Content Type: Article

  • US Government Continues to Penalize Unauthorized Disclosures of Suspicious Activity Reports

    US Government Continues to Penalize Unauthorized Disclosures of Suspicious Activity Reports

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    US Government Continues to Penalize Unauthorized Disclosures of Suspicious Activity Reports

    February 24, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 13, 2020, a former senior adviser at the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of a criminal information charging, among other things, that the employee engaged in a conspiracy to make unauthorized disclosures of suspicious activity reports (“SARs”).[1] The employee, Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards, had been charged in an information filed on Jan. 30, 2019 with violations of 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (Unauthorized Disclosures of SARs) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Make Unauthorized Disclosure of SARs) for allegedly providing SARs to a journalist.[2] The SARs were related to matters being investigated by the U.S. Office of the Special Counsel, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and/or the National Security Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and included information regarding potentially suspicious transactions relating to Paul Manafort, Richard W. Gates, Russian diplomatic accounts and other matters.[3] The government originally charged Edwards in a complaint on Oct. 16, 2018, which alleged that Edwards’ co-conspirator was an associate director at FinCEN, who supervised Edwards.[4] The associate director was not named as a defendant in the complaint and has not been charged.

    Under the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations, certain U.S. financial institutions are required to file SARs when they detect a known or suspected violation of Federal law or regulation, or suspicious activity related to money laundering, terrorist financing or other criminal activity.[5] SARs are subject to strict confidentiality requirements. The unauthorized disclosure of a SAR carries civil and criminal penalties, which include up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine.[6] FinCEN receives and analyzes reports, such as SARs, that have been determined to have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, taxand regulatory investigations and proceedings, and certain intelligence and counter-terrorism matters, in order to combat domestic and international money laundering and promote national security.[7] Government employees, such as the defendant and certain employees of financial institutions have access to SARs. Those with access to SARs through either government or private sector employment must keep SARs confidential or risk being penalized for unauthorized disclosure.

    In connection with the plea, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York emphasized that, in the government’s view, Edwards “abused her position of trust by agreeing to repeatedly disclose highly sensitive information contained in [SARs].”[8] According to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, “[m]aintaining the confidentiality of SARs, which are filed by banks and other financial institutions to alert law enforcement to potentially illegal transactions, is essential to permit them to serve their statutory function, and the defendant’s conduct violated the integrity of that critical system and the law.”[9]

    Edwards, who is scheduled to be sentenced in June 2020, and the prosecutors agreed to a stipulated advisory sentencing guideline of zero to six months in prison. This stipulation is not, however, binding on the judge.

    Edwards’ case is at least the third time the federal government has prosecuted an individual for the unauthorized disclosure of a SAR. In 2019, in United States vs. Fry, a former Internal Revenue Service analyst pleaded guilty to making the unauthorized disclosure of SARs related to Michael Cohen, President Trump’s personal attorney, and Mr. Cohen’s consulting company, to a California attorney.[10] Mr. Fry was sentenced to five years’ probation and ordered to pay a fine of $5,000.[11] In 2011, in United States vs. Mendoza, a jury found a bank employee guilty of one count of making an unauthorized disclosure of a SAR to a bank customer, and three counts of bank bribery; the judge sentenced the bank employee to six months in federal prison.[12]

    With this instant prosecution, the Government continues to emphasize the confidentiality of SARs and the penalties associated with violations of that confidentiality. Financial institutions should remind their employees of these penalties.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Jennifer M. Opheim and Melissa G.R. Goldstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Change of Not Guilty Plea to Guilty Plea as to Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards Count 1, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:19-cr-00064-GHW (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2020); Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, Former Senior FinCEN Employee Pleads Guilty To Conspiring To Unlawfully Disclose Suspicious Activity Reports (Jan. 13, 2020), available here.

    [2] Information, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:19-cr-00064-GHW (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2019), Dkt. No. 14, available here.

    [3] Complaint, United States v. Edwards, No. 1:19-cr-00064-GHW (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2018), Dkt. No. 1, available here. A prior SRZ Alert, available here, provided background on this case and the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions.

    [4] Complaint ¶ 19.

    [5] 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g). See e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1020.320 (regulations applicable to banks) and 1023.320 (regulations applicable to broker-dealers).

    [6] 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321 and 5322.

    [7] See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (declaration and purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act).

    [8] Press Release, supra note 1.

    [9] Id.

    [10] Plea Agreement, United States v. Fry, No. 3:19-cr-00102-EMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019), Dkt. No. 31; Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, Internal Revenue Service Analyst Pleads Guilty to Making Unauthorized Disclosure of Suspicious Activity Reports (Aug. 15, 2019), available here.

    [11] Judgment, United States v. Fry, No. 3:19-cr-00102-EMC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2020), Dkt. No. 43.

    [12] Jury Verdict, United States v. Mendoza, No. 5:09-cr-00107-RHW (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011), Dkt. No. 96; Judgment and Commitment, United States v. Mendoza, No. 5:09-cr-00107-RHW (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2011), Dkt. No. 116; Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, Former Chase Bank Official Convicted of Taking Bribes and Disclosing Existence of a Suspicious Activity Report (Jan. 11, 2011), available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Using IRS Supervisory Approval Rules To Fight Tax Penalties

    ARTICLE

    Using IRS Supervisory Approval Rules To Fight Tax Penalties

    February 20, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Bankruptcy Court Preliminary Injunction Held Not Appealable

    Bankruptcy Court Preliminary Injunction Held Not Appealable

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Bankruptcy Court Preliminary Injunction Held Not Appealable

    February 20, 2020

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy court’s preliminary injunction was “not a final and immediately appealable order,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Dec. 10, 2019. In re Alcor Energy, LLC, 2019 WL 6716420, *4 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2019). The court declined to “exercise [its] discretion” under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) to hear the interlocutory appeal. Id., citing 16 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 3926.1 (3d ed. 2017) (“There is no provision for appeal as of right from an injunction order of a bankruptcy judge to the district court.”).

    A bankruptcy court’s injunction is appealable, however, according to the decisions that the Alcor court never mentioned. See, e.g., In re GI Holdings, Inc., 122 Fed. Appx. 554-55 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Jurisdiction lies for this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the [district court] refused … to modify or dissolve a [bankruptcy court] preliminary injunction.”); Reliance Acceptance Corp. v. Levin (In re Reliance Acceptance Group), 235 B.R. 548, 553 (D. Del. 1999) (“the court looks to sections 158(c)(2) and 1292(a) to find the defendants have a right to appeal to this court [from] the Bankruptcy Court’s preliminary injunction order.”). The Alcor court also missed the latest update to the Wright & Miller treatise that cites In re World Imports Ltd., 820 F.3d 576, 582 n.5 (3d Cir. 2016) with the following: “Injunctions as final. An injunction from the district court can be treated as final from the district court as well as on appeal to the district court.” In the recent Third Circuit case, reported Wright & Miller, “the bankruptcy court issued an injunction … . The district court affirmed. The [Third Circuit] noted that the district court had jurisdiction of the appeal from the bankruptcy court both under [28 U.S.C. §] 158(a) and under § 1292(a) …” 16 Wright & Miller, supra, § 3926.1, n.28 (2018 Supp.). Unfortunately, the appellants in Alcor “provided no argument in support of” the district court’s appellate jurisdiction and thus “waived any argument that the appeal” was appropriate. Alcor, 2019 WL 6716420 at *4.

