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Court Awards $206 Million to Alta Wind Projects in Section 1603 Grant Litigation; Smaller Award to Biomass Facility
November 14, 2016
Read time: 12 min
The US Court of Federal Claims awarded damages of more than $206 million to Plaintiffs/applicants in a case with respect to the cash grant under Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5). In its opinion, which was unsealed on Monday, October 31, the court held that the US Department of the Treasury had underpaid the Section 1603 Grants arising from projects in the Alta Wind Energy Center because it had incorrectly reduced Plaintiffs’ eligible basis in the projects. In a separate case in the Section 1603 Grant context, the court awarded $450,000 to GUSC Energy, Inc. in connection with a combined heat and power biomass facility.
The US Court of Federal Claims awarded damages of more than $206 million to Plaintiffs/applicants in a case with respect to the cash grant (the Section 1603 Grant) under Section 1603 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the ARRA). In its opinion, which was unsealed on Monday, October 31, the court held that the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had underpaid the Section 1603 Grants arising from projects in the Alta Wind Energy Center because it had incorrectly reduced Plaintiffs’ eligible basis in the projects. The court rejected the Treasury’s argument that the applicants’ basis in the facilities was limited to development and construction costs, and accepted Plaintiffs’ position that the arm’s-length purchase price of the projects prior to their placed-in-service date was a reasonable starting place for the projects’ value. Importantly, the court also held that the power purchase agreements (PPAs) relating to the facilities should not be treated as ineligible intangible property for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant. This significant decision is welcomed by the renewable energy industry and an affirmation of a long held view by taxpayers as to an appropriate measure of cost basis in both the context of the Section 1603 Grant and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) under Section 48 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code).
Background
The ARRA was signed into law by President Barack Obama on February 17, 2009. The purpose of the ARRA was to create jobs and promote economic recovery in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Section 1603 of the ARRA appropriated funds for payments to persons who place in service certain renewable energy projects during 2009, 2010 or 2011, or after 2011 if construction began during one of those years and the project was subsequently placed in service by a certain date. The Section 1603 Grant amount was based on a percentage of the “basis” of the project (30 percent, in the case of wind, biomass, solar, landfill gas and fuel cells, and 10 percent in the case of microturbines, combined heat and power and certain geothermal applications). The Section 1603 Grant was available in lieu of the ITC or the production tax credit (PTC) under Code Section 45, and had the added benefit of being a cash grant (compared with a non-refundable tax credit, like the ITC and PTC).
Pursuant to Treasury guidance released in 2009, the basis of property for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant is determined in accordance with the general rules for determining the basis of property for federal income tax purposes. Thus, the basis of property generally is its cost, and includes all items properly included by the taxpayer in the depreciable basis of the property, such as installation costs and the cost for freight incurred in construction of the specified energy property. The eligible basis of a qualified facility only includes costs relating to qualified property, and does not include the portion of the cost of the facility that is attributable to a non-qualifying activity. For example, for a biomass facility that burns fuel other than open-loop biomass or closed-loop biomass, the eligible cost basis is the percentage of total eligible costs that is equal to the percentage of the electricity produced at the facility that is attributable to the open-loop biomass and closed-loop biomass. In the case of costs that relate to both a non-qualifying activity and a qualifying activity, the costs must be reasonably allocated between the non-qualifying and qualifying activities. In subsequent guidance released in 2011, the Treasury indicated that power purchase agreements were ineligible assets for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant.
Background of the Alta Wind Case
Alta Wind is the owner of 11 wind farm facilities (Altas I through XI) near Los Angeles, California, which together comprise the largest wind center in North America. The wind projects at the center of the lawsuit were developed in two stages. In the first stage, Oak Creek Energy Systems (Oak Creek) and Allco Wind Energy Management Pty. Ltd. (Allco) financed the projects’ development. During this stage, a subsidiary of Oak Creek and Allco entered into a Master PPA, which provided that all output would be sold to Southern California Edison (SCE) for a period of 24 years. The second stage commenced in July 2008, when Terra-Gen Power LLC (Terra-Gen) acquired Allco’s US wind energy business, including the Alta Wind projects. Terra-Gen acquired the projects from Allco in mid-development, and thereafter sold the finished products to Plaintiffs prior to their placed-in-service dates. Of the 11 Alta facilities, Alta I through Alta VI are the subject of the lawsuit.
