Content Type: Article

  • CFPB Proposes Revisions to Its Policy on No-Action Letters  and Creation of New Product Sandbox to Spur Fintech Innovation

    CFPB Proposes Revisions to Its Policy on No-Action Letters and Creation of New Product Sandbox to Spur Fintech Innovation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Proposes Revisions to Its Policy on No-Action Letters and Creation of New Product Sandbox to Spur Fintech Innovation

    December 14, 2018

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)[1] recently issued a proposal[2] consisting of: (i) revisions to its Policy on No-Action Letters—which was finalized in February 2016 (“2016 Policy”)[3] — designed to increase interest in applying for no-action letters (“NALs”) under the 2016 Policy; and (ii) the creation of a CFPB Product Sandbox (collectively, the “Proposal”). The Proposal was issued by the CFPB, among other reasons, to spur innovation in the financial technology (“fintech”) sector. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after its publication in the Federal Register.

    Under the 2016 Policy, which provides for the issuance of NALs consisting of non-binding staff-level no-action recommendations, the CFPB has issued only one such letter to date. The Proposal, which is intended to better incentivize firms — including fintech companies — to seek NALs from the CFPB, has the following overarching goals:

    • Streamlining the application process;
    • Streamlining the CFPB’s processing of applications;[4]
    • Expanding the types of statutory and regulatory relief available;
    • Specifying procedures for an extension where the relief initially provided is of limited duration; and
    • Providing for coordination with existing or future programs offered by other regulators designed to facilitate innovation.[5]

    The Proposal was filed on Dec. 10, 2018 and signed by Mick Mulvaney on the last day of his tenure as acting director of the CFPB. Kathy Kraninger, who was sworn in as the director of the CFPB later that same day, has not publicly opined on her position on the Proposal.[6]

    Below please find key highlights of the Proposal:

    2016 Policy Revisions

    Revisions to the 2016 Policy would include, among other things:

    • Removing the 2016 Policy’s statements that NALs will “not be routinely available” and that NALs “be provided rarely and on the basis of exceptional circumstances and a thorough and persuasive demonstration of the appropriateness of such treatment.”
    • Removing the 2016 Policy’s provision that applicants be required to commit to data sharing about the relevant product or service.
    • Removing the 2016 Policy’s temporal limitation on NALs, which allowed the CFPB to set an expiration date on the NAL or volume limitation on the product or service.
    • Reducing the number of required NAL application items.
    • Adding a provision that NALs will be issued by duly authorized CFPB officials in order to provide recipients with greater assurance that the CFPB stands behind the relief provided.
    • Adding a provision regarding the CFPB’s coordination with other regulators, including State authorities, that offer NALs or similar forms of relief.

    CFPB Product Sandbox

    Below please find key features of the proposed CFPB Product Sandbox:

    • Application Requirements. The CFPB Product Sandbox application requirements are similar to those for the NAL application. However, as part of its application, a CFPB Product Sandbox applicant will need to: (i) request a duration of participation (the CFPB expects that two years will be appropriate in most cases, and admitted participants may apply for extensions) and (ii) identify the statutory and regulatory provisions from which the applicant seeks relief (and the type of relief sought).
    • Available Relief. Along with providing no-action relief that would substantially be the same as the no-action relief offered by NALs, the CFPB Product Sandbox would provide two forms of additional relief: (i) approvals under safe harbor provisions of certain federal consumer protection laws and (ii) exemptions from certain statutory and regulatory provisions meeting the Proposal’s conditions. In either case, an entity issued an approval or exemption would be subject to good faith compliance with specific terms and conditions set forth by the CFPB, and would be immune from enforcement actions by any federal or state authorities, as well as from lawsuits by private parties, based on the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions and on the participant’s offering or providing the described aspects of the product or service.
    • Terms and Conditions of Participation. When an applicant is granted admission to the CFPB Product Sandbox, it will be provided with a document setting forth the terms and conditions of its participation, which will be signed by the Assistant Director of the Office of Innovation or other member(s) of the Office of Innovation, duly authorized by the CFPB, and by an officer of the participant (“T&Cs”). The CFPB expects the T&Cs will include: (i) a requirement that the participant report information about the effects of offering or providing the product or service on “complaint patterns, default rates, or similar metrics” that will enable the CFPB to “determine if doing so is causing material, tangible harm to consumers”; (ii) a commitment by the participant “to compensate consumers for material, quantifiable, economic harm” caused by the recipient firm’s offering or providing of the product or service within the CFPB Product Sandbox; and (iii) any other limitations or conditions, such as the nature and extent of the participant’s data sharing, and the extent that the CFPB intends to publicly disclose information about the firm’s participation in the CFPB Product Sandbox.[7]
    • Publication of Participation. The CFPB intends to publish on its website the following information concerning firms admitted to the CFPB Product Sandbox: (i) the participant firm’s identity; (ii) the subject matter scope of the firm’s participation; (iii) the duration of the firm’s participation; (iv) the types of relief provided to the firm (including, where applicable, the legal authority and rationale basis for any approval or exemption); and (v) in appropriate cases, a version or summary of the firm’s application.[8] The CFPB also intends to publish information about denials of applications, including explanations for such denials (such information would be published by the CFPB only after the applicant is given an opportunity to request reconsideration of the denial).[9]

    Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Kara A. Kuchar and Adam J. Barazani.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or would like assistance in engaging with the CFPB regarding the Proposal, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] While the CFPB, under former acting director Mick Mulvaney, has sought to rebrand itself as the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection or the BCFP, we understand the fate of such rebranding is uncertain. We also note that the CFPB refers to itself as such on its website and in previous press releases, among other forms.

