Content Type: Article

  • Mitigating OFAC Risks in Mergers and Acquisitions

    Mitigating OFAC Risks in Mergers and Acquisitions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Mitigating OFAC Risks in Mergers and Acquisitions

    February 3, 2020

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This past year marked a watershed in highlighting the U.S. sanctions risks associated with mergers and acquisitions. Both in word and in deed, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) served notice during 2019 that it expects acquirers to conduct appropriate pre-acquisition and post-acquisition due diligence on target companies, especially those located abroad. This Alert describes OFAC’s recent guidance and enforcement actions in the M&A context and identifies steps acquirers can take to mitigate sanctions risks.

    OFAC’s Compliance Framework

    In May 2019, OFAC for the first time published guidance outlining the key components of a sanctions compliance program, entitled “A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (“Framework”).[1] While not mandatory, OFAC “strongly encourages” U.S. firms and foreign firms subject to U.S. jurisdiction to employ a risk-based sanctions compliance program in accordance with the parameters set forth in the Framework.

    The Framework specifically addresses M&A, noting that in recent years, M&A “appears to have presented numerous challenges with respect to OFAC sanctions.” The Framework recommends that a company’s sanctions compliance functions be incorporated into the M&A process and when integrating the combined entities post-acquisition.

    More specifically, the Framework advises that, whether a firm is involved in an M&A deal as a participant or as an adviser, it should “engage[] in appropriate due diligence” to ensure that sanctions-related issues “are identified, escalated to the relevant senior levels, addressed prior to the conclusion of any transaction, and incorporated into the organization’s risk assessment process.”

    Post-acquisition sanctions compliance efforts are also important. “After an M&A transaction is completed,” the Framework states, “the organization’s Audit and Testing function will be critical to identifying any additional sanctions-related issues.”

    OFAC 2019 Enforcement Actions

    The concerns with M&A voiced in the Framework have been echoed in OFAC’s enforcement activity. During 2019, OFAC brought a total of 26 enforcement actions and collected $1.3 billion in penalties, both all-time highs. Six of those actions arose in the M&A context, with penalties imposed either on the basis of pre-acquisition OFAC violations by the target that were not detected during due diligence or on the basis of post-acquisition violations.

    Several common themes emerge from an analysis of these six enforcement actions.

    First, in each case, the alleged violations were committed by a foreign-based target, underscoring that, as OFAC has warned, “Foreign acquisitions can pose unique sanctions risks, to which a U.S. person parent company should be alert at all stages of its relationship with the subsidiary.”[2] Activities of foreign firms can give rise to OFAC liability in several circumstances:

    • S. Ownership or Control. Although OFAC sanctions primarily target U.S. persons, some sanctions programs also apply by their terms to non-U.S. persons that are “owned or controlled” by a U.S. person.
    • Facilitation. Even where a foreign subsidiary itself may deal with an OFAC-prohibited person or country without running afoul of OFAC sanctions, the U.S. parent — as well as any individual U.S. citizens employed either by the parent or the foreign subsidiary — are not allowed to “facilitate” such a transaction in any way.
    • Secondary Sanctions. Under some sanctions programs, OFAC has authority to impose so-called “secondary sanctions” against foreign companies that do not have U.S. ownership. This is true, for example, of OFAC’s sanctions directed against Russian oligarchs and their companies.

    Second, all six enforcement actions involved alleged violations of the Cuba sanctions program or the Iran sanctions program. That is not a coincidence. These are the most far-reaching of OFAC’s sanctions programs, particularly as they apply to foreign firms.

    • Cuba. OFAC’s Cuban Asset Control Regulations generally prohibit a “person subject to U.S. jurisdiction” — which includes a foreign company owned or controlled by a U.S. person — from engaging in transactions or dealings in any property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.[3]
    • Iran. OFAC’s Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations not only generally prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions or dealings with the government of Iran or persons ordinarily resident in Iran, but also prohibit a non-U.S. person owned or controlled by a U.S. person from “engaging in any transaction, directly or indirectly,” with the government of Iran or a person organized under the laws of Iran, ordinarily resident in Iran, or owned or controlled by such a person if the transaction would be prohibited if engaged in by a U.S. person.[4]

    Pre-acquisition, a foreign company may have been legally doing business in Cuba or Iran, or with Cuban or Iranian nationals. But the moment the acquisition closes and the target becomes U.S.-owned, those same activities will now violate OFAC sanctions. In one of the 2019 enforcement actions, the U.S. acquirer allegedly did not inform its foreign subsidiary that its Cuba-related activities were now subject to U.S. law until 15 months after the acquisition.[5]

    Third, in several cases, the U.S. acquirer learned during due diligence that the foreign target was doing business in Cuba or Iran, and took steps to ensure that the activity ceased post-closing. Nevertheless, personnel at the target continued to engage in Cuban or Iranian transactions despite the fact that such transactions, by virtue of its U.S. ownership, were now unlawful.

    In OFAC’s words, these enforcement actions “highlight[] the importance for U.S. companies to conduct sanctions-related due diligence both prior and subsequent to mergers and acquisitions,” and “to take appropriate steps to audit, monitor, and verify newly acquired subsidiaries and affiliates for OFAC compliance.” In particular: “Testing of compliance procedures and timely auditing of subsidiaries can mitigate the risk of exposure to U.S. sanctions violations.”[6]

    Risk Mitigation Measures

    Now more than ever, it is vital for U.S. acquirers to consider sanctions risks and incorporate sanctions risk mitigation measures both in their pre-acquisition due diligence and in their post-acquisition integration of the target.

    Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence

    During due diligence, the acquirer should ascertain whether the target does any business in, or with, any OFAC-prohibited jurisdictions or persons on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals. OFAC currently has sanctions programs impacting 22 different countries, territories and regions, among the most notable of which are Cuba, Iran, Russia and Venezuela.[7] Not all OFAC programs broadly prohibit dealings in or with a particular country; some are narrowly targeted at particular government officials and agencies or particular persons or industry sectors. Even the more comprehensive sanctions programs contain exceptions and licenses for certain activities.

