Content Type: Article

  • Tax Update: IRS and New York State Delay April 15 Income Tax Return Filing and Tax Payment (Uncapped) Deadlines Until July 15 (COVID-19)

    Tax Update: IRS and New York State Delay April 15 Income Tax Return Filing and Tax Payment (Uncapped) Deadlines Until July 15 (COVID-19)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Tax Update: IRS and New York State Delay April 15 Income Tax Return Filing and Tax Payment (Uncapped) Deadlines Until July 15 (COVID-19)

    April 3, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 20, 2020, the IRS published Notice 2020-18 (“Notice”) permitting all taxpayers to delay until July 15, 2020, without interest or penalties, making all federal income tax payments (uncapped) and filing tax returns otherwise due on April 15, 2020.[1] No extension (e.g., IRS Forms 4868 or 7004) is required to be filed as long as the applicable tax return is filed by July 15, 2020. This relief applies to tax payments in respect of 2019 and estimated tax payments for the first quarter of 2020, including payments on self-employment income.

    As a result of the tax return filing extension, the time for making contributions to an individual retirement account or health savings account for 2019 has also been extended to July 15, 2020.[2] An individual, estate, trust or corporation that is unable to file its federal income tax return by July 15, 2020, must request an automatic extension to file its tax return by July 15, 2020, using IRS Form 4868 or 7004 as applicable. An individual, estate, trust or corporation that files an extension must file its federal income tax return by Oct. 15, 2020 (and is not granted the usual six-month extension).[3] Estimated tax payments for the second quarter of 2020 have not been delayed and, absent future guidance, remain due on June 15, 2020.

    This Notice is limited to federal income tax payments and returns. Therefore, taxpayers would need separate relief to defer filing tax returns and making tax payments with respect to certain other federal taxes (e.g., withholding taxes) due on April 15, 2020.

    The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance has recently announced that individuals, fiduciaries (estates and trusts) and corporations may delay until July 15, 2020, all New York State tax payments and tax returns otherwise due on April 15, 2020.[4]

    Authored by Philippe Benedict, Dan A. Kusnetz, David J. Passey, Shlomo C. Twerski, Alan S. Waldenberg, David S. Wermuth, Elie Zolty, David S. Griffel, Christine Harlow, Karen J. Loga and Ying (Audrey) Wei

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] This relief does not apply to partnerships and S-corporations, as partnership and S-corporation federal income tax returns (or extension to file such returns) were due on March 16, 2020.

    [2] IRS Filing and Payment Deadlines Questions and Answers, Q17 and Q21,  (last visited April 2, 2020).

    [3] Ibid. Q12.

    [4] See New York Department of Taxation and Finance, N-20-2, Announcement Regarding Relief from Certain Filing and Payment Deadlines due to the Novel Coronavirus, COVID-19 (March 2020).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Philippe Benedict

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Dan A. Kusnetz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Alan S. Waldenberg

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David S. Wermuth

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David S. Griffel

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Karen J. Loga

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • 401(k) and 403(b) Plans Under the CARES Act: Implementing Special Employee Relief

    401(k) and 403(b) Plans Under the CARES Act: Implementing Special Employee Relief

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    401(k) and 403(b) Plans Under the CARES Act: Implementing Special Employee Relief

    April 3, 2020

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Among the many aspects of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) passed by Congress and signed into law, are those that cover tax-qualified retirement plans, including 401(k) plans and 403(b) plans. As described in greater detail in our prior Alert, with respect to plan participants who are impacted by the pandemic, the CARES Act increases the amount available to be taken as a loan and permits special repayable in-service distributions (“coronavirus-related distributions”) of up to $100,000, without early-withdrawal penalty taxes.

    Should New Provisions Be Implemented?

    • Like all in-service distributions, coronavirus-related distributions and higher loan amounts generally are unfavorable for long-term retirement saving.
    • A coronavirus-related distribution is only available to a plan participant who has been affected by COVID-19 and might be eligible to take a “hardship withdrawal” if offered by the plan.
    • Unlike a coronavirus-related distribution, a participant’s hardship withdrawal may be subject to a 10% penalty tax and will not be repayable.

    Implementation of New Provisions

    • The new CARE Act provisions can be implemented by plans immediately.
    • For a plan to implement the new distribution and loan provisions, the plan sponsor will need to adopt appropriate plan amendments, however, the amendments to a plan can be adopted at a later time.
    • Certain plan administrators, such as TIAA and Fidelity, that offer “pre-approved plans” (i.e., a form of plan document that has been determined by the Internal Revenue Service to meet tax requirements) are taking unilateral action to implement the CARES Act provisions automatically for all clients who have adopted their pre-approved plans.
      • A plan sponsor that does not want its plan to adopt one or more of the provisions must affirmatively opt out of the automatic changes by taking action, in some cases, within a very short time period.

    We are available to assist you with analyzing the impact of the new changes for your plan.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, David M. Cohen, Ian. L. Levin, Ronald E. Richman and Susan E. Bernstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David M. Cohen

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • COVID-19 – German Government Aid Measures

    ARTICLE

    COVID-19 – German Government Aid Measures

    April 1, 2020

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    UPDATE: Now also including federal states.

    Learn more about the options available to you by way of state aid provided by the German Federal Government.

    In just a few steps, we help you identify the subsidy offer that suits you.

     

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Uwe Goetker

    Partner

    DĂŒsseldorf

    Dr. Thomas Hauss

    Partner

    DĂŒsseldorf

    Dr. Matthias Kampshoff

    Partner

    DĂŒsseldorf

    Dr. Philip Uecker

    Associate

    DĂŒsseldorf

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  • New Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Established by Federal Reserve in Wake of COVID-19

    New Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Established by Federal Reserve in Wake of COVID-19

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Established by Federal Reserve in Wake of COVID-19

    April 2, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 23, 2020, as a result of the economic uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”) authorized a new Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF 2020”), among several extensive measures designed to support the flow of credit to consumers and businesses. Like its predecessor established in response to the global financial crisis (“TALF 2008”),[1] TALF 2020 is intended to operate as a funding backstop to facilitate the issuance of eligible asset-backed securities (“ABS”) and improving the general market conditions for ABS.[2]

    Under TALF 2020, the Federal Reserve will lend to holders of certain AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and recently originated consumer and small business loans. Eligible borrowers consist of all U.S. companies[3] that own eligible collateral and maintain an account relationship with a primary dealer. The Federal Reserve will lend an amount equal to the market value of the ABS less a “haircut” and will be secured at all times by the ABS. All loans made under the TALF 2020 are non-recourse to the borrowers and have a maturity of three years. Additionally, the borrowers will have the option to prepay loans made under the TALF 2020 in whole or in part, but substitution of collateral during the term of the loan is generally not allowed. To support TALF 2020, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will commit to lend a special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) on a recourse basis and the U.S. Department of the Treasury will make an initial equity investment of $10 billion in the SPV using the Exchange Stabilization Fund.

    Lenders who considered borrowing from TALF 2008, which was a similar program created to finance consumer and business credit through the issuance of ABS, may wish to consider participating in the TALF 2020. However, lenders considering participation in the TALF 2020 will need to act within the upcoming months, as the SPV will no longer make loans after Sept. 30, 2020, unless the deadline is extended by the Federal Reserve.

