ARTICLE
A New Supreme Court Case May Impact the Future of Spirits Direct Shipping
Winter 2018
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ARTICLE
Winter 2018
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
December 6, 2018
Read time: 9 min
“Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code [(“Code”)] and the doctrine of equitable recoupment entitled [a commercial tenant] to continue paying [reduced] rent … even after its landlord filed for bankruptcy and rejected the Lease,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Nov. 30, 2018. In re Revel AC Inc., 2018 WL 6259316, *6 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018). Affirming the lower courts, the Third Circuit sensibly explained that “[n]othing in the agreements or court orders governing [a third party’s] purchase of the [debtor’s] casino in bankruptcy changes this result.” Id.
Few cases address a landlord debtor’s bankruptcy and its effect upon tenants. This case deals not only with the landlord debtor issue but also with the effect of a bankruptcy court’s asset sale order permitting the sale to be “free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and other interests of any kind” under Code § 363(f). The asset buyer here (“P”) had “first tried to purchase [the debtor’s] assets under a sale order that would have extinguished [the tenant’s] possessory rights under the Lease,” but the Third Circuit, “in a prior decision,” stayed that proposed sale order. See In re Revel AC Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 575 (3d Cir. 2015).
Code § 363(f) allows a trustee or a debtor in possession (“DIP”) to sell property of the estate “free and clear of any interest in such property,” and a lease is an “interest in such property.” But Code § 365(h) allows the debtor’s tenant to choose between the termination of its lease and the continuation of its leasehold when the DIP, for example, rejects its unexpired real property lease. At bottom, Revel clarifies the important issue of whether a bankruptcy trustee or DIP can use a § 363(f) sale to extinguish a tenant’s possessory interest when Code § 365(h) protects that interest. Despite the often-criticized holding of the Seventh Circuit in Precision Industry Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBO LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003) (§ 365(h) doesn’t disable § 363(f)’s authority to sell leased property free and clear of the lease; § 365(h) triggered only when DIP rejects lease under § 365), Code § 365(h) does limit a trustee or DIP’s right to sell free and clear of interests under § 363(f). See Michael S. Baxter, “Section 363 Sales Free and Clear of Interests: Why the Seventh Circuit Erred in Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel,” 59 Bus. Law 1, 27 (February 2004) (“a debtor’s right to sell free and clear of interests under § 363(f) is expressly limited by § 365 (h)”).
The debtor owned an Atlantic City, New Jersey, casino. It had entered into a complex commercial lease (“Lease”) with a nightclub operator (“T”) long before it entered Chapter 11 in 2014. According to the Third Circuit, the “almost impenetrable” lease “is long and neither simple nor direct.” Id. During the bankruptcy case, the tenant sued the debtor to protect its rights under the lease. P later bought the debtor’s assets, including the casino, under purchase agreements that the bankruptcy court had approved in a “Sale Order.”
Purchase Agreement. The purchase agreement provided that P would purchase the debtor’s assets “free and clear of all liabilities except for those listed in the” purchase agreement including a potential liability to T “for an administrative expense claim up to a specified maximum amount.” Id. at *1. P also would agree to “acquire certain legal claims [the debtor] may have against [T] with respect to the Lease [including] any rent payments that [T] may still owe under the Lease.” Id.
Sale Order. The Sale Order authorized P’s purchase “free and clear of all liens,” etc., consistent with Code § 363(f). But the Sale Order … expressly preserved certain rights relating to [T’s] continued use of the casino premises under the Lease … : “[a]ny rights (including rights of setoff and recoupment), claims and defenses of [T] … with respect to [T’s] adversary proceeding against [the debtor]”; plus “any rights elected to be retained by [T] pursuant to” Code § 365(h) after the debtor rejected the Lease. Id. This “carve-out of … tenant rights” “set the stage for further litigation between [T and P] under the terms of the Lease … .” Id. at *2. After the debtor rejected the Lease, T filed a notice electing to “retain its rights as a tenant under § 365(h), … as expressly allowed by the Sale Order.” Id.
Litigation. The parties then litigated whether T was “permitted to deduct from its outstanding rent obligations certain ‘recoupment’ amounts owing to [T] under the Lease.” The bankruptcy court granted T’s summary judgment motion to the extent of permitting T “to offset” against future rent “any damages caused, after rejection, by [P’s] nonperformance” under the Lease and enabling T to “apply and set off the Recoupment Amount, as defined in the Lease … .” Id. at *2. On appeal, P challenged the amount of its obligations subject to recoupment.
Capital Contributions. The Lease contemplated that both the debtor and T “would make capital contributions to ‘build out’ [T’s] venues before opening them.” The “relative proportions of capital contributed by” the parties were the basis for the Lease’s rent and recoupment obligations. Id.
Rent Obligations. “The Lease contemplated that [T] would pay rent to [the debtor] each month on a venue-by-venue basis,” apportioning each party’s capital contribution among the three leased venues. The parties would use the “distributable cash flow from” each venue to determine the share of their required capital contributions.
Recoupment Obligations. The Lease required the debtor to make certain “recoupment” payments to T during the first four years of the Lease if one of the leased venues met the “applicable gross-sales threshold but did not have a positive return to capital net of depreciation.” In that case, the debtor “would refund to [T] the amount necessary to cause [T] to break even for that period.” Id. at *3.
The bankruptcy court and district court ruled that T had “a right to reduce its rent obligations to [P] by the amount of [P’s] recoupment obligations under the Lease.” Id.
T had retained certain rights when it made its election under Code § 365(h) to remain in possession, which included its “right to reduce its rent obligations by the recoupment amounts.” Also, T “would be permitted to reduce its rent obligations under the doctrine of equitable recoupment.” Id.
