Content Type: Article

  • European Court of Justice: Non-Serious Application Is Regarded Abusive

    ARTICLE

    European Court of Justice: Non-Serious Application Is Regarded Abusive

    July 28, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Thomas Gennert wrote this bylined article on a European Court of Justice decision, which held that a non-serious application of the EU Equality Directives is not protected and thus does not violate the provisions of the General equal treatment Act (AGG).

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 7

    IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 7

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 7

    July 2016

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Eleventh Circuit Permits Lower Court Judgment to Be Vacated After Settlement

    Eleventh Circuit Permits Lower Court Judgment to Be Vacated After Settlement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eleventh Circuit Permits Lower Court Judgment to Be Vacated After Settlement

    July 26, 2016

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Parties to an appeal who condition a settlement on the vacating of the lower court’s judgment “may still [have] an appropriate remedy,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on July 12, 2016. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 U.S. App LEXIS 12813, *15 (11th Cir. July 12, 2016). Reversing the district court’s “narrow” refusal to vacate its judgment after the parties had settled, the Eleventh Circuit found that “exceptional circumstances” warranted the vacatur. Id., at *3, *14.

    Relevance

    The U.S. Supreme Court had previously rejected a settling appellant’s requiring the vacatur of a lower court judgment because, as the losing party, it had “voluntarily forfeited [its] legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal … .”U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25, 29 (1994) (held, “mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur of a judgment under review.”). In Bancorp, a debtor and creditor settled after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to decide whether there was a “new value exception” to the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The creditor had asked the Court to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding the existence of the new value exception, but the debtor opposed. Despite the parties’ settlement, the Court allowed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to stand, reasoning that the “party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the mootness [of the appeal] by voluntary action.” Id., at 24. Also, reasoned the Supreme Court, despite the parties’ settlement, a court “must … take account of the public interest” and not upset “the orderly operation of the federal judicial system” by using vacatur “as a refined form of collateral attack on” unfavorable judgments. Id. at 26-27. The Court wanted to protect the public interest because “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole.” Id. Still, the Court stressed that its approach was “equitable” in nature and that “exceptional circumstances” may warrant vacatur.Id. at 29. But “those exceptional circumstances do not include the mere fact that the settlement agreement provides for vacatur.” Id. at 29.

    After Bancorp, parties understandably questioned whether they could ever effectively settle a case pending appeal. For example, a party worried about similar litigation arising in the future would understandably want the vacatur of an adverse lower court decision. Hartford suggests a way around Bancorp.

    Facts

    The plaintiff (“C”) sued the defendant insurer (“H”) in a garden-variety contractual dispute over “the scope of an insurance policy.” 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12813, at 3. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of C, and H appealed. While the case was awaiting oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit “ordered the parties to take part in a mediation conference” that later failed. After oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit again “ordered the parties to take part in a second mediation” that “resulted in a conditional settlement agreement” made “expressly contingent upon the issuance of a valid, final, written order by a court of competent jurisdiction vacating” the district court’s summary judgment orders against H. Id., at *4. The parties also provided that if the district court’s orders were not vacated, the dispute would “remain live” and the settlement agreement would be void. Id.

    The Eleventh Circuit stayed H’s appeal to enable the parties to seek a vacatur in the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (“On motion … , the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for … any … reason that justifies relief.”). Relying on Bancorp, the district court denied the motion, finding no “exceptional circumstances” warranting vacatur and that the parties had voluntarily settled. Moreover, said the district court, there was no public interest to “be served” by a vacatur. Id., at *5.

    The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had “applied the [Bancorp] standard incorrectly,” and reversed. Id. at *6. First, said the court, the district court ignored decisions by two other circuits. Motta v. District Director of INS, 61 F.3d 117, 118 (1st Cir. 1995) (vacatur warranted when parties settled after Court of Appeals suggested they do so “[d]uring oral argument;” appellant concerned with precedential effect of decision below because it was “a repeat player before the courts”; held, “equities plainly favor vacatur” because parties had no “undue control over judicial precedents”; interest of settling and benefits of efficiency outweighed any competing consideration; only slight harm to public interest in preserving precedent; if lower court “decision stands, all possibility of a settlement is eliminated”; “exceptional circumstances” present.); Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Pac. Trading Cards Inc., 150 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1998) (court ordered parties to mediate with help of staff counsel; settlement agreement contingent on vacatur of district court opinion; vacatur of lower court opinion “a necessary condition of settlement”; leaving adverse precedent on the books could subject plaintiff to a defense of acquiescence in future litigation; “[u]nlike Bancorp, … the victor in the district court wanted a settlement as much as, or more than, the loser did …”; settlement benefited both parties and caused minor damage to public interest; facts “met the exceptional circumstances” test ofBancorp.).

