Content Type: Article

  • Perspectives on Lender’s Standing to Foreclosure in New York

    Perspectives on Lender’s Standing to Foreclosure in New York

    ARTICLE

    Perspectives on Lender’s Standing to Foreclosure in New York

    September 17, 2019

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Scott A. Weinberg

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Tips for Conducting Effective Due Diligence in an Auction Process

    Tips for Conducting Effective Due Diligence in an Auction Process

    ARTICLE

    Tips for Conducting Effective Due Diligence in an Auction Process

    September 17, 2019

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Remuneration? Not If It’s Fair Market Value, Says Eleventh Circuit

    Remuneration? Not If It’s Fair Market Value, Says Eleventh Circuit

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Remuneration? Not If It’s Fair Market Value, Says Eleventh Circuit

    September 17, 2019

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Bingham v. HCA, Inc., a recent Eleventh Circuit case, highlights the centrality of fair market value to Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) analyses. This decision is significant for several reasons and we expect to see Bingham cited by many defendants in future False Claims Act cases. The case is also a reminder that the current regulatory and enforcement environment can result in litigation over arrangements with fair market value payments that involve little, or no, compliance concerns.

    In depth

    One of the most fundamental elements of managing risk under the federal Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) is ensuring remuneration is consistent with fair market value. A recent Eleventh Circuit case highlights the centrality of fair market value to AKS analyses. See Bingham v. HCA, Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-23671 (11th Cir. 2019). In Bingham, the court held that proving fair market value is an essential element for a relator to survive summary judgment and that relators must plead a lack of fair market value consistent with the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement to allege improper remuneration exists in the first place. The court’s holding is significant for two reasons: (1) it underscores that the plaintiff bears a burden in pleading and proving lack of fair market value, and (2) it suggests that fair market value compensation may be an absolute defense to an AKS allegation. We expect to see Bingham cited by many defendants in future False Claims Act cases, and we will be watching to see how the Eleventh Circuit and other courts continue to evaluate these concepts.

    Case Background and Procedural History

    We note that it took five years of costly litigation for HCA to reach this decision. Relator, who has filed a number of cases against hospital systems over the years concerning real estate deals, filed his first amended complaint on August 15, 2014. Relator alleged that HCA, through its Centerpoint Medical Center and Aventura Hospital facilities, violated the FCA due to improper space rental arrangements with physicians. Relator alleged that HCA allegedly paid a medical office building developer improper subsidies and that the developer passed the value of these subsidies onto physician tenants who signed 10-year leases through low initial lease rates, restricted use waivers, operating cash-flow shares and free office improvements. Relator also alleged HCA provided direct remuneration to physician tenants at the Aventura facility, including free parking, subsidized common area maintenance, free use permissions and below market rent.

    The United States declined to intervene on February 23, 2015. The district court then denied the parties’ joint motion to stay discovery while considering HCA’s motion to dismiss. Discovery commenced and the allegations against Centerpoint and Aventura took different paths. The district court dismissed relator’s compliant regarding Aventura on January 28, 2016. On March 8, 2016, relator filed a second amended complaint for Aventura. But discovery proceeded on the Centerpoint claims, leading to HCA’s summary judgment motion, which the district court granted on April 6, 2016. The district court then granted HCA’s motion to strike impermissible facts from the second amended complaint that the relator learned during discovery and dismissed the repleaded Aventura claims, issuing a final judgment on November 4, 2016. The appeal to the Eleventh Circuit ensued, and almost three years later, we have this decision.

    Centerpoint’s Summary Judgment Ruling

    On the Centerpoint arrangement, the Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment decision in favor of HCA, finding that the “critical question we must ask” when examining relator’s allegations that HCA passed remuneration to physician tenants is “whether physician tenants received anything of value from [the developer] under or in connection with their leases in excess of the fair market value of their lease payments.” The Court stated that “the issue of fair market value is not limited to HCA’s safe harbor defense . . . but is rather something Relator must address in order to show that HCA offered or paid remuneration to physician tenants.”

    The reasoning was based squarely on the definition of “remuneration.” The court consulted Black’s Law Dictionary to find remuneration defined as “payment; compensation” and that “compensation” required “some sort of benefit conferred.” In business transactions, the court said that “the value of a benefit can only be quantified by reference to its fair market value.” The court also borrowed from the civil monetary penalties statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6), which defines remuneration to include the “transfer of items or services for free or for other than fair market value.” Relator conceded that the proposed rents for the Centerpoint lease were within the range of “market rates” for new construction. The court thus found the relator failed to raise any problematic “benefits conferred in excess of fair market value” for the rental rates, space improvements, profit sharing or any other facet of the arrangement.

    The court also examined the Centerpoint Stark Law allegation. Whereas the AKS analysis turns on the question of whether there was any remuneration to induce referrals, the Stark Law analysis is more technical: is there a “financial relationship” between the physician and the entity furnishing designated health services (DHS) and, if so, does it satisfy an applicable exception.

    In this case, the question for Stark Law purposes was whether the lease arrangement created a financial relationship that met the definition of “indirect compensation arrangement.” In order to establish an indirect compensation arrangement, a relator (or the government) needs to show, among other things, that the physician receives aggregate compensation from the entity with which they have a direct financial relationship that varies with or takes into account the volume or value of referrals or other business generated by the physician for the DHS entity at the other end of the chain of financial relationships. The court held that there was no genuine factual dispute over whether an indirect compensation arrangement existed “because it plainly does not.” Specifically, the court found no evidence that “the rental rates or other benefits allegedly given by HCA to any specific physician tenant are at all correlated with the volume or value of referrals from that physician tenant.”

    Aventura Motion to Dismiss Ruling

    The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of relator’s second amended complaint based on relator’s impermissible use information from discovery in the complaint, and that the second amended complaint did not otherwise satisfy Rule 9(b). In addition, and more importantly, the court also affirmed dismissing relator’s first and second amended complaints consistent with the court’s summary judgment ruling on the Centerpoint claims—namely, that the relator failed to state with any particularity how HCA conveyed remuneration directly or indirectly to specific tenants. Relator simply alleged that the leases did not reflect fair market value based on his “information and belief” and his own calculations regarding the value of the land, concluding “relator does not provide specific details or evidence to support his claims that long-term ground leases were grossly undervalued or included overly generous terms.”

