Content Type: Article

  • FinCEN Issues Final Rules Relating to MSB Definitions

    FinCEN Issues Final Rules Relating to MSB Definitions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN Issues Final Rules Relating to MSB Definitions

    October 26, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 21, 2011, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued a final rule (the “MSB Rule”), revising the regulations regarding money services businesses (“MSBs”). The final rule clarifies which activities subject a person to the Bank Secrecy Act’s (“BSA”) rules pertaining to MSBs and subjects certain foreign-located MSBs with a U.S. presence to the BSA rules. In particular, the MSB Rule (i) provides that certain foreign-located persons engaging in MSB activities within the United States are subject to the BSA rules; (ii) updates the MSB definitions to reflect past guidance and administrative rulings, current business operations, evolving technologies and merging lines of business; (iii) expands the definition of a dealer in foreign exchange to include forex traders, unless they are functionally regulated or examined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”); and (iv) separates the provisions dealing with stored value from those dealing with issuers, sellers, and redeemers of traveler’s checks and money orders.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The Second Circuit’s Adoption of the Moench Presumption of Prudence Provides “Accommodation” for Employers Facing Stock Drop Suits

    The Second Circuit’s Adoption of the Moench Presumption of Prudence Provides “Accommodation” for Employers Facing Stock Drop Suits

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Second Circuit’s Adoption of the Moench Presumption of Prudence Provides “Accommodation” for Employers Facing Stock Drop Suits

    October 24, 2011

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A recent opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should reassure employers worried about employee lawsuits alleging the imprudence of investing in company stock through company retirement plans during unstable economic times. In recent years, the federal courts have heard an increasing number of these so-called “stock drop” cases (including many that have arisen as a result of the crash of the subprime mortgage market). Until now, the Second Circuit remained silent as to the decisive standard of review applicable to such claims.

    Adoption of the Moench Presumption of Prudence

    On Oct. 19, 2011, the Second Circuit joined its sister circuits in adopting the presumption of prudence — first articulated by the Third Circuit in Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3rd Cir. 1995) — as the standard of review applicable to stock drop claims. See In re: Citigroup ERISA Litig., No. 09-3804; Gearren v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., Nos. 10-792, 10-934.[1] Under the presumption, an employer’s decision to retain company stock as an investment option in an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA can be reviewed only for an “abuse of discretion.” Absent circumstances placing a company in a “dire situation” that was “objectively unforeseeable,” the employer is not required to override plan terms requiring that employees have the option of investing in company stock. In a divided opinion (with Judge Chester J. Straub dissenting), the court explained that the presumption provides “the best accommodation between the competing ERISA values of protecting retirement assets and encouraging investment in employer stock.”[2]

    Employees’ Claims Against Citigroup

    Following a 50 percent decline in Citigroup’s stock price, employee participants in Citigroup’s 401(k) plans filed a class action suit in 2008, alleging that the company and named defendants breached their fiduciary duty of prudence by failing to divest the plans of Citigroup stock despite its unsteady value. The employees also claimed that certain corporate defendants breached their fiduciary duty of communication by neglecting to provide complete and accurate information to employee participants in the plans regarding company stock and its exposure to risks associated with the subprime mortgage market. The plaintiffs alleged other breaches of fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty.

    The Court’s Dismissal of Employees’ Claims

    The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims against the company. Applying the Moench presumption to the Citigroup employees’ prudence claims, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegation that Citigroup had made bad business decisions was insufficient to show that the company was in a “dire situation” or that named defendants knew or should have known that the situation was dire. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiffs had pleaded no facts that, if proved, would show that an investigation of Citigroup stock would have led the defendants to conclude that Citigroup was no longer a prudent investment. Rather than relying on the steepness of the stock decline, the court considered “the extent to which plan fiduciaries at a given point in time reasonably could have predicted the outcome that followed.” Under this standard, given the unexpectedness of Citigroup’s losses, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that their employer acted imprudently. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Citigroup’s stock price was “inflated” during the class period “because the price did not reflect the company’s true underlying value.” The panel asserted that these facts alone cannot sufficiently plead a fiduciary breach.

    The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ communications claim. Because ERISA does not require fiduciaries to provide plan participants with non-public information pertaining to the expected performance of plan investment options, the court found that the defendants had “no duty to communicate a forecast as to when this volatility would manifest itself in a sharp decline in stock price.” In addition, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claim because the company and its CEO did not act as fiduciaries while discussing Citigroup’s financial health and because the Administrative Committee did not knowingly make any false statements.

    The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ duty of loyalty claim. The court held that such a claim cannot be based solely on the fact that an ERISA fiduciary’s compensation is linked to company stock. Under the plaintiffs’ reasoning, the court explained, “almost no corporate manager could ever serve as a fiduciary of his company’s [p]lan.”

    Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining claims as derivative of the prudence and communication claims.