    Eligible Collateral

    The eligible collateral is initially limited to ABS issued on or after March 23, 2020 where the underlying securitized assets are one of the following:[4]

    1. Auto loans and leases;
    2. Student loans;
    3. Credit card receivables (both consumer and corporate);
    4. Equipment loans;
    5. Floorplan loans;
    6. Insurance premium finance loans;
    7. Certain small business loans that are guaranteed by the Small Business Administration; or
    8. Eligible servicing advance receivables.[5]

    Eligible collateral includes U.S. dollar-denominated cash (that is, not synthetic) ABS that have a credit rating in the highest long-term or the highest short-term investment-grade rating category from at least two eligible nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (“NRSROs”) and do not have a credit rating below the highest investment-grade rating category from an eligible NRSRO.

    ABS that bear interest payments that step up or step down to predetermined levels on specific dates will not be included as eligible collateral. Additionally, the underlying credit exposures of eligible collateral must not include exposures that are themselves cash ABS or synthetic ABS.

    All or substantially all of the underlying credit exposures must have been originated by a U.S. company and be newly issued to be considered eligible criteria. The definition of “newly issued” has not been defined by the Federal Reserve, so lenders must wait for the detailed terms and conditions to be provided.

    Collateral Valuation

    The pledged eligible collateral will be valued and assigned a “haircut” according to a schedule based on its sector, the weighted average life and historical volatility of the ABS. The “haircut” will be similar to the “haircut” from the TALF 2008, and will be published by the Federal Reserve at a later date in the detailed terms and conditions.

    Pricing and Fees

    The interest rate for eligible ABS with underlying credit exposures without a government guarantee will be 100 basis points over the two-year LIBOR swap rate for securities with a weighted average life less than two years, or 100 basis points over the three-year LIBOR swap rate for securities with a weighted average life of two years or greater. The pricing for other eligible ABS will be set forth in the detailed terms and conditions. Additionally, borrowers will be required to pay the SPV an administrative fee equal to 10 basis points of the loan amount on the settlement date for the ABS collateral.

    The Federal Reserve will provide more detailed terms and conditions which are predicted to be similar to the terms and conditions for the TALF 2008 at a later date. Schulte Roth & Zabel will continue to provide updates as further developments become known. In the meantime, please contact your SRZ attorney or one of the authors if you have any questions.

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Craig Stein, Joseph P. Vitale and David Rosenberg.


    [1] See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20081125a.htm

    [2] See https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/monetary20200323b3.pdf

    [3] A U.S. company is defined as a U.S. business or entity organized under the laws of the United States or a political subdivision or territory thereof (including such an entity that has a non-U.S. parent company), or a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank.

    [4] Additional asset classes may be considered in the future.

    [5] The detailed terms and conditions to be provided by the Federal Reserve will contain further definitions to the eligibility of the underlying securitized assets and are expected to be similar to the TALF 2008 definitions.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Regulated Funds: SEC Provides No-Action Relief for Purchases of Debt Securities from Mutual Funds in Response to COVID-19

    Regulated Funds: SEC Provides No-Action Relief for Purchases of Debt Securities from Mutual Funds in Response to COVID-19

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Regulated Funds: SEC Provides No-Action Relief for Purchases of Debt Securities from Mutual Funds in Response to COVID-19

    April 2, 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 26, 2020, the staff of the Division of Investment Management of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Staff”) issued a no-action letter (“No-Action Letter”) indicating that, for the duration of the COVID-19 national emergency, registered open-end funds that are not exchange-traded funds and do not hold themselves out as money market funds (“mutual funds”) will be able to rely on the provisions of Rule 17a-9 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (“1940 Act”), to allow for purchases of debt securities by affiliated persons of such funds.[1] Prior to the issuance of the No-Action Letter, Rule 17a-9, which provides an exemption from prohibitions against transactions with affiliated persons under Section 17(a) of the 1940 Act, was only available to money market funds.[2] In reliance on Rule 17a-9, an affiliated person of a money market fund, or an affiliated person of such person, is permitted to purchase securities held by a money market fund, subject to certain conditions.

    Recognizing a “short-term dislocation” in the debt securities market resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak, the Investment Company Institute (“ICI”) noted that mutual fund investment advisers (directly or through their affiliates) may wish to purchase debt securities from such funds to enhance the funds’ liquidity and to help fund shareholder redemptions.[3] The Staff agreed to make the Rule 17a-9 exemption temporarily available to enable such purchases of debt securities from mutual funds, subject to the following conditions:

    1. The purchase price is paid in cash;
    2. The price of the purchased debt security is its fair market value under Section 2(a)(41) of the 1940 Act, provided that this price is not materially different from the fair market value of the security indicated by a reliable third-party pricing service;
    3. In the event that the purchaser thereafter sells the purchased security for a higher price than the purchase price paid to the fund, the purchaser shall promptly pay to the fund the amount by which the subsequent sale price exceeds the purchase price paid to the fund. If the purchaser is subject to Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, this condition does not apply to the extent that it would otherwise conflict with (i) applicable banking regulations or (ii) any applicable exemption from such regulations issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
    4. Within one business day of the purchase of the security, the fund publicly posts on its website and informs the Staff via email at IM-EmergencyRelief@sec.gov, stating the name of the fund, the name of the purchaser, the security(s) purchased (including a legal identifier if available), the amount purchased and the total price paid; and
    5. The relief set forth herein shall be in effect on a temporary basis in response to the national emergency concerning the COVID-19 outbreak, which was proclaimed by the President of the United States on March 13, 2020, and will cease to be in effect upon notice from the Staff.

    The No Action Letter states that if the above conditions are met, the Staff will not recommend enforcement action against a mutual fund or any affiliated person of such fund that is not a registered investment company in connection with the purchase of debt securities by the affiliated person.

    The No-Action Letter is part of a series of recent efforts by the Staff aimed at enhancing liquidity options for funds impacted by changing market conditions as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak.[4] If you have any questions about the content of this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

    Authored by Karen Spiegel and Noah B. Aschen.


    [1] Investment Company Institute, SEC No-Action Letter (March 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/investment/investment-company-institute-032620-17a.

    [2] 17 CFR § 270.17a-9

    [3] Request for No-Action Relief for Affiliated Purchases of Debt Securities from Registered Open-End Investment Companies (March 26, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2020/investment-company-institute-032620-17a-incoming.pdf.

    [4] See SRZ Alert  Regulated Funds: SEC Provides No-Action Relief to Money Market Funds in Response to COVID-19 Outbreak (March 25, 2020), /insights/regulated-funds-sec-provides-no-action-relief-to-money-market/; and SRZ Alert Regulated Funds: SEC Provides Temporary Exemption for Borrowing and Lending Arrangements in Response to COVID-19 Outbreak (March 31, 2020), /insights/regulated-funds-sec-provides-temporary-exemption-for-borrowing/.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
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  • CMS Issues Nationwide Blanket Waivers of Stark Law and OIG Issues an AKS Policy Statement

    CMS Issues Nationwide Blanket Waivers of Stark Law and OIG Issues an AKS Policy Statement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Issues Nationwide Blanket Waivers of Stark Law and OIG Issues an AKS Policy Statement

    April 1, 2020

    Read time: 28 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This On the Subject was updated on April 7, 2020, to address the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) April 3, 2020, Policy Statement and its potential impact as well.

    The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services issued nationwide blanket waivers for some Stark Law requirements in response to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Notably, 18 specific blanket waivers may be applicable to several scenarios that healthcare providers face in light of COVID-19. Providers must meet specific requirements to take advantage of the waivers. The Office of Inspector General issued a separate Policy Statement a few days later on the Stark Law waivers’ impact on Anti-Kickback Statute enforcement.

