ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act: A Growing Wave of Comprehensive State Privacy Laws
February 23, 2021
Read time: 10 min
Virginia’s Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA) is expected to be signed into law by Governor Ralph Northam and will be the second comprehensive state data privacy law in the United States after the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA). The CDPA comes into effect on January 1, 2023—the same date that the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) amendments take effect—and will require entities subject to the law to coordinate their efforts to ensure compliance with their growing obligations under these dynamic state privacy law developments. We explore the CDPA in more detail below.
Overview of the CDPA
Applicability
The CDPA will apply to companies that conduct business in Virginia, or that target their products and services to Virginia residents, and that either: (i) control or process personal data of at least 100,000 Virginia residents or (ii) control or process personal data of at least 25,000 Virginia residents and derive more than 50% of gross revenue from the sale of personal data.
As with the CCPA, the CDPA has several broad entity-type and data-type exemptions. The CDPA will not apply to nonprofits, institutions of higher education and entities governed by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). The CDPA also exempts personal data belonging to individuals acting in commercial or employment contexts, protected health information governed by HIPAA and health records governed by other healthcare-related state and federal laws, and data regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and Farm Credit Act.
Controller Obligations
CDPA uses the term “controller” to describe the entity that determines the purpose and means of processing data. Controllers have a number of responsibilities under the CDPA that are reminiscent of the obligations that apply to “businesses” under the CCPA/CPRA and “controllers” under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Controllers must:
- Provide to consumers a clear and conspicuous privacy policy that describes how they collect, use and share personal data, as well as whether they sell personal data or provide such data for targeted advertising purposes
- Obtain consent prior to collecting and processing sensitive personal data (g., data revealing certain protected characteristics, genetic or biometric data, data collected from children or precise geolocation data)
- Comply with data processing principles that ensure purpose limitation of personal data and data minimization
- Establish, implement and maintain reasonable administrative, technical and physical data security practices to protect the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of personal data
- Enter into a written contract with third-party “processors” that process data on the controller’s behalf that set forth the instructions and limitations on how the processor may process personal data, including the data that are subject to processing, the duration of processing and the rights and obligations of both parties
- Conduct and document a data protection assessment when processing sensitive data or conducting activities related to targeted advertising, selling personal data, profiling and other activities that present a heightened risk of harm to consumers
- Inform consumers of the various privacy rights afforded to them under the CDPA and honor those rights.
Consumer Rights
Consumers have a number of privacy rights under the CDPA that, again, are reminiscent of those found in the CPRA and the GDPR. These rights include the right to:
- Confirm whether the controller is processing the consumer’s personal data and right to access such personal data
- Correct inaccuracies in the personal data
- Delete personal data
- Request that the controller port the consumer’s personal data in a readily usable format
- Opt out of the processing of personal data for purposes of targeted advertising
- Opt out of the sale of personal data
- Opt out of profiling that results in legal or significant effects concerning the consumer (e., decisions that result in the denial of financial or lending services, housing, insurance, education, enrollment, criminal justice, employment opportunities, healthcare services or access to basic necessities).
In the event a company refuses to honor a request, consumers will have the right to appeal the company’s refusal.
Controllers are prohibited from discriminating against a consumer for exercising these rights, which includes denying goods or services, or charging different prices for goods or services or providing a different level of quality of goods or services. The caveat is that controllers may offer different prices or quality for goods or services if it is related to the consumer’s voluntary participation in a bona fide loyalty, rewards, premium features, discounts or club card program.
Enforcement
The Virginia attorney general has exclusive enforcement authority under the CDPA and may issue civil penalties of up to $7,500 per violation. Unlike the CCPA, the CDPA does not create a private right of action for Virginia consumers.
How Does the CDPA Compare to the CCPA?
With the passage of the CDPA, Virginia joins California as one of two states in the country with a comprehensive data privacy law. Companies already complying with the CCPA have a head start on their compliance efforts but will need to plan adjustments to their privacy compliance program to take into account both the CPRA and the CDPA, which take effect on January 1, 2023.