    Lingering Concerns for Employers

    In its articulation of the Moench standard, the court noted that judicial scrutiny should increase with the degree of discretion a plan gives its fiduciaries to invest in company stock. Here, under the plain language of the relevant plans, the plan fiduciaries were not provided any discretion to divest the plan of Citigroup stock. Although the court was willing to decrease the level of judicial scrutiny in the absence of fiduciary discretion, the court refused to completely insulate such employers from liability: “[S]uch a rule would leave employees’ retirement savings that are invested in [company stock] without any protection at all.” Employers with benefit plans granting discretion to plan fiduciaries with respect to company stock should be aware that courts in the Second Circuit may be less deferential to the decisions of those fiduciaries.

    Circuit Judge Straub wrote a lengthy and strongly-worded dissent, rejecting, among other things, the court’s adoption of the Moench standard. Under Judge Straub’s preferred “plenary” standard — as opposed to the deferential abuse of discretion standard — employers would have a much more difficult time defending against employees’ stock drop claims. Dismissal on the pleadings would also be unlikely under this plenary standard.

    For Now, Employers Can Relax About Stock Drop Claims

    Courts within the Second Circuit are now tasked with fleshing out how the presumption of prudence should be applied in practice, including determining how plan language impacts that analysis. In the meantime, employers and plan fiduciaries can take some comfort in the Second Circuit joining the Third, Fifth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits in adopting the deferential Moench presumption.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, William H. Gussman, Jr., Ronald E. Richman, Jill L. Goldberg Mintzer and Anne A. Marchessault.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] This Alert discusses the Citigroup opinion as the lead decision. The panel adopted the same reasoning in the “companion” Gearren decision.

    [2] In its decision, the Second Circuit adopted the Moench presumption with respect to both employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”) and eligible individual account plans (“EIAPs”). The court also noted that the presumption would apply at the pleading stage: “Where plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to establish that a plan fiduciary has abused his discretion, there is no reason not to grant a motion to dismiss.”


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    William H. Gussman Jr.

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Retirement Plan Dollar Limits Get a Boost for 2012

    Retirement Plan Dollar Limits Get a Boost for 2012

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Retirement Plan Dollar Limits Get a Boost for 2012

    October 21, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Internal Revenue Service announced the cost-of-living adjustments applicable to the dollar limitations for qualified retirement plans that will allow employees to increase their retirement savings for 2012. This Alert highlights some of the new limits, comparing the new limits to the limits of the prior seven years. Many of the limits had remained unchanged for several years, but the cost-of-living index has now met the statutory thresholds, which has triggered adjustments for 2012.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Zais Investment Grade Limited VII — CDO Noteholders Take Advantage of Chapter 11

    Zais Investment Grade Limited VII — CDO Noteholders Take Advantage of Chapter 11

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Zais Investment Grade Limited VII — CDO Noteholders Take Advantage of Chapter 11

    October 3, 2011

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently held that a Cayman Islands collateralized-debt obligation issuer (“CDO”) could be a debtor under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and declined to dismiss an involuntary case commenced against the CDO by certain noteholders on the grounds that the notes held by such noteholders were “non-recourse” notes. Below is a discussion of the court’s decision and its potential implications. The decision is currently being appealed.

    Senior noteholders of Zais Investment Grade Limited VII (“ZING VII”), a Cayman Islands CDO, commenced an involuntary case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code against ZING VII in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey on April 1, 2011.[1] ZING VII failed to contest the involuntary petition, and the Bankruptcy Court entered an order for relief on April 26, 2011.

    The petitioning creditors (the “Petitioning Creditors”) had acquired senior Class A-1 notes issued by ZING VII after the notes were already in default. Following the Petitioning Creditors’ commencement of the involuntary case, other investors acquired junior Class A-2 notes (the “Junior Noteholders”). The Petitioning Creditors’ Class A-1 notes are non-recourse notes (i.e., recourse under the notes is expressly limited to the assets of the CDO) and senior to the Junior Noteholders’ notes.

    The Junior Noteholders contested the filing of ZING VII’s bankruptcy case and are opposing the Chapter 11 plan proposed by the Petitioning Creditors. Under the plan, ZING VII’s assets would be transferred to a newly formed entity controlled by the Petitioning Creditors for liquidation and distribution. The Class A-1 noteholders would receive a pro rata recovery from ZING VII’s available cash and the other classes of noteholders would recover nothing. If the Petitioning Creditors are successful in obtaining confirmation of ZING VII’s Chapter 11 plan, holders of senior notes issued by CDOs may have an additional strategy for maximizing returns from troubled CDOs. As discussed below, however, it is not clear that senior noteholders holding non-recourse notes in all cases will be able to establish their eligibility to commence an involuntary case against the CDO issuer.

    Events Leading to Bankruptcy

    ZING VII is a CDO incorporated under the laws of the Cayman Islands. ZING VII’s assets span a broad array of structured products, including residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities (including consumer loans and non-consumer loans), and tranches of other collateralized debt obligations (a so-called “CDO squared”). As a result of deteriorating market conditions, ZING VII’s notes became undercapitalized, and ZING VII defaulted under its indenture.

