Content Type: Article

  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 82

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 82

    July, 2011

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    PATENTS

    The “Patent Box”: Preferential Tax on Profits From Patents

    On 10 June 2011, the UK Government launched a Consultation on the “Patent Box”, a preferential corporation tax regime of 10 per cent on profits arising from patents. According to HM Treasury, the consultation forms part of the Government’s plans to make the United Kingdom’s tax system the most competitive in the G20.

    UNREGISTERED DESIGN

    Documentation of the Creative Process is Key to Overcoming an Inference of Copying

    In Albert Packaging Ltd and others v Nampak Cartons and Healthcare ltd[2011] EWPCC 15, although there was an inference that the Claimants’ unregistered design had been a consideration in the Defendant’s creative process, the Defendant was able to produce documentation that showed the design as a work in progress.

    TRADE MARKS

    Court of Appeal of England and Wales Upholds High Court’s Construction of Co-Existence Agreement

    The Court of Appeal of England and Wales has upheld the judgment of Mr Justice Arnold in a dispute between US company, Omega Engineering Inc (Omega USA), and Swiss watchmaker, Omega SA (Omega Swiss), over the application by Omega USA for a UK trade mark for OMEGA and the construction of a co-existence agreement.

    UK High Court Rules on Oral Community Trade Mark Licensee Rights

    In Jean Christian Perfumes Ltd v Thakrar (t/a Brand Distributor or Brand Distributors Ltd) [2011] EWCH 1383 (Ch), John Baldwin QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge in the Chancery Division, ruled that even an oral licensee of a Community trade mark (CTM) can sue for infringement.

    COPYRIGHT

    Breach of Co-Existence Agreement, Passing Off and Copyright Infringement

    In Future Publishing Ltd v The Edge Interactive Media Inc & Ors [2011] EWHC 1489 (Ch) the Claimant succeeded in showing breach of a co-existence agreement through actions that amounted to passing off. The Claimant also succeeded in invalidating the Defendants’ marks.

    PASSING OFF

    Localised Goodwill of Small Businesses

    In Redwood Tree Services Ltd v Warren Apsey t/a Redwood Tree Surgeons [2011] EWPCC 14 (13 May 2011) it was found that a small business with highly localised goodwill could succeed in a claim for passing off against a business with a similar name located 10 miles away that traded in part in the same catchment area if there was the requisite misrepresentation. Unlike the national protection offered by a registered trade mark, the protection of goodwill against passing off is limited in scope to the geographical area common to both businesses.

    DATA PROTECTION

    Big Brother Becomes Big Bother For CCTV Monitoring Website Forced to Change the Way it Operates

    The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has required CCTV monitoring website, Internet Eyes, to make significant changes to its operations after CCTV footage of a shopper was posted on YouTube.

    European Parliament Calls for Stronger Rules on Personal Data Protection

    In adopting a resolution on the need for a comprehensive approach to data protection in Europe, the European Parliament notes that the current regime is strong but can be improved. Areas of focus are: the need for full harmonisation, the protection of children using social networks, and that all EU citizens should have the right to know what information is being stored and for what purpose.

    UNFIAR CONTRACTUAL TERMS

    Gym Contracts and The Unfair Trading Regulations

    The High Court of England and Wales has held that Ashbourne Management Services Ltd’s standard form contracts breached the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, and the Enterprise Act 2002.

    CONSUMER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE

    European Parliament Approves the Proposed Consumer Rights Directive

    On 23 June 2011, the European Parliament approved the proposed Consumer Rights Directive (CRD), which now only needs formal approval from the European Council to become law. The proposed Directive contains significant new protections for consumers including clearer pricing rules, common rules on delivery and transfer of risk, and a 14 day right of withdrawal.

