Content Type: Article

  • COVID-19 as a Trigger for Force Majeure: A Global Survey

    COVID-19 as a Trigger for Force Majeure: A Global Survey

    ARTICLE

    COVID-19 as a Trigger for Force Majeure: A Global Survey

    June 2020

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lisa Richman, Shawn Helms, Jason Krieser and Matthew Cin collaborated with ALM to author this helpful guide for companies and clients to use to quickly answer key questions about the impact of force majeure on contractual obligations during and in the aftermath of the pandemic. The survey covers 16 US jurisdictions and ten other countries to fully engage businesses to respond to and best leverage contractual obligations amid the pandemic.

    Use the link below to access the full guide.

    In depth
    Authors

    Lisa M. Richman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Shawn C. Helms

    Partner

    Dallas

    Jason D. Krieser

    Partner

    Dallas

    More insights

  • The Long-Term Impact of the Pandemic on Corporate Governance: Recommendations the General Counsel May Share with the Board

    ARTICLE

    The Long-Term Impact of the Pandemic on Corporate Governance: Recommendations the General Counsel May Share with the Board

    June 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Supreme Court Limits Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions

    Supreme Court Limits Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Limits Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions

    June 23, 2020

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 22, 2020, in Liu v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the SEC’s authority to seek disgorgement in enforcement actions in federal court, holding that the amount cannot exceed a defendant’s net profits and generally must be used to repay harmed investors.

    The SEC brought a civil enforcement action against defendants who allegedly misappropriated much of the money they raised from foreign investors towards the construction of a cancer center in the United States, contrary to their statements in an offering memorandum.[1] The District Court ruled in the SEC’s favor and imposed disgorgement, jointly and severally, of the full amount the defendants had raised.[2] The Ninth Circuit affirmed.[3]

    Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of a nearly unanimous Court.[4] The Supreme Court held that the SEC can properly pursue disgorgement in federal court, but limited the manner in which the amount of that remedy is calculated and distributed.

    Previously, in its 2017 decision in Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that disgorgement is a “penalty,” in the context of determining the statute of limitations.[5] There, the Court left open the question of whether “courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings.”[6]

    The defendants invited the Court to answer that question “no.” The defendants argued that Kokesh effectively held that disgorgement is necessarily punitive and therefore is not part of the “equitable relief” the SEC is permitted to seek in federal court enforcement actions.[7] The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that historically, courts had long been authorized under equitable principles to deprive wrongdoers of their unlawful profits so the money could be returned to victims.[8]

    At the same time, in order to avoid transforming disgorgement into a penalty outside the courts’ equitable powers, the Supreme Court placed significant limits on the SEC’s authority to seek disgorgement.

    First, the Court held that the calculation must deduct legitimate expenses.[9] Only the wrongdoer’s net profits are the proper subject of disgorgement, to avoid the remedy becoming a punishment.[10] For example, the Court suggested that the amounts the Liu defendants spent towards lease payments and actual cancer-treating equipment were likely eligible for deduction, and instructed the lower courts to consider whether to deduct them.[11] The opinion noted, however, that a defendant may be denied deductions where the “entire profit of a business or undertaking” results from the wrongdoing.[12]

    Second, the Court held that the SEC had gone too far in seeking disgorgement for profits that did not accrue to the defendant individually.[13] The Court recounted the long history of equity jurisprudence that disallowed joint and several liability and required individual liability for wrongful profits unless the defendants were “partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing.”[14] The opinion casts doubt on prior decisions, like the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Contorinis, that required the defendant to pay back not only his own gains but also benefits that he never touched, which his close associates enjoyed because of his wrongdoing.[15] Here, the Court left for remand whether the defendants, who were married and solicited investments together, had the type of partnership that would allow joint and several liability.[16]

    Third, the Court held that the equitable nature of disgorgement generally requires the SEC to return a defendant’s ill-gotten gains to the wronged investors.[17] The Court rejected the SEC’s view that simply depriving wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains was a permissible equitable remedy that would enable the SEC to deposit disgorged funds into the Treasury indefinitely.[18] After all, the Court reasoned, the statute does not allow “equitable relief” at large, but only the equitable relief that is “appropriate and necessary for the benefit of investors.”[19] The Court hinted a different rule might apply in a situation where the “profits cannot practically be disbursed to the victims” but did not reach that question in this case.[20]

    The Liu ruling will fundamentally reshape the amount the SEC can obtain as disgorgement in enforcement actions and, potentially, administrative proceedings.[21] While the Court did not eliminate the SEC’s authority to seek disgorgement altogether, this opinion will serve to curtail some of the SEC’s longstanding disgorgement practices. The ability to deduct expenses when accused of wrongdoing and to focus the remedy on each participant’s individual gain will be meaningful to many who face SEC enforcement actions.