    The Eleventh Circuit in Hartford “embrace[d] the equitable nature of the Supreme Court’s Bancorp inquiry.” Id., at *12. It weighed “the benefits of settlement to the parties and to the judicial system (and thus to the public as well) against the harm to the public in the form of lost precedent.” According to the court, the “scales decisively [tipped] in favor of vacating the” district court’s orders. Id.

    First, the parties “did not begin their negotiations leading to settlement unprompted. It was only after the second time [the Eleventh Circuit] referred their dispute to mediation that [they] agreed to settle.” Id. Because that agreement was “expressly conditioned” on the vacatur of the district court opinion, H had not voluntarily forfeited its “legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal … .” Id., at *13.

    Moreover, “both parties to this settlement desire vacatur because settlement would otherwise be impossible.” Id. In the court’s view, the “parties’ interests are best served through the voluntary disposition of this case, and further proceedings are curtailed, conserving judicial resources.” Moreover, the “slight value of preserving” the district court’s opinion as a “precedent” is “outweighed by the direct and substantial benefit of settling this case to [the parties] and to the judicial system (and thus to the public as well).” Id. In the view of the Eleventh Circuit, “the District Court’s erroneous bright-line approach … fails to recognize that the public interest is not served only by the preservation of precedent. Rather, [it] is also served by settlements when previously committed judicial resources are made available to deal with other matters, [thus] advancing the efficiency of the federal courts.” Id., at *15. The interests of the “parties, the judicial system and the public taken together” may very well warrant “vacatur [as] an appropriate remedy … . [P]reservation of precedent [should not be] considered in isolation.” Id., at *16.

    Comment

    Hartford is a pragmatic and result-driven way around the Supreme Court’sBancorp holding. As shown, the Eleventh Circuit, like the First and Second, ordered mediation to effect a settlement, a fact that purportedly distinguished their cases from Bancorp. Because most Circuits already effectively require mediation as part of the appeal process (see, e.g., 2d Cir. Local Rule 33.1(c) (“staff counsel may direct counsel … to participate in a conference to explore the possibility of settlement … ”), shrewd parties will rely on Hartford, Motta andMajor League Baseball to argue that this court-required mediation is an “exceptional circumstance” permitting vacatur of a lower court judgment when the parties require it.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • 2nd Circ. GM Ruling Shows Value of Debtor’s Disclosures

    ARTICLE

    2nd Circ. GM Ruling Shows Value of Debtor’s Disclosures

    July 26, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Darren Azman and Megan Preusker wrote this bylined article on the Second Circuit decision which held that the successor company to formerly bankrupt General Motors was not immune from plaintiff claims over alleged defective ignition switches. Because the court held that “the ‘free and clear’ provision in a bankruptcy court sale order did not bar successor liability claims brought against a purchaser by tort claimants,” the authors wrote, such purchasers “should conduct careful diligence regarding potential claims against the debtor.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Darren Azman

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Congress and Obama Administration Take Steps to Ease Buprenorphine Access

    Congress and Obama Administration Take Steps to Ease Buprenorphine Access

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    Congress and Obama Administration Take Steps to Ease Buprenorphine Access

    July 22, 2016

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This On the Subject notes recent expansions regarding buprenorphine prescribing. The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA), signed into law today, extends prescribing authority to physician assistants and nurse practitioners who meet CARA and US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) requirements. Earlier this month, HHS announced that it would increase the number of patients that a practitioner may treat pursuant to a buprenorphine waiver from 100 to 275.

    In depth

    On Friday, July 22, President Obama signed the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA). Following on federal, state and local trends, CARA seeks to expand access for persons needing opioid treatment.

    One of CARA’s more significant provisions expands buprenorphine prescribing privileges to nurse practitioners and physician assistants who meet certain specified education and training requirements to prescribe to treat opiate addiction. Currently, buprenorphine may be prescribed, administered or dispensed for addiction treatment only by a practitioner who meets the definition of a “qualifying physician” as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act and who has applied for and obtained from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) a waiver with an assigned unique identification number (X-waiver).

    CARA requires that the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) update regulations regarding buprenorphine prescribers within 18 months from the date of its enactment to include nurse practitioners and physician assistants.