    If the target is doing business with OFAC-prohibited parties, even if legally because it is a foreign firm not subject to OFAC sanctions, the acquirer must, if such activity would become illegal upon the closing, ensure that the business is shut down prior to the closing. If the target will continue to engage in such business post-closing (because the business does not involve Cuba or Iran and is otherwise legal for a non-U.S. person), steps should nonetheless be taken to “wall off” any U.S. persons from involvement in that business, as such involvement could constitute prohibited “facilitation” by U.S. persons.

    The acquirer should understand the target’s sanctions-related obligations and whether the target has a sanctions compliance program, including whether it has written policies and procedures and whether it conducts screening of counterparties. Any written policies and procedures should be reviewed, and diligence performed as to the extent to which they have been actually implemented. This includes, among other things, whether appropriate personnel have been required to read and certify compliance with the policy, and have received sanctions-related training.

    Having visibility into the target’s existing ownership structure and screening the names of the selling shareholders against OFAC’s list of prohibited persons is also essential to ensure that the acquisition transaction itself does not run afoul of U.S. sanctions.

    Contractual Representations

    Contractual representations from the seller are also important. Even though they do not obviate the risk of successor liability, contractual representations further evidence the acquirer’s efforts to ensure that the target is not engaged in prohibited dealings and that its shareholders, officers and directors are not prohibited persons. In some cases, an indemnity from the seller may be sought with respect to the financial consequences of prior violations in the event that the representations prove to be inaccurate.

    Self-Reporting of Violations

    If due diligence discloses that the target may have engaged in a violation of OFAC sanctions, the acquirer will need to ensure that the violations cease and take any appropriate remedial actions. Remedial actions could include an internal investigation, termination of contracts, disciplinary action against employees involved in the violation, and enhancements to compliance policies and procedures.

    The acquirer will also want to consider whether the apparent violations should be voluntarily disclosed to the government. Both OFAC and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) encourage self-reporting of sanctions violations. Under OFAC’s publicly issued Enforcement Guidelines, companies that voluntarily self-disclose a violation are eligible for a 50% reduction in the “base penalty” amount (which can be increased or decreased based on a variety of factors).[8]

    For its part, the DOJ issued a revised sanctions enforcement policy late last year creating a presumption that a company that voluntarily self-discloses violations will receive a non-prosecution agreement and not be required to pay a fine. Among the circumstances where the policy applies is “[w]hen a company undertakes a merger or acquisition, uncovers misconduct by the merged or acquired entity through thorough and timely due diligence or, in appropriate instances, through post-acquisition audits or compliance integration efforts, and voluntarily self-discloses the misconduct and otherwise takes action consistent with this Policy.”[9]

    Post-Acquisition Compliance

    Finally, OFAC compliance does not cease upon the closing of the acquisition. Continued monitoring and auditing of the target’s business from a sanctions perspective is key. Consideration should be given to folding the target’s business into the acquirer’s existing sanctions compliance program. If not, the acquirer should ensure that the target has, or puts into place, its own appropriate risk-based sanctions compliance program.

    As noted above, special attention should be paid to foreign targets that previously operated free from having to comply with OFAC sanctions. Their employees may have little or no awareness of OFAC’s restrictions and will have to be educated, trained and, if they previously did business in prohibited jurisdictions, monitored to make sure those activities are not resumed.

    Non-Controlling Investments

    Non-Controlling minority investments also pose OFAC risks. While such an investment would not result in the foreign firm itself generally being subject to OFAC sanctions, the U.S. investor and its personnel remain subject to the prohibition on “facilitation” and thus cannot be involved in transactions involving OFAC prohibited jurisdictions. Furthermore, while investing in a foreign company that does a relatively de minimis amount of business in Cuba or Iran (or another OFAC prohibited jurisdiction) would not necessarily violate OFAC sanctions, companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction face potential liability if they make investments for the purpose of facilitating the target’s business in a prohibited jurisdiction or in firms that conduct a disproportionate amount of their business in prohibited jurisdictions.

    Authored by Gary Stein, Betty Santangelo, Peter H. White, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Jennifer M. Opheim and Hannah M. Thibideau.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments” (May 2, 2019), available here. SRZ’s prior Alert on the Framework, “OFAC Update: A Framework for Compliance and Recent Settlements,” is available here.

    [2] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Enforcement Information for June 13, 2019 (Expedia Group, Inc.), available here.

    [3] 31 C.F.R. Part 515, and in particular §§ 515.201 and 515.329.

    [4] 31 C.F.R. Part 560, and in particular §§ 560.201, 560.204, 560.206 and 560.215.

    [5] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Enforcement Information for June 13, 2019 (Expedia Group, Inc.), available here.

    [6] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Enforcement Information for March 27, 2019 (Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.), available here (emphasis added).

    [7] The jurisdictions affected include the Western Balkans, Belarus, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Crimea, Cuba, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

    [8] 31 C.F.R. Part 501, Appendix A (Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines).

    [9] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Export Control and Sanctions Enforcement Policy for Business Organizations” (Dec. 13, 2019), available here. SRZ’s prior Alert on the revised policy, “Sanctions Update: DOJ Revises Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy for Export Control and Sanctions Violations,” is available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Private Funds — Impact of the Wuhan Novel Coronavirus on January NAV Calculations: Challenges for Private Fund Managers

    Private Funds — Impact of the Wuhan Novel Coronavirus on January NAV Calculations: Challenges for Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Private Funds — Impact of the Wuhan Novel Coronavirus on January NAV Calculations: Challenges for Private Fund Managers

    January 31, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    While the financial impact of the Wuhan Novel Coronavirus is still incalculable (as, of course, is the human cost), many private fund managers may find themselves forced to perform some kind of assessment.

    As today is the end of the month, many managers are required to calculate a net asset value that will serve as the basis for investor reporting, management fee calculations and subscription or redemption prices. With China’s equities and futures exchanges closed (reports indicate that most Chinese exchanges are scheduled to open on Monday, Feb. 3, 2020, albeit with reduced staffing), managers with funds and client accounts that are exposed to China need to consider how this impacts their valuation obligations. This situation will have different levels of impact: Advisers to Asia-focused funds are more likely to be substantially affected by these closures, while other managers may be able to determine that there is no material effect on their funds.