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  • Second Circuit Holds Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbor Insulates Sellers of Enron Commercial Paper from Preference and Fraudulent Transfer Liability

    Second Circuit Holds Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbor Insulates Sellers of Enron Commercial Paper from Preference and Fraudulent Transfer Liability

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Holds Bankruptcy Code Safe Harbor Insulates Sellers of Enron Commercial Paper from Preference and Fraudulent Transfer Liability

    June 29, 2011

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision on June 28, 2011, held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), which exempts a “Settlement Payment” from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoiding powers, insulated two sellers of Enron Corporation’s commercial paper from suit despite Enron’s early pre-bankruptcy redemption. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., ___F.3d ___, 2011 WL 2536101 (2d Cir. June 28, 2011) (2-1). In a victory for investors who sell the commercial paper of insolvent companies in the secondary market, the defendant noteholders will not have to return payments that they received from their stockbroker.

    Relevance to Commercial Paper Market

    Affirming the District Court’s reversal of a bankruptcy court decision, the Second Circuit agreed that the Enron litigation trust’s fraudulent transfer and preference complaint against Alfa and ING investment funds must be dismissed. On “an issue of first impression in the courts of appeals,” it held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(e), “which shields ‘settlement payments’ from avoidance actions in bankruptcy, extends to [Enron’s] payments to redeem its commercial paper prior to maturity.” Id. at *1.

    Facts

    Shortly before Enron sought bankruptcy relief in late 2001, it paid out more than $1.1 billion to retire some of its unsecured commercial paper prior to its maturity date. After bankruptcy, Enron sued 200 former noteholders and institutions (who initially received Enron’s payment and were also sued) to recover payments they received one day prior to the maturity date of the notes. Alfa and ING were the only two remaining defendants in the eight-year-old commercial paper litigation, the rest having settled.

    Alfa’s Defense

    Alfa argued that, as a noteholder, it was entitled to keep the money because of the “safe harbor” provision in Bankruptcy Code § 546(e). It never dealt with Enron, but only bought the commercial paper from its broker, and, at the broker’s request, sold it back to the broker.

    Court’s Holding

    The Second Circuit demolished Enron’s legal arguments: its “proposed exclusions from the reach of § 546(e) have no basis in the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. According to the court, the “plain language” of the Bankruptcy Code extends to commercial paper, and the “settlement payment” made to Alfa, which it defined as “any transfer that concludes or consummates a securities transaction,” was insulated from attack. The securities industry, moreover, considered the transfers here as “settlement payments.” Indeed, they were consummated under the standard clearing mechanism for transactions in commercial paper “using the customary mechanism of the Depository Trust Company.” Id. at *4.

    Though made within 90 days of Enron’s filing for Chapter 11, the court found that the redemption payments to Alfa “completed a transaction in securities” and were thus “settlement payments.” Disagreeing with the bankruptcy court and Enron “that redemption payments are not settlement payments” because they retired debt “and were not [made] to acquire title to the commercial paper,” the court stressed that the Bankruptcy Code imposed no “purchase or sale” requirement. Id. at *8-*9.

    The Dissent and Enron’s Argument

    Enron had argued that (a) there was no settlement payment, (b) commercial paper is not a security, and (c) the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provision did not apply. The dissenting judge, agreeing that the issue here “has never been decided previously by any court of appeals,” deemed the majority’s broad definition of “settlement payment” to “threaten . . . routine avoidance proceedings in bankruptcy courts.” Id. at *10.

    SRZ represented Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., one of the successful parties on this appeal.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Supreme Court Limits Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Rule on State Law Claims by Trustees and Debtors

    Supreme Court Limits Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Rule on State Law Claims by Trustees and Debtors

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Limits Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Rule on State Law Claims by Trustees and Debtors

    June 28, 2011

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Supreme Court held on June 23, 2011 that bankruptcy “judges should not be in the business of entering final judgments” on a debtor’s state law counterclaim in response to a claim filed by a creditor. Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 2011 WL 2472792, *25, *27 (2011) (5-4) (“The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”). In effect, the Court limited the ability of bankruptcy courts to rule on a trustee’s non-bankruptcy-related claims against third parties. The decision appears to be narrow, but, as shown below, will have a much broader effect on the ability of trustees and debtors to sue creditors in the “home” bankruptcy court.