Terra-Gen thereafter continued development and construction work on the projects, at a total cost of more than $2 billion relating to Altas I through VI. Because Terra-Gen was ineligible for the Section 1603 Grant (because certain of its indirect owners were disqualified persons under the Section 1603 Grant rules), it sold the projects. Alta VI was sold in an outright sale in 2012 to EverPower. Altas I through V were sold in sale-leaseback transactions between December 2010 and June 2011 to Citi, GE, UBOC and additional investors. The projects were held by the purchasers through trusts and other special purpose vehicles, which entities are the plaintiffs in the litigation. In the case of Altas II through V, the purchase prices reflected only property that the parties deemed eligible for the Section 1603 Grant, and ineligible property was acquired pursuant to separate agreements. Under the purchase agreements, Terra-Gen agreed to indemnify the purchasers for the anticipated Section 1603 Grant amount based on the foregoing purchase prices (the Purchase Prices).
In their Section 1603 Grant applications, the Plaintiffs claimed pro rata allocations of eligible property among the Purchase Prices of Altas I and VI (93.1 percent and 96.9 percent, respectively). In particular, Plaintiffs calculated the percentage of construction and development costs related to eligible property at each facility, and then applied those percentages to each facility’s Purchase Price to determine the eligible basis for those two facilities. Plaintiffs claimed basis in the amount of the entire Purchase Prices of Altas II through V, since the parties intended that those Purchase Prices reflected only eligible property. Thus, Plaintiffs’ Section 1603 Grant applications were for amounts equal to 30 percent of the Purchase Prices, adjusted in Altas I and VI by pro rata allocations of eligible property. However, the Treasury only paid cash grants equal to 30 percent of Terra-Gen’s construction and development costs for each facility. Plaintiff’s filed their lawsuit in 2013 seeking reimbursement for the difference between those amounts.
Court of Federal Claims Decision
As discussed above, the Treasury had taken the position that, for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant, basis only includes development and construction costs of each facility. Plaintiff’s position was that basis was equal to the Purchase Prices, minus reasonable allocations for ineligible property.
In its opinion, the court noted that both parties agreed that the Purchase Prices were higher than the mere costs of developing and assembling the facilities. It therefore focused the first half of its analysis on whether such excess reflected an eligible versus ineligible cost for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant. The court first considered whether some portion of the Purchase Prices constituted “goodwill” or “going concern value,” in which case Code Section 1060 and the accompanying “residual method” under Code Section 338(b)(5) would apply in valuing the assets. Under the residual method, value is allocated on a waterfall basis among several categories of tangible and intangible assets, and the Treasury argued that much of the value in Altas I through VI would be allocated to ineligible intangible assets (such as goodwill or going concern value) if such method applied. The court noted that, at the time of the sale of the projects, (1) the facilities were not yet operational, (2) had lined up only one long-term customer (SCE) to buy the entirety of their electricity output for the foreseeable future and (3) were not capable of taking on any other customers, so that goodwill could not have yet attached. The court also rejected the Treasury’s argument that goodwill attached because of the facilities’ prime location. Likewise, the court held that there was no going concern value at the time of the sales because there was not yet a going concern as the facilities were not yet operational. Because there was neither goodwill nor going concern value at the time of the sales, neither Code Section 1060 nor the residual method applied to the sales of the transactions.
The court instead characterized the excess of the Purchase Prices over the sum of construction and development costs as “turnkey value,” which it said “essentially describes value a facility has when it is ready for immediate use after purchase.” Where a property has turnkey value, the court noted, its tangible assets are more valuable than they would have been if the facilities were not ready to operate.
The court then analyzed whether the Purchase Prices were an appropriate measure of the fair market value of the properties, noting that the Tax Court may look to other measures where the transaction was not conducted at arm’s length by two economically self-interested parties or where a transaction is based on “peculiar circumstances” which influence the purchaser to agree to a price in excess of fair market value. “Peculiar circumstances” exist if the parties appear to be unduly manipulating the purchase price by entering into separate agreements at or near the time of purchase, causing the purchase price to be highly inflated. The court found that all of the Alta transactions occurred at arm’s-length between sophisticated and self-interested parties, so it then considered whether there were any peculiar circumstances that resulted in a highly inflated purchase price. It concluded that no peculiar circumstances arose from the sale-leaseback transactions or related prepayments, the Section 1603 indemnities provided by Terra-Gen, or any of the other various side agreements to the transactions.