    [2] Full proposal available here.

    [3] See 81 FR 8686 (Feb. 22, 2016), available here.

    [4] The CFPB would expect to grant or deny an application within 60 days of notifying the applicant that the CFPB has deemed the application to be complete. The CFPB’s determination regarding whether an application is deemed “complete” is within its sole discretion; thus application processing times will vary.

    [5] Proposal at *4. The CFPB noted that the Proposal is intended to bring certain aspects of the 2016 Policy into alignment with other federal regulators’ NAL programs.

    [6] At a Dec. 11, 2018 press conference, Ms. Kraninger noted that she has not yet been fully briefed on the Proposal, available here.

    [7] Proposal at *28-29.

    [8] Proposal at *33.

    [9] Proposal at *33.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • SEC Adopts Rules to Enhance Order Handling Information Available to Investors

    SEC Adopts Rules to Enhance Order Handling Information Available to Investors

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Adopts Rules to Enhance Order Handling Information Available to Investors

    December 14, 2018

    Read time: 15 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Nov. 2, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission adopted amendments (“Amendments”) to Rule 606 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”), to require new and enhanced disclosures by broker-dealers to customers regarding the handling of their orders.[1] The Amendments are intended to provide customers with greater clarity into broker-dealers’ order routing practices in light of significant changes to equity market structure that have occurred since the routing disclosure rules were originally adopted in 2000.[2] In particular, the Amendments will:

    1. Require broker-dealers, upon customer request, to provide customer-specific disclosures regarding the broker-dealer’s handling of a customer’s orders in NMS stocks[3] submitted on a not held basis for the prior six months, subject to two de minimis exceptions;[4]
    2. Require that broker-dealers’ quarterly order routing reports required by Exchange Act Rule 606(a) cover all customer orders in NMS stocks submitted on a held basis[5] and provide enhanced disclosures relating to payment for order flow, including both the net aggregate amounts of payment received from identified market centers and amounts received on a per share basis; and
    3. Require that broker-dealers maintain the quarterly order routing reports required by Exchange Act Rule 606, as well as the order execution reports currently required by Exchange Act Rule 605, free and accessible on a website for three years from the initial date of posting on the website.

    The Amendments will become effective Jan. 18, 2019 and the compliance date will be May 20, 2019.

    Background and Current Regulatory Framework

    Currently, Exchange Act Rule 606 requires broker-dealers to publicly disclose, on a quarterly basis, certain aggregated order routing information for customer orders[6] and to disclose separately to any customer, upon request, certain customer-specific order routing information for the six-month period preceding the request.[7] The SEC adopted the Amendments to address changes in the equity market structure, order routing and handling practices since Exchange Act Rule 606 was originally adopted,[8] including the increased percentage of orders being handled by trading algorithms and related routing systems. The Amendments are intended to assist market participants in comparing the routing services of broker-dealers and the relative merits of competing trading centers, and to help customers evaluate how broker-dealers handle conflicts of interest and risks of information leakage.

    Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 606 of Regulation NMS

    Customer-Specific Report on Not Held Order Handling

    Newly adopted Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) will require broker-dealers to provide a customer, within seven business days of the customer’s request, a report on the broker-dealer’s handling of the customer’s NMS stock orders[9] submitted on a not held basis for the prior six months, including the handling of all child orders derived therefrom. These reports must be separated by calendar month and include separate sections for directed and non-directed orders. Each section must identify the total number of shares sent by the customer, the number of shares executed by the broker-dealer as principal, the number of orders exposed by the broker or dealer through an “actionable indication of interest” and the related venue(s). Additionally, each report will require the following information for each venue to which the broker-dealer routed the customer’s not held orders:

    1. Information on Order Routing:
      1. Total shares routed;
      2. Total shares routed marked immediate or cancel;
      3. Total shares routed that were further routable; and
      4. Average order size routed.
    2. Information on Order Execution:
      1. Total shares executed;
      2. Fill rate;
      3. Average fill size;
      4. Average net execution fee or rebate;
      5. Total number of shares executed at the midpoint;[10]
      6. Percentage of shares executed at the midpoint;
      7. Total number of shares executed that were priced on the side of the spread more favorable to the not held order;
      8. Percentage of total shares executed that were priced at the side of the spread more favorable to the not held order;
      9. Total number of shares executed that were priced on the side of the spread less favorable to the not held order; and 
      10. Percentage of total shares executed that were priced on the side of the spread less favorable to the not held order.
    3. Information on Orders that Provided Liquidity:
      1. Total number of shares executed of orders providing liquidity;
      2. Percentage of shares executed of orders providing liquidity;
      3. Average time between order entry and execution or cancellation, for orders providing liquidity; and 
      4. Average net execution rebate or fee for shares of orders providing liquidity.
    4. Information on Orders that Removed Liquidity:
      1. Total number of shares executed of orders removing liquidity;
      2. Percentage of shares executed of orders removing liquidity; and 
      3. Average net execution fee or rebate for shares of orders removing liquidity.

