Content Type: Article

  • Treasury Issues Reports and Guidance to Assist Industry In Addressing Threats Posed by Certain Virtual Currency Transactions and Ransomware Payments

    Treasury Issues Reports and Guidance to Assist Industry In Addressing Threats Posed by Certain Virtual Currency Transactions and Ransomware Payments

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Treasury Issues Reports and Guidance to Assist Industry In Addressing Threats Posed by Certain Virtual Currency Transactions and Ransomware Payments

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Oct. 15, 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s (“Treasury”) Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued guidance clarifying the application of sanctions laws to virtual currency activity (“VC Sanctions Guidance”).[1] Among other topics, the VC Sanctions Guidance outlines recommended best practices for compliance with OFAC’s sanctions regulations.[2] OFAC’s issuance of the VC Sanctions Guidance follows steps OFAC took last month in the ransomware payments space. On Sept. 21, 2021, OFAC (1) issued an updated advisory (“2021 Ransomware Advisory”)[3] highlighting the potential sanctions risks associated with making and/or facilitating ransomware payments; and (2) designated a virtual currency exchange, SUEX OTC, S.R.O. (“SUEX”), as well as its associated digital currency addresses, for facilitating financial transactions for ransomware actors.[4]

    Relatedly, pursuant to the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) published its first report (“Report”) examining patterns and trends from financial institutions’ Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”), with the Report focusing on trends relating to ransomware payments.[5]

    Finally, on Oct. 18, 2021, Treasury released a report (“2021 Sanctions Review”)[6], which, among other matters, details the results of a review of its sanctions programs and outlines recommendations to “preserve and enhance” the programs’ effectiveness going forward with respect to digital currencies.[7]

    OFAC’s Sanctions Guidance Compliance to the Virtual Currency Industry

    Stressing the “increasingly critical role” the virtual currency industry plays in “preventing sanctioned persons from exploiting virtual currencies to evade sanctions,” OFAC’s VC Sanctions Guidance sets forth best practices for the virtual currency industry to mitigate risk, highlights several industry case studies, and identifies a series of “red flags” to help the industry fashion their compliance programs.[8] Broadly, the VC Sanctions Guidance reiterates that all U.S. persons — including virtual currency companies — are required to comply with OFAC regulations and that U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with sanctioned individuals or entities.[9] The VC Sanctions Guidance also reminds industry participants that the U.S. sanctions regime follows the concept of strict liability; U.S. persons may be civilly liable for certain sanctions violations even if such persons did not know or have reason to know they were violating OFAC regulations.[10]

    With respect to best practices for the virtual currency industry, the VC Sanctions Guidance details certain recommendations that align with the five components OFAC identifies as “essential” to a compliance program: (1) management commitment; (2) risk assessment; (3) internal controls; (4) testing and auditing; and (5) training.[11]

    • Management Commitment. Stressing that senior management’s commitment to compliance is “one of the most important factors in determining the [sanctions compliance] program’s success,” the VC Sanctions Guidance notes that many virtual currency companies do not implement OFAC sanctions policies and procedures until “months, or even years, after commencing operations.”[12] Warning that such a delay can expose virtual currency companies to a variety of risks, the VC Sanctions Guidance recommends that companies (1) review and “endorse” compliance policies and procedures, (2) make available adequate resources to support the compliance program, (3) “[d]elegate sufficient autonomy and authority to the compliance unit,” and (4) name a particular sanctions compliance officer with the “requisite technical expertise.”[13]
    • Risk Assessment. Virtual currency companies developing a sanctions program should conduct a routine risk assessment to “identify potential sanctions issues the company is likely to encounter.”[14] Notably, the VC Sanctions Guidance does not indicate how frequently a virtual currency company should conduct a risk assessment. The VC Sanctions Guidance also suggests that such a risk assessment exercise include a total review of the company in order to identify and evaluate its “touchpoints to foreign jurisdictions or persons.”[15] In addition, the VC Sanctions Guidance encourages virtual currency companies to assess their exposure to OFAC sanctions prior to providing services to customers.[16] Lastly, highlighting OFAC’s action designating a virtual currency exchange last month, discussed further below, the VC Sanctions Guidance underscores that a comprehensive risk assessment should include “understanding who is accessing a company’s platform or services” as it may “help members of the virtual currency industry identify the appropriate screening standards to set for each of its products and services.”[17]
    • Internal Controls. Noting that an effective sanctions program will “enable a company to conduct sufficient due diligence on customers, business partners, and transactions and identify ‘red flags,’” the VC Sanctions Guidance sets forth several recommendations to strengthen virtual currency companies’ internal controls.[18]
    • Geolocation Tools. Industry participants are urged to employ geolocation tools to “identify and prevent IP addresses that originate in sanctioned jurisdictions from accessing a company’s website and services for activity that is prohibited by OFAC’s regulations.”[19] Further, the VC Sanctions Guidance points out that alerts regarding a potentially sanctioned transaction can come from other sources, including address information provided by a customer or counterparty, information contained in email addresses, or invoice or other transactional information.[20] The VC Sanctions Guidance encourages companies to incorporate the review of such types of information.
    • Know Your Customer (“KYC”) Procedures. The VC Sanctions Guidance urges companies to obtain information about their customers during their onboarding process as well as throughout the customer relationship and evaluate that information for potential sanctions-related risk. At both the individual and entity level, such information could include legal/entity name, physical and email address, bank information, IP addresses associated with transactions and logins, and relevant government documents.[21]
    • Transaction Monitoring and Investigation. Virtual currency companies should employ transaction monitoring and investigation software in order to pinpoint transactions that involve virtual currency addresses or other identifying information.[22] The VC Sanctions Guidance notes that this control helps companies “prevent transfers to addresses associated with sanctioned persons and avoid violations of U.S. sanctions.”[23]
    • Implementing Remedial Measures. The VC Sanctions Guidance also urges industry participants, upon discovering any weakness in a compliance program, to take immediate action to implement “compensating controls” until the origin of the weakness can be identified and rehabilitated.[24] It notes that, in a potential enforcement action, OFAC may consider an entity’s implementation of remedial measures in reaction to a perceived violation of OFAC regulations as a mitigating factor.[25]
    • Testing and Auditing. The VC Sanctions Guidance encourages the use of a “comprehensive, independent, and objective” testing and auditing function to assess the effectiveness of a company’s sanctions compliance program.[26] Such procedures include: (1) ensuring that screening the Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) list is functional and effective; (2) ensuring that screening tools are properly flagging geographic keywords in connection with KYC-related and transactional screening; (3) ensuring that IP address software is effectively blocking users from sanctioned jurisdictions from accessing the company’s products and services; and (4) evaluating procedures for investigating transactions for a potential sanctions nexus as well as reporting rejected transactions to OFAC.[27] The VC Sanctions Guidance does not, however, indicate the frequency at which virtual currency companies should test or audit their sanctions compliance program.
    • Training. Finally, the VC Sanctions Guidance notes that OFAC training should be given to all “appropriate employees, including compliance, management, and customer service personnel” of a virtual currency company.[28] An effective training program, according to the VC Sanctions Guidance, covers the sanctions compliance responsibilities of employees as well as “hold[s] employees accountable for meeting training requirements through the use of assessments.”[29] Notably, the VC Sanctions Guidance indicates that training should be conducted on a “periodic basis, and, at a minimum, annually.”[30]