In the absence of peculiar circumstances that highly inflated the purchase prices, the court determined that the Purchase Prices were the appropriate starting place for determining basis for the Section 1603 Grant. With respect to Altas I and VI, the court had to determine if the pro rata allocation between eligible and ineligible property, as described above, was reasonable. The court noted that pro rata allocations are permissible in certain situations, and the percentages here appeared reasonable given that they were certified by a large accounting firm and were within industry standards (as testified to by Plaintiffs’ expert witness).
The court also rejected the Treasury’s argument that PPAs are intangible, ineligible property and should be classified as “customer-based intangibles” within the meaning of Code Section 197(d)(2)(A)(iii). If PPAs were so treated, their value would be excluded from the facilities’ cost basis for determining the Section 1603 Grant amount. The court held that PPAs were more like land leases which should not be viewed as separate assets from the underlying facilities, and are thus eligible property for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court awarded damages to Plaintiffs of $206,833,364. Read the case: Alta Wind I Owner-Lessor C, Alta Wind I Owner-Lessor D, et al v. United States. The US Department of Justice can appeal the case to the Federal Court.
GUSC Energy Decision
On November 8, 2016, the court issued another favorable decision in the Section 1603 Grant context. In GUSC Energy, Inc. v. United States, Plaintiff is the owner and operator of an open-loop biomass facility in New York state. The facility is a combined heat and power plant, and produces both steam heat and electricity for use at an associated business and technology park. Plaintiff had argued that the entire cost basis of the facility was eligible for the Section 1603 Grant. Although the Treasury agreed that all of the property in the facility was integral to the production of electricity, it reduced Plaintiff’s Section 1603 Grant because the facility produced both electricity and heat, the latter of which is not eligible for the Section 1603 Grant. Specifically, the Treasury determined that only 6.6 percent of the cost basis of the facility was eligible for the Section 1603 Grant, because only 6.6 percent of the facility’s total steam energy was converted to electricity. The court rejected both parties’ positions, and applied the “efficiency method” of allocation, which looks at the electricity generated by the facility relative to the electricity it would generate if it only generated electricity. Accordingly, the court determined that 15.24 percent of the cost basis of the facility was eligible for the Section 1603 Grant. The resulting grant amount was significantly less than the amount claimed by Plaintiff, but more than the initial award from the Treasury. The court awarded an additional $450,000 to Plaintiff based on this allocation method.
Significance of the Decisions The decision in Alta Wind has obvious significance for the many renewable energy projects that received lower-than-expected payments under the Section 1603 Grant program, and is a welcomed result by the renewable energy industry in general. The court’s decision is a strong rebuke to the Treasury’s position on what constitutes eligible property basis, which left many Section 1603 Grant applicants with unexpectedly small payouts. The decision is also noteworthy because the court held that PPAs should not be treated as ineligible intangible property for purposes of the Section 1603 Grant. This decision is a welcomed affirmation of a long-held view by many in the renewable energy sector and is consistent with the basic economics of a renewable energy project. The decision may also serve as much-needed support for purposes of determining cost basis for purposes of the ITC under Code Section 48, where taxpayers have been concerned that the Internal Revenue Service could take a similarly limited view as to what costs and valuations will be taken into account for determining cost basis of renewable projects. The Alta Wind and GUSC Energy decisions also suggest a cautiously optimistic climate with respect to the Treasury’s earlier hair-cutting decisions in the Section 1603 Grant context.
Disclosing an Antitrust Investigation: The US vs France
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Disclosing an Antitrust Investigation: The US vs France
November 10, 2016
Read time: 2 min
Lionel Lesur, Mark Mihanovic and Louise Aberg wrote this bylined article on how investigations by antitrust authorities may qualify as material information that publicly traded companies must disclose. “In the absence of a bright line or specific requirements from applicable authorities, however, companies are often left to make difficult judgments in determining whether, when and how to make public disclosure of antitrust investigations,” the authors wrote.