    Definition of Customer

    The Adopting Release notes that the term “customer,” when used in Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3), means the “customer that places the order with the broker-dealer, even if that customer may be acting on behalf of others and is not the ultimate beneficiary of any resulting transactions, such as when an investment adviser, as the customer of a broker-dealer, places an order with the broker-dealer that represents the trading interest of clients of the investment adviser.”[11] This interpretation of the term “customer” for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) has a number of implications. For instance, an underlying customer of an investment adviser is not the broker-dealer’s “customer” for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) and may not demand an Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) report (such reports, “Rule 606(b)(3) Reports”) unless the underlying customer maintains a separate relationship with the broker-dealer.[12] Further, an investment adviser, as “customer,” may only demand Rule 606(b)(3) Reports for orders the investment adviser submitted to a broker-dealer in aggregate (that is, the investment adviser could not demand a Rule 606(b)(3) Report at the underlying account level). Broker-dealers should note that the SEC’s interpretation of “customer” for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) may limit the broker-dealer’s ability to rely on the customer-specific de minimis exception.[13]

    Technology Outsourcing Scenarios

    The Adopting Release notes that where a “broker-dealer simply forwards its customers’ orders on to another broker-dealer and that second broker-dealer exercises all discretion in determining where and how to route and execute the orders, [ ] the first broker-dealer is not required to provide disclosures under Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) beyond those relevant to its activity in forwarding orders to the executing broker.”[14] However, the Adopting Release separately notes that where a broker-dealer “license[s] or outsource[s] technology offerings, such as trading algorithms, from third-parties, including other broker-dealers, to use for routing and executing orders”,[15] the broker-dealer utilizing these outsourced solutions must ensure it can provide the information required by Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3). Accordingly, broker-dealers that outsource trading algorithms from other broker-dealers should be aware of the SEC distinction when generating Rule 606(b)(3) Reports. The Adopting Release does not address how such arrangements should be viewed under Exchange Act Rule 606(a).

    Newly Defined Terms

    The SEC, as part of the amendments, has adopted a number of newly defined terms, including (i) “orders providing liquidity,” (ii) “orders removing liquidity” and (iii) “actionable indication of interest.”

    Liquidity Providing and Removing Orders

    The term “orders providing liquidity” is defined as any order “executed against after resting at a trading center.”[16] Relatedly, the term “orders removing liquidity” is defined as any order “executed against resting trading interest at a trading center.”[17] Importantly, the Adopting Release does not discuss how broker-dealers should address the use of derivatively priced orders (e.g., “pegged” orders) that may be viewed as both “providing” and “removing” liquidity under the adopted definitions. While participants may choose to rely on liquidity tags provided by destination market centers (such as alternative trading systems) in determining whether an order “provided” or “removed” liquidity, destination venues may have different approaches in determining whether a derivatively priced order “provides” or “removes” liquidity.

    Actionable Indications of Interest

    The Amendments define the term “actionable indication of interest” as “any indication of interest that explicitly or implicitly conveys all of the following information with respect to any order available at the venue sending the indication of interest: (i) [s]ymbol; (ii) [s]ide (buy or sell); (iii) [a] price that is equal to or better than the national best bid for buy orders and the national best offer for sell orders; and (iv) [a] size that is at least equal to one round lot.”[18] The Commission affirmed that the definition applies to indications of interest (“IOIs”) that are communicated electronically as well as IOIs that are communicated manually (e.g., via telephone).[19] As such, broker-dealers may need to adopt procedures to track “manual” IOIs and ensure information relating to such manual IOIs is included in Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) reports where appropriate.

    The Adopting Release notes that where terms (e.g., size or price) are implicitly included in an IOI, the IOI may meet the definition of “actionable indication of interest.”[20] The Adopting Release further notes that past dealings may be relevant in determining whether an IOI is “actionable.” For instance, where past dealings indicate that submission of a marketable order in response to IOI will result in an execution (unless the represented trading interest had already been executed or cancelled), the SEC will likely view the IOI as “actionable.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, the SEC notes that IOIs that require further agreement of the broker-dealer that communicated the IOI (e.g., conditional orders) should not be considered actionable IOIs, unless course of conduct suggests that the broker-dealer’s agreement can be assumed.[21]

    The Commission believes that the adopted definition of “actionable indication of interest” is “appropriately designed to capture trading interest that is the functional equivalent to an order or quotation.”[22] However, the Commission was careful to note that it “is not expanding the scope of existing rules, regulations, or guidance related to orders or quotations, other than Exchange Act Rule 606 and guidance related thereto, with regard to actionable IOIs.”[23]

    De Minimis Exceptions

    The Commission has also adopted two de minimis exceptions to the Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) reporting requirements. Specifically, a broker-dealer is not obligated to provide an Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) report: (i) to any customer if not held NMS stock orders constitute less than 5 percent of the total shares of NMS stock orders that the broker-dealer receives from its customers over the prior six months,[24] or (ii) to a particular customer if that customer trades through the broker-dealer, on average each month for the prior six months, less than $1 million of notional value of not held orders in NMS stocks.[25] Importantly, where a broker-dealer relies on a de minimis exception to Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3)’s reporting requirements, it must nevertheless comply with any requests for order routing information under Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(1).[26]

