ARTICLE
European Health & Life Sciences Symposium 2023 | Key Takeaways
November 2023
Read time: 4 min
200+ leading individuals in healthcare, life sciences and private equity gathered at the Shangri-La Hotel in Paris for the European Health & Life Sciences Symposium 2023 to enjoy a day packed with fireside chats, in-depth plenary sessions and an abundance of networking opportunities.
Transaction Trends in Life Sciences
The transactions landscape in the life sciences industry is constantly evolving, with new challenges and exciting opportunities awaiting in 2024. Innovative funding models, and the integration of cutting-edge technologies continue to drive the market forward.
- Despite strong expectations, transaction activity in the health and life sciences space has been depressed in 2023. We have seen some interesting activity from large pharma in the second half and potential green shoots of recovery in licensing deals and moves for pharma, medtech and biotech trading assets.
- Higher costs of capital and delayed R&D programmes continue to challenge biotech valuations, causing companies to focus inward rather than prioritise transactions.
- There is the potential for private equity to be more active in the healthcare space in 2024 following significant fundraising in recent years. PE involvement in life sciences has historically been limited primarily to the “pharma services” sub-sector but potential PE investors look more broadly at life sciences as investors look for growth and life sciences assets mature and have greater cash flow certainty.
- For the first time in history, US Congress is looking to introduce pricing regulation in 2026. Litigation is ongoing and it is unclear what pricing controls will ultimately look like, but the prospect creates great uncertainty for drug companies globally.
- Pricing regulation is not the only regulatory challenge facing dealmakers as governments increasingly consider biotech and pharma as strategic industries and ramp up their scrutiny on the foreign direct investment and antitrust side.
Innovation in Financing
As debt markets react to macroeconomic events globally, borrowers and lenders have had to be creative with their financing needs. At the same time, some of the more traditional thinking around financings, resilient sectors and the like has been challenged by new business types and innovative structures.
- The broader macro and geopolitical landscape has created a particularly challenging financing environment in 2023, with uncertainty and the higher cost of capital driving lender reticence and a flight to quality borrowers and top-tier assets.
- Cash-strapped biotech businesses are streamlining their businesses and leveraging relationships with big pharma to address liquidity.
- Relationships have been prioritised in 2023 and will remain the focus in 2024, with lenders looking to build productive two-way partnerships with management teams and sponsors in order to navigate balance sheet challenges.
Investment Opportunities in Health and Life Sciences and Developments in Data, AI & Health IT
In an era marked by rapid advancements and unprecedented challenges, transformative technologies are revolutionizing patient care, clinical decision-making, and operational efficiency. From digital health startups to innovative care delivery models, there is a wealth of potential in the market.
- There is still room for consolidation in healthcare services in Europe in areas such as clinical care, radiology, dental practices and veterinary surgeries. We can also expect more cross-border deals in the medtech space as US players look to acquire European assets.
- Investors will be particularly focused on assets underpinned by innovation or addressing the need to increase efficiencies in the system. These will include digital health startups, innovative care delivery models and businesses harnessing the power of big data or embracing cutting-edge AI algorithms.
- The era of personalised medicine and the increased adoption and integration of technology into drug discovery, diagnostics and therapeutics will require investors to think carefully about risk mitigation as valuations and cost of capital remain challenging.

Clearview AI Inc v the ICO: Where Technology and Data Protection Collide
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Clearview AI Inc v the ICO: Where Technology and Data Protection Collide
November 24, 2023
Read time: 8 min
Clearview AI Inc.’s facial recognition technology has been subject to regulatory scrutiny from the privacy sector worldwide, including the UK Information Commissioner who issued the US company with monetary penalty and enforcement notices (the Notices) for alleged violations of GDPR/UK GDPR (the Regulations). In a judgment dated 17 October 2023 (the Judgment), the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) upheld, on jurisdictional grounds, Clearview’s appeal of the Notices. The Commissioner sought permission to appeal on 17 November 2023. This matter underscores the zeitgeist debate pitting technological advancement against the safeguarding of personal information in a digital world and will remain of keen interest as the matter proceeds through the English Court system.
Background
Clearview is a US company providing facial recognition services to criminal law enforcement and national security agencies (and/or their contractors) outside of the UK and EU. In short, Clearview deploys web-based robots to ‘crawl’ the internet and ‘scrape’ images of faces, which are compiled into a database, containing over 20 billion images at the time of the November hearing (the Database). Clearview’s software then creates a mathematical ‘vector’ of those faces, such that they can be indexed and searched against.
Clearview’s clients are able to upload an image (known as a ‘probe image’) to their private Clearview platform, which image will be transposed into a vector and then compared to the Database images. Clearview’s algorithmic software will return images of sufficient similarity, without declaring whether a given image from the Database is a match or not. The client is able to use the information provided by Clearview as part of its investigative efforts to seek to identify the person shown in the probe image.
The Commissioner issued the Notices in May 2022 for Clearview’s alleged breaches of the Regulations in respect of it collecting web-based (publicly available) images of data subjects without consent. Clearview in turn appealed the Notices on substantive, as well as jurisdictional grounds, with the latter being heard as a preliminary issue in November 2022 and to which the Judgment relates. Insofar as jurisdiction is concerned, Clearview contended: (i) that its processing fell outside the territorial scope of the Regulations; and (ii) alternatively, that its processing was in the context of activities that fell outside the Regulations’ material scope. We address these arguments in turn below.
Territorial scope
As Clearview is a US entity, the Commissioner relied on the extra-territorial force of the Regulations conferred under Article 3(2)(b), which requires that, in order for the Regulations to apply, the processing in question must be in the context of activities related to the monitoring of behaviour of data subjects, as far as that behaviour takes place within the Union/United Kingdom. Clearview argued that its activities were simply not engaged in such monitoring.
The FTT determined that the images on the Database constituted ‘personal data’ (indeed the facial ‘vectors’ constitute biometric information and therefore special category data), and that Clearview was processing such personal data in the following two ways:
- Activity 1 processing, which covers the creation, development and maintenance of the Database; and
- Activity 2 processing, being the process of matching a probe image against the Database, and then providing the search results to the relevant client.
Clearview was deemed to be the sole controller insofar as activity 1 processing was concerned and a joint controller (together with any given client) in respect of activity 2. The FTT further found that – given the volume of images processed by Clearview – the Database most likely contained images of UK data subjects, which would, in turn, likely display behavioural characteristics. Whether such images included such characteristics required more than a revelation of a person’s features (hair colour, height etc.). It required information as to what a person may or may not do (for example, an image of a person playing football might be indicative of that person’s propensity to play the sport).
As to the issue of ‘monitoring’, paragraph 122 of the Judgment concluded that “monitoring” can occur on just a “single incidence”. In reaching that conclusion, the FTT relied, in part, on the language of Recital 24 to the Regulations, which refers to individuals being “tracked” as an indicator of behavioural monitoring: “[it] is important to note that the word is “tracked” as opposed to “tracking” which would imply a continuous or repeated activity”. At paragraph 123 of the Judgment, the FTT held that Clearview’s client organisations would utilise all information available for its investigations, which means (the FTT found, inferentially) that a Clearview client would use the service for more than the mere identification of individuals: it would use the service to monitor those individuals.