    Relevant Statutes

    Appeals from the bankruptcy court to the district court are governed by three provisions of the Judiciary Code. §§ 158(a); 158(c)(2); and § 1292(a)(1). 28 U.S.C. Section 158(a) reads in relevant part as follows:

    The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals (1) from final judgments, orders and decrees … and (3) with leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees …

    Section 158(c)(2) further provides that “[a]n appeal under … this section shall be taken in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district courts …” Finally, “the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from … [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts … granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions …” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

    A Preliminary Injunction Is Not Final

    An interlocutory order such as a preliminary injunction is not final because it does not fix the parties’ rights. Ritzen Group v. Jackson Masonry, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 526, *12, *19 (Jan. 14, 2020) (denial of “motion for relief from … automatic stay” is “final” because it disposes of a procedural unit consistent with [28 U.S.C. § 158(a)],… and can have large practical consequences …”); Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692 (2015) (bankruptcy court’s order final, appealable if it “alters the status quo and fixes the rights and obligations of the parties”). A preliminary injunction is only temporary in effect and is thus interlocutory, not final. Pipkin v. JVM Operating, L.C., 197 B.R. 47, 52 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (appeal from preliminary injunction interlocutory, but reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)), citing In re Reserve Production, Inc., 190 B.R. 287, 290 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (same).

    Relevant Precedent

    District courts have routinely applied § 1292(a)(1) to appeals from bankruptcy court injunctions because § 158(c)(2) makes section 1292(a)(1) applicable to the appellate process covered by § 158(a)(3) (appeals from bankruptcy court to district court). Prof’l Ins. Mgmt. v. The Ohio Cas. Grp. of Ins. Cos., 246 B.R. 47, 58 (D.N.J. 2000) (bankruptcy court injunctions are appealable as of right under Sections 158(c)(2) and 1292(a)(1)); In re Patio Indus., 220 B.R. 672, 676 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (granting appeal as of right under § 1292 (a)(1) for review of bankruptcy court injunction); Internal Revenue Service v. Ernest & Young, Inc., 135 B.R. 517, 520-21 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“the application of Section 1292(a) to bankruptcy [cases] makes bankruptcy injunctions appealable” as of right); In re Neuman, 81 B.R. 796, 801-02 and n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (permitting appeal from bankruptcy court injunction); In re Ocana, 151 B.R. 670, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (bankruptcy court preliminary injunction appealable) (Leval, J.). The district court in Alcor failed to mention these authorities or any others supporting appellate jurisdiction. In fairness, as noted, the appellant failed to make the case and the district courts, in any event, have not always been consistent.

    Rationale for Appellate Review of Preliminary Injunctions

    Congress adopted 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) “to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable consequence and because ‘rigid application of the [final judgment] principle was found to create undue hardship in some cases.’” Feit v. Drexler, 760 F.2d 406, 411 (2d Cir. 1995). An injunction issued by a bankruptcy court can have the same effect as an injunction issued by a district court. See First Owners’ Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred v. Gordon Properties, LLC, 470 B.R. 354, 372 (E.D. Va. 2012) (recognizing that preliminary injunctions issued by bankruptcy courts are appealable as of right to district court; “[a]pplication of § 1292(a) … to the bankruptcy context is appropriate….”). Consistent with § 158(c)(2), a district court must “review a bankruptcy court order in exactly the same way as a court of appeals reviews a district court order.” Ernst & Young, supra, 135 B.R. at 520.

    Sections of Title 28 must also be read together. Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). See In re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc., 46 B.R. 227, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[i]t is well settled that the standards embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) are applicable” to an appeal of a bankruptcy court order to the district court); In re Brentano’s, Inc., 36 B.R. 90, 91 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing applicability of section 1292(a)(1) to bankruptcy court appeals from injunctions).

    Injunctions issued by bankruptcy courts are no different from injunctions issued by district courts. Both can be equally serious, with irreparable consequences. Moreover, “[a]s a policy matter, the rulings of a non‑Article III bankruptcy court should not be more insulated from appellate review than the rulings of an Article III district court.” In re Reserve Production, Inc., 190 B.R. 287, 290 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (reviewing bankruptcy court’s preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court’s refusal to hear an appeal from bankruptcy court injunctions that the district court had deemed to be “interlocutory orders,” reasoning that “review by an Article III judge” was mandatory. United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, 406 F.3d 918, 923-24 (7th Cir. 2005) (“district court and court of appeals had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)”; preliminary injunctions “reviewable … no matter what the rendering judge called them”) (Easterbrook, J.); In re Affeldt, 60 F.3d 1292, 1294 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) …, we have jurisdiction over [bankruptcy court] injunctions.”), citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254-56 (1992); In re Prof’l Ins. Mgmt., 285 F.3d 268, 282 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002 (Ambro, J.) (district court, as appellate court authorized to hear appeal from bankruptcy court “injunctive order” [under] 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). Contra In re Kassover,* 343 F.3d 91, 94-96 (2d Cir. 2003) (held, no appellate jurisdiction because § 1291(a)(1) did not apply to district court’s denial of leave to appeal from bankruptcy court preliminary injunction; court ignored 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2)); In re First Republic Group Realty, LLC, 2020 WL 882986, *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (refused to apply § 1292(a)(1) to appeal from preliminary injunction, but applied § 1292(b) instead to deny leave to appeal) (Scheindlin, J.). But see In re Chateaugay Corp., 213 B.R. 633, 636-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applied § 1292(a)(1) to review bankruptcy court preliminary injunction).

    Section 158(a)(3) cannot be read in isolation from the other provisions of Title 28. Germain, 503 U.S. at 253-54 (“… so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy’ between two laws … a court must give effect to both … [G]iving effect to both §§ 1291 and 158(d) would not render one or the other superfluous … [N]o reason to infer from either § 1292 or § 158(d) that Congress meant to limit appellate review of interlocutory orders in bankruptcy proceedings. So long as a party to a proceeding … in bankruptcy meets the conditions imposed by § 1292 a court of appeals may rely on that statute as a basis for jurisdiction.”); United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“statutory construction … is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme …”). Accord 16 Wright & Miller, supra, § 3926.1 (3d ed. 2018) (“… § 1292 establishes jurisdiction in a ‘proceeding … in bankruptcy’ just as in all other cases.”), quoting Germain. A preliminary injunction, whether issued by the bankruptcy court or by the district court, must therefore be appealable as of right.

    Comments

    1. Duty To Review. Those courts declining to review bankruptcy court preliminary injunctions have simply ignored § 158(c)(2) of the Judiciary Code and contrary decisions. In effect, they have hidden behind the façade of the finality principle to avoid appellate review. But federal courts are duty-bound to review these appeals. See In re One2One Communications, LLC, 805 F.3d 428, 439-40 (3d Cir. 2015) (Krause, J.) (concurring) (“The mandate that federal courts hear cases within their statutory jurisdiction is a bedrock principle of our judiciary.”), citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, Ch. J.) (“we have no … right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction”); River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (“virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”); Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (“… the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid.”), quoting Cohens, 6 Wheat. at 404.
    2. Appellate Review Is Essential. No substantive bankruptcy court or district court order should be insulated from appellate review. Because a preliminary injunction ordinarily affects a party’s substantive rights, even if only temporarily, Congress mandated review of a district court injunction by the court of appeals. No court has given a credible reason to preclude district court review of these bankruptcy court orders. But many reasons exist for such review, including the text of the Judiciary Code (28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2)), prudence and common sense. See One2One Communications, 805 F.3d at 444-45 and n. 10 (“Adjudication by … non-Article III tribunals, including bankruptcy courts, raises two distinct constitutional concerns. The first is the infringement on a litigant’s ‘entitlement to an Article III adjudicator,’ a personal right … reaffirmed in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif … 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 … (2015) … Moreover, because they lack an alternative forum in which to pursue their claims against a debtor, most creditors do not truly consent to bankruptcy adjudication in the first place, … let alone adjudication without any appellate review … Appellate review by an Article III judge is crucial … One prominent commentator has argued that review by an Article III judge is both necessary and sufficient to uphold adjudication by any non-Article III judge. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,” 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 916 (1988)).”