    The VC Sanctions Guidance also highlights two new virtual currency-related FAQs released by OFAC. The first FAQ addresses the definitions of “digital currency,” “digital currency wallet,” “digital currency address” and “virtual currency.”[31] The second FAQ outlines how a U.S. person blocks digital currency, requiring U.S. persons who determine they hold a virtual currency that must be blocked to “deny all parties access to that virtual currency, ensure that they comply with OFAC regulations related to the holding and reporting of blocked assets, and implement controls that align with a risk-based approach.”[32] OFAC will not require U.S. persons holding blocked virtual currency to convert it into traditional fiat currency, and U.S. persons will not need to hold the blocked virtual currency in an interest-bearing account.[33] U.S. persons must report blocked virtual currency to OFAC within 10 business days and, as long as the virtual currency remains blocked, on an annual basis.[34]

    OFAC’s 2021 Ransomware Advisory

    As discussed above, OFAC’s issuance of the VC Sanctions Guidance follows steps taken last month in the ransomware payments space, including OFAC’s issuance of the 2021 Ransomware Advisory and its designation of a virtual currency exchange to the SDN list for facilitating transactions for ransomware actors. The 2021 Ransomware Advisory makes many of the same points made by OFAC in an advisory released in October 2020 regarding the potential risks for facilitating ransomware payments,[35] but it also provides clearer examples of strong cybersecurity practices and more forcefully suggests that companies should not pay ransoms.

    The 2021 Ransomware Advisory (1) reminds the public that U.S. persons are prohibited from transacting with sanctioned entities or individuals, (2) stresses that the U.S. sanctions regime incorporates the concept of strict liability, and (3) reiterates that the U.S. government strongly discourages private companies and citizens from paying cyber ransom or extortion demands.[36]

    The 2021 Ransomware Advisory recommends that companies should focus on strengthening their cybersecurity protocols because preventing a ransomware attack can negate the need to pay a ransom.[37] Specifically, OFAC suggests that companies institute cybersecurity training, develop incident response plans, utilize authentication protocols, and regularly update antivirus and anti-malware software.[38] Companies should also maintain offline data backups — which would allow the company to continue operating without having to pay the ransom — and, in the event of a ransomware attack, contact appropriate law enforcement agencies, such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, a local FBI field office or a local U.S. Secret Service office.[39] Lastly, the 2021 Ransomware Advisory strongly encourages full and ongoing cooperation with the relevant agencies both during and after a ransomware attack.[40] OFAC notes that these types of measures will be considered as mitigating factors in any potential cyber-related enforcement action.[41]

    Finally, if a company is considering paying a ransom, the 2021 Ransomware Advisory reminds companies that various ransomware groups and other malicious cyber actors have been sanctioned, and so facilitating or making payments to these actors constitutes a violation of U.S. sanctions laws and could result in civil penalties.[42]

    First Designation of a Virtual Currency Exchange

    Last month, OFAC designated SUEX, a virtual currency exchange based in the Czech Republic and Russia associated with ransomware groups and other criminal organizations, by adding SUEX and its associated digital currency addresses to OFAC’s SDN list.[43] As a result, all property and interests in property of the designated target under U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with the designated target.[44]

    In previous designations, OFAC has identified certain virtual currency wallet addresses and persons involved in virtual currency transactions as SDNs.[45] Notably, however, the addition of SUEX to the SDN list is the first time OFAC has designated a virtual currency exchange.[46]

    FinCEN Report on Ransomware Payments Trends

    Also on Oct. 15, 2021, FinCEN released a Report examining trends relating to ransomware payments, pursuant to a mandate in the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 that the agency “periodically publish threat pattern and trend information derived from financial institutions’ [SARs].”[47] Among other things, the Report finds that:

    • Covered institutions filed 635 ransomware-related SARs in the first half of 2021 alone, as compared to 487 reported SARs in the entire 2020 calendar year (a 30% increase);
    • The total value of suspicious activity reported in ransomware-related SARs was $590 million;
    • The average monthly value of ransomware transactions in the first half of 2021 was $66.4 million, and Bitcoin was the most common ransomware payment method; and
    • Several money laundering typologies were common among ransomware variants, “including threat actors increasingly requesting payments in Anonymity-enhanced Cryptocurrencies (AECs) and avoiding reusing wallet addresses, ‘chain hopping’ and cashing out at centralized exchanges, and using mixing services and decentralized exchanges to convert proceeds.”[48]

    Treasury’s 2021 Sanctions Review

    On Oct. 18, 2021, Treasury released its 2021 Sanctions Review, which evaluates the “framework guiding imposition of economic and financial sanctions” as well as “potential operational, structural, and procedural changes to improve Treasury’s ability to use sanctions now and in the future.”[49] Among other findings, the 2021 Sanctions Review warns that technological innovations like digital currencies and alternative payment platforms “potentially reduce the efficacy of American sanctions” and “offer malign actors opportunities to hold and transfer funds outside the traditional dollar-based financial system.”[50] Accordingly, Treasury concludes that it should “invest in deepening its institutional knowledge and capabilities in the evolving digital assets and services space to support the full sanctions lifecycle of activities.”[51]

    Conclusion

    Together, Treasury’s recent pronouncements indicate a concerted effort to counter the increasing threat of ransomware incidents and to better protect the public against these threats which are frequently tied to transactions in virtual currency. These statements also clarify the application of current sanctions regulations to certain virtual currency transactions and industry participants. Persons engaged in virtual currency transactions should be aware of these actions and published guidance and should, if necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure that their sanctions compliance programs are robust and adequate to resist these threats.

    Schulte Roth & Zabel lawyers are available to assist you in addressing any questions you may have regarding these developments. Please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or any of the following:

    Betty Santangelo – New York (+1 212.756.2587, betty.santangelo@srz.com)

    Gary Stein 

    Kelly Koscuiszka  – New York (+1 212.756.2465, kelly.koscuiszka@srz.com)

    Donald J. Mosher – New York (+1 212.756.2187, donald.mosher@srz.com)

    Kara A. Kuchar – New York (+1 212.756.2734, kara.kuchar@srz.com)

    Jessica Sklute – New York (+1 212.756.2180, jessica.sklute@srz.com)

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein – Washington, DC (+1 202.729.7471, melissa.goldstein@srz.com)

    Adam J. Barazani – New York (+1 212.756.2519, adam.barazani@srz.com)

    Jessica Romano – New York (+1 212.756.2205, jessica.romano@srz.com)

    Hadas A. Jacobi – New York (+1 212.756.2055, hadas.jacobi@srz.com)

    Steven T. Cummings – New York (+1 212.756.2251, steven.cummings@srz.com)


    [1] Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Virtual Currency Industry,” October 2021, available here; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Treasury Continues Campaign to Combat Ransomware as Part of Whole-of-Government Effort,” Oct. 15, 2021, available here (“October Press Release”).

    [2] VC Sanctions Guidance, supra note 1, at 10.

    [3] Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risk for Facilitating Ransomware Payments,” 2021, available here (“Ransomware Advisory”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Treasury Takes Robust Actions to Counter Ransomware,” Sept. 21, 2021, available here (“September Press Release”).

    [4] See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Publication of Updated Ransomware Advisory; Cyber-related Designation,”2021, available here (listing digital addresses added to SDN List).

    [5] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Financial Trend Analysis: Ransomware Trends in Bank Secrecy Act Data Between January 2021 and June 2021”, available here (“Report”).

    [6] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “The Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review,” October 2021, available here (“2021 Sanctions Review”).

    [7] Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “U.S. Department of the Treasury Releases Sanctions Review,” October 18, 2021, available here.

    [8] VC Sanctions Guidance, supra note 1, at 1, 12, 13.

    [9] Id. at 6.

    [10] Id.

    [11] Id. at 10; see also Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments,” available here.

    [12] VC Sanctions Guidance, supra note 1, at 11.

    [13] Id.

    [14] Id. at 12.

    [15] Id.

    [16] Id.

    [17] Id.

    [18] Id. at 13.

    [19] Id. at 14.

    [20] Id.

    [21] Id. at 14–15.

    [22] Id. at 15.

    [23] Id.

    [24] Id. at 16.

    [25] Id.

    [26] Id. at 18.

    [27] Id.

    [28] Id. at 19.

    [29] Id.

    [30] Id.

    [31] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Frequently Asked Questions, Questions on Virtual Currency, #559,” Oct. 15, 2021, available here.

    [32] U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Frequently Asked Questions, Questions on Virtual Currency, #646,” Oct. 15, 2021, available here.

    [33] Id.

    [34] Id.

    [35] Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, “Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments,” Oct. 1, 2020, available here. The 2021 Ransomware Advisory notes that it updates and supersedes the advisory released in 2020. 2021 Ransomware Advisory, supra note 3, at 1 n.2.

    [36] 2021 Ransomware Advisory, supra note 3, at 1, 3, 4.

    [37] Id. at 1.

    [38] Id. at 5.

    [39] Id. at 5–6.

    [40] Id. at 5.

    [41] Id. at 4–5.

    [42] Id. at 3.

    [43] September Press Release, supra note 3.

    [44] Id.

    [45] See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber actors for Virtual Currency Theft (Sept. 16, 2020), available here; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Designates Iran-Based Financial Facilitators of Malicious Cyber Activity and for the First Time Identifies Digital Currency Addresses (Nov. 28, 2018), available here.

    [46] September Press Release, supra note 3.

    [47] Report, supra note 5, at 1.

    [48] Id. at 1–2.

    [49] 2021 Sanctions Review, supra note 6, at 3.

    [50] Id. at 2.