    The Petitioning Creditors allege that the Class A-1 noteholders would receive a greater and more certain recovery (in present value terms) through an opportunistic liquidation of ZING VII’s assets than they would through passive management of the assets and distributions under the indenture. The indenture, however, requires the consent of two-thirds of all noteholders to liquidate ZING VII’s assets to satisfy its obligations under the notes. According to the disclosure statement filed with the Bankruptcy Court, only the holders of the Class A-1 notes (acquired by the Petitioning Creditors) are likely to receive distributions through a liquidation of ZING VII’s assets, and junior noteholders likely will find themselves out of the money. The Petitioning Creditors were unable to muster the required two-thirds consent from all noteholders and thus commenced an involuntary bankruptcy case against ZING VII on April 1, 2011.

    Junior Noteholders Challenge Bankruptcy

    The Junior Noteholders purchased their notes a few weeks after the Petitioning Creditors commenced ZING VII’s involuntary case. After the bankruptcy court entered the order for relief, the Junior Noteholders moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the case should be dismissed because (i) ZING VII, as a Cayman Islands company, is not eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, (ii) the Petitioning Creditors were ineligible to commence the involuntary case because they hold non-recourse notes and only unsecured creditors may commence involuntary cases, (iii) the Petitioning Creditors are the only parties that stand to benefit from the bankruptcy and the interests of ZING VII and its creditors would be better served without circumventing the indenture, and (iv) the Petitioning Creditors commenced the case in bad faith to avoid the indenture’s restrictions on commencing a liquidation of ZING VII’s assets. According to the Junior Noteholders, allowing ZING VII to be placed in involuntary bankruptcy sets a bad precedent for the CDO market. The bankruptcy court issued an opinion on Aug. 26, 2011 denying the Junior Noteholders’ motion.[2]

    Cayman Islands CDO Was an Eligible Debtor: The court rejected the Junior Noteholders’ argument that ZING VII is ineligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that “only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States . . . may be a debtor under [the Bankruptcy Code].” 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). No one contested whether ZING VII resided or had a domicile in the United States. Zais, 2001 WL 3795169, at *3. The Junior Noteholders argued, however, that as a CDO, ZING VII did not engage in business and thus had no “place of business” in the United States. Id. They asserted that the business activities of collecting money from the collateral securities and distributing it to noteholders were performed by the trustee and management of the collateral securities was done by the collateral manager. Id. The court disagreed. Recognizing that a person has a place of business in the United States if business is conducted in the United States on its behalf, the court held that ZING VII had a place of business in the United States because the collateral manager, the collateral administrator, and the trustee all performed services on its behalf in the United States. Id. The court analogized ZING VII to a “letterbox company”: “All that happens in the Cayman Islands are the necessities for maintaining registration. The important functions of investing, collecting, disbursing, recordkeeping and communicating with noteholders is primarily done in the U.S.” Id. at *5. The court also held that ZING VII had property in the United States because the cash and securities that ZING VII pledged as collateral was nominally ZING VII’s property and was held by the trustee in the United States. Id.

    Non-Recourse Noteholders Could Commence an Involuntary Case Because Debtor Failed to Contest: The court rejected the Junior Noteholders’ argument that the Petitioning Creditors were unqualified to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case against ZING VII. Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires creditors commencing an involuntary case to hold claims aggregating at least $14,425 in excess of the value of any collateral securing their claims. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1). The Junior Noteholders argued that because the Petitioning Creditors’ notes were non-recourse, their claims could never exceed the value of the collateral securing them. Zais, 2001 WL 3795169, at *5. The court did not address this argument on the merits. Instead, it held that because the debtor failed to contest the involuntary petition in the time prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code and the court had already entered an order for relief by default, the Junior Noteholders “may not question the petitioning creditors’ qualifications.” Id.

    Bankruptcy Court Will Hear Other Issues at Confirmation: The court declined to abstain from hearing the case or to dismiss it for being filed in bad faith. It found that the Petitioning Creditors “have shown good faith in their desire to realize the greatest present value of the Collateral Securities for the benefit of the A-1 creditors without negatively impacting junior creditors who have no prospect of recovery under the status quo.” Zais, 2001 WL 3795169, at *8. The court held that it would determine whether the plan treats creditors fairly and equitably without discrimination at the confirmation hearing. Id. at *6.

    Litigation Continues

    The Junior Noteholders have appealed the bankruptcy court’s order to the district court. Meanwhile, the Junior Noteholders have objected to the Petitioning Creditors’ proposed Chapter 11 plan, and a confirmation hearing is currently scheduled to begin on Oct. 5, 2011.

    Potential Implications

    Special purpose entity CDOs may be eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code, particularly when the trustee, collateral manager, collateral administrator, and other agents operate the CDO from the United States or when the CDO has assets in the United States. The bankruptcy court’s decision shows that while a special purpose entity CDO may be bankruptcy remote, it is not necessarily bankruptcy proof. As a practical matter, however, the ability of a tranche of noteholders to commence an involuntary case against the CDO may be limited if the noteholders hold non-recourse notes. Although the bankruptcy court declined to dismiss the case on that basis, if ZING VII had timely contested the involuntary petition, i.e., before the court entered the order for relief, the court may have considered the Petitioning Creditors’ eligibility on the merits. This may be a critical issue on appeal.

