ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Colorado AG Proposes Draft Amendments to the Colorado Privacy Act Rules
September 17, 2024
Read time: 5 min
For more information related to state privacy laws, please attend McDermott’s September 18, 2024, Privacy Legislation: What to Know From 2024 and Predictions for 2025 webinar.
On September 13, 2024, the Colorado Attorney General’s (AG) Office published proposed draft amendments to the Colorado Privacy Act (CPA) Rules. The proposals include new requirements related to biometric collection and use (applicable to all companies and employers that collect biometrics of Colorado residents) and children’s privacy. They also introduce methods by which businesses could seek regulatory guidance from the Colorado AG.
The draft amendments seek to align the CPA with Senate Bill 41, Privacy Protections for Children’s Online Data, and House Bill 1130, Privacy of Biometric Identifiers & Data, both of which were enacted earlier this year and will largely come into effect in 2025. Comments on the proposed regulations can be submitted beginning on September 25, 2024, in advance of a November 7, 2024, rulemaking hearing.
Privacy of Biometric Identifiers & Data
In comparison to other state laws like the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA), the CPA proposed draft amendments do not include a private right of action. That said, the proposed draft amendments include several significant revisions to the processing of biometric identifiers and data, including:
- Create New Notice Obligations: The draft amendments require any business (including those not otherwise subject to the CPA) that collects biometrics from consumers or employees to provide a “Biometric Identifier Notice” before collecting or processing biometric information. The notice must include which biometric identifier is being collected, the reason for collecting the biometric identifier, the length of time the controller will retain the biometric identifier, and whether the biometric identifier will be disclosed, redisclosed, or otherwise disseminated to a processor alongside the purpose of such disclosure. This notice must be reasonably accessible, either in a standalone disclosure or, if embedded within the controller’s privacy notice, a clear link to the specific section within the privacy notice that contains the Biometric Identifier Notice. This requirement applies to all businesses that collect biometrics, including employers, even if a business does not otherwise trigger the applicability thresholds of the CPA.
- Revisit When Consent Is Required: The draft amendments require controllers to obtain explicit consent from the data subject before selling, leasing, trading, disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating biometric information. The amendments also allow employers to collect and process biometric identifiers as a condition for employment in limited circumstances (much more limited than Illinois’s BIPA, for example).
Privacy Protections for Children’s Online Data
The draft amendments also include several updates to existing CPA requirements related to minors:
- Delineate Between Consumers Based on Age: The draft amendments define a “child” as an individual under 13 years of age and a “minor” as an individual under 18 years of age, creating additional protections for teenagers.
- Update Data Protection Assessment Requirements: The draft amendments expand the scope of data protection assessments to include processing activities that pose a heightened risk of harm to minors. Under the draft amendments, entities performing assessments must disclose whether personal data from minors is processed as well as identify any potential sources and types of heightened risk to minors that would be a reasonably foreseeable result of offering online services, products, or features to minors.
- Revisit When Consent Is Required: The draft amendments require controllers to obtain explicit consent before processing the personal data of a minor and before using any system design feature to significantly increase, sustain, or extend a minor’s use of an online service, product, or feature.
Opinion Letters and Interpretive Guidance
In a welcome effort to create a process by which businesses and the public can understand more about the scope and applicability of the CPA, the draft amendments:
- Create a Formal Feedback Process: The draft amendments would permit individuals or entities to request an opinion letter from the Colorado AG regarding aspects of the CPA and its application. Entities that have received and relied on applicable guidance offered via an opinion letter may use that guidance as a good faith defense against later claims of having violated the CPA.
- Clarify the Role of Non-Binding Advice: Separate and in addition to the formal opinion letter process, the draft amendments provide a process by which any person affected directly or indirectly by the CPA may request interpretive guidance from the AG. Unlike the guidance in an opinion letter, interpretive guidance would not be binding on the Colorado AG and would not serve as a basis for a good faith defense. Nonetheless, a process for obtaining interpretive guidance is a novel, and welcome, addition to the state law fabric.
What’s Next?
While subject to change pursuant to public consultation, assuming the proposed CPA amendments are finalized, they would become effective on July 1, 2025. Businesses interested in shaping and commenting on the draft amendments should consider promptly submitting comments to the Colorado AG.