    Held Order Disclosures

    The Commission, as part of the Amendments, is also enhancing the existing obligation under Exchange Act Rule 606 that broker-dealers provide public quarterly reports on their order routing practices.[27] The Amendments will require the quarterly reports to cover NMS stock orders of any size (currently, orders in NMS Stocks with a market value of $200,000 or higher are excluded) that are submitted on a held basis and continue to cover any order, whether held or not held, for an NMS security that is an option contract with a market value less than $50,000. Broker-dealers will now also be required to:

    • Report routing information separately for marketable limit orders and non-marketable limit orders;
    • Report routing information by calendar month instead of quarterly and no longer categorize NMS stocks by listing market;
    • Report routing information for NMS stock orders separately for securities included in the S&P 500 Index as of the first day of the quarter and other NMS stocks;
    • Include the following information for the ten venues to which the largest number of total non-directed orders were routed for execution and for any venue to which five percent or more of non-directed orders were routed for execution: 
      • The net aggregate amount of any payment for order flow received, payment from any profit-sharing relationship received, transaction fees paid, and transaction rebates received, both as a total dollar amount and per share for: non-directed market orders, non-directed marketable limit orders, non-directed non-marketable limit orders and other non-directed orders; and
    • Include a description of the terms of any payment for order flow and any profit-sharing arrangements that may influence a broker-dealer’s order routing decision, including, among other things: 
      • Incentives for equaling or exceeding an agreed upon order flow volume threshold;
      • Disincentives for failing to meet an agreed upon minimum order flow threshold;
      • Volume-based tiered payment schedules; and
      • Agreements regarding the minimum amount of order flow that the broker-dealer would send to a venue.

    “Other” Order Type

    While not discussed in the Adopting Release, the quarterly disclosures currently required by Exchange Act Rule 606(a) must be separated by (i) market, (ii) limit and (iii) “other” order types. SEC staff previously issued guidance regarding what orders should be included in the “other” order type category, noting that “market opening and closing orders, orders submitted with stop prices, all-or-none orders, orders that must be executed on a particular tick or bid (such as non-exempt short sale orders), and ‘not held’ orders”[28] should all be included. While Exchange Act Rule 606(a), as amended, retains the “other” order type category,[29] amended Exchange Act Rule 606(a) is expressly limited to orders handled on a “held” basis. Broker-dealers, however, should be aware that the “other” order type category will nevertheless remain.

    Implications

    Broker-dealers will need to assess the order and execution information they record when effecting an order to ensure they are able to comply with the Amendments. As noted above, broker-dealers will have to provide comprehensive disclosures regarding their handling of customers’ not held orders upon customer request. Given the relatively quick seven business day turnaround time to produce such reports, broker-dealers will need to ensure their systems capture all required information at the time of order receipt, routing or execution, as applicable. Further, the Amendments, which will provide regulators and market participants a significant amount of information on the effects of payment for order flow arrangements, maker-taker pricing systems and changes to exchanges’ fee structures, may also lead examiners to begin to ask broker-dealers how they use such data in their own best execution analyses.

    Investment advisers and other fiduciaries should assess how best to utilize the additional disclosure information provided by the Rule 606(b)(3) Reports to ensure that the advisers fulfill their best execution obligations. Furthermore, as the Amendments require the disclosure of a significant amount of additional information on the effects of payment for order flow arrangements, maker-taker pricing systems and changes to exchanges’ fee structures, investment advisers and other fiduciaries should prepare to be questioned by customers and regulators on the impact of these arrangements and structures on execution quality.

    Authored by Julian Rainero, William J. Barbera, Derek N. Lacarrubba and Akshay Ramanan.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See Exchange Act Release No. 34-84528 (Nov. 2, 2018), 83 Fed. Reg. 58338 (Nov. 19, 2018) (“Adopting Release”).

    [2] See Exchange Act Release No. 43590 (Nov. 17, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 75414 (Dec. 1, 2000), adopting Exchange Act Rule 11Ac1-6, predecessor to Exchange Act Rule 606.

    [3] As that term is defined at Exchange Act Rule 600(b)(47).

    [4] As further discussed herein, the requirements of the newly adopted Exchange Act Rule 603(b)(3) are subject to a firm-level de minimis exception and a customer level de minimis exception.

    [5] Currently, Exchange Act Rule 606(a) does not cover held orders in NMS stocks with a market value of $200,000 or more.

    [6] See Exchange Act Rule 606(a).

    [7] See Exchange Act Rule 606(b).

    [8] That is, since Exchange Act Rule 11Ac1-6, the predecessor to Exchange Act Rule 606, was adopted.

    [9] While the quarterly reporting requirements of Exchange Act Rule 606(a) apply to all NMS securities (subject to certain exceptions), the customer-specific reports required by Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) will only apply to NMS stocks.

    [10] This is not limited to customer orders pegged to the midpoint of the NBBO, but rather includes any midpoint execution.

    [11] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58356 (emphasis added).

    [12] Id.

    [13] That is, the broker-dealer will likely be unable to look through an intermediary to the underlying account in determining whether it may rely on the customer-specific de minimis exception.

    [14] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58357.

    [15] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58358 (emphasis added).

    [16] See Exchange Act Rule 600(b)(54), effective Jan. 18, 2019.

    [17] See Exchange Act Rule 600(b)(55), effective Jan. 18, 2019.

    [18] See Exchange Act Rule 600(b)(1), effective Jan. 18, 2019.

    [19] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58354.

