Content Type: Article

  • OCR Explains How Information Blocking Violates HIPAA

    OCR Explains How Information Blocking Violates HIPAA

    CLIENT ALERT / INFORMATION BLOCKING

    OCR Explains How Information Blocking Violates HIPAA

    October 26, 2016

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights recently posted guidance clarifying that a business associate such as an information technology vendor generally may not block or terminate access by a covered entity customer to protected health information maintained by the vendor on behalf of the customer.

    In depth

    The US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) recently posted guidance (OCR guidance) clarifying that a business associate such as an information technology vendor generally may not block or terminate access by a covered entity customer to protected health information (PHI) maintained by the vendor on behalf of the customer. Such “information blocking” could occur, for example, during a contract dispute in which a vendor terminates customer access or activates a “kill switch” that renders an information system containing PHI inaccessible to the customer. Many information vendors have historically taken such an approach to commercial disputes.

    The OCR guidance explains that such activity by a business associate is an impermissible use of PHI in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. In addition, to the extent the PHI constitutes a designated record set, such activity could cause a vendor to violate its obligations under the applicable business associate agreement and the Privacy Rule to make available PHI to a customer as necessary for the customer to satisfy its obligation to provide access to PHI to individuals under the Privacy Rule.

    A business associate is also required by the HIPAA Security Rule to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of PHI that it creates, receives, maintains or transmits on behalf of a covered entity. Under HIPAA, “availability” means that data or information is accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized person. A vendor that blocks a covered entity customer’s access to essential PHI potentially violates the Security Rule’s “availability” requirement.

    Moreover, the OCR guidance clarifies that maintaining the availability of PHI includes returning PHI at the termination of an agreement to a customer in a format that is reasonable in light of the vendor’s obligations under a business associate agreement. OCR acknowledged, however, that not all arrangements involving PHI require the covered entity to be able to access PHI. For example, some data aggregation arrangements will not implicate the information blocking prohibition when the source data that is used to create the aggregated data set is unreturnable after the data processing.

    Finally, the OCR guidance notes that a covered entity itself has an obligation to ensure the availability of its own information and may be in violation of both the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule provisions relating to business associate arrangements if it enters into a business associate agreement that by its terms prevents the covered entity from fulfilling this obligation. This new guidance should serve as reminder to covered entities to take care in drafting and negotiating business associate agreements and service agreements to protect against information blocking.

    The OCR guidance would not prevent a vendor from charging a fee for access to or post-termination transfer of a covered entity’s data, the amount of which would be primarily a contractual matter. Instead, OCR has taken the position in the guidance that blocking access to PHI is not an appropriate remedy for non-payment of fees or other contractual disputes.

    The OCR guidance adds to previous HHS activity discussing information blocking as a barrier to interoperability and health information exchange and a potential source of liability under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, including the following:

    • In April 2015, HHS’s Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) submitted a Report on Health Information Blocking to the US Congress that defined “information blocking” as the knowing and unreasonable interference with the exchange or use of electronic health information. The report outlined a number of scenarios that describe information blocking conduct, including an electronic medical record (EHR) system billing dispute that results in the termination of customer access to PHI.
    • On October 6, 2015, the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued an OIG Policy Reminder: Information Blocking and the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute (OIG Policy Reminder) that reminds health care providers that a safe harbor to the federal Anti-Kickback Statute related to the provision of EHR technology requires that a donor of EHR technology must not take any action to limit or restrict the use, compatibility, or interoperability of the items or services with other electronic prescribing or EHR systems (including, but not limited to, health information technology applications, products, or services).

    In February of this year, HHS announced that health information technology developers whose products cover 90 percent of the country’s electronic health records and five largest health care systems agreed to implement a commitment to refrain from engaging in information blocking as part of its voluntary Interoperability Pledge.

    Authors

    Amanda Enyeart

    Partner

    Chicago

    Ryan S. Higgins

    Partner

    Chicago

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • DOL Significantly Increases Some Penalties for ERISA Violations

    ARTICLE

    DOL Significantly Increases Some Penalties for ERISA Violations

    October 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Diane Morgenthaler, Alan Nesburg and David Diaz wrote this bylined article on new Department of Labor penalties on employers who violate certain ERISA reporting and disclosure rules. The authors urged plan sponsors to review their benefit plans for reporting and disclosure compliance, and to take advantage of any correction programs available to reduce penalties.

    In depth
    Authors

    Alan D. Nesburg

    Counsel

    Chicago

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  • Cities’ Transaction Taxes Threaten Digital Content Cos.

    Cities’ Transaction Taxes Threaten Digital Content Cos.

    ARTICLE

    Cities’ Transaction Taxes Threaten Digital Content Cos.