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If you have questions or need assistance preparing for the new state consumer laws, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or reach out to the authors.

Landmark Mental Health Parity Final Rule: What Plan Sponsors and Insurers Need to Know
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Landmark Mental Health Parity Final Rule: What Plan Sponsors and Insurers Need to Know
September 17, 2024
Read time: 10 min
Our October 3, 2024, webinar, Unpacking the Final Mental Health Parity Regulations, will review the final MHPAEA rules, including compliance deadlines and key takeaways for employers, plan sponsors, and issuers of group health plans. Register for the webinar here.
The US Departments of the Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services (the Departments) recently issued much-anticipated final regulations under the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA). The newly issued final regulations update the 2013 final regulations principally to reflect the changes to MHPAEA enacted by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA 2021), which requires plans and issuers to formally analyze and compare nonquantitative treatment limitations (NQTLs) as they apply to both mental health and substance use disorder (MH/SUD) benefits and medical/surgical (M/S) benefits.
The changes in the final regulations largely take effect in 2025, with the effective date for some provisions delayed until 2026. Although the final regulations may face litigation challenges, considering the recent decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, health plan sponsors should plan to comply by the quickly approaching deadlines in the meantime.
The 2024 final regulations:
- Establish the meaning of certain important terms (including “medical/surgical benefits,” “mental health benefits,” and “substance use disorder benefits”) with little change from the proposed regulations;
- Clarify the manner in which plans must demonstrate their compliance with the CAA 2021 rules governing NQTLs by eliminating the proposed regulations’ “substantially all” test and by adopting with certain modifications standards related to plan design and data collection and evaluation;
- Adopt with modifications the proposed regulations’ “meaningful benefit” requirement;
- Adopt new content requirements for NQTL comparative analyses and specify how plans and issuers must make such a comparative analysis available to the Departments and any applicable state authority, participants, and beneficiaries upon request; and
- Adopted, with certain modifications, the proposed regulations’ fiduciary certification requirement.
Background
The rules governing mental health parity have evolved over the last several decades. In 1996, Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, which required parity in aggregate lifetime and annual dollar limits for mental health benefits and M/S benefits. The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) expanded the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 by adding new requirements, including provisions to apply mental health parity to substance use disorder benefits. At a high level, MHPAEA generally requires that group health plans and group health insurance issuers ensure that (1) the financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to MH/SUD benefits are no more restrictive (e.g., not permitting more restrictive lifetime or annual dollar limits, financial requirements, or treatment limitations) in writing or operation than those applicable to M/S benefits, and that (2) there are no separate financial requirements or treatment limitations applicable only with respect to MH/SUD benefits.
The CAA 2021 expanded MHPAEA by expressly requiring health plans that cover both M/S and MH/SUD benefits and impose NQTLs on MH/SUD benefits to perform and document their comparative analyses of the design and application of NQTLs beginning on February 10, 2021. Many recent Department audits of health plans have focused heavily on MHPAEA compliance. Since 2021, the Departments have also performed MHPAEA compliance-specific audits of health plans, which have not revealed satisfactory compliance to date.
The Final MHPAEA Regulations
The final regulations generally follow and adopt most of the provisions of the 2023 proposed regulation, which attracted nearly 10,000 comment letters. While the final regulations modify the proposed regulations in a handful of welcome respects, the fundamental structure of the proposed regulations remains intact.
- Definition of Key Terms
The final regulations carry forward the definitions set out in the proposed regulations with minor changes. Terms such as “medical/surgical benefits,” “mental health benefits,” and “substance use disorder benefits” are defined with reference to generally accepted standards of current medical practice. Importantly, the proposed regulations referred to state law and guidelines as a basis for establishing those standards for purposes of MHPAEA compliance but now refer solely to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) and the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). New definitions have also been adopted substantially as proposed to describe the basic components of NQTL design and application. These include “processes,” “strategies,” “evidentiary standards,” and “factors.” Finally, the final rule adopts the proposed regulations to affirm that the list of illustrative treatment limitations is non-exhaustive and that a complete exclusion of benefits for a particular condition is not a treatment limitation.