Crucially, paragraph 138 of the Judgment states that the Regulations do not exclude processing by one controller from being ‘related to’ the behavioural monitoring of another. In particular, the FTT focused on the use of “the monitoring” instead of “their monitoring” in the Regulations as demonstrating the legislator’s intent to regulate the monitoring activity itself (i.e., there was less concern about who was doing the monitoring). Therefore, although Clearview is not itself engaged in behavioural monitoring, its processing is “related to” the behavioural monitoring activities of its clients (either as a joint controller or distinct controller), thereby territorially catching Clearview within Article 3(2)(b). Accordingly, it was held that Clearview’s processing was, prima facie, within the territorial scope of the Regulations. The Court then turned to the question of whether the processing nonetheless fell outside of the material scope of the Regulations.
Material scope
Article 2(2)(a) GDPR/ Article 3(2A) read with Article 2(1)(a) UK GDPR, establish that data processing occurring in the course of activities falling outside the scope of Union law is not subject to the Regulations (insofar as the UK GDPR is concerned, to the extent that such activities fell outside the scope of Union law before the exit from the EU on 31 December 2020). Importantly, it was not contested that the acts of foreign governments would constitute such out of scope activities, based on international principles of comity: “it is not for one government to seek to bind or control the activities of another sovereign state” (paragraph 153).
Clearview’s unchallenged evidence was that its clients are exclusively foreign government bodies (or their contractors) exercising criminal law enforcement and/or national security functions, which are out of scope of Union law. Clearview argued, therefore, that if the Commissioner were correct that Article 3(2)(b) applied to Clearview by virtue of the supposed behavioural monitoring activities of its clients, such activities constituted the sovereign acts of foreign governments, meaning that Clearview’s processing was ‘related to’ out of scope activities and therefore Clearview could not itself be within scope. Accordingly, the prima facie applicability of Article 3(2)(b) was disapplied.
Accepting Clearview’s evidence as to its client base, the FTT agreed with Clearview’s position, thereby ruling that the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to issue the Notices.
Conclusion and comment
Notwithstanding that a judgment of the FTT is not binding on other UK courts (much less those of the EU), the upshot of the Judgment for non-UK/EU companies concerning Article 3(2)(b) of the Regulations is that: (i) your processing might be caught by the Regulations if it is sufficiently related to the behavioural monitoring activities of a third party; and (ii) ‘monitoring’ will be interpreted widely, such that a “single incidence” might suffice. The material scope argument seized upon by Clearview was specific to its business, and will unlikely be available to the vast majority of foreign companies.
Despite the favourable findings given to the Commissioner in respect of Article 3(2)(b), it is not surprising that he has sought permission to appeal given the attention this case has received. The Commissioner has already given us a general flavour of his posturing:
“I fully respect the role of the Tribunal to provide scrutiny of my decisions – but as the defender of the public’s privacy, I need to challenge this judgment to clarify whether commercial enterprises profiting from processing digital images of UK people, are entitled to claim they are engaged in “law enforcement”.
As a final remark, in addition to action taken by the UK’s Information Commissioner, Clearview has been subject to international regulatory scrutiny, including in France, Italy, Greece and Australia. As regulators worldwide grapple with the challenges of data protection and technological advancement, the fate of Clearview in the ongoing UK appellate process will be held close to the microscope.
If you are a foreign company and have any concerns as to the applicability of GDPR to your operations, please reach out to McDermott’s data protection specialists.

SBA PPP Loan Concerns Linger for Small Businesses
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
SBA PPP Loan Concerns Linger for Small Businesses
November 27, 2023
Read time: 10 min
Many small businesses continue to face uncertainty over whether the Small Business Administration (SBA) will grant forgiveness of their Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. Despite the vast majority of small businesses receiving full forgiveness of their PPP loans, many loans remain unresolved with pending forgiveness applications, lengthy delays in SBA decision-making and unexpected audit risks. Potential SBA and US Department of Justice (DOJ) fraud investigations add to the pressure, with legal consequences and exposure lingering even after loan forgiveness. Some small businesses also grapple with inconsistent treatment by the SBA with the SBA’s reluctance to accept favorable appeal decisions from the Office of Hearings & Appeals (OHA), placing an additional burden on them. Amid these challenges, a recent update from the SBA provides a glimmer of relief for certain businesses utilizing third-party management companies.
1. Many PPP loan forgiveness applications are still in limbo at the SBA.
Some businesses are facing an increasingly common predicament: They appealed an unfavorable Final Decision to the OHA. The OHA granted their appeal, agreeing with the borrower that the SBA’s decision was based on clear error. The OHA then remanded the loan back to the SBA to conduct a new review, and the business is forced to wait for months for the SBA to act on the loan. Other borrowers are in a similar situation after filing an appeal with the OHA only to have the SBA withdraw the challenged Final Decision and place the loan back under review with no further communication from the SBA regarding the status of the loan. These businesses have been waiting and waiting for months—and in some cases more than a year—for the SBA to issue a new decision.
We have seen these scenarios play out time and again. The majority of SBA attorneys and loan specialists handling a borrowers’ appeals to OHA are committed to working with borrowers to reach the correct decision in a timely manner, but these SBA attorneys and loan specialists often lose control or oversight once a challenged Final Decision is withdrawn and goes back into what feels like a “black hole” of SBA review. The SBA likely lacks the resources and may not feel a sense of urgency to resolve outstanding loans in a timely manner. But many borrowers find themselves in limbo with a pending loan forgiveness application and an outstanding loan balance. This can cause significant issues for borrowers seeking to sell their business, obtain new financing to maintain or grow their business, or take other actions in the ordinary course of business.
So, what should borrowers do? Those that had a Final Decision withdrawn should update their lenders. Pursuant to 13 CFR 134.1202(d), a borrower’s loan repayment deferral period is extended until a final decision is rendered on the appeal. When a Final Decision is withdrawn by the SBA, borrowers have no obligation to begin making payments on the loan. Communication with lenders is also important for ensuring that borrowers are aware of any requests for documents or information that the SBA sends to the lender. The SBA will generally continue to communicate with borrowers through their lenders even after the OHA remands consideration of a loan back to the SBA.
Finally, borrowers can reach out directly to the SBA (or through their legal counsel or lenders) to request updates on their loan. While the SBA may not respond, such outreach demonstrates to the SBA that forgiveness of the loan is important to the borrower and places pressure on the SBA to expedite review. We have seen more than one instance where review of the loan slips through the cracks, and this proactive outreach causes the SBA to ensure that the review process is active.
2. Your PPP loan was fully forgiven years ago. Unfortunately, the SBA may circle back, audit and rescind a prior forgiveness decision.
We have seen a recent uptick in SBA reviews/audits of previously forgiven loans. The SBA has the authority to review and audit PPP loan and forgiveness applications for up to six years (for loans over $150,000) after it forgives the loan, and PPP borrowers must maintain documentation supporting their applications during this potential audit period.