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    * The author succeeded in losing this appeal.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Justices Poised to Reshape Employer Religious Bias Issues

    Justices Poised to Reshape Employer Religious Bias Issues

    ARTICLE

    Justices Poised to Reshape Employer Religious Bias Issues

    February 19, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Third and Seventh Circuits Preserve Secured Lenders’ Rights

    Third and Seventh Circuits Preserve Secured Lenders’ Rights

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Third and Seventh Circuits Preserve Secured Lenders’ Rights

    February 18, 2020

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A creditor’s “later-in-time reclamation demand is ‘subject to’ [a lender’s] prior rights as a secured creditor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Feb. 11, 2020. In re HHGregg, Inc., 2020 WL 628268 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020). And “[w]hen a lender insists on collateral, it expects the collateral to be worth something,” said the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Feb. 11, 2020, when rejecting a guarantor’s “novel reading” of his security agreement. In re Somerset Regional Water Resources, LLC, 2020 WL 628542 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 2020).

    Reclamation Creditor Subordinate to Prior Secured Lender

    The reclamation creditor (“W”) in HHGregg, “a longtime supplier” to the corporate debtor, had delivered goods to it “during the period just before the bankruptcy filing.” HHGregg, 2020 WL 628268, at *1. Under a pre-bankruptcy credit agreement, though, the lender had a “first-priority floating lien on nearly all of” the debtor’s assets, “including existing and after-acquired inventory and its proceeds.” Id.

    Within one day of the debtor’s Chapter 11 filing, the lender entered into a debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing agreement with the debtor, obtaining a “first-priority security interest on substantially all of” the debtor’s assets, “including existing and after-acquired inventory and its proceeds.” W sent a “reclamation demand seeking the return of” goods it had delivered in the 45-day period “before the [bankruptcy] petition date” three days after the bankruptcy court had approved the DIP financing. Id. at *3. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the granting of the lender’s motion for summary judgment dismissing W’s reclamation complaint that sought priority as to the goods subject to its reclamation demand.

    The Seventh Circuit relied on Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 546(c), as amended in 2005, to subordinate W’s reclamation claim to the lender’s floating lien on the debtor’s inventory. Under Code § 546(c), it reasoned, a seller’s right to reclaim goods is “subject to the prior rights of a holder of a security interest in such goods or the proceeds thereof.” Id. at *1–*2.

    The Seventh Circuit easily rejected W’s arguments that (a) its reclamation claim was “in effect” on the date of bankruptcy, (b) there was a purported “gap” in the lender’s “lien chain” and that (c) the lender was not a good faith purchaser under applicable state law. According to the court, “a reclamation right is not a security interest.” Nor is the “reclamation remedy self-executing, either within or outside bankruptcy.” W served its reclamation demand after the lender’s post-bankruptcy DIP financing lien attached pursuant to a bankruptcy court order. Id. at *8.

    Nor was there any “gap” in the lender’s “lien chain.” Prior to bankruptcy, the lender held “a first-priority, perfected lien on” the debtor’s assets, including the inventory sold by W. The lender later “obtained a court-approved, priming, first-priority, perfected lien on” the debtor’s assets, including inventory. Id. at *8. Thus, W’s goods “were continuously encumbered by one or both of” the lender’s liens. “The lien chain remained unbroken.” Id.

    Finally, reasoned the court, because of the 2005 amendment to Code § 546(c), “the rationale for examining the lienholder’s status as a good-faith purchaser has evaporated.” The statutory text “expressly subordinates a seller’s reclamation claim to the prior rights of a lienholder,” removing the need for any “state law good-faith purchaser inquiry.” Id. (emphasis in original).

    Ambiguous Security Agreement

    The lender in Somerset was the corporate debtor’s largest creditor with a “blanket lien on most of the Debtor’s assets” and a personal guaranty by “M,” the debtor’s principal. Somerset, 2020 WL 628542, at *1. After sustaining losses in 2015, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition and sought DIP financing from its preexisting secured lender. Because the debtor had already “pledged most of its assets to” the lender, “it had little left to offer.” “To entice” the lender to make the DIP loan, M agreed to “pledge” his anticipated net tax refund of $1 million “as collateral.” Id. at *2. In “hasty negotiations that followed,” M signed an agreement pledging as collateral “any rights or interests in the 2015 federal tax refund due to him individually, but attributable to the operating losses of the Debtor.” According to trial testimony, the lender would not have made the new loan “[w]ithout that valuable collateral.” Id. Unfortunately, “the agreement left open the details about executing the tax filings needed to trigger the expected refund,” but the bankruptcy court had approved the agreement as part of a consent order. The debtor later defaulted on the DIP financing and a Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation ensued.

    M then tried to “keep” for himself the entire refund “that he had pledged.” Id. at *2–3. When the lender and M filed cross motions seeking a determination as to ownership of the refund, the bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing. It accepted the lender’s testimony and the “overwhelming evidence” of the parties’ intent, holding that “the deal was to pledge the entirety of the refund generated by the [Debtor’s] 2015 operating losses.” Id. at 3.

    The Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court and the district court, interpreting the DIP financing order “as a contract.” Id. at *5. Although the security agreement was “ambiguous because it [was] ‘subject to multiple reasonable interpretations,’” the Third Circuit accepted the lender’s interpretation of that agreement: the 2015 federal tax refund attributable to debtor’s operating losses referred to “any refund paid because of losses that the Debtor incurred in 2015.” Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).

    The court relied on parol evidence — “statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement.” Id. at *6. That evidence showed not only the parties’ intent, but also the circumstances of the parties’ agreement. Id.

    Not only would the lender have not advanced more funds, but the parties also expected M to “pledge close to $1 million of his tax refund as collateral.” The parties never specified “the details of how they would execute new and amended tax returns because the negotiations were moving so fast.” Id. In any event, “the parties understood that the ‘2015 refund’ referred generally to any refund generated by the Debtor’s 2015 losses.” Id.

    M admitted that under his distorted interpretation (excluding refunds from 2013 and 2014), “the agreed-upon refund ‘would be valueless.’” Id. at *7. The court therefore rejected “this commercially unreasonable reading” because “worthless collateral would [not] have enticed the [lender] to make so risky a loan.” Id.

    Finally, representatives of the debtor and the lender told M during negotiations that they had read the security agreement “as requiring [M] to pledge around $1 million of the tax refund as collateral for the emergency loan.” M never “told them of his contrary reading at the time,” but “kept them in the dark until after the [lender] had relied on the collateral to extend a risky loan.” Id. at 8. The court therefore rejected M’s unexpressed reading in order to “prevent a silent party from later ambushing his unwitting opponents.” Id. at *8.