- Demonstrating NQTL Compliance
The proposed rule would have established a three-pronged test, which included a “substantially all” requirement. Counterintitively, the “substantially all” test in the proposed rules would have applied to NQTLs a quantitative test similar to the test that currently applies to financial and quantitative treatment limitations. The requirement was roundly criticized in comments and the Departments abandoned it in the final regulation – a change that plan sponsors and issuers will likely welcome. The other two requirements relating to plan design and data evaluation were adopted with minor modifications.
In another significant change from the proposed regulations, separate exceptions relating to the design of NQTLs for generally recognized independent professional medical or clinical standards and for reasonable and appropriate measures to detect or prevent and prove fraud and abuse were not carried over into the final regulation. These exceptions were instead relegated to the status of factors that influence the NQTL design. Going forward, plans and issuers that rely on independent professional medical or clinical standards or fraud and abuse measures must comply with the general rule of the design and application requirement. If such a standard or measure is used as an NQTL, the plan or issuer also must comply with the relevant data evaluation requirements.
- The “Meaningful Benefit” Requirement
Under the proposed regulations, a plan or issuer would not have been considered to provide MH/SUD benefits in every classification in which M/S benefits were provided unless, among other things, the plan or issuer provided “meaningful benefits” for the treatment for that condition or disorder in each such classification. This is an anti-abuse rule. Its purpose is to prevent plans or issuers from covering a broad range of M/S conditions while providing only limited MH/SUD benefits in the classification. The final regulations retain the meaningful benefit requirement but with some modifications. To qualify as “meaningful,” the plan or policy must cover a “core treatment” for each MH/SUD condition or disorder in each classification in which the plan covers a core treatment for one or more M/S benefits. This meaningful benefits requirement has been widely criticized as creating a benefit mandate and is arguably inconsistent with the intent of MHPAEA and may be vulnerable to litigation challenges.
- NQTL Contents
The final regulations adopt with little change the proposed content requirements for NQTL comparative analyses, consisting of six core content elements. They also specify how plans and issuers must make such a comparative analysis available to the Departments – within 10 business days of receiving a request – and any applicable state authority, participants, and beneficiaries upon request.
- Fiduciary Certification
The proposed regulations would have required a named Employee Retirement Income Security Act fiduciary to certify whether they found the plan’s comparative analysis of NQTLs to comply with the CAA 2021 NQTL content requirements. While the final regulation retains the fiduciary certification requirement, it cuts back substantially on the scope of the certification. Going forward, fiduciaries are merely required to confirm their engagement in a prudent process to select one or more qualified service providers to perform and document a comparative analysis in connection with the imposition of any NQTLs. According to the preamble to the final regulation, this will require the fiduciary to, among other things, “review the comparative analysis prepared by or on behalf of the plan with respect to an NQTL; [and] ask questions about the analysis and discuss it with service providers, as necessary, to understand the findings and conclusions documented in the analysis.” Practically, given the lack of service providers available to perform and document a comparative analysis and the unwillingness of major third-party administrators to provide assistance, plan sponsors will need to determine a path forward to meet this requirement.
In the preamble to the final regulations, the Departments explain that provisions added to MHPAEA by the CAA 2021 are self-implementing and have been in effect since February 10, 2021. The new features of the final regulations generally take effect for group health plan years commencing on or after January 1, 2025. However, certain of the regulations’ requirements, including the meaningful benefits standard, the prohibition on discriminatory factors and evidentiary standards, the relevant data evaluation requirements, and guidance regarding the design and scope of the comparative analyses apply in plan years commencing on or after January 1, 2026.
We foresee numerous difficulties for health plan sponsors in implementing the final regulations. Among these are the small headcount of individuals in a typical company benefits department which make meeting the ever-expanding regulatory requirements an uphill battle, the lack of willing third-party vendors to assist plans and plan sponsors with mental health parity compliance, and the continuing lack of clarity in how the rules apply. Given a recent US Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo effectively limiting deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, we anticipate that there may be legal challenges to the application of these MHPAEA final regulations. In the meantime, health plan sponsors and fiduciaries should work closely with their legal counsel and any third-party vendors to develop a compliance plan in light of approaching deadlines for MH/SUD benefits that may have already been finalized for the 2025 plan year.
For any questions regarding mental health parity, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or one of the authors.