Fortunately, the CDPA and CCPA share many commonalities, such as the disclosures required in privacy notices, certain consumer rights and reasonable security requirements. However, the CDPA does contain a number of meaningful differences from the CCPA and CPRA, some of which we detail in the chart below.
| Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA) | California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)
* indicates that this provision will come into effect January 1, 2023 |
|
| Applicability | For-profit entities that conduct business in Virginia or offer products or services targeted to residents in Virginia and (i) control or process the data of at least 100,000 consumers or (ii) control or process the data of at least 25,000 consumers and derive more than 50% of revenue from the sale of personal data | For-profit entities that collect personal information from California residents and meet any of the following thresholds: (i) at least $25 million in gross annual revenue; (ii) buys, sells or receives personal information about at least 50,000 California consumers, householders or devices for commercial purposes; or (iii) derives more than 50% of its annual revenue from the sale of personal information
* (ii) above is replaced with “buys, sells or shares personal information of 100,000 or more California residents or households”; (iii) above is replaced with “derives 50% or more of annual revenue from selling or sharing California personal information” |
| Covered personal information | Any information that is linked or reasonably associated to an identified or identifiable natural person | Information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household |
| Sensitive data | Consent is required to process “sensitive data” which includes racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, mental or physical health diagnosis, sexual orientation, citizenship or immigration status, biometric data, personal data collected from a known child and precise geolocation data | Not currently covered
* New categories of “sensitive personal information,” including Social Security numbers (SSNs), driver’s license, financial account and card numbers, precise geolocation, racial and ethnic characteristics, religious and philosophical beliefs, union membership, contents of mail, email and text messages, and genetic and biometric data |
| Employee and business-to-business (B2B) exemptions | CDPA does not apply to personal data associated with individuals acting in a commercial or employment context; there is no expiration for this exemption | Exemptions are set to expire on January 1, 2023 |
| Consumer rights | Rights include:
|
Rights include:
|
| Contracting | Requires controllers to enter into contracts with processors to govern the processing of personal data by a processor on behalf of the controller
The contract should include:
|
Mandatory contracting requirements for “service providers” and “third parties” to whom the company does not sell data
* Mandatory contracting requirements for “contractors” to whom the company makes available personal information for a business purpose |
| Data protection assessments | Yes, for the following processing activities:
|
Not currently required
* Cybersecurity audits and risk assessments will be required for companies whose processing presents a significant risk to consumer privacy or security |
| Enforcement authority | Enforced by the attorney general | Enforced by the attorney general
* Creation of new California Privacy Protection Agency (Agency) for enforcement, rulemaking and guidance |
| Private right of action | None | Limited private right of action for breach of unredacted or unencrypted personal information due to failure to maintain reasonable security practices
* Private right of action will be available for breach of email address and password or security question and answer that would allow access to account |
| Cure period | Yes, 30 days after notice of violation from the attorney general | Yes, 30 days for attorney general enforcement
* Removes the 30-day cure period and gives the Agency discretionary power to provide the business with a time period to cure |
| Penalties and damages | Up to $7,500 for each violation | Up to $2,500 for each violation and $7,500 for each intentional violation
*Automatic $7,000 fine for a violation involving the personal information of minors Statutory damages from $100-$750 per violation. |
The Future of US Privacy Law Is Still Pending
Despite repeated and ongoing efforts to present and pass a comprehensive federal privacy law, as of the date of this article, there does not appear to be any particular bill that has gained significant traction in either the US House of Representatives or the Senate. In the absence of a federal standard, many states, such as Oklahoma, Washington, Florida, Minnesota and New York, have followed California’s example in introducing and considering comprehensive state data privacy bills, with varying levels of success. The common themes are predictably centered on notice, consumer privacy rights and related business obligations. Issues related to enforcement, and in particular, whether private rights of action should be permitted, have stalled bills both at the state and federal level. That said, in light of what appears to be a heightened awareness and focus on privacy and cybersecurity issues, companies can expect new or additional modifications and updates to their data privacy and security programs in the coming years.
Saba Bajwa, a law clerk in our Los Angeles office, also contributed to this On the Subject.