    October 25, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stephen Kranz, Mark Yopp and Eric Carstens wrote this bylined article on the growing trend of cities seeking to impose transaction taxes on the sale or rental of digital content. The authors wrote that “the local governments are addressing the issue without clear legislative authority, by issuing administrative guidance and taking aggressive positions on audit,” and predicted “it will be difficult, if not impossible, for companies to comply with such regimes.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Eric D. Carstens

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Looking Beyond Delaware: Exercising Shareholder Appraisal Rights in N.Y.

    Looking Beyond Delaware: Exercising Shareholder Appraisal Rights in N.Y.

    ARTICLE

    Looking Beyond Delaware: Exercising Shareholder Appraisal Rights in N.Y.

    October 24, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael Huttenlocher and Lillian Horan wrote this bylined article that examined implications of the recent increase in appraisal actions against Delaware corporations. “Given the success that shareholders have had enforcing their appraisal rights in Delaware courts, New York-based companies may also be targeted for appraisal actions,” Mr. Huttenlocher predicted.

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  • Federal Banking Agencies Propose New Cybersecurity Regulations

    Federal Banking Agencies Propose New Cybersecurity Regulations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Banking Agencies Propose New Cybersecurity Regulations

    October 24, 2016

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Oct. 19, 2016, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC,” collectively the “Agencies”) issued a joint advance notice of proposed rulemaking (“Notice”) inviting public comment on cybersecurity regulations and guidance designed to improve the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial system.[1] The Notice includes 39 questions on which the Agencies seek input, including whether the Agencies ultimately issue a formal regulation, guidance or some combination of those tools.[2] That choice will be particularly important as it may determine whether the regulatory regime remains flexible enough for covered entities to adapt to new technologies and evolving threats. The Agencies will receive public comments until Jan. 17, 2017.[3] The Agencies are “considering establishing enhanced standards for the largest and most interconnected entities under their supervision, as well as for services that that these entities receive from third parties.”[4]

    The Notice proposes a two-tiered framework in which all covered institutions would have to meet a minimum standard, and “those entities that are critical to the functioning of the financial sector,” which the Notice refers to as “sector-critical systems,” would have to meet with “more stringent standards.”[5] The Agencies ambitiously call for entities that provide sector-critical systems to ensure they can recover those systems within two hours of a cyber event and validate their efforts with regular, quantitative testing.

    If the Agencies do in fact issue binding standards, they will go beyond the existing, largely nonbinding frameworks that apply to covered institutions, such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act[6] (and the rules promulgated thereunder, including the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards[7]), the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council’s IT Handbook[8] and the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework.[9] Further, the Agencies are also considering going beyond the Interagency Paper on Sound Practices to Strengthen the Resilience of the U.S. Financial System,[10] written by the Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, which concerned clearing and settlement activities, to address the cyber risks that could impact the largest, most interconnected U.S. financial entities in all their operations.[11]

    Who Is Covered

    The Agencies propose to apply the new enhanced standards to institutions under their supervision (including non-bank financial institutions) with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.[12] In addition, the Federal Reserve proposes to apply the standards to financial market utilities for which it acts as “Supervisory Agent” and other financial market infrastructures over which it has primary supervisory authority or which are operated by the Federal Reserve Banks. Further, the Notice also contemplates defining who is covered based on the overall “number of connections an entity (including its services providers) has to other entities in the financial sector.” However, as the notice acknowledges, metrics such as “connections” may be difficult to quantify.

    The Notice’s enhanced standards apply with equal force to the service providers of any of the above entities. The Agencies also foresee that in some instances, entities that are not covered institutions and thus not themselves subject to the enhanced standards will nonetheless be subject to the highest tier of standards (sector-critical standards) if they “provide services considered sector-critical [either] directly to the financial sector or through covered entities.”[13]

    Standards Applicable to All Covered Institutions

    The Notice outlines five categories of standards that will apply to all covered institutions on an enterprise-wide basis (i.e., across all subsidiaries and affiliates).

    Cyber Risk Governance

    Many covered entities already have strategic plans and risk governance structures that anticipate and build resilience against shocks that threaten their businesses and operations. The Notice anticipates making it a legal requirement that covered entities approach cyber risk in that same way, and that they continually monitor the residual risk that remains after their efforts at mitigation.[14] To aid the board of director’s ability to receive timely and accurate information about cyber risks, the Notice considers “requiring the senior leaders with responsibility for cyber risk to be independent of business line management.”[15]