Texas Comptroller Proposes Rule Changes Cementing Tax on 130% of Marketplace Sales
ARTICLE
Texas Comptroller Proposes Rule Changes Cementing Tax on 130% of Marketplace Sales
Sep 17, 2024
Read time: 4 min
In a controversial move, the Texas Comptroller is poised to amend Rule 3.330, Data Processing Services, effectively rewriting the rules to favor the contentious stance it has adopted in recent audits and litigation. This proposed amendment, which aims to cement the aggressive stance the Comptroller has taken in audits and litigation that a marketplace provider’s commission-based earnings are taxable “data processing services,” represents a significant departure from long-standing practices and highlights a disturbing trend of what is effectively a retroactive regulatory adjustment.
A LOOK AT THE PROPOSED CHANGES
The crux of the proposed amendment is the addition of paragraph (b)(5) to Rule 3.330, which the Comptroller explains is being added “to clarify that marketplace providers provide data processing services to their customers as they enter, retrieve, search, manipulate, and store data or information in the course of their business.” New paragraph (b)(5) provides that:
Marketplace provider services may be included in taxable data processing services when they involve the computerized entry, retrieval, search, compilation, manipulation, or storage of data or information provided by the purchaser or the purchaser’s designee. For example, services to store product listings and photographs, maintain records of transactions, and to compile analytics are taxable data processing services.
This new paragraph specifically targets the commissions that marketplace providers charge for facilitating sales, taxing them separately from the underlying transactions themselves. This is not just an expansion of the tax base; it’s a redefinition of what constitutes a taxable service, applying it in ways that were never intended under previous interpretations of the law that considered such commissions nontaxable auctioneer/brokerage fees.
WHY THIS AMENDMENT IS PROBLEMATIC
The Comptroller’s approach is problematic for several reasons, including:
- Effective Retroactivity. The proposed amendment seeks to justify an aggressive (and questionable) agency position that the Comptroller has only recently begun to assert in audits and litigation after it quietly revoked a long-standing administrative ruling in 2020. The revocation of this ruling in 2020, without public notice or legislative approval, was a stark deviation from established practices. By changing the rules after the fact, the proposed amendment undermines the stability and predictability of the law.
- Double Taxation. If a marketplace facilitates a sale where a consumer pays $100 and the marketplace earns a $30 commission, the proposed amendment would not only tax the $100 transaction but also the $30 commission. This results in an effective tax on 130% of marketplace sales, with the additional 30% a double tax on the portion of the sales proceeds paid to the marketplace provider as a commission. Under this scheme, the Comptroller is demanding that marketplace providers pay tax on 130% of the sales price and charge the consumer for tax on the 100% and the seller for the 30%.
- Discriminatory Tax Under ITFA. The proposed amendment subjects commissions earned by online marketplace providers to taxation as data processing services while similar services provided offline, such as commissions earned by auctioneers of oil and gas leases, consignment stores, and real estate agents using computers, remain untaxed. This disparate treatment violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA), which prohibits discrimination against electronic commerce by ensuring that online transactions are not taxed more heavily than their offline equivalents.
CONCLUSION
The proposed amendment rewrites the definition of data processing services subject to tax in Texas, normally something one would expect the legislature to do. The proposed amendment also purports to supersede decisions from the Supreme Court of Texas detailing how the true object test applies to sales of such services and changes the focus from the buyer’s perspective to that of the seller.
Texas should be encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship, especially in the digital commerce space, rather than retroactively penalizing it with ill-considered tax policies. The Comptroller’s move to amend Rule 3.330 in a way that supports questionable audit positions is not only unfair but also undermines the principles of equitable and predictable tax regulation.
The good news for some is that Texas is still making marketplace providers a go-forward offer they can’t refuse. If you are in this situation and need advice on navigating this new and complex Texas discussion, please reach out to the authors of this article.
Written comments on the proposed amendment must be submitted to the Comptroller by October 13, 2024.

US Attorney’s Office in California Announces Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Program for Corporate, Financial Crimes
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
US Attorney’s Office in California Announces Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Program for Corporate, Financial Crimes
September 11, 2024
Read time: 6 min
On August 23, 2024, the US Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, which is the largest judicial district in the United States, announced a new Voluntary Self-Disclosure and Whistleblower Pilot Program. The Whistleblower Program is designed to incentivize individuals to report corporate crime and financial fraud to the government and, in turn, increase the pressure on companies to voluntarily self-disclose misconduct. In exchange for full cooperation with the investigation, whistleblowers may be able to avoid prosecution for their own misconduct and obtain a non-prosecution agreement (NPA) or deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).[1]
This Whistleblower Program follows on the heels of the US Department of Justice (DOJ) announcing the details of its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program. Other US Attorney’s Offices, including the Southern District of New York and Northern District of California, also announced similar whistleblower programs earlier this year. These whistleblower programs are the latest example of DOJ’s increased focus on investigating and prosecuting corporate crime.