These SBA reviews of forgiven PPP loans encompass both the borrower’s eligibility for the loan they received, the borrower’s eligibility for the full forgiveness amount and the borrower’s loan forgiveness calculations. The most frequent issues the SBA reviews seem to be whether the borrower correctly calculated its initial PPP loan amount and whether the borrower was “small” enough for the loan. These reviews usually require the borrower to submit tax returns and payroll information from as far back as 2018 and 2019, and they frequently request borrowers to collect and provide sensitive financial documents from other businesses the SBA deems to be potential affiliates even when the borrower has no control over those businesses or the ability to obtain the requested documents.
Unfortunately, it has become clear that loan forgiveness is not the end of the PPP loan journey for some businesses. Borrowers must be prepared to defend their eligibility for the loan they received and their eligibility for forgiveness of that loan.
This is important for mergers & acquisitions involving small businesses that had loans forgiven. Buyers may be stuck dealing with an SBA audit focused on decisions and documents from years ago in which the buyers were not involved. The takeaway for all borrowers is to maintain required PPP loan documentation and justification even if the loan has already been forgiven.
3. The government continues to scrutinize PPP borrowers.
The SBA and the DOJ have been closely scrutinizing PPP borrowers they believe may have fraudulently obtained a loan. The DOJ has brought criminal charges against hundreds of individuals for PPP loan-related fraud; many more criminal charges are likely to come. There also appears to be an increasing number of civil False Claims Act (FCA) investigations and lawsuits. The FCA is a federal law that prohibits knowingly making false statements or claims to obtain federal funds, and it carries significant penalties, including treble damages and civil penalties assessed per violation.
The government’s focus on PPP fraud stems from the sheer volume of loans disbursed and the potential for abuse. The SBA processed 11.8 million PPP loans, totaling $800 billion, which is a greater volume of loans than the agency processed in the prior 20 years combined. The SBA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) stated in a June 2023 report that it believes as many as 17% of all PPP loans and Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) were disbursed to potentially fraudulent actors. The report said that OIG is working on tens of thousands of investigative leads on instances of possible fraud, waste and abuse and estimated that thousands of investigations will ensue for years to come. As of August 31, 2023, OIG’s PPP and EIDL investigative work has already resulted in 1,090 indictments, 906 arrests and 576 convictions. Congress increased the statute of limitations for PPP fraud to 10 years, meaning that potentially thousands of PPP borrowers will need to defend their decision to obtain PPP loans over the coming decade. The OIG report stressed that the government will look to potential instances of fraud even in instances where the loan has already been forgiven.
4. You “won” your appeal of an unfavorable SBA decision. What happens next?
We have recently encountered an unsettling trend for borrowers: Even an OHA opinion finding that the SBA’s Final Decision was based on clear error of fact and law may result in the SBA digging in its heels and issuing a new Final Decision based on the same errors or on issues that seem to come out of nowhere.
In most instances, the SBA will do the right thing and go back and properly evaluate the loan, taking into consideration OHA’s opinion. The SBA will request any additional information it needs and work cooperatively with the borrower to determine the forgiveness amount the borrower is eligible to receive. However, we have seen borrowers prevail before the OHA only for the SBA to issue another Final Decision denying the borrower’s forgiveness application on different grounds (and even one case where the SBA inexplicably denied forgiveness on the exact same grounds the OHA found to be clear error).
This recalcitrance by the SBA places a significant burden on the small businesses that must time and time again defend their eligibility for loan forgiveness. Often, the SBA’s repeated denials of the borrower’s forgiveness application contain little detail as to the reason behind the SBA’s denials, forcing the borrower to guess at the SBA’s reasoning. Such guesswork and uncertainty result in increased expenses and time spent on attempts to get the SBA to reconsider its denials. This takes a real toll on small businesses that should be spending their time and money on maintaining and growing their business.
5. Beware of debt collectors.
The SBA’s rules permit PPP lenders to request that the SBA purchase the expected forgiveness amount of a PPP loan. As a result, some borrowers will find that their loan is held not by the lender that issued the loan but by the SBA itself. Unfortunately, the SBA and the US Department of Treasury are now dispatching private debt collection agencies to try to collect “unpaid” PPP loan debts from small businesses that have no repayment obligation, are unaware that they have outstanding debt, or have tried in earnest to work out a repayment plan with their lenders or SBA/Treasury but have been given the runaround. This is putting struggling small businesses in a devastating and unnecessary position.
6. There is some good news from the SBA.
There is one category of PPP borrowers that can breathe a sigh of relief: businesses that utilized third-party management companies to employ their workers. This arrangement is especially common in the hotel business where a management company technically employs the individuals who work for the hotel, but the hotel itself funds the management company’s payroll. Earlier this year, the SBA sought to claw back some PPP loans that were issued to borrowers that used third-party management companies for payroll on the grounds that the borrowers were not actually the technical employer of the employees.
Thankfully—and wisely—the SBA reversed course on these targeted borrowers and issued its 72nd Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 72). FAQ 72 provides that the amounts paid by a borrower to a third-party payer for the third-party payer’s employees to operate the borrower qualify as eligible payroll expenses for the purpose of calculating the maximum PPP loan amount. Per FAQ 72, such payments qualify so long as the management company did not itself apply for and receive a PPP loan. Borrowers in this type of situation should ensure that their management companies did not apply for a PPP loan based on payroll to employees that the borrower also counted in its own PPP loan application.
***
If you have any questions or need assistance regarding the denial of a PPP forgiveness application or any PPP-related issue, please contact the authors of this article or your regular McDermott lawyer.

Global Legal Insights: Merger Control Laws and Regulations 2023 | European Union
ARTICLE
Global Legal Insights: Merger Control Laws and Regulations 2023 | European Union
November 2023
Read time: 2 min
The GLI Merger Control Laws and Regulations 2023 covers key topics including recent merger control activity, developments in jurisdictional assessment and procedure, industry sectors, economic appraisal techniques, approach to remedies, and policy developments in 20 jurisdictions.
In the European chapter of the Guide authored by Hendrik Viaene, Stéphane Dionnet and Mélissa Hui, our team delves into the evolution of the two phases proceeding provided by the EUMR and EC’s merger decisions in 2022, and provides a review of key industry sectors, economic appraisal techniques, remedies and policy developments.
To read the full chapter, please click here.
The Guide was first published on the GLI website.

International Legal Highlights | Winter 2023
ARTICLE / REPORT
International Legal Highlights | Winter 2023
Winter 2023
Read time: 2 min

California Enacts PBM Anti-Discrimination Law
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
California Enacts PBM Anti-Discrimination Law
November 20, 2023
Read time: 3 min
On October 7, 2023, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed Senate Bill 786 (SB 786) into law, prohibiting pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) from discriminating against covered entities participating in the 340B Program.