The Investor from Abroad under Review
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The Investor from Abroad under Review
November 9, 2016
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This article by Nikolaus von Jacobs and Germar Enders explains certain restrictions which investors from abroad may have to face when intending to invest in German companies. Under the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz) the Federal Ministry of Economics may review and under certain circumstances prohibit investments of foreign investors in German companies. The article provides an overview of the different types of review procedures and their implications on investors.
Navigating the Double Whammy of Sexism and Ageism When Reentering the Workplace
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Navigating the Double Whammy of Sexism and Ageism When Reentering the Workplace
November 8, 2016
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Andrea Kramer was co-author of this bylined article on workplace age and gender bias against women over 50. “An older woman faces the Double Whammy of both ageism and sexism, making it much tougher to reenter the workplace than it is for younger women and men of all ages,” Ms. Kramer wrote.
A Refreshed Look at Combined Reporting
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A Refreshed Look at Combined Reporting
November 7, 2016
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Arthur Rosen and Alysse McLoughlin wrote this bylined article urging that the unitary business doctrine’s fundamental purpose should be considered by tax authorities applying combined reporting. Such application should be done “only when necessary to properly apportion a corporation’s income, not merely because a certain number of items are mechanically checked off on a list,” the authors wrote.
QinetiQ Tests APA’s Application to Tax Deficiency Notices
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QinetiQ Tests APA’s Application to Tax Deficiency Notices
November 4, 2016
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Roger Jones, Andrew Roberson and Jeffrey Glassman wrote this bylined article on the Fourth Circuit QinetiQ case, in which a taxpayer argued that an IRS notice of deficiency was arbitrary and violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The authors wrote that the case “would have far-reaching implications” if the court upheld the taxpayer, and “it is unknown how many notices of deficiency might be invalidated” by such a decision.
Another Key Victory for FTC’s Geographic Market Definition
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Another Key Victory for FTC’s Geographic Market Definition
November 4, 2016
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Ashley Fischer, Jeffrey Brennan and James Camden wrote this bylined article detailing an FTC Illinois federal court win (following one in Pennsylvania) upholding its geographic analysis approach to challenge hospital mergers. “The FTC’s winning streak can only enhance its likelihood of continuing to challenge health care transactions that the agency views to be anti-competitive,” the authors wrote.
Pre-Insolvency proceedings
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Pre-Insolvency proceedings
November 11, 2016
Read time: 1 min
Dr. Uwe Goetker and Dr. Benedikt Schulz wrote this article about the needs of pre-insolvency proceedings.

CMS Releases CY 2017 Final Rule Implementing Changes to Outpatient Prospective Payment System
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CMS Releases CY 2017 Final Rule Implementing Changes to Outpatient Prospective Payment System
November 3, 2016
Read time: 8 min
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services released the calendar year 2017 final rule implementing changes to the Medicare hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System, or OPPS, including provisions implementing Section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, a statutory change that affects payments to off-campus hospital outpatient departments established on or after November 2, 2015.
On November 1, 2016, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released the calendar year 2017 final rule implementing changes to the Medicare hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System or OPPS (Final Rule), including provisions implementing Section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, statutory change that affects payments to off-campus hospital outpatient departments established on or after November 2, 2015.
Under Section 603, effective January 1, 2017, most hospital off-campus provider-based departments (off-campus PBDs) that began furnishing services on or after November 2, 2015, (date of enactment of Section 603) will no longer be eligible to be paid under OPPS. How and how much they would be paid, and what other rules would apply to these entities and grandfathered facilities were left to CMS to determine. This much-anticipated Final Rule provides more clarity but also leaves some critical questions unresolved.
Section 603 does not apply to items and services furnished (1) by a dedicated emergency department (defined at 42 CFR 489.24(b)); (2) at “remote locations of a hospital” (i.e., a location where hospital inpatient services are furnished) and locations that are within 250 yards of a remote location of a hospital; and (3) at a location that was billing as an outpatient department of a hospital prior to November 2, 2015. Locations, items and services within the scope of these grandfathered exceptions are referred to by CMS as “excepted” locations, items and services.
The proposed rules to implement Section 603 that were released by CMS earlier this year generated significant concern from the hospital industry, as well as from US Congress, with many stakeholders strongly encouraging CMS to postpone implementation of Section 603, unless significant changes were made. McDermott’s prior summary and analysis of the proposed rule is available, as is McDermott’s article summarizing proposed legislative amendments to Section 603.