    Cyber Risk Management

    The Notice encourages covered entities to assess and protect against cyber risk in three overlapping ways. First, covered entities should consider each business unit separately, considering the internal and external assets it depends on in order to understand the risks specific to that business unit. Second, covered entities should integrate cyber risk into their existing independent risk management functions to understand the risks they face on the enterprise level. Finally, regular assessment of cyber risk and the covered entity’s cybersecurity program should be a significant component of the covered entity’s audit plan. For example, the Agencies are considering requiring covered entities to assess and quantitatively measure the “completeness, effectiveness, and timeliness” with which they reduce the residual and aggregate risk they face so they can demonstrate that they are meeting their board-approved risk levels.[16] Depending on the size, complexity, scope of operations and interconnectedness of the covered entity, such an audit should include penetration testing and other appropriate vulnerability assessment activities.[17] The Agencies are likewise seeking comment on possible consistent, repeatable methods to measure the cyber risk within covered entities.[18]

    Internal Dependency Management

    The Notice calls for covered entities to inventory the assets that their operations depend upon, looking both at assets under their control and under the control of third parties. The “internal dependencies” of a covered entity are the “business assets (i.e., workforce, data, technology, and facilities) … upon which such entity depends to deliver services, as well as the information flows and interconnections among those assets.” The Agencies would like covered entities to generate and maintain a current, accurate and complete listing of all their internal assets and business functions, including the information flows and interconnections between them, on which the covered entity can map associated risks.[19] Each covered entity should assess the risk of a new asset prior to deployment as well as throughout its lifecycle, attend to all known violations of or deviations from its cybersecurity policy, and regularly test its backup systems.[20]

    External Dependency Management

    Likewise, the Notice calls for covered entities to inventory and assess their “external dependencies,” which are their “relationships with outside vendors, suppliers, customers, utilities (such as power and telecommunications), and other external organizations and service providers that the covered entity depends on to deliver services, as well as the information flows and interconnections between the entity and those external parties.”[21] As with internal dependencies, the Notice anticipates that covered entities will inventory and rank the systems outside their direct control to prioritize their cyber risk management efforts.

    Incident Response, Cyber Resilience and Situational Awareness

    The Notice calls for covered entities to create and implement plans that will allow them to “anticipate, withstand, contain, and rapidly recover from a disruption caused by a significant cyber event.” Those plans should consider the impact of “multiple concurrent or widespread interruptions and cyber-attacks” on critical infrastructure, including the U.S. energy and telecommunications grids. Covered entities should also make themselves aware of their connections to sector partners and external stakeholders so that they limit “cyber contagion.”[22] The Agencies envision that covered entities will establish recovery time objectives appropriate for each of their systems. Such plans should recognize that malware and corrupted data can propagate through connected systems and should ensure recovery point objectives appropriate to the nature of specific kinds of data so that the covered entity is resilient against attacks that corrupt or destroy important data.[23] Interestingly, the Agencies propose that covered entities store data using a shared defined data standard so that other covered entities or even the FDIC can rapidly take over and carry on the operations of covered entities incapacitated by an attack.[24]

    In all of these areas, covered entities must timely identify and assess potential cyber risks to the organization by tracking and analyzing relevant data and learning about current threats and solutions.[25] At various points, the Notice highlights that boards and business lines need to have sufficient personnel with the cybersecurity expertise to properly assess, mitigate and adapt to technology and cyber risks as they evolve.[26] The Notice encourages reporting up pertinent cybersecurity information to senior management and the board so that the leadership of the covered entity is fully informed of the organization’s risks and strategies.[27]

    Sector-Critical Standards for Specific Systems

    What Makes a System Sector-Critical

    The sector-critical standards apply not to institutions or entities but rather to specific systems that would profoundly affect the financial sector if disrupted. Therefore, as noted above, entities not otherwise subject to the enhanced standards may still be required to implement the sector-critical standards for certain of their systems, particularly the third parties that covered entities rely upon to conduct their operations.[28] The Notice proposes several possible metrics for determining which systems are “sector-critical”:

    • “systems that support the clearing or settlement of at least five percent of the value of transactions (on a consistent basis) in one or more of the markets for federal funds, foreign exchange, commercial paper, U.S. Government and agency securities, and corporate debt and equity securities”;
    • “systems that support the clearing or settlement of at least five percent of the value of transactions (on a consistent basis) in other markets (for example, exchange-traded and over-the-counter derivatives)”;
    • systems “that support the maintenance of a significant share (for example, five percent) of the total U.S. deposits or balances due from other depository institutions in the United States”;
    • “systems that provide key functionality to the financial sector for which alternatives are limited or nonexistent, or would take excessive time to implement (for example, due to incompatibility)”; and
    • “systems that act as key nodes to the financial sector due to their extensive interconnectedness to other financial entities.”[29]

    The Substance of Sector-Critical Standards

    The entity that provides a sector-critical system must “substantially mitigate the risk of a disruption due to a cyber event.”[30] For example, entities must “establish protocols for secure, immutable, transferable storage of critical records” “including financial records of the institution, loan data, asset management account information, and daily deposit account records, including balances and ownership details” and prioritize maintaining an up-to-date inventory and assessment of the internal and external dependencies of their sector-critical systems.[31]