    The statutory expansion of buprenorphine prescribing limits follows on a significant regulatory expansion announced earlier this month. On July 8, 2016, the Obama administration announced new rules that substantially increased the number of patients that a given practitioner may treat with buprenorphine at any one time. The rules take effect on August 8, 2016, and expand the number of patients that a practitioner may treat from 100 to 275.

    HHS, which issued the rules, noted that the policy rationale is a desire to expand access to Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) for opiate addiction, thereby addressing a pressing public health problem:

    Evidence suggests that utilization of buprenorphine is limited directly by the existence of treatment limits. Practitioners currently providing MAT with buprenorphine [] report that being limited to treating not more than 100 patients at a time is a barrier to expanding treatment. (81 FR 44729)

    HHS’s revised rules reflect a continued dedication to the concept of limiting buprenorphine prescribing to practitioners who have met specific training requirements, who prescribe for the purpose of MAT, and who meet other “good standing” requirements with regard to the DEA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. As with previous waiver expansions, the move from a limit of 100 to 275 is a “graduated” process. A practitioner may apply for the 275 waiver one year after receiving approval to treat 100 patients.

    The application to move to 275 patients will require practitioners to certify that they meet a number of requirements, including that they will (1) adhere to nationally recognized evidence-based guidelines for the treatment of patients with opioid use disorders; (2) provide patients with necessary behavioral health services; (3) use patient data to inform the improvement of outcomes; (4) adhere to a diversion control plan; (5) consider how to ensure continuous access to care in the event of practitioner incapacity or an emergency situation that would affect a patient’s access to care; and (6) in the event that the request for the higher patient limit is not renewed or the renewal request is denied, notify all patients above the 100 patient level that the practitioner will no longer be able to provide MAT services using buprenorphine to them and make every effort to transfer patients to other addiction treatment.

    HHS acknowledged that it received many comments urging that nurse practitioners and/or physician assistants have a role in prescribing buprenorphine, but noted that prior to CARA it did not have statutory authority to extend buprenorphine prescribing privileges to allied health professionals.

    With the statutory authority provided by CARA, HHS will extend the prescribing authority to allied health professionals within 18 months. CARA calls for HHS to determine additional parameters of training, experience and other qualifications that allied health professionals must meet in order to obtain such authority.

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  • The Yates Memo’s “All Relevant Facts” Requirement Leaves Privilege Protections in Flux

    ARTICLE

    The Yates Memo’s “All Relevant Facts” Requirement Leaves Privilege Protections in Flux

    July 21, 2016

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    J. Christian Nemeth

    Partner

    Chicago, Miami

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  • Liability Insurance Basics for Litigators

    ARTICLE

    Liability Insurance Basics for Litigators

    July 21, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Mark Collins and Joshua Rogaczewski wrote this bylined article to identify and describe the insurance issues most likely to arise when a liability insurer defends against a claim or lawsuit. “Liability insurance can be an important resource, as the insurer may have a duty to defend or reimburse the defendant company’s or individual’s defense costs … judgments and settlements,” the authors wrote.

    In depth
    Authors

    Joshua David Rogaczewski

    Partner & Deputy General Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Lessons for Hedge Fund Managers From the Government’s Failed Prosecution of Alleged Insider Trading Under Wire and Securities Fraud Laws

    ARTICLE

    Lessons for Hedge Fund Managers From the Government’s Failed Prosecution of Alleged Insider Trading Under Wire and Securities Fraud Laws

    July 21, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Todd Harrison wrote this bylined article about his successful defense of a hedge fund manager against federal insider trading charges. “Defendants should take heart from the wisdom of the jury that acquitted” his client, Mr. Harrison wrote, calling the verdict “a clear statement that, in the jury’s judgment,” a trader who was unaware his conduct could be unlawful “has not committed a crime.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Todd Harrison

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Retirement Plans After IRS’ Determination Letter Cutback

    ARTICLE

    Retirement Plans After IRS’ Determination Letter Cutback

    July 20, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    David Rogers, Andrew Liazos, Brian Benko and Emily Rickard wrote this bylined article about what they called “the death knell” for the program by which the IRS provided periodic determination letters to employers that sponsor an individually designed qualified retirement plan. Such sponsors “must develop new means for assuring they comply with the qualification requirements” after the program ends on 1-31-17, the authors wrote.

