that the defendants had misappropriated Compulife’s trade secrets and that they were jointly and severally liable for the misappropriation. The defendants argued that Compulife did not undertake reasonable efforts to maintain its trade secrets, but the Court was not persuaded. It pointed out that Rutstein lied to gain access to the software, and then he and his codefendants used that code to commit a scraping attack that acquired millions of insurance quotes. Those quotes were then used on the defendants’ website, causing Compulife to lose revenue and subscriptions. The Court also found that Florida law clearly supports joint and several liability for damages since Florida is a comparative fault regime with an exception for intentional torts, such as trade secret misappropriation, and instances where defendants act in concert to produce a single injury, as they did here.

    Practice Note: Computer software can be particularly challenging for courts to analyze for copyright infringement. In this case, elements of software code that are not individually protectable may nevertheless be protectable as an arrangement.

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