    Perhaps the most striking part of the Notice is the proposal that entities be required to secure, and validate by testing, a recovery time objective of only two hours for sector-critical systems. Thus, covered entities and third parties would have to ensure that their sector-critical systems could return to full operation within two hours of a cyber event “with the overall goal of completing material pending transactions on the scheduled settlement date.”[32]  

    Some sector-critical systems may be outside of U.S. control or at smaller institutions that may have more difficulty reaching the level of resilience the Notice aspires to achieve. For example, the hackers who robbed more $100 million from the central bank of Bangladesh succeeded by placing malware on the central bank’s computers that keylogged the bank’s credentials and then placed apparently authenticated SWIFT transfers with the New York Bank of the Federal Reserve over the weekend.[33] While the Federal Reserve and other banks’ suspicions prevented a further $869 million in transactions from being completed, the Bangladesh hack illustrates how interconnected the global financial sector is, and how hard it may be to secure a sector-critical system.[34]

    Conclusion

    The Notice invites public comment on what the Agencies intend to be a robust and wide-reaching policy to enhance the cybersecurity of the U.S. financial sector. The formal regulations, guidance, or other policy the Agencies ultimately issue will likely reach far more entities than the $50 billion-or-greater institutions the Notice aims to protect. The careful thought and openness reflected in the Notice and the 39 questions the Agencies posed to the public indicate that the Agencies are taking cybersecurity seriously and seek to increase the resilience of the U.S. financial sector in a rigorous but practical manner.

    Authored by Joseph P. Vitale, Michael L. Yaeger and Noah N. Gillespie.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, &Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Joint Press Release, Agencies Issue Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards (Oct. 19, 2016), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20161019a.htm; Joint Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20161019a1.pdf (hereinafter “Notice”).

    [2] Notice at 44-45.

    [3] Id. at 2.

    [4] Id. at 8.

    [5] Id. at 8.

    [6] 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809.

    [7] See 12 CFR part 208, App. D-2 and 12 CFR part 225, App. F (Federal Reserve); 12 CFR 30, App. B (OCC); and 12 CFR part 364, App. B and 12 CFR part 391, subpart B, App. B (FDIC).

    [8] FFIEC, IT Examination HandBook InfoBase, available at http://ithandbook.ffiec.gov/it-booklets.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).

    [9] NIST, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (v. 1) (Feb. 2014), available at https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.

    [10] Available at https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.

    [11] Id. at 12.

    [12] Id. at 13. In the case of non-U.S. banks subject to Federal Reserve supervision, only U.S. assets would be counted towards the threshold.

    [13] Id. at 21 (Question 12).

    [14] Id. at 24.

    [15] Id. at 25.

    [16] Id. at 28.

    [17] Id. at 29-30.

    [18] Id. at 43.

    [19] Id. at 32.

    [20] Id. at 33.

    [21] Id. at 22.

    [22] Id. at 37.

    [23] Id. at 37.

    [24] Id. at 38; see also id. at 40 (Question 24). There might be tension between adopting a common data standard and protecting data from being stolen or destroyed. A common format might interfere with the creation of overlying proprietary or non-common solutions that prevent data from being transferred.

    [25] Id. at 39.

    [26] E.g., id. at 25.

    [27] Id. at 30.

    [28] Id. at 21.

    [29] Id. at 18-19.

    [30] Id. at 22.

    [31] Id. at 21, 31, 34, 38.

    [32] Id. at 41.

    [33] Michael L. Yaeger et al., The Bangladesh Bank Hack and Compliance Programmes, E-Finance & Payments Law & Policy (May 2016).

    [34] See id.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • The Investment Test of the BMWi for the Acquisition of Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors

    ARTICLE

    The Investment Test of the BMWi for the Acquisition of Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors

    October 17, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This article by Nikolaus von Jacobs and Germar Enders elaborates on certain restrictions which investors from abroad may have to face when intending to invest in German companies. Under the German Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz) the Federal Ministry of Economics may review and under certain circumstances prohibit investments of foreign investors in German companies. The article provides for an overview of the different types of review procedures (i.e. the cross-sectoral examination and the sector specific examination) and explains which points the parties should keep in mind when structuring any transaction.

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  • Need for Amendments of Articles of Associations of Family Owned Companies After the Recent Inheritance and Gift Tax Law Reform

    ARTICLE

    Need for Amendments of Articles of Associations of Family Owned Companies After the Recent Inheritance and Gift Tax Law Reform

    October 14, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Nils Christian Wighardt on the need for amendments of articles of associations after the recent inheritance and gift tax reform and a critical comment on the practicability of the new tax exemption provision for family owned companies.