The stated purpose of the Central District of California’s Whistleblower Program is to “encourage early voluntary self-disclosure and promote effective enforcement of criminal laws.”
First, the Whistleblower Program only applies to individuals who report certain types of alleged misconduct. The program specifically focuses on alleged criminal conduct involving “public or private companies, exchanges, financial institutions, investment advisers, or investment funds involving fraud or corporate control failures or affecting market integrity.” It also applies to “state or local bribery” and “fraud relating to federal, state, or local funds.” Notably, however, the Whistleblower Program does not apply to individuals who report Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts (FCPA) violations, bribery of federal officials, campaign finance misconduct, tax offenses, and environmental crimes.
Second, to be entitled to an NPA or DPA, a whistleblower must satisfy the following criteria:
- The alleged misconduct cannot be publicly known and cannot be known to the US Attorney’s Office or DOJ at the time of the disclosure.
- The disclosure must be made voluntarily. The disclosure cannot be made in response to a government inquiry, a reporting obligation, or prior to an imminent threat of disclosure to the government.
- The whistleblower must provide “substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of at least one equally or more culpable” person. The whistleblower cannot have played a “leading role” in the alleged misconduct. The whistleblower must also agree to “cooperate fully” with the US Attorney’s Office’s prosecution and investigation.
- The whistleblower must “truthfully and completely” disclose all prior criminal conduct.
- The whistleblower cannot be: (a) a federal, state, or local official; (b) a law enforcement agent or official; or (c) the CEO or any other individual who exercises primary control over a public or private company.
- The whistleblower cannot have engaged in certain criminal conduct, including violent crimes, sex offenses, and terrorism or national security offenses. The whistleblower also cannot have any prior felony convictions or those involving fraud or dishonesty.
Third, even if the whistleblower does not meet the specific program requirements, the US Attorney’s Office may still offer the whistleblower an NPA or DPA in exchange for his or her cooperation. In exercising this discretion, the US Attorney’s Office will consider many of the same factors described above, including the extent of the cooperation, the whistleblower’s role in the alleged misconduct, and the adequacy of noncriminal sanctions, such as civil settlements with government regulators.
Key Takeaways
- The Central District of California, which serves seven counties (including Los Angeles) and a population of nearly 20 million people, is increasingly focused on investigating and prosecuting corporate and financial crimes. Its Whistleblower Program comes less than a year after US Attorney Martin Estrada launched a Corporate and Securities Fraud Strike Force targeting complex corporate crimes, abuses by company insiders, and offenses impacting the US financial system. Companies doing business in the Central District of California should be aware that the US Attorney’s Office is devoting significant additional resources to corporate investigations and prosecutions.
- The Central District of California’s Whistleblower Program is the most recent example of DOJ’s department-wide focus on voluntary self-disclosure. The US Attorney’s Office and DOJ hope the threat of increased whistleblower activity – with significant benefits for individual tipsters – will pressure companies to scrutinize their compliance programs more closely and voluntarily self-disclose corporate misconduct.
- Individuals may still face substantial personal exposure if they attempt to take advantage of the Whistleblower Program. Although potentially obtaining an NPA or DPA is a significant benefit, there is no practical way for whistleblowers or their counsel to determine in advance whether the whistleblower will satisfy all the criteria to be eligible for such agreements. The Whistleblower Program also vests considerable discretion in the US Attorney’s Office and individual prosecutors to determine whether an NPA or DPA is appropriate. There is no mechanism for a whistleblower to challenge the final determination. Before making any disclosures to the US Attorney’s Office or DOJ, potential whistleblowers and their counsel should carefully consider whether disclosure is in the whistleblowers’ best interests.