    Analysis and Lessons

    The Bingham decision is significant for several reasons.

    First, it recognizes the obligation of relators (and the government) asserting an AKS claim to allege with particularity in their complaint that payments were not consistent with fair market value and, ultimately, to prove that payments were not fair market value.

    Second, the court’s reasoning on the AKS claim was that compensation that is consistent with fair market value does not create remuneration, and that without remuneration there can be no AKS claim. The Bingham decision will thus likely be cited for the proposition that fair market value compensation is an absolute defense to an AKS allegation.

    Third, in evaluating whether the compensation arrangement “took into account the volume or value of referrals or other business generated” for purposes of the Stark Law, the court focused on whether there was any correlation between the lease terms and physician referrals. The court did not incorporate the question of fair market value into the volume/value analysis. Thus, the court appears to have construed the volume or value standard to be a question of variability and correlation—focusing on the nature of the compensation, rather than the absolute amount.

    Finally, this case is a reminder that the current regulatory and enforcement environment can result in providers becoming stuck in a multi-year expensive litigation battle over arrangements with fair market value payments that involve little, or no, compliance concerns. Hopefully, the Department of Health and Human Services efforts to reform the AKS and Stark Law in the “regulatory sprint to coordinated care” will help dislodge providers from this ditch.

    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Bankruptcy Court Dismisses Collusive Bidding Claim

    Bankruptcy Court Dismisses Collusive Bidding Claim

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Bankruptcy Court Dismisses Collusive Bidding Claim

    September 17, 2019

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A credit-bidding lender (“Lender”) acquired a debtor’s assets “in ‘good faith’ and ‘without collusion,’ the purchase price ‘was not controlled by any agreement among potential bidders,’ and [Lender] had not ‘engaged in any conduct that would cause or permit the Purchase Agreement to be avoided or costs and damages to be imposed under section 363(n) of the Bankruptcy Code,’” held the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on Sept. 10, 2019. In re Waypoint Leasing Holdings, Ltd., 2019 WL 4273889, *11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019). The disappointed stalking horse bidder, M, “blame[d] [its] loss of the sale and/or a $19.5 million break-up fee” plus an expense reimbursement claim (up to $3 million) on the defendant acquiror, L. “[I]n its capacity as assignee” of the Chapter 11 debtors and “in its own right,” M had sued L for damages. Id. at *1. M alleged that L “had colluded with [Lender] to control the sale price of the … assets in violation of” Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(n). Id. at *5.

    Relevance

    Code § 363(n) presumes that collusive bidding is, per se, bad faith. In relevant part, it reads as follows: “if the sale price was controlled by an agreement among potential bidders,” the “trustee may avoid” the sale or, alternatively, “recover” the difference between the price paid and the “value of the property sold” from any party to such agreement. The colluding parties may also be held liable for “costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses” and, if “willful disregard of this subsection” is found, punitive damages.

    Facts

    Marketing; Non-Disclosure. The debtor marketed the sale of its helicopter assets. L signed a non-disclosure agreement enabling it to acquire confidential information relevant to any proposed sale. Under that agreement, L could use confidential information only to evaluate the assets and participate in discussions with the debtor, but could not contact any creditor or subsidiary of the company except in the ordinary course of business. L was also barred from disclosing or referring to a potential transaction with the debtor or to confidential information obtained from the debtor.

    Bidding Procedure. M agreed to buy the debtor’s assets as a stalking horse bidder. The debtor later obtained from the court an appropriate bidding procedures order that set up a process for third-party bidding and secured lender credit bidding. M would be entitled to a break-up fee of $19.5 million plus up to a $3-million expense reimbursement claim unless “a transaction was effected through a credit bid.” Id. at *2. Also, if Lender “made a credit bid for the [assets] in the full amount of its claim, [M] could not submit a matching bid.” Id.

    The bidding procedures order further modified the “no contact” provisions in the non-disclosure agreements signed by Lender and L. “The secured [creditors] could engage in discussions and negotiations with an entity to manage the assets upon the consummation of a successful credit bid … and were released from any restriction on ‘engaging in discussions or negotiations’ under their agreements with the [debtor].” Id.

    Bidding. No third parties submitted a bid, leaving only M and Lender as potential purchasers. Lender “submitted a credit bid for the [assets] in the amount of 100% of its claim.” At the sale hearing, Lender disclosed that it had discussed with L “a subsequent transaction pursuant to which the [assets] would be recapitalized and sold to [L].” Id. at *3. Lender also testified that it had negotiated with M “as the … proposed stalking horse bidder … [stating] that if [M] wanted to acquire the [assets], it ‘needed to pay par plus accrued interest.’” Id. According to the court, though, Lender was “not a helicopter leasing company [but] intended to sell the … [assets] at some point in the future.” Id. It had “preliminary discussions with potential servicers,” but never disclosed confidential information about the assets and “had no agreement to sell the assets.” Id.

    Issues at Sale Hearing. M’s counsel argued at the sale hearing that Lender “had violated the confidentiality and ‘no-contact’ provisions of its own non-disclosure agreement … and had entered into a collusive bidding agreement with [L].” Id. Because it had no facts to support its assertions, it suggested that the court allow it time for discovery, but the court rejected that request. Thus, the possible violation of the non-disclosure agreement and collusive bidding had been raised by M when it objected to the sale of the assets to Lender.

    Court Ruling at End of Sale Hearing. The court ruled at the end of the sale hearing that Lender had been the credit bidder for the assets, meaning that M was not entitled to a break-up fee based on Lender’s successful credit bid. Nor was there any evidence, found the court, that Lender “had shared any confidential information with any servicers .…” Id. at *4. The court further discounted Lender’s possible “technical violation” of the non-disclosure agreement when Lender “had discussed the possibility of a future sale” of the assets to L. Also, Lender had not acted in bad faith when it started to look for a subsequent purchaser, primarily because Lender intended “to liquidate its collateral and get paid back,” not wanting to “incur the costs of insuring the aircraft and paying a servicer.” Id.