    For those managers who need to cut a month-end NAV, we expect that they will find that they need to rely on a “fair value” valuation process for assets that are otherwise considered (under applicable accounting rules) to be Level 1 or Level 2 assets (and which are typically valued by reference to exchange-quoted prices), especially bearing in mind there has been no trading on such markets since they closed for the Lunar New Year on Jan. 25, 2020.

    Such managers should consider the full range of options available and the various sources of data that might be employed in undertaking a fair value pricing, which might include — among others — Monday’s opening prices (if there is an orderly opening on Monday), activity in China- and Asia-focused futures contracts that are actively trading in non-Chinese marketplaces, trading of Chinese names on secondary exchanges, trading of comparable non-Chinese securities and bespoke or industry models. Managers also should consider evaluating their options with their auditors. Of course, for funds with material exposure to suspended markets, it may make sense to defer February subscriptions (although this does not help in terms of previously scheduled redemptions) or even to push back the valuation point to Monday (assuming an orderly opening on Monday).

    While there are numerous options to consider, managers should start by reviewing their existing obligations, and consider whether any of the following steps are appropriate:

    • Review constitutional documents or other client agreements (including side letters) and disclosure documents to ascertain what options are available and, in particular, what requirements might apply in respect of a fair value calculation;
    • Perform a similar exercise with the adviser’s valuation policy and any desk policies to isolate the specific requirements and constraints on any fair valuation process; and
    • Consider reviewing the proposed course of action with on and offshore counsel, as well as the fund auditors, external administrator and fund/GP board of directors (as applicable).

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Regulatory Agencies Request Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Volcker Rule Which Will Affect Collateralized Loan Obligations

    Regulatory Agencies Request Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Volcker Rule Which Will Affect Collateralized Loan Obligations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Regulatory Agencies Request Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Volcker Rule Which Will Affect Collateralized Loan Obligations

    January 31, 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 30, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (collectively, “Agencies”) requested comments on proposed amendments to the regulations implementing section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act (commonly referred to as the “Volcker Rule”)[1]. Several of the proposed revisions to the Volcker Rule (“Proposed Amendments”) will affect collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”). The Proposed Amendments are the follow-up to a notice of proposed revisions to the Volcker Rule originally published by the Agencies in July 2018 (“2018 Notice”)[2] and address comments received from CLO market participants in response to the 2018 Notice.

    In the 2018 Notice, the Agencies solicited feedback on a number of provisions of the Volcker Rule affecting CLOs, including the Volcker Rule’s “covered fund” definition (which limits investments in CLOs by banking entities covered by section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act), as well as the “loan securitization exclusion” and “ownership interests” in covered funds generally.

    Although the Proposed Amendments do not directly address all of the issues on which the Agencies requested comment in the 2018 Notice, they do propose a number of important changes that will affect the application of the Volcker Rule to CLOs:

    • The Proposed Amendments would modify the loan securitization exclusion to permit a loan securitization to hold up to 5% of its assets in non-loan assets. This would allow CLOs that rely upon the loan securitization exclusion to invest up to 5% of their assets in bonds, notes, letters of credit and other non-loan assets;
    • The Proposed Amendments would also modify the definition of “ownership interest” to make clear that “creditors’ remedies,” upon the occurrence of an event of default or an acceleration event under a debt instrument, include the right to participate in the removal of a CLO’s collateral manager for cause, as well as in the replacement of a CLO’s collateral manager following its resignation or removal, and will not give rise to a banking entity having an ownership interest in a covered fund; and
    • The Proposed Amendments would further amend the definition of “ownership interest” to create a safe harbor for “ordinary debt instruments” that were never intended to confer an ownership interest in the borrower to the holders of such debt instruments. Under the Proposed Amendments, senior loans or other senior debt interests would not be treated as “ownership interests” in a covered fund if:
      1. The holders of any such interest does not participate in the profits of the covered fund, but receive only interest payments that are not dependent on the performance of the covered fund and a fixed principal payment on or prior to a stated maturity date;
      2. The entitlement to payments on the interest payable to the holders of any such interest is absolute and not contingent (i.e., not subject to write-down or other adjustments arising from losses incurred by the covered fund); and
      3. The holders of any such interest are not entitled to receive the underlying assets of the covered fund or any residual assets remaining after the repayment in full of all other interests (excluding creditor rights to exercise remedies upon an event of default or an event giving rise to acceleration).

    A copy of the Proposed Amendments is available at:
    https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/files/volcker-rule-fr-notice-20200130.pdf. Comments to the Proposed Amendments are required to be submitted to the Agencies by April 1, 2020.

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Craig Stein, Daniel V. Oshinsky, Paul N. Watterson, Jr., James V. Williams, III and Adam M. Singer.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5808 (Jan. 31, 2014).

    [2] Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. 137 (July 17, 2018).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Daniel V. Oshinsky

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Paul N. Watterson, Jr.

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam M. Singer

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Federal Reserve Provides Greater Clarity and Flexibility for Noncontrolling Investments in (and by) Banking Organizations

    Federal Reserve Provides Greater Clarity and Flexibility for Noncontrolling Investments in (and by) Banking Organizations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Reserve Provides Greater Clarity and Flexibility for Noncontrolling Investments in (and by) Banking Organizations

    January 31, 2020

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 30, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board (“Board”) issued a final rule (to be published in 12 C.F.R. Parts 225 and 238) (“Final Rule”)[1] revising the Board’s regulations governing determinations of whether a company “controls” another company for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”)[2] or the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”).[3] While the Final Rule is largely consistent with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the Board in April 2019 (“Proposed Rule”),[4] it does contain certain modifications as further discussed herein. The Final Rule is effective April 1, 2020.