Brexit/GDPR: European Commission Publishes Draft Adequacy Decision for Data Transfers
ARTICLE
Brexit/GDPR: European Commission Publishes Draft Adequacy Decision for Data Transfers
February 23, 2021
Read time: 1 min

Easing the Burden: New PBGC Rule Simplifies Multiemployer Plan Withdrawal Liability Calculations
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Easing the Burden: New PBGC Rule Simplifies Multiemployer Plan Withdrawal Liability Calculations
February 23, 2021
Read time: 3 min
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (the PBGC) kicked off 2021 by releasing a final rule intended to streamline withdrawal liability calculations for multiemployer plans that are or were in “critical” or “endangered” status (the Final Rule). The Final Rule closely tracks the proposed rule issued in 2019and provides streamlined methods for calculating withdrawal liability for multiemployer plans that have adopted benefit reductions, benefit suspensions, surcharges or contribution increases, as many financially troubled multiemployer plans have.
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), multiemployer plans assess withdrawal liability on employers that reduce or discontinue participation in an underfunded plan. When an employer leaves an underfunded multiemployer plan in a manner that triggers withdrawal liability, the plan determines that employer’s allocation of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits and assesses an annual withdrawal liability amount (typically a series of installment payments that sometimes can be negotiated into a lump sum settlement).
Provisions in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 allow financially troubled multiemployer plans to adopt benefit reductions, impose benefit suspensions, assess surcharges and increase contributions. Depending on the circumstances, some of these adjustments are mandatory, while others are permissive. After implementing such adjustments, these laws further require a plan sponsor to disregard most of these adjustments when determining an employer’s withdrawal liability.
The Final Rule provides simplified, streamlined methods for a multiemployer plan sponsor to:
- Disregard reductions and suspensions of nonforfeitable benefits in determining the plan’s unfunded vested benefits for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability.
- Disregard certain contribution increases and surcharges for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability.
The Final Rule applies to assessments of withdrawal liability for employer withdrawals that occur in plan years beginning on or after February 8, 2021. Adherence with the Final Rule is optional. While the use of one of the streamlined methods set forth in the Final Rule ensures compliance, the use of another method may continue to be permissive. If plan sponsors are considering an alternative calculation method, the PBGC encourages informal consultations with its trustees and their advisors.
The PBGC expects that the Final Rule will reduce the actuarial fees (and occasional arbitration fees) historically paid by financially troubled multiemployer plans when calculating withdrawal liability. Unfortunately for employers that participate in such plans, the Final Rule will not likely result in material changes to the amount of withdrawal liability assessed on the employers that withdraw from these plans. The amount of withdrawal liability assessed by funds on participating employers continues to be a hotly contested issue in court and through proposed legislation.
No More Bites at the Apple: Intervening Junior User Can Force You To Get Your Head Out of the Cloud(s)
ARTICLE
No More Bites at the Apple: Intervening Junior User Can Force You To Get Your Head Out of the Cloud(s)
February 22, 2021
Read time: 1 min

EU and UK Data Sharing: UK Adequacy Decision
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
EU and UK Data Sharing: UK Adequacy Decision
February 22, 2021
Read time: 6 min
On February 19 2021, the European Union Commission issued its draft adequacy decision for data flows between the European Union (EU) and United Kingdom (UK).
Whilst widely expected, this draft decision will provide some assurance about the continuing free flow of data between the EU and UK although businesses should take heed of a few ongoing regulatory issues.
Post-Brexit (the UK’s exit from the European Union):
- The UK largely adopted the EU GDPR as standalone UK law
- The UK became a “third country” for data flows from the EU
- Transitional provisions have been applied to allow data flows between the UK and the EU. The EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement agreed on December 24, 2020 included a “bridge period” of four to six months to allow for the EU Commission to adopt an adequacy decision under the GDPR for the UK
- The UK deemed the EEA to be adequate on a transitional basis, a position likely to be the case until 2024. The UK also retained the EU standard contractual clauses as a transfer mechanism
- The UK also adopted previous EU adequacy decisions meaning that data may continue to flow, as before, to countries outside of the EU, such as Japan, with adopted adequacy decisions. The UK has said it will keep these adequacy decisions under review
The speed of issue of this draft decision will provide some comfort to businesses working across the EU and UK, but there are a few key issues to carefully consider. The draft decision must still be reviewed by the European Data Protection Board and then needs the “green light” from representatives of EU member states under the “comitology” procedure.
What Does Adequacy Mean?
In brief, an adequacy decision means that the EU has accepted that the UK data protection regime affords adequate protections for EU data subjects.