    Factual Overview

    The 15-year litigation in Stern turned on a multi-state conflict between a widow and her stepson. She claimed that the stepson had fraudulently prevented his father, a wealthy Texan, from including his wife, the soon-to-be widow, in a living trust prior to his death, although the decedent had “meant to give her half his property.” Id. at *6.

    The widow first asserted her claim in a Texas probate court, before her husband’s death in April 1995. The stepson disputed the claim in Texas, but the widow, after being forced into a California Chapter 11 case, then reasserted her claim as a counterclaim in response to the stepson’s defamation claim in the bankruptcy court. The stepson also filed a defamation complaint against the widow in the bankruptcy court, asserting that his claim was not dischargeable. The California district court agreed with the bankruptcy court that the stepson was liable on the widow’s counterclaim but did not enter a judgment until after the Texas court had first rejected her claim.

    The Ninth Circuit, in 2010, on remand from a 2006 Supreme Court ruling, held that “the Texas probate court’s judgment [was] the earliest final judgment . . . on matters relevant to” the parties’ claims. Id. at *8. Thus, in its view, the California district court should have “afford[ed] preclusive effect” to the Texas “court’s determination of relevant legal and factual issues.” Id. The Supreme Court affirmed on constitutional grounds.

    The Invalidated Statute

    The Judiciary Code, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), authorizes bankruptcy judges to “hear and determine all core proceedings arising under [the Bankruptcy Code] 11, or arising in a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] 11 . . ., and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to [appellate] review . . .,” including “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate.” (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, the majority of the Court in Stern (five Justices) found this specific provision of the Judiciary Code to be unconstitutional because of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which requires “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” to “be vested in” only those independent judges who have life tenure and whose salaries Congress may not diminish — i.e., U.S. district judges, not bankruptcy judges. Article III judges (Supreme Court  Courts of Appeals and district courts) are appointed by the President (Art. II, § 2) with the “advice and consent of the Senate.” Congress has failed, however, to give bankruptcy judges Article III status, choosing instead to provide for their appointment as Article I, § 8 judges under Congress’s legislative power. As the Supreme Court noted, “bankruptcy judges . . . have been appointed to 14-year terms by the courts of appeals . . .,” Id. at *9, pursuant to federal legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).

    Majority Rationale

    Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, summarized the principal “reasons given in the Court’s opinion for concluding that an Article III judge [i.e., a district judge] was required to adjudicate this lawsuit [a debtor’s nonbankrutpcy law counterclaim]”:

    1. it “was one ‘under state common law’”;

    2. it “was ‘not “completely dependent upon’ adjudication of a claim created by federal law”;

    3. “[the creditor here] did not truly consent to resolution of [the debtor’s] claim in the bankruptcy court proceedings”;

    4. “the asserted authority to decide [the debtor’s] claim is not limited to a particularized area of the law”;

    5. “there was never any reason to believe that the process of adjudicating [the creditor’s] proof of claim would necessarily resolve [the debtor’s] counterclaim”;

    6. “[the debtor] was not ‘asserting a right of recovery created by federal bankruptcy law’”; and

    7. the Bankruptcy Judge “ha[d] the power to enter appropriate orders and judgments” — including final judgments — subject to review only if a party chooses to appeal.”

    Id. at *27. In sum, Stern will have far-reaching consequences in bankruptcy litigation, only some of which can be predicted here. Indeed, the dissent predicted “a constitutionally required game of ping-pong between courts [that will] lead to inefficiency, increased cost, delay, and needless additional suffering . . . .” Id. at *37.

    Likely Consequences

    First, a trustee’s counterclaim based on state law (e.g., contract, tort) must now be determined by a district judge despite the creditor’s filing of a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court. A preference counterclaim, but not a fraudulent transfer counterclaim, can still be heard and determined by the bankruptcy judge. Id. at *21-22, citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966) and Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990). Other routine matters will still be handled by bankruptcy judges (e.g., allowance of claims; contract rejection and contract assumption; fee issues; automatic stay disputes). In doubt and subject to litigation will be any non-bankruptcy claims asserted by the debtor’s estate against third parties, including fraudulent transfers, lender liability claims and fraud claims.