    Comment

    These two sensible opinions show resistance by appellate courts to baseless attacks on secured creditors. The lenders here not only bargained for collateral, but also advanced new funds to enable their borrowers’ survival.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • The California Consumer Privacy Act Training Requirements: Tips for Private Fund Managers

    The California Consumer Privacy Act Training Requirements: Tips for Private Fund Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The California Consumer Privacy Act Training Requirements: Tips for Private Fund Managers

    February 18, 2020

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Private fund managers that have prospective natural person investors, employees or even job applicants in California need to consider how the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), which went into effect on Jan. 1, 2020, may apply to them. In addition to required disclosures, which were an important part of initial compliance, the CCPA also contains a training requirement.

    What Training Is Required?

    The CCPA requires covered businesses to ensure that all individuals responsible for handling consumer inquiries about privacy practices or CCPA compliance are “informed” of the rights of California “consumers” under the statute and “how to direct consumers to exercise their rights.”[1] As we discussed in our Dec. 6, 2019 Alert, prospective investors, employees, independent contractors and job applicants are among the individual persons who could be considered “consumers” under the CCPA.[2]

    A training program for personnel at covered managers should discuss how — under the CCPA — California consumers have the following rights:

    • The Right to Know. California consumers have the right to obtain specific information about the collection, use and sharing of their personal information and the purpose.
    • The Right to Request Deletion. California consumers have the right to request deletion of their personal information.[3]
    • The Right to Nondiscrimination. California consumers have the right to not be discriminated against because they exercised their rights under the statute.[4]
    • The Right to Opt Out. California consumers have the right to request that a business not sell their personal information to third parties.[5] This is not applicable to most fund managers, as most do not sell personal information.[6]

    How Are Consumer Requests Submitted?

    To comply with the CCPA, fund managers must include at least two ways of submitting a request in the required disclosures, including, at a minimum, a toll-free telephone number.[7] Other methods should be determined based on how the manager primarily interacts with investors, and may include an interactive form accessible through the business’s website, a designated email address or a form submitted in person or by mail.[8]

    Who Should Be Trained?

    All personnel who could receive inquiries from individual California consumers (including personnel who monitor requests made through the manager’s website or via the email address or telephone number provided in a California privacy notice) should be trained to identify such requests and know the person(s) to whom such requests should be sent for review and response (likely legal and compliance officers). Training also should be customized for particular functional areas, including the following:

    • Legal and Compliance Officers. Officers or other representatives charged with legal and compliance matters should be trained on the CCPA’s requirements (although the knowledge gained in preparing for CCPA effectiveness may obviate this for current legal and regulatory personnel).
    • Investor Relations Staff. The investor relations team should be the most important focus of training. This team, in particular, should be trained on the manager’s policies for disseminating disclosures to prospective investors (e.g., by adding required disclosures to marketing materials or including a link to your California privacy notice in emails sent to investors).
    • HR Staff. HR staff should be trained to ensure disclosures are disseminated to employees, independent contractors and job applicants who reside in California when their personal information is collected.
    • Senior Management. Regulatory agencies have emphasized the need for senior management to actively oversee compliance with data security requirements. Therefore, senior management should have at least a general awareness of the CCPA’s requirements.[9]
    • Independent Contractors. Training requirements should extend to independent contractors and other service providers acting on your behalf who are involved in the collection, use, sharing or disposal of personal information about California residents.[10]

    Private fund managers should be aware that they need to address all requests, even ones not made through the designated channels in their disclosures. Therefore, anyone who could receive a consumer request should be trained. Managers should also monitor continuing developments as the regulations are finalized and additional changes to the law are expected and determine if additional training is warranted.

    How Should Compliance Be Documented?

    Fund managers should document their compliance with the training requirements of the CCPA. While there are different ways this can be done, distributing written training materials or adding guidance regarding CCPA compliance to employee handbooks and independent contractor agreements can be key elements of training, as are live training sessions.

    Recordkeeping and Verification of Requests

    The Proposed Regulations require businesses to maintain records of the consumer requests received, including details such as the date and manner in which the request was made, as well as how the business responded or the basis for denying a request, for at least 24 months.[11]

    Fund managers should also bear in mind the requirements with respect to verifying consumer requests. For example, a covered business must:

    • Confirm receipt of a request within 10 business days[12];
    • Promptly take steps to determine whether a request is verifiable and respond to the request within 45 days[13];
    • Verify the identity of the person making the request by matching the information provided in the request with the personal information already maintained, or through the use of a third-party verification service; and[14]
    • Provide a general description of the process used to verify consumer requests in their privacy policies.[15]

    Right-To-Know Requests

    To satisfy any right-to-know requests, managers will need to identify the personal information they have collected on the California consumer making the request and how it has been used for the preceding 12-month period.[16] For most managers, this information will be relatively easy to identify through reviewing the contents of CRM systems and compliance archives to identify emails through which personal information was sent and received. However, private fund managers will need to think about any personal information they collect but do not enter into such systems (e.g., personal information in paper files that does not also reside in electronic systems).

    Deletion Requests

    While individual California consumers have the right to request that their personal information be deleted, in many instances fund managers will be prohibited from complying with such requests due to legal recordkeeping obligations under the Investment Advisers Act or similar regulatory regimes.[17] In these cases, managers will need to assess requests on a case-by-case basis and be flexible in formulating responses to requests. If a business is unable to delete the information, the business must still respond to the consumer’s request for deletion and must indicate the basis for the denial of the consumer’s request.[18]

    How Often Should Training Be Conducted?

    Neither the CCPA nor the Proposed Regulations specify how often CCPA training should occur; however, as the CCPA requires businesses to update their CCPA disclosures annually,[19] fund managers should put CCPA training on their annual compliance checklists and consider the need for additional training no less than annually.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz, Edward H. Sadtler and Kelly Koscuiszka.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130(a)(6). The regulations proposed by the Attorney General (“Proposed Regulations”) go even further, requiring that relevant personnel be informed of all the requirements of the CCPA and the Proposed Regulations. Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.317(a). This Alert is based on the revised regulations issued on Feb. 7, 2020; the regulations are expected to be finalized and effective no earlier than July 1, 2020. The Attorney General’s website provides the complete text and updates on the rulemaking process for the Proposed Regulations.

    [2] Due to a one-year moratorium on the application of these rights to certain persons, businesses are not required to respond to “right to know,” deletion and opt-out requests from employees, independent contractors, job applicants and certain B2B contacts until Jan. 1, 2021. A more limited disclosure obligation applies for employees, independent contractors and job applicants. See our Dec. 6, 2019, Alert for further discussion on this point.

    [3] CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a).

    [4] Id. § 1798.125.

    [5] Id. § 1798.120(a).

    [6] Sale is defined broadly to include any disclosure or dissemination of personal information “for monetary or other valuable consideration.” Id. § 1798.140(t).

    [7] Id. § 1798.130(a)(1); Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.312(a)-(c). The only exception to the toll-free number requirement is for a business that operates exclusively online. Id. § 999.312(a).

    [8] Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.312(a)-(c).

    [9] In a Jan. 27, 2020 report, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) underscored the importance of involving senior leadership in establishing and overseeing cybersecurity programs. See Cybersecurity and Resiliency Observations, Jan. 27. 2020.

    [10] CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(c).

    [11] Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.317(b).

    [12] Id. § 999.313(a).

    [13] CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130(a)(2). This 45-day period may be extended by an additional 45 days “when reasonably necessary,” provided the consumer is provided notice of the extension during the initial 45-day period. Id.