    [51] Id. at 6.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Regulated Funds: SEC Proposes Rule Amending Form N-PX and Requiring More Specific Disclosure On Proxy Votes Relating to Executive Compensation

    Regulated Funds: SEC Proposes Rule Amending Form N-PX and Requiring More Specific Disclosure On Proxy Votes Relating to Executive Compensation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Regulated Funds: SEC Proposes Rule Amending Form N-PX and Requiring More Specific Disclosure On Proxy Votes Relating to Executive Compensation

    October 28, 2021

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 29, 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission proposed Rule 14Ad‑1 and amendments to Form N-PX (collectively, “Proposal”) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (“1940 Act”), that, if adopted, would require more comprehensive information from mutual funds, exchange-traded funds and certain other investment companies registered under the 1940 Act that currently file reports on Form N-PX annually regarding their proxy votes, and would make that information provided easier to analyze. In addition, the Proposal would require all fund managers that are 13F filers[1] to disclose their proxy votes on executive compensation matters, otherwise called “say-on-pay” votes, annually on Form N-PX, regardless of whether or not they manage a registered investment company. The Proposal is intended to implement Section 951 of Dodd-Frank, which relates to managers’ reporting requirements.[2]

    Below are some of the key proposals related to the amended Form N-PX that would be applicable to registered investment companies and their managers if the Proposal is adopted.

    Scope of the Proposed Rule 14Ad-1 and Amendments to Item 1 of Form N-PX

    Form N-PX is currently used by registered investment companies to file reports containing their proxy voting records pursuant to Section 30 of the 1940 Act, and requires funds to disclose votes considered at any shareholder meeting held during the reporting period with respect to which the fund was entitled to vote.[3] As noted in the proposing release, the intended purpose of Form N-PX is to “improve transparency” and “enable [registered] fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance activities of portfolio companies.”[4]

    The proposed Rule 14Ad-1 would amend the scope of voting decisions required to be disclosed on Form N-PX by requiring fund managers subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”),[5] to annually report their say-on-pay votes on Form N-PX by Aug. 31 of each calendar year for the most recent 12-month period ended June 30.[6] Notably, while the foregoing disclosure requirement would apply to managers of both private funds and registered investment companies, the consolidated reporting provisions included in the Proposal will likely limit the additional reporting burden for managers of registered investment companies that are already required to report on Form N-PX. Additionally, the proposed amendments to Form N-PX’s instructions would further broaden the scope of voting decisions that registered investment companies must report on Form N-PX by expanding the definition of matters with respect to which a fund was “entitled to vote” to include portfolio securities that were on loan to a person other than the registered fund as of the record date for the relevant meeting.[7]

    Types of Votes Reported

    Under the proposed Rule 14Ad-1, registered investment companies that are already subject to the requirement to publicly disclose their voting records annually on Form N-PX would be additionally required to include in such reports their say-on-pay votes. The say-on-pay votes required to be reported under the proposed rule are the types of votes outlined in Section 14A of the Exchange Act, and include votes on, among other categories:[8]

    • The approval of executive compensation;
    • The frequency of executive compensation votes; and
    • The approval of executive compensation that relates to an acquisition, merger, consolidation or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of an issuer’s assets.

    What Must Be Reported

    The proposed amendments to registered investment companies’ reporting obligations on Form N-PX would require the disclosure of the following information related to say-on-pay votes:

    • The number of shares voted (or instructed to be voted); and
    • How those shares were voted (e.g., for or against proposal, or abstain).
      • If the votes were cast both for and against, the proposed rule calls for “disclosure of the number of shares voted (or instructed to be voted) in each manner.”[9]

    The proposed amendments to Form N-PX would also require disclosure of the number of shares the reporting person loaned and did not recall (both in the context of say-on-pay votes and otherwise) on the theory that the context given by disclosing the number of shares voted would allow investors to better understand how securities lending activities affect the voting practices of the reporting person.[10]

    Consolidated Reporting

    As part of the Proposal, the SEC also proposed several amendments to Form N-PX that, in some cases, would allow fund managers to jointly file Form N-PX, and would also permit a manager to a registered investment company to potentially rely on Form N-PX reports filed by that registered investment company in lieu of making its own separate filings.[11] As a result, a manager that exclusively advises one or more registered investment companies may be able to avoid the need to file its own separate Form N-PX, to the extent it meets the requirements to rely upon the Form N-PX filings made by the registered investment companies that it advises. These requirements are listed in the proposed General Instructions C.3 and C.4 of Form N-PX, which provide in relevant part that “[a]n Institutional Manager [i.e. a fund manager that is a 13F filer] is not required to report proxy votes that are reported on a Form N-PX report that is filed by a Fund,” provided that such report “identif[ies] each [such manager] and Fund” on whose behalf the voting securities are being reported and appropriately lists such manager on the Form N-PX cover page.[12] Such consolidated reporting will likely mitigate the reporting burden borne by managers to registered investment companies from the Proposal.

    Other Proposed Updates to Form N-PX

    In addition to the revisions necessary to implement Rule 14Ad-1, the SEC proposed further revisions to Form N-PX to provide for standardized descriptions for certain proposals, with a view towards ease of comparison of the proxy voting records between reporting persons.[13] The SEC also proposed requiring reporting persons to categorize votes to allow investors to more quickly focus on topics of interest, including votes on matters such as environmental or climate, among others. Unlike the proposed revisions with respect to “say-on-pay” matters, which would impact both reporting managers and funds, these broader proposed revisions to Form N-PX would only impact Form N-PX reports filed by registered investment companies.