    The Final Rule codifies much of the Board’s historical practice regarding control determinations, which did not appear in the Board’s regulations and, therefore, was primarily known only by experienced practitioners. As indicated by the Board:

    The Board believes that the final rule, which is largely consistent with the proposal, will increase the transparency and consistency of the Board’s control framework. As a result, the final rule should help facilitate permissible investments in banking organizations and by banking organizations.

    However, under certain circumstances, the Final Rule also significantly expands the relationships and rights an investor could have while still being deemed noncontrolling.

    We expect these changes will make investments in bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies and depository institutions (collectively, “Banking Organizations”) more attractive to investors (including private equity funds, hedge funds and activist investors) and better facilitate joint ventures and minority investments by Banking Organizations.[5]

    Why Is Being Deemed Noncontrolling Important?

    Under U.S. banking law, an entity that is deemed to control a Banking Organization must register as a holding company with the Board. Becoming a holding company subjects the entity to regulatory supervision, capital requirements, “source of strength” obligations and potentially significant activity and investment restrictions. Similarly, if a Banking Organization is deemed to control another entity, that entity will generally become subject to the laws applicable to the Banking Organization.

    How Does the Final Rule Change the Level of Investment and/or Involvement Permissible for a Noncontrolling Investor?

    Under the BHCA, a company has control over another company if the first company (i) directly or indirectly, or acting through one or more other persons owns, controls or has power to vote 25% or more of any class of voting securities of the other company; (ii) controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors of the other company; or (iii) directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management or policies of the other company.[6] HOLA contains a substantially similar test for control.[7]

    However, under the Board’s recent historical practice applying the third prong, an entity possessing as little as 5% of any class of a second entity’s voting stock or 25% of its total equity (even if it does not hold any voting rights) could also be deemed a controlling shareholder, depending on its overall relationship with the second entity. The Final Rule provides increased flexibility in several areas that would allow noncontrolling investors to maintain increased total equity stakes and greater relationships without being deemed to be in control of an entity. The chart below provides a brief summary of the Board’s historical practice with regard to the major potential indicia of control and the changes contained in the Final Rule. It is important to note, however, that most of the lines drawn by the Final Rule are merely presumptions. Thus, the Board retains the discretion to find (after notice and opportunity for hearing) that a particular situation amounts to control based on the totality of the circumstances, despite the applicability of one or more presumptions of noncontrol.

    Potential Indicia of Control

    Recent Historical Practice

    Final Rule’s Presumptions

    Total Equity Investments up to 33% of total equity generally are viewed as noncontrolling, so long as the investor does not hold 15% or more of any class of voting securities (or instruments convertible/exercisable into such voting securities).

    Bank Holding Companies (“BHCs”). Investments up to 33% of total equity are viewed as noncontrolling, regardless of the investor’s voting interest, unless the investor separately triggers some other conclusive or presumptive indicia of control.

    Savings and Loan Holding Companies (“SLHCs”). Investments up to 25% of total equity are viewed as noncontrolling, regardless of the investor’s voting interest, unless the investor separately triggers some other conclusive or presumptive indicia of control.

    The Final Rule is different from the Proposed Rule in that it establishes a single total equity threshold for investors (and differs for BHCs and SLHCs), regardless of their voting interest, while the Proposed Rule provided for no change to historical practice.

    Board Representation

    1. Number of Seats
    2. Role
    3. Committee Service
    1. In theory, noncontrolling investors with less than 10% of any class of voting securities are permitted to have multiple board representatives, so long as they do not constitute a majority of the board. (However, in practice, such investors have typically been subject to further restrictions.) Noncontrolling investors with 10% or more, but less than 25%, of any class of voting securities are permitted to have one board representative (and one observer) and still be viewed as noncontrolling. Additionally, in theory, the investor may have two board seats without being deemed to control, so long as (a) there is at least one other shareholder with a greater interest and that larger shareholder is a registered holding company; (b) the two seats would not constitute more than 25% of the board’s voting members; and (c) the two seats would be proportionate to the investors total interest.
    2. A noncontrolling investor’s representative may not serve as the chairman of the board or, in general, of any committee.
    3. A noncontrolling investor’s representative may not represent more than 25% of any committee and may not serve on any committee that has the power to bind the board.
    1. Noncontrolling investors with less than 5% of any class of voting securities would be permitted to have representatives constituting less than 50% of the total board seats. Investors with greater voting rights, but less than 25% of any class of voting securities would be permitted to have representatives constituting less than 25% of the board. (Each of the foregoing presumptions assumes that the investor’s representatives would not have the power to unilaterally make or block major decisions.)
    2. Noncontrolling investors with less than 15% of any class of voting securities would be permitted to have a representative serve as chairman of the board or of any committee. Noncontrolling investors with greater voting rights would not be permitted to have a representative serve as chairman of the board (or presumably any committee that has the power to bind the board (and possibly all committees), although the Final Rule does not explicitly discuss chairing committees).
    3. Noncontrolling investors with less than 10% of any class of voting securities would not have any limitations regarding representation on committees. Noncontrolling investors with greater voting rights would not be permitted to have representatives constituting more than 25% of any committee that has the power to bind the board.
    Proxy Solicitations In general, noncontrolling investors with 10% or more of any class of voting securities have not been permitted to solicit proxies. Moreover, noncontrolling investors with smaller voting interest have not been permitted to solicit proxies to elect more than one board representative and one independent nominee (although there have been certain exceptions where an investor has put forth greater number of independent nominees). All noncontrolling investors would be permitted to solicit proxies in support of shareholder proposals. Noncontrolling investors with 10% or more of any class of voting securities would not be permitted to solicit proxies to elect opposition board candidates who would constitute 25% or more of the total board. Noncontrolling investors with smaller voting interests would not have any explicit limit on their ability to nominate, and solicit proxies in favor of, opposition board candidates.
    Consultations with Management Noncontrolling investors may communicate with management and advocate for changes, so long as there is no explicit or implicit threat to sell shares (or solicit proxies) to influence management’s decisions (especially for investors holding 10% or more of any class of voting securities). Threats to dispose of securities would not necessarily be presumed to be inconsistent with noncontrol.
    Covenants Covenants that substantially limit the discretion of the target over operational or policy decisions (e.g., regarding hiring, firing, executive compensation, operations, raising debt and equity, merging, consolidating, acquiring assets and companies, etc.) are viewed as suggesting control. In contrast, covenants that were limited to matters that would affect the rights or preference of an investor’s interest (e.g., regarding issuing senior securities, borrowing on a senior basis, modifying the terms a security or liquidating the target) were not viewed as indicia of control. No material change for noncontrolling investors with 5% or more of any class of voting securities. Noncontrolling investors with smaller voting interests would be permitted to substantially limit the discretion of the target over certain operational or policy decisions but would not be permitted to hold rights that enable them to exercise significant influence or discretion over the core operations or general management of the target.
    Business Relationships Business relationships between a noncontrolling investor and the target should remain limited, and the Board reviews such relationships on a case by case basis. Factors of such review include whether the relationship will be on market terms, non-exclusive and terminable without penalty by the target.