    [14] Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.323.

    [15] Id. § 999.308(c)(1)(c).

    [16] The CCPA provides the consumer the right to request the following information specifically: (i) the categories and “specific pieces” of personal information collected, (ii) the sources from which personal information is collected, (iii) the commercial purpose for collecting personal information and (iv) the categories of third parties with whom personal information may be shared. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110; Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.313(c). In addition, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115 requires business to respond to requests by consumers with respect to the sale of their personal information.

    [17] CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(d).

    [18] Proposed Regulations, 11 C.C.R. § 999.313(d).

    [19] CAL. CIV. CODE 1798.130(a)(5).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • CMS Advances 340B Drug Acquisition Cost Survey to OMB and Solicits Final Comments Directly to OMB

    CMS Advances 340B Drug Acquisition Cost Survey to OMB and Solicits Final Comments Directly to OMB

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Advances 340B Drug Acquisition Cost Survey to OMB and Solicits Final Comments Directly to OMB

    February 14, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On February 7, 2020, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS) published a notice signaling that it has submitted its previously published September 2019 proposed survey of hospital 340B drug costs for Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval. Through the Survey, CMS plans to collect information on hospitals’ acquisition costs for 340B drugs, and it may use that data to set future reimbursement rates for 340B drugs furnished by hospitals to Medicare beneficiaries.

    In depth

    On February 7, 2020, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS) published a notice (the Notice) signaling that it has submitted its previously published September 2019 proposed survey (the Survey) of hospital 340B drug costs for Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval. Through the Survey, CMS plans to collect information on hospitals’ acquisition costs for 340B drugs, and it may use that data to set future reimbursement rates for 340B drugs furnished by hospitals to Medicare beneficiaries. The Notice advises the public of its opportunity to submit final comments to the survey directly to the OMB by March 9, 2020.

    Background

    In the Calendar Year 2018 Medicare Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) final rule (2018 Final Rule), CMS reduced the Medicare reimbursement rate for drugs purchased through the 340B program from the Average Sales Price (ASP) plus 6% to ASP minus 22.5%. CMS explained in the 2018 Final Rule that it did not have hospital acquisition cost data for 340B drugs, but it would nonetheless set the reimbursement rate at an approximation of hospital acquisition cost for 340B drugs, as previously calculated by MedPAC to be 22.5% less than ASP. CMS characterized the reimbursement rate reduction as an “adjustment” from the standard ASP plus 6%.

    The rate reduction was challenged in federal court. In December 2018, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) exceeded its statutory authority to adjust payment rates under the OPPS for separately payable, 340B-acquired drugs from ASP plus 6% to ASP minus 22.5% (American Hospital Ass’n v. Azar, 348 F. Supp. 3d 62, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2018). The ruling was made, in part, on the basis that HHS had not collected the necessary data to set payment rates for 340B drugs at rates lower than non-340B drugs because CMS has not obtained 340B drug acquisition cost data. HHS has appealed the ruling. While the case is under appeal, CMS has continued to reimburse 340B drugs at ASP minus 22.5%.

    The Initial Notice

    In September 2019, CMS published notice of its intent to collect information on 340B drug acquisition costs from hospitals participating in the 340B Program. CMS would require responses from all hospitals that were enrolled in the 340B program in the last quarter of 2018 and/or the first quarter of 2019 to respond to the survey. Hospitals would be required to submit the net acquisition costs for each drug acquired under the 340B Program. This cost may be the 340B ceiling price, a 340B sub-ceiling price, or another amount, depending on the discounts the hospital received when acquiring a particular drug. In instances where the acquisition price for a particular drug is not available or submitted in response to the survey, CMS indicated that it intends to use the ceiling price for that drug as a proxy for the acquisition cost. The acquisition cost would need to be reported regardless of whether the drug was dispensed, whether it was dispensed in multiple settings, or how it was purchased.

    More specifically, the Survey would require respondents to complete an Excel spreadsheet with the following information:

    • Hospital name, address, and contact information
    • Provider CCN Number
    • HCPCS code for each drug
    • Drug name / short descriptor
    • Dose (as reflected in HCPCS dose descriptor)
    • National Drug Code (optional)
    • Q4 2018 Payment Rate
    • Q1 2019 Payment Rate
    • Average 340B price of drug for Q4 2018
    • Average 340B price of drug for Q1 of 2019

    Originally, the Survey response period was proposed to begin on February 17, 2020, and end on March 16, 2020.

    The Republished Notice

    Despite significant opposition from 340B hospital stakeholders to the CMS data collection effort and identification of material concerns regarding the Survey content and methodology, on February 7, 2020, CMS republished the Survey with only minor, non-substantive revisions. The republication is consistent with standard procedures under the federal Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) that require federal agencies to provide the public with an opportunity to provide comments directly to OMB in connection with proposed data collection activities. The republished notice permits the public to submit comments directly to OMB until March 9, 2020. The PRA provides OMB with 60 days to review comments before finalizing the Survey.

    Notably, the Survey materials published on the CMS website indicate that Survey response period will run from March 23, 2020, through April 10, 2020. Therefore, it is possible that the OMB review period may extend beyond the currently identified data collection period. If the OMB review extends beyond March 23, 2020, it is unclear whether the data collection period will be modified and, if so, to what dates.

    Takeaways

    Although comments to the initial notice did not appear to materially alter CMS’s plan to survey hospitals for 340B drug acquisition cost data, stakeholders that expect to be affected by the collection and its potential implications should consider submitting comments to OMB regarding the proposed collection. The collection will proceed if the Survey is approved by OMB. Stakeholders should consider specifically focusing on considerations relevant to the OMB’s review (e.g., whether CMS has taken every reasonable step to ensure the proposed collection of information is the least burdensome necessary for the proper performance of its functions to comply with legal requirements and achieve program activities; is not duplicative of information otherwise accessible to the agency; and has practical utility).

    CMS has indicated that the purpose of the Survey is to collect data necessary to establish lower “acquisition cost” payment rates for 340B drugs dispensed to hospital Medicare patients. While it remains uncertain whether a court would agree that the Survey meets the statutory requirements necessary to use the data for such purposes, if CMS is unsuccessful in its appeal of the prior 340B rate cuts, it is highly likely that CMS will use the data for both prospective rate cuts and possibly in connection with any remedies required for the prior rate cuts. Further, if the Survey data reflects rates below the prior 22.5% rate cut, CMS could proceed with even more significant cuts to 340B payments.

    While it remains unclear what authority CMS would rely on to enforce the reporting requirement, hospitals’ failure or refusal to submit their acquisition costs may result in CMS relying on ceiling prices or otherwise inaccurate prices for purposes of future rate setting.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Steven J. Schnelle

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Cathy Ren

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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  • FINRA Proposes Amendments to CAB Rules

    FINRA Proposes Amendments to CAB Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FINRA Proposes Amendments to CAB Rules

    February 14, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 30, 2020, FINRA solicited comments on proposed amendments to its CAB Rules designed to expand the activities in which “capital acquisition brokers,” or “CABs,” may engage, while also proposing additional requirements on CABs intended to increase investor protections.[1] Comments on the proposed rule changes must be received by March 30, 2020.