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  • California Passes Legislation Limiting Enforceability of Forum Selection and Choice of Law Provisions in Employment Contracts

    California Passes Legislation Limiting Enforceability of Forum Selection and Choice of Law Provisions in Employment Contracts

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California Passes Legislation Limiting Enforceability of Forum Selection and Choice of Law Provisions in Employment Contracts

    October 14, 2016

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    California Governor Jerry Brown recently signed into law Senate Bill No. 1241 (codified at California Labor Code Section 925), which generally prohibits employers from requiring an employee who primarily lives and works in California to enter into a contract that: (i) requires the employee to litigate or arbitrate disputes with his or her employer outside of California; or (ii) “deprive[s] the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising in California.” These restrictions apply to agreements entered into as a condition of the employee’s employment, such as employment agreements, confidentiality agreements and arbitration agreements.

    The law was drafted as a response to concerns over employers imposing choice of law and forum selection provisions on California residents; groups advocating for the law characterized these provisions as attempts by employers to “evade California law, make it more difficult for employees to pursue legitimate claims, and ensure that any disputes are decided in a forum that is most favorable to the employer.”[1]

    Under the law, any contract provision that violates these requirements will be “voidable by the employee.” If a provision is rendered void at the request of an employee, the matter must be adjudicated in California, with California law governing the dispute. The law will allow the employee to void only the forum selection or choice of law provision, not the entire contract.

    The law will not apply if the employee was represented by legal counsel when negotiating the forum selection or choice of law provision.

    The law will only apply to contracts entered into, modified or extended on or after Jan. 1, 2017. Employers with California-based employees should consider the new law when entering new employment agreements. Employers that want to apply out-of-state forum selection or choice of law provisions to California-based employees may consider entering, modifying or extending the contracts containing such provisions before Jan. 1, 2017. After Jan. 1, 2017, if employers want to utilize those provisions, they should consider encouraging California-based employees to obtain independent counsel, possibly even by reimbursing some amount of the employees’ attorneys’ fees, when entering, modifying or extending employment-related agreements that contain forum selection or choice of law provisions.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ian L. Levin, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold, and Ann Margius.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Cal. Senate Floor Analysis, Aug. 31, 2016, at 5, available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1241#.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Split Sixth Circuit Dismisses Appeal from Detroit’s Confirmed Plan

    Split Sixth Circuit Dismisses Appeal from Detroit’s Confirmed Plan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Split Sixth Circuit Dismisses Appeal from Detroit’s Confirmed Plan

    October 13, 2016

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Equitable mootness” prevented the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from “unravel[ing] the entire Plan, … forc[ing] the City [Detroit] back into emergency oversight, and requir[ing] a wholesale recreation of the vast and complex web of negotiated settlements and agreements.” In re City of Detroit, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17774, *14, *17 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 2016) (2-1). Affirming the district court’s dismissal of an appeal by a group of pensioners from an order confirming Detroit’s Chapter 9 plan (“Plan”), the Sixth Circuit agreed that the pensioners failed to “obtain a stay,” the Plan had “been substantially consummated,” and that “reversal of the Plan would adversely impact third parties and the success of the Plan.” Id. at *9. The pensioners had unsuccessfully challenged “the [Plan’s] reduction in their pensions” and, among other things, “a release provision … [preventing] retirees from asserting claims against the State of Michigan.” Id. at *8.

    The dissenting Sixth Circuit judge forcefully argued that the majority had “brush[ed] aside the retirees’ legal claims[, leaving] them with the impression that their rights do not matter.” Id. at *17-18. In the dissent’s view, equitable mootness is a “judicial invention with almost no legal basis.” Id.

    Relevance

    The dissent conceded that “the doctrine of equitable mootness has been adopted” not only by the Sixth Circuit, but also by “every other circuit to consider its vitality … .” Id. at *18. The doctrine prevents appellate courts from “unscrambling complex … reorganizations.” In re Nordhoff Invs. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, appellate courts recently have been wrestling with the limits on this judicial doctrine, requiring that an appellant must “diligently” seek a stay pending appeal, and that the appeals court must be able to grant effective relief without unraveling the reorganization plan, which would unfairly affect third parties. See, e.g., Transwest Resort Properties, 801 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (2-1); One 2 One Communications, LLC, 805 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2015); and In re NICA Holdings, 810 F.3d 781 (11th Cir. 2015).

    These courts have expressed concern about whether the equitable mootness doctrine enables parties to implement a questionable reorganization plan favoring certain creditors over others without any oversight by an Article III court (a district court or a Court of Appeals). The pensioners here argued, among other things, that Detroit could not, as a matter of Michigan law, impair their pension rights in a municipal bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy court rejected that argument. In re City of Detroit, 504. B.R. 191, 194-195 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). Some judges also have been concerned whether the doctrine enables courts to abdicate their responsibilities.