    The court later signed the asset sale order, finding that Lender had “complied with” the bidding procedures, “was the successful bidder,” was a “good faith purchaser” and that neither the debtor nor Lender had “engaged in any conduct that would cause or permit the Purchase Agreement to be avoided or costs and damages to be imposed under section 363(n) of the … Code.” The amount of Lender’s credit bid totaled $98.4 million, “the highest and best value” for the assets. The sale order also preserved any asserted claim by M for “damages flowing from violations of the Bidding Procedures or Bidding Procedures Order ‘arising from intentional misconduct.’” Id. at *4-5.

    M’s Later Claims

    M asserted three claims against L in a later suit. First, as assignee of the debtor, M asserted that L had breached the confidentiality and “no-contact provisions” of the non-disclosure agreement. M’s second claim, asserted in its own right, asserted that L had “tortiously interfered with its business relationship” with the debtor. Finally, M asserted, both in its own right and as assignee of the debtor, that L had “colluded with [Lender] to control the sale price of” the assets in violation of Code § 363(n). The court easily disposed of the first two claims asserted by M.

    No Damages for Asserted Confidentiality Breach. Assuming that L had breached the non-disclosure agreement by contacting Lender, M “failed to allege how those contacts damaged” the debtor. M speculated “that the collusive bidding arrangement between [Lender] and [L] induced Lender to make a credit bid it would not have otherwise made and thus deprived” the debtor of “obtaining potential competing cash bids” for the assets. According to the court, M’s claim of asserted harm to the debtor “defies common sense.” Id. at *7. “To suggest that [Lender] would not have made a credit bid but for [L’s] prompting to prevent a sale at a depressed price … ignores the entire purpose of the right to credit bid ….” Id. Nor did M allege that its cash bid for the assets “was higher, a critical piece of information in determining if the Debtor was damaged, or that [M] intended to pay anything more which, in any event, seemed unlikely.” Id. According to undisputed testimony, M “could have purchased [Lender’s] claim for par plus interest .… Had it done so, it could have made its own credit bid.” Id. In any event, Lender “outbid [M] by roughly $13 million to prevent a sale to M at a depressed price .…” Id. Moreover, no third party could have stepped in with a higher offer because “the deadline for third-party bids had expired before [Lender] made its credit bid .…” A “third party would [still] have had to bid at least $121 million” for the assets in order for its bid to top “[Lender’s] credit bid.” Id., at * 7.

    No Tortious Interference. The court similarly rejected M’s tortious interference claim. L was admittedly “engaged in the business of leasing aircraft … and … was [M’s] competitor. If [L] induced [Lender] to sell it the [assets] for its own economic benefit it did not use wrongful means.” Id. at *9. L never engaged in “physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits [or] criminal prosecutions.” Id. The claim thus failed as a matter of law.

    No Collusive Bidding. The court discussed M’s collusive bidding claim, quoting the operative language of Code § 363(n): was “the sale price … controlled by an agreement among potential bidders?” According to the court, “‘control’ means more than causing ‘an incidental or unintended impact on the price; it implies an intention or objective to influence the price.’” Id. at *9, quoting In re New York Trap Rock Corp., 42 F.3d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1994). Further, said the court, “prohibited collusive agreements are secret agreements that have not been disclosed to the court.” Id., citing In re Colony Hill Assocs., 111 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 1997). Also, Code § 363(n) “only grants the right to bring a claim to a trustee or debtor in possession,” but “an unsuccessful bidder may have standing to challenge the actions of a successful bidder that destroyed the ‘intrinsic fairness’ of the sale transaction so that it was not a good faith purchaser.” Id., citing Colony Hill, 111 F.3d at 274.

    First, M lacked “standing to assert a claim” under § 363(n) “as assignee” of the debtor. Id. at *10. The debtor never assigned any rights under § 363(n), and M never even alleged that the debtor was “damaged by the alleged collusion.” “Put simply, [Lender] outbid [M], the only other bidder.” Id. at *10.

    Nor could M challenge the “intrinsic fairness” of the sale in its own right. During an evidentiary hearing on the sale motion, M not only objected but was also heard by the court. At the end of the hearing, the court found that the debtor had “conducted a fair and open sale process”; that it was “non-collusive, properly noticed,” and gave any other entity “a full, fair and reasonable opportunity … to make” a purchase offer. Id., at * 10. In the sale order, the court also found that the parties had negotiated and agreed in good faith, “without collusion, and from arms’ length bargaining positions”; Lender had been a “good faith purchaser “and had “complied with the Bidding Procedures Order.” Finally, the court found that the purchase price had not been “controlled by any agreement among potential bidders”; neither the debtor nor Lender had “engaged in any conduct that would cause or permit the Purchase Agreement to be avoided or costs and damages to be imposed under” Code § 363. Finally, most important, M never appealed from the sale order. Id.

    M’s challenge to the “intrinsic fairness” of the sale repeated the same allegations it made at the earlier sale hearing, said the court. It was thus “an impermissible collateral attack on” the sale order and was barred “by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Id. “If [Lender] did not improperly collude with [L], [L] did not improperly collude with [Lender].” Accord, In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 408 B.R. 497 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 639 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirmed dismissal of alleged misconduct claims on collateral estoppel ground, among others; objecting party had opposed prior sale order but lost and never appealed; misconduct issues were the same as those that had already been litigated and determined by bankruptcy court in prior orders).