    Liu’s impact on disgorgement in insider trading cases, in particular, will be hotly debated. Under prior law, the SEC regularly sought to disgorge insider trading profits, even those earned by persons other the defendant.[22] Now, defendants can be expected to advance arguments drawing on all three of the limitations announced in Liu: that legitimate expenses must be deducted from any disgorgement award; that the defendant cannot be held liable for trading profits earned by others; and that no disgorgement is proper where, as is typically the case, the victims of insider trading are difficult to identify and thus unlikely to receive any award the SEC distributes.

    Authored by Barry A. Bohrer, Charles J. Clark, Marc E. Elovitz, Howard Schiffman, Craig S. Warkol, Peter H. White and Noah N. Gillespie.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Liu v. SEC, No. 18-1501, slip op. at 4 (June 22, 2020).

    [2] Id. at 5.

    [3] Id.

    [4] Justice Thomas would have held that disgorgement was never available to the SEC in enforcement actions because, in his view, “disgorgement is not a traditional equitable remedy.” Liu v. SEC, slip op. at 22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

    [5] Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).

    [6] Id. at 1642 n.3.

    [7] Liu, slip op. at 12; see 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (authorizing the SEC to seek in a federal court enforcement action the “equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary to protect investors.”). The defendants also emphasized that the statute authorizing administrative proceedings before the SEC’s own administrative law judges explicitly lists disgorgement as a remedy. 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1(e), (g). The Court readily dispensed with this difference in statutory language, noting that courts have inherent equity powers while administrative agencies have only the powers a statute expressly confers. Liu, slip op. at 13.

    [8] Id. at 8-9, 12-13.

    [9] Id. at 10-12, 19.

    [10] Id. at 6-9.

    [11] Id.

    [12] Id. at 19.

    [13] Id. at 17.

    [14] Id. at 9-10, 18.

    [15] Id. at 12 n.3, 17 (discussing SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 304-06 (2d Cir. 2014)).

    [16] Id. at 18.

    [17] Id. at 15.

    [18] Id. at 15-16.

    [19] Id. at 16 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5)).

    [20] Id. at 17.

    [21] Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion states that “[i]t is unclear” whether the Court’s restrictions on disgorgement will apply in administrative proceedings as well. Liu v. SEC, slip op. at 8 (Thomas, J. dissenting).

    [22] See Liu v. SEC, slip op. at 17 (majority opinion) (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 454 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is well settled that a tipper can be required to disgorge his tippee’s profits.”).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Howard Schiffman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • LIBOR Transition: SEC Announces Examination Initiative

    LIBOR Transition: SEC Announces Examination Initiative

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    LIBOR Transition: SEC Announces Examination Initiative

    June 23, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In January 2020, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) identified registrant preparedness for the transition away from the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) as an examination program priority for the 2020 fiscal year.[1] On June 18, 2020, OCIE released a Risk Alert[2] that provides registered investment advisers with additional information about the scope and content of these examinations.[3]

    In the Risk Alert, OCIE staff asserted that preparation for the transition from LIBOR is essential to minimize potential adverse effects associated with the expected discontinuation of LIBOR after 2021. OCIE also warned that assessments of preparedness for the expected discontinuation (as well as the transition to alternative reference rates, if applicable) will be a focus of upcoming examinations. These examinations can include a review of a registrant’s evaluation of the impact of LIBOR discontinuance on its business activities, operations and services, as well as on their customers, clients and investors, as applicable. For example, OCIE stated that it will review the registrant’s plans and steps taken for:

    • The firm’s and investor’s exposure to LIBOR-linked contracts that extend past the current expected discontinuation date, including any fallback language incorporated into these contracts;
    • The firm’s operational readiness, including any enhancements or modifications to systems, controls, processes and risk or valuation models associated with the transition to a new reference rate or benchmark;
    • The firm’s disclosures, representations and/or reporting to investors regarding its efforts to address LIBOR discontinuation and the adoption of alternative reference rates;
    • The identification and response to potential conflicts of interest associated with the LIBOR discontinuation and the adoption of alternative reference rates; and
    • Client’s efforts to replace LIBOR with an appropriate alternative reference rate.