If the decision is adopted, data may continue to flow between the EU and UK without the need for additional provisions, such as standard contractual clauses or the adoption of binding corporate rules.
There had been some question as to whether special terms and conditions would be included to take into account the recent Schrems II ruling by the European Court of Justice, but the draft adequacy decision confirms that existing UK law is sufficient, and that no further safeguard steps need be taken by data exporters.
Regulatory Oversight – No “One Stop Shop”
Despite the adequacy decision, the UK and the EU are still subject to separate regulatory regimes.
From January 1, 2021 organisations that process data in the EU and the UK (or if UK based, offer goods or services, or target individuals in the EU and vice versa) are now subject to both the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR and, depending on their operations may need to:
- Appoint an EU representative or a UK representative
- Consider which EEA or EU supervisory authority will be their lead authority, given that the UK Information Commissioner’s Office may no longer be the lead supervisory authority for data controllers and data processors located in the UK without a main establishment in the EEA.
Adequacy and the Longer Term
The Adequacy decision, once adopted, will not be a permanent position. It will be re-examined every four years by the EU and by the UK. However, this review period is longer than the review period in other adequacy decisions, for example the Japan adequacy decision allows for a review every two years, subject to confirmation after the first two-year review.
Some risk remains that any EU Adequacy decision may be challenged in a similar way to the Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield provisions which were recently challenged in the Schrems II case. This may be considered a heightened risk given the European Court of Human Rights ruling regarding the UK mass surveillance programme.
However, the EU UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement does include provisions which foresee the risk of future declarations of unlawful transfers. The Agreement outlines the steps to be taken by the Partnership Council to agree on joint interpretations, recommend appropriate actions, adopt appropriate adaptations and extend any suspensions. These provisions are based on the need for future co-operation, and the need to take steps to allow data to continue to flow between the EU and the UK.
Failing any resolution through the EU-UK Trade and Co-operation Agreement provisions, alternative mechanisms may need to be adopted to deal with any invalidation, for example the adoption of standard contractual clauses
Ongoing Opinions and Guidance – Some Divergence?
Despite the Adequacy decision, organisations operating in the EU and UK will need to continue to monitor developments in both areas. A few examples to bear in mind below:
- The EU is currently consulting on revisions to the standard contractual clauses. Given that the UK has adopted the previous standard contractual clauses, it remains to be seen whether the UK will also adopt any revised version
- On February 2, 2021, the EU issued guidance on health research and secondary use of data. A week later, on February 9, 2021, the UK announced a review into the use of health data for research and analysis. We will cover these developments in a separate future briefing
- On the theme of facilitating continued flow of data, the ICO published its long awaited Data Sharing Code of Practice (the Code) at the end of last year. Due to the detailed way in which the Code covers data sharing in the context of the GDPR, it will also be of wider interest to data controllers outside of the UK post-Brexit
The Compensation of a Spin-Off-Related Balance Sheet Loss of a Public Limited Company
ARTICLE
The Compensation of a Spin-Off-Related Balance Sheet Loss of a Public Limited Company
February 20, 2021
Read time: 2 min
The article by Renate Prinz and Dr Fabian Rösner is dedicated to the question, which continues to be highly controversial in the literature, of how to achieve balance sheet equalisation in the case of a spin-off with an asset surplus.

Ultra Petroleum Bankruptcy Court Allows Make-Whole Premium and Postpetition Interest at Contractual Default Rate
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Ultra Petroleum Bankruptcy Court Allows Make-Whole Premium and Postpetition Interest at Contractual Default Rate
February 22, 2021
Read time: 7 min
On Oct. 27, 2020, Judge Marvin Isgur for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas held that (1) a make-whole premium was not interest or unmatured interest and thus not subject to disallowance, (2) a make-whole claim was enforceable as liquidated damages under New York law and (3) the solvent debtor exception survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and the Noteholders were entitled to postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.
The Bankruptcy Court’s decision has been certified for direct appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
The Ultra opinion helps creditors because it may make it more difficult for debtors to argue that make-whole premiums should be disallowed as claims for unmatured interest under Section 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Although this decision was issued in the Southern District of Texas, it will likely be persuasive precedent in other jurisdictions as part of the long-running litigation over make-whole claims. In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., No. 20-32631 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2020), amended (Oct. 27, 2020) [ECF 1874].