    Courts still view equitable mootness as a limited doctrine. In re SemCrude, LP, 728 F.3d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 2013) (dismissal of appeal “should be the rare exception and not the rule”). In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009) (“equitable mootness should be applied with a scalpel rather than an axe”).

    Facts

    The city of Detroit, in its huge “municipal bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code” (“Code”), had “crafted a complex network of settlements and agreements with its thousands of creditors and stakeholders” that had been incorporated in a comprehensive Plan confirmed by the bankruptcy court. Several municipal employee pensions opposed “any reduction in their benefits” and opposed confirmation of the Plan. As a result of agreements “by and among the City, the State of Michigan, and certain philanthropic foundations,” the Plan reduced the pensions here “by 4.5% and eliminated cost-of-living increases; reduced retiree healthcare coverage and eliminated dental, vision, and life insurance,” among other things. Id. at *3-4. The class of claimants that included the appealing pensioners “voted 73% in favor of accepting the Plan … .” Id. at *4. The Sixth Circuit never discussed the substance of the pensioners’ objections, but stressed that “the Plan eliminated approximately $7 billion in debt and freed approximately $1.7 billion in revenue for reinvestment in City services and infrastructure … .” Id. at *4.

    Analysis

    The Court of Appeals avoided any discussion of the merits of the underlying appeal. Instead, it was “concerned with protecting the good faith reliance interests created by implementation of the [City’s] plan from being undone … .” Id. at *6. “Stated bluntly, equitable mootness negates appellate review of the confirmation order or the underlying plan, regardless of the problems therein or the merits of the appellant’s challenge.” Id. at *7. The court’s “three-part test” looked at whether the appellant had obtained a stay, whether the plan had been “substantially consummated,” and “whether the relief requested would significantly and irrevocably disrupt the implementation of the plan or disproportionately harm the reliance interests of other parties not before the court.” Id. But the “most important factor is whether the relief requested would affect the rights of third parties or the overall success of the plan.” Id.

    Applying these criteria, the court noted that the petitioners had not obtained a stay, the plan had been substantially consummated (“numerous significant — even colossal —actions had been undertaken or completed, many irreversible”), and the requested “pension reduction would necessarily rescind” the basis of the Plan, “its $816 million in outside funding, and the series of other settlements and agreements … , thereby unravelling the entire Plan and adversely affecting countless third parties, including, among others, the entire City population.” Id. Finding that this case was “not a close call,” the court stressed that the doctrine of equitable mootness was meant to apply to “exactly this type of scenario … .” Id. “Given the immensity of the Grand Bargain [underlying the Plan], even within this enormous bankruptcy, such a drastic action would unavoidably unravel the entire Plan, likely force the City back into emergency oversight.” Id. at *8. Moreover, reasoned the court, the “harm to the City and its dependents — employees and stakeholders, agencies and businesses and 685,000 residents — so outweighs the harm to these [pensioners] that granting their requested relief and unravelling the Plan would be ‘impractical, imprudent, and therefore inequitable.’” Id., quoting In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d 942, 947 (6th Cir. 2008).

    Equitable Mootness Viable

    The court rejected the pensioners’ argument that equitable mootness is no longer a viable doctrine. First, the Supreme Court has not yet abolished the doctrine, nor has any other Court of Appeals. Indeed, the equitable mootness doctrine “is the law of the Sixth Circuit.” Id. at *9, citing United Producers, 526 F.3d at 947, and In re Schwartz, 636 F. App’x 673 (6th Cir. 2016).

    Equitable Mootness Applies in Chapter 9

    The court further rejected the pensioners’ argument that the equitable mootness doctrine did not apply in Chapter 9 cases. Other courts have, in fact, applied the doctrine to Chapter 9 cases, “with little analysis.” Id. at *9, citing Alexander v. Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., 498 B.R. 550 (D.S.C. 2013); In re City of Vallejo, 551 F. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2013); and In re City of Stockton, 542 B.R. 261, 273-74 (9th Cir. BAP 2015). The only decision holding that equitable mootness does not apply in Chapter 9 cases, Bennett v. Jefferson County, 518 B.R. 613 (N.D. Ala. 2014), is currently pending on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit. Municipal ratepayers there “claimed that the increase in rates — without vote or voter approval — violated the state constitution,” but the Sixth Circuit stressed that they were not creditors, investors or shareholders whose interest in the case was defined by the amount of their investment. Id. at *18. Because the “potential harm to third-party reliance interests from unravelling the Jefferson County plan would not outweigh the harm inflicted on those captive Ratepayer ‘creditors’ by allowing the plan’s drastic rate increase to go unchallenged,” equitable mootness was not an appropriate doctrine in that case. Unlike the captive customers “like the Ratepayers in Bennett, at risk of being subjected to an unlimited financial obligation, namely, a 365% rate increase to continue forever,” the pensioners in Detroit “were given a vote on the pension reduction and 73% of the Class voted for it … .” Id. at *11.