Code § 365(h) Election. Section 365(h) “protects a tenant whose landlord files for bankruptcy and then rejects the tenant’s lease.” Id. The Sale Order expressly preserved “any rights elected to be retained by [T]” under Code § 365(h). T also preserved its rights when it made its § 365(h) election after the bankruptcy court had granted the debtor’s motion to reject the Lease. A “tenant who makes an election under [§ 365(h)] is ‘entitled to remain under the same rental terms as set forth in the lease.’” Id., quoting in re Flagstaff Realty Assocs., 60 F.3d 1031, 1034 (3d Cir. 1995).
The “rental terms” under which T leased property from the debtor included “the right to receive recoupment payments under the Lease.” Id. at *4. Because T had a “statutory right to remain in possession of the premises under the same rental terms,” it was “permitted to reduce its rent obligations by the recoupment amounts applicable under the Lease for the balance of the term of the Lease after the date of rejection.” Id.
Equitable Recoupment. According to Third Circuit precedent, “[w]hen a claim against a debtor qualifies for equitable recoupment, the claim ‘avoids the usual bankruptcy channels,’ in that it receives full value in the netting of obligations between a creditor and the debtor without regard to the bankruptcy priority of the claim — ‘thus, in essence, [the claim] is given priority over other creditors’ claims.’” Id. at *4, quoting Flagstaff, 60 F.3d at 1035, and In re Anes, 195 F.3d 177, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1999). “Recoupment means ‘the setting up of a demand arising from the same transaction as the plaintiff’s claim or cause of action, strictly for the purpose of abatement or reduction of such claim.’” Id. at *5, quoting In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d 1065, 1079 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Third Circuit agreed that “the doctrine of equitable recoupment requires reducing [T’s] existing rent obligations by [P’s] recoupment obligations.” Id. Because the “recoupment provisions of the Lease performed a periodic downward adjustment to [T’s] rent obligations under the Lease,” the parties’ opposing claims arose from the same transaction. Thus, it would be unfair to require T “to pay the full amount of its rental obligations without applying the countervailing downward adjustments contemplated by the recoupment provisions.” Id., citing Flagstaff, 60 F.3d at 1035.
The Sale Order also preserved T’s setoff and recoupment rights, thereby eliminating any argument that P could make under Code § 363(f) (sale “free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and other interests of any kind”). In any event, the Third Circuit stressed that because “equitable recoupment is an affirmative defense,” any asset sale “free and clear” of liens, encumbrances and interests “does not include defenses to claims.” Id., citing Folger Adam Sec. Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 257, 258-64 (3d Cir. 2000) and In re Trans World Airlines Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d. Cir. 2003) (“[A] right of recoupment is a defense and not an interest and therefore is not extinguished by a § 363(f) sale.”).
No Affirmative Recovery Authorized. Finally, the Third Circuit stressed that T was not “entitled to recover affirmatively any recoupment amount from [P].” Id., n.6. It limited its holding “to giving [T] the right to reduce its rent obligations to [P].” Id.
The Third Circuit, as noted, had previously rescued T from P. In 2015, it stayed part of a bankruptcy court sale order that would have “stripped” T’s lease from the casino property being sold to P. In re Revel AC Inc., 802 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2015). Reversing the lower courts’ denial of a limited stay pending T’s appeal from the sale order, the Third Circuit not only recognized the public interest in protecting commercial tenants’ rights, but also held that the debtor had shown no “objective basis — either in law or fact — to cast doubt on the validity of” the debtor’s lease with T. Id. at 575.
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
December 6, 2018
Read time: 4 min
On Dec. 6, 2018, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) announced two new initiatives and two revised resources related to the deposit insurance application process for organizers of new (“de novo”) banks. At the same time, the FDIC announced two additional initiatives that relate to all applications filed with the agency, whether by new applicants or existing banks.
“A pipeline of new banks is critical to the long-term health of the industry and communities across the country. The application process should not be overly burdensome and should not deter prospective banks from applying. The FDIC wants to see more de novo banks, and we are hard at work to make this a reality,” said FDIC Chairman Jelena McWilliams.
With regard to de novo bank applicants, the FDIC:
Comments on the RFI will be due 60 days from its publication in the Federal Register.
These resources address the informational needs of organizers and provide comprehensive instruction to FDIC staff.[4]
With regard to all applications, the FDIC:
Authored by Joseph P. Vitale and Jessica Romano.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the authors.
[1] The RFI is available here.
[2] Full details of the new process are available here.
[3] Three such situations occurred during the last 18 months, as Social Finance Inc. (“SoFi”), Square Inc. and Nelnet Inc. each withdrew publicly announced applications in, respectively, October 2017, July 2018 and September 2018.
[4] The updated publications are available here.
[5] The time frame guidelines are available here.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
December 5, 2018
Read time: 6 min
On Dec. 3, 2018, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the National Credit Union Administration and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (collectively, the “Agencies”) issued a joint statement encouraging depository institutions, such as banks and credit unions, to explore innovative approaches to their Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering (“BSA/AML”) compliance obligations (“Joint Statement”).[1] The Joint Statement emphasizes two points: first, the importance of innovation in the private sector and second, the Agencies’ commitment to engaging with banks in promoting such innovation.
The Joint Statement recognizes that private sector innovation with tools such as artificial intelligence or digital identity technologies can help financial institutions enhance security and better identify and report activities such as money laundering and terrorist financing. Specifically, the Joint Statement notes that innovations can augment existing BSA/AML compliance programs by automating risk identification and enhancing transaction monitoring systems.