Background and Procedural History
In Ultra, the confirmed plan of reorganization did not provide for payment of a contractually triggered make-whole premium or postpetition interest at the contractual default rate, despite the debtors’ solvency during the case as a result of increased oil and commodity prices. The Noteholders argued that the plan impaired their valid state law claims for liquidated damages (e.g., the make-whole premium) and that the solvent debtor exception required the Debtors to pay postpetition interest at the contractual default rate.
The Bankruptcy Court initially agreed with the Noteholders. The Fifth Circuit reversed in part and directed the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether the make-whole premium constituted unmatured interest and to decide the appropriate postpetition interest rate on remand.
Analysis
Unmatured Interest. The Bankruptcy Court first addressed whether the make-whole premium constituted unmatured interest as defined by section 502(b)(2) of the Code. That provision states that claims are disallowed to the extent they are for “unmatured interest” (a term the Code does not define).
Reasoning that “interest” is “widely understood as consideration for the use or forbearance of another’s money accruing over time,” the Bankruptcy Court found that the make-whole premium was not interest because it instead “compensates the Note Claimants for [the Debtor’s] breach of a promise to use money.” The Court held that because the make-whole amount did not represent a claim for interest, by definition it could not be a claim for “unmatured interest.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp. at *8.
Liquidated Damages. The Bankruptcy Court then found that the make-whole premium was an enforceable liquidated damages claim under New York law. The court emphasized that the premium was a “one-time charge” that fixed the Noteholders’ damages when triggered. Because it did not accrue over time, but was immediately payable upon redemption, the make-whole amount was properly considered liquidated damages under the law of New York and other states.
The court also considered whether the make-whole premium was a claim for the “economic equivalent” of unmatured interest. These claims compensate lenders for the “delay and risk involved with lending money.” The court found that a make-whole premium did not compensate lenders for the delay and risk inherent in lending money and thus was not unmatured interest; rather, the make whole premium set damages resulting from the borrower’s choice not to use the loan. Id. at *6.
Solvent Debtor Exception and Postpetition Interest Rate. The Bankruptcy Court next addressed whether the solvent debtor exception survived enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and held that it did. The solvent debtor exception requires that, “absent compelling equitable considerations,” solvent estates pay creditors in full before the debtor and its equity holders recover a surplus. Judge Isgur found that the solvent debtor exception applied because it is a fundamental equitable principle of bankruptcy law and Congress expressed no intent to abandon it when it passed the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *32.
Having determined that the solvent debtor exception applied, the Bankruptcy Court next considered the appropriate rate of postpetition interest to award the Noteholders. The Bankruptcy Court reviewed Section 726(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows creditors to receive postpetition interest at the “legal rate” prior to any surplus being returned to the debtor.[1] Courts are split as to whether the “legal rate” of interest means the federal judgment rate or the contractual default rate.
The Bankruptcy Court stated that awarding interest at the currently very low federal judgment rate would “contraven[e] the purpose of the solvent-debtor exception,” and that, in solvent estate cases, the Bankruptcy Court’s responsibility was “merely to enforce the contractual rights of the parties.” Because limiting postpetition interest recovery to the federal judgment rate “would curtail the [Noteholders’] recovery, while allowing [Debtor] and its equity holders to escape bankruptcy with a windfall,” the Bankruptcy Court held that postpetition interest had to be calculated at the contractual default rate to avoid an inequitable result. Id. at *42.
Takeaways
- The Ultra ruling is helpful to lenders because (at least in the Southern District of Texas) it effectively takes away a debtor’s argument that a make-whole premium that is otherwise valid under state law should be disallowed as a claim for unmatured interest.
- In recent years, many courts have weighed in on make-wholes, including the Second and Third Circuits in Momentive and In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., respectively. However, those courts did not address whether a make-whole premium constituted unmatured interest; they largely addressed whether make-whole premiums were due under the terms of the debt documents as a matter of state law and contract interpretation.