- It is unclear whether the Central District of California’ Whistleblower Program or any of the other DOJ whistleblower programs will have a substantial impact on the number of corporate investigations or prosecutions going forward. Individuals with substantial knowledge of or involvement in corporate misconduct may be hesitant to disclose that misconduct to the government. Other whistleblower programs that offer financial awards, such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s whistleblower program, the False Claims Act, or the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s enhanced whistleblower program, are more likely to drive increased enforcement activity.
- The best way for companies to minimize the risks of increased whistleblower activity and government enforcement actions is to implement a robust compliance program, subject to periodic review. An effective compliance program should now be viewed as a necessity. Among other things, companies should put in place policies and procedures that encourage employees to report any potential misconduct internally instead of to DOJ so the company can thoroughly evaluate the issues raised and determine whether additional actions, including voluntary self-disclosure to the government, are necessary or appropriate.

The Pulse of Health Tech: Market Access and Regulatory Challenges
ARTICLE
The Pulse of Health Tech: Market Access and Regulatory Challenges
April 2024
Read time: 2 min
Dr. Christian Lebrecht and Dr. Katharina Hoffmeister with the article “The Pulse of Health Tech: Market Access and Regulatory Challenges” in the fourth issue of Legal Industry Review Germany.

German Medical Research Act – A Jumpstart for Medical Research and Innovation in Germany
ARTICLE
German Medical Research Act – A Jumpstart for Medical Research and Innovation in Germany
September 2024
Read time: 2 min
The German Parliament has passed the draft Medical Research Act as part of Germany’s new National Pharma Strategy. In the article “German Medical Research Act – A Jumpstart for Medical Research and Innovation in Germany”, published in the Legal Industry Review, Jana Grieb and Dr. Lea Hachmeister provide insights into the most important changes brought about by the Medical Research Act.

Seasonal considerations for packaging and selling alcoholic beverages
ARTICLE
Seasonal considerations for packaging and selling alcoholic beverages
Sep 6, 2024
Read time: 3 min
The final quarter of the year is the alcohol industry’s busiest period, accounting for approximately 70% of annual business. Many holiday-themed seasonal products are beginning to make their way to market, and it is important to remember that these products may have additional regulatory considerations and hurdles.
The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) publishes a list of allowable revisions to approved labels – that is, the changes that can be made to a product with an existing certificate of label approval (COLA) without necessitating a new label approval. Notably, however, seasonal products have special allowances. Generally, any nonmandatory label information, such as a graphic, would require a new COLA to be added to a label. Yet, in accordance with Allowable Revision #28, so long as that graphic is holiday and/or seasonally themed, it can be added, deleted, or changed without a new COLA. For example, adding a smiley face to a label would require a new COLA, but adding a candy cane would not.
Even though the candy cane would not require a new COLA, it is important to remember that any additions must not conflict with or qualify the mandatory information, and they must comply with all existing regulations and avoid all prohibited practices. For example, “Happy Valentine’s Day!” can be added to a label, but “Dizzy with love on Valentine’s Day” could not be added – with the acquisition of a COLA or without. “Dizzy” or other statements that describe how the contents of the bottle may affect someone would, if added to a distilled spirits label, run afoul of 27 CFR § 5.129 (a)(1), as the term implies a physical or psychological sensation resulting from consuming the distilled spirits. For wines, a similar qualification can be found in 27 CFR § 4.39(h), and for beers, it can be found in 27 CFR § 7.129(a)(1).
After the new seasonal labels have been printed, there are several additional considerations. These include:
- Packaging: There are limitations on whether the alcoholic beverage can be packaged together with a food or point of sale (POS) item.
- Pricing: It is important to consider the price and whether the market will allow a pricing variance from the same alcoholic beverage when not accompanied by POS.
- Separate brand registrations and price postings where required.
- Special price posting designations, such as a limited availability designation for New York.
Label and packaging compliance is an area that is routinely investigated by the TTB and state regulators. Regulators conduct these compliance checks by visiting retail locations and verifying that the labels on the products conform to state and federal labeling requirements. When a label is not in compliance, the industry member may face penalties and will need to address the regulators’ concerns and correct the label(s). Maintaining compliance with TTB and state regulations helps safeguard existing licenses and helps avoid disruptions within supply chains.
For questions or assistance with seasonal items or their packaging, please contact Alva Mather or the McDermott alcohol team.