The Agencies recognized the importance of pilot programs in implementing innovations, and emphasized that regulatory oversight of innovation efforts would be tolerant and supportive. According to the Joint Statement:
Pilot programs undertaken by banks, in conjunction with existing BSA/AML processes, are an important means of testing and validating the effectiveness of innovative approaches. While the Agencies may provide feedback, pilot programs in and of themselves should not subject banks to supervisory criticism even if the pilot programs ultimately prove unsuccessful. Likewise, pilot programs that expose gaps in a BSA/AML compliance program will not necessarily result in supervisory action with respect to that program. For example, when banks test or implement artificial intelligence-based transaction monitoring systems and identify suspicious activity that would not otherwise have been identified under existing processes, the Agencies will not automatically assume that the banks’ existing processes are deficient. In these instances, the Agencies will assess the adequacy of banks’ existing suspicious activity monitoring processes independent of the results of the pilot program. Further, the implementation of innovative approaches in banks’ BSA/AML compliance programs will not result in additional regulatory expectations.
Importantly, the statement also provides that the Agencies will not “penalize or criticize banks that maintain effective BSA/AML compliance programs commensurate with their risk profiles but chose not to pursue innovative approaches.” The Agencies cautioned, however, that ongoing safety and soundness and BSA/AML compliance must be maintained throughout any pilot program trial or implementation of an innovative approach to BSA/AML compliance. Bank management should carefully evaluate whether innovative approaches are sufficient in addressing BSA/AML compliance obligations or raise alternative concerns, such as those involving information security, third-party risk management and “compliance with other applicable laws and regulations, such as those related to customer notifications and privacy.”
To best assist depository institutions, the Agencies committed to continued engagement with the private sector to discuss pilot programs to support innovation in BSA/AML compliance, and exploring additional cooperative measures, such as engaging in a dialogue with the private sector regarding innovation and outreach efforts, that include dedicated times for financial institutions, technology providers and other firms involved in financial services innovation, to discuss the implications and applications of their products and services. According to the Joint Statement, such engagement will allow regulators to better understand the capabilities of new technologies and provide guidance regarding continued compliance risk management. In addition, the Joint Statement also provides that, as long as depository institutions maintain the overall effectiveness of their BSA/AML compliance programs, FinCEN has agreed to consider requests for exceptive relief from regulations administered by FinCEN to facilitate the testing of new technologies.[2]
The Joint Statement was highlighted in a speech made by Under Secretary Sigal Mandelker before the 2018 American Bankers Association and American Bar Association Financial Crimes Enforcement Conference. Under Secretary Mandelker stated:
In recent years, financial institutions have improved their ability to identify customers and monitor transactions using new technologies that rely on artificial intelligence and machine learning. To that end, we are actively engaged with financial institutions and businesses in the FinTech and RegTech sectors as we explore ways to work more closely with financial institutions, in particular, to foster innovation and leverage financial and regulatory technology. We are committed to a long-term and collaborative approach to combat financial crime and root out illicit actors. These efforts are so much more effective when we work as partners.[3]
This publication is the second statement resulting from a working group formed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, FinCEN and the federal depository institutions’ regulations, aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the BSA/AML regime in the United States. On Oct. 3, 2018, the Agencies issued an Interagency Statement on Sharing Bank Secrecy Act Resources.[4] That statement noted that depository institutions may enter into collaborative arrangements to share resources to manage their BSA/AML compliance obligations more efficiently and effectively.
Authored by Joseph P. Vitale, Betty Santangelo and Melissa G.R. Goldstein.
[1] Joint Statement on Innovative Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Dec. 3, 2018), available here.
[2] See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.970 (authorizing FinCEN to grant broad exemptive relief to compliance with the BSA implementing regulations).
[3] The full speech is available here.
[4] Interagency Statement on Sharing Bank Secrecy Act Resources (Oct. 3, 2018), available here.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
December 3, 2018
Read time: 10 min
The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “does not limit the allowability of unsecured claims for contractual post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Nov. 26, 2018. In re Tribune Media Company, 2018 WL 6167504 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2018). In a short and sensible opinion, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s disallowance of an undersecured lender’s fees. In its view, the “courts of appeals that have considered this issue … have unanimously … allowed unsecured claims for contractual attorneys’ fees that accrued post-filing of the bankruptcy petition.” The Third Circuit, it noted, had not ruled on the issue. Nor has there “been a nationwide consensus on the allowability” of these claims. Id. at *2.
Lower courts have either ignored or misread the Supreme Court’s opinion in Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 452-54 (2007) (“[C]laims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”). See, e.g., Summitbridge Nat’l Investments III LLC v. Faison, 64 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 247, *3 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 27, 2017) (despite raft of overwhelming appellate authority, a purported “absence of binding [Fourth] Circuit precedent” enabled court to hold that “unsecured creditors are not entitled to post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees.”). As the court in Summitbridge mistakenly reasoned, “a secured creditor [is not permitted] to advance an unsecured claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees on the premise that these fees are somehow independent of its secured claim, and thereby avoid the application of [Code] § 506(b).” Id. In its view, the Code allows “only oversecured creditors to add post-petition attorneys’ fees.” Id.[1]
The lender in Tribune was undersecured (i.e., its underlying claim exceeded the value of its collateral). It asserted a $30-million claim for its legal fees in a ten-year-old reorganization case. The debtor objected to the claim and the bankruptcy court sustained that objection, relying on decisions like Summitbridge. The bankruptcy court reasoned that Code § 506(b) implicitly limits unsecured claims under § 502. Because § 506(b) allows an oversecured lender reasonable attorneys’ fees, Congress, in that court’s mistaken view, must have meant to disallow an undersecured lender’s claims for legal fees.
The district court “merely note[d]” its unwillingness to hold that § 506(b) “expressly” disallowed the claims for legal fees. It agreed “with the position adopted by every court of appeals faced with this question; Section 506(b) does not limit the allowability of unsecured claims for contractual post-petition attorneys’ fees under Section 502.”
