ARTICLE
Innovations for the Early Renovation
Unternehmeredition
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ARTICLE
Unternehmeredition
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ARTICLE
September 9, 2019
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
September 9, 2019
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On Aug. 14, 2019, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled to uphold the strict application of Barnes & Noble Education Inc.’s (“BNED”) advance notice bylaw requiring a shareholder to be a record holder of shares in order to submit a nomination notice to nominate directors to the board. The court denied Bay Capital Finance LLC’s (“Bay Capital”) preliminary motion for injunction filed in order to permit Bay Capital to run its slate of directors at BNED’s 2019 annual meeting of shareholders. The denial was based on Bay Capital’s failure to become a shareholder of record of BNED’s common stock by the June 27, 2019 nomination deadline as required under BNED’s advance notice bylaw. Although Bay Capital submitted its nomination notice by the June 27 deadline, Bay Capital did not become a shareholder of record until June 28, 2019, one day after the deadline. In its ruling, the court upheld BNED’s board of directors’ decision to declare Bay Capital’s nomination notice deficient due to its failure to be a record holder. The ruling demonstrates the court’s willingness to uphold the validity of certain advance notice bylaws when they do not “unduly restrict the stockholder franchise” and are not “applied inequitably.”[1] The decision also emphasizes the need for any shareholder that is considering nominating directors or submitting shareholder proposals to understand the concept of record ownership and the other requirements under the company’s bylaws and to start the process to become a record holder well before the deadline.
In Bay Capital, the court was unmoved by the arguments Bay Capital submitted for its failure to establish record holder status by the June 27, 2019 nomination deadline, particularly when Bay Capital’s own advisers had repeatedly reminded Bay Capital of the nomination deadline and the need to be a record holder of BNED shares. The court noted that the principal of Bay Capital, despite receiving targeted advice on the matter, may not have understood the concept of holding shares in record name as opposed to holding the shares indirectly through a bank or broker in what is known as “street name.”
Whenever shares of a company are purchased, they are typically recorded in the name of the broker-dealer or bank intermediary — this is called owning shares in street name. Shares held in street name still entitle the acquiring party to the economic and voting rights associated with ownership of the securities, though indirectly through the intermediary who holds the shares directly on the company’s record of shareholders. However, companies are often entitled to rely on their own books and shareholder register for making certain determinations when specified in the bylaws, and, in order to avail oneself of these rights, a shareholder may need to hold shares in “record name” on a company’s books.
To obtain record holder status, a shareholder must instruct its broker or banker to coordinate with a company’s transfer agent (sometimes electronically via the Depository Trust Company) to transfer shares into record name, resulting in the shareholder appearing as a direct holder of shares on the company’s register of shareholders. The process of transferring shares into record name typically takes some time once initiated, so it is usually prudent to transfer shares into record name well in advance of a nomination deadline to avoid the scenario that disqualified Bay Capital’s nomination notice.
Because Bay Capital only began to acquire BNED shares three days before the nomination deadline, it was unable to coordinate the transfer of shares into record name until the day after the deadline. (Importantly, the court did not find that the company played any part in the delay of registering the shares in record name.) In denying Bay Capital’s motion, the court stated:
“Needless to say, not even Delaware’s strong public policy favoring the stockholder franchise will save Bay Capital from its dilatory conduct. Bay Capital blew the deadline. It then made up excuses for doing so. No record evidence suggests that the company is in any way at fault for that mistake. If this Court required the company to accept the nomination in these circumstances, advance notice requirements would have little meaning under Delaware law.”[2]
The actions of Bay Capital ought to serve as a cautionary tale for all shareholders seeking to satisfy the requirements of an advance notice bylaw in order to make nominations or submit proposals. Shareholders would do well to plan ahead when undertaking the process so that they have the requisite time to fully comply with the requirements of a company’s advance notice bylaws by the applicable deadline.