Effective January 1, 2024, PBMs cannot impose requirements, conditions or exclusions that discriminate or prevent a 340B covered entity from obtaining and retaining the benefit of the discounted drugs available through the 340B Program. Under the new law, the prohibited discriminatory practices against 340B covered entities, pharmacies owned by 340B covered entities and pharmacies that contract with 340B covered entities to dispense 340B drugs include:
- Establishing payment terms, reimbursement methodologies, or other contract terms and conditions that are designed to distinguish between 340B drugs and other drugs and make reimbursement less favorable for 340B drugs
- Imposing terms or conditions based on the furnishing or dispensing of 340B drugs or their status as a 340B covered entity, 340B owned pharmacy or 340B contract pharmacy, including restrictions or requirements for participation in specialty, standard or preferred pharmacy networks, or requirements related to the frequency or scope of audits
- Refusing to contract with, terminating a contract with, or retaliating against a 340B covered entity solely because of its status
- Retaliation based on a 340B covered entity’s exercise of any right or remedy under this law
- Interfering with an individual’s choice to receive a 340B drug
- Restricting or prohibiting a 340B covered entity from raising a grievance, speaking publicly or filing a legal action against any PBM for violating this law
The law applies to any entity that meets the California definition of a PBM, including wholly and partially owned and controlled entities of a PBM and PBMs that contract with Medicare or Medi-Cal managed care organizations.

Private Client 2023 Global Overview
ARTICLE
Private Client 2023 Global Overview
November, 2023
Read time: 2 min
Abigail Nott and Jonathon Golstone contributed to the Global Overview and United Kingdom – England & Wales chapters in Lexology Getting The Deal Through, Private Client 2023. They touch on some of the trends that we see have become more pronounced for the private client arena globally and in the UK in the past year.

NLRB Makes Joint Employment the Rule, Not the Exception
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
NLRB Makes Joint Employment the Rule, Not the Exception
November 17, 2023
Read time: 6 min
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has changed its joint-employer rule, making it easier for entities doing business with each other to be deemed joint employers, and so jointly subject to union organizing campaigns, collective bargaining, and related operational restraints, strikes, and unfair labor practice investigations and litigation. This new rule goes further than any earlier joint-employer standard in two ways: (1) by making clear that indirect (or even unexercised) control is sufficient to prove joint-employer status, and (2) by dropping the requirement that there be enough control to permit meaningful collective bargaining.
ANALYSIS
Under the NLRB’s new joint employer rule (New Rule), two or more entities which “share or codetermine those matters governing employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment” will be joint employers. These essential terms and conditions of employment have been expanded and include wages, benefits, other compensation, scheduling, hiring, discharge, discipline, safety, supervision, assignment and work rules.
The New Rule assumes authority to control (and so “codetermine”), without regard to whether such control is actually exercised and regardless of whether such control is direct or indirect. This is a radical shift from the NLRB’s prior standard, which required “substantial, direct, and immediate control” over essential terms of conditions of employment. It is also far more expansive than the joint-employment tests under other employment statutes.
In counting “reserved” and “indirect” control as equivalent to actual control, the New Rule changes everything. Now, a company will be found to have “reserved control” where it maintains authority to control essential terms and conditions of employment even though it has never exercised such control. “Indirect control” will also trigger joint employment, making a company accountable for conduct of intermediaries or third parties.
The New Rule is set to take effect on February 26, 2024, and will only be applied to cases filed after that date.
IMPACT
Business organizations will now have additional exposure for the labor law violations of their business counterparties, including suppliers and contractors. In addition, a finding of joint-employer status has implications for collective bargaining obligations. Companies found to be joint employers could be required to collectively bargain with the employees of these other entities and subjected to the same pressure campaigns. Businesses utilizing third-party staffing models will most obviously be impacted, especially franchisors.
But, in truth, there are few businesses operating in a silo immune from this exposure. For example, consider a widget manufacturer that hires a logistics contractor to package the widgets at the manufacturer’s facility for shipping. Are uniform safety rules for both widgets employees and packing employees enough to make both joint employers? That appears to be the NLRB’s intent based on the New Rule.
The healthcare industry will acutely feel the New Rule’s effects. Some healthcare businesses, including hospitals, are required to have both employed and contracted staff follow policies, procedures and protocols for their own health and safety, and to facilitate consistent, safe patient care as part of licensing and enrollment requirements—everything from wearing identification badges, to complying with immunization requirements, to the uniform use of personal protective equipment like gloves and masks—as well as guidance around the provision of basic clinical care by nurses and other staff and the scheduling and patient assignments around such care. If viewed as sharing or codetermining terms and conditions of employment, the New Rule will be triggered.
Under prior NLRB standards, the existence of such policies would not have met the NLRB’s standard for joint-employer status; however, under the New Rule, even the mere authority to implement such policies could be determined to be sufficient to constitute a joint-employer relationship with all such staff. This would place an immediate and serious burden on healthcare businesses, which regularly contract with staff of all types to meet patient needs and cause them to treat contractors as joint employees with the physician groups, nurse and clinical staffing agencies, and other organizations that are their direct employers.
The downstream effects of the New Rule on contracted healthcare services could be even more far-reaching. Currently, hospitals that contract with (rather than directly employ) physicians rely upon such physicians’ “independent contractor” status as a protection from claims of vicarious liability. While this principle is not exclusive to contractors in healthcare, the potential for significant liability claims, professional and otherwise, as the joint employer of such contracted staff makes the potential for vicarious liability especially concerning.
This is why court challenges to this expansive rule have already been filed, and more are expected. It is possible that Congress could act to invalidate the New Rule, with multiple members of Congress already planning to take action to overturn the New Rule.
NEXT STEPS
Businesses need to begin preparing for the New Rule by mapping each business relationship for potential joint-employment exposure. As a starting point, any entity whose employees work on the premises of your business is a potential joint employer. This mapping should include an analysis of whether this business relationship is still more advantageous than utilizing your own employees for those tasks given this seismic legal shift by the NLRB on what constitutes joint employment.
Following that preliminary review, businesses should consider potential options to manage this new joint-employment risk:
- Review agreements with an eye to amending control-related provisions. Review third-party agreements, including with temporary staffing agencies, franchisees and other entities engaged for purposes of furnishing labor to evaluate the impact of the New Rule on those arrangements and the practical risks given the third party’s current labor profile and relationships.
- Review agreements with an eye to collateral protections. Indemnity provisions with certain counterparties to protect against the costs of defending claims or damage obligations due to joint employment claims should be considered. So too should requiring EPLI insurance from contractors with your company named as a separate insured.
- Evaluate day-to-day interactions with contractors. If micromanagement occurs on a practical level, that will generally outweigh a written agreement purporting to limit or disclaim any control. The basic ground rule must be that your managers deal only with the management team of the contractor and not the contractor’s rank-and-file employees.
- Create or update existing rapid response plans. In light of recent NLRB case law making it easier (and quicker) for unions to organize, prepare “rapid response plans” that address what will be done IF a union attempts to organize a counterparty’s employees naming your organization as a joint employer, or what if their existing union embroils your company in a strike or hostile public relations campaign. Sun Tzu said it perfectly: “In war, prepare for peace; in peace, prepare for war.”