    In depth

    On March 30, 2020, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a series of nationwide Section 1135 waivers applicable to the physician self-referral law (the Stark Law) in response to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The waivers exempt healthcare entities from sanctions under section 1877(g) of the Social Security Act for noncompliance, provided certain conditions are met, and absent the government’s determination of fraud or abuse. Importantly, and discussed further below, CMS has structured the waivers to apply only to arrangements that meet one of several required COVID-related purposes.

    On April 3, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a Policy Statement stating OIG’s intention not to impose administrative sanctions under the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) for remuneration covered by most of the 18 Stark Law waivers.

    Background

    On March 13, 2020, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act and made an emergency determination under the Stafford Act. This announcement followed the January 31, 2020, declaration of a public health emergency under the Public Health Service Act by the Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These actions opened the door for the authorization of waivers of certain Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) requirements as provided by Section 1135 of the Act (collectively, Section 1135 waivers).

    Section 1135 of the Act allows the Secretary to temporarily waive certain, but not all, healthcare regulatory requirements in an emergency area during an emergency period. To implement Section 1135 waivers, CMS must determine that a provider has been affected by the emergency that prompted the issuance of the waivers. CMS has the option to issue individual Section 1135 waivers on a case-by-case basis, or CMS can implement “blanket” waivers.

    Section 1135 waivers typically end either at the termination of the emergency period or 60 days from the date that the waiver or modification is published. With notice, HHS may provide for additional periods of up to 60 days until the end of the emergency period. It is unclear at this time whether compensation arrangements entered into during the emergency period in reliance on a blanket Stark Law waiver are protected if the arrangement continues after the emergency period. For more information on Section 1135 waivers, see our previous On the Subject.

    Generally, the Stark Law prohibits a “physician” from “referring” Medicare beneficiaries to an “entity” for the furnishing of “designated health services” (DHS) if the physician (or one of her immediate family members) has a “financial relationship” with the entity (the DHS Entity), unless a statutory or regulatory exception applies (the Stark Law’s referral prohibition). The Stark Law also prohibits the DHS Entity from billing Medicare or any other person or entity for improperly referred DHS (the Stark Law’s billing prohibition). DHS includes 10 categories of services, including inpatient and outpatient hospital services, clinical laboratory services, and radiology and other imaging services.

    Under the national Stark Law waiver, CMS has provided 18 specific blanket waivers that will apply to arrangements in which a DHS Entity conveys a benefit directly to a physician or an immediate family member of a physician, or in which a physician (or immediate family member) conveys a benefit directly to a DHS Entity.

    The blanket waivers have retroactive effect to March 1, 2020. CMS notes that the
    blanket waivers may be revised, but any revisions that narrow or terminate a blanket waiver will be effective only on a prospective basis. CMS may issue additional blanket waivers. Inquiries regarding the blanket waivers may be sent to 1877CallCenter@cms.hhs.gov. DHS Entities and physicians may also request individual waivers from CMS for arrangements that do not meet the criteria for one of the nationwide blanket waivers.

    The Blanket Stark Law Waivers Must Be Related to COVID-19 Purposes

    CMS specified certain conditions that apply to the use of any of the new blanket Stark Law waivers. Specifically, the waivers apply only to financial relationships related to the COVID-19 national emergency and the remuneration or referrals described in the waivers “must be solely related to COVID-19 Purposes.” A “COVID-19 Purpose” means any one of the following:

    • Diagnosing or providing medically necessary treatment of COVID-19 for any patient or individual, regardless of whether the patient or individual is diagnosed with a confirmed case of COVID-19
    • Securing the services of physicians and other healthcare practitioners and professionals to furnish medically necessary patient care services, including services not related to the diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19
    • Ensuring the ability of healthcare providers to address patient and community needs due to COVID-19
    • Expanding the capacity of healthcare providers to address patient and community needs due to COVID-19
    • Shifting the diagnosis and care of patients to appropriate alternative settings due to COVID-19
    • Addressing medical practice or business interruption caused by COVID-19 to maintain the availability of medical care and related services for patients and the community.

    This last COVID-19 Purpose (addressing medical practice or business interruptions caused by COVID-19) raises some questions of what degree of financial assistance may be provided to physicians simply to address interruption of their business, similar to the business interruption suffered by virtually all businesses. This COVID-19 Purpose also requires that that the activity or arrangement maintain availability of services for patients in the community. The actions that meet this Purpose may change over time, but currently, simply giving financial assistance to physicians to soften the financial blow of business interruption may not meet this Purpose. In contrast, financial assistance contingent on the physician providing a reciprocal benefit to the hospital or community likely would be deemed related to a COVID-19 Purpose. For example, permitting delays in or (perhaps) abatement of rent, or furnishing space, equipment or personnel, when necessary for the practice to continue to safely and affordably furnish services to COVID-19 and/or non-COVID patients, is arguably protected. We also note that some of the other Purposes more directly address COVID-19 responses, and therefore may be more commonly used, such as “ensuring the ability of health care providers to address patient and community needs due to COVID-19.” Under this Purpose, and under the specific waivers discussed below, DHS Entities could provide free or below-FMV priced personal safety equipment to physicians to enable the physicians to continue to provide in-person care to patients.

    CMS also requires that any remuneration described in the blanket waivers be a direct financial relationship between a DHS Entity and a physician, a physician organization in whose shoes the physician stands, or a physician’s immediate family member. This limitation would make the waivers unavailable whenever the DHS Entity’s financial relationship is with an entity other than the physician’s medical practice. It is not clear why the waiver would not be available for a relationship between, for example, a hospital and a physician-owned business such as a real estate holding company. This and other questions about the waivers perhaps will be clarified in the future.

    The 18 Blanket Stark Waivers

    CMS provided 18 specific blanket waivers that will apply to scenarios in which a DHS Entity makes payments to a physician or an immediate family member of a physician, or in which a physician provides payments to a DHS Entity.

    Waivers on Fair Market Value (FMV) Requirements for Leases, Services, Purchases and Loans

    The broadest waivers apply to payments made either by a DHS Entity or by a physician, where the payments are for space or equipment rental, or for the purchase of items or services, and the payments or purchases are not in line with FMV. The waivers apply to the following scenarios:

    • Payments by a DHS Entity to a physician, or an immediate family member of a physician, for services personally performed by the physician, where the remuneration is above or below fair market value for services performed
    • Payments made between a DHS Entity and a physician, or an immediate family member of a physician, for space or equipment rental, where the remuneration is below FMV for the lease
    • Payments made between a DHS Entity and a physician, or an immediate family member of a physician, for items or services purchased, where the remuneration is below FMV for the items or services
    • Remuneration resulting from a loan between a DHS Entity and a physician, or an immediate family member of a physician, where the interest rate is below fair market value or on terms that are unavailable from a bank or other commercial lender.

    Incidental Benefits and Non-Monetary Compensation Waivers

    A hospital or other DHS Entity may provide non-monetary remuneration to a physician (or an immediate family member of a physician) in the following circumstances:

    • Medical staff incidental benefits that exceeds the 2020 limit of $36 per occurrence
    • Non-monetary compensation that exceeds the 2020 limit of $423 per calendar year.