    Background

    Broker-dealers that engage in a limited range of activities, including acting as placement agent in sales of unregistered securities to “institutional investors” or providing capital advisory and corporate restructuring services, may elect to be governed by a limited FINRA ruleset (such rules, “CAB Rules,” FINRA members that elect to operate under the CAB Rules, “CABs”).[2] FINRA’s goal in adopting the CAB Rules was to provide regulatory relief to capital acquisition brokers while continuing to provide investor protection.[3] Any firm that meets the definition of capital acquisition broker[4] (whether an existing FINRA member or new applicant) may elect CAB status.

    Proposed Amendments

    FINRA has proposed amendments to its CAB Rules intended to expand the scope of activities in which CABs may engage (and, relatedly, expanding the number of firms eligible for CAB status). FINRA has also proposed related amendments that would require CABs with business models that present insider trading risks to adopt policies and procedures designed to mitigate those risks.

    Among other things, FINRA’s proposed amendments to the CAB Rules would:

    • Allow CABs to dually-register as investment advisers, so long as advisory services are provided only to “institutional investors.”[5]
    • Broaden the definition of “institutional investor” under the CAB Rules to include “knowledgeable employees”[6] of an issuer to which the firm provided CAB services.
    • Permit CABs to act as a placement agent in secondary transactions involving unregistered securities of an issuer for which the CAB had previously acted as a placement agent, provided that the purchaser is an “institutional investor” and the new sale qualifies for an exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“Securities Act”).[7]
    • Permit CAB associated persons to invest in unregistered securities, provided they give prior written notice to their CAB.[8]
    • Require CABs with business models that create potential insider trading risks to establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to mitigate and prevent those risks, including compliance with the transaction review requirements of FINRA rule 3110(d)[9] and the personal account trading requirements of FINRA rule 3210.[10]

    Key Takeaways

    FINRA recognizes that the current restrictions on CABs have discouraged a large number of firms that otherwise meet the definition of “capital acquisition broker” from electing to register as CABs.[11] The proposed amendments are designed to address this issue by providing CABs with increased flexibility in their business activities, including by permitting CABs to dually-register as investment advisers and by permitting CABs to engage in certain secondary transactions.

    FINRA recognizes that, notwithstanding the foregoing, the proposed rule changes may provide insufficient incentives to firms considering CAB status (whether it be current FINRA members or entities not currently registered as broker-dealers). As such, FINRA requests comment on whether there are additional activities in which CABs should be permitted to engage, and whether additional incentives would be necessary or appropriate to encourage CAB elections (e.g., further relaxation of the CAB Rules).

    Importantly, any comment letter should be careful to assess the impact of any proposed change on investor protections as FINRA may view any requested expansion as requiring additional regulation.[12] Further, while FINRA may amend its CAB Rules, CAB status does not exempt the firm from any federal securities law (e.g., the Securities Act and the Exchange Act), which continue to apply in full to the activities of any broker or dealer (including any CAB).

    As noted above, comments on the proposed amendments must be received by March 30, 2020.

    Authored by Julian Rainero, William J. Barbera and Akshay Ramanan.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See FINRA Regulatory Notice 20-04 (“Regulatory Notice 20-04”), available here.

    [2] See Regulatory Notice 16-37 (October 2016). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78617 (Aug. 18, 2016), 81 FR 57948 (Aug. 24, 2016) (Order Approving Rule Change as Modified by Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 to Adopt FINRA Capital Acquisition Broker Rules; File No. SR- FINRA-2015-054).

    [3] See FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-37.

    [4] See CAB rule 016(c)(1).

    [5] See proposed CAB rule 016(c)(1)(I). Note that unlike regular FINRA members, dual-registrants are currently ineligible for CAB status. 

    [6] “Knowledgeable employees” include senior officers and directors of private funds and their advisers, and would also include persons performing similar functions at other private issuers for which CABs act as placement agents. See proposed CAB rule 016(i)(8) and proposed CAB rule 016(m). See also rule 3c-5(a)(4) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.

    [7] See proposed CAB rule 016(c)(1)(H). Currently, CABs may only act as placement agents in connection with secondary transactions where the transaction is in connection with the change of control of a privately-held company (see CAB rule 016(c)(1)(F)).

    [8] See proposed CAB rule 321(c).

    [9] This rule requires FINRA member firms to adopt supervisory procedures for the review of securities transactions that are reasonably designed to identify trades that may violate provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”), and SEC and FINRA rules prohibiting insider trading in accounts of the firm’s associated persons and their immediate family members.

    [10] See proposed CAB rule 321. FINRA rule 3210 requires associated persons of FINRA member firms to obtain the prior written consent of such member firm to open or otherwise establish at another firm any account in which securities transactions can be effected and in which the associated person has a beneficial interest.

    [11] For instance, Regulatory Notice 20-04 notes that while only 55 member firms have elected CAB status since FINRA adopted the CAB Rules in April 2017, approximately 700 member firms that have not elected CAB status have business models that would meet the definition of “capital acquisition broker.”

    [12] For instance, while the proposed amendments would allow CABs to dually-register as investment advisers, such CABs would need to adopt insider-trading policies and procedures and otherwise comply with FINRA rule 3110(d).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    William J. Barbera

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Texas Appeals Court Rules Private Communications with Customers Not Protected Free Speech

    Texas Appeals Court Rules Private Communications with Customers Not Protected Free Speech

    ARTICLE

    Texas Appeals Court Rules Private Communications with Customers Not Protected Free Speech

    February 13, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    In a case addressing the applicability of free speech as a defense to trade secret misappropriation, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas retracted its previous ruling, holding that communications with customers and suppliers did not involve a matter of public concern and were therefore not an exercise of free speech. Goldberg, et al. v. EMR (USA Holdings) Inc., et al., Case No. 05-18-00261-CV (Tex. App. Jan. 23, 2020) (Myers, J).

    The case concerns allegations of trade secret misappropriation brought by EMR (USA Holdings) (EMR), against Kenneth Goldberg, his company Geomet Recycling (Geomet), and several Geomet employees who, like Goldberg, formerly worked for EMR. EMR and Geomet are both involved in the business of scrap metal recycling. EMR alleged that Goldberg, Geomet and the former EMR employees (collectively, “Defendants”) violated the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA), breached fiduciary duties and tortuously interfered with contracts by, among other things, using EMR’s trade secrets and confidential and proprietary information to contact purchasers and suppliers.

    Defendants moved to dismiss all claims under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA), claiming that their contacts with purchasers and suppliers were protected free speech involving a matter of public concern. The TCPA allows litigants to seek early dismissal of a lawsuit if they prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on, or is in response to, a party’s exercise of the right of free speech.

    The TCPA defines “exercise of the right of free speech” as “a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” The statute states that a “‘[m]atter of public concern’ includes an issue related to: (A) health or safety; (B) environmental, economic, or community well-being; . . . or (E) a good, product, or service in the marketplace.” Id. § 27.001(7). Additionally, under the “commercial-speech exemption,” the TCPA does not apply to a legal action brought against a person engaged in the business of selling goods or services if the conduct arises out of a commercial transaction in which the intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.

    After the trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss without providing any reasoning, Defendants appealed.

    On August 22, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court held that the commercial-speech exemption to the TCPA applied to the Defendants’ communications with purchaser and suppliers. However, the Court also found that these communications concerned “an issue related to . . . a good, product, or service in the marketplace” and therefore involved a matter of public concern under the TCPA.