    [20] Assuming the other factors required by the definition are met.

    [21] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58354.

    [22] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58353 (emphasis added).

    [23] See Adopting Release, 83 FR at 58355.

    [24] See Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(4), effective Jan. 18, 2019. Under the rule, the first time a broker-dealer meets or exceeds the 5 percent threshold, it has a grace period of up to three calendar months to provide the Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) report. There is no such grace period for compliance after the first time the threshold is met or exceeded.

    [25] See Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(5), effective Jan. 18, 2019. When either de minimis exception applies, the broker-dealer still must provide, if requested, the Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(1) customer-specific disclosures for not held NMS stock orders that it receives from customers.

    [26] That is, the current customer-specific disclosure requirements under Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(1). Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(1) is being amended to clarify its scope in relation to Exchange Act Rule 606(b)(3) and the related de minimis exceptions.

    [27] See Exchange Act Rule 606(a).

    [28] See here (Emphasis added).

    [29] That is, disclosures under Exchange Act Rule 606(a)(1) will be separated the following order types: (A) market orders, (B) marketable limit orders, (C) non-marketable limit orders and (D) other orders.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    William J. Barbera

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Recent Developments in Tax Law: Tax Law Changes at the Turn of the Year

    ARTICLE

    Recent Developments in Tax Law: Tax Law Changes at the Turn of the Year

    December 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Gero Burwitz authored this bylined article on tax law changes at the turn of the year.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Gero Burwitz

    Partner

    Munich

    More insights

  • Lower Courts Wrestle with Debtors’ Tuition Payments

    Lower Courts Wrestle with Debtors’ Tuition Payments

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Lower Courts Wrestle with Debtors’ Tuition Payments

    December 12, 2018

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Two courts have added to the murky case law addressing a bankruptcy trustee’s ability to recover a debtor’s tuition payments for their children. In Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al., 2018 WL 6333588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2018), a New York Bankruptcy Judge permitted a trustee to claw back payments that parents made to their financially independent adult children for college-related costs. In Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al., 2018 WL 6182502 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2018), a District Court held that schools may assert a “good faith” defense for tuition payments received before the student enrolls in classes, but not those payments received after the student has enrolled.

    Geltzer v. Oberlin College, et al.

    Facts. Two parents (“Parents”) filed joint Chapter 7 petitions. Asserting fraudulent transfers, the trustee sued to recover the debtor’s payments made to (i) their two daughters (“Daughters”) to help cover education-related costs, (ii) Oberlin College and (iii) a student loan servicer. Oberlin and the student loan servicer settled for $11,319, but the Daughters did not. The Daughters, who had received $25,627 in the six years[1] prior to their Parents’ bankruptcy filing, were the remaining defendants.

    The trustee alleged that the Parents received no “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the tuition payments. In response, the Daughters asserted that their Parents received an economic benefit because a college degree would make them financially self-sufficient.

    The parties limited their cross-motions for summary judgment to a single issue: whether the Parents had received reasonably equivalent value for the tuition payments. Id. at *1. The parties stipulated as to certain facts: (i) some of the transfers were made to one of the Daughters (“S”) before she was 21 (New York State’s age of majority), and some were made thereafter, and (ii) all of the transfers made to the second Daughter (“A”) were made “after she was 21, … already graduated from college,” and financially independent. Id. at *1 (emphasis in original).

    Court’s Analysis. The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) does not define “reasonably equivalent value,” but case law provides guidance. Id. at *3. “Reasonably equivalent value” does not ordinarily require the exchange to be mathematically equal, but “[p]urely emotional benefits, such as love and affection,” will not suffice. Id. (citation omitted). Rather, courts consider both direct and indirect benefits. Id. (citation omitted).

    The Parents’ tuition payments fell into three categories: (i) transfers made after the Daughters were 21, (ii) transfers made to S before she was 21 and (iii) transfers made to A after she graduated from college. Id. at *4. The court held that the Parents received no value for payments they made (i) to the Daughters after they were 21 and (ii) to A after she graduated from college. Id. But payments to S before she was 21 were proper. Id.

    The court was constrained by the definitions of “value” and “fair consideration” in the Code and in the New York Debtor & Creditor Law, which require either the transfer of property or the satisfaction of a present or antecedent debt. Id. (citations omitted).[2] The Parents, it reasoned, received neither benefit after their Daughters turned 21, the age of majority, because the Parents no longer had a duty under New York law to support the Daughters. In sum, the court did not question the Parents’ decision to pay for their Daughters’ college education, but found that any economic benefit identified by the Daughters after they had turned 21 did not constitute “value” under New York law or the Code. Id. at *6.

    Parents are not required to pay college tuition for a minor child, said the court, but cited cases holding that parents had properly satisfied their legal obligation to educate their children. Id. at *6-7. “To hold otherwise would permit a trustee to scrutinize debtors’ expenditures for their children’s benefit, and seek to recover from the vendor if, in the trustee’s judgment, the expenditure was not reasonably necessary, or if the good or service could have been obtained at a lower price, or at no cost, elsewhere … . A trustee is not granted veto power over a debtor’s personal decisions, at least with respect to pre-petition expenditures.” Id. at *6-7.

