Content Type: Article

  • South Carolina Supreme Court Cannot Find “Economic Value” to Support Trade Secret

    South Carolina Supreme Court Cannot Find “Economic Value” to Support Trade Secret

    ARTICLE

    South Carolina Supreme Court Cannot Find “Economic Value” to Support Trade Secret

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The South Carolina Supreme Court (S.C. Supreme Court) affirmed a state Court of Appeals finding that information taken by a minority LLC member did not have the requisite independent value to be considered a “trade secret” under the state’s Trade Secrets Act. Wilson v. Gandis, Case No. 27980 (S.C. June 3, 2020) (James, C.J.).

    In response to what the trial court classified as an “unconscionable,” “brazen,” “classic squeeze-out,” Wilson brought an action against his business partners, Gandis and Shirley, along with Carolina Custom Converting (CCC), a broker of industrial film materials. Wilson was a 45% member of CCC, while Gandis and Shirley were 45% and 10% members respectively. Starting in 2011, Gandis and Shirley made multiple efforts to remove Wilson as a member of CCC. The laundry list of “oppressive acts” cited by the trial court included Gandis and Shirley’s (1) withholding guaranteed monthly distributions to Wilson, (2) monitoring Wilson’s private emails, (3) limiting Wilson’s access to CCC financials, (4) terminating Wilson’s family healthcare plan, (5) surreptitiously forming a competing business, (6) funneling money to Gandis through inflated rent payments to Gandis-owned properties and (7) attempting to physically remove Wilson from his own office using a police officer. In response to these acts, Wilson left his office with his company laptops and Blackberry, which contained information about CCC clients. The trial court and Court of Appeals found for Wilson, forcing Gandis and Shirley to buy out Wilson’s share of CCC and denying all of their counterclaims against Wilson. CCC, Gandis and Shirley filed petitions for writ of certiorari to the S.C. Supreme Court, which were granted.

    The issue on certiorari was whether the trial court erred in finding CCC failed to prove its trade secret misappropriation claim against Wilson (and his subsequent employers) under the South Carolina Trade Secrets Act. In a relatively short analysis, the S.C. Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in finding CCC failed to prove its trade secret misappropriation claim against Wilson. The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act defines a “trade secret” as information that “derives independent economic value … from not being generally known to … the public [and efforts are made] to maintain its secrecy.” The Court applied its own precedent requiring an initial analysis of “the extent to which the [alleged trade secret] is known outside of his business and … the difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired … by others.” Relying on trial testimony by two “experienced film brokers” who stated that the type of business information taken by Wilson was “widely available,” “ascertainable from trade associations [and] publicly available sources,” and that customers “are free to share” that type of information, the Court held that the record supported the trial court’s finding that the information taken by Wilson “did not have the required independent economic value” to be considered a trade secret. The Court affirmed and remanded on an issue related to the details of Wilson’s buyout from CCC.

    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • HHS Finalizes Anti-Discrimination Revisions to ACA Section 1557

    HHS Finalizes Anti-Discrimination Revisions to ACA Section 1557

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    HHS Finalizes Anti-Discrimination Revisions to ACA Section 1557

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 12, 2020, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) finalized a rule under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the 2020 Final Rule) that rescinds certain protections afforded to LGBTQ individuals and persons with limited English proficiency. At the same time, the 2020 Final Rule removes burdensome disclosure requirements that may be a welcome relief for entities covered by Section 1557. On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that workplace discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation is forbidden under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although Title VII is not included in the precedential civil rights laws that gave rise to Section 1557, we nevertheless anticipate that the Supreme Court’s holding will lead to legal challenges in a number of areas, including healthcare and health insurance, religious exemptions and the 2020 Final Rule from HHS OCR.

    In depth

    On June 12, 2020, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) finalized a rule under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (2020 Final Rule) that rescinds certain protections afforded to LGBTQ individuals and persons with limited English proficiency (LEP). At the same time, the 2020 Final Rule removes burdensome disclosure requirements that may be a welcome relief for entities covered by Section 1557. The 2020 Final Rule will go into effect 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register. HHS believes that the 2020 Final Rule will enhance compliance, relieve billions of dollars in undue regulatory burdens, reduce provider and public confusion, and help clarify the scope of Section 1557. HHS projects that, after finalization, this 2020 Final Rule will result in an estimated $2.9 billion in cost savings for covered entities over the first five years. HHS declined to estimate the health impact the 2020 Final Rule would have on patients.

    Impact of Later Supreme Court Decision

    While separate from the 2020 Final Rule, on June 15, 2020, as part of the Supreme Court of the United States rulings in the combined cases of Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia; Altitude Express, Inc., et al. v. Zarda, et al.; and R.G. & G.R Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, Associate Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote for the majority of the Court that “sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision [to fire someone simply for being transgender], exactly what Title VII forbids,” preventing workplace discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not included in the precedential civil rights laws that gave rise to Section 1557, we nevertheless anticipate that the Bostock holding will lead to legal challenges regarding the narrow definition of “on the basis of sex” in the healthcare and health insurance space, both in Congress and in the federal and state court systems in the coming months. We also expect to see challenges regarding religious exemption, who can be a “religious employer,” and whether private corporations can qualify. These actions will likely include challenges to the 2020 Final Rule, which is at odds with the holding in Bostock.

    Background

    Enacted on March 23, 2010, Section 1557 of the ACA prohibits any healthcare program or activity, any part of which is receiving federal financial assistance (interpreted at the time to include insurance companies, health systems or hospitals, and individual providers) from discrimination in specific health programs or activities. In defining what constitutes discrimination, Section 1557 incorporated existing federal civil rights laws, specifically, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (race, color, national origin), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (sex), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 USC § 200d et seq. (race, color, national origin), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (disability) and 29 USC § 794 (disability), and applied such protections to federally funded health programs and activities. On May 18, 2016, based on its interpretation of the statutory prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex,” HHS finalized a key provision defining sex discrimination as including discrimination based on sex stereotyping, gender expression, gender identity and termination of pregnancy, among other things (2016 Final Rule). The 2016 Final Rule also addressed ways to ensure meaningful access to key communications for individuals with LEP and imposed requirements for communicating effectively with persons with disabilities.

    Immediately upon its finalization, OCR began enforcing the 2016 Final Rule by bringing claims for health coverage on behalf of transgender employees. Later in 2016, the 2016 Final Rule was challenged in the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The challengers included five states and a large health system. Among the challengers’ complaints was that by defining “sex” to include “gender identity” and “termination of pregnancy,” HHS exceeded its authority pursuant to the ACA, and it failed to include religious exemptions for conscientious objections. The court agreed with the challengers and enjoined HHS from enforcing Section 1557’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender identity and termination of pregnancy, in part because the aforementioned federal civil rights laws did not interpret “on the basis of sex” with the same degree of breadth as was articulated in the 2016 Final Rule (See Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 695 (N.D. Tex. 2016)).

    Subsequently, President Donald Trump was elected, the United States experienced a change in administration, and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and HHS began working on revising the 2016 Final Rule. In a brief filed on behalf of HHS in Franciscan Alliance, the DOJ stated that the United States has “returned to its longstanding position that the term ‘sex’ in Title VII does not refer to gender identity, and there is no reason why Section 1557…should be treated differently,” signaling a changed position for the new administration. HHS next took action on June 14, 2019, when it issued a proposed rule that would make sweeping changes to the 2016 Final Rule.

    Shortly thereafter, while HHS was reviewing comments on the proposed rule, the Franciscan Alliance court decided that a permanent injunction of the unlawful sections of the 2016 Final Rule was improper. Instead, the court held that the 2016 Final Rule contained provisions that violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, thereby requiring vacatur of the offending portions of Section 1557. (Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Azar, 414 F. Supp. 928, 944 (N.D. Tex. 2019)). Notably, the 2016 Final Rule’s broad interpretation of “on the basis of sex” has not been enforced since 2016, and the Franciscan Alliance case is pending appeal with the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

    Elimination of Overbroad Provisions Related to Sex and Gender Identity

    The 2020 Final Rule removes HHS nondiscrimination protections related to gender identity, gender expression, sex stereotyping and termination of pregnancy that were outlined in the 2016 Final Rule because Title VII and Title IX do not prohibit discrimination on such grounds. Instead, arguing that reliance on biological sex is medically imperative, the 2020 Final Rule declines to promulgate a formal definition of “on the basis of sex.” However, it articulates that it intends to enforce the definition in compliance with the plain meaning of the term under Title IX: as a binary genetic construct of male and female. Further, the 2020 Final Rule rejects the inclusion of “termination of pregnancy” with the definition of “sex” for failure to incorporate Danforth Amendment provisions and other languages that would allow for conscientious objections for religious or moral purposes. The 2020 Final Rule, like the 2016 Final Rule, also does not consider sexual orientation to be encapsulated by the word “sex.”