    Given the lead time necessary to amend or renegotiate trading and business arrangements, investment advisers should consider undertaking an assessment of their clients’ exposure to LIBOR discontinuance as soon as practicable. Advisers should also consider documenting their transition plans, both to assist in addressing the LIBOR discontinuance as well as to help shorten any regulatory or investor inquiries on an adviser’s readiness.

    OCIE rarely provides sample requests lists, like the one attached as Appendix A to the Risk Alert, in advance of examinations. Firms whose business activities, operations, services or investors/clients will be impacted by the discontinuation of LIBOR should review the sample list and identify materials, information and documentation that will help them to assess, and to address, their preparedness for LIBOR’s discontinuation.

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz, Taleah E. Jennings, Douglas I. Koff, Craig Stein, Atul Joshi and Amanda C. Wichot.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or would like assistance with the transition from LIBOR, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Read the examination priorities.

    [2] Read the Risk Alert.

    [3] Previously, the SEC staff also released an announcement by the Division of Corporate Finance, Division of Investment Management, Division of Trading and Markets, and the Office of the Chief Accountant addressing the discontinuance of LIBOR. For a detailed summary, see the SRZ Alert “SEC Staff Publishes Statement on LIBOR Transition.”


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Taleah E. Baez

    Senior Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Douglas I. Koff

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Qualified Retirement Plan Updates: The Changing Landscape for Communication with Participants

    Qualified Retirement Plan Updates: The Changing Landscape for Communication with Participants

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Qualified Retirement Plan Updates: The Changing Landscape for Communication with Participants

    June 23, 2020

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In February 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling that narrowed the definition of “actual knowledge” in a case that focused on the electronic delivery of disclosure documents. In May 2020, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) expanded the methods by which plan sponsors can satisfy the disclosure requirements under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), when using electronic delivery for retirement plans documents. Thus, plan sponsors and administrators need to be cognizant of the ramifications of both the DOL’s rule and the Supreme Court’s ruling to ensure efficient and prudent administration of qualified plans.

    Supreme Court Tightens the Actual Knowledge Standard

    ERISA requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, rather than within the six-year period that would otherwise apply. In Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768, a case centered on the definition of actual knowledge under ERISA, the Supreme Court held that “actual knowledge” meant that the plaintiff “must in fact have become aware of that information.” Constructive knowledge from proof of sufficient disclosure is not sufficient. Under the court’s interpretation, actual knowledge requires concrete proof that the plaintiffs had read the relevant documents or otherwise taken affirmative actions that should have alerted them to the alleged breach, and not merely proof that the participant had received the relevant documents.

    In light of that ruling, plans may wish to consider adopting procedures to confirm that participants have reviewed disclosures, such as (i) asking participants to electronically acknowledge that they have read and understood plan disclosures, (ii) reminding participants to read carefully, (iii) inviting participants to ask questions and (iv) ensuring that any electronic databases track participants’ access of important disclosure documents. These steps, in addition to others, will help create an evidentiary record should proof be needed in a litigation.

    Department of Labor Expands the Electronic Delivery Rule for Retirement Plans

    The DOL announced a new rule, effective July 27, 2020, that allows employers to either post retirement plan disclosure documents on the plan sponsors’ website or deliver them to participants by email, with the required document either in the body of the email or as an attachment. The DOL has stated that it will not take any enforcement action against a plan administrator that relies on the new rule before the effective date. Plan sponsors or administrators can selectively apply the new rule to some or all disclosures. The rule does not change the type of information that must be provided to beneficiaries and plan participants. Rather, it expands the mode of communication to include electronic messaging if the participant so desires. These provisions apply only to retirement plan disclosures. They do not apply to ERISA-required notices for health or welfare plans, nor do they apply to notices required solely by the IRS or other government agencies.

    The DOL had been exploring ways to expand or revise the existing rules regarding electronic distribution of plan information since 2011. After considerable time, the DOL developed an expanded option which it estimates will allow plans to save approximately $3.2 billion in net cost by eliminating significant materials, printing and mailing costs associated with furnishing printed disclosures.

    Under the new rule, generally all required retirement plan-related communications (other than those provided only upon request) may be posted to a website, provided that the affected individual receives a notice at a personal “electronic address,” either an email address or smart phone, directing the individual to the website. A plan administrator cannot use this method if a participant does not have an electronic address and, for the eligible participants, the plan administrator should attempt to solicit a secondary electronic address to ensure delivery of the documents. If a plan administrator chooses to implement the safe harbor electronic communications program with respect to any individual, it must provide an initial paper notice that covered documents will be provided electronically to an identified electronic address; necessary access instructions; a “cautionary statement that the covered document is not required to be available on the website for more than one year or, if later, after it is superseded by a subsequent version of the covered document”; and a statement of the right (free of charge) to obtain a paper version or to opt out of electronic delivery.