    Comment

    Oberlin is consistent with current lower court decisions in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., In re Lindsay 2010 WL 1780065 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (tuition payments for debtors’ son voidable; unclear as to son’s age; no obligation to pay tuition). It affirms, though, that parents are deemed to receive value in exchange for educating their minor children. Oberlin merely holds that parents do not receive value in exchange for their financially independent adult children’s education.

    The Parents in Oberlin had approximately $756,104 in debt. Of this amount, approximately $129,200 was owed to governmental taxing authorities for trust fund taxes. In the Stipulated Facts, the trustee acknowledged that “[a]ny money recovered from the Debtor’s daughters will be used to pay: (a) … their parents’ [priority] non-dischargeable tax debt after the payment of Trustee fees and professional fees and expenses; or (b) as [the trustee] asserts, administrative and other creditors according to the scheme provided in the Bankruptcy Code.” [Case No. 18-1015; Dkt. No. 21, Stipulated Fact No. 31.] Therefore, the parties agreed that, other than the trustee, his professionals and the governmental taxing authorities, no other creditors will receive a distribution. Nevertheless, the trustee and his attorneys engaged in more than nine months of litigation with other litigants reaching settlements with Oberlin and the loan servicer that will provide $11,317.02 to the estate. If the Daughters ultimately pay the amounts the trustee claims ($23,351) after further litigation, he may recover for the estate a total of $34,668.02 before his own fees. After payment of the Trustee’s statutory fee (roughly $3,966.80),[3] legal fees and accounting fees, the remainder of the recovered money, if any, will be paid to the governmental taxing authorities.

    Pergament v. Brooklyn Law School, et al.

    The debtor in Brooklyn Law had sustained a multimillion dollar judgment for fraud. From 2009 until his 2014 bankruptcy filing, the debtor paid tuition to separate colleges on behalf of his two children. While his bankruptcy case proceeded, he continued to pay his children’s tuition payments to two colleges and, later, to one of the children’s law school.

    The schools all treated the tuition payments in the same way. “[A]ny payments received, from whatever source, were placed in [each] student’s school account; funds were only applied toward tuition, and transferred to the school’s general account, upon the student’s registration for classes; in the event the student withdrew from the program, the student received the refund of any balance in the account.” 2018 WL 6182502, *2. Only the student had access to this money once it was deposited in his or her account until the student enrolled in classes. Once the student enrolled, the student account was debited by each school.

    Bankruptcy Court Litigation. The Trustee sued the children’s two colleges and the law school (collectively, the “Schools”) to recover all of the debtor’s tuition payments.[4] According to the trustee, the debtor’s tuition payments were fraudulent transfers under both the Code and New York law because the insolvent debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value.

    When the trustee avoids a constructively fraudulent transfer, it may recover the transferred property or its value from (a) the “initial transferee” or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made, or (b) any “subsequent transferee” of the initial transferee. Code §550(a). If a subsequent transferee takes the property in “good faith,” however, then Code §550(b) bars a trustee from recovering the property.

    In March 2018, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment dismissing the trustee’s complaint. In that court’s view, whether the tuition payments were constructive fraudulent transfers was irrelevant. The “undisputed facts establish that the Debtor’s children were the initial transferees of the Debtor’s transfers,” and “the [Schools, as subsequent transferees] are entitled to the good faith defense provided by § 550(b).” 2018 WL 6182502, *2 (citation omitted).[5] The trustee appealed.

    District Court Appeal. The sole question on appeal was whether the Schools were “initial” transferees or “subsequent” transferees entitled to the good faith defense. The Trustee admitted that the Schools received the funds in good faith. Like “reasonably equivalent value,” the Code does not define “initial transferee,” requiring courts to fill the void. 2018 WL 6182502, *2; see also Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (the Code does not define terms “transferee” or “initial transferee” and there is no helpful legislative history). In Bonded Fin. Svcs. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Bonded”), the Seventh Circuit held that “the minimum requirement [to be an initial transferee] is dominion over the money or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes. When A gives a check to B as agent for C, then C is the ‘initial transferee’; the agent can be disregarded.” Id. at 893. The Seventh Circuit explained that “an entity does not have legal dominion over the money until it is free to invest that money in lottery tickets or uranium stocks.” Id. at 894. The Seventh Circuit’s analysis is referred to as the “dominion and control test.”

    The Second Circuit adopted Bonded’s dominion and control test with what it called the “mere conduit” test. Christy v. Alexander & Alexander of New York (In re Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey), 130 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1997). Effectively, the “mere conduit” test frames the Bonded “dominion and control” test in the negative. Manhattan Inv. Fund, 397 B.R. at 14. Rather than stating that a party is an initial transferee if it exercises “dominion and control” over the funds, the Second Circuit held that a party is not an initial transferee if it is a “mere conduit” of the funds. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). “A ‘mere conduit’… has no dominion or control over the asset; rather, it is a party with actual or constructive possession of the asset before transmitting it to someone else. Mere conduits can do no more than transmit a transferor-debtor’s funds to a transferee.” 2018 WL 6182502, *3 (citation omitted).

    Tuition Payments Made Before the Students Enrolled in Classes. The District Court first addressed the debtor’s payments made to the Schools before the students had enrolled in classes. It held that the Debtor’s children were not contractually obligated to do anything: “rather, until they registered for classes, they had the discretion to do whatever they wanted with the transferred money.” 2018 WL 6182502, *6. The District Court rejected the trustee’s argument that the debtor’s children lacked dominion and control over the money in their student accounts, holding that it “didn’t matter whether the children knew that they had the right to keep the money.” 2018 WL 6182502, *6 (citation omitted).