    In-Office Ancillary Services Exceptions/Group Practice Waivers

    CMS also issued two blanket waivers applicable to physician group practices, effectively waiving the “location test” of the in-office ancillary services exception:

    • The referral by a physician in a group practice for medically necessary DHS furnished by the group practice in a location that does not qualify as a “same building” or “centralized building” for purposes of 42 CFR § 411.355(b)(2)
    • The referral by a physician in a group practice for medically necessary DHS furnished by the group practice to a patient in his private home, an assisted living facility or independent living facility where the referring physician’s principal medical practice does not consist of treating patients in their private homes.

    Physician-Owned Hospital and ASC Expansion Waivers

    CMS provided two waiver provisions addressing physician-owned hospitals and ASCs that are meant to expand the capability of physician-owned entities to provide care to patients in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, referrals by a physician owner to a hospital temporarily expanding its bed capacity or an ASC converted to a temporary hospital are permitted. Without the waiver, physician-owned hospitals are generally prohibited from expanding their bed capacity, and physician-owned ASCs are generally prohibited from converting an ASC to a hospital. A physician-owned ASC that is considering temporarily converting into a hospital must comply with additional requirements, however, in line with Medicare conditions of participation and other hospital enrollment requirements that are not waived by CMS under Section 1135 waivers. For additional details on the Section 1135 waivers, click here.

    Physician Home Health Ownership Waiver

    CMS will permit physicians to refer patients to a home health agency in which the physician (or an immediate family member of the physician) has an ownership or investment interest, regardless of whether the home health agency qualifies as a rural provider.

    Writing and Signature Requirement Waiver

    CMS will permit referrals to a DHS entity with whom a physician has a financial relationship where the compensation arrangement does not satisfy the writing or signature requirements of a Stark Law exception, but satisfies all of the other requirements of the applicable exception. However, CMS clarified that a provider may rely on another Stark Law blanket waiver in addition to relying on the waiver exempting the writing and signature requirements. For example, this permits a healthcare provider to effectively rely on waivers related to payments that are both (1) above or below fair market value, as applicable, and (2) not documented in a signed writing.

    Example Scenarios

    CMS provided a list of examples of remuneration, referrals or conduct that may fall within the scope of the blanket waivers. CMS pointed to these as examples only and noted that other scenarios could qualify for the waiver of sanctions. For instance, CMS offers the example of a DHS entity paying physicians above their previously contracted rates for furnishing professional medical services to COVID-19 patients in hazardous or challenging settings. Another example includes an entity selling personal protective gear to a physician practice at no cost or below FMV. The examples provided by CMS may be helpful to providers determining whether the Secretary would deem an arrangement with a physician to satisfy one of the “COVID-19 Purposes.”

    CMS provided additional examples in a fact sheet for physicians and other practitioners related to the new waivers. For example, a hospital may provide space on hospital grounds at no charge to a physician who is willing to treat patients who seek care at the hospital but are not appropriate for emergency department or inpatient care. Alternatively, a physician in a group practice may order medically necessary DHS furnished to a patient in the patient’s home and contemporaneously provide a physician service by telehealth to the patient.

    Record Keeping

    CMS emphasized that parties using the blanket waivers must make records relating to the blanket waiver use available to CMS upon request. The Stark Law blanket waivers may be used retroactively to March 1, 2020, and CMS encourages providers to develop and maintain records relating to financial relationships between DHS Entities and physicians as a best practice.

    OIG’s AKS Policy Statement

    Recognizing the public health emergency created by COVID-19, the OIG published a Policy Statement on April 3, 2020, indicating that it will not seek to impose administrative sanctions for remuneration protected under any of the first 11 (of 18) Stark Law blanket waivers. The OIG has authority under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(b)(7) and 1320a-7a(a)(7) to exclude from participation in federal healthcare programs, or to impose civil monetary fines on, any person found to have violated the AKS. While OIG’s policy statement does not extend to all of the Stark Law blanket waivers, it covers the situations that are most likely to implicate the AKS from OIG’s perspective, including payments made either by a DHS Entity or by a physician where the payments are for space or equipment rental, or for the purchase of items or services, as well as direct remuneration to physicians in the form of non-monetary compensation or medical staff incidental benefits, or loans at below FMV or with terms that are not commercially available.

    All of the conditions and definitions that apply to the Stark Law blanket waivers apply to the OIG’s Policy Statement. This extends to the requirement that the blanket waivers apply only to financial relationships that solely relate to at least one of the CMS “COVID-19 Purposes,” discussed above.

    The OIG’s Policy Statement and its exercise of discretion regarding the imposition of administrative sanctions will apply only to conduct occurring on or after April 3, 2020, and will terminate concurrently with the Stark Law blanket waivers. While the Policy Statement is not retroactive to March 1, 2020, on its terms, it seems reasonable to conclude that OIG would also not impose sanctions on arrangements that met a Stark Law blanket waiver prior to April 3, 2020.

    The OIG is accepting questions about the application of its administrative sanctions authority to the remaining Stark Law waivers that are not covered in the Policy Statement. Questions may be submitted to OIGComplianceSuggestions@oig.hhs.gov and should include facts about the key parties involved and terms of the arrangement involved. OIG is also publishing FAQs related to the COVID-19 pandemic online.

    Key Takeaways

    The blanket Stark Law waivers may provide welcome relief at a time when hospitals and other providers are confronting an unprecedented pandemic. However, given that the waivers are narrowly tailored and require the relevant entity to satisfy a “COVID-19 Purpose,” potential use of any waiver will require fact-intensive analysis to determine applicability. Moreover, while the waivers provide relief from the FMV requirement of key compensation exceptions and the dollar value limits included in the medical staff incidental benefits and non-monetary compensation exceptions, the waivers do not appear to relieve DHS Entities from compliance with the other elements of Stark Law exceptions, such as the “set in advance” requirement.

    While healthcare providers are not required to notify CMS before using a Stark Law blanket waiver, providers should document both a valid COVID-19 Purpose and the particular facts and circumstances for each arrangement where the provider believes a Stark Law waiver applies. Providers should ensure that non-FMV or otherwise commercially unreasonable arrangements are entered into solely for a COVID-19 Purpose, and not to extend charity to significant referral sources. In light of the uncertain status of arrangements entered into in reliance on a Stark Law waiver that continue after the emergency period ends, providers should include traditional “change of law/illegality” provisions should such clauses be needed to later modify or end an arrangement.

    Finally, it is important for providers to recognize that OIG’s Policy Statement requires compliance with all of the requirements of the applicable Stark Law waiver, including the requirement of a COVID-19 Purpose. Limiting the Policy Statement to the Stark Law waivers also means that arrangements between non-DHS Entities (such as pharmaceutical or device manufacturers) and physicians are not covered by the Policy Statement. However, these non-DHS Entities are also a critical part of addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and may have legitimate reasons to engage with physicians or others in efforts to address the crisis. Thus, arrangements not covered by the Stark Law waivers require a careful examination of the facts and circumstances to assess AKS risk.

    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Monica Wallace

    Partner

    Chicago

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Caroline Reignley

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • DEA Provides Additional Guidance Regarding Prescription and Other Policies During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency

    DEA Provides Additional Guidance Regarding Prescription and Other Policies During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    DEA Provides Additional Guidance Regarding Prescription and Other Policies During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency

    April 1, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    To assist healthcare providers and others in the industry during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has issued guidance addressing specific areas of concern, including practitioner registration with the Agency when practicing in additional states; early refills; oral Schedule II prescriptions; narcotic treatment programs and medication-assisted treatment; DEA Form 222s; and manufacturing/quota issues.