    Authored by Lawrence V. Gelber, Daniel V. Oshinsky, Craig Stein and Adam Leon Hirsch.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1]  According to papers filed in the bankruptcy court, the indenture governing the notes issued by ZING VII does not specifically prohibit the senior noteholders from commencing an involuntary case against the CDO.

    [2] In re Zais Inv. Grade Ltd. VII, Case No. 11-20243 (RTL), 2001 WL 3795169 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2011).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Daniel V. Oshinsky

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 84

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 84

    October, 2011

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    TRADE MARKS

    “The War of the Roses”:  Proportionality and Use in Accordance With Honest Practices

    Samuel Smith Old Brewery v Philip Lee (t/a Cropton Brewery) [2011] EWHC 1879 (Ch) concerns two breweries, Yorkshire pride, and a lost sense of proportionality. Although Cropton Brewery was found liable for trade mark infringement, notably, Arnold J made no award for damages.

    Registrability of Marks Containing Geographical Indications of Origin

    “Cognac” as a geographical indication (GI) cannot be used in a trade mark of a spirit drink not covered by that GI, as the commercial use of such a mark would harm the protected indication.

    CJEU Considers Effect of Honest Concurrent Use in BUDWEISER Reference

    In Budějovický Budvar, národní podnik v Anheuser-Busch, Inc, C-482/09 (22 September 2011), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that both Anheuser-Busch and Budvar can continue to use the BUDWEISER trade mark in the United Kingdom as there had been a long period of honest concurrent use. The CJEU found that Budvar’s use of its registered mark did not have any adverse effect on Anheuser-Busch’s registration, which was a prerequisite for granting a declaration of invalidity under Article 4(1)(a) of the Community Trade Mark Directive (89/104/EEC, now replaced by 2008/95/EC).

    Further CJEU Guidance On Keyword Advertising And Trade Mark Infringement

    In (1) Interflora Inc. (2) Interflora British Unit v (1) Marks & Spencer plc (2) Flowers Direct Online Ltd, Case C-323/09 (22 September 2011), the Court of Justice of the European Union has provided further guidance on circumstances in which use of a registered trade mark as a keyword by a third party advertiser may constitute trade mark infringement.

    COPYRIGHT AND LICENSING:

    Territorial Exclusivity of Football Broadcasts Found Contrary to EU Law

    The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled in Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure C-403/08 and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd C-429/08 (4 October 2011) that a system of licences for the broadcasting of sporting events which grants licensees territorial exclusivity on a Member State basis, and which prohibits television viewers from watching the broadcasts in one Member State using a decoder licensed for use in another, is contrary to EU law.

    EU Enhances Copyright Protection for Sound Recordings and Songs

    On 12 September 2011, Directive 2011 / 77 / EU, amending Directive 2006 / 116 / EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights (the Directive) was adopted. The Directive extends the term of copyright protection for performers and sound recordings from 50 to 70 years.

    REGISTERED COMMUNITY DESIGN RIGHT:

    The European General Court Decides Only Visible Parts Determine Overall Impression

    In Kwang Yang Motor Co Ltd v OHIM Cases T-10/08 and T-11/08 9 September 2011 (unreported) the European General Court held that a design that constituted a component part of a complex product could only be considered to have individual character if the component part remained visible during normal use and fulfilled the requirements as to novelty and individual character.

    DATABASE

    Sui Generis Database Rights and What Constitutes a Substantial Part

    In Beechwood House Publishing v Guardian Products Ltd [2011] EWPCC 22, the Claimant’s database right was found to have been infringed when the Defendants extracted 6,000 records from the Claimant’s database of 43,000 records. Additionally, the judge found that a subsequent mass-mailing exercise also amounted to infringement as each extraction was systematic.

    DATA PROTECTION:

    How The Cookie Crumbles: A Clash of Cultures on Cookie Regulation

    The Article 29 Working Party has met with Internet Advertising Bureau Europe and European Advertising Standards Alliance representatives to tell them in no uncertain terms that their otherwise well-received Best Practice Recommendation and Framework on Online Behavioural Advertising does not comply with the revised e-Privacy Directive provisions on cookies.

    In depth
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  • SEC Proposal on Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations

    SEC Proposal on Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Proposal on Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations

    September 22, 2011

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 19, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) issued, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), a notice of proposed rulemaking that addresses the prohibition of conflicts of interest in certain securitizations (the “Proposed Rule”). The deadline for submission of comments to the SEC on the Proposed Rule is Dec. 19, 2011.

    Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act adds new Section 27B to the Securities Act of 1933 which prohibits an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser or sponsor of an asset-backed security, including a synthetic asset-backed security (or any of their affiliates) from engaging in a transaction that would result in a material conflict of interest vis-à-vis any investor in the asset-backed security for a period of one year following the initial closing date. Exceptions are available in the cases of (a) hedging activities engaged in by an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser or sponsor if the risk being hedged is specific to the party’s function in the securitization (e.g., shorting warehoused assets prior to closing); (b) commitments by any such party to provide liquidity for the asset-backed security; and (c) bona fide market-making in the asset-backed security. The language of the Proposed Rule (Rule 127B) is substantially similar to the language of existing Section 27B; however, in the Proposed Rule, the SEC clarifies the scope of the new prohibition.

    The SEC explains that in order for the Rule 127B prohibition to apply to a transaction, five elements must be present:

    1. Covered persons: “Covered persons” include underwriters, placement agents, initial purchasers, sponsors, or any of their subsidiaries or affiliates. The SEC notes that its interpretation of the definition of sponsor for Rule 127B purposes is broader than the Regulation AB definition of sponsor, since Regulation AB does not apply to synthetic asset-backed securities.
    2. Covered products: “Covered products” include any asset-backed securities, registered or unregistered, including synthetic asset-backed securities. The Dodd-Frank Act definition of an asset-backed security is broad and includes traditional asset-backed securities as well as collateralized debt obligations.
    3. Covered timeframe: The “covered timeframe” during which transactions are prohibited under Proposed Rule 127B ends one year after the first closing of the sale of the asset-backed security to the public. The SEC notes that the prohibition would apply to transactions that are effected prior to the closing date.
    4. Covered conflict: The term “covered conflict” is defined as a conflict that arises between an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser or sponsor, on the one hand, and an investor, on the other hand, in their respective capacities in the securitization. Thus a conflict solely between two underwriters or between two investors would not qualify as a covered conflict. The Proposed Rule also explains that a covered conflict must arise out of a transaction. Activities that are not transactions — e.g., providing investment research — cannot give rise to covered conflicts.
    5. Material conflict of interest: The Proposed Rule explains that for a conflict of interest to be a “material conflict of interest,” it must satisfy a two-prong test. First, the relevant party either (a) must benefit directly or indirectly from actual or potential losses on, or from a decline in the market value of, the asset-backed security (including the asset pool underlying the asset-backed security) or (b) must receive compensation or the promise of future business from a third party which is allowed to structure a transaction where the third party would benefit from losses or decline. Second, there must be a “substantial likelihood” that a “reasonable” investor would consider the conflict important in making his or her investment decision.

    The full text of the Proposed Rule is available from the SEC’s website.

    Authored by Phillip J. Azzollini, Craig Stein, Joseph Suh, Paul N. Watterson, Jr. and Jacob B. Wentworth.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Phillip J. Azzollini

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Paul N. Watterson, Jr.

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • New Reporting Requirements for New York State Employers

    New Reporting Requirements for New York State Employers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Reporting Requirements for New York State Employers

    September 15, 2011

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective July 15, 2011, New York State employers must report whether health insurance benefits are available to the dependents of their employees pursuant to the Low Income Support Obligation and Performance Improvement Act (the “Act”). The Act, which amends New York Tax Code Sections 171-a and 171-h (“Section 171-a” and “Section 171-h”), was enacted in an effort to increase the number of children enrolled in health insurance programs.

    Quarterly Wage Reporting

    Employers have been required to report the name, Social Security number, and gross wages paid to each employee who resides in, or is employed in, New York State on Form NYS-45 (Quarterly Combined Withholding, Wage Reporting, and Unemployment Insurance Return) in accordance with Section 171-a. Under the Act, employers must additionally disclose whether dependent health insurance benefits are available to these employees. Form NYS-45 has been revised to include a new entry for the availability of dependent health insurance benefits. View Form NYS-45.

    New Hire Reporting

    The Act also expands upon an employer’s reporting requirements for new hires and re-hires. Section 171-h previously required that employers report the name, address, and Social Security number of each newly hired or rehired employee as well as the employee’s identification number on Form W-4, or an equivalent form. Under the Act, employers now must also disclose whether dependent health insurance benefits are available to newly hired or re-hired employees and, if so, the date that the employee qualifies for the benefits. This information must be reported on Form IT-2104 (Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate) or Form IT-2104-E (Certificate of Exemption From Withholding), both of which were updated to reflect this new requirement. Employers may also submit this information electronically. It should be noted that employers can no longer fulfill their new hire reporting obligations by submitting a Form W-4 alone.

    Educational Institution Rule

    According to the Rules for Specific Employment Types on the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance website, teachers and other employees of educational institutions who are paid an annual salary are not considered to be rehired when they return to school for the beginning of a new school year.