    Noncontrolling investors with less than 5% of any class of voting securities would not have any explicit limit on their business relationships with a target. Noncontrolling investors with 5% or more, but less than 10%, of any class of voting securities would be permitted to engage in business that did not represent 10% or more of the target’s annual revenue or expenses. Noncontrolling investors with 10% or more, but less than 15%, of any class of voting securities would be permitted to engage in business that was on market terms and did not represent 5% or more of the target’s annual revenue or expenses. Noncontrolling investors with 15% or more, but less than 25%, of any class of voting securities would be permitted to engage in business that was on market terms and did not represent 2% or more of the target’s annual revenue or expenses.

    The Final Rule differs from the Proposed Rule in that it only takes into account the significance of the business relationship from the perspective of the target, not from the perspective of both the investor and the target.

    Senior Management Interlocks Noncontrolling investors with 10% or more of any class of voting securities are not permitted to have any of their employees or directors serve as a management official of the target. No explicit restriction exists with regard to management interlocks involving investors with lesser voting interests. Noncontrolling investors with 5% or more, but less than 15%, of any class of voting securities would be permitted to have a single employee/director serve as a senior management official (excluding the CEO) of the target. No explicit management interlock restrictions would apply to noncontrolling investors with lesser voting interests.

    Authored by Joseph P. Vitale and Jessica Romano.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

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  • Schrems II: Accountability Balances Adequacy with Standard Contractual Clauses

    Schrems II: Accountability Balances Adequacy with Standard Contractual Clauses

    ARTICLE

    Schrems II: Accountability Balances Adequacy with Standard Contractual Clauses

    January 30, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
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  • Up, Up and Away: 2020 Increased Penalties for Employee Benefit Plans

    Up, Up and Away: 2020 Increased Penalties for Employee Benefit Plans

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Up, Up and Away: 2020 Increased Penalties for Employee Benefit Plans

    January 30, 2020

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    For 2020, legislation enacted in December of 2019 dramatically increases penalties imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) for late filing of certain employee benefit plan notices and reports. In addition, a final rule published by the Department of Labor (DOL) makes inflation adjustments to a wide range of penalties. This article compiles the penalty amounts that apply beginning in 2020.

    In depth

    Sharply Increased Internal Revenue Code Penalties

    To raise government revenue, the Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act of 2019 (SECURE Act) increases tenfold the penalties for failure to:

    1. Timely file a plan’s annual return on IRS Form 5500;
    2. Timely file notice of a plan merger, transfer of assets or spin-off on IRS Form 5310-A;
    3. Timely file the registration statement for deferred vested benefits under a retirement plan on IRS Form 8955-SSA;
    4. Timely file notification of certain changes in a plan’s registration information on IRS Form 5500; and
    5. Timely provide a required withholding notice to retirement plan participants on IRS Form W-4P.

    A late filing of Form 5500 may result in penalties under both ERISA and the Code. For Form 5500, penalty relief may be available under the DOL’s Delinquent Filer Voluntary Compliance Program, and that relief may result in IRS penalty relief.

    The SECURE Act’s increased penalties are generally effective for returns, statements and notices required after December 31, 2019. The table below compares penalty amounts before and after the SECURE Act.

     

    INTERNAL REVENUE CODE PENALTIES
    Code Penalty Section Description of Code Violations Subject to Penalty 2019 Penalty Amount 2020 Penalty Amount
    Code §6652(e) Failure to timely file annual report (Form 5500) under Code §6058. $25 per day, up to $15,000 $250 per day, up to $150,000
    Code §6652(e) Failure to timely file a notice of plan merger, spin-off or asset transfer (Form 5310-A) under Code §6058. $25 per day, up to $15,000 $250 per day, up to $150,000
    Code §6652(d)(1) Failure to timely file the registration statement for deferred vested benefits (Form 8955-SSA) under Code § 6057(a). $1 per participant per day, up to $5,000 $10 per participant per day, up to $50,000
    Code §6652(d)(2) Failure to timely file notification of certain changes (Form 5500) in a plan’s information (name, plan administrator, plan termination, plan merger or spin-off) under Code § 6057(b). $1 per day, up to $1,000 $10 per day, up to $10,000
    Code §6652(h) Failure to timely provide a required withholding notice (Form W-4P) under Code § 3405(e)(10)(B). $10 per failure, up to $5,000 per year $100 per failure, up to $50,000 per year

    Inflation Adjusted Penalties Announced by the Department of Labor

    The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 2015 directs the DOL to make annual inflation adjustments for penalties due to specified ERISA violations. The increased penalties generally apply to reporting and disclosure failures if the penalty is assessed after January 15, 2020, and if the violation occurred after November 2, 2015. The table below compares penalty amounts assessed for violations after January 23, 2019, through January 15, 2020 (the column labeled 2019 Penalty Amount), to penalty amounts assessed after January 15, 2020 (the column labeled 2020 Penalty Amount).