    Finally, the trustee argued a person who receives payments (the children) that are earmarked for a third party (the Schools) is a mere conduit. 2018 WL 6182502, *7 (citing Tardif v. St. John the Evangelist Catholic Church (In re Engler), 497 B.R. 125 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013)). Again, the District Court disagreed because the debtor made payments to the Schools, stating that the payments were for the benefit of his children. 2018 WL 6182502, *7. In sum, each student could have withdrawn from school prior to enrolling in classes and the Schools would have been obligated to refund the payments to the students, but not to the debtor. Therefore, the debtor’s children were the initial transferees of those funds, and not the Schools.

    Tuition Payments Made After the Students Enrolled in Classes. As the District Court wryly noted, however, “in this appeal, timing is everything.” 2018 WL 6182502, *9. Because the record from the bankruptcy court did not detail the timing of the tuition payments, said the District Court, further evidence was needed to show that the tuition payments had been made before the Debtor’s children registered for classes. 2018 WL 6182502, *10. If the Debtor made tuition payments after the students had registered for classes, then the Schools, and not the students, would be the initial transferees. Once the Schools debited the student accounts, they were free to do with the money as they wished.

    Comment

    Brooklyn Law did not address whether the parents received reasonably equivalent value or if the transfers to the Schools were fraudulent transfers. If Oberlin is any indication, then tuition payments made by the parents before the children reached 21 should not be voidable as fraudulent transfers.

    These cases lead to draconian results for innocent schools. Schools accept tuition payments in exchange for an intangible service—teaching. When schools are required to disgorge tuition payments, they are worse off than a seller of goods who may seek to reclaim its goods under section 2-702 of New York’s Uniform Commercial Code. The innocent schools have nothing to reclaim.

    The appellate courts may soon confront this social dilemma. A legislative solution would be more effective, though. See e.g., Religious Liberty and Charity Donation Protection Act 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-183 (1998) (amends Code’s fraudulent transfer provisions to prevent trustee from challenging good faith charitable gifts; “transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious or charitable entity … shall not be considered to be a [constructively fraudulent transfer… . ”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and James T. Bentley.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Six years is the New York law statute of limitations for fraud. NY CPLR 213(8).

    [2] The Code expressly excludes from the definition of “value” an “unperformed promise to furnish support to … a relative of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).

    [3] Chapter 7 trustees are entitled to 25 percent of the first $5,000 they recover that is disbursed, and 10 percent of the next $45,000.

    [4] The trustee sought, as constructively fraudulent transfers, the tuition payments made before bankruptcy and, as unauthorized post-petition transfers, the tuition payments made after bankruptcy. 2018 WL 6182502, *2, fn. 3.

    [5] The trustee also asserted that the tuition payments were voidable under New York law because they were made without “fair consideration” while the debtor was a defendant in an action for money damages; because a judgment had been entered against him; and because he failed to satisfy the judgment. Id. at *2, fn. 5 (citing N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law § 273-a). Because the Schools were entitled to the good faith defense, the bankruptcy court did not address this claim by the trustee.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Time Management Strategies: A Discussion at the Fraud and Compliance Forum’s Women’s Networking Breakfast

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    Time Management Strategies: A Discussion at the Fraud and Compliance Forum’s Women’s Networking Breakfast

    December 2018

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    Vanessa Burrows authored this bylined article on time management strategies discussed during an AHLA Women’s Leadership Council event in September.

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  • The Taste of a Food is Not Copyrighted Work

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    The Taste of a Food is Not Copyrighted Work

    December 10, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Boris Uphoff and Laura Morelli authored this bylined article summarizing the case of two companies in a legal dispute, as one company claimed the second company copied the taste of one of its food products. After going through different legal instances the European Court of Justice  said that the taste of a food product is not a work that can be protected by copyright due to two main arguments: subjectivity of each different person towards tastes and currently no technical possibility to measure scientifically the taste or to differentiate it from other tastes.

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    Dr. Boris Uphoff

    Partner

    Munich, Düsseldorf

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  • When Is Antitrust Merger Review Over? Judge Considers Separating Merged Company Pending Review of DOJ Settlement (CVS/Aetna)

    When Is Antitrust Merger Review Over? Judge Considers Separating Merged Company Pending Review of DOJ Settlement (CVS/Aetna)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    When Is Antitrust Merger Review Over? Judge Considers Separating Merged Company Pending Review of DOJ Settlement (CVS/Aetna)

    December 10, 2018

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 3, 2018, Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia said that he is considering whether CVS Health Corporation (“CVS”) and Aetna Inc. (“Aetna”) should be ordered to keep their operations separate until he can determine whether the settlement the parties reached with the Justice Department Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) satisfies the required legal standard of review under the Tunney Act.[1] Judge Leon ordered the parties to submit arguments addressing this issue by Dec. 14, 2018 and set another hearing for Dec. 18, 2018. Such a move is highly unusual, given such merger settlements are ordinarily approved without a hearing.