    Potential Impact of the Proposal[14]

    The categorization of votes and other revisions reflected in the amended Form N-PX may encourage changes in the treatment of proxy voting by registered funds generally. In particular, many registered fund managers rely on third-party proxy advisory firms to provide recommendations with respect to proxy voting matters. An emphasis on categorizing proxy voting matters, which would ease comparisons between managers, may encourage certain registered fund managers to take a more active role in considering prospective proxy votes. Such a change may also encourage the SEC staff to provide further guidance regarding the ability of registered funds to “actively vote” shares they hold alongside affiliates within the framework of restrictions on affiliated transactions imposed under the 1940 Act.

    The SEC is soliciting comments on a wide range of items related to the proposed rule and changes to Form N-PX, with all comment letters due within 60 days after publication in the Federal Register.

    Authored by Shaina L. Maldonado.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] To clarify, the SEC’s proposed rule and amendments to Form N-PX do not include any proposed changes to Form 13F. The SEC is requiring that fund managers obligated under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act to file Form 13F also disclose on their Form N-PX filings their say-on-pay votes. Because registered investment companies are already required to file annual reports on Form N-PX under Rule 30b1-4, see infra n.3, from the perspective of such registered funds and their managers, the proposed amendments primarily constitute changes to the format and level of detail required in such reports, rather than an entirely new filing obligation.

    [2] “Enhanced Reporting of Proxy Votes by Registered Management Investment Companies; Reporting of Executive Compensation Votes by Institutional Investment Managers,” Exchange Act Release No. 34-93169 (Sept. 29, 2021), available here.

    [3] See 17 CFR 270.30b1-4.

    [4] See Exchange Act Release No. 34-93169 at 9 and “Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies,” Investment Company Act Release No. 25922 (Jan. 31, 2003) at n.34.

    [5] Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, together with the rules thereunder, requires managers to file reports on Form 13F with the SEC if they exercise investment discretion with respect to accounts holding $100 million or more of certain equity securities (such securities, “Section 13(f) securities”). See 17 CFR § 240.13f-1.

    [6] See Exchange Act Release No. 34-93169 at 17 and 81-82.

    [7] See id. at 16.

    [8] See id. at 18.

    [9] Id. at 43.

    [10] See id. at 43-44.

    [11] See id. at 62-64.

    [12] See id. at 160 (proposed General Instruction C.3-C.4 of Form N-PX) and at 162-63 (proposed Special Instruction B.2.c-B.2.d of Form N-PX).

    [13] See id. at 54-59.

    [14] For a further discussion of the impact of the proposed amendments on private fund managers and their funds, please see “SEC Proposes Rules Requiring 13F Filers to Disclose ‘Say-on-Pay’ Votes,” SRZ Client Alert, (Oct. 12, 2021).


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • California Employers: Your Online Job Advertisements Could Get Your Business in Hot Water

    California Employers: Your Online Job Advertisements Could Get Your Business in Hot Water

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    California Employers: Your Online Job Advertisements Could Get Your Business in Hot Water

    October 27, 2021

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) announced a new affirmative effort to detect and correct violations of the Fair Chance Act (FCA)—California’s ban-the-box law—by using online technology to identify words and phrases in job advertisements that violate the FCA. The FCA was first enacted on January 1, 2018, to prohibit employers with five or more employees from asking job candidates about their conviction history before making them a job offer.

    In depth

    On October 20, 2021, the DFEH announced a new effort to enforce the FCA by using online search tools to capture statements in job advertisements that violate it, sending more than 500 notices to employers in violation in just one day. The DFEH indicated that it is documenting these violations and has provided an online toolkit as a resource for employers. “Using technology to proactively find violations of the state’s anti-discrimination laws is a powerful strategy for our department to protect Californians’ civil rights,” Kevin Kish, director of the DFEH, said.

    The DFEH also provided the following examples of statements it deems in violation of the FCA and should not be present in job advertisements:

    • No Felons
    • Must Have Clean Record
    • Any other blanket statements indicating that an employer will not consider anyone with a criminal history

    The DFEH made it clear that it will “continue to monitor job advertisements” in compliance with the FCA and encourages individuals to report discriminatory job advertisements or file complaints with the DFEH. Possible consequences for violating the FCA include actual damages for injuries or losses, (including back pay and loss of future income); compensatory damages for pain, suffering, humiliation, and emotional distress; punitive damages and attorneys’ fees and court costs.

    IMMEDIATE ACTION

    To ensure compliance with California law and to avoid DFEH scrutiny, McDermott recommends that all employers immediately review their job applications, background check forms and onboarding documents with experienced employment counsel, including:

    • Job advertisements and applications
    • Background check disclosure and authorization forms (under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act and others if you hire outside of California)
    • State and local ban-the-box notices (City of Los Angeles, City and County of San Francisco and others if you hire outside of California)
    • Vendor agreements (including with third-party background check providers, job application and hiring software and online job search engines)

    McDermott’s employment team is available to assist businesses with developing practical solutions for addressing questions related to job applications and onboarding documents and processes.

    Authors

    Maria C. Rodriguez

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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  • The Growing Role of Data Analytics in Healthcare Enforcement

    The Growing Role of Data Analytics in Healthcare Enforcement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Growing Role of Data Analytics in Healthcare Enforcement

    October 27, 2021

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Department of Justice (DOJ) and US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) are increasingly relying on sophisticated data analytics tools to identify and investigate fraud schemes, particularly in the healthcare sector. DOJ’s announcement of four new False Claims Act settlements and cases involving similar fraudulent billing schemes further demonstrates the effectiveness and importance of DOJ and HHS-OIG’s data analytics programs. Healthcare companies should take steps to prepare for these data-driven enforcement actions and incorporate data analytics into their own compliance and audit programs.