Alphabet and Others (C-233/23): Game-Changing Ruling Looms in Google Antitrust Battle
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Alphabet and Others (C-233/23): Game-Changing Ruling Looms in Google Antitrust Battle
September 6, 2024
Read time: 10 min
On September 5, Advocate General (AG) Medina rendered her opinion in Alphabet and Others, (Opinion) suggesting the Court of Justice not to apply the strict Bronner2 criteria for assessing Google’s refusal to grant access to its Android Auto platform for an app providing a set of features for charging electric vehicles.
Instead, AG Medina concludes that a dominant company that owns a platform and which excludes, obstructs or delays access of an app developed by a third-party infringes Article 102 TFEU, provided that such behaviour gives rise to anticompetitive effects to the detriment of consumers and cannot be objectively justified.3
Importantly, AG Medina breaks new legal ground in that she believes that a refusal to grant access to a platform cannot be objectively justified by the “mere fact that the dominant undertaking must develop a software template taking into account the specific needs of the operator requesting access.” In other words, just granting access to a platform is not enough, certain changes to facilitate access have to be undertaken.
JuicePass is an app developed by Enel X that offers a set of features for charging electric vehicles. Android Auto is a platform that enables drivers to use Android apps, such as Google Maps, via their vehicle’s own display, instead of on their mobile phone device.
Google had informed Enel X Italia (EXI) that its electric car charging app, JuicePass, could not be published on Android Auto due to security concerns and resource allocation. For apps to interoperate with Android Auto, Google needs to develop specific templates. Google claimed that it did not have the resources at that time to create the template. Only templates for media and messaging apps were available.
On 27 April 2021, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) imposed a fine on Google for infringing Article 102 TFEU by refusing to supply, and, specifically, not allowing JuicePass to be published on Android Auto.
Google appealed the ICA’s decision, at the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio, Italy, which upheld the ICA’s decision. Google subsequently appealed the judgment before the Consiglio di Stato (Italian Council of State) who made a preliminary ruling request seeking clarification on the following questions:
- Does Article 102 TFEU require that access to a product be indispensable for a specific activity in a neighbouring market, or is it enough that access makes the product or service more convenient to use, especially if the product’s main function is to enhance convenience?
- Can behavior be considered abusive under Article 102 TFEU if the requesting undertaking was already active and growing in the market, and other competitors continued to operate, despite the lack of access to the requested product?
- Should Article 102 TFEU consider the non-existence of a product at the time of the request as an objective justification for refusal? Must a competition authority analyse the time needed for a dominant undertaking to develop the product, or must the dominant undertaking inform the requester of the development time?
- Does Article 102 TFEU require a dominant undertaking controlling a digital platform to modify or develop new products for those requesting access? Should the undertaking consider general market requirements or the specific needs of the requester, and establish objective criteria for reviewing and prioritizing requests?
- Should the competition authority in question previously define the relevant market or is it sufficient to consider a potential product market?
I. AG Opinion
On 5 September 2024, AG Medina issued its much-anticipated Opinion.
Essential facilities case law (‘Bronner criteria’) is not applicable
The AG confirms that the starting point is that a dominant undertaking in principle is free to refuse to grant access to a product, service or infrastructure that it has developed for its own needs4. Only in exceptional circumstances, i.e., (i) when the access request concerns a product or service indispensable to the exercise of an economic activity on a neighbouring market; (ii) the refusal is likely to eliminate all competition in that market; and (iii) the refusal is not capable of being objectively justified5, a right of access must be granted.
In cases like Bronner, where access to infrastructure is requested for something that was created and used internally, the high threshold is appropriate because forcing access might deter the dominant firm from making future investments.
In the case of Android Auto, the AG concludes that the Bronner conditions do not apply because the platform was not developed exclusively for Google’s internal use. Quite to the contrary, Android Auto was created as an open platform to facilitate the use of third-party apps in a vehicle’s infotainment system. Thus, Android Auto is not the type of essential infrastructure covered by Bronner.
Since Android Auto was designed to host third-party apps, the refusal to integrate JuicePass is less about protecting proprietary infrastructure and more about controlling access to a shared platform.
This changes the competitive dynamic and calls for a different legal approach; the refusal should be assessed based on whether the owner of the platform excludes, obstructs or delays the requested access of an app developed by a third-party, creating anticompetitive effects to the detriment of consumers, and which cannot be objectively justified6.