    Clarification of Scope of Covered Entities

    The 2016 Final Rule applied to all health programs, activities and providers that received federal financial assistance through HHS (e.g., Medicare, excluding Part B; Medicaid; CHIP), health programs and activities administered by HHS, and health programs and activities administered by entities established under Title I of the ACA. In the 2020 Final Rule, HHS clarifies that Section 1557 applies to any health program or activity that receives federal funds from HHS, any program or activity administered under Title I of the ACA, and health insurance marketplace participants. This means that Section 1557 will no longer apply to other HHS programs or HHS itself unless it relates to and deals with the ACA program. Specifically, HHS states that “this [2020 Final Rule] does not extend [HHS’s] enforcement authority to a covered entity that is not principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare to the extent of its operations that do not receive financial assistance from [HHS].”

    Originally, the 2016 Final Rule applied broadly, requiring health insurers to comply with Section 1557. However, under the 2020 Final Rule, HHS clarifies that providing health insurance is not a “health program or activity” for purposes of Section 1557. Additionally, employer-sponsored group health plans that do not receive federal financial assistance and are not principally engaged in the business of providing healthcare are not considered covered entities subject to Section 1557. This same analysis applies to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, employer-sponsored plans not covered by ERISA, such as self-insured church plans or non-federal governmental plans, as well as excepted benefits. That is because, according to HHS, “a health insurer is principally engaged in the business of providing coverage for benefits consisting in [sic] healthcare, which is not the same as the business of providing healthcare.”

    That said, both the 2016 Final Rule and the 2020 Final Rule recognize that states may balance for themselves the various sensitive considerations that apply to medical judgment and gender identity, and may choose to extend nondiscrimination protections to transgender men, transgender women, gender nonbinary individuals and other classes of their residents. Accordingly, in 24 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, where more protective anti-discrimination measures have been extended, private insurance and/or Medicaid may not discriminate against beneficiaries on the grounds of gender identity, gender expression or sex stereotypes, unless those laws have been preempted by ERISA. However, even with these protections, 25% of transgender people reported in 2017 that they experienced a problem with their insurance in the past year because of their gender identity, even for routine care unrelated to gender confirmation services. Further, 13% of respondents reported denial of services considered to be sex-specific, such as routine Pap smears for transgender men or prostate examinations for transgender women.

    Elimination of Regulatory Burdens

    The 2016 Final Rule mandated that healthcare organizations take reasonable steps to provide meaningful access to each individual with LEP who was eligible to be served or likely to be encountered by the organization in its healthcare programs and activities. Specifically, the 2016 Final Rule required such organizations to post a notice regarding their nondiscrimination policy in English along with taglines in the 15 non-English languages most commonly spoken in the state. Organizations were also required to include the notice in all significant publications directed at the public along with taglines in the aforementioned 15 other languages, instructing individuals that language assistance services were available. Subregulatory guidance related to the 2016 Final Rule considered “significant communications” to include the following materials:

    • Outreach, education and marketing materials
    • Patient handbooks
    • Notices requiring an individual’s response
    • Written notices such as those relating to benefits, coverage or individuals’ rights
    • Consent and complaint forms
    • Written notices of eligibility criteria, including coverage rights and denials and any losses or decreases in benefits and services
    • Applications to participate in services or programs.

    The 2020 Final Rule eliminates the requirement for covered entities to send notices and taglines with all significant communications. However, HHS will continue to require that covered entities provide beneficiaries with a written notice of nondiscrimination. HHS believes that removing the requirement regarding significant communications will ease the regulatory burden imposed on the healthcare system and the substantial unexpected expenses that healthcare organizations incurred. However, HHS clarifies that the repeal of the tagline requirement does not repeal all other notice and tagline requirements that exist under other statutes and rules.

    The 2016 Final Rule further required covered entities with 15 or more employees to have a grievance procedure and a compliance coordinator with respect to Section 1557 violations. Entities with fewer than 15 employees were not required to implement a grievance procedure or appoint a compliance coordinator. The 2020 Final Rule repeals the requirement that entities maintain specific grievance procedures to address complaints of discrimination under Section 1557. To the extent that covered entities have otherwise appropriate grievance procedures, HHS states that such other procedures are sufficient for enforcement of Section 1557.

    Finally, the 2020 Final Rule repeals the definition of “national origin” as a grounds for nondiscrimination. Instead, to determine compliance with the requirement to provide meaningful access for individuals with LEP, HHS will evaluate how the entity balances four key factors:

    • The number or proportion of LEP individuals eligible to be served or likely to be encountered in the eligible service population
    • The frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact with the entity’s health program, activity or service
    • The nature and importance of the entity’s health program, activity or service
    • The resources available to the entity and costs.

    HHS emphasizes that it will prohibit any actions that use criteria or methods of administering healthcare or health insurance that have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin, or that have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing such access by individuals on account of their race, color or national origin.

    Further, HHS will permit remote English-language interpreting services to be audio-based rather than requiring them to be video-based. HHS will still require a video if a video connection is necessary to provide meaningful access to LEP individuals (e.g., for LEP individuals who are also deaf or hard of hearing). HHS also will retain the prohibition on requiring an LEP individual to provide her own interpreter or rely on an accompanying adult to interpret or facilitate communication.

    Conclusion

    HHS believes that the 2020 Final Rule conforms Section 1557 to the plain reading of the text and the civil rights laws that undergirded the promulgation of Section 1557. HHS states that the 2020 Final Rule will continue to prohibit discrimination based on race, color, national origin, disability, age and sex, in accordance with the text of existing federal laws and HHS regulations.

    Compliance with the 2020 Final Rule permits covered entities, including employers offering employee benefit health programs that were subject to the 2016 Final Rule, to roll back some of their notice obligations. Covered entities should review and identify desired changes to grievance procedures. Communications regarding health and welfare benefits subject to the 2016 Final Rule may be revised to remove the nondiscrimination statement and required taglines in non-English languages.

    In the meantime, hospitals, health systems, health insurance companies, applicable group health plans and providers must provide healthcare and coverage for such care to all individuals regardless of race, color, national origin, sex, age or disability. If they wish to add categories of nondiscrimination, they are welcome to do so. The 2020 Final Rule is merely a floor; it is not a ceiling.

    Authors

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

    Todd A. Solomon

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Could Offering EHR System Access to Community Providers Lead to Civil Monetary Penalties for Information Blocking?

    Could Offering EHR System Access to Community Providers Lead to Civil Monetary Penalties for Information Blocking?

    CLIENT ALERT / INFORMATION BLOCKING

    Could Offering EHR System Access to Community Providers Lead to Civil Monetary Penalties for Information Blocking?

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Under the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT (ONC) 21st Century Cures Act final rule, effective July 1, 2020, health care providers, in their capacities as such, are not subject to information blocking civil monetary penalties. However, health systems, hospitals and other health care providers may face information blocking civil monetary penalties if they engage in activities that cause them to be a health information technology (IT) developer of certified health IT (Certified Health IT Developer) or health information network or health information exchange (HIN/HIE), and engage in activities that are “likely to interfere” with the access, exchange or use of electronic health information (EHI). This On the Subject discusses whether a health system or provider could be a Certified Health IT Developer or an HIN/HIE when it provides access to its electronic health record (EHR) system to unaffiliated community providers, and the potential risk that EHR access terms or practices could subject the health system or provider to civil monetary penalties for information blocking.

    In depth

    A hospital or other health care provider is an actor subject to the new information blocking restrictions under the final rule issued by the ONC under the 21st Century Cures Act (Final Rule), but is not subject to information blocking civil monetary penalties unless it (1) is a Certified Health IT Developer (including as an offeror of certified health IT), or (2) operates an HIN/HIE in which more than two unaffiliated parties access, exchange or use EHI.