    District judges are not looking for more work. They will probably construe Stern narrowly and reallocate pre-trial matters in non-core bankruptcy litigation to the bankruptcy courts. This kind of reallocation occurred after the Second Circuit held that a bankruptcy judge could not determine a breach-of-contract claim when the non-debtor was entitled to a jury trial. In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1994). The district courts later allowed bankruptcy judges to preside over all pre-trial matters until the dispute was ready for trial. See, In re Loral Space & Communications, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13230 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“While the issue is always case specific, often courts in this District have found it appropriate to defer withdrawing the reference [to the bankruptcy court] until a case is trial ready.”)(citing cases).

    Comment

    Supreme Court precedent had led litigators to assume that a creditor’s filing of a claim in the bankruptcy court constituted a submission to the bankruptcy’s jurisdiction for all purposes. In order to distinguish this precedent, which was limited to preference counterclaims that are part of the claims allowance process, Katchen, Langenkamp, supra, the majority in Stern held that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) was unconstitutional by going beyond the basic bankruptcy scheme. Although Stern is ostensibly a narrow ruling, the majority essentially held that Congress had given too much power to bankruptcy judges, who are not Article III hearing officers.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Treasury Issues Notices Extending FBAR Deadlines for Officers and Employees of Investment Advisers and Others

    Treasury Issues Notices Extending FBAR Deadlines for Officers and Employees of Investment Advisers and Others

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Treasury Issues Notices Extending FBAR Deadlines for Officers and Employees of Investment Advisers and Others

    June 28, 2011

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) has issued guidance with respect to the filing of reports of foreign financial accounts (“FBARs”) by officers and employees of investment advisers and others with different filing deadlines. Specifically, officers and employees of investment advisers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) who have only signature authority over foreign financial accounts, will now have until June 30, 2012 to file an FBAR. With respect to officers and employees of non-SEC-registered investment advisers and other entities, the filing deadline for 2009 and prior years will be Nov. 1, 2011, but the deadline for the year 2010 continues to be June 30, 2011.

    Background Information

    On Feb. 24, 2011, the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued final regulations relating to the filing of FBARs and reaffirmed the FBAR reporting requirement for persons with “signature or other authority” over foreign financial accounts.[1]

    Any U.S. person who has a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, any foreign financial accounts, including bank, securities, or other types of financial accounts in a foreign country, must report that relationship each calendar year by filing an FBAR with the Treasury on or before June 30 of the succeeding year, if the aggregate value of these financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.

    The Treasury has previously issued Notice 2009-62 and Notice 2010-23, effectively extending until June 30, 2011, the deadline for filing FBARs for calendar year 2009 and for earlier calendar years for persons having only signature authority over a foreign financial account.

    After the release of the final regulations, three additional filing extensions were granted:

    Notice 2011-54: Additional Administrative Relief for Individuals Whose Filing Deadline Was Extended Under Notice 2010-23:

    Individuals who deferred filing FBARs under Notice 2009-62 or Notice 2010-23 now have until Nov. 1, 2011, to file FBARs with respect to accounts for which they have only signature authority in a foreign financial account in 2009 or earlier calendar years. The deadline for reporting signature authority over foreign financial accounts for the 2010 calendar year remains June 30, 2011.

    Notice 2011-2: Extended Filing Date Relating to Officers or Employees of Investment Advisers Registered With the Securities and Exchange Commission:

    On June 17, 2011, FinCEN granted relief with respect to the filing of FBARs to those officers or employees of SEC-registered investment advisers who have signature or other authority over, but no financial interest in, foreign financial accounts of persons that are not investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The relief applies to the filing of FBARs for calendar year 2010 and any earlier year for which the filing deadline was properly deferred under Notice 2009-62 or Notice 2010-23. The new FBAR filing date for this category of persons is June 30, 2012.