- Ultra reiterates, like Momentive and EFC, that counsel must be careful when drafting debt documents containing make-whole premiums. Based on the decision, lender’s counsel would be wise to include language in the indenture providing that the make-whole premium represents an approximation of actual pecuniary damages (and thus constitutes liquidated damages), rather than interest compensating the lender for the debtor’s use of the borrowed funds. As Judge Isgur observed, liquidated damages are not interest and thus cannot be disallowed under Section 502(b)(2).
- Finally, when it comes to the postpetition interest rate, forum and choice of law clauses are critical considerations for lenders. Although courts in New York, Delaware, and Texas award postpetition interest at the contract rate, some bankruptcy courts — particularly in California — hold that the proper “legal rate” of interest is the federal judgment rate, rather than the contractual default rate, even in solvent debtor cases.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
Authored by Douglas S. Mintz, Kristine Manoukian and Peter J. Amend.
[1] Although Section 726(a)(5) applies in the context of liquidations under Chapter 7, most courts have found it to be applicable to creditors of solvent debtors in Chapter 11 through the “best interest of creditors” test in Section 1129(a)(7), which, in turn, provides that impaired creditors in a Chapter 11 case receive property of the same value that they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See Section 1129(a)(7); In re Ultra Petroleum Corp. at *19 (“Section 1129(a)(7), commonly known as the best interest of creditors test, prohibits confirmation of a chapter 11 plan if a dissenting impaired class would receive less than it would in a chapter 7 liquidation.”)
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
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Maryland Sued over Digital Advertising “Tax”
ARTICLE
Maryland Sued over Digital Advertising “Tax”
Feb 18, 2021
Read time: 2 min
Today, McDermott Will & Emery filed suit in Maryland federal court on behalf of a number of leading trade associations against Maryland Comptroller Peter Franchot, challenging the state’s recently enacted 10% gross receipts “tax” applicable to digital advertising revenue. The plaintiffs in the suit are the US Chamber of Commerce, the Internet Association, NetChoice and the Computer and Communications Industry Association. The suit asks that the court invalidate Maryland’s punitive imposition as violating several provisions of the US Constitution and the Internet Tax Freedom Act.
A file-stamped copy of the complaint is available here.
The complaint alleges that Maryland’s focus on internet advertising services (the tax does not apply to traditional advertising) discriminates against the internet, violating the Internet Tax Freedom Act. Next, because Maryland’s new law burdens and penalizes conduct occurring outside Maryland, it violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the US Constitution. The complaint alleges that the characteristics of the imposition and the circumstances surrounding its enactment demonstrate a clear purpose and intent to punish out-of-state digital advertising companies for their extraterritorial activities.
The case is Civil No. 21-cv-410 (D. Md., filed February 18, 2021). Michael B. Kimberly, Paul W. Hughes, Stephen P. Kranz and Sarah P. Hogarth of McDermott, Will & Emery’s Washington, DC, office represent the plaintiffs.
Practice Note: The filing of this suit sends a signal to other states, like New York, Connecticut and Montana, where similar proposals are under consideration. Policymakers in those other states should recognize that following Maryland’s lead will only lead to the courthouse.

Ninth Circuit Signals Shift in Arbitration Landscape for Non-Signatories
ARTICLE
Ninth Circuit Signals Shift in Arbitration Landscape for Non-Signatories
February 17, 2021
Read time: 1 min

New Limits to the UK SFO’s Ability to Compel Production of Evidence from Overseas May Lead to Increase in DOJ Investigations
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
New Limits to the UK SFO’s Ability to Compel Production of Evidence from Overseas May Lead to Increase in DOJ Investigations
February 16, 2021
Read time: 6 min
On February 5, 2021, in a unanimous decision, the UK Supreme Court held that the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) did not have the authority under Section 2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (the 1987 Act) to compel a foreign company that does not have a registered office and does not conduct business in the United Kingdom to produce documents it holds outside the United Kingdom. (See: R (on the application of KBR, Inc.) v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2021] UKSC 2 (Feb. 5, 2021).) The SFO is an agency that investigates and prosecutes fraud and corruption in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
This landmark ruling significantly curtails the SFO’s reach and ability to investigate cross-border financial crimes, as it means the SFO cannot sidestep more conventional international evidence‑sharing procedures, such as the mutual legal assistance (MLA) process. MLA treaties allow prosecutors to recruit the assistance of another state to acquire and to share relevant evidence but are notorious for being time‑consuming.