At least seven Courts of Appeals have taken a sensible approach to allowing an undersecured creditor’s claim for legal fees – if the claim is valid under applicable state law, it is allowable. A comprehensive decision of the Second Circuit, holding that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred under a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement, illuminates the entire issue. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009). The Second Circuit explained that the Code “interposes no bar … to recovery.” Id., at 148 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 452 (2007)).
Lenders, financial advisors, accountants, indenture trustees and other professionals who bargain for reimbursement of their legal fees should be reassured by Tribune and Ogle. Lower courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere had previously disallowed creditors’ professional fees, wrongly holding that (a) nothing in the Code authorizes the payment of these fees, and (b) contractual rights to these fees are unenforceable. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Trust Co., N.A. v. A.P. Green Indus. Inc., No. 06-0885, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2007) (affirmed bankruptcy court’s denial of indenture trustee’s reimbursement claim for legal fees; “Under the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of the alternatives), silence as to undersecured claims for attorneys’ fees and costs in [Code] § 506(b) indicates that they are excluded from payment.”); In re Crafts Retail Holding Corp., 378 B.R. 44, 50 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A]bsent statutory authority, [financial advisor’s] claimed contractual rights or asserted principles of equity alone do not constitute cognizable bases for an award of compensation or reimbursement of expenses in bankruptcy cases.”). According to the Second Circuit in Ogle, however, the courts had been “closely divided on the” issue of post-bankruptcy fees. 586 F.3d at 145. Compare In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, 839-45 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowing unsecured guarantor’s reimbursement claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees based on pre-petition contract); Martin v. Bank of Germantown, 761 F.2d 1163, 1168 (6th Cir. 1985) (“… creditors are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy claims if they have a contractual right to them valid under state law … collection costs and legal fees in lender’s note”); In re Shangra-La Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 848-49 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Entitlement to attorneys’ fees … depended on … terms of [contract] and on state law.”); In re Sokolik, 635 F.3d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 2011); In re Gencarelli, 501 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011) (disallowing these “claims based on section 506(b) defies common sense.”); with Adams v. Zimmerman, 73 F.3d 1164, 1177 (1st Cir. 1996) (disallowing claim for post-insolvency fees against FDIC receiver; non-bankruptcy case) and In re Waterman, 248 B.R. 567, 573 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000) (allowing claim for post-petition fees under Code § 506(b) only because creditor was oversecured).
The claim for attorneys’ fees in Ogle arose from a series of pre-bankruptcy agreements between Fidelity and Agway. Fidelity’s efforts to enforce its contractual rights against Agway, however, resulted in protracted litigation during which Fidelity incurred costs, including attorneys’ fees. 586 F.3d at 145. The Second Circuit asked whether “an unsecured creditor is entitled to recover post-petition attorneys’ fees that were authorized by a pre-petition contract but were contingent on post-petition events?” Id. The court answered affirmatively because the Code does not bar these claims.
Code § 502(b) Not a Bar to Recovery. The court first rejected the trustee’s argument in Ogle that Code § 502(b) precluded the legal fees sought by Fidelity. Quoting the Supreme Court in Travelers, the Code defines “claim” to be a “right to payment,” which “usually refer[s] to a right to payment recognized under state law.” Id., at 146. (Travelers, 549 U.S. at 451) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The contingent nature of the creditor’s claim in Ogle was also unimportant. As the court explained, Code § 101(5)(A) includes “contingent” claims in its definition of “claim.” Id. Because applicable state contract law gave the creditor a right to payment when the indemnification agreement was signed, the creditor “possessed a contingent right to post-petition attorneys’ fees,” although “its right arose pre-petition.” Id. Moreover, nothing in Code § 502(b) precludes an unsecured creditor’s recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees merely because the claim was contingent. Id., at 146-147. Accord, In re SNTL Corp., 571 F3d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Under section 502(b)(1), those contingent claims cannot be disallowed simply because the contingency occurred postpetition … . Contingent claims are allowed under Section 502(b)”). According to the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court’s Travelers opinion required it to “presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”
Moreover, none of the exceptions to the allowability of a claim listed in § 502(b) applied to the claim in Ogle. Although § 502(b)(1) makes any defense to a claim available to a bankruptcy trustee, unless applicable state law or one of the exceptions in § 502(b) applies, “the claim must be allowed.” Id., at 147 (quoting Travelers, 549 U.S. at 452).
The Second Circuit’s reasoning is straightforward:
The underlying contract is valid as a matter of state substantive law; none of the § 502(b)(2)-(9) exceptions apply; and the Code is silent as to the particular question presented—… whether the Code allows unsecured claims for fees incurred while litigating issues of contract law more generally.
Id., at 476 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Code § 506(b) Not a Bar To Recovery. The Second Circuit in Ogle also rejected the trustee’s reliance on Code § 506(b), which only bars interest on an undersecured creditor’s claim. Because Code § 506(b) “does not implicate unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees,” reasoned the court, it thus “interposes no bar to recovery.” Id. Accord. In re SNTL Corp., 57 F3d at 841 (“ … we reject the argument that section 506(b) preempts postpetition attorneys’ fees for all except oversecured creditors.”), citing In re 268 Ltd., 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986) (§ 506(b) does not “limit the fees available” as an unsecured claim but merely “define[s] the portion of the fees [to] be afforded secured status,”); In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308, 1316-20 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (§ 502(b) “does not … disallow attorneys’ fees of creditors … .”).
Timbers Not a Bar to Recovery. Nor does the Supreme Court’s holding in United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) mandate disallowance of unsecured claims for post-bankruptcy legal fees. Although § 502(b)(2) “specifically disallows claims for unmatured interest,” § 502(b) “does not contain a similar prohibition against attorneys’ fees.” SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 844. As the Second Circuit stressed in Ogle, “while section 502(b)(2) bars claims for unmatured interest, it does not similarly bar (or even reference) claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees.” Id., at 148.