     

    DOL PENALTIES
    ERISA Penalty Statute Description of ERISA Violations Subject to Penalty 2019 Penalty Amount 2020 Penalty Amount
    ERISA §209(b) Failure to furnish reports (e.g., pension benefit statements) to certain former participants and beneficiaries or maintain records. $30 per affected participant and beneficiary $31 per affected participant and beneficiary
    ERISA §502(c)(2) Failure or refusal to properly file annual report (Form 5500) required by ERISA §104; and

    Failure of a multiemployer plan to certify endangered or critical status under ERISA §305(b)(3)(C) treated as a failure to file annual report.

    Up to $2,194 per day Up to $2,233 per day
    ERISA §502(c)(4) Failure to notify participants under ERISA §10(j) of certain benefit restrictions and/or limitations arising under Internal Revenue Code §436;

    Failure to furnish certain multiemployer plan financial and actuarial reports upon request under ERISA §101(k);

    Failure to furnish estimate of withdrawal liability upon request under ERISA §101(l); and

    Failure to furnish automatic contribution arrangement notice under ERISA §514(e)(3).

    Up to $1,736 per day per affected participant Up to $1,767 per day per affected participant
    ERISA §502(c)(5) Failure of a multiple employer welfare arrangement to file report required by regulations issued under ERISA §101(g). Up to $1,597 per day Up to $1,625 per day
    ERISA §502(c)(6) Failure to furnish information requested by the Secretary of Labor under ERISA §104(a)(6). Up to $156 per day, not to exceed $1,566 per request Up to $159 per day, not to exceed $1,594 per request
    ERISA §502(c)(7) Failure of a defined contribution plan to furnish a blackout notice under ERISA §101(i) or a notice of the right to divest employer securities under ERISA §101(m). Up to $139 per day per affected participant Up to $141 per day per affected participant
    ERISA §502(c)(8) Failure by a plan sponsor of a multi-employer plan in endangered status to adopt a funding improvement plan or a multiemployer plan in critical status to adopt a rehabilitation plan. Penalty also applies to a plan sponsor of an endangered status plan (other than a seriously endangered plan) that fails to meet its benchmark by the end of the funding improvement period. Up to $1,378 per day Up to $1,402 per day
    ERISA §502(c)(9)(A) Failure by an employer to inform employees of Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) coverage opportunities under ERISA §701(f)(3)(B)(i)(l). Up to $117 per day per affected employee Up to $119 per day per affected employee
    ERISA §502(c)(9)(B) Failure by a plan administrator to timely provide to any State the information required to be disclosed regarding coverage coordination under ERISA §701(f)(3)(B)(ii). Up to $117 per day per affected participant and beneficiary Up to $119 per day per affected participant and beneficiary
    ERISA §502(c)(10)(B)(i) Failure by any plan sponsor of a group health plan, or any health insurance issuer offering health insurance coverage in connection with the plan, to meet the requirements of ERISA §§702(a)(1)(F), (b)(3), (c) or (d); or §701; or §702(b)(1) with respect to genetic information. $117 per day during non-compliance period $119 per day during non-compliance period
    ERISA §502(c)(10)(C)(i) Minimum penalty for de minimis failures to meet genetic information requirements not corrected prior to notice from the Secretary of Labor. $2,919 minimum $2,970 minimum
    ERISA §502(c)(10)(C)(ii) Minimum penalty for failures to meet genetic information requirements which are not corrected prior to notice from the Secretary of Labor and are more than de minimis. $17,515 minimum $17,824 minimum
    ERISA §502(c)(10)(D)(iii)(ll) Cap on penalty for unintentional failures to meet genetic information requirements. $583,830 maximum $594,129 maximum
    ERISA §502(c)(12) Failure of Cooperative and Small Employer Charity Act (CSEC) plan sponsor to establish or update a funding restoration plan. Up to $107 per day Up to $109 per day
    ERISA §502(m) Defined benefit distribution prohibited by ERISA §206(e) due to an impermissible forfeiture following withdrawal of a participant’s contributions. Amount distributed but not more than $16,915 per distribution Amount distributed but not more than $17,213 per distribution
    ERISA §715 Failure by a group health plan to provide Summary of Benefits Coverage under Public Health Services Act §2715(f), as incorporated into ERISA §715 and 29 CFR 2590.715-2715(e). Up to $1,156 per failure Up to $1,176 per failure

    For more information on any of these potential penalties, please contact your McDermott lawyer or one of the below listed authors.

    Authors

    Alan D. Nesburg

    Counsel

    Chicago

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  • Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2020

    Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2020

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Increased HSR Act Thresholds Announced for 2020

    January 30, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended (“HSR Act”), requires parties to acquisitions of voting securities, assets or non-corporate interests meeting certain thresholds to make a premerger notification to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and to observe a waiting period prior to consummating such acquisitions. On Jan. 28, 2020, the FTC announced its annual adjustments to the current HSR Act thresholds. Any transaction that will be consummated on or after the February 2020 effective date of such adjustments may be reportable under the HSR Act if, as a result of such transaction, the acquiring person will hold voting securities, assets and/or non-corporate interests of the acquired person valued above $94 million (the current adjusted minimum threshold is $90 million). The new adjusted thresholds reflect changes in the gross national product for the preceding fiscal year. The size-of-person threshold looks at the total sales or assets of each party to a transaction, including its ultimate parent and certain affiliates, and is also being increased.

    The updated size-of-transaction and size-of-person thresholds under the HSR Act are set forth below:

    Threshold

    HSR Act Original

    2020 Adjusted

    Size-of-transaction when
    size-of-person test applies
    $50 million $94 million
    Size-of-person (if applicable) $10 million and $100 million $18.8 million and $188 million
    Size-of-transaction above which size-of-person test does not apply $200 million $376 million

     

    The filing fees applicable to premerger notifications filed under the HSR Act have not changed in over a decade and will continue as follows:

    Size-of-Transaction (as adjusted)

    Filing Fee

    Valued at greater than $94 million but less than $188 million $45,000
    Valued at $188 million or greater but less than $940.1 million $125,000
    Valued at $940.1 million or greater $280,000

     

    When a premerger notification has been filed under the HSR Act, and the applicable waiting period has expired or been terminated, any additional acquisitions by the same acquiring person of the same issuer’s voting securities will be exempt from notification, so long as:

    • The acquiring person’s holdings crossed the notification threshold with respect to which the premerger notification was made, within one year of the expiration or early termination of the HSR Act waiting period; and
    • The subsequent acquisition is consummated within five years following the expiration or early termination of the HSR Act waiting period;

    unless a higher notification level is met or exceeded. The various notification levels are set forth below:

    HSR Act Original

    2020 Adjusted

    $50 million $94 million
    $100 million $188 million
    $500 million $940.1 million
    25% if value of voting securities to be held is greater than $1 billion 25% if value of voting securities to be held is greater than $1,880.2 million
    50% if value of voting securities to be held is greater than $50 million 50% if value of voting securities to be held is greater than $94 million

     

    Any subsequent acquisition would be subject to the adjusted thresholds in effect when such subsequent acquisition is consummated.