    In depth

    The US Department of Justice (DOJ), US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), and other federal agencies have long discussed using data analytics to identify and investigate fraud and other criminal conduct. Data analytics is the process of examining data sets to draw conclusions and identify patterns about the information they contain. Aided by advancements in technology and more robust and useable data sets, federal agencies are finally using this game-changing investigative tool to effectively and efficiently pursue criminal and civil enforcement actions, as explained in this Bloomberg Law article. DOJ’s most recent healthcare enforcement matters further demonstrate this trend, particularly in the healthcare sector.

    On October 14, 2021, DOJ announced the latest four enforcement actions in an ongoing national investigation into an alleged improper billing scheme involving P-Stim electro-acupuncture devices. Federal healthcare programs do not reimburse for P-Stim devices, but the parties promoted them as billable to Medicare and other federal healthcare programs, causing providers to submit fraudulent claims. This ongoing national initiative has produced more than 15 False Claims Act (FCA) settlements nationwide worth approximately $15 million.

    DOJ announced that the enforcement actions stemmed directly from its use of data analytics. The agency emphasized that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the district in which the enforcement actions were filed) is helping to lead the “national Department of Justice effort to apply analytics to healthcare claims data to identify providers who have fraudulently billed federal healthcare programs.”

    Consistent with these most recent enforcement actions, DOJ and HHS-OIG (among others) increasingly are emphasizing and relying on data analytics to identify and combat fraud and abuse in the healthcare context. HHS-OIG’s data scientists and statisticians use a variety of sophisticated data analytics tools, including predictive and geospatial analytics and artificial intelligence, to examine vast amounts of healthcare, law enforcement and operational data. This allows HHS-OIG to quickly identify trends, outliers and potential investigative targets. Once HHS-OIG or DOJ identifies new trends and types of fraud schemes, their data analytics tools allow them to rapidly identify and target similar instances of fraud throughout the country—which appears to be exactly what happened in the most recent P-Stim device FCA cases.

    DOJ and HHS-OIG’s increased use of data analytics has already led to a significant rise in the number of federal FCA cases initiated directly by DOJ as opposed to via qui tam whistleblower complaints. DOJ initiated 100 more FCA cases in 2020 than it did in 2019, resulting in the most non-qui-tam FCA cases filed in almost 30 years. The number of data-driven FCA fraud investigations will likely continue to increase, particularly as the government continues to investigate potential fraud associated with the CARES Act, the Provider Relief Fund and the COVID-19 pandemic.

    All healthcare companies and providers should be mindful of DOJ and HHS-OIG’s increased reliance on data analytics and should take steps to prepare for any potential data-driven enforcement actions. Companies should incorporate sophisticated data analytics into their audit and compliance programs to minimize enforcement risk. Just as the government can use data analytics to rapidly identify and investigate fraud and abuse, companies can likewise use it to identify risks early and avoid being ensnared in costly government investigations and prosecutions. Companies should continue to monitor high-risk areas, evaluate whether all data relating to those risk areas are actually being collected, and put in place systems to ensure that the data collected is effectively monitored and analyzed to identify any potential errors and/or misconduct. To the extent a company finds itself subject to a government enforcement action, defense counsel should conduct their own data analysis to prepare an effective defense strategy. Data analytics can be instrumental in helping healthcare companies respond to FCA claims or other enforcement actions.

    Authors

    Julian L. André

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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  • Federal Law to Address Cybersecurity Risks for K-12 Educational Institutions

    Federal Law to Address Cybersecurity Risks for K-12 Educational Institutions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Law to Address Cybersecurity Risks for K-12 Educational Institutions

    October 27, 2021

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In response to a recent increase in cyber-crimes targeted at K-12 educational institutions, President Biden signed the K-12 Cybersecurity Act of 2021 (“Act”) into law on Oct. 8, 2021 to better protect the sensitive academic, medical and other personal data held by such institutions. The Act directs the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) to conduct a study on the cybersecurity risks that K-12 educational institutions face by Feb. 5, 2022, and, based on such study, promulgate cybersecurity guidelines for K-12 educational institutions and develop an online training toolkit designed to educate officials at K-12 educational institutions. The Act expressly provides that compliance by schools with the cybersecurity recommendations developed pursuant to the Act will be voluntary. 

    The Act provides that the CISA study must include the following:

    • An analysis of how cybersecurity risks specifically impact K-12 educational institutions;
    • An evaluation of the challenges that K-12 educational institutions face in securing sensitive or proprietary information; and
    • An evaluation of the most accessible ways to communicate cybersecurity recommendations and tools to K-12 educational institutions.

    The Act also calls for the study to identify cybersecurity challenges relating to remote learning.

    In terms of timing, the Director of CISA must promulgate the guidelines no later than 60 days after completion of the study, and the online training toolkit must be developed no later than 120 after the development of the guidelines. Until the guidelines and toolkit are developed, schools should continue to ensure that they follow best practices in protecting their data, including requiring that staff are educated on common cyber threats and how to mitigate the risk of such threats.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Edward H. Sadtler, Donna K. Lazarus and Victor Haas.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • IRS Provides Further Guidance on COBRA Election and Payment Deadlines

    IRS Provides Further Guidance on COBRA Election and Payment Deadlines

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Provides Further Guidance on COBRA Election and Payment Deadlines

    October 26, 2021

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Notice 2021-58 (the Notice), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) clarified that the one-year tolling relief periods for Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) elections and initial premium payments run concurrently, not consecutively. This means that a qualified beneficiary generally will have only one year of total disregarded time for the election and initial payment periods.