No Unfairness. Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the trustee’s policy argument in Ogle that allowance of the fees would “unfairly disadvantage other creditors … whose distributions would be reduced.” Id., at 149. Sophisticated parties in Ogle negotiated an agreement with a provision for the recovery of legal fees. The creditor will not be receiving an undeserved bonus at the expense of others. Allowance of the claim “‘merely effectuates the bargained-for terms of the [pre-bankruptcy] loan contract.’” Id. (quoting In re United Merchants & Mfrs. Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1982) (pre-Code case)). See SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 845 (“… the Bankruptcy Code itself [does] not specifically disallow … postpetition fees … . In the end, it is the province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult policy questions embedded in the statute.”).
Consistent Appellate Decisions. Seven Circuits have put to rest the contractual post-bankruptcy legal fee issue. But there is still no uniformity in the lower courts, as Tribune shows. Outside the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the contractual legal fee issue is still open. The Third Circuit should have no hesitation, though, in affirming the district court’s Tribune decision.
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
[1] See generally M. L. Cook, “Court Wrongly Disallows Lender’s Post-Bankruptcy Legal Fee,” Law 360, Dec. 8, 2017, available here.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE
December 3, 2018
Read time: 2 min
Darren Azman, Alexandra Scheibe and David Taub authored this bylined article considering how tokens will be treated in a hypothetical U.S. bankruptcy case. “There is no doubt that bankruptcy courts will soon be tasked with adjudicating these issues and will rely to a significant degree not only on the terms that govern the relevant token issuance, but also on the evolving regulatory framework,” they wrote.
ARTICLE
December 1, 2018
Read time: 2 min
Simon Weiss authored this bylined article on the proposed changes to Germany’s law on shareholder rights.
Simon Weiss authored this bylined article on the proposed changes to Germany’s law on shareholder rights.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
November 29, 2018
Read time: 10 min
“… Ponzi scheme payments to satisfy legitimate antecedent debts to defendant banks could not be avoided” by a bankruptcy trustee “absent transaction-specific proof of actual intent to defraud or the statutory elements of constructive fraud – transfer by an insolvent debtor who did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on Nov. 20, 2018. Stoebner v. Opportunity Finance LLC, 2018 WL 6055636 at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018), citing Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W. 2d 638, 653-56 (Minn. 2015). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of a bankruptcy trustee’s $250-million fraudulent transfer suit against two banks (“Banks”), rejecting the so-called “Ponzi scheme presumption” that “allows a creditor to by-pass the proof requirements of a fraudulent-transfer claim by showing that the debtor operated a Ponzi scheme and transferred assets ‘in furtherance of the scheme.’” Id., at *3, quoting Finn, 860 N.W. 2d at 646 (Minn. 2015) (construing Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“MUFTA”), declined to apply Ponzi scheme presumption).
The judge-made Ponzi scheme presumption has generated litigation in the past few years. The Eighth Circuit in Stoebner enthusiastically followed the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2015 Finn decision to reach the right result (i.e., rejecting the presumption). In contrast, two years ago, the Fifth Circuit begrudgingly accepted the Texas Supreme Court’s similar reading of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act in Janvey v. Golf Channel Inc., 834 F.3d 570, 572-73 (5th Cir. 2016) (because “the Supreme Court of Texas is the authoritative interpreter of [the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act] and [because] we are bound by its answer to our certified question when applying that statute,” the defendant’s “media-advertising services had objective value and utility from a reasonable creditor’s perspective at the time of the transaction, regardless of [the debtor’s] financial solvency at the time.”), quoting Janvey v. Golf Channel Inc., 487 S.W. 3d 560, 581-82 (Tex. 2016). The Fifth Circuit in Janvey also ignored the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2015 Finn decision.
An entity known as PCI “purported to run a ‘diverting’ business that purchased electronics in bulk and resold them at high profits to major retailers.” 2018 WL 6055636 at *1, quoting Ritchie Capital Management LLC v. Stoebner, 779 F.3d 857, 859 (8th Cir. 2015). PCI deceived investors into providing it with financing to acquire merchandise for resale, but never purchased merchandise or sold it to retailers. Like other classic Ponzi schemes, PCI’s purported income came from investor loans that PCI used to repay earlier investors. Id., n.1, citing In re Armstrong, 291 F.3d 517, 520 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) (a Ponzi scheme is a “fraudulent business venture … in which investors’ ‘returns’ are generated by capital from new investors rather than the success of underlying business venture.”).
PCI also acquired legitimate businesses, including the debtor here, in 2005. When the PCI Ponzi scheme later collapsed, the debtor sought bankruptcy relief. The debtor’s bankruptcy trustee later sued the Banks under MUFTA to recover $250 million in loan payments they received from the debtor’s predecessor, claiming that the debtor was the successor in interest to a PCI affiliate.
The bankruptcy court granted the Banks’ motion to dismiss, not only because of the trustee’s lack of standing,[1] but also because the trustee had failed to state a claim for “actual or constructive fraudulent transfer under MUFTA.” Id., at *2. The district court affirmed. Both of the lower courts relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Finn decision.
Unlike other PCI companies, the debtor’s predecessor “actually purchased, warehoused, and sold to prominent retailers high volumes of consumer electronic equipment.” It funded most of the purchases with loans from the Banks “bearing a 12% interest rate that was ‘substantially in excess of the market rate for such loans.’” Id., at *3.