    Both sides asked for rehearing. In its new ruling, the Court of Appeals reversed course and found that Defendants’ communications with purchasers and suppliers did not involve matters of public concern. Defendants argued that the business of recycling scrap metal relates to environmental, economic and community well-being, which are considered matters of public concern under the TCPA. The Court rejected this argument, noting that while scrap metal recycling may indeed relate to matters of public concern, the communications at issue “were private communications regarding private commercial transactions for the purchase and sale of a commodity.” The Court held that, because the communications themselves did not implicate matters of public concern, they were not subject to the TCPA.

    Practice Note:

    The new ruling significantly restricts the application of the TCPA. The holding indicates that the TCPA cannot shield defendants from trade secret claims based on communications between the defendant and potential customers or suppliers that solely relate to the purchase or sale of a commodity—even if the commodity at issue might arguably relate to matters of public concern.

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  • CMS Issues Medicare Advantage and Part D 2021 Proposed Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Issues Medicare Advantage and Part D 2021 Proposed Rule

    February 13, 2020

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently released three items relating to the Medicare Advantage and Part D programs: a proposed rule, Part II of the Advance Notice and Rate Announcement for Calendar Year (CY) 2021, and the CY 2021 Part C Benefits Review and Evaluation Memorandum (Bid Memorandum). This article discusses a few of the key proposed changes in the proposed rule and summarizes other substantive proposals. Upcoming deadlines for these items are:

    • March 6, 2020: Comments on the Advance Notice due
    • March 9, 2020: Comments on the Bid Memorandum due
    • April 6, 2020: Comments on the proposed rule due
    In depth

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released three items relating to the Medicare Advantage and Part D programs on February 5, 2020: a proposed rule, Part II of the Advance Notice and Rate Announcement for Calendar Year (CY) 2021, and the CY 2021 Part C Benefits Review and Evaluation Memorandum (Bid Memorandum). The proposed rule sets out new provisions and revisions on key Medicare Advantage (MA) and Part D topics, including end-stage renal disease (ESRD) coverage, reinsurance, pharmacy specialty tiers and pharmacy quality metrics. The proposed rule would also continue CMS’s recent trend of codifying standards previously specified only in subregulatory guidance.

    Part II of the Advance Notice defines changes in MA and Part D payment methodology and benefit parameters, and the Bid Memorandum provides guidance on the criteria CMS will use to review CY 2021 Part C bids. Unlike previous years, CMS will not publish a call letter for CY 2021, and intends to cover much of the guidance historically contained in call letters through the proposed rule and separately issued notices.

    The bulk of the new and substantive provisions are in the proposed rule. If finalized, its provisions would impact a broad range of MA and Part D regulatory requirements, and would affect not only MA Organizations (MAOs) and Part D sponsors, but also healthcare providers, pharmacies and others. Comments on the proposed rule are due April 6, 2020. Comments on the Advance Notice are due March 6, 2020. Bid Memorandum comments are due March 9, 2020. This article discusses a few of the key proposed changes in the proposed rule and summarizes other substantive proposals.

    Impact of Codifying Existing Policies

    In the proposed rule, CMS proposes to codify its existing policy in regulation on several topics, including cross walking guidelines, marketing and communication requirements, and certain network adequacy standards. CMS did something similar last year, codifying its Star Ratings guidelines.

    In reviewing these codifications, interested parties should be aware that the process presents an opportunity to seek changes to current policies, and codification further embeds policies, requiring another notice-and-comment rulemaking to change them in the future. As such, interested parties should review the proposed codifications and consider providing appropriate comments.

    Some of the proposed codifications may also reflect the Supreme Court’s 2019 ruling, which held that any policies that establish a “substantive legal standard” that governs the scope of benefits, payment for services, or eligibility to provide or receive benefits under Medicare must be issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking and may not be merely set forth in subregulatory guidance.

    ESRD Coverage

    The proposed rule includes provisions to implement the 21st Century Cures Act, which allows individuals with ESRD to enroll in an MA plan beginning in 2021. Currently, although individuals with ESRD can remain in an MA plan through the end of the year if diagnosed while enrolled in the plan, they could not newly enroll in an MA plan.

    In light of the Cures Act’s expansion of MA eligibility to individuals with ESRD, CMS has proposed several payment and benefit-related changes to coverage. First, it provides that the costs of organ acquisitions for kidney transplants must be excluded from MA coverage, benchmarks, and capitation rates, and proposes regulatory text to codify these requirements.

    CMS also proposes a methodology for setting the maximum out-of-pocket (MOOP) limits, now that individuals with ESRD will be able to enroll in MA plans. Currently, CMS sets two annual MOOP limits based on cost-sharing data for beneficiaries in traditional Medicare, and MA plans have the flexibility to set lower limits. CMS proposes to establish three MOOP limits beginning in CY 2022.

    CMS also proposes to include expenditures for individuals with ESRD in its calculation of the MOOP limits beginning in CY 2021. CMS would calculate the difference between non-ESRD individuals’ costs in CY 2021 and all Medicare FFS beneficiaries’ costs (including both ESRD and non-ESRD), and incorporate that difference in its calculations of the annual MOOPs by including an increasing percentage of the difference each year. For example, if the difference in expected annual costs of non-ESRD individuals in CY 2021 versus all individuals (including ESRD) for CY 2022 was $1,000, CMS would add 60% of $1,000 to the MOOP limits for 2022. While the proposed rule does not directly address the MOOP limit for 2021, the Bid Memorandum proposes applying this methodology in 2021 using 40% of such difference. In later years, CMS would add increasing percentages and eventually 100% of the difference to the MOOP limits. CMS would adjust the pace at which the percentages increase depending on the degree to which costs increase. CMS proposes this phased approach to address the fact that not all ESRD individuals will enroll in the MA program immediately. CMS aims to “strike a balance between potential increases in plan costs and enrollee cost sharing or premiums,” which it hopes will mitigate sudden increases in costs.

    MA plans have expressed concerns that the current mechanism for setting ESRD rates does not adequately cover costs for ESRD beneficiaries, an issue that takes on greater significance as ESRD enrollment increases.

    Network Adequacy and Telehealth

    CMS has traditionally set forth its network adequacy standards in subregulatory guidance. Here, CMS proposes to codify these standards, including time/distance standards, into regulation.

    It also proposes to grant a 10% credit towards those time/distance standards for MA plans that contract with telehealth providers in the areas of dermatology, psychiatry, neurology, otolaryngology and cardiology. MA plans also would be permitted to cover telehealth services through a non-contracted provider as a basic benefit.

    Star Ratings

    Since CMS codified the Star Ratings and Quality Bonus Payment (QBP) processes in 2018, CMS can only propose, modify and remove measures through rulemaking. In addition to proposing such measure changes in this proposed rule, CMS outlines several changes to how it would assign ratings in certain exceptional circumstances, and proposes to codify certain existing subregulatory policies.

    CMS proposes to codify its current policy for how it assigns QBP ratings to contracts. Since the establishment of the QBP program, QBP ratings policy has been announced outside of rulemaking, through the Advance Notice. Portions of the relevant standards were previously codified in 2018, with the codification of the Star Rating calculation process. For example, CMS previously codified how it makes QBP determinations where a contract lacks sufficient data to calculate and assign Star Ratings because the contract is for a new MA plan or has low-enrollment.

    CMS now proposes to codify standards for a contract that lacks sufficient data to calculate and assign Star Ratings but does not meet the definition of a low-enrollment contract or a new MA plan. A new contract under a parent organization that has an existing MA contract with CMS would receive an enrollment-weighted average of the Star Ratings earned by the parent’s existing MA contract. If the parent organization does not have another MA contract with Star Ratings, CMS would look to see if the parent organization held another contract in the previous three years, and, if it did hold such a contract, CMS would use the enrollment-weighted average of such contracts’ highest Star Rating from the most recent year that had been rated.