    As the court stressed in Waypoint, “[t]o grant relief to [M] under section § 363(n), the Court would have to conclude, contrary to its prior findings, that the sale was unfair, the purchase price was controlled by an agreement between potential bidders and [Lender] acted in bad faith.” Id. at *11. The court here had previously “overruled [M’s] objections and found that [Lender] was a good faith purchaser that did not impermissibly collude with [L].” Although M lost, it “never appealed.” Because M raised “the same collusion issues that were rejected by the Court and memorialized in” the sale order, the court dismissed M’s “claims asserted as assignee and in its own right.” Id. at *12.

    Comments

    1. Waypoint shows that Code § 363(n) is intended to block collusive agreements meant to deprive the debtor of the full market value of its assets, enabling the colluding parties to divide the benefit of an improper bargain. Essentially, § 363(n) applies when one bidder pays another bidder to drop out of the bidding process. At the very least, the section ordinarily enables the estate to recover the difference between the true value of the assets and its depressed purchase price.
    2. M had its chance to make a case of collusion at the earlier sale hearing, but failed to do so. It took no discovery, had no supporting facts and failed to appeal from the sale order. The lesson here: a party making serious allegations of misconduct had better be able to prove the facts at trial, even when the court accelerates the process. See New York Trap Rock, 42 F.3d at 754 (discovery appropriate to ascertain why potential bidder dropped out of bidding).
    3. Code § 363(n) applies to both public auctions and private sales of the debtor’s property. Ramsay v. Vogel, 970 F. 2d 471 (8th Cir. 1992).
    4. As the court in Waypoint noted, only the “trustee or debtor-in-possession” has “the right to bring a claim” under Code § 363(n). 2019 WL Y273889 at *9 n. 9, quoting the language of the Code: “The trustee may avoid … or may recover ….” This is consistent with the Supreme court’s holding in Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000) (only trustee has standing under § 506(c) to surcharge lender’s collateral; “plain language” of Code). And, of course, a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession has “the rights … and powers” and must “perform all the functions and duties … of a trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
    5. The bankruptcy court in Waypoint had jurisdiction over this dispute between third parties because the asserted claims arose out of the sale order and under Code § 363(n). 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). M had also “consented to the entry of final … judgments by” the court and alleged that L had “consented” to the court’s “exclusive jurisdiction … for any” actions “arising out of or relating to” the non-disclosure agreement it had signed. Waypoint, 2019 WL at *6.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook. 

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Illinois Enacts New Trust Code: What Fiduciaries Need to Know

    Illinois Enacts New Trust Code: What Fiduciaries Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Illinois Enacts New Trust Code: What Fiduciaries Need to Know

    September 16, 2019

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Effective January 1, 2020, the new Illinois Trust Code (ITC) will replace the Illinois Trusts and Trustees Act, ushering in several changes of note for fiduciaries. In light of the ITC, fiduciaries and estate planners should review existing revocable and irrevocable trusts and revisit their regular trust administration procedures to ensure that they conform to the new standards when applicable.

    Silent Trusts and the Designated Representative

    Under the Trusts and Trustees Act, the default rule is that all trustees must account directly to all current income beneficiaries not under a legal disability. For a beneficiary under a legal disability, accountings are to be provided to the representative of the estate of the beneficiary or, if none, to the beneficiary’s spouse, parent, adult child or guardian. 760 ILCS 5/11(e). With the ITC, Illinois joins the growing number of states that have enacted statutes that allow a settlor to waive the duty to account to certain beneficiaries for a period of time, during which the trustee need not disclose the existence, terms or assets of a trust to the beneficiary. This was recently discussed by our lawyers in an article published by Bloomberg.

    The ITC offers Illinois settlors the opportunity to create a so-called “silent trust,” by permitting a settlor, directly in the trust instrument, to (1) waive the trustee’s duty to account or provide information about the trust to beneficiaries under age 30, and (2) nominate or authorize any one or more persons to nominate a “designated representative,” a fiduciary to whom the trustee must account and provide required trust information on behalf of the represented beneficiary during the trust’s silent period. The silent period must end, as to each represented beneficiary, when the represented beneficiary attains age 30. The actions of the designated representative bind the represented beneficiary so long as the designated representative does not serve concurrently as trustee.

    If no designated representative is acting (or once a designated representative ceases to act), the trustee must notify qualified beneficiaries of (1) the trust’s existence, (2) the beneficiary’s right to request a complete copy of the trust instrument, and (3) whether the beneficiary has the right to receive or request trust accounts. The settlor cannot waive this duty.

    Dueling Accounting Standards

    The ITC also creates two different trust accounting standards. Which standard the trustee must follow depends on the date a trust is created, whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable, and the date upon which the trust became irrevocable.

    For trusts that are irrevocable prior to January 1, 2020, or for trustees who accept their appointments prior to the effective date of the ITC, the ITC incorporates the standard for furnishing accounts currently set forth in Section 5/11 of the act. For these pre-2020 trusts, a trustee is required to account only to beneficiaries then entitled to receive or receiving the income from the trust estate, or if none, then to those beneficiaries eligible to have the benefit of income from the trust estate. The annual account must set forth the receipts, disbursements and inventory of the trust estate. The trustee has no duty to account to remainder beneficiaries. The key difference between the rules applicable to pre-ITC trusts and trustees and post-ITC trusts and trustees is that the ITC will give effect to a settlor’s waiver of the duty to provide annual accountings in a pre-ITC trust instrument.

    For revocable trusts created prior to January 1, 2020, this standard applies until the trustee then acting ceases to act, at which time the successor trustee thereafter must follow the new ITC standard.

    For irrevocable trusts created on or after January 1, 2020, the trustee must account annually to all current mandatory and permissible distributees of income or principal. The trustee may not waive this duty, although as discussed above, the settlor may direct that accountings be provided to a designated representative for certain beneficiaries until each represented beneficiary turns 30. The trustee also must account to presumptive remainder beneficiaries unless the trust instrument provides otherwise. Under this new standard, the trustee must disclose more information in the account than currently required under the Act. In addition to disclosing the inventory, receipts and disbursements of the trust, the trustee must disclose:

    • A description of the trustee’s compensation
    • The value of the trust assets on hand at the close of the accounting period
    • All other material facts related to the administration of the trust

    New Considerations for the Prudent Investor Rule

    Under the ITC, a trustee must follow the prudent investor rule in making investment decisions on behalf of the trust. The ITC permits the trustee to consider environmental, social and governance considerations when making investment decisions. The ITC also permits a trustee to consider whether a trust asset has a special relationship to the purpose of the trust, or to one or more of the beneficiaries, in determining whether to retain or dispose of the asset.