    In addition, if a given notice or disclosure is going to be posted on the administrator’s website, plan participants must be furnished with a “Notice of Internet Availability” each time a new covered document is made available on the website. The Notice of Internet Availability must include:

    • A prominent statement that indicates “Disclosures About Your Retirement Plan”;
    • A statement that reads “Important Information about your Retirement Plan Is now Available. Please Review This Information”;
    • Identification of the document by name and a brief description of the document;
    • The internet website address where the document is available;
    • A statement of the participant’s right to request and obtain a paper version of the document, free of charge;
    • A statement of the participant’s right, free of charge, to opt out of electronic delivery and receive paper versions of covered documents;
    • A cautionary statement that the covered document is not required to be available on the website for more than one year, or if later, after it is superseded by a subsequent version of the covered document; and
    • A telephone number to contact the plan administrator.

    The rule allows an annual notice to include information about multiple documents. The rule also requires plan administrators to have a system in place to detect invalid electronic addresses and to ensure accurate electronic contact information for all plan participants, including in the case of a participant who was using a work email address and loses access to that email due to the cessation of the participant’s employment. The system must be designed to alert the plan administrator if a message “bounces back” or an email is invalid or inoperable. In this case, the plan administrator should try to cure the problem by sending the disclosure to a secondary electronic address, obtain a new electronic address or treat the participant as having opted out of electronic delivery and send a paper notice as soon as reasonably practicable.

    This is an expansion of the existing safe harbor rule that continues to be available, which allows plan administrators to electronically distribute plan documents and notices including documents for health and welfare plans, provided that certain conditions are met (e.g., the participant has to be able to effectively access electronic documents furnished at any location where he or she is reasonably expected to perform his or her duties).

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, David M. Cohen, Susan E. Bernstein and Cristell M.S. Fortune.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David M. Cohen

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Texas Appeals Court: Try Again, and This Time Get the Jury Instructions Right

    Texas Appeals Court: Try Again, and This Time Get the Jury Instructions Right

    ARTICLE

    Texas Appeals Court: Try Again, and This Time Get the Jury Instructions Right

    June 18, 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    A Texas Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on claims of trade secret misappropriation under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) and fraud. The Court reversed the misappropriation verdict because the jury form commingled valid and invalid theories of liability, and reversed the fraud verdict because the jury instructions permitted a finding of liability under theories that were closely related to trade secret misappropriation and therefore preempted by TUTSA, as well as theories that were not. The Court ordered a new trial on both claims. Title Source, Inc. v. HouseCanary, Inc., Case No. 04-19-00044-CV (Tex. App. – San Antonio June 3, 2020) (Watkins, J.).

    Title Source (TSI) provides title insurance, property valuations and settlement services. HouseCanary is a real estate analytics company. TSI hired HouseCanary to build an iPad application for its appraisers to use. The app would be based on HouseCanary’s automated valuation models (AVM). The parties’ agreement specifically prohibited TSI from reverse-engineering or attempting to discover HouseCanary’s source code or confidential information. Nonetheless, and despite its assurances to the contrary, TSI sought and used HouseCanary’s proprietary information to develop its own AVM. The parties’ contract required HouseCanary to maintain a certain “hit rate” (a metric of accuracy), but TSI’s employees took steps to purposely drive down the hit rate (including searching for an appraisal of the supposed street address: “Wiping a Vendor Wipes the fee”). The parties’ contract originally provided for a per-appraisal royalty to be paid to HouseCanary; the parties later amended the agreement to provide for a flat fee in exchange for TSI’s promise to deliver valuable historical valuation data (which it did not deliver).

    TSI sued HouseCanary for breach of contract and fraud, alleging that HouseCanary had failed to deliver the app as promised. HouseCanary counterclaimed for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit and misappropriation of trade secrets under TUTSA. The jury rejected all of TSI’s affirmative claims and found in favor of HouseCanary on its misappropriation, fraud and breach of contract claims. TSI moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied. HouseCanary elected to recover on its misappropriation and fraud claims. The trial court entered judgment in favor of HouseCanary and awarded almost $740 million. TSI appealed.