    In depth

    As McDermott previously discussed, COBRA election and payment deadlines were tolled for up to one year as a result of COVID-19 relief. Employers wondered whether, under this tolling relief, a qualified beneficiary could wait one year to elect COBRA, and then wait another year to make her initial premium payment (assuming the COVID-19 “outbreak period” had not ended sooner). The IRS has now opined that the answer is no. The IRS illustrated this point as follows:

    • If a qualified beneficiary elected COBRA coverage outside of the normal 60-day COBRA election period (i.e., the qualified beneficiary took advantage of the tolling relief when electing COBRA coverage), the tolled period for making the initial premium payment begins on the date the COBRA notice was provided, and the payment deadline is one year and 105 days later (i.e., the 60-day election period plus the usual 45-day period in which to make the initial payment).
    • If the qualified beneficiary elected COBRA within the normal 60-day COBRA election period (i.e., the qualified beneficiary did not take advantage of the tolling relief when electing COBRA coverage), the tolled period for making the initial premium payment begins on the date of the COBRA election, and the payment deadline is one year and 45 days later (i.e., to account for the usual 45-day period in which to make the initial payment).

    The IRS included an exception to the above rules in the form of “transition relief.” Under the transition rule, a plan may not require a qualified beneficiary to make an initial COBRA premium payment before November 1, 2021, as long as the payment is made within one year and 45 days of the individual’s COBRA election. This is the IRS’s way of protecting individuals who may have thought they had a longer period in which to make their first COBRA payment (i.e., a new one-year tolling period applicable to their initial payment after delaying their COBRA election via the tolling relief).

    With regard to payment deadlines for periods not covered by the initial COBRA premium payment (i.e., generally, premiums due each subsequent month), the Notice indicates that the payments are due one year from the date that the payment originally would have been due, taking into account the normal 30-day grace period.

    The Notice also reiterates the earlier guidance stating that the tolling relief does not apply to elections of the American Rescue Plan Act’s no-cost COBRA coverage.

    For more information on how to apply COBRA election and payment guidance to your group health plan, please contact your regular McDermott employee benefits lawyer or one of the authors.

    Authors

    Sarah G. Raaii

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Privacy as a Competitive Differentiator: Building an Effective and Strategic Healthcare Privacy Program

    Privacy as a Competitive Differentiator: Building an Effective and Strategic Healthcare Privacy Program

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    Privacy as a Competitive Differentiator: Building an Effective and Strategic Healthcare Privacy Program

    October 20, 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview
    In depth
    Tabs

    Jiayan Chen

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Ryan S. Higgins

    Partner

    Chicago

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    Endnotes

  • What Is a QOF?

    What Is a QOF?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    What Is a QOF?

    October 21, 2021

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Since coming into effect in January 2018, Subchapter Z of the US Tax Code—also known as the opportunity zone provisions—has enabled investors to pour billions of dollars into a broad array of businesses, from real estate development companies to tech startups. Investments in qualified opportunity funds (QOFs) offer a number of distinct tax benefits, not the least of which is reduced capital gains tax liability. But the rules governing these investments are quirky, perplexing and—in some cases—severely restrictive.

    How does a qualified opportunity fund actually get qualified as a QOF? Failure to satisfy the US Department of the Treasury’s definition of a QOF can severely restrict the fund’s ability to attract capital. In this third of our series of articles on QOFs, we discuss—from a fund’s perspective—the mechanics of qualifying the fund as a qualified opportunity fund.

    In depth

    In order to take advantage of the many tax benefits of the opportunity zone provisions, a taxpayer must invest eligible gains in a qualified opportunity fund (QOF). This article focuses on what precisely a fund must do to qualify as a QOF. The ability of a fund to attract capital from eligible investments is critically dependent upon whether it satisfies the definition of a QOF.

    Broadly, a QOF is an entity organized as a corporation (including an S corporation, REIT, RIC or REMIC) or partnership for the purpose of investing in “qualified opportunity zone property” (QOZ property) and that holds at least 90% of its assets in QOZ property (the 90% asset test). QOZ property includes “qualified opportunity zone stock” (QOZ stock), “qualified opportunity zone partnership interests” (QOZ partnership interests) and “qualified opportunity zone business property” (QOZB property). Whether a fund meets the 90% asset test is determined by calculating the average percentage of QOZ property held by the fund as measured at six-month intervals.

    In practice, virtually all QOFs invest in either QOZ stock or QOZ partnership interests. QOZ stock and QOZ partnership interests are defined as stock or interests in an entity that is a “qualified opportunity zone business” (QOZB). (In a subsequent article in this series, we discuss the requirements of a QOZB.) While it is technically possible for a QOF to directly hold QOZB property in satisfaction of the 90% asset test, such an arrangement would be highly unusual, and almost certainly impractical. Thus, we do not discuss such an arrangement here.

    The remaining assets of the QOF (up to 10%, by value) may be in any form, including cash, real estate, financial assets, property held for investment, unrelated business property, property located outside of a QOZ, etc.

    In measuring the proportion of its assets that constitute QOZ property, the QOF computes the percentage based on the value of the assets directly held. The value of QOZ stock and QOZ partnership interests are generally determined based on cost basis without adjustment. Alternatively, if the QOF maintains financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the QOF may value its assets based on its financial statements. Under either method, the QOF must consistently value all of its assets under a single method during any particular taxable year.

    An entity that wishes to be treated as a QOF must certify to the IRS that it fulfills all requirements under the Opportunity Zone Provisions by filing Form 8996 for the first year in which it receives an eligible investment and each year subsequently.

    Click here for the previous article in the series: How to Invest in a QOF

    Click here for the next article in the series: Basics of QOF Investing: What Is a QOZB?

    View all articles in the Qualified Opportunity Funds OTS Series. 

    Authors
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  • Tax Losses and GrESt in Intra-Group Restructurings – Pitfalls and Recent Developments

    Tax Losses and GrESt in Intra-Group Restructurings – Pitfalls and Recent Developments

    ARTICLE

    Tax Losses and GrESt in Intra-Group Restructurings – Pitfalls and Recent Developments

    October 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In the case of intra-group restructurings, the problem areas of tax losses and real estate transfer tax must always be reviewed. An article by Dr. Annette Keller.