    CMS has previously addressed how it would assign Star Ratings in the context of a contract consolidation. In the proposed rule, CMS proposes that if either the consumed or the surviving contract is missing a measure score due to certain specified data integrity issues, CMS would assign a score of zero for the missing measure score in the calculation of the enrollment-weighted calculation.

    Withdrawal and Dismissal of Coverage Requests and Appeals

    CMS proposes rules to govern procedures for withdrawals or dismissals of beneficiary coverage requests and appeals. MAOs and Part D sponsors encounter situations where enrollees want to voluntarily withdraw a request for coverage, or where an improper appeal at the MAO, Part D sponsor or Independent Review Entity (IRE) level warrants dismissal on procedural grounds. Current CMS regulations do not set forth specific rights or processes for such withdrawals and dismissals.

    CMS proposes to codify existing practices involving withdrawals and dismissals that are currently guided by related Medicare fee-for-service regulations into parallel regulations specific to Part C, Part D and integrated plans. Enrollees or other proper parties would have the right to voluntarily withdraw coverage requests and appeals, including expedited requests and IRE reconsiderations, and the proposed regulations detail the relevant processes. The new rules would also provide for circumstances where an MAO, Part D sponsor or IRE could dismiss a coverage request or appeal, and would provide notice and process requirements. Enrollees would be given a new right to appeal to the IRE an MAO or Part D sponsor’s dismissal of a request for reconsideration or redetermination, as current CMS regulations do not cover such a right or related processes.

    While the new regulations would extend to certain integrated plans, CMS requests comment on whether the rules could create inconsistencies with any state-specific Medicaid procedures pertaining to dismissals and withdrawals. MAOs and Part D sponsors with integrated products may wish to evaluate and comment.

    If these rules are finalized, MAOs and Part D sponsors should undertake an evaluation of their current processes relating to enrollee withdrawals and plan dismissals, and should update policies, procedures and processes to ensure compliance, as CMS likely would include these requirements in future CMS Program Audit protocols and coverage evaluations. MAOs and Part D sponsors should also assess their systems and software to determine capabilities for implementing new processes relating to the new requirements.

    Past Performance

    CMS proposes to both codify and modify its past performance methodology, which it uses when evaluating applications for new or expanded MAO or Part D sponsor contracts based on a prior failure to comply with relevant Medicare contract standards. CMS proposes to adopt three factors as a basis for denying an MA or Part D application:

    • Imposition of civil money penalties or intermediate sanctions
    • Low Star Ratings
    • Failure to maintain a fiscally sound operation.

    CMS notes that each factor on its own may be a sufficient basis for CMS to deny an application.

    This proposal replaces the annually released past performance methodology through which CMS has historically defined its past performance contract review criteria. The three factors proposed represent a significant reduction in the complexity of CMS’s review compared to the past methodology, which relied on 11 categories and a complex points system to determine whether an applicant’s poor performance under a past contract met the threshold for denial.
    CMS proposes to continue to make its past performance determinations at the parent organization level so that CMS’s evaluation of applications is influenced by the performance of affiliates.

    Reinsurance

    CMS proposes to define the level of per-member reinsurance that an MAO may obtain. The Medicare statute permits MAOs to obtain insurance or make other arrangements for the cost of providing to a member “such services the aggregate value of which exceeds such aggregate level as the Secretary specifies.” Historically, CMS has not specified a minimum attachment point for such reinsurance. Now, however, CMS proposes that such per-member reinsurance may be purchased when an individual enrollee’s covered costs for basic benefits exceed $10,000 during a contract year. The rule would also permit the reinsurance to be structured as first dollar coverage as long as it is actuarially equivalent to a $10,000 attachment point and the cost of such reinsurance is priced at an actuarial value not to exceed the cost of purchasing reinsurance with a $10,000 attachment point.

    CMS notes that compliance with the reinsurance standard would be evaluated at the parent organization level, such that risk sharing among wholly owned subsidiaries would not be evaluated under this rule. CMS states that the use of any such reinsurance would be regulated by state insurance departments, and would not be subject to preemption under the Medicare statute.

    Reporting of Pharmacy Performance Measures

    CMS proposes to require that Part D sponsors disclose the performance measures they use to evaluate pharmacy performance. CMS does not propose the specific data elements that could be collected, but instead suggests six data elements that it is considering collecting. If the rule is finalized, CMS will separately undergo the 60-day and 30-day Paperwork Reduction Act notice and comment processes with respect to the actual data elements settled upon. CMS has taken this approach in part to encourage industry to develop consensus measures for evaluating pharmacy performance.

    Second “Preferred” Specialty Drug Tier

    CMS proposes rules to give Part D sponsors greater flexibility in managing high cost drugs by allowing the establishment of a second “preferred” specialty drug tier, and proposes to codify maximum cost sharing applicable to the specialty tier as well as the methodology for determining the specialty tier cost threshold annually.

    The Part D program’s defined standard benefit allows for alternative benefit designs and the use of tiered formularies, which currently may include a single specialty tier for the management of very high cost Part D drugs and biological products. CMS proposes to allow Part D sponsors to establish up to two specialty tiers in their Part D formularies, subject to certain parameters and restrictions, consistent with a 2016 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission recommendation.

    Part D sponsors that choose to establish two specialty tiers would be required to offer lower cost sharing in a “preferred” specialty tier than in the higher cost sharing specialty tier. The Part D sponsor would be permitted to design a tiering exception process that permits exempting drugs on the specialty tiers from tiering exception requests to non-specialty tiers. However, current CMS policy would continue to require tiering exceptions to be permitted for drugs on the higher cost sharing specialty tier to the “preferred” specialty tier. CMS is considering allowing sponsors to exempt tiering exceptions between the specialty tiers, although it has reservations regarding that approach, and Part D sponsors may wish to comment on this alternative.

    Part D sponsors’ placement of drugs on each specialty tier will be subject to CMS’s ingredient cost threshold methodology. CMS proposes to codify the methodology for determining annually the specialty cost threshold using ingredient cost reported on the prescription drug event and adjusting the threshold when certain conditions are met.

    CMS also proposes to codify, with some modifications, current methodologies for cost sharing and calculations relative to the specialty tier that would apply to a single specialty tier or, if the plan has two specialty tiers, to the higher cost sharing specialty tier. CMS proposes to set the maximum allowable cost sharing for the highest specialty tier between 25% and 33% depending on whether the plan includes a deductible, and the maximum allowable cost sharing the “preferred” tier could be set at any amount lower than that of the higher cost specialty tier.

    CMS believes these proposals have the potential to improve enrollee access to necessary drugs, empower Part D sponsors and pharmacy benefit managers to negotiate better rebates with drug manufacturers, and lower overall drug costs for the Part D program and for beneficiaries, while maintaining protections from discriminatory formulary structure.

    Other Proposals

    CMS requests input on a variety of issues not discussed above that MAOs and Part D sponsors may wish to respond to through written comments. These include several provisions aimed at helping victims of the opioid epidemic, such as mandatory drug management programs; provisions regarding the medical loss ratio calculation methodology; standards for the real-time benefit tool; various Special Needs Plan Model of Care standards; supplemental benefit standards; agent and broker referral fee standards; the methodology for increasing civil money penalties; and certain cost sharing limits.

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