    The software license agreements between many certified EHR vendors and their health system or other health care provider customer-licensees (EHR System Licensees) allow the EHR System Licensees to offer EHR system access to non-employed physician practices and other unaffiliated community providers for implementation and use in their physician office locations and other facilities. The EHR System Licensees typically provide access to their EHR systems as part of an agreement structured to meet the Stark Law exception and/or the federal anti-kickback statute safe harbor for EHR items and services, or waivers available under certain accountable care and other value-based care models. When the EHR System Licensee, its affiliated providers and community providers share an instance of the EHR system, they are able to access, exchange and use EHI created by any of the EHR system users, including the unaffiliated community providers. The offering of these EHR access arrangements may cause the EHR System Licensee to meet the definition of a Certified Health IT Developer and/or an HIN/HIE. We discuss this risk below. For more information about the Final Rule, please see our Special Report.

    Certified Health IT Developers

    The following sections address the Final Rule’s definition of a Certified Health IT Developer and questions that an EHR System Licensee should consider when evaluating whether an EHR access agreement could cause it to be Certified Health IT Developer.

    What Is a Certified Health IT Developer?

    The Final Rule defines a Certified Health IT Developer as follows:

    • An individual or entity, other than a health care provider that self develops health IT for its own use, that develops or offers health information technology and which has, at the time it engages in a practice that is the subject of an information blocking claim, one or more Health IT Modules certified . . . pursuant to [the] ONC Health IT Certification Program…. (emphasis added)

    The Final Rule does not clarify who is an “offeror” or what offeror activities would constitute “information blocking.” The Final Rule also fails to explain what it means for an offeror to “[have], at the time it engages in a practice that is the subject of an information blocking claim, one or more Health IT Modules certified . . . pursuant to [the] ONC Health IT Certification Program.”

    An EHR System Licensee that is not the EHR vendor that sought and obtained the certification for the EHR software under the ONC Health IT Certification Program does not seem to “have . . . one or more Health IT Modules certified” and therefore arguably could never meet the definition of a Certified Health IT Developer. However, ONC’s preamble discussion of the definition is not clear on this point, and until ONC resolves the ambiguity, an EHR System Licensee that offers EHR system access to community providers should consider whether any of its EHR access agreement terms or other practices involving the access, exchange or use of EHI with community providers in connection with such agreements could constitute information blocking.

    Is the EHR System Licensee a Certified Health IT Developer?

    To assess whether an EHR System Licensee could be a Certified Health IT Developer, the EHR System Licensee should consider the following questions related to an offer of access to certified EHR technology to community providers:

    1. Does the EHR System Licensee simply make portions of payments to an EHR vendor to enable community providers to license a separate instance of the EHR software (or other certified health IT) directly from an EHR vendor?
      • If so, then the EHR System Licensee may not be considered an “offeror” within the definition of a Certified Health IT Developer since the EHR vendor licenses the software directly to the community providers.
    2. Does the EHR System Licensee offer to enter into an agreement with community providers under which community provider personnel may access and use the EHR System Licensee’s instance of the EHR system in the community provider’s offices or other facilities?
      • If the EHR System Licensee offers access to its EHR system, then the EHR System Licensee may be considered a Certified Health IT Developer based on the “offer.”

    HINs and HIEs

    The following sections discuss the Final Rule’s definition of an HIN/HIE, and questions that an EHR System Licensee should consider when evaluating whether an EHR access agreement could cause it to be an HIN/HIE.

    What Is an HIN/HIE?

    The Final Rule combines the definitions for HIN and HIE into one definition as follows:

    • An individual or entity that determines, controls or has the discretion to administer any requirement, policy or agreement that permits, enables or requires the use of any technology or services for access, exchange or use of EHI:
      1. Among more than two unaffiliated individuals or entities (other than the individual or entity to which this definition might apply) that are enabled to exchange with each other; and
      2. That is for a Treatment, Payment or Health Care Operations purpose, as such terms are defined in the HIPAA regulations, regardless of whether such individuals or entities are subject to the HIPAA regulations.

    An EHR System Licensee should evaluate whether its implementation of EHR access agreements to facilitate the exchange of EHI by or with community providers meets the above definition. For example, EHR System Licensees that provide EHR system access to community providers may implement security safeguards or procedures to control the flow of EHI among the community providers through the EHR system. The exercise of such control, even if to serve a legitimate privacy function that is not information blocking (e.g., preventing a community provider from accessing the EHI of non-patients in violation of HIPAA), could in turn cause the EHR System Licensees to meet the definition of an HIN/HIE.

    Is the EHR System Licensee an HIN/HIE?

    To assess whether an EHR System Licensee could be considered an HIN/HIE, the EHR System Licensee should consider the following questions:

    1. Does the EHR System Licensee administer or control any policy, agreement or requirement that permits, enables or requires the use of technology (e.g., health information exchange functionality) that enables the exchange of EHI among more than two unaffiliated individuals or entities (not counting the EHR System Licensee)?
    2. If the EHR System Licensee administers access to technology that enables more than two unaffiliated individuals or entities to exchange EHI, then is the exchange for Treatment, Payment or Health Care Operations (as each term is defined by the HIPAA regulations)?
      • For example, can the unaffiliated entities use the technology to exchange EHI with each other to coordinate the care they provide to a common patient? If yes, then the EHR System Licensee may be considered an HIN/HIE.

    What Practices in Connection with Health IT Access Arrangements Raise Potential Information Blocking Concerns?

    If the EHR System Licensee is a Certified Health IT Developer (as an offeror) or an HIN/HIE, then the EHR System Licensee should structure its agreements with community providers consistent with the information blocking exceptions under the Final Rule to avoid the risk of information blocking civil monetary penalties. For example, the EHR System Licensee should consider the following questions:

    1. If an EHR System Licensee is a Certified Health IT Developer:
      • Does the EHR System Licensee host (in its data center or through a third party) the EHI created by or received on behalf of the community providers?
        • If the EHR System Licensee hosts the EHI, it could be in a position to exercise control over the EHI in ways that could implicate the information blocking prohibition.
        • Even if the EHR vendor hosts the EHR system and EHI, the EHR System Licensee may still be in a position to exercise control over the EHI (e.g., through its control of EHR system configuration settings) in ways that could implicate the information blocking prohibition.
      • Does the EHR System Licensee actually exercise control over some or all of the EHI created or received by the community provider in the certified health IT? For example, does the EHR System Licensee control the EHR system configuration settings that determine whether a particular user may access EHI in the EHR system?
        • Under the Final Rule preamble, ONC stated that an offeror could be subject to the information blocking prohibition with respect to EHI it “hold[s] or control[s].” If an EHR vendor holds or controls providers’ EHI, then an EHR System Licensee that is a Certified Health IT Developer because it offers access rights to community providers, but does not hold or control the EHI, would not, under ONC’s preamble discussion, seem to be in a position to engage in information blocking in its capacity as an offeror. Further, under a specific Cures Act provision, the EHR System Licensee would not be responsible for actions taken by the EHR vendor that could constitute information blocking.
    2. Does the EHR System Licensee condition access to the EHR system (including, for example, its HIN/HIE functionality) on the community provider’s provision of intellectual property rights?
      • If yes, does the practice comply with the Final Rule’s Content and Manner Exception, Fees Exception or Licensing Exception? Note that under the Licensing Exception, actors may not require licensees or sublicensees (e.g., the community provider) to grant, assign or transfer to the actor any intellectual property of the licensee in return for the license or sublicense.
    3. Does the EHR System Licensee’s EHR access agreement with a community provider address the disposition of records maintained within the EHR upon termination of the agreement?
      • Termination provisions that limit the community provider’s access, exchange or use of EHI post-termination could implicate the information blocking prohibition. (Likewise, a provision requested by the community provider that limits the EHR System Licensee’s access to the EHI may implicate the information blocking prohibition, since health care providers are subject to the prohibition. However, even if the community provider’s practice constitutes information blocking, it would not subject the community provider to civil monetary penalties because the community provider would be acting as a health care provider and not a Certified Health IT Developer or an HIN/HIE.)
    4. Does the EHR System Licensee control the timing and implementation of bug fixes, upgrades and other software maintenance to the EHR system (including its HIN/HIE functionality)?
      • The Health IT Performance Exception permits actors in certain circumstances to inhibit the access, exchange or use of EHI for a limited period of time to perform planned or unplanned maintenance or updates. To comply with this exception, EHR System Licensees that control the timing and implementation of software maintenance or upgrades that could slow or cut off access to EHI should consider including service level agreement terms that establish a framework for limited planned and unplanned periods of maintenance in the EHR access agreement.

    These are just some of the questions that health systems, hospitals and other health care providers potentially meeting the definition of a Certified Health IT Developer or an HIN/HIE should consider to ensure that they structure their EHR access agreements and conform their related practices in ways that mitigate potential information blocking civil monetary penalty exposure under the Final Rule.