    Conclusion

    New York State employers should ensure that they are in compliance with the new reporting requirements. Those employers utilizing payroll providers to file quarterly wage and new hire reports should coordinate with their payroll providers to determine how to identify and report employees who qualify for dependent health insurance benefits.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold and Adam J. Rivera.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Fifth Circuit Shows Reorganization Investors How to Get and Keep an Expense Reimbursement Order

    Fifth Circuit Shows Reorganization Investors How to Get and Keep an Expense Reimbursement Order

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Shows Reorganization Investors How to Get and Keep an Expense Reimbursement Order

    September 9, 2011

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Aug. 16, 2011, affirmed the lower court’s decision authorizing reimbursement of expenses to qualified bidders for a reorganization debtor’s assets. In re Asarco, LLC, 2011 BL 213002 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011). In the court’s view, the debtor provided “a compelling and sound business justification for the reimbursement authority.” Id. at *12.

    Facts

    The Chapter 11 debtor had invited investors to bid at an auction sale of its most valuable asset. It promptly sought, with advice from its professionals, authorization under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(b) to reimburse expenses incurred by any selected bidders, explaining “that . . . it . . . would [give the bidders] the opportunity to conduct additional due diligence” entailing “highly sophisticated legal analysis” at “substantial” expense.” Id. at *3-4. In the debtor’s view, it had to “provide bidders with an incentive to undertake this investment.” Id.

    The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s motion for the so-called expense “reimbursement order” after a hearing. Although the debtor’s corporate parent had objected, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor had shown “a compelling and sound business justification” for the relief requested. Id. When the corporate parent appealed, the district court affirmed, but the parent appealed again to the Fifth Circuit.

    Arguments Made on Appeal

    The debtor’s corporate parent argued that the bankruptcy court had applied the wrong legal standard for authorizing the reimbursement of expenses. In its view, the bankruptcy court should have relied on Code § 503(b), which applies to administrative expenses, a standard that is “more stringent” than the business judgment standard contained in Code § 363(b). Id. at *7-8. Second, according to the parent, even if Code § 363(b) was the correct standard, the bankruptcy erred in finding that the debtor’s “motion satisfied the business judgment” test. Id. at *8. Finally, although the parent argued that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in approving the reimbursement procedures “without notice” to it and “without sufficient judicial oversight,” Id. at *8, it had not raised this issue in the lower courts, and the Court of Appeals refused to consider the argument, deeming it waived. Id.

    Legal Standard: §§ 363(b) or 503(b)

    1. Business Judgment — 363(b): A chapter 11 debtor-in-possession may, under Code § 363(b), “after notice and hearing . . . use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” (emphasis added) To satisfy the court in this context, the debtor-in-possession or trustee must articulate a “business justification . . .” for the use of cash — estate property. Id. at *9. According to the Fifth Circuit, the business judgment standard in section § 363(b) is “flexible and encourages discretion,” requiring the bankruptcy judge to “consider all salient factors pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly, act to further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike. Id. (quoting In re Cont’l Airlines, 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) and In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983)).
    2. Administrative Expense — § 503(b):. Code § 503(b), pertaining to administrative expenses, provides a narrower standard for the use of the estate’s cash. It allows a party to recover, as administrative expenses, “the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate.” As explained by the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he words ‘actual’ and ‘necessary’ have been construed narrowly: ‘the debt must benefit [the] estate and its creditors.’ ” Id. at *10 (quoting In re Trans American Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).

      The debtor’s parent argued here that “the reimbursement order was in error because the requested reimbursements were not actually necessary to preserve the value of the estate.” Id. To support this argument, the parent cited “two Third Circuit Decisions where the lower court applied § 503(b) and not 363(b) to requests for break-up fees.” In re O’Brien Envt’l Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d at 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1999) (held, no break-up fees to unsuccessful stalking horse bidder; § 503(b) governs unsuccessful bidder’s request for break-up fees; applying administrative expense standard, unsuccessful bidder failed to make requisite showing that its fees were actually necessary to preserve value of estate; fees to be paid if prospective bidder unsuccessful; court concerned that fee would “chill . . . the competitive bidding process.”); In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2010) (same).

    3. Resolution: The Fifth Circuit was “not persuaded that Reliant and O’Brien” applied here. First, the debtor only sought “authority to reimburse expense fees for second-round ‘qualified’ bidders in a multiple stage auction for a very unique and very valuable but possibly worthless asset.” Id. at *11. Second, “prospective (and qualified) bidders could be reimbursed regardless of whether they were successful.” Id. Finally, there was no bid-chilling here because the debtor ”sought to increase competition by providing bidders an incentive to undertake the costly but necessary due diligence.” Id. In the court’s view, § 363(b) applied to the debtor’s advance request to use its funds “before any potential qualified bidders . . . had incurred due diligence and work fees.” Id. at *12. In contrast, the “unsuccessful bidders in O’Brien and Reliant Energy sought payment for expenses incurred without the court’s pre-approval,” making § 503(b) “the proper channel for requesting payment.” Id.

      The Court of Appeals also deferred to the bankruptcy court’s findings in Asarco that the “proposed reimbursement . . . was designed to maximize the value” of the debtor’s estate; “was fair, reasonable, and appropriate”; and was “in the best interests” of the debtor, “its estate, creditors, interest holders, stakeholders, and all other parties in interest.” Id. Moreover, there was “no evidence . . . of self-dealing or manipulation among the parties who negotiated the reimbursement procedures; the Reimbursement Order facilitated, not hindered, the auction process; and the approved maximum available size of the reimbursement fee was reasonable.” Id. at *12-13.