    The doctrine of equitable mootness, reasoned the Court, is “outside of the Code entirely, both Chapters 11 and 9.” Id. at *14. On the “particular facts of this case,” it said, “equitable mootness … applies ‘with greater force to the City’s Chapter 9 Plan, which affects thousands of creditors and residents.’” Id. at *15, quoting City of Detroit, 2015 WL 5697702, at *5.

    Municipal Status Irrelevant

    Nor does it matter whether the debtor is a business enterprise or a municipality. “The fact that the debtor is a municipality, with state sovereignty, rather than a business enterprise does not reduce the municipal debtor’s rights in bankruptcy”; in fact, “the opposite is true.” Id. Here, the debtor “not only had numerous stakeholders and employees [but] also had over 100,000 creditors and 685,000 residents relying on its Plan.” Id. at *13. In this context, the equitable mootness doctrine is meant “to achieve finality in [the] bankruptcy [case] and to protect the good faith reliance interests created by implementation of the bankruptcy plan.” Id. at *13.

    Dissent

    Judicial Abdication

    Accusing the majority of “judicial abdication,” the dissent argued that the majority had extended “an already questionable prudential doctrine to a context in which it has no place” in order “to avoid the merits of this case.” Id. at *16-17. The retiree pensioners in this case “spent their lives serving the people of Detroit through boom and bust, and … feel that the City’s bankruptcy was resolved through a game of musical chairs in which they were left without a seat,” believing that “their rights were violated by the agreement that resulted in the settlement of Detroit’s bankruptcy …. ” Id. at *17. According to the dissent, the district court and the majority of the Sixth Circuit panel ensured that the pensioners’ claims “will never be heard by an Article III judge,” something that is “no mere formality.” The protections of Article III ‘help to ensure the integrity and independence of the Judiciary’ … and Article III supervision of bankruptcy judges is key to the constitutionality of the bankruptcy-court system that adjudicated the retirees’ claims.” Id

    Equitable Mootness Unjustified

    First, argued the dissent, the Code does not justify the application of the equitable mootness doctrine here. The Sixth Circuit, it said, has “never examined the legal basis for” the doctrine. “Indeed, ‘[a]lthough the equitable mootness doctrine is embraced in every circuit, the rationale underlying the doctrine is unsettled at best.’” Id. at *21, citing In re SemCrude, L.P., 728 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2013) and quoting R. Murphy, “Equitable Mootness Should Be Used As A Scalpel Rather Than An Axe In Bankruptcy Appeals,” 19 J. Bankr. L & Pract. 1 Art. 2 (2010).

    Equitable Mootness Inappropriate

    Equitable mootness is also an inappropriate prudential doctrine upsetting the constitutional balance of the bankruptcy court system, argued the dissent. Id. at *23. The doctrine is “nothing but a prudential doctrine of ‘judicially self-imposed limits.’” Id., quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). “The problem with equitable mootness is not only that it cuts off entirely the right to appeal to an Article III court, but that ‘it effectively delegates the power to prevent that review to the very non-Article III tribunal whose decision is at issue’ because ‘bankruptcy courts control nearly all of the variables’ that are considered in assessing whether an appeal is equitably moot.” Id. at *25.

    Pensioners’ Objections Warrant Judicial Review

    Finally, argued the dissent, there is no legal basis for applying the equitable mootness doctrine in Chapter 9 cases. Because the panel here was “bound by [6th Circuit] precedent applying the doctrine of equitable mootness, … it is high time for us to review the doctrine’s basis as a full court sitting on en banc.” Id. at *26. In the dissent’s view, the Plan here “is known to be subject to significant challenge on appeal,” but the majority has ensured that the appellants “may never have their claims heard by an Article III judge, … all in the name of protecting reliance interests.” Id. at *29.