    In depth
    Authors

    Andrew C. Liazos

    Partner

    Boston, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Second Circuit Clarifies Notice Requirement for Successor Liability Protection in Chapter 11 Asset Sale Orders

    Second Circuit Clarifies Notice Requirement for Successor Liability Protection in Chapter 11 Asset Sale Orders

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Clarifies Notice Requirement for Successor Liability Protection in Chapter 11 Asset Sale Orders

    July 20, 2016

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy court’s asset sale order limiting specific pre-bankruptcy product liability claims required prior “actual or direct mail notice” to claimants when the debtor “knew or reasonably should have known about the claims,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 13, 2016. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12848, *46-47 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016). “[M]ere publication notice” to known or knowable claimants, explained the court, was insufficient when the debtor sought to enforce a “free and clear” provision in a “Sale Order” insulating the asset buyer from successor liability based on tort claims “that … could have been brought against” the debtor-seller. Id., at *26-27. Had the requisite notice been given, though, the Sale Order (and the buyer’s protection against successor liability) would probably have been enforceable. See Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(b)(1) (sale may be made “free and clear of any interest in such property”); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F. 3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (successor liability claims are interests), vacated as moot, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).

    The bankruptcy court properly found that the debtor “should have provided direct mail notice to … [known] owners” of defective vehicles, said the Second Circuit, but erred in holding that “plaintiffs were not prejudiced … because [it] would have approved the Sale Order even if plaintiffs [had been] provided adequate notice.” According to the bankruptcy court, these plaintiffs would not have “succeeded on [their] successor liability argument” and their “other arguments were ‘too speculative.’” Id., at *58. But the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that “enforcing the Sale Order [so as to insulate the asset buyer from liability] would violate procedural due process” because, with adequate notice, the “plaintiffs could have had some negotiating leverage [regarding the terms of any sale order] … and [a meaningful] opportunity to participate in the proceedings.” Id., at *61.

    The court declined to “decide whether prejudice is an element” when there is inadequate notice of a proposed § 363 sale, but agreed “[plaintiffs] have [shown prejudice] here.” Id., at *57. Although some courts require a showing of prejudice when a party asserts a due process violation, other “courts have held … that ‘a due process violation cannot constitute harmless error.’” Id., at *53, citing In re New Concept Hous., Inc., 951 F.2d 932, 937 n.7 (8th Cir. 1991); McNabb v. Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 727 F.3d 1334, 1347 (11th Cir. 2013 (“… the flat-out denial of the right to be heard on a material issue can never be harmless”); In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (“In bankruptcy proceedings, both debtors and creditors have a constitutional right to be heard on their claims, and the denial of that right to them is the denial of due process which is never harmless error”).

    Facts

    Asset Sale. This dispute arose out of the General Motors Chapter 11 case. Immediately after filing its Chapter 11 petition in June 2009, the debtor sought to sell its core assets to a new entity “owned predominantly by [the U.S.] Treasury (over 60 percent).” Id., at 11. “The proposed sale order provided that [the buyer] would acquire [the debtor’s] assets ‘free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and other interests of any kind or nature whatsoever, including rights of claims based on any successor or transferee liability.” Id. Other than a few liabilities that the buyer agreed to assume, “this ‘free and clear’ provision would act as a liability shield to prevent individuals with claims against [the debtor] from suing [the buyer].” Id. The buyer could then “immediately begin operating the [debtor’s] business, free of [the debtor’s] debts.” Id., at *12.

    Notice. The bankruptcy court ordered the debtor “to provide notice of the proposed sale order” by “direct mail … to numerous interested parties, including ‘all parties who are known to have asserted any lien, claim, encumbrance, or interest in or on [the to-be-sold assets]’ and to post publication notice … in major publications,” specifying a deadline for “interested parties … to submit … responses and objections to the proposed sale order.” Id., at *13. The product liability claimants here received only “mere publication notice.” Id., at *26.

    Bankruptcy Court Hearing on Sale Order. The bankruptcy court addressed and dismissed 850 objections to the proposed sale order. “Among those objections were arguments against the imposition of a ‘free and clear’ provision to bar claims against [the buyer] as the successor to [the debtor] … .” Id., at *13.

    Liabilities Assumed by Buyer. The Sale Agreement between the parties required the buyer, after meaningful negotiations with parties who had received actual notice, to assume “fifteen categories of liabilities,” including post-closing accidents, warranty claims and “liability for any Lemon Law claims.” Id., at *14-15; *59-60. But the key “‘free and clear’ provision [of the Sale Order] would act as a liability shield to prevent individuals [the plaintiffs here] with claims against [the debtor] from suing [the buyer].” Id., at *11. The sale closed in July 2009 and the bankruptcy court confirmed a liquidating Chapter 11 plan for the debtor in March of 2011.