    Please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or any of the authors of this On the Subject if you have questions or need assistance with your compliance obligations under the Final Rule.

    Authors

    James A. Cannatti III

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Preparing Your Workplace: How to Navigate Safety Mandates and Recommendations

    Preparing Your Workplace: How to Navigate Safety Mandates and Recommendations

    ARTICLE

    Preparing Your Workplace: How to Navigate Safety Mandates and Recommendations

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
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  • Looming Confusion as COVID-19 State Emergency Orders Begin to Expire

    ARTICLE

    Looming Confusion as COVID-19 State Emergency Orders Begin to Expire

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
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  • When Can Bitcoin Positions Be Taxed as Mixed Straddles Subject to the Special Mixed Straddle Rules?

    When Can Bitcoin Positions Be Taxed as Mixed Straddles Subject to the Special Mixed Straddle Rules?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    When Can Bitcoin Positions Be Taxed as Mixed Straddles Subject to the Special Mixed Straddle Rules?

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Taxpayers who enter into offsetting positions in actively traded personal property where one or more—but not all—of the positions making up a straddle are taxed as section 1256 contracts (while another offsetting position is not a section 1256 contract) are subject to the mixed straddle rules. Potential adverse consequences can be magnified or made more complex by application of these special rules. This article can help taxpayers understand and take action to minimize or avoid these consequences when such positions involve virtual currencies.

    In depth

    Taxpayers often enter into offsetting long and short positions to minimize risk, defer tax, and convert long-term and short-term capital gain and loss to maximize the possible benefits of tax-rate differentials. Particularly onerous tax consequences can result if taxpayers enter into offsetting positions where one—but not all—of the positions making up a straddle are taxed as section 1256 contracts while another offsetting position is not a section 1256 contract. Taxpayers who enter into certain virtual currency transactions can be subject to the adverse consequences of holding mixed straddles and need to understand ways they can minimize or avoid these consequences.

    Taxpayers who do nothing—whether intentionally or inadvertently—are subject to the “killer rule,” which applies to convert a short-term loss from a non-section 1256 position to a 60/40 loss (see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)-2T(b)(2) (1986).). Short-term gains offset by 60/40 losses are left unchanged. The killer rule “converts” only one way—in the government’s favor—and it is a “killer” to any taxpayer with a substantial volume of mixed straddles. This one-way conversion typically has a punitive tax effect. (The killer rule can be avoided by making the elections and identifications discussed below.)

    Taxpayers who hold positions in Bitcoins and Bitcoin futures or options traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) can be subject to the mixed straddle rules if they hold straddles where not all of the positions are in CME futures or options. For background reading on the straddle rules and section 1256 treatment, see McDermott’s article, “When Virtual Currency Positions are Subject to the Straddle Rules” and “Special Tax Rules Apply to Bitcoin Futures and Options and Might Apply to Positions in Ether and Other Virtual Currencies in the Future.” This article discusses the tax rules for mixed straddles; that is, straddles that consist of both section 1256 contracts and non-section 1256 contracts.

    Overview of Straddle Rules

    A tax straddle exists when a taxpayer holds two or more positions in personal property when one or more of the positions substantially diminishes the risk of loss with respect to another position (I.R.C. § 1092(d)(1)). Virtual currency positions are subject to the tax straddle rules if the virtual currency is actively traded personal property and the positions are offsetting (I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1092(b)–1T and –2T). The straddle rules require deferral of losses on an offsetting position until the gain positions are closed out.

    Convertible virtual currency is “property” for tax purposes, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) applies general tax principles to transactions in virtual currency (Notice 2014-21, Q&A-1). By way of example, because Bitcoins have an equivalent value in actual currency, can be substituted for actual currency, are traded on an established online market, and can be purchased for or exchanged into US dollars or other actual or virtual currencies, it is likely that Bitcoins are subject to the straddle rules.

    Mixed Straddles

    A tax straddle is a mixed straddle if one or more of the positions in the straddle is a section 1256 contract and the other positions are not section 1256 contracts (I.R.C. § 1256(d)(4)(A)). If a taxpayer holds CME Bitcoin futures or options as well as other Bitcoin positions, the taxpayer probably holds a tax straddle that may be subject to the mixed straddle rules. Because section 1256 contracts are subject to 60/40 tax treatment while non-section 1256 positions are subject to short-term capital gain or loss, taxpayers could have an incentive to use mixed straddles to convert short-term capital gain into 60/40 gain. Congress enacted the mixed straddle rules to prevent such a tax conversion.

    Why Special Rules Were Needed

    In the absence of the mixed straddle rules, taxpayers could generate short-term loss in a non-section 1256 contract position and an offsetting 60/40 gain in a section 1256 contract. The short-term loss could then be used to mop up unrelated short-term gain (leaving the taxpayer with only long-term capital gain). The mixed straddle rules prevent taxpayers from doing this. They also prevent taxpayers from reporting 60/40 gain or loss on section 1256 contracts and (depending on the taxpayer’s holding period) 100% short-term or long-term capital gain or loss on their non-section 1256 positions (see Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, at 304 and 316-17 (Joint Comm. Print 1984)).

    Choices Available When Holding A Mixed Straddle

    Taxpayers with mixed straddles essentially have four choices if they want to avoid the killer rule:

    1. Elect Out of I.R.C. § 1256. A taxpayer can make a one-time section 1256(d) identified mixed straddle election that removes the section 1256 contracts in the straddle from section 1256 treatment. The mixed straddle remains subject to the straddle rules. Interest and carrying charges incurred to carry a mixed straddle position must also be capitalized.
    2. Make an “Identified Straddle Identification.” If a taxpayer’s mixed straddle qualifies as an identified straddle under I.R.C. § 1092(a)(2), the taxpayer can designate the straddle as an “identified straddle.” Instead of deferring straddle losses, the taxpayer must adjust the tax basis on the gain position to reflect the nondeductible straddle losses (T.D. 9678, 2014-32 I.R.B.). Interest and carrying charges incurred to carry the mixed straddle must also be capitalized.
    3. Straddle-by-Straddle Identification. A taxpayer can identify a mixed straddle using “straddle-by-straddle” identification under I.R.C. § 1092(b)(2). With straddle-by-straddle identification, the taxpayer nets all gains and losses on the mixed straddle. In addition, the taxpayer must defer recognition of pre-straddle gain or loss on any of the positions that had been open before the straddle was established (T.D. 9627 (Doc 2013-18683)) under Treas. Reg. § 1.1092-6T (Announcement 2013-45; 2013-47 I.R.B. 546.). The straddle rules still apply after the taxpayer makes the required computations (Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.1092(b)-3T(c) (1985)).
    4. Establish a Mixed Straddle Account. A taxpayer with a large number of mixed straddles can establish a mixed straddle account for each class of activities, with gains and losses recognized and offset on a periodic basis. In setting up a mixed straddle account, the taxpayer must carefully determine which positions qualify as a particular “class of activities.” It is not likely, for example, that a straddle account including Bitcoins could properly include other virtual currencies. The convenience of a mixed straddle account is offset by a tax cost. Not more than 50% of any net gain derived from positions in the account (whether or not otherwise qualified for section 1256 treatment) can be treated as long-term capital gain, while not more than 40% of any net loss can be treated as short-term capital loss (Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)-4T(c)(4) (1985)).

    * * * *

    Taxpayers should avoid the killer rule by selecting one of the mixed straddle choices set out in this article; doing nothing is never a recommended way to proceed. Loss on a non-section 1256 contract can be converted under the killer rule to 60/40 loss without also converting section 1256 contract losses to short-term capital losses. A taxpayer with a mixed straddle that produces a loss on the section 1256 contract position, a short-term gain on the non-section 1256 contract position, and a long-term capital gain from sources unrelated to the straddle will convert long-term capital gain to short-term gain (see House Conference Report, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 912 (1984)). The Treasury cannot impose the killer rule on positions other than those making up a mixed straddle (Arrow Fastener Co. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 423, 431 (1981); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936), rev’g 81 F.2d  641 (9th Cir. 1936)).

    Taxpayers should, on a regular basis (at least annually), carefully determine whether there is an established market for the virtual currencies they hold, therefore potentially subjecting their positions to the straddle rules. Next, they should determine whether they hold offsetting positions in those virtual currencies. And, if they hold both section 1256 contracts and non-section 1256 contracts, they need to evaluate whether those straddles are mixed straddles subject to the special rules that apply only to mixed straddles.