    This comes at the end of a year with other notable instances in which parties have had to continue to defend their mergers long after the expiration of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (“HSR”) process, even after closing. On Dec. 18, 2017, the DOJ required Parker-Hannifin to divest certain assets that it had acquired in its Feb. 28, 2017 acquisition of CLARCOR Inc., despite the fact that DOJ had earlier reviewed the merger and allowed the HSR waiting period to expire on Jan. 17, 2017.[2] And in October this year, a judge in the Eastern District of Virginia found divestiture to be an appropriate remedy for an anticompetitive merger challenged in a private antitrust action.[3] In that case, Steves Brothers alleged that JELD-WEN Holding Inc.’s 2012 acquisition of CraftMaster Manufacturing Inc., violated the Clayton Act, even though the DOJ cleared the merger under HSR in 2012 and, again, in 2015 after a further investigation initiated at the request of Steves. (A final decision on remedies remains pending in this case.)

    Background

    CVS, Aetna and the DOJ agreed in October to resolve the DOJ’s concerns regarding potential anticompetitive aspects of the merger by requiring CVS and Aetna to divest an overlap between their Medicare Part D plans as a condition to approval under the HSR Act. To comply with that requirement, Aetna sold its Medicare Part D business to WellCare Health Plans. CVS and Aetna closed their $70-billion deal on Nov. 28, 2018.

    When merging parties settle the DOJ’s antitrust concerns with a consent agreement, under the Tunney Act, a federal judge must approve the settlement based on factors enumerated in the Act. This step has become somewhat of a formality, with judges rarely questioning the settlement terms or holding hearings. Companies are not required to, and typically don’t, wait for final judicial approval before closing their transactions.

    Tunney Act Background

    The Tunney Act, officially known as the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, imposes specific rules for the notification of DOJ merger settlement consent agreements, provides a 60-day period for third parties to provide comments, and requires judicial review of the terms of the consent to determine if it is in the “public interest.”

    Prior to the Tunney Act’s passage in 1974, there were no judicial procedures governing the DOJ’s entering into of antitrust consent decrees. The Act was passed in part as a response to the DOJ’s controversial settlement of antitrust merger challenges involving International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (“ITT”) during the Nixon Administration. The ITT merger settlements prompted allegations that the DOJ was improperly influenced by ITT because they imposed significantly less restrictive relief than initially sought and were contemporaneous with significant political contributions to the President’s political party.

    Judicial Review of a DOJ Merger Consent is Limited Under the Tunney Act

    Under the Tunney Act, judges are tasked with ensuring that the merger settlement is in the public interest and that it addresses the harms the government has identified in its complaint. However, the law does not give the judge the authority to try the case on the merits, block the merger or reject a settlement based on aspects of the merger that the DOJ did not find problematic.

    In its merger consent filings, the DOJ routinely states that the standard of review under the Tunney Act is limited to whether the proposed remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in a reasonable manner given that the DOJ is entitled to broad discretion.[4] The DOJ argues that the court’s role is to evaluate whether the DOJ has breached its duty to the public in consenting to the decree, even if it falls short of what the court would impose on its own. The DOJ also notes that the court’s authority to review depends entirely on the DOJ exercising its prosecutorial discretion to bring a case in the first place.

    Looking Forward

    It will be interesting to see in the coming weeks if Judge Leon follows through on his concerns and orders CVS to hold the Aetna business separate pending his review of the consent agreement. Such a move would be unprecedented and could be costly to the parties. Whether Judge Leon forces the parties to operate separately while he conducts his review, at the end of the process he is limited to deciding whether the agreement the DOJ struck with CVS and Aetna on their Medicare Part D businesses addresses the DOJ’s anti-competitive concerns. If he finds it does not, the companies would likely need to renegotiate their settlement with the DOJ or appeal the ruling.

    Judge Leon’s statements add further to merging parties’ concerns regarding the finality of the HSR merger review process, and whether HSR “approval” by the DOJ provides meaningful comfort if the government and private parties remain free to bring successful challenges to consummated mergers.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Gregory L. Kinzelman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Pub.L. 93–528, 88 Stat. 1708, enacted Dec. 21, 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16.

    [2] Press Release, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Parker-Hannifin, Dec. 18, 2017, available here.

    [3] Press Release, Oct. 06, 2018, JELD-WEN Announces Rulings in Steves & Sons Litigation, available here.

    [4] Competitive Impact Statement, U.S. v. CVS Healthcare Inc. and Aetna Inc., Case 1:18-cv-02340, D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2018, available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • “More Than a Feeling”: Boston Trademark Dispute Slips Away

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    “More Than a Feeling”: Boston Trademark Dispute Slips Away

    December 10, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Kalpesh Upadhye authored this bylined article summarizing the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision to uphold a summary judgement concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish a breach of contract relating to use of a co-owned trademark.

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    Dissenting Voices

    December 2018

    Read time: 2 min

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    Paul Schoenhard and Rebecca Harker Duttry authored this bylined article on patent-related decisions, none of which were unanimous, made by the US Supreme Court in 2018.

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  • Teaming with the General Counsel to Increase Information Flow Efficiency and Reduce Board Liability Exposure

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    Teaming with the General Counsel to Increase Information Flow Efficiency and Reduce Board Liability Exposure

    November 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
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    Brad Dennis and Megan Rooney authored this bylined article on the importance of how and what to communicate to a hospital or health system’s governing body so it can fulfill its fiduciary and oversight duties efficiently and with protection from legal exposure.

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    Brad Dennis

    Partner

    Chicago

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