    Fewer Restrictions on Delegation

    The ITC also makes it easier for a trustee to delegate discretionary powers. A trustee may avoid liability for the actions of an agent to whom discretionary powers are delegated, so long as the trustee exercises reasonable care, skill and caution in (1) selecting the agent; (2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes of the trust and trust instrument; and (3) periodically reviewing the agent’s actions to ensure compliance with the delegation.

    Invalidity of Exculpatory Clauses in Certain Situations

    The ITC creates a rebuttable presumption that an exculpatory provision in a trust instrument is invalid where the trustee either drafted the trust instrument or otherwise procured the inclusion of the exculpatory provision. To rebut this presumption in these cases, the trustee must show the exculpatory clause is fair to the beneficiaries under the circumstances. This fairness showing may require the trustee to show that the settlor was represented by independent counsel when the exculpatory provision was added to the trust instrument.

    Shortened Limitations Periods

    Finally, the ITC shortens limitations periods for claims against trustees in certain instances. With respect to trusts that become irrevocable on or after January 1, 2020, or trustees who accept their appointments after that date, the ITC shortens the limitations period for a beneficiary to bring a claim for breach of trust from three years to two years after the date on which the information disclosing the existence of a potential claim is furnished to the person entitled to receive the information.

    The ITC also creates a new limitations period for actions to contest the validity of a trust that is revocable upon the settlor’s death. The contest must be commenced within the earlier of two years after the settlor’s death, or six months from the date the trustee sends notice of the trust to the beneficiaries.

    Authors

    Margaret E. Sanne

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • The Three Baskets of CFC Income

    ARTICLE

    The Three Baskets of CFC Income

    September 13, 2019

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Taxation of Individual U.S. Shareholders under the Transition Tax and Participation Exemption System of Taxation

    Taxation of Individual U.S. Shareholders under the Transition Tax and Participation Exemption System of Taxation

    ARTICLE

    Taxation of Individual U.S. Shareholders under the Transition Tax and Participation Exemption System of Taxation

    September 12, 2019

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
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    Authors

    Ellen K. Harrison

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Ninth Circuit Limits Substantive Consolidation

    Ninth Circuit Limits Substantive Consolidation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Ninth Circuit Limits Substantive Consolidation

    September 12, 2019

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “[A] party moving for substantive consolidation must provide notice of the motion to the creditors of a putative consolidated non-debtor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Sept. 9, 2019. In re Mihranian, 2019 WL 4252115 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (emphasis added). Affirming the lower courts’ denial of a Chapter 7 trustee’s motion to consolidate substantively the debtor’s estate “with the estates of various non-debtors,” the Ninth Circuit stressed that the trustee had given “no such notice” and that he had “failed to adequately research and serve Non-debtors’ creditors.” Id., at *3. According to the court, it had “not [previously] determined whether a party moving for substantive consolidation must give notice of the motion to creditors of a putative consolidated non-debtor,” but “[s]everal considerations support such a notice requirement.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

    Relevance and Context

    “Substantive consolidation” is an equitable remedy. It “treats separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative assets and liabilities …. The result is that claims of creditors against separate debtors morph to claims against the consolidated survivor.” In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005).

    Substantive consolidation differs from “procedural” or administrative consolidation. Procedural consolidation merely allows a court to administer related cases (e.g., a corporate parent and affiliates) together, with each entity treated separately.

    The Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) says nothing about substantive consolidation. Equitable principles, though, apply. Accordingly, key decisions under the former Bankruptcy Act are still applicable. See In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 765 (9th Cir. 2000) (“… the equitable power [of substantive consolidation] undoubtedly survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.”).

    The most persuasive analysis of substantive consolidation was articulated by the Third Circuit. In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (Ambro, J.). In that court’s view, separate entities should be consolidated only if “(i) [pre-bankruptcy] they disregarded separateness so significantly their creditors relied on the breakdown of entity borders and treated them as one legal entity, or (ii) [post-bankruptcy] their assets and liabilities are so scrambled that separating them is prohibitive and hurts all creditors.” Id. at 211. The Third Circuit thus rejected the mechanical application of “prefixed factors,” used by some courts, to ascertain entity separateness. Id. at 210. Instead, the Third Circuit ordered an “intentionally open-ended, equitable inquiry” governed by the following principles: (1) entity separateness must be respected as a “fundamental ground rule” of limited liability, absent compelling circumstances calling equity … into play; (2) substantive consolidation should only be used to redress harms caused by debtors, not creditors (who are subject to other remedies such as fraudulent transfer avoidance and equitable subordination); (3) administrative convenience cannot justify this remedy; (4) the “rough justice” wrought by substantive consolidation should be “rare and, in any event, one of last resort after considering and rejecting other remedies” that more precisely redress the harm at issue; and (5) substantive consolidation cannot be used “offensively,” i.e., as a tactic to disadvantage a creditor group or alter creditors’ rights, but may be used “defensively to remedy the identifiable harms caused by entangled affairs ….” Id. at 210-211.

    The Third Circuit then summarized the equitable nature of the substantive consolidation remedy. “Substantive consolidation at its core is equity. Its exercise must lead to an equitable result. Communizing assets of affiliated companies to one survivor to feed all creditors of all companies may to some be equal (and hence equitable). But it is hardly so for those creditors who have lawfully bargained prepetition for unequal treatment by obtaining guarantees of separate entities.” Id. at 216, citing Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring) (“equality among creditors who have lawfully bargained for different treatment is not equity but its opposite ….”).