The trustee sought to recover more than $250 million of loan repayments made by the debtor’s predecessor before it acquired the debtor, linking the predecessor’s financing of legitimate purchases of consumer electronics to the ongoing PCI Ponzi scheme. According to the trustee, PCI caused the debtor’s predecessor “to finance and engage in these retail transactions ‘at least in part to give his organization a physical presence in the market place and thereby to give a false appearance of legitimacy to [its] organization.’” Id. Moreover, alleged the trustee, PCI had “laundered proceeds from the Ponzi scheme through [the debtor’s predecessor] and withdrew laundered funds from [that entity].” Id. The debtor’s predecessor, according to the complaint, “consistently lost money,” operated at a loss, and “could not realistically expect to make a profit.” Id. PCI “knew that [the debtor’s predecessor] was destined to fail, and … ultimately … did fail.” Id. Not only was the predecessor insolvent at all material times, but “was capitalized and propped up with funds obtained by fraud through the Ponzi scheme.” It “received less than reasonably equivalent value for loan repayments [to the Banks] because the 12% interest rate was ‘significantly above-market’ or constituted ‘false profits.’” Id.
The “bankruptcy court and the district court correctly dismissed the Trustee’s claims on the merits,” said the Eighth Circuit, making it “unnecessary to decide the standing issues.” Id. Like Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 548, MUFTA “allows creditors to recover assets that debtors have fraudulently transferred to third parties.” Id., quoting Finn, 860 N.W. 2d at 644. It also “includes both actual and constructive fraud provisions.”
Detailed Pleading Required. “The heightened particularity requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) apply to fraudulent transfer claims under MUFTA,” held the court. Id., at *4 n.6, citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’”; “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”; court “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”).
No Actual Fraud. The Eighth Circuit rejected the trustee’s claim of actual fraud based upon PCI’s purported knowledge. “This theory flies in the face of Finn’s requirement that each transaction must be analyzed individually and presumes fraudulent intent based on ‘the form or structure of the entity making the transfer.’ … . [T]his theory is simply a repackaging of the Ponzi scheme presumption rejected by Finn.” Although Finn said a court could infer from the existence of a Ponzi scheme “that a particular transfer was made with fraudulent intent … ,” the complaint here “is bereft of facts demonstrating [the debtor’s] intent to defraud its own creditors through the loan repayments.” Id., at *4. In fact, according to the complaint, the debtor’s predecessor had “financed legitimate business transactions with capital from [the Banks],” repaying the loans through the proceeds “of ‘real life’ transactions.” Id. And the trustee never even alleged that the loan proceeds “were diverted to the Ponzi scheme being perpetrated through PCI.” Id.
No Constructive Fraud. The Eighth Circuit also rejected the trustee’s constructive fraudulent transfer claim. “… [A]n unsupported allegation that 12% interest was above ‘the market rate’ does not plausibly assert with sufficient particularity the absence of reasonably equivalent value for the repayment of ongoing loans to finance legitimate transactions in a specific market – the purchase and sale of consumer electronics by a ‘diverter.’” Id., at *5.
No Insolvency or Inadequate Capitalization. Finally, the Eighth Circuit rejected the trustee’s allegations of insolvency and inadequate capitalization. Conclusory allegations reciting the statutory elements “are insufficient to state a claim.” Id., at *5. Additional supporting facts as to the debtor’s improper capitalization and operating losses were “insufficient to plausibly plead that, at the time of each of the hundreds of challenged transfers, [the debtor] had insufficient assets to carry on its legitimate business and would be unable to pay its debt as it became due.” Id. The trustee could not merely assume that the debtor’s predecessor was financially distressed because it received funds from the PCI Ponzi scheme. “That is contrary to Finn: ‘it is not at all clear that every fraudulent investment arrangement that is later determined to be a Ponzi scheme necessarily will have been insolvent from its inception’: ‘a debtor could have assets or legitimate business operations aside from the Ponzi scheme … that it uses to stave off insolvency, at least for a while.’” Id., quoting Finn, 860 N.W. 2d at 649.
Comment
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
[1] According to the Eighth Circuit, “[t]his is an unusual fraudulent transfer case because the trustee seeks to avoid transfers made by a party prior to the time it even arguably became a … debtor.” 2018 WL 6055636, at *2.
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
November 29, 2018
Read time: 8 min
In two recent enforcement actions, the SEC looked past formal offering documents and cited statements made on Reddit, YouTube and other social media to determine that the AirFox and Paragon ICOs were unregistered sales of securities.
On November 16, 2018, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in separate actions, settled charges with Carrier EQ Inc. d/b/a AirFox(AirFox) and Paragon Coin, Inc. (Paragon), alleging that each entity had launched an initial coin offering (ICO) that constituted the unregistered sale of securities.
In its press release, the SEC announced that AirFox and Paragon Coin sold and delivered digital tokens to consumers in 2017, which according to the SEC, was “after the [SEC] warned that ICOs can be securities offerings in its DAO Report of Investigation.” The press release further stated that these are the SEC’s “first cases imposing civil penalties solely for ICO securities offering registration violations.”
AirFox
In 2017, AirFox launched an initial token offering for the virtual currency “AirTokens,” ultimately selling 1.06 billion AirTokens to more than 2,500 investors and raising approximately $15 million. Proceeds from the ICO were to be used to finance the development of the AirToken Project.
The company informed potential investors that they were contributing to “the development of the AirToken Project,” described as an ecosystem to be created by the company in which AirTokens would serve as a medium of exchange for mobile data, physical goods, and micro lending.
While the “terms of AirFox’s initial coin offering purported to require purchasers to agree that they were buying AirTokens for their utility as a medium of exchange for mobile airtime, and not as an investment or a security,” the SEC looked beyond AirFox’s offering documents and formal contracts with investors in determining that AirFox had sold unregistered securities.