In the Final Rule, CMS retained many of the controversial aspects of the proposed rules, but made some favorable changes in response to stakeholder concerns, including establishing a new payment system for non-excepted services. Since the new payment system was not subject to prior comments, CMS is implementing the new payment system effective January 1, 2017, but the agency will take comments until December 31, 2016, in connection with refinements to the payment system for 2018 and future years.
Relocations and Service Expansions
Two of the most controversial elements of the proposed rule included CMS’s proposals to limit relocations of excepted locations and to limit expansions of excepted services at excepted locations. Under the proposed rule, excepted locations that relocated would lose excepted status (and be subject to the non-OPPS alternative payment system). Similarly, excepted locations that added new services [according to groups of “clinical families of services” defined by ambulatory payment classification (APC)] would be unable to receive OPPS payments for such new services.
As to relocations, CMS in the Final Rule largely adhered to the proposed standard. Specifically, an off-campus PBD that relocates from the physical address that was listed on the hospital’s Medicare enrollment form as of November 1, 2015, would be considered “new” and ineligible for continued excepted status. However, CMS will consider making exceptions limited to extraordinary circumstances outside a hospital’s control, such as natural disasters, significant seismic building code requirements, or significant public health and public safety issues, that necessitate moving to a new building (either temporarily or permanently). Exceptions will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the appropriate CMS Regional Office. CMS says in the Final Rule that it expects these exceptions to be rare. CMS expects to release sub-regulatory guidance with more details regarding the exceptions request process.
The Final Rule does not incorporate an automated method for identifying the addresses associated with excepted locations or tracking changes in the addresses. CMS notes that it will instruct Medicare contractors to update their “systems” to identify all off-campus PBDs by address and the date the location was added to the hospital’s enrollment record.
As to expansions of services, CMS decided not to limit expansions of services at excepted locations for 2017. As such, at least for the time being, there will be no limit on a grandfathered facility’s ability to expand services beyond those furnished as of November 2, 2015.
The Final Rule does not discuss expansions of physical space, so it remains unclear how CMS may view physical expansions of excepted locations or whether guidance on such expansions will be included in the forthcoming sub-regulatory guidance addressing relocations. CMS also declined to provide relief for off-campus PBDs that were “mid-build” or “under development” as of November 2, 2015, and deferred to Congress to amend Section 603 to establish such an exception.
Change of Ownership
In the proposed rule, CMS proposed to permit continued OPPS payment for off-campus PBDs that undergo a change of ownership, so long as the change involves both the main hospital entity and the off-campus PBD and the new owner accepts assignment of the hospital’s Medicare provider agreement. If the provider agreement is terminated, all excepted off-campus PBDs and the excepted items and services furnished by such off-campus PBD would no longer be protected. CMS finalized this proposal without modification.
Payment
In the proposed rule, CMS proposed to pay for services furnished by non-excepted off-campus PBDs during 2017 under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS) at the non-facility rate. CMS further stated that these payments would have to be made directly to the physicians furnishing the services, and that arrangements would have to be established with the hospital hosting the services to recover the technical portion of the service.
In the Final Rule, CMS opted not to implement this payment policy exactly as proposed. Instead, CMS will pay the hospital a rate that is approximately 50 percent of the OPPS rate, with some limited exceptions. Items and services that are currently paid under a methodology other than OPPS will continue to be paid at the currently applicable non-OPPS payment system or rate (e.g., drugs and biologicals that are separately payable will continue to be paid ASP+6%, and will not be subject to this reduction). Hospitals will use modifier “PN” to identify services at non-grandfathered entities. Payments under the new methodology will be subject to a geographic adjustment and the multiple procedure payment adjustment, but other OPPS payment adjustments (e.g., outlier payments, sole community hospital adjustments, cancer hospital adjustments) will not apply. Because of this new payment policy (and other technical adjustments to the calculations), CMS revised the payment impact of the Section 603 policies from a reduction in payment for 2017 from $330 million to $50 million.
Physicians furnishing professional services in non-excepted departments will continue to be paid separately at the MPFS facility rate for services for which they are permitted to bill.