    Facts

    The trustee in the Mihranian case initially sued the debtor’s ex-wife, his two sons and the office manager of his medical business for purportedly having received fraudulent transfers. While his suit was pending, he moved for substantive consolidation of the non-debtors’ assets with those of the debtor’s estate. As the Ninth Circuit said, the trustee “sought the same relief — recovery of Debtor’s assets that allegedly were kept from judgment creditors through fraudulent transfers — in both” the fraudulent transfer suits and the substantive consolidation motion. The bankruptcy court eventually dismissed the fraudulent transfer actions because the trustee was unable to “establish that Debtor was the initial transferor … and those dismissals were upheld on appeal.” 2019 WL 4252115 at *1.

    The bankruptcy court later denied the trustee’s substantive consolidation motion because the trustee failed to prove that the debtors’ assets “were entangled with Non-Debtors’ assets to such an extent as would justify substantive consolidation.” The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed because the trustee “failed to serve the [substantive consolidation] Motion on Non-Debtors’ creditors.” On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the trustee argued that he was not required to give notice “and that, even if such notice is required, he provided the requisite notice.” Id. at *1.

    The Ninth Circuit

    “The sole aim of substantive consolidation is ‘fairness to all creditors,’” said the Ninth Circuit. According to the court, case law in the circuit “supports extending a notice requirement” to the non-debtor’s creditors. Id. at *2. Other courts addressing the issue have also required notice. Some lower courts may have permitted substantive consolidation without separate notice, but “that approach is the ‘minority view.’” Id.

    Fairness. “[N]otice and an opportunity to be heard must be given to creditors of the putative consolidated parties­ — whose claims would be equitably distributed under the consolidation order — and not just to the consolidated parties themselves,” held the court. As a matter of fairness, the bankruptcy court should hear “from any objecting creditor before issuing its decision on consolidation [to] ensure that the consolidation truly is fair to all affected creditors.” Id. at *3. Indeed, reasoned the court, substantive consolidation affects “the substantive rights of the creditors of the different estates.” Id., citing In re Bonham, 229 F.3d 750, 762 (9th Cir. 2000).

    Presumption of No Reliance on Separate Credit of Putative Consolidated Entities. Substantive consolidation, as a matter of law, is warranted when “creditors dealt with the debtor and non-debtors as a single economic unit.” Id. Because an objecting creditor has the burden of proving “that it did not rely on the separate credit of the putative consolidated entities,” that creditor “must be given notice … and an opportunity to be heard in order to meet its burden of overcoming the presumption.” Id.

    Lack of Notice and Research. The trustee here only gave notice to the putative non-debtors themselves, not their creditors. Nor did the trustee “adequately research” the creditors of the non-debtors. His “knowledge of some creditors was several years old”; he never asked whether one non-debtor had any creditors; and he never made any attempt to discover the creditors of two other non-debtors.

    Comment

    Logic and fairness drove the Ninth Circuit’s sensible decision. The trustee’s inconsistent strategy was obvious. When his fraudulent transfer claims based on separate entities were about to fail, he resorted to a desperate substantive consolidation motion, one based on a lack of separateness.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook. 

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2019 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Assessment of Injury: Current Issues (Actions for Compensation of Anticompetitive Practices: State of Play in France and in the Union – Paris Court of Appeal, March 28, 2019)

    ARTICLE

    Assessment of Injury: Current Issues (Actions for Compensation of Anticompetitive Practices: State of Play in France and in the Union – Paris Court of Appeal, March 28, 2019)

    September 2019

    Read time: 1 min

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  • SAMHSA Proposed Rule Would Reduce Barriers to Care Coordination

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SAMHSA Proposed Rule Would Reduce Barriers to Care Coordination

    September 10, 2019

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    SAMHSA has released a long-awaited proposed rule that would modify the federal regulations at 42 CFR Part 2 (Part 2) governing the confidentiality of substance use disorder (SUD) patient records created by federally assisted SUD treatment programs. The Proposed Rule includes several provisions aimed at reducing barriers to the coordination of care for SUD patients between Part 2 programs and non-Part 2 providers. However, HHS has called for further congressional action to remove additional statutory barriers to better aligning Part 2 with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

    In depth

    On August 26, 2019, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) published a long-awaited proposed rule (Proposed Rule) in the Federal Register that would modify the federal regulations at 42 CFR Part 2 (Part 2) governing the confidentiality of substance use disorder (SUD) patient records (Part 2 Records) created by certain federally assisted SUDs programs (Part 2 Programs). The Proposed Rule is the first of four regulations that the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) plans to release as part of its Regulatory Sprint to Coordinated Care.

    In the Proposed Rule, SAMHSA seeks to eliminate barriers to care coordination among Part 2 Programs and other health care providers, particularly in today’s health care delivery system, which increasingly aims to reward providers for effectively managing patient care across multiple care settings and penalize providers who fail to do so. Part 2 currently requires health care providers and health plans to develop strategies to remove SUD treatment information from records before sharing them with other providers or care coordinators or implement complicated processes for obtaining patients’ consent to share the records.

    The Proposed Rule seeks to achieve a “balance of policy interests” by minimizing Part 2’s disruptions to providers’ ability to share records to care for patients with SUDs, while still respecting the privacy concerns of patients seeking treatment who may be concerned about the social stigma of SUDs.

    Under the Proposed Rule, Part 2 Programs and recipients of records created by Part 2 Programs (Lawful Holders) would generally remain subject to Part 2’s limitations on using and disclosing Part 2 Records. SAMHSA did not propose further modifications to Part 2 because SAMHSA concluded it did not have the needed flexibility under the Public Health Services Act, the federal statute that authorizes Part 2. When HHS Secretary Alex Azar announced the Proposed Rule, he requested that Congress consider legislation to amend the statute to allow SAMHSA to bring Part 2 into closer alignment with the patient privacy protections of the less stringent HIPAA Privacy Rule. The Privacy Rule does not preempt requirements of state and federal privacy laws, like Part 2, that are more protective of an individual’s privacy. Proposed legislation that would address Secretary Azar’s request has been introduced in Congress and is discussed below.