Authored by Ele Klein, Adriana Schwartz and Brandon S. Gold.
If you have any questions concerning advance notice bylaws, owning shares in record name or this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 239 (Del. Ch. 2007).
[2] Bay Capital Finance, LLC v. Barnes & Noble Education, Inc., at *14 (Del. Ch.; 8/19).
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE
September 8, 2019
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ARTICLE
September 6, 2019
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ARTICLE
September 6, 2019
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ARTICLE
September 6, 2019
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
September 6, 2019
Read time: 5 min
On Aug. 27, 2019, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) announced that it issued its first enforcement action based on violations of the Remittance Transfer Rule (“Rule”).[1] The Bureau issued the consent order against Maxitransfers Corporation (“Maxi”) for various violations, including (1) disclosing in its terms and conditions with consumers that Maxi would not be responsible for errors made by payment agents, (2) failing to develop and maintain written policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with error resolution requirements, (3) failing to comply with the customer notification disclosures of the error resolution requirements, (4) failing to use the Rule’s specified terms or substantially similar terms in receipts and prepayment disclosures and (5) failing to treat certain international bill-payment services as covered remittance transfers. The consent order does not include restitution, but the Bureau imposed a civil monetary fine of $500,000.
This action should serve as a reminder to all remittance transfer providers (“Providers”) of their obligations under the Rule. Providers should also take note of the following considerations:
Authored by Kara A. Kuchar and Donald J. Mosher.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] The CFPB’s press release and consent order are available here. The Remittance Transfer Rule (Subpart B of 12 C.F.R. Part 1005) implements certain provisions of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1).
[2] See 12 C.F.R. § 1090.107.
[3] “The “date of discovery” is the date when the plaintiff obtains actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to the action, or notice of the facts, which in the exercise of reasonable diligence, would have led to actual knowledge.” CFPB v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-CV-5211 (CM), 2016 WL 7188792, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (not reported) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
[4] CFPB Bulletin 2013-06, dated June 25, 2013, available here.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
September 6, 2019
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On Sept. 3, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, for the second time, dismissed a lawsuit brought by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”) that sought to block the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (“OCC”) special purpose national charter for financial technology firms (better known as the “fintech charter”), but the charter’s long-term survival remains uncertain due to an identical, but separate, lawsuit filed by the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”).
In dismissing the action, Judge Dabney L. Friedrich reasoned that the CSBS lacked standing because the OCC has not yet received a fintech charter application (which we note is partially due to the uncertainty caused by the lawsuits brought against the OCC), similar to the reasoning she used when she dismissed the CSBS’ lawsuit against the OCC in May 2018. The court also noted that no event concerning the fintech charter since the prior case’s dismissal, including the OCC’s decision to begin accepting applications for fintech charters and its finalization of its fintech charter policy on July 31, 2018, cured the original jurisdictional deficiency.[1] As Judge Friedrich explained in her opinion, “[n]ot much has happened since [the original CSBS lawsuit] that affects the jurisdiction analysis.”[2]
Though the CSBS’ lawsuit was dismissed, there is still active litigation concerning the fintech charter in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, where the NYDFS brought a lawsuit against the OCC seeking to block the charter. On May 2, 2019, Judge Victor Marrero ruled against the OCC’s motion for dismissal and ruled that the NYDFS’ claims against the OCC and its fintech charter are ripe for adjudication.[3] In her opinion concerning the CSBS’ lawsuit, Judge Friedrich noted her disagreement with Judge Marrero’s decision.
Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Joseph P. Vitale and Adam J. Barazani.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Dist. Ct. D.C., 18-cv-2449DLF (Sept. 3, 2019), available here.
[2] Id.