    In depth
    Authors

    Annette Keller

    Partner

    Munich

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  • DOJ Announces New Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative

    DOJ Announces New Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    DOJ Announces New Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative

    October 12, 2021

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On October 6, 2021, Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco announced the launch of the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative. The initiative will focus on using the False Claims Act (FCA) to pursue fraud related to cybersecurity, with an emphasis on fraudulent acts perpetrated by government contractors and recipients of federal funds. The FCA gives the DOJ authority to bring civil enforcement actions against companies that make false claims for federal funds, and it empowers whistleblowers to advance the government’s interest in combatting fraud by allowing private parties to bring lawsuits on the government’s behalf and take a share of the proceeds of any recovery.

    Led by the Fraud Section of the DOJ Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch, the initiative seeks to “hold accountable entities or individuals that put U.S. information or systems at risk by knowingly providing deficient cybersecurity products or services, knowingly misrepresenting their cybersecurity protocols, or knowingly violating obligations to monitor and report cybersecurity incidents and breaches.” The DOJ’s announcement lists a series of benefits the DOJ hopes to achieve through the initiative, which include “[h]olding contractors and grantees to their commitments to protect government information and infrastructure[,]” and “[e]nsuring that companies that follow the rules and invest in meeting cybersecurity requirements are not at a competitive disadvantage.”

    In depth

    INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CIVIL ENFORCEMENT

    Notably, the Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative is the first major initiative announced by the Department as a result of an ongoing cyber review ordered by the Deputy Attorney General in May 2021.* The initiative also puts into action statements made by DOJ officials following the 2020 presidential election, and it underscores the importance of affirmative civil enforcement in broader efforts to counter threats posed by ransomware attacks and other cyberattacks. For example, last December, at the ABA Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement Institute, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Michael D. Granson warned that there may be enhanced False Claims Act activity in the cybersecurity space. In February 2021, Acting Assistant Attorney General Brian M. Boynton emphasized in remarks at the Federal Bar Association Qui Tam Conference that “[t]o the extent that the government pays for systems or services that purport to comply with required cybersecurity standards but fail to do so, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where False Claims Act liability may arise.”

    On the same day that the DOJ announced the creation of the Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative, Deputy Attorney General Monaco published an op-ed in which she urged Congress to pass legislation to create a national standard for reporting cyber incidents that pose significant risk, including ransomware and incidents that affect critical infrastructure. Deputy Attorney General Monaco called for Congress to designate a single mechanism where victims can file reports to the federal government to be shared immediately with the DOJ and US Department of Homeland Security.

    The Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative and Deputy Attorney General Monaco’s op-ed should be viewed in conjunction with a variety of other recent measures from the Biden administration that seek to combat ransomware and malign cyber activities, including:

    • Deputy National Security Advisor Anne Neuberger’s June 2, 2021, Open Letter to Corporate Executives and Business Leaders, emphasizing that the private sector has a “critical responsibility” to protect against cyber threats, “urg[ing]” businesses “to take ransomware crime seriously and ensure [their] corporate cyber defenses match the threat” and recommending a variety of cyber “best practices” to be implemented by companies (e.g., multifactor authentication, endpoint detection and response, encryption and a skilled, empowered security);
    • US President Joe Biden’s August 25, 2021, meeting with corporate leaders from technology, finance, energy and water, insurance and education sectors to discuss the “whole-of-nation” effort needed to address cyber threats, especially in critical infrastructure;
    • The US Department of the Treasury’s September 21, 2021, Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments;
    • Guidance from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Internet Crime Compliant Center’s (IC3) (Ransomware: What It Is & What To Do About It), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) (Stop Ransomware) and CISA and FBI (Ransomware Awareness for Holidays and Weekends); and
    • FinCEN June 30, 2021, announcement regarding its anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism priorities, which identified cybersecurity and ransomware as a “top priority” for FinCEN and financial institutions (FinCEN Announces Anti-Money Laundering Priorities).

    In addition, a bipartisan group of US Senators has introduced the Cyber Incident Notification Act; if enacted, the legislation would require federal agencies, government contractors and critical infrastructure owners and operators to report cyber intrusions to CISA within 24 hours of their discovery. A number of states—including New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Texas—are considering legislation that would ban or restrict state and local government agencies from paying ransom in the event of a cyberattack.

    IMMEDIATE TAKEAWAYS

    The Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative demonstrates that cybersecurity is increasingly on the government’s enforcement radar. In light of DOJ’s announcement, government contractors should keep in mind the following key takeaways:

    • Formation of the Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative suggests that the DOJ will initiate more FCA lawsuits targeting US government contractors that fail to uphold their legal or contractual obligations pertaining to cybersecurity. Relatedly, the initiative signals that the DOJ may be more willing to intervene in qui tam cases alleging FCA violations relating to cybersecurity and may embolden whistleblowers and their counsel to bring more FCA suits in this area.
    • US government contractors should continue their efforts to implement the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) framework and other cybersecurity requirements set forth in the US Department of Defense interim rule published in September 2020, emphasizing compliance and reducing the risk of FCA-liability.
    • US government contractors should review cybersecurity representations and warranties in their existing contracts with the federal government, and they should evaluate such terms in new contract proposals to evaluate FCA-enforcement risk.
    • US government contractors should conduct periodic, privileged reviews of their cybersecurity programs to ensure they comport with industry standards and government expectations.

    *In June 2021, the DOJ launched a Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force in response to President Biden’s Executive Order on improving the nation’s cybersecurity.

    Authors

    Julian L. André

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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