    Comments on the Proposed Rule are due on October 25, 2019.

    We address the following topics below:

    • Proposed modifications to the scope of records covered by Part 2
    • Proposed changes to the Part 2 consent requirement
    • Proposed changes to remove barriers to research involving Part 2 patient identifying information
    • Proposed changes to facilitate disclosures to prescription drug monitoring programs and centralized registries
    • Congressional proposals to align Part 2 and HIPAA
    • Next steps for industry stakeholders

    Proposed modifications to scope of records covered by Part 2

    Although Part 2 only applies to Part 2 Records created by a Part 2 Program, a Lawful Holder of Part 2 Records is also prohibited from re-disclosing the Part 2 Records unless the Lawful Holder has obtained the patient’s consent. In a final rule amending Part 2 in 2018, SAMHSA clarified that Lawful Holders could re-disclose Part 2 Records to downstream agents, subcontractors and legal representatives that are assisting the Lawful Holder to carry out uses of the Part 2 Records if permitted under the scope of the original consent. Otherwise, however, Part 2 generally requires Lawful Holders to obtain consent for any re-disclosure of Part 2 Records to a subcontractor or other third party. The requirement to obtain consent for re-disclosure has caused many industry stakeholders to conclude that Part 2 impairs care coordination efforts among health care providers to the potential detriment of Part 2 patients’ health.

    The primary objective of the Proposed Rule is to clarify the extent to which health care providers that do not operate Part 2 Programs are subject to Part 2 requirements, and eliminate confusion as to the applicability of Part 2 to SUD information held by such non-Part 2 providers. The Proposed Rule would amend Part 2 to clarify that information that a non-Part 2 provider records in writing about a patient’s SUD or SUD treatment is not automatically a Part 2 Record to which Part 2’s re-disclosure prohibitions apply, so long as the non-Part 2 provider segregates Part 2 Records the provider maintains from other SUD information that the provider records in non-Part 2 records (e.g., general medical records).

    The Proposed Rule would accomplish this by amending the definition of “records” to provide that “information conveyed orally by a part 2 program to a non-part 2 provider for treatment purposes with the consent of the patient does not become a record subject to [part 2]…merely because that information is reduced to writing by that non-part 2 provider.”

    The Proposed Rule would also update Part 2’s applicability section to emphasize that the “act of recording information about a substance use disorder and its treatment does not by itself render a medical record which is created by a non-part 2 treating provider subject to the restrictions of this part 2.” SAMHSA anticipates that these proposed amendments will facilitate coordination of care for patients with SUDs by encouraging non-Part 2 providers to more freely document SUD information in medical records without the concern that those records will become subject to Part 2’s consent requirements and re-disclosure restrictions. The Proposed Rule would also potentially eliminate the need to separate SUD-related diagnosis, medication or laboratory result information from non-Part 2 medical records before sharing the information with other health care providers. Instead, non-Part 2 providers would only need to segregate copies of Part 2 Records received from Part 2 Programs.

    Notably, the Proposed Rule only discusses records retained by non-Part 2 providers and not other Lawful Holders. Health plans, for example, receive information from Part 2 Records in the form of insurance claims from Part 2 Programs and then create their own records when they process and pay the claim (e.g., claim adjudication records or remittance advice issued to providers). The Proposed Rule’s clarification does not address whether Part 2 applies to records created by Part 2 patients’ health plans. Health plans and other payer entities should consider whether to submit comments to SAMHSA requesting clarification of how the Proposed Rule impacts records created as part of the billing and payment process for Part 2 Program services, including the HIPAA-standardized electronic claim and remittance advice transactions.

    Proposed Changes to the Part 2 Consent Requirement

    The Proposed Rule would make the following changes to Part 2’s requirement to obtain consent for most disclosures or re-disclosures of Part 2 records.

    Ability to Designate Entity as Recipient under Part 2 Consent

    Currently, Part 2 Programs and Lawful Holders must obtain a consent that identifies the specific name of the individual to whom a Part 2 Program or Lawful Holder may disclose the Part 2 Records rather than the name of the recipient’s corporation or other legal entity, unless the recipient is a treating provider or a third-party payer. Under the Proposed Rule, Part 2 Programs and Lawful Holders would be permitted to obtain a consent that identifies the name of the individuals or entities for all categories of recipients. SAMHSA explained that this change, if finalized, would make it easier for patients that are seeking a disability determination, participating in a deferred prosecution program, such as a drug court, or seeking to participate in case management programs offered by third-party payers to generally consent to the disclosure of their Part 2 Records to the agencies or organizations receiving the Part 2 Records rather than specific individuals within those agencies or organizations.

    Re-Disclosures by Lawful Holder under Original Consent

    As noted above, SAMHSA modified Part 2’s consent requirements in its 2018 final rule to permit a Lawful Holder to re-disclose Part 2 Records to agents, subcontractors and legal representatives for payment and health care operations purposes (but not treatment purposes) that are consistent with the stated purpose of the original consent under which the Part 2 Program disclosed Part 2 Records to the Lawful Holder. In the 2018 final rule preamble, SAMHSA listed 17 examples of payment and health care operations activities that would be permissible for re-disclosures by Lawful Holders to subcontractors without an additional patient consent. The 17 examples mostly align with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s definitions of “payment” and “health care operations.” For example, if a Part 2 Program disclosed Part 2 Records to a third-party payer as part of a claim for payment pursuant to a consent for billing purposes, the third-party payer could re-disclose the Part 2 Records without an additional patient consent to a subcontractor that assists the third-party payer to process the claim.

    Under the Proposed Rule, SAMHSA does not propose to modify the 17 examples of payment and health care operations purposes listed in its 2018 preamble guidance, but instead proposes to move the examples into the Part 2 regulatory text to clarify that: (1) Lawful Holders may disclose Part 2 Records to subcontractors for the purposes noted in the 17 examples; and (2) the 17 examples are meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive.