    Comments

    1. The requested fees here were based on actual “due diligence” expenses. They were not merely the typical “break-up fee . . . paid by a seller to a prospective purchase in the event that a contemplated transaction is not consummated.” Id. (quoting O’Brien, 181 F.3d at 528).
    2. Prior court authorization for the expense reimbursement was essential to the result here. With the proper showing — reasonableness, arm’s length negotiations and tangible benefit to the estate — a court is more likely to pre-approve expense reimbursement if it learns of the fees at the earliest stage of the process. For the prospective acquiror, early court review also provides the certainty of reimbursement before incurring substantial expenses.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Lawrence V. Gelber.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • New Treasury Department Reporting Obligations for Certain US Investment Managers

    New Treasury Department Reporting Obligations for Certain US Investment Managers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Treasury Department Reporting Obligations for Certain US Investment Managers

    September 7, 2011

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Executive Summary

    Starting Sept. 30, 2011, U.S. investment managers that meet or exceed certain reporting thresholds described below must file Treasury International Capital (“TIC”) Form SLT, quarterly in 2011, and monthly in 2012. U.S. investment managers file TIC Form SLT with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. These filings may be made electronically. U.S. investment managers are required to present a consolidated snapshot of the holdings and issuances of all U.S.-managed funds and accounts. In addition to requiring reporting at the portfolio level, TIC Form SLT also requires fund-level reporting, including holdings by foreign residents in a U.S. fund, and holdings between funds in a master-feeder structure where one or more funds is a foreign entity and the other is a U.S. fund.

    Reporting Obligations

    The TIC reporting system collects information relating to cross-border financial flows and positions between U.S. residents and foreign residents. TIC Form SLT will collect information on ownership of foreign long-term securities by U.S. residents. The U.S. Treasury uses the data in the “formulation of international financial and monetary policies and for the preparation of the U.S. balance of payments accounts and U.S. international investment position.”[1] The data gathered on TIC Form SLT will be kept confidential by the government and will be used in reports on an aggregate basis only.

    On March 31, 2011, the U.S. Treasury proposed TIC Form SLT, which will apply to certain U.S. investment managers of hedge funds and private equity funds. U.S. investment managers should consider whether reporting requirements mandated by the TIC Form SLT apply to their organizations. While TIC Form SLT applies to a variety of U.S.-resident institutions, this Alert only addresses its potential impact on U.S. investment managers.[2]

    A U.S. investment manager will have a filing obligation on TIC Form SLT if its consolidated reportable holdings and issuances of long-term securities (as defined in the TIC Form SLT instructions, but which generally includes equity and debt instruments, such as common stock, preferred stock and partnership interests as well as bonds, notes and asset-backed securities, but excludes, among other things, loans and derivative contracts) have a total fair market value of $1 billion or more as of the last business day of the reporting month. This minimum threshold test requires the U.S. investment manager to aggregate all holdings across all applicable funds and foreign resident countries; it is not a fund-by-fund or a country-by-country test.

    To the extent that the threshold amount is met, U.S. investment managers will be required to report: (i) the fair market value of holdings by their U.S. funds in foreign securities,[3] (ii) the fair market value of holdings by foreign investors in U.S. hedge funds and U.S. private equity funds formed by the U.S. investment manager, and (iii) the fair market value of holdings between U.S. master or feeder funds and their counterpart foreign master or feeder funds.

    • Holdings of Securities: Holdings of securities issued by foreign residents may be reportable, except to the extent that such transactions or holdings qualify as “direct investments”[4] or are reportable by a U.S.-resident custodian. TIC Form SLT is designed to minimize reporting by end investors, such as U.S. investment managers, by requiring that certain financial intermediaries (e.g., brokers, dealers, issuers, custodians and paying agents) provide the majority of the reporting. To avoid duplication, U.S. investment managers are required to report only transactions and holdings that are not required to be reported by an intermediary. Note, however, that prime brokers located outside of the United States will not have TIC Form SLT reporting obligations because they are not U.S. resident custodians (even if they are affiliated with a U.S. financial firm). It is important, therefore, for U.S. investment managers to contact each of their prime brokers and determine if that prime broker will be making the TIC Form SLT filing with respect to the foreign securities managed by the U.S. investment manager.
    • Holdings by Investors: U.S. investment managers are required to report the holding of any interests in their U.S. funds and accounts issued directly to, or placed directly with, foreign residents. Because many U.S. investment managers of hedge funds offer securities to foreign residents through a foreign entity, this part of the report will probably be more relevant to U.S. investment managers of private equity funds, which frequently offer securities of U.S. entities to foreign residents.
    • Master-Feeder Structure: The TIC Form SLT filing instructions provide detailed examples of a number of cases in which holdings between feeder and master funds must be reported. [5] For example, if the reporting threshold is passed, a U.S. investment manager of a hedge fund set up as a master-feeder structure, with a U.S. feeder fund and a Cayman Islands master fund, will be required to report ownership by the U.S. feeder fund of shares in the Cayman Islands master fund.