    Taxpayers who believe they might hold mixed straddles should consult with their tax advisors to assure that they properly report federal and state tax. Many states do not follow the federal tax Code in computing state taxes.

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  • Special Tax Rules Apply to Bitcoin Futures and Options and Might Apply to Positions in Ether and Other Virtual Currencies in the Future

    Special Tax Rules Apply to Bitcoin Futures and Options and Might Apply to Positions in Ether and Other Virtual Currencies in the Future

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Special Tax Rules Apply to Bitcoin Futures and Options and Might Apply to Positions in Ether and Other Virtual Currencies in the Future

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Special tax rules require taxpayers to treat gains on certain virtual currency positions as taxable even though they still hold their positions. These rules apply to futures and options that qualify as section 1256 contracts, which is potentially relevant to taxpayers buying, selling, and holding Bitcoin futures and options, as well as Ether futures and other virtual currencies. This article reviews a number of issues that arise—or may arise in the future—for taxpayers with virtual currency positions.

    In depth

    As a general rule, taxpayers are not taxed on gains in virtual currency positions until the positions are sold, exchanged or otherwise disposed of. Special tax rules can apply, however, that require taxpayers to treat their gains on certain virtual currency positions as taxable even though they still hold their positions. This is referred to as marking their positions to market for tax purposes.

    Special tax rules—including the requirement to mark open positions to market annually—apply to futures and options that qualify as section 1256 contracts. Two of the five types of enumerated section 1256 contracts are potentially relevant to taxpayers buying, selling, and holding Bitcoin futures and options. Such contracts currently trade on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). Whether Ether futures also qualify as section 1256 contracts will turn on whether these contracts meet the statutory definitions. As discussed in this article, Bitcoin futures and options currently qualify as section 1256 contracts and, therefore, are subject to the special tax timing and tax character rules available under I.R.C. § 1256(a). As is also discussed in this article, section 1256 treatment could apply to other virtual currency positions in the future. At the date of this writing, Ether futures contracts will begin trading on ErisX.

    Section 1256 Contracts Defined

    Section 1256 contracts are defined to include regulated futures contracts (RFCs) and nonequity options, both of which are defined below.

    Regulated Futures Contracts

    RFCs must meet two requirements. First, the amounts required to be deposited or allowed to be withdrawn on the contracts must follow a system of marking to market (I.R.C. § 1256(g)(1)(A)). Second, the contracts must be traded on (or made subject to the rules of) a qualified board or exchange (QBE; I.R.C. § 1256(g)(1)(B)), which includes a registered national securities exchange and a domestic board of trade (designated as a contract market by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)). Bitcoin futures are subject to a system of daily marking to market, and the CME is a QBE. As a result, the CME’s Bitcoin futures are RFCs. It is important to note that not all US securities exchanges and commodities exchanges that trade virtual currency positions will qualify as QBEs. This means that the first step is to determine whether a particular exchange is a QBE.

    Nonequity Options

    Nonequity options must meet a circular definition that involves the definitions of “listed options” and “equity options” (I.R.C. § 1256(g)(3)). For these purposes, a listed option is any option that is traded on or subject to the rules of a QBE (I.R.C. § 1256(g)(5)). And a nonequity option is on products other than individual stocks or narrow-based stock indexes (I.R.C. § 1256(g)(6)(A)). Working our way through this circular definition, nonequity options must be traded on a QBE and can be options based on convertible virtual currency. The CME’s Bitcoin options meet this definition and qualify as nonequity options.

    Other Virtual Currency Derivatives Are Not Section 1256 Contracts

    At the date of this writing, only the CME’s Bitcoin futures and options qualify as section 1256 contracts. (Options on exchange-traded funds that hold Bitcoin and that are formed as trusts or pass-through entities but not corporations might also qualify as nonequity options.) It is possible that Ether futures might qualify as section 1256 contracts, based on whether their contract design meets the section 1256 requirements. No other virtual currency derivatives currently meet this definition. Other virtual currencies and derivatives will not be marked-to-market annually and will remain subject to the general tax rules that apply to capital or ordinary assets. Futures on Ether or other actively traded virtual currencies could be section 1256 contracts in the future.

    Section 1256 Treatment

    As section 1256 contracts, the CME’s Bitcoin futures and options are subject to the mark-to-market rule and the 60/40 rule. (Section 1256 treatment does not apply to qualified hedging transactions, identified section 1256(d) mixed straddles (where mixed straddle election has been made), or mixed straddle accounts.) Section 1256 is not elective. Transactions that meet these definitions are subject to these two rules, discussed in what follows.

    The Mark-to-Market Rule

    The mark-to-market rule provides that section 1256 contracts open on the last day of the taxable year are marked-to-market; that is, treated as if they were sold on that date. All unrecognized gains and losses are taken into account. In other words, open section 1256 futures and options are treated as if they were sold for their fair market value on the last business day of the taxable year. The fair market value of such futures or options is their settlement prices. For Bitcoin futures and options, for example, their settlement prices are determined by the CME on the last business day of the taxable year (I.R.C. § 1256(c)(3)). All gains and losses are tallied up and used to compute taxable income.

    When taxpayers terminate Bitcoin futures or options during the year (by offset or otherwise), these contracts are taxed at their sale or close-out price (I.R.C. § 1256(c)(1)).

    Because taxes are paid on recognized and unrecognized gains and losses, taxpayers holding Bitcoin futures and options can be required to pay tax on gain that, in fact, they may never actually realize. (On the other hand, a taxpayer can report a mark-to-market loss on a section 1256 contract that is never realized.) If they continue to hold contracts that were marked-to-market at year end, gains and losses realized in a subsequent tax year are adjusted to reflect gains and losses taken into account in the preceding taxable year (I.R.C. § 1256(a)(2)). The mark-to-market rule can, therefore, distort income and cause economic hardship if gains that were reported in the first year do not materialize in a subsequent tax year.

    The 60/40 Rule

    Under the 60/40 rule, CME’s Bitcoin futures and options that are capital assets in taxpayers’ hands are taxed as 60% long-term and 40% short-term capital gain or loss. The 60/40 rule applies without regard to the length of time taxpayers hold such positions, meaning that the capital gain holding period requirement is eliminated for section 1256 contracts. Futures or options that are ordinary assets in the taxpayers’ hands are not eligible for 60/40 treatment even though they remain subject to mark-to-market (I.R.C. §§ 1256(a)(3), 1256(f)(2)). The mark-to-market rule applies to all section 1256 contracts, without regard to whether they are ordinary or capital, unless the taxpayer is a hedger that made a valid hedge identification.

    Straddles Consisting Only of Bitcoin Futures and Options

    If taxpayers hold tax straddles that consist only of Bitcoin futures and options, the general straddle rules of I.R.C. § 1092 do not apply (I.R.C. §§ 1092(d)(5)(A), 1256(a)(4)). This is because the mark-to-market rule taxes all gains and losses on section 1256 contracts as of the last business day of the taxable year, preventing taxpayers from deferring their gains or accelerating their losses. For a discussion of the straddle rules, see McDermott’s article, “When Virtual Currency Positions are Subject to the Straddle Rules.”

    Straddles Consisting of Section 1256 Contracts as Well as Other Positions

    Taxpayers who hold futures or options that qualify as section 1256 contracts might also hold actual virtual currencies or other derivatives. If the taxpayers’ positions meet the requirements of a straddle (offsetting positions in actively traded personal property), their straddle is subject to the straddle rules. Straddles that include both section 1256 contract positions and non-section 1256 contract positions are treated as mixed straddles, subject to various elections available to mixed straddles. See again McDermott’s article, “When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Straddle Rules.”

    Special Loss Carryback Rules

    Taxpayers who are not corporations, trusts or estates can elect special loss carryback rules for section 1256 contract losses that qualify for 60/40 treatment. Eligible taxpayers can use their section 1256 losses incurred in one year to reduce income generated on such contracts in prior tax years. This carryback rule provides a form of income averaging not available to other taxpayers. Taxpayers can carry net section 1256 contract losses back to each of the three preceding years and apply the losses against net section 1256 contract gains recognized in those prior years (I.R.C. § 1212(c)).