California’s new reproductive privacy laws AB 352 and AB 254 create complexities for health information sharing
CLIENT ALERT / INTEROPERABILITY
California’s new reproductive privacy laws AB 352 and AB 254 create complexities for health information sharing
November 17,2023
Read time: 12 min
In the wake of the Supreme Court of the United States’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization and the adoption of laws outside California that criminalize most abortions as well as gender affirming care, California Governor Gavin Newsom recently signed Assembly Bill 352 (AB 352) and Assembly Bill 254 (AB 254) into law on September 27, 2023.
Through these new laws, California seeks to mitigate the risk of out-of-state prosecution of individuals seeking abortions or gender affirming care. These bills include significant changes to California privacy and health information interoperability laws that will impact health care providers, health plans, employers, electronic health record (EHR) developers and digital health companies handling medical information related to gender affirming care, abortion, abortion-related services, sexual health, fertility or contraception.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
- EHR developers and digital health companies storing or maintaining medical information for California health care providers, health plans, pharmaceutical companies, employers and certain contractors must develop new privacy, security and data segmentation functionality, policies and procedures by July 1, 2024.
- Health care providers must take steps to limit out-of-state medical information disclosures or cooperation with out-of-state inquiries or investigations consistent with AB 352, with enforcement for noncompliance beginning January 31, 2026.
- Digital health companies, employers and other businesses offering reproductive or sexual health digital services to individuals are subject to certain requirements in the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) beginning January 1, 2024.
- The California laws are consistent with other states that have adopted special protections for reproductive health information. For example, Maryland enacted a law earlier this year that generally limits health information exchanges and electronic health networks from disclosing information related to abortion care other than for the adjudication of claims or to a specific treating provider with an appropriate written consent.
AB 352
AB 352 adopts privacy protections for information about gender affirming care, abortion, abortion-related services and contraceptives, and it attempts to prevent out-of-state prosecution against individuals who come to California for abortion or reproductive health-related medical services or gender affirming care.
New Health Information Technology Capabilities, Policies and Procedures
AB 352 amends the CMIA to require EHR developers, digital health companies and other businesses that electronically store or maintain California individuals’ medical information on the provision of sensitive services on behalf of health care providers, health plans, pharmaceutical companies, contractors or employers to develop capabilities, policies and procedures by July 1, 2024, to enable the following:
- Limitations on user access privileges to information systems that contain medical information related to gender affirming care, abortion, abortion-related services and contraception only to those persons who are authorized to access the medical information
- Prevention of the disclosure, access, transfer, transmission or processing of such information to any person or entity outside of California
- Segregation of medical information related to gender affirming care, abortion, abortion-related services and contraception from the rest of a patient’s medical record
- Ability to automatically disable access to segregated medical information related to gender affirming care, abortion, abortion-related services and contraception by individuals and entities in another state
The requirement to segregate a subset of medical information from the rest of a patient’s medical record creates both technical and compliance challenges for health IT developers, digital health companies and other businesses that electronically store medical information. While federal interoperability regulations emphasize the sharing of complete medical records, AB 352 would require the creation of certain data silos that could impact the completeness of an individual’s medical record when viewed by certain users or disclosed to health care providers in other states. AB 352’s data segmentation, access control and disclosure restriction requirements may necessitate complex software development. No algorithm or standardized computational methodology currently exists to automate the reliable classification of medical information related to the provision of sensitive services such as reproductive or gender affirming care. There is a potential for health IT developers to require end-user clinicians and staff to provide context to manually segment and restrict sensitive data elements within a health IT system, which could place a significant burden on these end users.
Notably, AB 352 applies these requirements to businesses that electronically store or maintain medical information on behalf of a wide range of health care industry organizations but not to the health care providers that deploy EHRs and otherwise electronically store or maintain medical information.
In connection with these requirements, California health care organizations should be prepared for potential workflow/functionality changes and fees from health IT developers as they develop new technical capabilities for compliance. AB 352 allows EHR and other health IT developers to charge cost-based fees for the new capabilities consistent with the fees exception to the federal information blocking regulations adopted by the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. Interestingly, AB 352 limits the ability of all impacted health IT and digital health companies to charge fees for new capabilities necessitated by AB 352 consistent with federal information blocking regulations, even if a company is not a regulated actor under the information blocking regulations. For more information about the federal information blocking regulations, see our Special Report.
Out-of-State Data Disclosures, Inquiries or Investigations
AB 352 further amends the CMIA to prohibit health care providers, health care service plans, contractors and employers (each as defined by CMIA) from cooperating with any inquiry or investigation—or otherwise disclosing medical information—to anyone or any entity from another state that would identify an individual and is related to that individual seeking or obtaining an abortion or abortion-related services that are lawful under California law unless authorized under any of the following conditions:
- In accordance with a written authorization that is valid under CMIA and clearly states that medical information on abortion or abortion-related services may be disclosed, and only to the extent and for the purposes expressly stated in the authorization
- Under the CMIA’s preexisting billing and payment-related confidentiality exceptions to the extent necessary to allow responsibility for payment to be determined and payment to be made or to the extent that it is not further disclosed by the recipient in a way that would violate the CMIA
- Under the CMIA’s preexisting confidentiality exceptions for certain quality-related activities for the purpose of accreditation, in reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care professionals, or in reviewing health care services with respect to medical necessity, level of care, quality of care or justification of charges
- Under the CMIA’s preexisting confidentiality exception for bona fide research, provided that institutional review boards must consider the potential harm to the patient and the patient’s privacy when the research uses data that contains information related to abortion or abortion-related services and is performed out of California
This provision does not prohibit compliance with an investigatory request related to activity that is punishable as a crime in California and took place in California. The provision also does not impact disclosures of medical information to patients or their representatives, even while the requesting individual is out of state. Health care organizations will need to carefully consider how they respond to such patient access requests to ensure that disclosures to third parties, as directed by a patient, comply with AB 352’s authorization requirements.
Prior to January 31, 2026, health care providers will not be subject to liability for damages or to civil or enforcement actions for failure to meet the disclosure prohibitions if the provider is working diligently and in good faith to come into compliance. This provision gives providers time to determine the best path to compliance but notably excludes the other entities subject to the disclosure prohibitions, including health plans, pharmaceutical companies, contractors and employers.
Impact on Health Information Exchange
AB 352 prohibits health care providers, health care service plans, contractors and employers from “knowingly” disclosing or transmitting medical information in an EHR system or through a health information exchange (HIE) that would identify an individual seeking, obtaining, providing, supporting or aiding a lawful abortion to out-of-state individuals, unless authorized. Accordingly, health care providers will need to evaluate the types of medical information transmitted to other EHR systems and HIEs, determine where that information is going and determine how to withhold medical information that cannot be shared by law. This evaluation will be particularly important for health care organizations that participate in national or regional HIEs.