    Although SAMHSA’s movement of the 17 examples to the Part 2 regulatory text may clarify that Lawful Holders can subcontract certain payment and health care operations involving Part 2 Records within the scope of the patient’s original consent, the Proposed Rule did not provide guidance on the steps that Lawful Holders (who in many cases do not have access to the consent form used by the Part 2 Program to obtain consent for the disclosure) must take to ensure the purposes stated in the original consent are sufficient to permit subcontracting.

    Re-Disclosures for Case Management and Care Coordination

    Although the 17 examples mostly align with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s definitions of payment and health care operations, SAMHSA states (consistent with its 2018 final rule preamble guidance) that it considers case management and care coordination to be treatment and not health care operations (even though the Privacy Rule includes the activities within both definitions). Consequently, third-party payers that are Lawful Holders cannot re-disclose Part 2 Records to third-party case managers or care coordinators under the original billing consent obtained by the Part 2 Program.

    Third-party payers rely on case management and care coordination to coordinate their members’ care, promote adherence to treatment and control costs. Care coordination and case management are potentially beneficial to SUD patients since they often have complex cases involving behavioral health co-morbidities and are susceptible to non-adherence to prescribed treatments. Without the original consent pathway, third-party payers must obtain a consent from their members before they disclose Part 2 Records to case managers and care coordinators—a barrier that does not exist under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Third-party payers and their care coordination subcontractors should consider submitting comments to the Proposed Rule asking SAMHSA to reconsider its determination that case management and care coordination are treatment activity rather than health coaching or other legitimate plan health care operations activities under modern payment methodologies.

    Proposed Changes to Remove Barriers to Research Involving Part 2 Patient Identifying Information

    Currently, Part 2 Programs may only disclose Part 2 patient identifying information for research without consent if the recipient of the information is a HIPAA covered entity or business associate, or is subject to the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Common Rule). Researchers that are not subject to HIPAA or the Common Rule, such as state agencies or professional associations, may only receive Part 2 patient identifying information for research pursuant to patient consent. Consequently, Part 2’s current research exception prevents such researchers from performing retrospective data studies that would typically qualify for a waiver of the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s authorization requirement and the Common Rule’s consent requirement. The Privacy Rule permits a covered entity to disclose protected health information to any researcher if the covered entity has obtained a waiver from an institutional review board or privacy board, even if the researcher is not a HIPAA covered entity or business associate.

    Under the Proposed Rule, Part 2 Programs (and Lawful Holders) that are covered entities or business associates under HIPAA could disclose Part 2 Records for research purposes in accordance with HIPAA’s disclosure pathways for research. Additionally, the Proposed Rule would permit Part 2 Programs (and Lawful Holders) to disclose Part 2 Records to researchers who are subject to Food and Drug Administration regulations on human subject research. These proposed provisions would allow Part 2 Programs and Lawful Holders to disclose Part 2 Records to a greater number of researchers and harmonize Part 2 with other HHS authorities regulating clinical research.

    Disclosures to Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs and Centralized Registries

    Part 2 does not currently permit opioid treatment programs (i.e., health care providers that provide medication-assisted treatment, such as methadone clinics) to report methadone or buprenorphine dispensing information to state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs), which gather pharmacy dispensing data to help prescribers and pharmacies prevent overdoses and detect excessive prescribing and dispensing. Recognizing that including opioid treatment program data in PDMPs could help prevent opioid overdoses, SAMHSA proposes to permit opioid treatment programs to disclose Part 2 Records concerning patient treatment in the program to PDMPs with the consent of the patient.

    Although Part 2 does not currently permit opioid treatment programs to disclose dispensing information to a PDMP, opioid treatment programs are permitted to contribute patient enrollment information to certain centralized registries aimed at preventing multiple enrollments in different programs. However, currently only opioid treatment programs may query the data from these centralized registries. The Proposed Rule would modify this provision to allow any health care provider with a treating provider relationship with a patient to query opioid treatment program centralized registries to determine whether the patient is already receiving medication-assisted treatment prior to referring them to another opioid treatment program.

    Congressional Proposals to Align Part 2 and HIPAA

    Like HHS, members of Congress recognize the need for changes to Part 2 to facilitate coordination of care and adapt it to the modern health care delivery system. Accordingly, legislation has been proposed to better align Part 2 with the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

    Senators Manchin (D-WV) and Capito (D-WV) in the Senate, and Reps. Blumenauer (D-OR) and Mullin (R-OK) in the House, reintroduced legislation that seeks to align Part 2 with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, allowing Part 2 providers to disclose Part 2 Records to HIPAA covered entities for treatment, payment and health care operations purposes without first obtaining written patient consent. The proposed legislation, titled the Overdose Prevention and Patient Safety Act in the House and the Protecting Jessica Grubb’s Legacy Act in the Senate, would otherwise maintain special confidentiality protections for Part 2 Records, including a prohibition on using the Part 2 Records in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings without a court order or the patient’s written consent. A similar bill passed the House last year on a bipartisan basis as part of the SUPPORT Act (on a 357-57 vote), but was removed by the Senate prior to passage. Two leading Republicans on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Congressman Greg Walden (R-OR) and Michael Burgess (R-TX), issued a press release following SAMHSA’s publication of the Proposed Rule advocating for Congress to pass the Overdose Prevention and Patient Safety Act.

    Next Steps

    If finalized, the Proposed Rule is likely to help non-Part 2 providers and other Lawful Holders in specific situations. Non-Part 2 providers will likely benefit from being able to separately document SUD diagnoses in their own medical records without such records becoming subject to Part 2. Third-party payers may benefit by being able to seek consent from members to disclose Part 2 Records to a care coordination entity rather than individual employees of the entity.

    However, there are several areas of the Proposed Rule that are ripe for comment and further clarification from SAMHSA—such as the ability of health plans and other Lawful Holders who are not health care providers to create separate records containing SUD information that would not be subject to Part 2. Stakeholders impacted by the Proposed Rule should consider submitting comments to SAMHSA by October 25, 2019. If you would like to submit comments, please contact the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

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