    Losses that are carried back are treated as if 60% were long-term and 40% were short-term (I.R.C. § 1212(c)(1)). Carryback losses cannot be used to increase or produce a net operating loss for the prior taxable year (I.R.C. § 1212(c)(3)). Such losses are carried back to the earliest of the three preceding taxable years in which there is a net section 1256 contract gain (I.R.C. § 1212(c)(2)). Any portion of the loss not absorbed in the earliest year can then be carried forward to the next taxable year and, if any loss remains, to the next (most recent) taxable year (I.R.C. § 1212(c)(2)). Any net section 1256 contract loss carried forward from the first carryback year is again recharacterized as 60% long-term and 40% short-term capital loss (I.R.C. § 1212(c)(6)(A)). The loss carryback election is quite complicated in its application, applying only after netting section 1256 contract losses with unrelated capital gains and losses.

    * * * * *

    Taxpayers should keep these special rules for section 1256 contracts in mind for their Bitcoin futures and options and for other positions in other virtual currencies, such as Ether futures, to determine whether they qualify for section 1256 treatment when QBEs begin trading futures and options on additional virtual currencies.

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  • When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Straddle Rules

    When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Straddle Rules

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Straddle Rules

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Taxpayers who hold virtual currency positions may be subject to the tax straddle rules that require them to defer losses on one offsetting position to the extent of unrecognized gain on other offsetting positions. This article explores guidance (or the lack thereof) relating to actively traded personal property, offsetting positions and other issues as applied to virtual currency holdings.

    In depth

    Taxpayers who hold virtual currency positions need to determine if the straddle rules will defer their losses and require them to capitalize certain otherwise deductible expenses. When taxpayers hold “offsetting positions” in “actively traded” “personal property” (I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1092(b)–1T and –2T), the I.R.C § 1092 straddle rules require them to defer recognition of their losses on closed positions while holding offsetting gain positions.

    A straddle consists of holding two or more positions in personal property if holding one of the positions substantially diminishes the taxpayer’s risk of loss from holding the other position. If one position protects the other position so there is a substantial diminution of risk of loss, this is enough to establish a straddle, even if the amount of loss reduction is not reciprocal. Positions in actively traded personal property include personal property of a type that is actively traded (I.R.C. § 1092(d)(1)).

    An example might help explain application of the straddle rules. Let’s assume a taxpayer holds 100 Bitcoins in her digital wallet. Assume for purposes of this example that Bitcoin qualifies as actively traded personal property for straddle purposes (which is discussed below). Let’s assume further that she agrees to sell 100 Bitcoins for delivery to a buyer in three months. This “short position” would be an offsetting position to her “long” Bitcoin position in her digital wallet. If she closes out her short position at a loss, the straddle rules would prevent her from taking the loss on her tax return while she holds an offsetting gain position.

    The loss deferral rule requires taxpayers to defer losses on one or more offsetting positions to the extent of any unrecognized gain on the other offsetting positions (I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1)(B)). (Temporary Treasury regulations include the modified wash sales rule and the modified short sale rule. The modified wash sales rule prevents a deduction for the disposition of a position at a loss if the taxpayer has an unrecognized gain in a successor position. The modified short sale rule suspends the holding period for a position during the period the taxpayer holds offsetting positions and positions that are successor positions to the initial offsetting position; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)-2T(a)(I) (1986).)

    The basic concept underlying the loss deferral rule is that taxpayers cannot deduct losses incurred with respect to a position in personal property if they also hold an offsetting position with an unrecognized gain (I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1)(A)). (If the loss deferral rule applies, a taxpayer must defer losses realized on any position in personal property that is part of the straddle while holding the offsetting position; I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1)(B).) The straddle rules apply to virtual currency positions that meet these requirements.

    Under I.R.C. § 263(g), taxpayers must also capitalize interest and carrying charges allocable to personal property that is part of a straddle. Interest and carrying charges that must be capitalized while holding offsetting positions include (1) interest expense incurred to purchase or carry property; (2) expenses incurred to store, insure or transport personal property; and (3) amounts paid or incurred in connection with personal property used in a short sale.

    Actively Traded Personal Property

    The straddle rules apply to actively traded personal property (I.R.C. § 1092(d)(1)). I.R.C. § 1092 does not provide any guidance as to when property is actively traded. And, the legislative history that accompanied enactment of I.R.C. § 1092 provides only minimal guidance, stating that to “be treated as actively traded, property need not be traded on an exchange or in a recognized market” (Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, at 289 (Joint Comm. Print 1981)). As a result, actively traded personal property includes more items than the types of property that are traded on an exchange or in a “recognized” market.

    Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(d)-1(a) specifies that personal property is actively traded if there is an “established” market for that property. An established market includes (1) a national securities exchange, (2) a commodity exchange registered with the CFTC, and (3) an interdealer market. Hence, personal property is actively traded if there is an interdealer market for that property.

    An interdealer market is defined as a market characterized by a “system of general circulation” (including quotations disseminated to subscribing brokers, dealers or traders) that provides a reasonable basis to determine fair market value by disseminating either recent price quotations or actual prices of recent transactions.

    Offsetting Positions

    Losses realized on actively traded positions in personal property cannot be recognized to the extent that a taxpayer has unrecognized gains in an offsetting position (I.R.C. § 1092(a)(1)(A)). In other words, if a taxpayer holds two or more positions in actively traded personal property, the taxpayer cannot deduct any losses on closing out any of those positions to the extent the taxpayer has unrecognized gain in positions that reduce the risk of loss on the position that was closed out. This means that determining which positions offset other positions is critical in ascertaining whether losses are currently deductible.

    Taxpayers hold offsetting positions if their risk of loss from holding any position in personal property is substantially diminished because they hold one or more other positions with respect to personal property. Neither the Code nor the Treasury regulations define what is required for one or more positions to substantially diminish the taxpayer’s risk of loss. Relevant legislative history says, however, that positions in the same personal property are considered to be offsetting “provided the values of the positions vary inversely with each other. Generally, values vary inversely if the value of one position decreases when the value of the other position increases.” (See General Explanation of ERTA, at page 289.) Risk reduction because of mere diversification of assets is not generally considered to substantially diminish risk.

    Application to Virtual Currency

    In IRS Notice 2014-21, the IRS takes the position that convertible virtual currency is “property” for tax purposes. This means that the IRS applies general tax principles to transactions to convertible virtual currency (Notice 2014-21, A-1). Under Notice 2014-21, a taxpayer who receives virtual currency as the medium of exchange for the payment for goods or services is taxed at the fair market value of that virtual currency, measured in US dollars, as of the date the taxpayer received the virtual currency (Notice 2014-21, A-3). The IRS views convertible virtual currency as property, not as foreign currency (Notice 2014-21, A-2).

    The straddle rules would apply to virtual currency positions in a particular virtual currency if that virtual currency is actively traded personal property and the taxpayer holds offsetting positions. Convertible virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, have an equivalent value in an actual currency and they can act as a substitute for actual currency. Bitcoin can be traded online and can be purchased for, or exchanged into, US dollars or other actual or virtual currencies. It is likely, therefore, that there is an established market for Bitcoin trading. Convertible virtual currency such as Bitcoin might be subject to the straddle rules, while nonconvertible virtual currency is not likely to be actively traded personal property.

    Mixed Straddles

    Taxpayers who hold offsetting positions in Bitcoin need to be aware of the additional tax implications of holding Bitcoin as well as futures or options. Because Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) Bitcoin futures and options are section 1256 contracts, they are subject to the special rules that apply to those contracts. For a discussion of section 1256 contracts, see McDermott’s article, “Special Tax Rules Apply to Bitcoin Futures and Options and Might Apply to Positions in Ether and Other Virtual Currencies in the Future.” The special rules include provisions for so-called mixed straddles where at least one (but not all) of the positions making up the straddle consist of section 1256 contracts. As a result, taxpayers holding Bitcoin futures and options as part of straddles need to consider both the special rules at I.R.C. § 1256 and the special straddle rules that apply to mixed straddles.

    * * * *

    Given the rapid changes in the virtual currency marketplace, taxpayers should carefully determine on a yearly basis whether there is an established market for the virtual currencies they hold. Next, taxpayers should determine whether they hold offsetting positions that a virtual currency. Taxpayers holding other convertible virtual currencies will need to evaluate whether they hold offsetting positions in those virtual currencies.

    Taxpayers should consult with their tax advisors for proper reporting of gains and losses and with respect to the federal and state implications of the straddle rules. Many states do not follow federal tax returns in computing state taxes.

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  • When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Wash Sales Rule

    When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Wash Sales Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Wash Sales Rule

    June 17, 2020

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Under the wash sales rule, taxpayers cannot deduct a loss on the sale of stock or securities if the taxpayer purchases the same or substantially similar assets a short time before or after the sale that triggered the loss. This article examines possible application of the wash sales rule to virtual currencies.