[3] See Maria T. Vullo v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, S.D.N.Y., 18-cv-08377VM (May 2, 2019), available here.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
September 6, 2019
Read time: 9 min
“… [P]ayments owed to a shareholder by a bankrupt debtor, which are not quite dividends but which certainly look a lot like dividends, should be treated like the equity interests of a shareholder and subordinated to claims by creditors of the debtor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Sept. 3, 2019. In re Linn Energy, LLC, 2019 WL 4149481 (5th Cir. Sept. 3, 2019). According to the court, subordination of a purported creditor’s claims “was appropriate” when “deemed dividends gave the [creditor] benefits normally reserved for equity investors.” Affirming the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit found the creditor-shareholder’s claim to be for “damages” involving “securities,” “aris[ing] from” a “purchase or sale” and having a “nexus with those securities.” Because the estate had “limited assets,” the “subordination order effectively gutted the [creditor-shareholder’s] chances to receive any money.” Id. at *2.
Courts have broadly interpreted the nature and scope of claims arising from the purchase or sale of a security under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 510(b). That section provides in relevant part as follows: “a claim arising from the rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of a debtor or of an affiliate of a debtor, [or] for damages arising from the purchase or sale of such security … shall be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior or equal to the claim or interest represented by such a security, except that if such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock.”
Code § 510(b) thus “mandates subordination of ‘a claim … for damages arising from the purchase or sale of … a security [of the debtor].’” In re Med. Diversified, Inc., 461 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 2006).
Courts typically ask whether the claim in question has a “nexus” with the purchase or sale of a security. In re Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d 143, 155 (5th Cir. 2015); In re Telegroup Inc., 281 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2002). On that basis, appellate courts routinely subordinate the claims of “those who conclude the bargain to become investors or shareholders ….” Id., at 257.
The shareholder claimant in Linn, “C,” received “deemed dividends, … akin to settlement payments whose amount was tethered to the value of” distributions paid to other shareholders of the debtors and their predecessors. C’s interest originated with shares he inherited in 1930, a later 1986 settlement and a later 2013 transaction in which the debtors “purportedly promised to undertake and continue” the payment of deemed dividends to C. When the payments stopped, the parties litigated during 2014 and 2015, with C asserting “tort claims [for] misrepresentation, elder abuse, and breach of fiduciary duty.” 2019 WL 4149481, at *2.
The debtors filed Chapter 11 petitions in 2016. C “filed claims for almost $10 million in unpaid deemed dividends.” Id. The lower courts subordinated C’s claims.
The “policy goals of [Code § ]510(b) are clear, but applying the statute is more complex,” said the court. Id., at *4. In its view, “the deemed dividends gave [C] benefits normally received for equity investors ….” “Policy goals” thus helped drive the court’s interpretation and application of the law to the “particular facts” here. Id., citing Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d at 154-55 (policy goals of the statute support subordination).
Damages. The Code does not define “damages,” but the term connotes, in the context of § 510(b), “some recovery other than the simple recovery of an unpaid debt due upon an instrument.” Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d at 154. Because C was seeking compensation “for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty,” his claims for damages fell within the scope of § 510(b). 2019 WL 4149481, at *4. In fact, C argued that “its interest … is more akin to a creditor’s contractual right to payment than the equity interest of an investor.” Id. C thus sought “damages within the meaning of the … Code.” Id.
Securities of the Debtor. The Fifth Circuit rejected C’s argument that its “interest in receiving dividend payments” and “deemed dividend payments” did not constitute a “security.” According to the court, “the deemed dividend interest owned by [C] is a security interest under the residual clause of” the Code’s definition of a “security”: “if a claimant’s interest does not fit any of the specific examples provided in the Code and is not explicitly excluded from the definition of ‘security,’ it will be considered a security if it is any ‘other claim or interest commonly known as ‘security.’” Id. at *5, citing Code § 101(49)(A)(xiv). Interests are therefore securities if they “bear hallmarks of interests commonly known as securities.” Id., quoting Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 855 F.3d 459, 475 (2d Cir. 2017). When a claimant “ha[s] the same risk and benefit expectations as shareholders,” it holds a security, regardless of the form of the equity interest. Id.