340B Drug Pricing Program
CMS received comments regarding the impact of the Section 603 provisions on continued 340B Program eligibility for non-grandfathered entities. Because current 340B eligibility for these locations is, in part, tied to the reporting of costs and charges associated with services at the locations on the Medicare cost report, hospitals worried that CMS’s proposed policy would adversely affect eligibility to furnish or prescribe 340B drugs at non-excepted locations. CMS provided some measure of reassurance by explicitly stating that services provided at non-grandfathered entities will remain reported on the hospital cost report, but deferred to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) for further questions regarding 340B eligibility.
Other Provisions
In the Final Rule, CMS addressed additional comments related to the scope and implementation of Section 603, including
- CMS revised the date for determination of excepted versus non-excepted status as the date a location first furnished services payable under OPPS, rather than the date a location first billed for a service under OPPS;
- CMS acknowledged inconsistent application of the definition and measurements under the 250 yard definition for “on-campus” locations, but deferred further guidance (and possible rulemaking) until a later date;
- CMS confirmed that Section 603 applies only to services paid under OPPS (Social Security Act § 1833(t)); and
- CMS confirmed that services performed at non-excepted locations will be subject to hospital outpatient supervision rules, but MPFS cost sharing rules.
As a result of this Final Rule, hospitals should closely examine their existing outpatient operations to identify any locations that may fall within the scope of the payment changes discussed above and closely evaluate their Medicare enrollment records to ensure that they are complete and correct. Hospitals undergoing transactions should also be mindful of the Final Rule and its impact on transaction structures and future payments.
This Final Rule may not be the final word on Section 603. Some hospitals that had off-campus outpatient projects underway, but not operational as of November 2, 2015, have urged Congress to loosen the grandfather rules and move the date, and the US House of Representatives responded with favorable legislation approved in June 2016. The hospital community undoubtedly will continue to push that legislation and may seek further relief in response to this Final Rule as well.

Second Circuit Affirms Denial of Arbitration in Bankruptcy Priority Fight
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Second Circuit Affirms Denial of Arbitration in Bankruptcy Priority Fight
November 2, 2016
Read time: 12 min
“[T]he bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the debtor’s former employees’] motion to compel arbitration” when the dispute turned on the relative priority of their claims, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Oct. 6, 2016. In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 2016 WL 5853265, *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2016). The Securities Investor Protection Act (“SIPA”) trustee in the liquidation of Lehman Brothers Inc. (“LBI”) had asked the bankruptcy court to enforce the subordination provision of the employees’ compensation plan agreements, but the employees sought to enforce the arbitration clause in those agreements to avoid litigating in the bankruptcy court. According to the Second Circuit, because the priority dispute was a “core proceeding,” the proposed arbitration “would have ‘seriously jeopardize[d]’ the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id., citing MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2006).
Relevance
Courts have disagreed on a clear test for determining whether a bankruptcy court must refer a dispute to binding arbitration. According to the Supreme Court, “the [Federal Arbitration] Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). The Court originally focused on the “desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litigation,” with its typical delay and expense. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953). The Court later reasoned that “passage of the [Arbitration] Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered.” Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220. Moreover, an agreement to arbitrate requires no relinquishment of substantive rights, but is, instead, a “trad[e of] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). The Arbitration Act thus “establishes a ‘federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’ and mandates the enforcement of contractual arbitration provisions.” Hill, 436 F.3d at 107.
The bankruptcy process centralizes the resolution of disputes in the bankruptcy court. That centralization is not absolute, though. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (district court has “original, but not exclusive jurisdiction” over proceedings “arising under” Code, or “arising in or related to” bankruptcy cases). The bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme ordinarily gives the bankruptcy judge discretion to determine whether a “core” proceeding[1] should be referred to arbitration. That same scheme, however, gives the bankruptcy judge less power with respect to non-core-related proceedings when the parties do not consent to a bankruptcy court adjudication. In re U.S. Lines, Inc. 197 F. 3d 631, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1999).