    In depth

    The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently updated its COVID-19 Information Page to address areas of concern brought to its attention by a variety of sources.

    Practicing Across State Lines

    Citing the fact that many states have declared public emergencies and have granted reciprocity to neighboring states and their practitioners to allow for practice across state lines, the DEA granted an exception to its requirement that that practitioners are required to register in each state in which they dispense controlled substances. Specifically, the DEA stated that “DEA-registered practitioners are not required to obtain additional registration(s) with DEA in the additional state(s) where the dispensing (including prescribing and administering) occurs, for the duration of the public health emergency declared on January 31, 2020, if authorized to dispense controlled substances by both the state in which the practitioner is registered with DEA and the state in which the dispensing occurs.” The DEA noted that this exception will also apply to prescribing controlled substances via telemedicine to patients in states in which the practitioner is not DEA-registered. (See our previous On the Subject regarding the DEA’s position on the issuance of prescriptions based on telemedicine encounters.) The exception is granted from March 23, 2020, through the duration of the public health emergency as declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).

    Early Refills

    The DEA has noted that some states have issued orders allowing pharmacies to dispense early refills of controlled substances due to the COVID-19 emergency. The DEA has agreed that this practice may be permitted if the early dispensing is allowed by state law and regulation. The DEA also noted, however, that the prohibitions against refills of Schedule II controlled substances continue to apply.

    Oral Schedule II Prescriptions

    The DEA provided guidance and two “temporary exceptions” regarding the use of oral prescriptions for Schedule II controlled substances. The exceptions are:

    • The DEA will allow practitioners “15 days within which to provide [a follow-up paper copy of an emergency oral prescription] to the pharmacy.” This represents an extension of the standard seven-day requirement.
    • Recognizing that providing the pharmacy with a paper prescription may be “very challenging or impossible,” the DEA will allow practitioners to send the follow-up prescription via facsimile or to take a photograph or scan of such follow-up prescription and send the photograph or scan to the pharmacy in place of the paper prescription. The prescription must include the standard required information as well as a statement that the prescription is “Authorization for Emergency Dispensing.” The original paper prescription must be maintained in the patient file. The DEA also noted that emergency oral prescriptions for Schedule II drugs should be limited to the amount adequate to treat the patient during the emergency period.

    Both exceptions are effective on March 16, 2020, and will last through the duration of the public health emergency.

    Narcotic Treatment Programs/Medication-Assisted Treatment

    At the request of the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the DEA granted exceptions to the requirement that narcotics dispensed or administered at narcotic treatment programs (NTPs) be dispensed or administered by certain licensed personnel (21 C.F.R. 1301.74). The DEA noted that the exception was granted in order to allow for consistent dosing of patients enrolled in NTPs during the public health emergency. The DEA will allow, in the event that a patient is quarantined due to coronavirus, for alternative delivery methods using the NTP’s established chain of custody protocols for take-home medications. NTPs may make “doorstep” deliveries of take-home medications where diversion controls, such as a lockbox, are implemented. The DEA also expanded the category of person who can deliver the medications to include authorized NTP staff members, law enforcement officers and National Guard personnel. This exception is effective on March 16, 2020, through the duration of the public health emergency.

    DEA Form 222

    In response to concerns raised on behalf of its members by the Healthcare Distribution Alliance regarding purchasers’ “inability to mail a hard copy version of a DEA Form 222 to the supplier for fulfillment” considering the public health emergency, the DEA granted an exception to the 21 C.F.R. 1305.13 requirement that purchasers submit a hardcopy 222 to the supplier (where paper copies are used).

    The DEA has allowed that “all DEA registrants who order controlled substances are permitted to fax or scan/email a DEA Form 222 to their respective suppliers.” The fax/scan/email may be treated as the original order form for purposes of the regulation. The exception is effective as of March 20, 2020, and will remain in place through the duration of the public health emergency. At the conclusion of the public health emergency, purchasers must send the original 222s to their suppliers.

    Manufacturing/Quota

    Noting the need to ensure that there is an adequate and uninterrupted supply of controlled substances during the public health emergency, the DEA issued an exception to the requirement that the inventory of an individual manufacturer remain at or below 65% of its estimated net disposal as determined at the time its quota was issued. The DEA will allow all DEA-registered bulk manufacturers “to exceed the 65% ceiling in order to supply dosage form manufacturers with the active pharmaceutical ingredients” with the goal of avoiding potential drug shortages. The DEA noted, however, that the exception does not authorize any manufacturer to exceed its previously established annual quota. The exception is effective as of March 23, 2020, and will last for the duration of the public health emergency.

    Authors
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  • Covid-19 – Compensation for Loss of Earnings due to Closure of Daycare Centers and Schools in Germany

    Covid-19 – Compensation for Loss of Earnings due to Closure of Daycare Centers and Schools in Germany

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Covid-19 – Compensation for Loss of Earnings due to Closure of Daycare Centers and Schools in Germany

    April 1, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “SOCIAL CARE ACT” AND THE “ACT ON PEOPLE’S PROTECTION FOR EPIDEMIC SITUATIONS OF NATIONWIDE IMPORTANCE”

    In response to the ongoing coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis, the laws on people’s protection for epidemic situations of nationwide importance and social care, which were passed last week in an emergency procedure, have become effective on March 29, 2020.

    The Social Care Act is intended to deal with the social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This will simplify access to social benefits, raise the supplementary income threshold to the retirement pension and extend minimal employment in the form of short-term employment. Furthermore, earnings from secondary employment in system-relevant areas taken up during short-time work will no longer be fully accounted for. Social service providers will also be provided with financial support to help them partake in measures to counter the effects of the pandemic. Finally, an amendment to the Working Hours Act allows for exceptions to maintain the operation of system-relevant areas.

    Together with the “Act on people’s protection for epidemic situations of nationwide importance”, the Infection Protection Law has also been amended. Alongside additional federal competencies in the fight against epidemics, it now also provides for a compensation claim for parents who suffer loss of earnings due to the closure of schools and daycare centers by the authorities.

    Below we provide an overview of the significant changes in labour law for companies in Germany as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

    In depth

    AMENDMENT OF THE WORKING HOURS ACT FOR SUPPORT OF SYSTEM-RELEVANT COMPANIES

    In order to ensure the maintenance of system-relevant operations, such as in the healthcare sector, public safety and order, services of general interest and the supply of the population with existential goods, the Social Care Act includes an amendment to the Working Hours Act. It has been extended by a statutory ordinance, which allows nationwide exceptions to the working time regulations to ensure the maintenance of critical infrastructure. The Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, together with the Federal Ministry of Health, can now permit temporary exceptions from the regulations of the Working Time Act for certain employees in system-relevant occupations in the event of exceptional emergencies with nationwide implications, such as epidemics. Previously, the Working Hours Act only allowed local exceptions in urgent public interest by the authorities responsible under state law.

    COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OF EARNINGS DUE TO CLOSURES OF DAYCARE CENTERS AND SCHOOLS

    Following the nationwide closure of daycare centers and schools by the authorities as a result of the pandemic, both employers and employees demanded precise legal regulations on how to compensate for the loss of earnings of working parents. The government has now reacted to this by passing the “Act on people’s protection for epidemic situations of nationwide importance”. The act introduces an extension of the Infection Protection Act (IfSG) until the end of 2020. Parents who are unable to work (even remotely at home) as a result of closed childcare facilities or schools may be entitled to compensation in accordance with the new § 56 (1a) IfSG.