Impact on the California Data Exchange Framework
AB 352 amends the California Health and Safety Code section that authorizes the California Data Exchange Framework (DxF) to provide that its requirement for DxF participants to share health and social services information does not apply to the exchange of health information related to abortion and abortion-related services. Health care organizations and other entities that signed the DxF data sharing agreement are required to exchange data on or before January 31, 2024, so it is unclear how they will operationalize AB 352’s data-sharing restrictions while their health IT developers work to comply with the July 1, 2024, deadline for data segmentation and related privacy functionality. Any fees charged by EHR vendors to enable a regulated entity’s compliance with the DxF are required to be reasonable and consistent with the federal information blocking regulations.
On a related note, AB 352 directs the DxF stakeholder advisory group to consider whether standards for including EHR vendors in the DxF would be appropriate and, if determined to be appropriate, develop those standards. If the stakeholder advisory group develops standards for including EHR vendors in the DxF, AB 352 would require EHR vendors to sign the DxF data sharing agreement within 12 months of the completion of those standards.
For more information about the California DxF, see our On the Subject, “10 Things Providers Should Know About California’s Data Exchange Framework.”
AB 254
The CMIA imposes privacy requirements on certain health care providers, pharmaceutical companies, California health care service plans and other entities. It does not regulate all California businesses.
The CMIA prohibits regulated entities from disclosing “medical information” in their possession regarding a patient, enrollee or subscriber without the individual’s prior authorization unless an exception applies. The CMIA further requires those entities to create, maintain, store or destroy medical information in a manner that preserves its confidentiality. As discussed below, effective January 1, 2024, AB 254 revises the CMIA to regulate companies providing reproductive or sexual health digital services and data considered to be reproductive or sexual health application information.
Expansion of CMIA-Regulated Entities
AB 254 amends the CMIA to add a new class of regulated entities. Specifically, AB 254 requires “any business that offers a reproductive or sexual health digital service to a consumer” to comply with the CMIA requirements applicable to health care providers. A reproductive or sexual health digital service is a mobile-based application or internet website that collects reproductive or sexual health application information from a consumer, markets itself as facilitating reproductive or sexual health services to a consumer, and uses the information to facilitate reproductive or sexual health services to a consumer. This could include services individuals use to manage or track their menstrual, fertility, or pregnancy information, or other sexual health data. These services include mobile applications or websites that collect reproductive or sexual health application information from consumers. This expansion is significant for digital health companies and employers offering reproductive or sexual health digital services in California that might not have previously addressed the CMIA’s requirements in their privacy compliance programs.
As a result of this expanded scope, entities offering reproductive or sexual health digital services must comply with the CMIA’s:
- Prohibition on the disclosure of medical information, except as permitted by one of the CMIA’s disclosure exceptions or an individual’s authorization
- Requirement to not “intentionally share, sell, use for marketing, or otherwise use medical information for a purpose not necessary to provide health care services to the patient,” except to the extent expressly authorized by the individual
Consequently, AB 254 limits the ability of a reproductive or sexual health digital service to collect and sell the data collected from individuals. To the extent that a mobile application or website also collects other types of medical information, AB 254 will impose a burden upon them to bifurcate data (especially reproductive or sexual health information) from California individuals to comply with the CMIA.
Expansion of the Definition of Medical Information
The CMIA currently defines “medical information” to include individually identifiable information about an individual’s medical history, mental health application information, mental or physical condition or treatment. Effective January 1, 2024, AB 254 adds “reproductive or sexual health application information” to that definition. Reproductive or sexual health application information is information about a consumer’s reproductive health, menstrual cycle, fertility, pregnancy, pregnancy outcome, plans to conceive or type of sexual activity collected by a reproductive or sexual health digital service, including information from which one can infer someone’s pregnancy status, menstrual cycle, fertility, hormone levels, birth control use, sexual activity or gender identity. Consequently, health care providers and other CMIA-regulated entities must begin protecting reproductive and sexual health application information as they would other types of medical information protected by CMIA.
NEXT STEPS
- Health IT developers and digital health companies that serve organizations in California will need to begin evaluating their technical capabilities, policies and procedures to determine how they will comply with the data segmentation and other privacy requirements of AB 352. These entities should also carefully calculate any fees for new functionality or technical capabilities required under AB 352 for compliance with limitations in the federal information blocking regulations.
- Health care providers and health plans in California will need to map their data flows, especially those that result in out-of-state disclosures of medical information, and to take steps to “diligently and in good faith” comply with the disclosure prohibitions in AB 352.
- Health care providers, health plans, pharmaceutical companies, contractors and employers should reach out to their IT vendors to inquire about the vendors’ plans to comply with the requirements in AB 352 before the July 1, 2024, compliance deadline. Entities participating in the California DxF will need to evaluate how to meet their information-sharing commitments beginning on January 31, 2024, given the potential functionality gap to support the special handling of data related to reproductive health and gender affirming care.
- Digital health companies and employers that offer reproductive or sexual health digital services to individuals in California should evaluate their compliance with the CMIA’s requirements for health care providers, including certain limitations on the use and disclosure of medical information.
If your organization has questions about how AB 352 and AB 254 (or other similar state laws) impact your privacy or interoperability compliance plans, please contact one of the authors or your McDermott lawyer.

What Makes a Patient a “Patient”? Court Rejects Restrictive 340B Definition
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
What Makes a Patient a “Patient”? Court Rejects Restrictive 340B Definition
November 16, 2023
Read time: 16 min
On November 3, 2023, the US District Court for the District of South Carolina issued a landmark order in Genesis Health Care, Inc. v. Becerra, a case analyzing the definition of a “patient” under the 340B Program Statute. The court concluded that the government’s restrictive interpretation of the term was contrary to the plain language of the 340B Statute and would frustrate the goals of the 340B Program. In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on common definitions of the term “patient,” as well as the structure and congressional intent of the 340B Statute, to support a “broad reading” of the term “patient.” The court enjoined the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) from enforcing its more restrictive interpretation of the term against the plaintiff, a federally funded health center.
Although this decision may bring this years-long litigation to an end, Genesis raises a host of new questions for 340B Program stakeholders, including the applicability of the decision to other covered entities, the practical import of the decision in enforcement actions, and how the court’s analysis will alter covered entity and manufacturer compliance with HRSA and Apexus guidance.
BACKGROUND
The Genesis case involves the definition of a “patient of the entity” as that term is used in the 340B Statute (42 USC § 256b). The 340B Statute prohibits a healthcare provider participating in the 340B Program (known as a “covered entity”) from reselling or otherwise transferring a 340B drug to a “person who is not a patient of the entity.” The scope of this definition (i.e., the conditions under which a covered entity can purchase a drug at the 340B discounted price) is consequential to both covered entities and drug manufacturers. A broad definition would increase the volume of drugs purchased at the discounted 340B prices, and a narrow definition would decrease the volume.
In 1996, HRSA published a final notice in the Federal Register purporting to define the term “patient of a covered entity” under the 340B Statute. The 1996 guidance provided that an individual would be considered a patient of a covered entity only if (in applicable part) both of the following were true:
- The covered entity has established a relationship with the individual, such that the covered entity maintains records of the individual’s healthcare.