    Notice 2011-1: Extended Filing Date Related to Employees or Officers of Certain Financial Institutions (Revised):

    On June 6, 2011, FinCEN granted an extension of the FBAR filing date to June 30, 2012, to allow the following individuals additional time to file:

    1. An employee or officer of a regulated entity under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f)(2)(i)-(v), e.g., a bank examined by federal regulators for compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act or a financial institution registered with, and examined by, the SEC or Commodities Futures Trading Commission, who has signature or other authority over, and no financial interest in, a foreign financial account of a controlled person of the regulated entity; or
    2. An employee or officer of a controlled person of a regulated entity who has signature or other authority over, and no financial interest in, a foreign financial account of the regulated entity, the controlled person, or another controlled person of the regulated entity.

    This extension covers U.S. officers or employees who have signature or other authority over, and no financial interest in, foreign financial accounts owned by foreign subsidiaries of a regulated entity.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Philippe Benedict, Shlomo C. Twerski, William I. Friedman and Matthew P. Truax.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors


    [1]The final regulations are analyzed in our April 1, 2011, Alert available at: /insights/treasury-clarifies-fbar-regulations-for-private-investment-funds/.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Philippe Benedict

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The End of the First Five-Year Determination Letter Cycle Is Approaching for Qualified Retirement Plans

    The End of the First Five-Year Determination Letter Cycle Is Approaching for Qualified Retirement Plans

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The End of the First Five-Year Determination Letter Cycle Is Approaching for Qualified Retirement Plans

    June 23, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Every individually-designed qualified retirement plan has a five-year fixed, regular remedial amendment cycle, which begins in different years for different plans, depending on the last digit of the plan sponsor’s employer identification number (EIN). Each plan has a corresponding five-year determination letter cycle (A-E). Plan sponsors have to retroactively amend their plans by the end of the five-year cycle to comply with applicable legislative and regulatory changes. A favorable determination letter is valid only until the end of the plan’s five-year determination letter cycle. Plan sponsors should take note that the end of the first five year cycle is six months away (i.e., Jan. 31, 2012) for any plan in Cycle A that has a one or a six as the last digit of their EIN.

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  • New Bankruptcy Rule 2019: Mandatory Disclosures for Ad Hoc Committee Members

    New Bankruptcy Rule 2019: Mandatory Disclosures for Ad Hoc Committee Members

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Bankruptcy Rule 2019: Mandatory Disclosures for Ad Hoc Committee Members

    June 21, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Supreme Court recently submitted to Congress an amendment to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 dealing with disclosure by groups of hedge funds and other distressed investors in reorganization cases. Unless Congress blocks its passage, which is unlikely, the amendment will become effective on Dec. 1, 2011. The new rule streamlines and clarifies what had become a frequently litigated disclosure process.

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  • SEC to Vote on Private Fund Manager Registration at June 22 Meeting

    SEC to Vote on Private Fund Manager Registration at June 22 Meeting

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC to Vote on Private Fund Manager Registration at June 22 Meeting

    June 9, 2011

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced today that it will hold an open meeting on June 22, 2011 at which it will consider whether to adopt new rules and rule amendments to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act including registration requirements for many hedge fund and private equity fund managers. The SEC staff previously indicated that it expects the SEC to extend the registration deadline until Mar. 30, 2012.

    At the June 22 meeting the SEC also will address other aspects of implementation of Dodd-Frank, including: (1) reporting requirements for advisers exempt from registration; (2) the adoption of exemptions for managers of venture capital funds and funds with less than $150 million under management in the United States; and (3) a rule excluding family offices from the definition of investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

    We will provide an analysis of the final rules and rule amendments when they are released.

    The meeting notice can be found at http://www.sec.gov/news/openmeetings/2011/ssamtg062211.htm.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Reminder: Cafeteria Plans May Need to be Amended for Health Care Reform Over-the-Counter Drug Requirements

    Reminder: Cafeteria Plans May Need to be Amended for Health Care Reform Over-the-Counter Drug Requirements

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Reminder: Cafeteria Plans May Need to be Amended for Health Care Reform Over-the-Counter Drug Requirements

    June 6, 2011

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    If you sponsor a cafeteria plan and have not yet amended your plan to comply with the new requirements for over-the-counter drugs, you have until June 30, 2011 to adopt the necessary changes.