    According to this law, persons entitled to compensation are employed custodians of children up to the age of 12 or disabled children who are dependent on help,

    • if they have to look after their child themselves due to the closures and therefore suffer a loss of earnings; and
    • if they have no other reasonable possibility of care (e.g. by the other parent or emergency care in the facilities; however, currently identified risk groups such as the child’s grandparents should not have to be given priority for care). The burden of proof for the lack of alternative childcare possibilities lies with the employee.

    Loss of earnings does not apply if there are other legal ways of staying away from work temporarily on a paid basis, for example by reducing the amount of accumulated time credits. Just as with short-time working compensation, credit balances on working time accounts will therefore have to be reduced to “zero” before a claim for compensation exists. A possible claim for short-time work compensation takes precedence over the compensation claim. It is still unclear how to deal with holiday entitlements. It is imaginable that, in line with the approach to short-time work compensation, at least any remaining holiday entitlements from the previous year will have to be reduced.

    There is no entitlement to compensation during periods of time when the childcare facility or school would have been closed anyway (e.g. during school holidays).

    The compensation payment amounts to 67% of the loss of earnings (net remuneration) of the working custodian, up to a maximum of €2,016 per full month. It is granted for up to six weeks, based on the continued payment of wages in the case of illness.

    The employee’s claim for compensation is directed to the state, but the employer acts – as in the case of the IfSG – as a “state payment office”. The employer makes advance payments and pays the compensation to the employee. On application, the employer can then have the amount paid out refunded by the relevant authority. Responsible authorities are to be determined according to state law. In most federal states, these will presumably be the local health departments.

    Employers should submit the application – in accordance with the deadline regulation for claims under § 56 (1) IfSG – at the latest within three months. It is unclear whether the period begins with the official closure order or only when the loss of earnings of the employee begins. As a precaution, the deadline should be calculated from the time of the closure order.

    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    DĂŒsseldorf

    Volker Teigelkötter

    Partner

    DĂŒsseldorf

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  • COVID-19 – Checklist to Assist Companies in Germany in Dealing with the Crisis

    COVID-19 – Checklist to Assist Companies in Germany in Dealing with the Crisis

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    COVID-19 – Checklist to Assist Companies in Germany in Dealing with the Crisis

    April 1, 2020

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Following the wider global outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19), radical – and sometimes controversial – actions have been and are further expected to be taken by national, federal and local governments and authorities in affected countries.

    Given the scope of these actions, along with widespread impacts of the crisis on the economy in general and in particular employment, supply chains, pending M&A activity and capital markets, boards are urged to take action now to ensure the health of contingency plans, mitigate risks, tackle immediate priorities and ensure business continuity and stability.

    This high-level checklist can assist corporates and portfolio companies of private equity funds navigate current uncertainties related to COVID-19. The checklist was originally published on March 13, and has been updated for Germany as of March 31 2020. Read the updated checklist in German.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Uwe Goetker

    Partner

    DĂŒsseldorf

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  • CJEU Provides Important Clarifications in Relation to the Assessment Of Pay-For-Delay Agreements Under EU Competition Law

    ARTICLE

    CJEU Provides Important Clarifications in Relation to the Assessment Of Pay-For-Delay Agreements Under EU Competition Law

    April, 2020

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On 30 January 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘CJEU’) rendered its preliminary ruling in C-307/18 – Generics (UK) and Others in response to a request from the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (the ‘CAT’). This is a first CJEU judgment that dealt with so-called ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements, namely a form of a patent dispute settlement agreement by which the originator company agrees to transfer benefits to a generic company in exchange for the latter to undertake not to seek to enter the market with an independent generic product for a while.

    In depth

    In this judgment, the CJEU provided clarity about:

    • Under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘Article 101 TFEU’):
      • the concept of ‘potential competition’; and
      • the criteria to determine whether a pay-for-delay agreement is characterised as a restriction of competition by object.
    • Under Article 102 of the TFEU (‘Aticle 102 TFEU’):
      • the definition of the relevant product market; and
      • the criteria to determine whether the conclusion of a set of pay-for-delay agreements amounts to an abuse of a dominant position.

    We set out below first, a summary of the underlying proceedings before the CAT, and then the details of the CJEU’s ruling, followed by our comment.

    1. UK Main Proceedings

    On 12 February 2016, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (the ‘CMA’) fined:

    • GlaxoSmithKline plc and its affiliates (together ‘GSK’) ÂŁ37,606,275 in total
      • for having concluded pay-for-delay agreements with Generics (UK) Ltd and its former parent company (together ‘GUK’) and Alpharma LLC and its former subsidiaries (together ‘Alpharma’) in violation of the prohibition imposed by section 2(1) of the UK Competition Act 1998 (the ‘Chapter I Prohibition’) and, in respect of the agreement with GUK for the period between 1 May 2004 and 1 July 2004, also Article 101 TFE; and
      • for having abused its dominant position on the UK paroxetine supply market in contravention of section 18 of the UK Competition Act (the ‘Chapter II prohibition’) by making significant value transfers to potential competitors to induce them to delay their potential independent entry to the UK paroxetine market.
    • GUK ÂŁ5,841,286 in total for having concluded a pay-for-delay agreement with GSK in contravention of the Chapter I Prohibition and, with respect to the period between 1 May 2004 and 1 July 2004, also Article 101 TFEU.
    • Alpharma ÂŁ1,542,860 in total for having concluded a pay-for-delay agreement with GSK in contravention of the Chapter I Prohibition.

    GSK concluded three agreements in the years 2001-2004 following the expiry in January 1999 in the United Kingdom of its patent for the active ingredient of the originator medicine, paroxetine. Paroxetine is a prescription-only anti-depressant medicine, belonging to a class of antidepressant medicines known as selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (‘SSRIs’). GSK marketed paroxetine under the brand name ‘Seroxat’, which became a blockbuster product for GSK.

    The brief overview of each of the three agreements (together the ‘Infringing Agreements’) is as follows:

    i. GSK entered into an agreement with IVAX on 3 October 2001 (the ‘First Infringing Agreement’). Under this agreement, IVAX agreed to distribute limited quantities of GSK’s Seroxat and GSK agreed to make significant value transfers, including cash payments, to IVAX (at least £17.9 million). GSK had not brought patent infringement proceedings against IVAX prior to the conclusion of the Agreement. The agreement expired on 29 June 2004.

    ii. GSK entered into a second agreement with GUK on 13 March 2002 (the ‘Second Infringement Agreement’). Prior to this, GSK had brought patent infringement proceedings against GUK. Under this agreement, GUK undertook to enter into a sub-distribution agreement with IVAX for the supply of paroxetine, and not to make, import or supply paroxetine hydrochloride in the United Kingdom during the term of that agreement. For its part, GSK agreed to make significant value transfers, including cash payments, to GUK (at least £21.3 million). The agreement expired on 1 July 2004.

    iii. GSK entered into a third agreement with Alpharma on 12 November 2002 (the ‘Third Infringing Agreement’). Prior to this, GSK had brought patent infringement proceedings against Alpharma. Under this agreement, Alpharma undertook to enter into a sub-distribution agreement with IVAX for the supply of paroxetine, and not to make, import or supply in the United Kingdom any paroxetine hydrochloride other than what it would purchase from IVAX or what would be manufactured by GSK. For its part, GSK agreed to make significant value transfers, including cash payments, to Alpharma (at least £11.8 million). The agreement expired on 13 February 2004.