The issue in Lehman turned on whether the bankruptcy court, in a core proceeding, had to defer to a contractually binding arbitration agreement. Because the Arbitration Act removes disputes from the judicial system, the Second Circuit had previously recognized that arbitration can conflict with the policy of centralized dispute resolution in bankruptcy cases. In re U.S. Lines Inc., 197 F.3d at 641 (bankruptcy court has discretion in deciding whether it must enforce arbitration agreement so long as it “has properly considered the conflicting policies in accordance with law.”). “[W]hether or not a bankruptcy court should allow a dispute to be resolved by an arbitration forum to which the parties agreed implicates the clash of two federal statutes.” In re Spectrum Info. Tech., Inc., 183 B.R. 360, 362 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting In re Al-Cam Dev. Corp., 99 B.R. 573, 575-76 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
Facts
LBI’s former employees filed a claim for deferred compensation in the LBI SIPA case. After the trustee objected to the claims and sought to enforce the subordination clause in the relevant agreements, the former employees then moved to stay that proceeding in reliance on the arbitration clause in their agreements, and sought to compel arbitration. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling from the bench denying arbitration.
The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit summarily affirmed, applying a “two-part test.” 2016 WL 5853265, at *1. If “the proceeding is non-core, generally the bankruptcy court must stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration, as non-core proceedings usually do not warrant overriding the presumption in favor of arbitration.” Id. But “if the proceedings are core, a court must consider whether enforcing the arbitration provisions would seriously jeopardize ‘any underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.’” Id., quoting In re U.S. Lines, 197 F.3d at 640. Moreover, when “arbitration [of a core proceeding] would seriously conflict with the text, history or purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy court has discretion to compel or stay the arbitration.” 2016 WL 5853265, Id. at *2.
The central underlying substantive issue in Lehman was where the employees’ “claims fall in the priority scheme of distribution … .” Id. Because a priority dispute is a “core” proceeding, the bankruptcy court, said the Second Circuit, “reasonably determined that Congress simply could not have intended to turn over the determination of the relative priority of claims against the estate and the equitable distribution of the estate’s assets in the largest SIPA liquidation in U.S. history [to] the financial industry regulatory authority to be decided under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.” Id. According to the court, the bankruptcy judge had “considered the conflicting policies of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code, made a particularized inquiry into the nature of the claims and the facts, [finding] that an underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code would be jeopardized by enforcing an arbitration clause in this case.” Id. Thus, reasoned the Second Circuit, “arbitration would have ‘seriously jeopardize[d]’ the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id.
Comments
- The Second Circuit’s analysis in Lehman was deceptively simple. On the facts of the case, the court was correct. The priority status of a creditor’s claim is ordinarily a core proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (core proceedings include “allowance or disallowance of claims … .”). But appellate decisions from the Second and other Circuits tell a more complex story.
- A threshold issue is whether the dispute is, in fact, a core proceeding. The Second Circuit’s U.S. Lines decision shows how difficult that determination can be. The court there upheld a bankruptcy court’s order denying arbitration of a post-bankruptcy declaratory judgment action against the debtors’ indemnity insurance carriers. The insurance proceeds were the only potential source of recovery for employees who had filed asbestos-related personal injury claims against the debtors. 197 F.3d at 634, 640-41. Although the bankruptcy court had discretion to deny arbitration in a core proceeding when arbitration would “seriously jeopardize” the bankruptcy process, the district court in U.S. Lines had disagreed, holding that insurance contract disputes are not core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the dispute was a core proceeding because of “the impact these contracts have on other core bankruptcy functions … .” Id. at 638. A core proceeding determination turns on “(1) whether the conflict is antecedent to the reorganization petition; and (2) the degree to which the proceeding is independent of the reorganization.” Id. at 636-37.
The other two members of the three-judge panel in U.S. Lines filed concurring opinions setting forth their separate views on how to define a core proceeding. “In my view, the efficient functioning of the bankruptcy system [requires] a bright-line rule that treats as core proceedings all suits alleging post-petition breaches of pre-petition contracts.” Id. at 641 (Newman, J.). Another member of the panel, however, “would be inclined to favor a case-by-case approach … [and] would defer the matter to another day … .” Id. at 643 (Calabresi, J.). Nonetheless, all three judges agreed that the “particular post-petition breach of a pre-petition contract [in U.S. Lines] is core.” Id. Because the entire panel believed the suit in U.S. Lines to be “integral to the bankruptcy court’s ability” to administer the debtor’s estate, that court was “the preferable venue in which to handle mass tort actions involving claims against an insolvent debtor,” underscoring the need “for a centralized proceeding … .” Id. at 641.