    As discussed in our Summer 2010 Employment & Employee Benefits Developments Newsletter, Special Health Care Reform Issue, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), effective Jan. 1, 2011, employer-sponsored plans, including health flexible spending accounts (“health FSAs”) and health reimbursement arrangements (“HRAs”), may no longer reimburse participants for expenses incurred for over-the-counter drugs and medicines unless the drug or medicine is obtained by prescription. As described in IRS Notice 2010-59, Health FSA and HRA debit cards may not be used to purchase over-the-counter drugs and medicines after Jan. 15, 2011, though participants can continue to use debit cards to purchase medical items other than over-the-counter drugs and medicines.

    Employer-provided plans, including health FSAs and HRAs, can therefore pay or reimburse participants for expenses incurred for drugs and medicines only if the drug or medicine:

    • Requires a prescription;
    • Is available without a prescription but the participant has obtained a prescription nonetheless; or
    • Is insulin.

    The same is true for health savings accounts (“HSAs”) and Archer medical savings accounts (“Archer MSAs”): for amounts paid on or after Jan. 1, 2011, a distribution from an HSA or Archer MSA for a drug or medicine will constitute a tax-free qualified expense only if the drug or medicine is a prescribed drug, regardless of whether the drug or medicine is available without a prescription, or is insulin. If a distribution is made from an HSA or Archer MSA for a drug or medicine that does not satisfy these requirements, the distribution will be for a nonqualified medical expense and will be included in the participants’ gross income and generally be subject to a 20 percent additional tax.

    Call to Action

    Sponsors of cafeteria plans need to adopt a plan amendment to comply with the over-the-counter drug and medicine requirements of PPACA and Notice 2010-59. Though cafeteria plan amendments are generally effective only prospectively, Notice 2010-59 provides a transition rule which permits a retroactive amendment that is effective for expenses incurred after Dec. 31, 2010, or after Jan. 15, 2011, for health FSA and HRA debit card purchases, provided the amendment is adopted by June 30, 2011. If you have not yet amended your cafeteria plan, your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel, or one of the attorneys who have authored this Alert, can advise you in drafting the amendment.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Susan E. Bernstein and Melissa J. Sandak.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage but Do Not Require Internal Reporting

    SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage but Do Not Require Internal Reporting

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Whistleblower Rules Encourage but Do Not Require Internal Reporting

    June 2, 2011

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A month after their scheduled release date, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) voted 3-2 to adopt final rules implementing the hotly-debated whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).[1] Differences between the proposed rules released in November 2010 and the final rules approved on May 25, 2011 center around the role of internal compliance programs in the reporting process, the extent of anti-retaliation protections, eligibility criteria for awards, and the factors affecting award amounts.

    Comments and debate about the proposed rules focused on whether a whistleblower should be required to report possible violations internally before contacting the SEC to be eligible to receive an award. Several commentators argued that the absence of an internal reporting requirement would undercut internal compliance programs. While the SEC’s final rules do not require internal reporting, they encourage internal reporting by providing whistleblowers with credit for internally-reported information that is later provided by the company to the SEC, and factoring in cooperation with internal compliance programs when determining the amount of an award.

    Background

    The Dodd-Frank Act added Section 21F to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It requires the SEC to award whistleblowers — individuals who provide original information that leads to successful SEC enforcement actions — 10 to 30 percent of the total monetary sanctions collected if sanctions exceed $1 million. The $1 million threshold may be met by aggregating monetary sanctions in SEC and “related” actions by federal or state criminal authorities, appropriate regulatory agencies or self-regulatory organizations.