- The individual receives healthcare services from a healthcare professional who is either employed by the covered entity or provides healthcare under contractual or other arrangements (e.g., referral for consultation) such that responsibility for the care provided remains with the covered entity.
The 1996 guidance provided that an individual would not be considered a “patient” of the entity if the only healthcare service received by the individual from a covered entity was the dispensing of a drug or drugs for subsequent self-administration or administration in the home setting. The guidance was silent as to whether a prescription must be written during a visit to a covered entity or by a practitioner employed by or under contract with the covered entity to be eligible to be filled with 340B drugs.
In June 2017, HRSA conducted an audit of Genesis Health Care and determined that it had failed to maintain auditable records and had dispensed 340B drugs to ineligible patients. Specifically, the audit report claimed that Genesis’s in-house pharmacy and several of its contract pharmacies had dispensed 340B drugs to individuals without sufficient documentation of a provider-patient relationship between Genesis and those individuals. Genesis’s in-house pharmacy also had used 340B drugs to fill prescriptions that were written by private physician practices that were not eligible as 340B covered entity sites. Genesis did not have patient records to support Genesis’s responsibility for the care delivered by these private physician practices, nor was Genesis able to show that the individuals received healthcare services from a healthcare professional who was either employed by Genesis or under a contractual or other arrangement demonstrating Genesis’s responsibility for the individuals’ care.
Following issuance of the final audit report, HRSA took steps to remove Genesis from the 340B Program. Genesis subsequently filed suit challenging HRSA’s actions. Shortly after the suit was filed, HRSA reinstated Genesis in the 340B Program. However, HRSA maintained its position that Genesis had dispensed 340B drugs to patients who were not “patients of the entity” under the 340B Statute. HRSA issued a letter to Genesis on March 20, 2019, in which it “clarified” that in order for an individual to qualify as a patient of a 340B covered entity, the covered entity must have initiated the healthcare service resulting in the prescription. In its letter, HRSA stated:
HRSA would like to clarify that in order for an individual to qualify as a 340B patient, [Genesis] must have initiated the health care service resulting in the prescription, regardless if the patient had an unrelated billable [Genesis] encounter.
In December 2019, the district court indicated it would not issue a decision on Genesis’s case because there was no longer a live controversy since Genesis had been reinstated in the 340B Program. Genesis appealed the decision on the basis that HRSA’s definition of “patient” remained unclear and that a clear definition was necessary for Genesis to certify compliance with the 340B Statute. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit sided with Genesis and remanded the case back to the district court for a determination of the 340B Program definition of “patient.”
In motions before the district court on remand, Genesis argued that the language in the 340B Statute is plain and unambiguous and therefore must be construed according to its terms. Genesis argued that HRSA does not have the authority to issue interpretations of the 340B Statute, its publications of definitions of the term “patient” are not enforceable, and the structure of the 340B Statute does not support HRSA’s restrictive interpretation that a “patient” of the covered entity must have received a prescription for a 340B-qualifying drug during a visit to the covered entity. In response, HRSA argued that it had properly interpreted the statutory phrase “patient of the entity” to mean that the covered entity “initiated the health care services resulting in the prescription,” and that it has the authority to state its interpretation of the 340B Statute.
THE DISTRICT COURT’S OPINION
On November 3, 2023, the district court issued an opinion in Genesis generally siding with Genesis and enjoining HRSA from enforcing against Genesis its interpretation of the definition of “patient” so far as it requires that prescriptions eligible for 340B pricing result from care initiated at the covered entity.
Plain Language
The court found that HRSA’s interpretation of the term “patient,” as set forth in its audit letter to Genesis, was contrary to the plain language of the 340B Statute. The court stated that “nothing in the statute conditions an individual’s eligibility as a 340B patient on whether the health care service resulting in the prescription was initiated by the ‘covered entity.’”
The court went on to clarify that although the statute defines certain terms, it does not define “patient,” nor does it require that a prescription originate from a covered entity in order for an individual to be considered a “patient.” In reviewing various dictionary definitions of the word “patient,” the court found that the term has a fairly common definition and ordinary understanding that does not impose the restriction HRSA proposed reading into the definition.
Congressional Intent
The court found that the purpose of the 340B Statute was to combat the increase in prescription drug prices following the implementation of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (MDRP). Because of manufacturers’ drug price increases in response to the MDRP, covered entities experienced substantial increases in the costs of their outpatient drugs, which reduced the services that covered entities were able to provide to indigent individuals. With this purpose in mind, the court found it reasonable to conclude that Congress intended “patient” in the 340B Statute to have its plain and ordinary meaning, which would not reflect HRSA’s more restrictive interpretation. The court summarized:
Bearing in mind that the purpose of the 340B Statute was, in part, to make “covered entities” profitable so they could stretch Federal resources as far as possible, reach more eligible patients, and provide more comprehensive services, a broad definition of the term “patient” complies with congressional intent in that the more patients a “covered entity” can sell discounted 340B drugs to, the greater the “covered entity’s” profit margin, and the greater the ability of the “covered entity” to provide services to the indigent and achieve the purpose of the 340B Statute.
The court noted that HRSA did not direct the court to any attempt by HRSA to reconcile its restrictive definition of the term “patient” with the purpose of the 340B Statute. Indeed, in developing the restrictive definition of the term “patient,” HRSA “does not appear to have made any attempt to consider the purpose of the 340B Statute—the profitability of ‘covered entities’ in light of prescription drug price increases,” the court stated. To the contrary, the court concluded that HRSA’s restrictive definition “limits the scope of the 340B Program, limits the profitability of ‘covered entities,’ and frustrates the goal of the 340B Statute, which is to make ‘covered entities’ profitable in the face of prescription drug price increases that followed the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program and that continue to this day.”
Accordingly, the district court enjoined HRSA from enforcing its restrictive interpretation against Genesis.
ANALYSIS
The Genesis decision will have reverberations throughout the 340B Program, altering covered entities and manufacturers’ risk analyses of compliance with other HRSA interpretations of undefined terms in the 340B Statute.
The Patient Definition
While the district court enjoined HRSA from enforcing its March 20, 2019, interpretation of the term “patient” against Genesis, it did not address the enforceability of HRSA’s 1996 definition of “patient.” However, the court offered several common definitions of “patient” that covered entities could consider as potentially acceptable definitions. Some of these definitions are clearly broader than HRSA’s 1996 guidance, defining individuals as patients even if they are “awaiting” or “registered to receive” medical care and treatment, although other definitions cited by the court require the past or present care of a patient. Accordingly, the district court’s opinion leaves open whether prescriptions filled prior to a visit with a covered entity would qualify a patient as a “patient of the covered entity.”
To the extent that HRSA’s March 20, 2019, definition of “patient” is inconsistent with the 340B Statute, it would appear that a covered entity could reasonably interpret the 340B Statute as allowing it to purchase drugs at 340B prices and dispense them to its patients (either directly or through contract pharmacies) who have received prescriptions written by other providers or which resulted from visits to other providers as long as the individuals receiving the drugs are otherwise “patients of” the covered entity. For example, a covered entity could take the position that it could dispense a 340B-purchased drug to an individual who initiated the care resulting in the prescription at another provider, as long as the individual also received services from the covered entity to establish a patient relationship with the covered entity. The court did not explicitly address whether such services must be provided before or after the prescription at issue was written, nor did it address the clinical relationship of the covered entity services to the prescription.