    In depth

    Tax law has special rules that disallow a deduction for a loss on the sale of certain assets where the taxpayer purchases the same or substantially similar assets a short time before or after the sale that triggered the loss. This rule, called the wash sales rule, applies to prevent taxpayers from reporting losses from selling “stock” or “securities” as defined in the tax laws. Because virtual currencies are not viewed as stock or securities for purposes of the wash sales rule, the loss disallowance rules of I.R.C. § 1091 arguably should not apply. If applicable, these rules would prevent taxpayers from reporting tax losses without substantially changing their economic positions. This article addresses possible application of the wash sales rule to virtual currency. (For a discussion of possible application of the tax straddle rules to defer tax losses, see McDermott’s article, “When Virtual Currency Positions Are Subject to the Straddle Rules.”

    Operation of the Wash Sales Rule

    Taxpayers cannot deduct otherwise allowable losses if the losses are from a sale or other disposition of stock or securities and the taxpayers acquire substantially identical stock or securities (by a purchase or in a taxable transaction) within a period beginning 30 days before and ending 30 days after the date of the disposition (the 61-day prohibited period; I.R.C. § 1091).

    The tax basis of newly acquired stock or securities is adjusted to reflect the amount of loss that must be deferred and is not immediately deductible. When the newly acquired stock or securities are subsequently disposed of, this basis adjustment means that taxpayers have larger losses or smaller gains to reflect previously deferred losses.

    Limited to Stock or Securities Transactions

    Although the phrase “stock or securities” appears with slightly different meanings in various Code provisions, that phrase is not defined in I.R.C. §1091 or the applicable US Department of the Treasury regulations. What we do know is that stock generally refers to shares of stock in a corporation. Securities typically refers to notes, bonds, debentures and other evidences of indebtedness. Some Code provisions have broader definitions of securities and include options. For example, I.R.C. § 1236(c) defines security for purposes of dealer investment accounts to include “any evidence of an interest in or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing.” When I.R.C. § 1091 was amended to provide that the wash sales rule includes entering into a contract or option to acquire substantially identical stock or securities, Congress did not attempt to define the term stock or securities. Rather, it simply amended I.R.C. § 1091 to include as “securities” contracts or options to acquire stock or securities.

    The wash sales rule is based on mechanical rules and definitions. It does not grant the Treasury broad anti-abuse authority to apply the rule to transactions beyond stock or securities. Further, because commodities, commodity derivatives and futures contracts are not stock or securities, the wash sales rule does not apply to them.

    Application to Virtual Currency

    In Notice 2014-21, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided its view that convertible virtual currency is property—not foreign currency—for federal tax purposes (2014-16 I.R.B. 938). The IRS does not address whether virtual currency is taxable as a security. For a discussion of when virtual currency is treated as a security for tax purposes, see McDermott’s article, “Can a Virtual Currency Position Be Treated as a Security for Tax Purposes.” Some convertible virtual currencies—such as Bitcoin—are likely to be treated as “commodities” for tax purposes, not as actual stock or securities. As a result, losses from the sale, exchange or other disposition of convertible virtual currencies are not deferred under the wash sales rules.

    There are some situations, however, where virtual currency positions—such as certain initial coin offerings (ICOs) and certain tokens—might be treated as securities under Supreme Court guidance and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules (See SEC, Report of Investigation Pursuant to §21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Securities Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017), at 3). This means that taxpayers need to consider the possibility that if the SEC treats particular transactions as securities, the IRS might seek to apply the wash sales rule to those transactions.

    In circumstances where virtual currency transactions are not taxed as securities, taxpayers can sell virtual currency at a loss and acquire substantially identical virtual currency without being required to defer their losses under the wash sales rule. Taxpayers who hold virtual currency units at prices below their tax basis might consider selling those units at a loss to harvest their losses, without regard to whether they want to reestablish their positions. Those taxpayers who want to maintain substantially identical positions after taking their losses for tax purposes can reacquire substantially identical units at the then market price at less than their basis in the units they disposed of. Such a sale and reacquisition would allow such taxpayers to maintain their virtual currency positions while reporting tax losses.

    * * * *

    Taxpayers should discuss their loss transactions with their tax advisors. Although most convertible virtual currency positions are not likely to be subject to the wash sales rule, taxpayers should be aware of possible application of the wash sales rule to certain transactions, as well as possible application of the tax straddle rules and other statutory and judicial anti abuse rules that could prohibit tax losses.

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  • Trust Administration in Volatile Markets: How Should a Fiduciary React to the COVID-19 Crisis

    Trust Administration in Volatile Markets: How Should a Fiduciary React to the COVID-19 Crisis

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Trust Administration in Volatile Markets: How Should a Fiduciary React to the COVID-19 Crisis

    June 16, 2020

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On February 19, 2020, the S&P 500 index closed at a record high of 3386.15. Since that date, markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia have experienced record volatility due to the effects of the COVID-19 crisis and many investment management professionals anticipate that this market volatility will persist throughout the rest of the year. Such volatility creates a challenging environment for fiduciaries charged with investing and managing trust assets. This article offers insights into how a fiduciary should navigate this environment and highlights specific investment liability issues that arise as a result of volatile markets.

    Dive deeper with us on Thursday, June 18 to discuss properly managing and investing trust property in volatile markets. We’ll highlight best practices, specific investment issues and trustee protections available.

    In depth

    The Standards Trustees Must Satisfy in Investing Trust Assets

    The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have enacted a version of the Prudent Investor Rule as the standard that a fiduciary must comply with respect to the investment and management of trust assets. While the duties imposed by the Prudent Investor Rule may be modified by the trust instrument and may differ slightly between jurisdictions, the Prudent Investor Rule provides, generally, that a fiduciary has a duty to invest trust assets as a prudent investor would considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. The rule requires the fiduciary to exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in investing the assets of a trust. The rule applies to the investments of the trust in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole.

    Importantly, compliance with the Prudent Investor Rule is a test of the trustee’s conduct, not the resulting performance of the trust. The rule imposes a specific duty upon the fiduciary to review trust assets and make decisions concerning the retention and disposition of those assets. It requires the trustee to adopt an investment strategy that considers both income and principal enhancement consistent with the duty of impartiality. In addition, it creates a duty to diversify the assets of the trust.

    Navigating Volatile Markets

    The most important thing for fiduciaries to remember in navigating volatile markets is that the Prudent Investor Rule remains a processed-based, and not performance-based, standard even though beneficiaries will complain about performance. Therefore, fiduciaries must continue to exercise reasonable, care, and skill in the managing the assets of the trust. In particular, fiduciaries should actively monitor and review a trust’s existing assets to determine whether the trust should retain or dispose of those assets.

    The fiduciary should also review the investment managers that the fiduciary has retained or invested trust assets with. In particular, fiduciaries should ensure that trust investment managers are following the investment manager’s respective investment policies, procedures, and guidelines. For example, if the investment manager’s prospectus for a fund states that the fund will invest in a mixed portfolio of 60% equities and 40% bonds, the fiduciary should ensure that the fund’s portfolio mix complies with the prospectus. If it does not, the fiduciary should consider terminating the relationship with the investment manager.

    In addition, fiduciaries should maintain regular contact with beneficiaries when markets are volatile to ensure that the trust portfolio is aligned with the best interests of the beneficiaries. Since some beneficiaries may not be overly responsive, the fiduciary should exercise diligence in maintaining contact with the beneficiaries.

    Fiduciaries should also make a written record of their rationale for any decisions they make with respect to the retention, disposition, or acquisition of an asset as well as any decisions they make with respect to distributions, investment managers, allocation of principal and income, and investment policies. Documenting communications with beneficiaries regarding the trust portfolio is also important. These written records could serve as valuable evidence in any subsequent litigation that the fiduciary exercised reasonable care, skill, and caution in managing the assets of the trust.

    Specific Investment Liability Issues Caused by Volatile Markets

    Despite the fact that the Prudent Investor Rule is a process-based standard, there are a number of specific theories of liability that relate to the performance of a trust’s portfolio that disgruntled beneficiaries will assert when there is a substantial decline in the market. While the exercise of prudent trust management should shield a fiduciary from liability based on these theories, fiduciaries should be aware of these investment liability issues.