    On Jan. 13, 2020, the FTC announced that the maximum civil penalty for violation of the HSR Act reporting requirements has been increased from $42,430 to $43,280 per day.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz and Gregory L. Kinzelman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Agencies Publish Proposed Volcker 2.0 for Fund Activities

    Agencies Publish Proposed Volcker 2.0 for Fund Activities

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Agencies Publish Proposed Volcker 2.0 for Fund Activities

    January 30, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 30, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (collectively, the “Agencies”) asked for comment on a proposed rule (“Proposal”) to simplify and tailor compliance requirements relating to section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act, commonly known as the “Volcker Rule.”[1] A copy of the Proposal is available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/files/volcker-rule-fr-notice-20200130.pdf.

    In November 2019, the Agencies finalized certain amendments to the “proprietary trading” provisions of the Volcker Rule and stated that they would propose a separate rulemaking regarding the “covered fund” provisions. As indicated by the Fed, the Proposal is intended to clarify and streamline the covered fund-related provisions of the regulations by:

    • Limiting the extraterritorial impact of the rule on foreign funds offered by foreign banks to foreign individuals;
    • Permitting certain low-risk transactions (including intraday credit and payment, clearing, and settlement transactions) between a banking entity and covered funds for which the banking entity serves as investment adviser or sponsor;
    • Simplifying existing provisions of the rule related to foreign public funds, loan securitizations, and small business investment companies;
    • Permitting banking entities to invest in or sponsor certain types of funds that do not raise the concerns the Volcker Rule was intended to address, such as credit funds, venture capital funds, customer facilitation funds, and family wealth management vehicles;
    • Clarifying that credit exposures to a covered fund would generally not constitute ownership interests under the Volcker Rule; and
    • Clarifying that parallel direct investments made by a banking entity in the same underlying investments as a sponsored covered fund are not deemed to be investments in the fund itself.

    The Proposal spans more than 160 pages (in its original format) and poses 87 separate questions on which it solicits comments (many with multiple subparts). Comments will be due by April 1, 2020. 

    SRZ is reviewing the full Proposal and will issue further Alerts, including a detailed summary of its provisions. In the meantime, if you have any questions concerning this Alert, or would like help drafting or submitting any comments, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    Authored by Joseph P. Vitale and Jessica Romano.


     [1] The Volcker Rule was part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and restricts the proprietary trading and private investment fund activities of U.S. banks and their worldwide affiliates, as well as foreign banks with banking operations in the United States and their worldwide affiliates. Regulations implementing the Volcker Rule were finalized and jointly promulgated by the Agencies in December 2013.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Insider Trading Law in Flux — What Advisers Need to Know

    Insider Trading Law in Flux — What Advisers Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Insider Trading Law in Flux — What Advisers Need to Know

    January 29, 2020

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “For too long,” a task force on insider trading headed by former U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara concluded in a report issued this week, “insider trading law has lacked clarity, generated confusion, and failed to keep up with the times.”[1] The unusual “uncertainty and ambiguity” of insider trading law, the report explains, is attributable to the fact that it has been fashioned by courts without the benefit of any statutory definition of insider trading.[2] As a result, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have spent decades exercising their discretion over what cases to bring, how to charge them and which judicial construct of the law best suits their objectives.

    Two recent developments, one legislative and one judicial, seek to bring clarity to the law of insider trading. However, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will in fact clarify the law or will instead create new confusion.

    Insider Trading Prohibition Act

    In December 2019, with overwhelming bipartisan support (410-13), the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Insider Trading Prohibition Act (“ITPA”) in an effort to simplify the law of insider trading and address certain of its inconsistencies. The ITPA would amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,[3] creating civil and criminal liability for:

    (A) Any person who buys or sells securities[4] while aware of material non-public information relating to such security, or any nonpublic information, from whatever source, that has or would reasonably be expected to have, a material effect on the market price of any such security, if the person knows or recklessly disregards that the information has been obtained wrongfully or that such trading would constitute a wrongful use of the information; and

    (B) Any person, if that person’s own purchase or sale of a security would violate section (A), to provide such material non-public information to another if it is reasonably foreseeable that the recipient will buy or sell securities or communicate the information to another person who will buy or sell securities.

    Wrongfully obtained information, per the ITPA, includes information obtained by virtue of:

    • Theft, bribery, misrepresentation or espionage;
    • A violation of any federal law protecting computer data or the intellectual property or privacy of computer users;
    • Conversion, misappropriation or other unauthorized and deceptive taking of information; or
    • Breach of any fiduciary duty, confidentiality agreement, contract, code of conduct or ethics policy or any other personal or other relationship of trust and confidence for a direct or indirect personal benefit (including pecuniary gain, reputational benefit or a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend).

    If enacted into law, the ITPA would make it easier in certain respects for the government to bring insider trading cases. For example, the legislation prohibits trading while “aware” of material non-public information, irrespective of whether the trader “used” the information in his or her trading decision (in fact, the House rejected a proposed amendment to incorporate a “use” standard). An existing SEC regulation, Rule 10b5-1, provides that the government need only show the defendant’s “awareness” of the information, but in the absence of clear statutory language some courts have required a showing of “use” as well, particularly in criminal cases. In addition, the ITPA explicitly allows for mere recklessness to satisfy the government’s burden of proof, specifying that liability may be found if a trader either “was aware, consciously avoided being aware or recklessly disregarded” that material non-public information was wrongfully obtained, improperly used or wrongfully communicated.