Applicability
The court limited its relief to solely to Genesis, without extending it to other covered entities. In other words, the court did not prohibit HRSA from enforcing its restrictive March 20, 2019, interpretation of the term “patient of the covered entity” on any other covered entity. Limitation of this relief to Genesis is consistent with other recent federal court decisions involving claims against the government, including those involving the 340B Program, that have limited relief to the named plaintiffs. For example, in Eli Lilly and Company v. Cochran, 526 F.Supp.3d 393, the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enjoined HRSA from implementing or enforcing its administrative dispute resolution regulations against Eli Lilly and Company but did not expressly enjoin HRSA from implementing or enforcing the regulations against any other manufacturers.
This means that if HRSA were to take enforcement action against a covered entity under the March 20, 2019, definition of “patient,” a covered entity could be required to bring its own claim against HRSA in federal court in order to obtain relief. While the Genesis decision would provide favorable precedent for finding HRSA’s interpretation invalid, there is no guarantee that another court would reach the same conclusion.
Analytical Framework
The Genesis decision provides a relatively clear analytical framework for 340B stakeholders to consider how a federal court might consider the enforceability of HRSA’s interpretations of the 340B Statute. This framework would consider the following:
- Is the interpretation consistent with the plain language of the 340B Statute?
- Is the interpretation consistent with the intent of the 340B Statute, i.e., to increase covered entity revenue opportunities deriving from participation in the 340B Program?
While the Genesis decision was limited to a particular interpretation of the “patient” definition, this analytical framework may be considered in other circumstances where HRSA has adopted an interpretation that would appear inconsistent with the plain language and intent of the 340B Statute.
For example, the Genesis analytical framework could be used when interpreting the scope of the 340B Program group purchasing organization (GPO) limitation. Under the 340B Statute, the GPO limitation excludes from the “covered entity” definition certain hospitals that obtain covered outpatient drugs through a GPO or other group purchasing organization. HRSA has historically interpreted this limitation as applying to drugs purchased before the setting in which they will be dispensed is determined (i.e., before it is known whether they will be dispensed to an outpatient and potentially as a “covered outpatient drug”). A covered entity may apply the reasoning in Genesis to evaluate whether HRSA’s current interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the 340B Statute and its intent to allow covered entities to maximize revenue opportunities from participation in the 340B Program.
Benefits of Affirmative Litigation
The Genesis decision highlights the benefits of covered entities engaging in affirmative litigation against the government. If Genesis had not pursued its claims, the enforceability of HRSA’s interpretation of the patient definition would still be unknown, and Genesis might have unnecessarily self-restricted the financial benefits that Congress intended it to have under the 340B Program.
The decision also highlights that covered entities cannot expect to necessarily benefit from favorable court rulings obtained by other covered entities and should consider joining in litigation to ensure that they receive the benefits of a favorable decision. In this case and in others, the court limited its relief to the covered entity that filed litigation. HRSA is not prohibited by this decision from continuing to pursue enforcement actions against other covered entities using its more restrictive definition of “patient of the covered entity.” As a result, covered entities could be forced to engage in their own litigation if HRSA takes future enforcement action against them.
Implications for Future HRSA Interpretations and Administrative Dispute Resolution
Of note, the district court opined that in order to administer the 340B administrative dispute resolution process, HRSA “necessarily will be obliged to set forth its understanding of various stakeholders’ obligations under the 340B Program, including an interpretation of the statutory term ‘patient.’” This position is consistent with the US District Court for the District of Columbia’s 2015 ruling in PhRMA v. HHS, 138 F.Supp. 3d 31, which opined that even in cases where HRSA lacks the authority to promulgate a rule as a binding statement of law, HRSA is not forbidden altogether from proffering its interpretation of the 340B Statute. These interpretations, however, if inconsistent with the plain language and intent of the 340B Statute, should be challenged by covered entities if the analytical framework in Genesis suggests that HRSA has overstepped or misapplied its authority.
Potential for Appeal
HRSA may respond to the Genesis case by appealing the decision to the Fourth Circuit and arguing that the March 20, 2019, definition is consistent with the 340B Statute and congressional intent for the 340B Program. While the district court’s opinion is generally viewed as a win for Genesis, because the court did not grant Genesis all of the relief it requested, Genesis could also appeal the court’s refusal to find that HRSA does not have authority to issue any interpretation of the definition of “patient of the entity.” The deadline for filing an appeal is January 2, 2024. Depending on the party filing the appeal and the specific issues being appealed, there remains some possibility that the Genesis saga is not over and, conceivably, some chance that HRSA’s March 20, 2019, definition could ultimately prevail.
Example Open Questions
While the Genesis decision clarifies one court’s position on a particular dispute relating to the patient definition, it leaves open many questions relating to the patient definition and the import of HRSA’s other guidance, as discussed above. The court noted that the statute does not state a specific temporal requirement for the term “patient,” and HRSA offered no suggestions for a temporal requirement. The court noted that a commenter raised this issue in 1996, but HRSA did not set a time limit. The court observed that the American Medical Association (AMA) considers an established patient to be an individual who has received a healthcare service from the provider within the last three years, but the district court acknowledged that the recency of a healthcare encounter with a “covered entity” as a requirement to be considered a “patient” of the “covered entity” was not the issue before the court. Accordingly, the court appears to have left open the possibility for HRSA to establish a temporal limitation in the future.
The decision also does not contemplate that a patient could be considered a patient of multiple entities at the same time. In such cases, there must be a determination of which covered entity may claim the patient relationship for purposes of particular drug dispenses. This decision determines which covered entity receives the financial benefit of the transaction and may not be easily evaluated at the time the drug is dispensed. Since many 340B drugs are dispensed through contract pharmacy arrangements using third-party administrator software to determine eligibility, this may place pharmacies and software vendors in the unenviable position of having to establish protocols for “tie breaking” or otherwise adjudicating disputes between clients as to who has the stronger argument for claiming the patient as their own.
NEXT STEPS
Both manufacturers and covered entities should consider their policies and procedures relating to the criteria for determining whether an individual is a “patient” under the 340B Program and whether changes to the policies may be appropriate in response to the Genesis decision. Similarly, 340B contracting pharmacies, third-party administrators and other vendors should evaluate their criteria for associating a particular prescription with a particular covered entity and what changes may be necessitated by changing covered entity policies. More broadly, all 340B stakeholders should consider the court’s analytical framework in Genesis when evaluating how to apply HRSA’s interpretations of the 340B Statute to their operations and whether HRSA’s interpretations are subject to legal challenge and likely to be found enforceable by a court.
We will continue to watch the Genesis case and will provide updated information on developments through our 340B Litigation Tracking Tool.
Join us for our Q&A webinar on this case on November 28. Click here to learn more and register to attend.