    Proceedings Below. Individual plaintiffs sued the buyer in April 2014 in the bankruptcy court, asserting tort damages. The buyer then moved to enforce the Sale Order to enjoin these claims being asserted by the plaintiffs. Id., at *25. As noted, “the bankruptcy court held that [the Buyer] could not be sued — in bankruptcy court or elsewhere — for [tort] claims that otherwise could have been brought against [the debtor], unless those claims arose from [the buyer’s] own wrongful conduct.” Id., at *27.

    The Second Circuit

    The court took a direct appeal from the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Its opinion dealt primarily with “the extent to which the bankruptcy court may absolve [the buyer], as a successor corporation, of [the debtor’s] liabilities.” Id., at *28-29. According to the court, if “the Sale Order covers certain claims, then [it] would have to consider whether plaintiffs’ due process rights are violated by applying the ‘free and clear’ clause to those claims.” Id., at *34. But if the order “did not cover certain claims, … then those claims could not be enjoined by enforcing the Sale Order and due process concerns would not be implicated.” Id., at *35.

    Ability to Sell Assets Free and Clear. Recognizing that the Code does not define the type of “interest” of which property may be sold free and clear, the court relied on its earlier Chrysler decision for guidance in holding that “successor liability claims are interests.” In re Chrysler LLC 576 F. 3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009). Id. Although Chrysler was vacated by the Supreme Court on mootness grounds, the Second Circuit still found the decision to “have persuasive authority.” Id., at *38. Because “successor liability claims are interests,” the court reasoned that certain claims “may be barred under Chapter 11 generally.” Id., at *48. According to the Second Circuit, “a bankruptcy court may approve a 363 sale ‘free and clear’ of successor liability claims if those claims flow from the debtor’s ownership of the sold assets. Such a claim must arise from a (1) right to payment (2) that arose before the filing of the petition or resulted from pre-petition conduct fairly giving rise to the claim. Further, there must be some contact or relationship between the debtor and the claimant such that the claimant is identifiable.” Id., at *39-40.

    Applying this test, the court found that “(1) pre-closing accident claims, [and] (2) economic loss claims arising from the [debtor’s defective products] … are covered by the Sale Order … .” Id., at *40. To the contrary, “independent claims relating only to [the buyer’s] conduct and … Used Car purchasers’ claims” were not covered by the Sale Order. Id.

    Required Notice. Having determined which claims were covered by the Sale Order, the court then addressed the type of notice the claimants “were entitled to as a matter of procedural due process and, … if they were provided inadequate notice, whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying relief on the basis that most plaintiffs were not ‘prejudiced’.” The bankruptcy court, explained the Second Circuit, properly held that the debtor should have provided direct mail notice to vehicle owners because the record showed that it “knew or reasonably should have known about the [defective products] prior to bankruptcy.” Id., at *47. As the court stated, “[individuals with claims arising out of the defective products] were entitled to notice by direct mail or some equivalent as required by procedural due process.” Id., at *52.

    The court also rejected the bankruptcy court’s finding that the claimants had not been prejudiced. The claimants had been deprived of the opportunity, given their possible “negotiating leverage, … to participate in the proceedings” and negotiate a possible preservation of their claims against the buyer. Id., at *61. In the court’s view, “there was a reasonable possibility that plaintiffs could have negotiated some relief from the Sale Order.” Id., at *65.

    Finally, the Second Circuit dismissed the bankruptcy court’s fear that the debtor faced liquidation if the sale were not approved. In its view, the major participants in the case, including the U.S. Treasury Department, “would have endeavored to address the [defective product] claims in the Sale Order if doing so was good for the [buyer’s] business” and that “accommodations could have been made.” Id., at *66.

    Comment

    Motors Liquidation does not bar “free and clear” provisions in asset sale orders that are designed to protect buyers against successor liability. Instead, it merely requires adequate notice. As the Second Circuit previously held, Code “§ 363(f) permitted the bankruptcy court to authorize the sale free and clear of [tort claimants’] interest in the property.” Chrysler, 576 F. 3d at 126. “Both [the Second] and the Third Circuit have continued to cite Chrysler favorably.” Id., citing In re N. New England Tel. Operations LLC, 795 F. 3d 346 (2d Cir. 2015); and In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F. 3d 173, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, ____ U.S. ______ (June 28, 2016).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances.The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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