    The First Infringing Agreement was exempted from the Chapter I prohibition by reason of the UK Competition Act 1998 (Land and Vertical Agreements Exclusion) Order 2000 notably because of the lack of an express restriction on entry by IVAX. Also, Article 101 TFEU was not applied to it because it was unlikely to have an anticompetitive object and/or effect during the period from 1 May 2004 to 29 June 2004 that followed the independent generic entry by Apotex Europe Ltd and its distributors in December 2003.

    GSK, GUK and Alpharma brought appeals against the CMA decision before the CAT.  On 8 March 2018, the CAT issued an intermediate judgment and dismissed certain grounds of appeal; but it decided to refer a number of questions to the CJEU before handing down its final judgment.

    2. The CJEU Ruling

    2.1 Article 101 TFEU

    2.1.1 The Concept of ‘Potential Competition’

    The CMA found that GUK and Alpharma were potential competitors of GSK and treated this finding as a condition for concluding that the Second and Third Infringement Agreements had the object of restricting competition. The appellants therefore challenged the CMA’s finding of potential competition. The CAT took the provisional view to dismiss those challenges. Nevertheless, it asked the CJEU whether the originator pharmaceutical company and generic pharmaceutical companies seeking to enter the market with a generic version of the originator drug are potential competitors.

    The CJEU confirmed that they are potential competitors provided that the below two cumulative conditions are met:

    i. The generic manufacturer has a firm intention and an inherent ability to enter the market.

    ii. The market entry does not meet insurmountable barriers to entry.

    (a) The First Condition

    In order to satisfy the first condition, it is necessary for the generic manufacturer concerned to have taken sufficient preparatory steps to enable it to enter the market concerned within such a period of time as would impose competitive pressure on the originator manufacturer at the time when the agreement concerned was concluded. Such steps could include:

    • measures taken to obtain marketing authorisations;
    • an adequate stock of the generic medicine;
    • legal steps actually undertaken with a view to challenging process patents held by the originator manufacturer; and
    • marketing efforts to market the generic medicine.

    The CJEU considered that when a generic manufacturer has taken sufficient preparatory steps, such as those, there are “real and concrete possibilities” of its entering the market, a requirement set out in the case law to consider a company that is not present in a market as a potential competitor of a company that is already present in that market.

    In relation to ‘legal steps actually undertaken’, the CJEU noted that the existence of a genuine dispute as to whether a patent is valid or whether the generic medicine infringes that patent constitutes evidence of the existence of a potential competitive relationship.

    The CJEU also found that the intention and the actual value transfers by an originator manufacturer to a generic manufacturer in exchange for the postponement of the latter’s market entry are strong indications of a competitive relationship between them and that “[the] greater the transfer of value, the stronger the indication”.

    Moreover, the CJEU also added that “in the pharmaceutical sector, potential competition may be exerted before the expiry of a compound patent protecting an originator medicine, since the manufacturers of generic medicines want to be ready to enter the market as soon as that patent expires”.

    (b) The Second Condition

    With regard to the second condition, the CJEU remarked that the existence of a manufacturing process patent cannot, as such, be regarded as an insurmountable barrier.

    2.1.2 Restriction by Object

    The CMA found that the Second and Third Infringing Agreements had the object of restricting competition. All the applicants disagreed and argued that those Agreements brought about pro-competitive effects. Noting that such effects are “dwarfed by the effect that would flow from independent and unrestricted generic entry (“genericisation”), as indeed occurred from December 2003”, the CAT decided to refer to the CJEU a more fundamental question of whether a pay-for-delay agreement restricts competition by object.

    The CJEU confirmed that a pay-for-delay agreement restricts competition by object:

    i. if the net gain from the transfers of value by the originator manufacturer in favour of the generic manufacturer can have no other explanation than their commercial interest not to engage in competition on the merits;

    ii. unless the agreement is accompanied by proven pro‑competitive effects capable of giving rise to a reasonable doubt that it causes a sufficient degree of harm to competition.

    (a) The First Condition

    Following its case-law, the CJEU assessed whether a pay-for-delay agreement displays, in itself and having regard to the content of its provisions, its objective, and the economic and legal context of which it forms part, a sufficient degree of harm to competition, for the view to be taken that it is not necessary to assess its effects for the purposes of applying Article 101(1) TFEU.

    In carrying out such an assessment, the CJEU acknowledged that not all pay-for-delay agreements can be considered to be a restriction by object for two reasons. First, in light of its chances of success in the court proceedings, a generic manufacturer may decide to abandon entry to the market concerned and to conclude an agreement with the originator manufacturer to settle those proceedings. Second, transfers of value may prove to be justified, for instance, when they are made to compensate for the costs or disruption caused by the litigation or when they correspond to remuneration for the actual supply, immediate or subsequent, of goods or services.

    However, the CJEU concluded that a pay-for-delay agreement must, in principle, be considered to restrict competition by object when it is plain that the transfers of value, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary, cannot have any explanation other than the commercial interest of both the originator manufacturer and the generic manufacturer not to engage in competition on the merits.

    The CJEU noted that there is no requirement for the finding of a restriction by object that the transfers of value should necessarily be greater than the profits which the manufacturer of generic medicines would have made if it had been successful in the patent proceedings. The CJEU underlined that “[a]ll that matters is that those transfers of value are shown to be sufficiently beneficial to encourage the manufacturer of generic medicines to refrain from entering the market concerned and not to compete on the merits with the manufacturer of originator medicines concerned”. In such a case, competitors deliberately substitute practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition, as required by the case law to characterize an agreement as a restriction by object.

    (b) The Second Condition 

    The CJEU accepted that any alleged pro-competitive effects of an agreement must be taken into account when examining whether that agreement restricts competition by object. According to the CJEU, such effects must be “relevant and specifically related to the agreement concerned” and must be “sufficiently significant, so that they justify a reasonable doubt as to whether the settlement agreement concerned caused a sufficient degree of harm to competition, and, therefore, as to its anticompetitive object”.

    The CJEU took the view that the pro-competitive effects of the Second and Third Infringing Agreements were not only minimal but probably uncertain and cannot be sufficient justification for holding a reasonable doubt that those Agreements revealed sufficient harm to competition. The CJEU based this conclusion mainly on the CAT’s finding that some benefits brought to consumers under the Second and Third Infringing Agreements were significantly less than the competitive benefits that would have followed an independent generic market entry.

    2.2 Article 102 TFEU

    2.2.1 Relevant Product Market

    In its decision, the CMA found that the relevant market was the supply of paroxetine in the UK and that GSK held a dominant position in that market at least between January 1998 and November 2003. GSK challenged the finding of dominance, arguing that the relevant product market comprised all SSRIs and low dose venlafaxine. If that is the correct product market, the CMA accepted that GSK was not dominant. The CAT provisionally concluded that the relevant product market should encompass generic versions of paroxetine but not other SSRIs because significant competitive constraint on GSK’s Seroxat in economic terms came from paroxetine and not other SSRIs. The CAT decided to ask the CJEU to confirm whether the relevant product market should indeed encompass generic versions of an originator medicine when they would not be able legally to enter the market before the expiry of a process patent protecting the process of manufacturing of the originator medicine.