    HouseCanary’s TUTSA Claim

    On appeal, TSI argued that the verdict was insufficiently supported by evidence and that two questions on the jury form commingled valid and invalid theories of recovery (Casteel error). The first question involved ownership of trade secrets. The Texas Court of Appeals held that sufficient evidence had been presented to sustain the finding of trade secret ownership, and that TSI had waived its objection based on the alleged Casteel error.

    The second question asked the jury whether TSI misappropriated HouseCanary’s trade secrets, and the corresponding instruction provided that misappropriation could be found on either a “use” or an “acquisition by improper means” theory. The Court found that there was enough evidence to sustain a verdict on the “use” theory, but that the jury instructions regarding “acquisition by improper means” was overbroad, because it included potential liability theories that were not supported by the evidence (e.g., bribery, espionage) and used a definition of “improper means” [i.e., “breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, to limit use, or to prohibit discovery of a trade secret”] without further instructing the jury that the defendant must have been shown to have acquired the trade secrets as a result of those breaches. Because the jury could have found that “acquisition by improper means” was a consequence of breaches that occurred after TSI acquired the information, which is an invalid theory of recovery, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

    HouseCanary’s Fraud Claim

    TSI argued that HouseCanary’s fraud claim was preempted by TUTSA. TSI characterized the fraud claim as “a recycled version” of the “improper means” theory of trade secrets misappropriation. HouseCanary argued that its fraud claim was separate from trade secrets misappropriation and was based on damages it allegedly suffered in reliance on TSI’s promises about paying for and rolling out the app (among other things).

    The Texas Court of Appeals explained that both parties were correct: TSI was correct that a fraud theory based on misappropriation of trade secrets was preempted, and HouseCanary was correct that a fraud theory independent of trade secrets was not preempted. However, the Court could not determine which theory was the basis for the jury’s verdict and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for a new trial.

    TSI’s Breach of Contract Claim

    The Court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict against TSI on its breach of contract claim. The Court therefore affirmed the take-nothing judgment against TSI.

    Practice Note: In this case, a $740 million award was wiped out based on improper jury instructions. Be careful that proposed jury instructions are not so broad as to permit both valid and invalid theories of recovery. Parties opposing recovery should seek more tailored instructions and preserve objections.

    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Key Takeaways | Developments in the PJM Market

    Key Takeaways | Developments in the PJM Market

    ARTICLE

    Key Takeaways | Developments in the PJM Market

    June 18, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 18, 2020, McDermott partners Neil Levy and David Tewksbury were joined by Paul M. Sotkiewicz, PhD, of E-Cubed Policy Associates, LLC, to discuss recent developments in the markets operated by PJM Interconnection (PJM).

    Below are key takeaways from this week’s webinar.

    In depth
    • In December 2019, the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued an order requiring PJM to expand its Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR). Under the expanded MOPR, a capacity resource that receives a state subsidy will be subject to a minimum offer floor price in PJM’s capacity auctions, unless it is entitled to one of the exemptions set forth by FERC.
    • The expanded MOPR is not expected to have significant impacts on the results of PJM’s capacity auctions, particularly in the near term. There are at least three reasons for this: First, there are various exemptions to the expanded MOPR, including, but not limited to, exemptions for existing renewable resources, as well as for resources used for self-supply. Second, default offer floors are determined based on the technology of the resource, and certain of these default offer floor prices are low enough to allow resources to continue to clear in PJM’s capacity auctions. Third, and most importantly, a resource can submit offers below the default minimum offer floor price if it can demonstrate that its costs are below the default price.
    • FERC acted relatively quickly on requests for rehearing of its December 2019 order, and issued an order on rehearing in April 2020. Petitions for review of FERC’s orders are pending in the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and are expected to be consolidated in the Seventh Circuit.
    • PJM has made two compliance filings in response to the December 2019 and April 2020 orders. Given the speed with which FERC acted on rehearing, there is the possibility that FERC could also act quickly on the compliance filings. PJM has indicated that it intends to hold the Base Residual Auction for 2022/2023, which was originally scheduled to take place in May 2019, six and a half months after FERC issued an order accepting the compliance filings.
    • Various states are considering opting out of PJM’s capacity markets by using the Fixed Resource Requirement (FRR) alternative. The FRR alternative could give state regulators more control over the mix of resources in the state, but has historically resulted in higher costs for ratepayers in the FRR states.
    • FERC also recently approved modifications to PJM’s rules to provide additional compensation for operating reserves. At the same time, FERC also required PJM to adopt a forward-looking, rather than historical, methodology to calculate the energy and ancillary services offset (E&AS Offset) that is used in the capacity market. Notwithstanding the expected increase in energy and ancillary services revenues as a result of the operating reserves rule change, using a forward-looking methodology may not result in significant changes to the E&AS Offset in light of other offsetting changes, including reductions in fuel prices.
    Authors

    Neil L. Levy

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    David G. Tewksbury

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Stephanie S. Lim

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • COVID-19 and EU Merger Control: Time to Revisit the Failing Firm Defense?