    The objective and scope of TIC Form SLT is broad. The instructions canvass a large number of possible reportable fund-related issuances, transactions and portfolio investments. Nevertheless, three important analyses should be undertaken by U.S. investment managers whose fund transactions and sizes come within range of the threshold reporting levels: (i) determine whether your existing financial intermediaries have a reporting obligation (under TIC Form SLT) with respect to the U.S. funds and accounts you manage; (ii) determine whether your U.S. funds have issued securities to foreign residents; and (iii) determine whether your current master-feeder fund structure, including master-feeder holdings, could, in the aggregate, trigger the applicable reporting obligations.

    Timing

    TIC Form SLT filings must be made on a quarterly basis during 2011 and on a monthly basis starting Jan. 31, 2012. The effective date for TIC Form SLT is Sept. 30‚ 2011. TIC Form SLT must be filed no later than the 23rd day of the month following the last business day of the month in which a U.S. investment manager’s holdings exceed the reporting threshold. If an investment manager’s holdings exceed the threshold on Sept. 30, 2011, the first filing deadline will be Oct. 24, 2011 (as the 23rd is a Sunday). Once the threshold has been passed, U.S. investment managers must continue to file for the balance of a calendar year even if their holdings in subsequent months fall below the reporting threshold.

    For a copy of the TIC Form SLT, its proposed instructions and Frequently Asked Questions, please visit: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/forms-slt.aspx.

    Please note that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York held a training seminar which provided information on reporting criteria, data concepts and preparation of the TIC Form SLT. A webcast of the seminar is available for viewing until Oct. 20, 2011 at: http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/events/banking/2011/0405_2011.html.

    Authored by Daniel F. Hunter and Jesse M. Hirsch.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Departmental Offices; Proposed Collections; Comment Requests, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 62447 (Oct. 8, 2010).

    [2] It is important to note that investment managers that maintain their primary office outside of the United States but maintain branch offices in the United States or advise funds or accounts formed in the United States may also have TIC Form SLT filing obligations on behalf of the U.S. resident funds, accounts or offices.

    [3] An investment manager would also need to report the fair market value of holdings by their non-U.S. funds in U.S. securities if such securities are held in an omnibus account.

    [4] A “direct investment” includes U.S. resident ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting equity securities of a foreign business, and foreign resident ownership of 10 percent or more of the voting equity securities of a U.S. business. Limited partners are deemed to be passive owners and, accordingly, cannot qualify to have made a “direct investment” in the applicable limited partnership. Direct investments are not reported on TIC Form SLT. Instead, they are reported on a reporting system administered by the Bureau of Economic Affairs (“BEA”).

    [5] While feeder funds often hold more than 10 percent of the corresponding master fund’s voting securities and would therefore seem to qualify as “direct investments” (reported to the BEA), the examples provided in the instructions state that these investments are portfolio transactions and/or holdings subject to TIC Form SLT.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Daniel F. Hunter

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Lehman Brothers Disclosure Statement Approved

    Lehman Brothers Disclosure Statement Approved

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Lehman Brothers Disclosure Statement Approved

    August 31, 2011

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Aug. 30, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York approved the disclosure statement with respect to the revised second amended joint Chapter 11 plan of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors (the “Debtors”). The order approving the Debtors’ disclosure statement and establishing certain procedures related to the hearing to consider confirmation of the plan (the “order”) can be accessed here.

    As set forth in the order, the Bankruptcy Court approved the following time line:

    Solicitation and Voting

    • Voting record date: Aug. 1, 2011.
    • Deadline to object to claims to determine whether claimant is entitled to vote: Sept. 16, 2011.
    • Debtors to distribute solicitation packages: Sept. 23-30, 2011.
    • Voting deadline: Nov. 4, 2011 at 4 p.m. (EST).
    • Debtors’ tabulation agent will file a voting certification: Dec. 1, 2011.
    • The order also contains procedures and deadlines for establishing the amount, allowance, and classification of claims for voting purposes. Claimants seeking to challenge the proposed amount, allowance, or classification of their claims for voting purposes must do so within 14 days of receiving (i) notice of the confirmation hearing, which will be included in the Debtors’ solicitation package or (ii) notice of an objection to their claims, whichever is later, but in no event later than Oct. 7, 2011.

    Chapter 11 Plan and Confirmation

    • Deadline to object to confirmation of the plan: Nov. 4, 2011, at 4 p.m. (EST).
    • Confirmation hearing will commence Dec. 6, 2011, at 10 a.m. (EST).

    Authored by Lawrence V. Gelber, Adam Leon Hirsch and Kyu (Mike) Paek.

    The order contains additional details, deadlines, and procedures for soliciting and voting on the Debtors’ plan. Please consult your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP if you have any questions.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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