Although the SFO’s authority to reach outside its territories has been limited, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) retains its ability during investigations to request the collection of documents from companies subject to the extraterritorial jurisdictional reach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other federal statutes. As many companies subject to violations of the UK Bribery Act (UKBA) also are potentially subject to investigations by the DOJ for violations of the FCPA, this new limitation imposed on the SFO may lead to increased prosecutions and investigations in situations with dual jurisdiction by the DOJ.
Background
In 2017, the SFO began a criminal investigation into Kellogg Brown & Root Ltd. (KBR UK), a British subsidiary of US parent engineering company, KBR, Inc. (KBR, Inc.), for suspected bribery and corruption offenses. KBR UK cooperated and provided the SFO with various materials. KBR UK also made clear that certain material was not in its possession or control but, if and to the extent it existed, would be held by KBR, Inc. in the United States.
As part of this investigation, during a meeting in London, the SFO provided written notice to representatives of KBR, Inc. to produce documents held outside of the United Kingdom pursuant to the Section 2(3) notice provision of the 1987 Act.
This provision enables the director of the SFO to require persons under investigation to produce specified documents that appear to the director of the SFO to relate to any matter relevant to the investigation. Failure to comply with this request without a “reasonable excuse” is an offense under the 1987 Act punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment, a fine or both.
The UK Supreme Court Unanimously Reversed a Prior Divisional Court’s Decision
Although the Divisional Court initially denied KBR, Inc.’s attempt to quash the SFO’s notice, the UK Supreme Court rejected that decision, finding that Parliament did not intend for Section 2(3) of the 1987 Act to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality in English law. The Supreme Court stated that the Divisional Court’s “sufficient connection” standard is not supported by the language of the statute.
The Supreme Court acknowledged there is a public interest in ensuring effective investigation of serious crimes but stated these concerns are addressed by way of international agreements, such as the MLA Agreements between the United Kingdom and the United States, that allow foreign authorities to share evidence in compliance with principles of international comity.
The Supreme Court stated, “It is to my mind inherently improbable that Parliament should have refined this machinery as it did, while intending to leave in place a parallel system for obtaining evidence from abroad which could operate on the unilateral demand of the SFO, without any recourse to the courts or authorities of the State where the evidence was located and without the protection of any of the safeguards put in place under the scheme of mutual legal assistance.”
Conclusion (DOJ Stepping In)
In the wake of this decision, international companies that receive SFO Section 2 Notices (and those that advise these companies) should make sure to evaluate whether evidence falls within the scope of UK jurisdiction before responding to and producing documents to the SFO.
Another potential consequence of this decision may be an increase in DOJ-led investigations. As noted above, it is usually the case that the DOJ also will have jurisdiction over alleged misconduct that is the subject of an SFO investigation. As anyone who regularly represents companies in these types of matters knows, the DOJ is no stranger to requesting that companies under investigation provide documents and records located beyond US borders to obtain cooperation credit. Indeed, over the past decade, DOJ attorneys have become well versed in the limitations of foreign law on fact-gathering in internal investigations as well as their impact on compliance programs.
The DOJ specifically addressed the latter in its June 2020 updated guidance to its “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs,” which added a key endnote directing prosecutors specifically to consider how foreign law considerations affect the structure of a company’s compliance program. DOJ lawyers similarly expect sophisticated counsel to know these boundaries when representing companies before them. While the updated DOJ guidance was helpful in acknowledging how foreign law considerations can impact the design and implementation of companies’ compliance programs in different countries, it also made it clear that companies document these issues in real time and stand ready to explain how they affect compliance decisions.
In addition to more DOJ involvement, we also may see reliance on the new US-UK Bilateral Data Access Agreement as a mechanism for American and British law enforcement agencies, with appropriate authorization from each of their respective domestic courts, to obtain electronic evidence by going directly to a communication services provider based in the other country instead of through governments via the MLA channels.
The SFO also will no doubt look for other, perhaps more informal channels, to cooperate and share evidence with foreign law enforcement agencies in criminal investigations and proceedings. While it is possible that the SFO may seek to change the 1987 Act so it can have more tools at its disposal to investigate international crimes, that would in and of itself be a burdensome process, so we expect more informal information sharing to take place in the first instance.