- Lehman confirms that a bankruptcy court, in a core proceeding at least, must analyze the facts of each dispute on a case-by-case basis as to whether arbitration conflicts with the Code. The Third Circuit, however, takes a more pragmatic approach. In Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit limited the bankruptcy court’s discretion in deciding whether to enforce an arbitration clause. Reversing the district court’s denial of arbitration, the Court of Appeals held that “the trustee-plaintiff stands in the shoes of the debtor for purposes of the arbitration clause” when the trustee is enforcing the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy claim — a non-core dispute. Id. at 1156-57, 1162. As to a non-core matter, no bar to mandatory arbitration existed. Id. at 1157. Still, the Hays court held the trustee’s non-derivative claims under Code § 544(b), created for the benefit of creditors, were core matters not subject to mandatory arbitration, and creditors are not bound by the arbitration clause. Accord, In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 118 F.3d 1056, 1071 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirmed bankruptcy court’s denial of arbitration in suit to enforce Code-created right to enforce debtor’s discharge under its confirmed Chapter 11 plan; arbitration would undermine Code in this kind of dispute).
- More significant is the Second Circuit’s decision in MBNA America Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2006), where the court held that the bankruptcy judge lacked discretion in a core proceeding and could not deny enforcement of an arbitration clause in a pre-bankruptcy loan agreement. After the debtor had received a discharge in her Chapter 7 case, she sued a lender in a putative class action on behalf of herself and others, asserting the lender’s willful violation of the automatic stay and seeking damages under Code § 362(h). The bankruptcy court, finding that it was the more appropriate forum, denied the lender’s motion to compel arbitration. The district court affirmed, noting that arbitration would “seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 107. Reversing, the Second Circuit explained that “arbitration of [the debtor’s] claim would not seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code because (1) [the debtor’s] estate has now been fully administered and the debts have been discharged, so she no longer requires protection of the automatic stay and resolution of the claim would have no effect on her bankruptcy estate; (2) as a purported class action, [the debtor’s] claims lack the direct connection to her own bankruptcy case that would weigh in favor of refusing to compel arbitration; (3) a stay is not so closely related to an injunction that the bankruptcy court is uniquely unable to interpret and enforce its provisions.” Id. at 109.
- The Third Circuit has now apparently rejected the general premise that enforcement of an arbitration clause turns on whether the proceeding is core or non-core. In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2006). The issue in Mintze, said the court, was whether the party opposing arbitration can establish a statutory intention to preclude that procedure.
A lender in Mintze filed a claim in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case. The debtor then sued the lender alleging that it had induced her to enter into an illegal home equity loan resulting in a mortgage being placed against her home. She sought to rescind the mortgage under the federal Truth in Lending Act plus other state and federal consumer protection laws. The lender moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in its loan agreement. Because the matter was admittedly core, the bankruptcy core denied arbitration, reasoning that rescission of the mortgage would affect the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan and any distribution to other creditors. The Third Circuit disagreed, finding no inherent conflict between the Code’s purposes and the Arbitration Act, and reasoning that the debtor’s statutory claims were based on state or federal consumer protection laws, but not on any claims under the Code. “With no bankruptcy issue to be decided by the bankruptcy court, we cannot find an inherent conflict between arbitration of Mintze’s federal and state consumer protection issues and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 231-32.
- The bankruptcy/arbitration case law is thus unpredictable, making litigation costly and time-consuming, particularly when two rounds of appeals are considered. Even if courts were to agree on one consistent approach, parties would still retain their appellate rights. See generally Alan N. Resnick, “The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Bankruptcy,” 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., 183, 214 (2007) (“Congress should adopt a general rule that contractual arbitration clauses are unenforceable in core proceedings, regardless of whether the proceeding involved causes of action derived from the debtor or bankruptcy actions that the Bankruptcy Code has created for the benefit of creditors or the estate.”).
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
[1] “A core proceeding … involv[es] a right created by federal bankruptcy law and which would only arise in bankruptcy.” F. Neufeld, “Enforcement of Contractual Arbitration Agreements Under The Bankruptcy Code,” 65 Am. Bankr. L. J. 525, 528 (1991) — e.g., trustee’s objection to proof of claim; motion to lift automatic stay; dischargeability dispute; motion to reject executory contract.
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