    Comment

    The appealing pensioners in Detroit will most likely seek a petition for rehearing en banc. If that fails, in view of the recent spate of decisions debating the wisdom of the equitable mootness doctrine, they will most likely seek review by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, like many of the courts of appeals, will be in no hurry to review difficult cases, particularly when there is apparently no split among the circuits on the substantive merits of this particular case.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Federal Appeals Court Rules CFPB Structure Unconstitutional

    Federal Appeals Court Rules CFPB Structure Unconstitutional

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Appeals Court Rules CFPB Structure Unconstitutional

    October 12, 2016

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The D.C. Circuit held yesterday in PHH Corporation (“PHH”) v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) that the structure of the CFPB was unconstitutional because, as an independent agency, it should have been constituted with a board or commission instead of having all power vested in a single person.[1] However, the court chose not to shut down the CFPB or invalidate its prior actions. Instead, the court decided on a more narrow remedy — it struck down the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act that only permitted the president to remove the CFPB director “for cause.”[2] The court’s ruling essentially makes the CFPB an executive agency, subject to the supervision and direction of the president. The CFPB has not yet indicated how it will react to the court’s ruling on its structure, however it has suggested it is considering options for seeking further review of the court’s decision. The CFPB can either file a petition to the D.C. Circuit for rehearing en banc or file a petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari.

    PHH, a mortgage lender, had petitioned the court to review the constitutionality of the CFPB’s agency structure, as part of its appeal of a $109-million order the CFPB had levied against it (the “PHH Order”) for what the CFPB had deemed a violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). While the court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the CFPB structure did not affect the PHH Order, separately the court vacated the PHH Order and remanded for further proceedings.

    Independent vs. Executive Agencies

    Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the president alone is vested with all executive power (i.e., the power to enforce the law). However, in 1935, the Supreme Court ruled that, notwithstanding Article II, Congress had the power to create independent agencies that exercise executive power.[3] Because independent agency heads are removable by the president only for cause, they are not accountable to or checked by the president. While there is judicial review to ensure the legality of the agency’s decisions, the courts do not have the authority to review discretionary decisions that are within the legal boundaries of the agency’s authority.

    Historically, independent agencies exercising substantial executive power have been headed by a multiple-member board or commission.[4] Thus, each individual board member or commissioner is accountable to and checked by their fellow board members or commissioners. In contrast, the CFPB is headed by a single director, who has unilateral authority to enforce the 19 federal consumer protection statutes under its purview. The court found this provided the CFPB director “more unilateral authority than any other officer in any of the three branches of the U.S. Government, other than the President.”[5]

    The court maintained that: “The CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also poses a far greater risk of arbitrary decision making and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency.”[6] Accordingly, the court held that the CFPB structure exceeds the boundaries of traditional independent agencies and violates Article II of the Constitution.

    To remedy this unconstitutional structure, the court found a narrow remedy appropriate, and relying on Supreme Court precedent, severed the unconstitutional for-cause provision from the rest of the statute, removing the CFPB’s status as an independent agency. The president now has the power to both remove the CFPB director at will, and to supervise and direct the director’s actions. While this ruling affects the oversight of the CFPB director, the CFPB will continue to operate as an administrative agency with the power to enforce federal consumer protection statutes. The court declined to consider the potential effect this decision may have on CFPB’s prior actions or decisions.[7] In the particular CFPB action at issue, rather than vacate the PHH Order simply because it had been issued while the agency was unconstitutionally structured, the court proceeded to judge it on the merits.[8]

    The PHH Order

    Finding that the CFPB can remain an agency under this new constitutional structure, the court looked to PHH’s substantive challenges to the $109-million order issued against it. The court found for PHH, ruling that: (1) the CFPB incorrectly interpreted Section 8 of RESPA, which does not bar captive reinsurance arrangements; (2) the CFPB retroactively applied a new interpretation of RESPA against PHH, violating its due process rights; and (3) the three-year statute of limitations under RESPA does apply to all CFPB actions to enforce Section 8 of this act. Thus, the court vacated the PHH Order and remanded for further proceedings.

    Authored by Joseph P. Vitale and Hannah Thibideau.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016). This opinion was written by Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit. While the ruling on the PHH Order was unanimous, Judge Henderson dissented from the court’s ruling on the constitutionality question, arguing that the court did not need to address the constitutional issue in its decision. Judge Henderson’s dissent does not address the merits of the constitutionality question.

    [2] 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (c) (3).

    [3] Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

    [4] E.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission or the National Labor Relations Board. The one potential exception recognized by the court is the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which the court indicated “raises the same question we confront here.” PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177, at 33 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 11, 2016).

    [5] Id. at 6.

    [6] Id. at 9.

    [7] Id. at 69 n.19.

    [8] The D.C. Circuit has previously upheld other organizations’ past rules and determinations subsequent to a successful challenge to an organizational structure on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, 796 F.3d 111, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that “ratification [of previous decisions] by a properly constituted board would be appropriate”); see also Federal Election Com’n v. Legi-Tech Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the organization’s “post-reconstruction ratification of its prior decisions” should be taken at “face value” and treated as “an adequate remedy for the [] constitutional violation”). Pursuant to these precedents it would seem that the CFPB director can insulate prior actions from challenge by revisiting and ratifying them. Nonetheless, it is likely that there will still be legal challenges to overturn previous actions taken by the CFPB.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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