The SEC pointed to the AirToken Project’s white paper, blog posts, online videos and correspondence with virtual currency exchanges on which AirFox was seeking to have the AirTokens listed. In this context, AirFox stated that “AirTokens would increase in value as a result of Airfox’s efforts, and that AirFox would undertake efforts to provide investors with liquidity by making AirTokens tradeable on secondary markets.”
The SEC Order determined that according to SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) and its progeny, Airfox’s “AirTokens” constituted securities without any applicable exemption from registration. Under Howey, a “security” is defined as an “investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”
The SEC determined that the AirToken ICO was a sale of securities because “investors’ profits were to be derived from the significant entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of others—specifically AirFox and its agents—who were to create the ecosystem that would increase the value of AirTokens, and facilitate secondary market trading.” The SEC further pointed to the fact that at the time of the ICO, that purported functionality of the system was not available.
Importantly, the SEC looked beyond AirFox’s offering documents and formal contracts with investors in determining that AirFox had sold unregistered securities. AirFox admitted that the mobile airtime and loyalty point prototype “was ‘really just for the ICO and just for investment purposes so people know . . . how it’s going to work’ and ‘[did not] have any real users’ at the time of the ICO.” Those in the industry should be aware that in determining that the ICO was an unregistered sale of securities, the SEC pointed to the white paper, blog posts, online videos and AirFox’s responses to questions on applications from virtual currency exchanges when AirFox was seeking to get AirTokens listed on those virtual currency exchanges. The AirFox matter indicates that the SEC will be reviewing the full suite of statements made by a company launching an ICO to determine whether an unregistered sale of securities has occurred.
As a part of the settlement, AirFox agreed to undertake significant remedial actions, including registering the AirTokens as a security under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and timely making all required securities filings under the Exchange Act. Other remedial actions included issuing a press release notifying the public of the SEC’s order, sending claim forms to its investors that purchased AirTokens before October 5, 2017, notifying them of their potential claims under Section 12(a) of the Securities Act, and submitting to the SEC monthly reports, final report and certification of completion regarding claims received and paid out. Additionally, the SEC fined AirFox $250,000.
Paragon
In 2017, Paragon announced in a white paper that it would launch an “initial token crowdsale” to the general public for the virtual currency “ParagonCoins” or “PRG.” Paragon announced in a white paper that the proceeds from the sale would be used to “develop its business,” to “build an ‘ecosystem’ around the token,” and to fund the purchase of real estate for a contemplated “ParagonSpace” co-working space.
Paragon announced in its white paper that a total of 200,000,000 PRG tokens were to be generated and that over time the number of tokens in circulation would decrease, increasing demand. Paragon also described a timeline that provided for various development milestones in 2017 and 2018, including the listing of PRG tokens on “major exchanges” within one month of the close of the offering. Paragon also engaged a celebrity to promote the offering and directed the celebrity (a hip hop artist called The Game) to release statements on various social media sites promoting Paragon, including through promotional videos on YouTube. Paragon also engaged in “Ask Me Anything” sessions with potential purchasers through Reddit, an online forum. Paragon announced on the Reddit “Ask Me Anything” forum that PRG tokens were “a product that we’re expecting to appreciate in value due to it[s] limited supply and the ecosystem we’re building around to build a strong demand.”
The SEC determined that Paragon’s PRG tokens were securities according to Howey and its progeny. The SEC’s order states “the offering was an offer and sale of ‘securities’ as defined by Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act because it constituted the offer and sale of investment contracts.” Like the case against AirFox, the SEC relied on Paragon’s marketing of the PRG token to determine that the ICO constituted the unregistered sale of securities. The order describes Paragon’s marketing on Paragon’s web pages, the white paper it released, as well as statements made by Paragon on message boards, blogs, social media, and other outlets.”
The SEC determined “PRG token purchasers had a reasonable expectation of profits from their investment in the Paragon enterprise . . . [p]urchasers had a reasonable expectation that they would obtain a future profit from buying PRG tokens if Paragon were successful in its entrepreneurial and managerial efforts to develop its business.”
Paragon agreed to undertake significant remedial actions. This includes, among other measures, the issuance of a press release notifying the public of the order, registering the PRG token as a security, issuing claim forms to purchasers of the securities notifying them of their right to submit claims against Paragon, complying with the reporting requirements of the 1934 act, and paying a $250,000 civil money penalty.
Key Takeaways
The AirFox and Paragon cases indicate that the SEC is actively monitoring and pursuing actions against companies that have launched ICOs that the SEC believes constitutes the sale of securities. Following the AirFox and Paragon orders the SEC issued a Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading which addresses “several recent [SEC] enforcement actions involving the intersection of long-standing applications of our federal securities laws and new technologies,” and is explained in depth in the following article, “SEC Divisions Issue Digital Asset Securities Statement.” Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division stated: “We have made it clear that companies that issue securities through ICOs are required to comply with existing statutes and rules governing the registration of securities. These cases tell those who are considering taking similar actions that we continue to be on the lookout for the federal securities laws with respect to digital assets.”
What is particularly notable about the AirFox and Paragon cases is the sort of information the SEC cited as evidence that the ICO actually constituted the sale of securities. Despite the language in the offering documents and other formal contracts, the SEC relied upon blog posts, Reddit, YouTube videos, white papers and other less traditional forms of evidence to determine that AirFox and Paragon had engaged in the unregistered sale of securities. These orders indicate that when launching ICOs, companies need to be extraordinary careful with not only their offering documents and white papers, but everything that they put out in the public sphere particularly in less formal mediums, like blog posts, Reddit and social media.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
November 28, 2018
Read time: 7 min
The SEC Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and Trading and Markets recently issued a statement addressing the SEC’s recent digital asset securities actions. This statement confirms the applicability of the federal securities law framework to new and emerging technologies and provides a concise summary of circumstances in which the SEC has taken enforcement action against participants in the marketplace for digital asset securities.