    Sell Disciplines

    In response to substantial market declines, beneficiaries have brought cases against fiduciaries alleging that a fiduciary has breached the duty of care by failing to implement a “sell discipline” with respect to the trust portfolio. A “sell discipline” is a process instituted by the trust instrument or the trustee that requires the trustee to sell a liquid trust asset if the value of the asset falls to a predetermined threshold. In theory, a “sell discipline” could prevent the dissipation of the value of a trust asset in a rapidly declining market. In practice, very few trust instruments have a “sell discipline” built into the investment or administration powers of the trust. In addition, very few trustees have implemented “sell disciplines.”

    No case has ever expressly held that a trustee must implement an objective “sell discipline” in order to satisfy his or her duties under the Prudent Investor Rule. Indeed, some courts have criticized the theory because a sell discipline could effectively lock in losses for the trust that may be difficult to recover. See In re Mark Anthony Fowler Special Needs Trust, 160 Wash. App. 1001) (Ct. App. 2011). However, at least one court has held that a trustee violated the Prudent Investor Rule by failing to take any measures to protect against a decline in the value of a trust’s stock where the trustee recognized that it was highly probable that the stock would continue to decline in value. See Uzyel v. Kadisha, 188 Cal.App.4th 866 (2010). Therefore, while fiduciaries should not be liable for failing to implement a sell discipline, they must be diligent in monitoring performance and have a reasonable basis for continuing to hold an asset during a decline in performance.

    Overweight Equity Accounts

    While both equity markets and bond markets have experienced substantial volatility during the COVID-19 crisis, equity markets have historically experienced greater declines in bear markets than other forms of investment. Beneficiaries have brought claims against fiduciaries for allegedly breaching the duty of diversification in situations where a trust has held substantial equity positions with respect to the overall value of the trust.

    Generally, fiduciaries can defeat such claims because a trust’s investment mix does not implicate the duty to diversify. Rather, the duty to diversify generally requires the fiduciary to convert a single asset trust or a trust in which there is an over-concentration in a single asset (usually more than between 10 and 15% of the portfolio value) into more than a single investment, so that there is no over-concentration in any particular asset. Therefore, investing heavily or entirely in equities or in bonds does not violate the duty to diversify. See, e.g., Central National Bank of Mattoon v. United States Department of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897 (7th Cir. 1990); Goddard III v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co., 177 Ill. App. 3d. 504 (1st Dist. 1988).

    However, at least one case has held that an over-concentration in a particular type of investment class could constitute a failure to diversify. See Estate of Scharlach, 809 A. 2d 376 (Pa. Super. 2002). Therefore, trustees should be mindful of the asset allocation in prudently managing trust portfolios. If a trustee decides it is prudent to concentrate the assets of a trust in a single asset class, the trustee should be prepared to defend the process in reaching that decision.

    Performance Versus Benchmarks

    When trustees and other investment managers sell their investment services, they will typically compare their performance to various benchmarks and indices. As a result, beneficiaries have brought claims against trustees for failing to either outperform or meet the performance of a specific index or benchmark, such as the S&P 500. Courts have generally rejected these claims. These courts have held that trustee liability is measured by whether the trustee acted imprudently in managing the assets of the trust, it is not based on any performance driven standard. See Matter of Jakobson Trust, 662 N.Y.S.2d 360 (N.Y. Surr. 1997); In re Trusts of Kuoching, 717 N.Y.S. 2d 512 (App. Div. 2000). Therefore, if a trustee employs a prudent process in investing trust assets, the trustee should have limited exposure for performance that does not meet or exceed benchmarks.

    Unconventional Investment Vehicles

    As markets have gotten more complex, a number of fiduciaries have found unconventional investment vehicles, such as investing on margin, short sales, or engaging in venture capital practices, to be attractive investments. However, when such investments have resulted in a loss, courts have found that these investments are imprudent due to their inherent risk. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch v. Bockock, 247 F. Supp. 373 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Mennen v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2015 WL 1897828 (Del. Ct. Ch. 2015). As a result, fiduciaries face substantial liability exposure in a volatile market environment if they have invested trust assets in unconventional investment vehicles because volatile markets increase the risk of a complete loss with respect to such investments. Therefore, fiduciaries should avoid investing trust assets in unconventional investment vehicles unless directed by the trust instrument and generally approved by the beneficiary.

    Total Return Trust Conversion

    Many states have adopted statutory provisions that allow for the conversion of a trust that defines the current beneficiaries’ rights in terms of accounting income, to “total-return” trusts, otherwise referred to as unitrusts. If the beneficiaries do not agree on a conversion, or the appropriate rate of total return to be applied, the trustee can initiate a court proceeding to decide the issue. However, volatile markets can make conversion proceedings more complex and expensive as expert financial testimony will be necessary to demonstrate that a conversion will not cause a substantial erosion in the principal value of the trust.

    England and Offshore

    Much of what is said above about the situation in the United States holds true in England and the offshore jurisdictions albeit often expressed in slightly different language. We would like to highlight certain facets of claims in those jurisdictions. Claims for investment losses against a trustee fit into three categories: (1) unauthorized investments, (2) disloyal investments and (3) failure to invest with due care and attention or “negligent” investments.

    Claims for unauthorized investment are now comparatively rare owing to statutory expansion of the categories of authorized investment; however, owing to the right of beneficiaries to investment by investment falsification of unauthorized investments such claims are devastating if successful. Under s 3 of the Trustee Act 2000, a trustee in England and Wales has a ‘general power of investment’, which allows him to invest the assets of the trust in any kind of investment he could make as if he were absolutely entitled to those assets. This statutory power does not extend to investments in non-UK land, save for loans secured on land (s 3(3) and 8, Trustee Act 2000). The statutory power may be widened by the trust instrument, which usually contains very wide powers of investments, but such clauses will be interpreted strictly against the trustee (Re Maryon-Wilson’s Estate [1912] Ch 55). Likewise, the power can be limited by the provisions of a trust deed, if the trust was drafted after 3 August 1961. If the trustee has made unauthorized investments the beneficiaries may require that any unprofitable ones were made with the trustee’s own funds rather than with the trust assets.

    Disloyal investment is more commonly seen and still problematic for trustees. As a fiduciary, the trustee owes undivided loyalty to his beneficiaries, and must not place himself in a position where his duties to third parties or his own interests conflict with his duty to the beneficiaries. Investments made in breach of this duty are disloyal investments. The trustee may be required to re-constitute the trust for any disloyal investments on an investment-by-investment basis without regard to whether they were competent investments; however, the trustee can argue that the disloyalty did not cause the losses, albeit the burden of establishing causation as a defence is on the trustee.

    Finally, the trustee has an obligation to invest with due care and attention (for its jurisprudential and statutory expression see Re Whiteley (1886) 33 ChD 347 and s 1 of the Trustee Act 2000). In connection with such claims all of the common law protections and requirements of a claim sounding in negligence have been incorporated into this equitable claim. Significantly, losses suffered during the global financial crisis were held to be not foreseeable and therefore not actionable (Rubenstein v HSBC Bank plc [2011] EWHC 2304 (QB), [2011] 2 CLC 459; though the decision was overturned on appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 1184, [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 915 on fact specific grounds that the investor in question had made it clear they did not want any exposure to the market). One wonders if such an argument would be successful to defeat claims arising from the current pandemic.

    There are a number of arguments founding liability which might be (and likely will be) made for current investment losses including the failure to take advice. Whilst it is possible for the trustee to neither take advice nor to appoint a discretionary asset manager over the trust assets, this is limited to where the trustee believes it “unnecessary or inappropriate” to do so (section 5, Trustee Act 2000). The difficulty of course is that in retrospect given substantial losses in the trust this decision may appear questionable or indeed actionable. Additionally, whether the trustee has in fact taken advice is likely to be an issue in light of the rise of the doctrine of contractual estoppel (which estopps claims against investment advisors for negligent advice where their boilerplate language asserts that no advice has been given even where advice is in fact given) in JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation Corp. [2010] EWCA Civ 1221, [2010] All ER (D) 08 (Nov).

    Conclusion

    Volatile markets present a challenging environment for fiduciaries to navigate. While market declines increase the likelihood that beneficiaries will bring claims against fiduciaries for financial mismanagement, fiduciaries should be able to defeat such claims if they have exercised care in making decisions with respect to the retention, disposition, or acquisition of trust assets. As long as fiduciaries employ a prudent process in managing the investment of trust assets, it is unlikely that they will be liable for claims of breach of fiduciary duty resulting from the performance of the trust’s portfolio.

    Authors

    David A. Baker

    Partner

    Chicago

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