C “held greater financial expectations than that of a creditor during his lifetime. The upside of his deemed dividend payments was theoretically limitless, as it tracked the value of the corporation. Further, because he risked receiving nothing at all if the corporation went bankrupt or if the corporation chose not to issue dividends, [C] faced many of the same risks as a traditional shareholder.” 2019 WL 4149481, at *5. Treating C’s interests “as securities comports with the broad reading courts have given Section 510(b).” Id., citing Lehman Bros., 855 F.3d at 474. In short, “the deemed dividends only entitled [C] to receive profits whenever shareholders of [the debtor] were receiving profits.” Id.
Purchase or Sale of a Security. But for the 1930 stock bequest to C and the later 1986 and 2013 transactions, C “would not have a right to demand the deemed dividends in the bankruptcy” case here. Id. at *6. “Each of those transactions counts as a purchase or sale … of securities of the Debtors.” Id. “[S]ome nexus or causal relationship” thus existed between C’s claims and, at the very least, the 2013 transaction. Id., citing Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d at 155.
Applying the policies underlying Code § 510(b), C’s claims sought “to recover a portion of [C’s] equity investment.” Id. Although the deemed dividend payments due C did not “fit perfectly in the investor box,” C’s interest “was certainly more like an investor’s interest than a creditor’s interest.” Id. C’s claim could therefore not be treated at the same level as creditors’ claims. To do so “would undermine the … Code’s absolute priority rule.” Id., at *7.
Linn is consistent with relevant decisions in other circuits. “Section 510(b) is to be construed broadly because it is a remedial statute intended ‘to prevent shareholders from changing their claims into creditors’.’” In re Med. Diversified, Inc., 461 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 2006).
Some courts, though, struggle with the broad reading of § 510(b). For instance, the Ninth Circuit recently held that a claim based on a judgment arising from the debtors’ conversion of the claimant’s stock was not subject to subordination under § 510(b). In re Khan, 846 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2017) (2-1). According to the majority in Khan, the claimant’s judgment for money damages “has nothing to do with his investment, other than the fact that he had purchased the now-purloined securities many years earlier.” Id., at *1064. Despite a “broad interpretation” by courts, “there is a limit to the reach of § 510(b), which stops short of encompassing every transaction that touches on or involves stock in a corporation.” Id. Still, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged its “broad interpretation” of § 510(b) in In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2016), but stressed the claim there was based on an “investment” and “the amount … invested.”
A Delaware district court also held that an employee’s contractual claim was not an “equity interest subject to subordination” under Code § 510(b) and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s refusal to subordinate it. In re Cybersight LLC, 2004 WL 2713098 (D. Del. 2004). The creditor was an employee of the debtor who had bought a 1.5% membership interest in the debtor LLC. After his employment was terminated in 1999, the debtor was “obligated to” buy his equity interest at its fair market value under the terms of the debtor’s LLC agreement. To determine the fair market value of that equity interest, the parties entered into an arbitration, where the creditor received an award of $1.291 million, which was confirmed by a state court judgment on March 26, 2001. The debtor later filed a Chapter 11 petition more than a year later, on April 5, 2002. Most important, according to the court, the creditor’s “equity stake in the [debtor] extinguished pre-petition and with it [the creditor’s] ability to participate in any of [the debtor’s] profits or losses.” Id., at *3. In short, the employee creditor’s “former equity interest … has been converted into a fixed debt obligation.” Id., at *4 n.2.
The Ninth Circuit had earlier denied a request to subordinate a financial adviser’s claim for pre-bankruptcy services when his compensation was tied to the value of the debtor’s stock. In re Am. Wagering, 493 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2007). According to the Ninth Circuit, the financial adviser was never a shareholder. Rather, the debtor’s stock value was simply the basis for calculating his compensation. Id., at 1073.
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.