On November 16, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Divisions of Corporation Finance, Investment Management, and Trading and Markets issued the Statement on Digital Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (the Statement) addressing the SEC’s recent enforcement actions involving and relating to digital asset securities.
At its core, the Statement is a confirmation of the applicability of the federal securities law framework to new and emerging technologies, such as blockchain. The Statement provides a concise summary of the circumstances under which the SEC has taken enforcement action against participants in the marketplace for digital asset securities. The Statement groups these actions into three categories, each of which corresponds to a fundamental aspect of the SEC’s statutory authority. Taken together, they form the framework for the SEC’s oversight of the securities markets: (1) initial offerings and sales of securities, (2) investment vehicles and investment advisors and (3) actors and institutions that develop and facilitate the secondary market for securities.
The takeaway from the Statement is that, once a digital asset has been identified as a security, it becomes subject to the oversight of the SEC. As a result, individuals dealing in that asset may be prohibited from engaging in a wide range of activities involving that digital asset unless those individuals and those activities comply with the federal securities laws.
Initial Offerings and Sales of Digital Asset Securities (the Securities Act of 1933)
On the same day that the SEC staff issued the Statement, the SEC also issued two settlement orders against issuers participating in unregistered offerings of securities in the form of digital tokens. The SEC entered separate orders finding that AirFox and Paragon and its owners offered and sold digital tokens in ICOs that were not registered under the Securities Act of 1933 and for which no exemption from registration was applicable. According to the order, AirFox and Paragon have undertaken to register the tokens under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to file such periodic reports with the SEC as required pursuant to such registration. For additional commentary on this topic, please read our On the Subject, “ICOs Should Tread Carefully on Social Media.”
As emphasized in the Statement, these enforcement actions show a willingness by the SEC to bring unregistered ICOs into compliance. The AirFox and Paragon ICOs were conducted subsequent to the SEC’s Decentralized Autonomous Organization Report issued in July 2017 (the DAO Report), which is now being viewed as the first and only warning by the SEC. According to many commentators, the DAO Report marks a turning point after which the SEC will be subjecting ICOs and other activities in digital asset securities to full regulatory scrutiny. The Statement is consistent with this view.
When a digital asset is deemed a security by the SEC, the SEC staff expects that offers and sales of such digital asset will comport with the registration requirements of the federal securities laws. Unregistered offerings that do not rely on an applicable exemption from registration may become subject to similar enforcement actions.
Investment Vehicles and Investment Advisors (the Investment Company and Investment Adviser Acts of 1940)
On September 11, 2018, the SEC issued its first enforcement action regarding an investment company registration violation based on investments in digital assets. The SEC’s order states that Crypto Asset Fund, LLC, its manager, and its sole principal, Timothy Enneking, engaged in the business of investing, holding and trading certain digital assets that were investment securities. According to the order, the digital assets exceeded 40 percent of the fund’s assets, causing the fund to operate as an unregistered investment company. The order also states that Crypto Asset Fund was touted as the “first regulated crypto asset fund in the United States” and its management claimed to have filed a registration statement with the SEC.
The Statement reiterates that pooled holdings of digital asset securities, and the individuals that manage these holdings, must comply with the legal requirements applicable to investment companies. Investment vehicles and the individuals that advise others with regard to investments must meet the registration and regulatory requirements of the federal securities laws, regardless of the fact that the securities involved are digital asset securities.
Secondary Market for Securities (Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
On September 11, 2018, the SEC issued its first enforcement action charging unregistered broker-dealers for selling securities in the form of digital tokens. The SEC entered an order finding that TokenLot LLC, a self-described “ICO Superstore,” and its owners solicited and took orders for the sale of digital tokens in both ICOs and secondary market trading. According to the order, TokenLot handled hundreds of different digital tokens and the SEC found that these tokens included securities. TokenLot and its management performed such activities without registering as broker-dealers.
On November 8, 2018, the SEC also issued an enforcement action charging the founder of a digital token trading platform with operating as an unregistered national securities exchange. The SEC entered an order finding that EtherDelta and its founder facilitated a secondary market for the trading of ERC20 tokens by bringing together buyers and sellers for digital asset securities through the use of an order book, a website and smart contract execution on the Ethereum blockchain.
The Statement emphasizes that in making the determination of whether an individual, entity or platform is acting as a broker-dealer or an exchange, the SEC will conduct its analysis based upon the totality of the activities conducted by the participant as well as the functional reality of what those activities achieve. In circumstances where an entity provides a marketplace for bringing together buyers and sellers of digital asset securities, the SEC may find that such an entity is operating as an exchange. In circumstances where an individual or entity is effecting transactions in digital assets or buying and selling digital assets for its own account, the SEC may find that such an entity or individual is acting as a broker or dealer in securities.
Conclusion
The Statement is an affirmation by the SEC that regulation of digital asset securities falls squarely within its statutory authority and within its mission to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. For participants in the digital asset economy, it is important to be aware of the various legal requirements that are being imposed on digital assets that are deemed to be securities. More importantly, such participants should be aware that the SEC, along with other regulators, are taking action to ensure that participants are complying with these legal requirements.
Although not mentioned in the Statement, the SEC has indicated that it is planning to release “plain English” guidance that will help issuers and potential issuers determine whether their digital asset is a security or not. Individuals and entities engaging in the digital asset marketplace should continue to seek legal advice regarding their activities.
For additional commentary on these enforcement actions, read our On the Subject, “Enforcing the Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies: Recent Developments.” For additional information on securities laws as applied to token sales, see our Special Report, “Digital Offerings and Sales under Regulation S.” For additional information about McDermott’s FinTech and Blockchain practice, please see our practice group page.