    For advisers, what might appear to be subtle changes in pleading requirements will have real implications. Advisers will need to conduct due diligence with respect to any information received that may have been wrongfully obtained. If the source of information is a former company executive, expert, consultant or any other person who may have received information from someone in one of these groups, advisers should inquire, at a minimum, about (1) the confidentiality of the information; (2) the source of the information; and (3) whether the source was authorized to share the information. Failure to inquire may be considered tantamount to conscious avoidance or reckless disregard, so advisers should ask questions and document the responses to be able to show robust processes.

    United States v. Blaszczak

    One of the ways criminal prosecutors have sought to avoid the complexity of insider trading law in recent years has been to charge insider trading under the general securities fraud statute enacted as part of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1348. Like § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 1348 does not mention insider trading, but courts have increasingly allowed the DOJ to use it in insider trading cases. In cases brought under § 10(b), courts have long required the government to prove that a tipper received a “personal benefit” in exchange for providing material non-public information.[5] But in United States v. Blaszczak,[6] the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the government does not have to prove a personal benefit in cases brought under § 1348.

    In Blaszczak, a paid consultant to hedge funds received nonpublic information from a friend who worked for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) regarding pending changes in reimbursement rates. The consultant passed that information to employees of hedge funds who traded profitably. Evidence of a personal benefit was scant — sports tickets and free meals — and, perhaps for that reason, the jury acquitted the defendants of the § 10(b) charges. The jury convicted the defendants, though, on the charges brought under § 1348, which the trial court held did not require proof that the tipper received a personal benefit.

    On appeal, the defendants argued that the government should have to prove a personal benefit under § 1348, just as it has to under § 10(b). The Second Circuit disagreed. The court wrote that the personal benefit test was a “judge-made doctrine premised on the Exchange Act’s statutory purpose . . . [that is,] eliminating the use of inside information for personal advantage.” By contrast, “Section 1348 was added to the criminal code . . . in large part to overcome the ‘technical legal requirements’ of the Title 15 fraud provisions.” Said more simply, the Second Circuit approved the use of § 1348 as an easier way to prosecute insider trading. Although some federal district courts have also held the personal-benefit requirement inapplicable in a § 1348 prosecution,[7] Blaszczak is the only federal court of appeals decision to have addressed this issue.

    In a key additional holding, the Second Circuit found that a government agency’s “nonpublic predecisional information” constitutes “property” under § 1348. After emphasizing that Supreme Court precedent “did not . . . establish any rigid criteria for defining property,” the court found that “CMS has a property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use of its nonpublic predecisional information,” and, thus, held that such information may constitute government property for purposes of the SOX statute. One of the three judges on the panel dissented on this issue, arguing that CMS’s confidential predecisional information should not be considered the agency’s “property” because the premature disclosure of such information “has no economic impact on the government” and need not affect the substance or timing of the planned regulation.

    The Blaszczak defendants have indicated that they intend to file a petition for rehearing en banc, seeking review of the decision by the full Second Circuit, and have obtained an extension of time until Feb. 3, 2020, within which to do so.

    Takeaways

    The Blaszczak ruling does not relieve the government of proving a personal benefit in all insider trading cases going forward. § 1348 applies only to trading in registered securities (as well as commodities), whereas § 10(b) applies to trading in any security, registered or unregistered. In addition, § 1348 imposes only criminal liability — civil insider trading charges brought by the SEC still must be pursued under § 10(b) and, therefore, must satisfy the personal benefit test. Moreover, § 1348 imposes certain requirements on the government not found in § 10(b), such as in the requirement to show a deprivation of “property.”

    The ITPA does include a personal benefit requirement, added by an amendment passed on the day of the House vote.[8] But unless and until the ITPA is passed by the Senate and signed into law, and potentially thereafter, the law will remain unclear and prosecutors may continue their use of § 1348 as an end-run around § 10(b). Indeed, even if the ITPA does become law, its personal benefit requirement may be viewed as inapplicable in an insider trading prosecution under § 1348 because, as currently drafted, the bill does not provide that it would be the exclusive means of bringing insider trading charges.[9]

    Advisers should be mindful that despite the shifting legal landscape, ultimately prosecutors continue to focus on information traders come by “wrongfully” that confers an unfair advantage. The SEC and DOJ will continue to exercise their notion of rough justice rather than be constrained by rigid legal standards. Accordingly, managers must do more than have robust policies regarding insider trading. However a manager comes into possession of nonpublic information, trading decisions should be carefully evaluated with an eye toward how they will be viewed by a regulator down the road. Being able to show due diligence with respect to vetting information, particularly information obtained from management, experts and consultants, will go a long way with regulators and may protect the firm against charges.

    Authored by Gary Stein, Craig S. Warkol, Peter H. White, Katherine M. Sullivan and Gregory J. Ketcham-Colwill.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Report of the Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading, January 2020.

    [2] For more than 50 years, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act has formed the principal basis for liability for insider trading, prohibiting it as a form of securities fraud, even though the text of the statute does not mention insider trading.

    [3] The ITPA, while leaving § 10(b) intact, would create a new § 16A under the Exchange Act, where the ITPA would be codified.

    [4] The ITPA reaches trading in security-based swap agreements as well as securities.

    [5] See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

    [6] United States v. Blaszczak, 2019 WL 7289753 (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 2019).

    [7] See, e.g., United States v. Slawson, 2014 WL 5804191 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2014).

    [8] While its own recommendations generally accord with the provisions of the ITPA, the Bharara report disagrees with the bill’s inclusion of a personal benefit requirement, saying it “undermines much of the improvement and simplification that [the ITPA] otherwise achieves.”

    [9] Congressional Record, H9275-76 (Dec. 5, 2019).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • What to Know before Enforcing a Nicotine-Free Workplace

    What to Know before Enforcing a Nicotine-Free Workplace

    ARTICLE

    What to Know before Enforcing a Nicotine-Free Workplace

    January 23, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

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