    The CJEU confirmed that not only an originator medicine but also its generic versions must be taken into account for the purposes of definition of the relevant product market if the generic manufacturers concerned are in a position to present themselves within a short period on the market concerned with sufficient strength to constitute a serious counterbalance to the originator manufacturer. For the CJEU, if generic manufacturers are in such a position, there is a sufficient degree of interchangeability between the originator medicine and the generic medicines concerned.

    The CJEU noted that a generic manufacturer is in a position to enter the market immediately or within a short period on the expiry of the patent relating to the active ingredient concerned, or of the data exclusivity period of that active ingredient, particularly if it has formed a prior effective strategy for market entry, has taken the steps necessary to achieve it (e.g. the lodging of an MA application), or has concluded a supply contract with a third-party distributor. The CJEU added that the perception by the originator manufacturer of the immediacy of the threat of market entry by the generic manufacturers might also be taken into account in order to assess the significance of the competitive constraints imposed by the latter.

    2.2.2 Abuse

    In its judgment, the CAT was inclined to take the position that for the purpose of finding an abuse, it was relevant to look at the three Infringing Agreements as a whole since GSK was pursuing a conscious strategy of seeking to preclude the risk of generic entry by concluding the Infringing Agreements. In this regard, the CAT asked the CJEU, in essence, whether the strategy of a dominant manufacturer of an originator medicine, which leads it to conclude a set of settlement agreements which have, at the least, the effect of keeping temporarily outside the market potential competitors who manufacture its generic versions constitutes an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.

    The CJEU answered affirmatively “provided that that strategy has the capacity to restrict competition and, in particular, to have exclusionary effects, going beyond the specific anticompetitive effects of each of the settlement agreements that are part of that strategy”.

    In line with the case-law, the CJEU first confirmed that a contract-oriented strategy of a manufacturer of an originator medicine holding a dominant position in a market may be penalised not only under Article 101 TFEU by reason of each agreement taken individually but also under Article 102 TFEU for the possible additional damage that strategy may cause to the competitive structure of the market. The CJEU then found that a strategy of an originator manufacturer that leads to the conclusion of a set of settlement agreements that have at least the effect (if not the object) of delaying the market entry of generic medicines impedes, in principle, the growth of competition in the market of the originator medicine. The CJEU also noted that a significant foreclosure effect of such a strategy is liable to exceed the anticompetitive effects inherent in the conclusion of each of the settlements agreements that are part of it.

    Comment

    In its first judgment on pay-for-delay agreements, the CJEU presented a framework for the assessment of those agreements both under Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU.

    First, the CJEU set out a test to see whether a generic company is a potential competitor to the originator. Under this test, generic companies are likely to be identified as potential competitors of the originator company where the patent covering the active ingredient has expired and generic entry is possible as long as process patents are not infringed, as in the UK Main Proceedings. The CJEU also recognized that it is also possible for generic companies to be recognized as potential competitors even before the expiry of the patent covering the active ingredient. It remains to be seen what sufficient preparatory steps generic companies need to take for them to be regarded as potential competitors in such a situation.

    Second, the CJEU’s conclusion that a pay-for-delay agreement is, in principle, a restriction of competition by object if the net gain from the transfers of value can have no other explanation than their commercial interest not to engage in competition on the merits is in line with its case-law. The CJEU’s identification of ‘other explanations’ for value transfers, such as compensation for litigation costs or remuneration for the actual supply, would be helpful for companies in assessing the competitive impact of an agreement it is contemplating to conclude.

    Third, the CJEU provided an important clarification that pro-competitive effects that are relevant, specific and sufficiently significant should be taken into account in the assessment of whether an agreement is a restriction of competition by object.  According to the CJEU, this is “merely to appreciate the objective seriousness of the practice concerned” and is not in conflict with its settled case-law that EU competition law does not recognise a ‘rule of reason’, which would require a weighing of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of an agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU. This clarification could potentially be helpful in assessing agreements other than pay-for-delay agreements in the pharmaceutical sector.

    Fourth, the CJEU’s conclusion as to the relevant product market in this judgment would be of little relevance to cases where the interchangeability of medicines beyond the active ingredient level is at issue, such as Perindopril. But its assessment gives some clarity on the assessment of the competitive relationships between the originator medicine and its generic versions.

    Fifth, the CJEU’s finding that for a strategy of the originator company to be considered as abusive, it must have exclusionary effects is another testimony to the adoption of more economic approach to EU competition law following its judgments in e.g. Cartes Bancaires and Intel.

    Overall, although some aspects of this ruling may only apply to cases such as the one in the UK Main Proceedings, these clarifications would be helpful in assessing an agreement between an originator company and a generic company that involves a value transfer. It would be interesting to see how the CJEU will apply the criteria set out in this ruling in the forthcoming judgments in Lundbeck and Perindopril and what guidance it will give in relation to pay-for-delay agreements that have been concluded in contexts different from the one in the UK Main Proceedings in these judgments.

    This Judgment sends some clear signals to the parties in the Lundbeck and Perindopril cases on the factors which the CJEU will weigh and consider in deciding on the appeals in their cases. Indeed, most elements deliberated on by the CJEU in the Paroxine case are highly relevant to the outcome of the Lundbeck and Perindopril cases.

    Note: The Japanese version of this article was published in a Japanese legal publication Legal Mind, published by the Japan Pharmaceutical Industry Legal Affairs Association in April, 2020.

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    1. Judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52.
    2. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1/1, 4 January 2003) became applicable from 1 May 2004. This Regulation requires the CMA, when applying national competition law to agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States, also to apply Article 101 TFEU.
    3. Article 102 TFEU was not applied from 1 May 2004, since GSK’s dominant position ended when independent generic entry began in December 2003 following the judgment of the Court of Appeal which held that Apotex Europe Limited’s paroxetine anhydrate product did not infringe valid patent claims held by GSK (SmithKline Beecham Plc and others v Apotex Europe Ltd and others [2003] EWHC 2939 (Ch)).
    4. See the CMA’s case closure summary in respect of the IVAX-GSK agreement published on 10 August 2016.
    5. Intermediate judgment of 8 March 2018 of the CAT in Paroxetine GSK v CMA [2018] CAT 4.
    6. See judgment of 28 February 1991 of the CJEU, Delimitis, C‑234/89, EU:C:1991:91, paragraph 21.
    7. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 56.
    8. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 51.
    9. See intermediate judgment of 8 March 2018 of the CAT in Paroxetine GSK v CMA [2018] CAT 4, paragraph 320.
    10. See, for instance, judgment of 11 September 2014 of the CJEU, CB v Commission, C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paragraph 53.
    11. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 94.
    12. See judgment of 20 November 2008 of the CJEU, Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers, C‑209/07, EU:C:2008:643, paragraph 34.
    13. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 107.
    14. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 107.
    15. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 172.
    16. See judgment of 13 February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, 85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paragraph 120.
    17. See judgment of 30 January 2020 of the CJEU, Generics (UK) and others v Competition Markets Authority, C-307/18, EU:C:2020:52, paragraph 104.
    18. See judgment of 12 December 2018 of the General Court of the European Union (the ‘GCEU’), Servier and Others v Commission, T-691/14, EU:T:2018:922. Appeal cases before the CJEU: C-176/19 P and C-201/19 P.
    19. Judgment of 11 September 2014 of the CJEU, CB v Commission, C‑67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204.
    20. Judgment of 6 September 2017 of the CJEU, Intel v Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632.
    21. Judgment of 8 September 2016 of the GCEU, Lundbeck v Commission, T-472/13, EU:T:2016:449. Appeal case before the CJEU: C-591/16 P.
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