    ARTICLE

    COVID-19 and EU Merger Control: Time to Revisit the Failing Firm Defense?

    June 18, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Don’t SULKA: Plaintiff Must Demonstrate Intent and Ability to Use Mark

    ARTICLE

    Don’t SULKA: Plaintiff Must Demonstrate Intent and Ability to Use Mark

    June 18, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

    More insights

  • Use of the Coronavirus Alert App in the Employment Relationship

    Use of the Coronavirus Alert App in the Employment Relationship

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Use of the Coronavirus Alert App in the Employment Relationship

    June 18, 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    • HOW DOES THE CORONA-ALERT APP WORK?

    The Corona Alert App (“App”) is used to exchange anonymised contact IDs of smartphones when users with the installed app come close to each other. The IDs are stored decentrally on the respective devices. To prevent the creation of motion profiles, the contact IDs are changed regularly. A list containing the anonymized contact IDs is the only thing stored centrally. The app accesses these at a regular basis in order to identify possible problematic contacts.

    If a user tests positive for COVID-19, it’s entirely up to the user to share the test result via the app. If the user shares the result, a list of contact IDs including the time they were valid and a confirmation code is sent to the central server. If another user’s app recognizes that one of the stored foreign IDs (i.e. the contact IDs of other smartphones) reports a positive test during itsregular synchronization with the central server, it informs the user of a possible infection nearby.

    Depending on how long they are in contact with or the distance to the infected person, an individual “risk score” is determined and displayed to the user as a message. As soon as this risk score exceeds a certain threshold, the user will receive a respective alert in the App.

    • VOLUNTARY USE BY EMPLOYEES

    Employees are at liberty to use the App voluntarily on their personal devices. However, an employer’s consent is required for installation on a company mobile phone provided exclusively for business use.

    Just as in the case of an infection with COVID-19, the employee must immediately inform the employer of any suspected infection indicated to him by the App due to his fiduciary obligations under his employment contract. Even if only a low risk is indicated, the employer must be able to decide in each individual case on the appropriate employment of the employee in order to minimise the risk of infection at the workplace environment (e.g. working from home).

    • CAN EMPLOYERS OBLIGE EMPLOYEES TO USE THE APP?

    Employers cannot oblige employees to use the App on a private or company mobile phone outside of working hours. Moreover, employers cannot oblige employees to use it on their personaldevice during working hours. Such intrusion in private life and/or property of the employees is generally unjustifiable.

    However, particularly in professions with changing and frequent contact to (unknown) third parties, the question arises whether the employer can at least order or carry out the installation of the App on a company mobile phone. One argument in favour of this is the extended infection protection at the workplace environment, which benefits all employees (including users of company mobile phones). Nevertheless, this is mostly viewed critically, because such an order could conflict with the data protection compliant use of the App, since a compulsory use on the part of the employer would exclude the required voluntary (and only then effective) consent of the person concerned (i.e. the user) to use the app. In light of this, members of the parliamentary group Bündnis 90/Die Grünen have already proposed a draft legislation that would explicitly prohibit an obligation to use the App in the employment relationship (BT-Drs. 19/20037).

    Even if an instruction to use the app on a company mobile phone during working hours, as is at least partly argued, would be permissible under individual employment law, the works council would have to co-determine this instruction. In addition, it would still be unclear how the employer should ensure or control the use or activation of the App during working hours.

    As it is still unclear whether employees can be instructed to use the App – at least on their company mobile phone during working hours – no disciplinary measures should be taken (e.g. warnings, dismissals) in the event of violations of an expressed request to use the app.

    • RECOMMENDATION

    Due to the uncertain legal situation, employers should not unilaterally order their employees to use the App. Instead, employers should recommend its use to their employees. If there is a works council and/or a data protection officer, a suitable joint recommendation wording could be created and published in collaboration with them to increase acceptance among the workforce.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    Dr. Philip Uecker

    Associate

    Düsseldorf

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