The fact that the access requesting party remained active on the neighbouring market is not relevant for the abuse analysis
The AG concluded that, even if Enel X has survived and continued to operate on the market, Google cannot rely on this to “escape” liability. The Opinion repeats the known mantra that the mere fact that competition on the market had been maintained or had even increased as such does not prove that the dominant company’s behaviour had no anti-competitive effects. It is up to the dominant company to prove that the absence of such actual effects is the consequence of the fact that the conduct under investigation was unable to produce such effects.
Objective justifications for refusing access to a platform and management of access requests
The AG made a detailed analysis of whether the absence of a template for allowing apps such as JuicePass to interoperate with Android Auto can constitute an objective justification for refusing access and – one step further – whether a dominant undertaking can be required to develop such a template.
The Opinion recalls that an exception to a rule of EU law must be interpreted restrictively. This implies, in the realm of Article 102, that exceptions to the prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position must be interpreted equally restrictively.
In the context of a refusal to grant access to a platform and where such refusal gives rise to anticompetitive effects – and in the Opinion the AG assumes both those conditions are met – only circumstances that compromise the functioning and purpose of that platform may be accepted. This implies that any objective justification that is invoked by Google, but that does not relate to compromising of the functioning and purpose of the platform can never be successfully invoked. The AG acknowledges that where the development of a template is technically impossible, this could constitute an objective justification.
The AG then lays out the burden of proof dynamic in this type of objective justification discussions. It is for a competition authority to prove the existence of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. However, it is then for the dominant company to invoke any objective justifications, and to support it with concrete evidence and arguments. It is only then back on the competition authority to demonstrate that the arguments and evidence adduced cannot prevail and that the justification cannot be accepted.
Google had argued that creating the required template would have taken time and resources, and it was not possible to immediately facilitate JuicePass’ integration. The AG recalled that an undertaking may invoke an objective justification for refusing access, provided that it is necessary and proportionate. As to time constraints, Google cannot simply invoke them. Google must demonstrate it has informed the third-party requesting access of the time needed to develop the template. It can take as long as objectively required. Also other factors – such as the COVID-19 – may be taken into account to assess the time frame. If then the competition authority concludes that the time frame is not justified, it cannot constitute an objective justification for refusal of access.
The same, the AG argues, is true for resources. This boils down to discussions about costs for developing a template and who has to bear those costs. Those costs have to be estimated objectively, but it is not required that the dominant company bears those costs. They can be borne by the entity requesting access. Again, if a competition authority then concludes that such costs are inappropriate or disproportionate, the justification put forward by the dominant company based on resources cannot be accepted.
Regarding the fourth question, the AG held that the special responsibility of dominant firms, under EU competition law, does not extend to creating or altering infrastructure for each third-party request. Also, the AG stated that Google must consider such requests fairly but implementing objective criteria for managing access requests is not necessary, unless failing to do so results in unjustified delays or discrimination.
No need to precisely define the neighbouring markets
Lastly, referring to the fifth question, the AG explained that, when defining the relevant downstream market to assess whether the conduct of the dominant undertaking was capable of restricting competition, in particular in the case of conduct consisting in refusing access, it is acceptable to identify a hypothetical or potential relevant market (paragraph 84). In an interesting development, the AG also acknowledged that the downstream market in this case is still evolving and that, given the rapid development of digital markets, defining the relevant market with precision may prove to be a difficult task (paragraphs 87-88).
II. Conclusion
The Opinion clearly shows that for platforms such as Android Auto competition authorities should not apply the essential facilities case law in order to force Google to grant access to its platform.
However, also under general refusal of access case law in an Article 102 TFEU context, dominant companies will be requested to facilitate access to a platform that is aimed at being nourished by third-party apps. If it can be shown that a refusal of access excludes, obstructs or delays access by the app developed by that third-party operator resulting in anticompetitive effects to the detriment of consumers, the dominant undertaking’s behaviour is an abuse of a dominant position, unless where that dominant undertaking can successfully invoke objective justifications.
The duty to ensure access is far-reaching with the dominant company even having to develop templates to facilitate access. However, the costs for such development can be charged to (one or more) third-party app developers, provided such costs are not disproportionate and templates are developed within a reasonable timeframe.

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