    Expanded Whistleblower Eligibility

    Under the final rules, a “whistleblower” is an individual — an employee, consultant, or other person outside the company — who provides the SEC with information about a possible violation of the federal securities laws that has occurred, is ongoing or is about to occur. To receive an award, a whistleblower must meet several requirements:

    • Only natural persons are eligible to receive awards, although they may provide information alone or jointly with others and may do so anonymously. Corporations or other legal entities cannot receive whistleblower awards.
    • A whistleblower must “voluntarily” provide the SEC with the information. In general, a whistleblower will be deemed to have provided information voluntarily if he provides information before a request, inquiry or demand relating to the information is directed to the whistleblower by the SEC or by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a self-regulatory organization or the government in connection with an investigation, inspection or examination.
    • A whistleblower must provide “original” information based on his independent knowledge or independent analysis — not on information already known to the SEC and not on information derived exclusively from certain public sources.
    • The whistleblower’s information must lead to “successful enforcement” by the SEC of a federal court or administrative action. The information may be deemed to have led to successful enforcement in three circumstances: (1) if the information is sufficiently specific, credible, and timely to cause the SEC to open an investigation, reopen an investigation, or inquire about different conduct in a current examination, and the SEC brings a successful judicial or administrative action based on the conduct that was the subject of the information; (2) if the conduct was already under investigation when the information was submitted, and the information significantly contributes to the success of the action; or (3) information is provided to an internal compliance program before or at the same time as it is provided to the SEC, the company reports the information to the SEC, and a successful action under (1) or (2) results.

    If a whistleblower reports a potential violation to the SEC within 120 days of reporting the same potential violation through an internal compliance program, the whistleblower will be deemed to have reported the potential violation to the SEC as of the date he reported it to his employer. The proposed rules provided for a 90-day “grace period.”

    Inclusion of the third category of “successful enforcement” reflects the outcome of the debate over whether internal reporting should be mandatory. Many commentators expressed concern that failing to require internal reporting, coupled with the possibility of a significant monetary reward, would incentivize employees to report information to the SEC before reporting problems internally, if at all. In a statement before the SEC’s vote, Chairman Schapiro stated that the final rules strike “the correct balance between encouraging whistleblowers to pursue the route of internal compliance when appropriate — while providing them the option of heading directly to the SEC.”[2] The SEC also noted that this provision increases the likelihood that a whistleblower will receive an award, because the award could be based solely on the whistleblower’s tip to the SEC, or on the information provided by the whistleblower’s employer. For instance, the employer’s submission may meet the “specific” and “credible” requirements, even though the original tip did not, thus qualifying the whistleblower for an award that he would not have otherwise received.

    In light of comments on the proposed rules, and concerns about deterring submissions, the final rules expand the range of information deemed to be given “voluntarily.” The proposed rules excluded information that was provided to the PCAOB, a self-regulatory organization, or the government in response to any request or inquiry. Under the final rules, information is given “voluntarily” unless it is provided to regulators in response to a request or inquiry relating to an investigation.

    Other Key Issues

    Eligibility Exclusions: The proposed rules excluded certain individuals from whistleblower awards to ensure that those most responsible for an entity’s conduct and compliance lacked any incentive to promote their own interests at the expense of the entity. Those excluded included individuals with pre-existing legal duties to report information to the SEC, such as attorneys and accountants. The SEC’s final rules cut back on these exclusions, although the following individuals generally are not eligible to receive whistleblower awards:

    • Officers, directors, trustees and partners who learn information in connection with an entity’s internal controls or legal processes;
    • Employees whose principal duties involve compliance or internal audit responsibilities, and employees of independent firms that have compliance or audit responsibilities;
    • Employees of entities retained to investigate violations of law; and
    • Independent public accountants who obtain information in connection with an engagement required under federal securities laws.

    Persons in these categories may, however, receive a whistleblower award if they report a possible violation to the SEC and (1) reasonably believe that disclosure is necessary to prevent the entity from causing substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the entity or investors, (2) reasonably believe the entity is impeding investigation of the misconduct, or (3) at least 120 days have passed since they provided the information to internal authority or compliance programs, or learned that they were aware of the information.

    Attorneys who learn information through privileged communications or in connection with legal representation are not eligible to receive whistleblower awards except when disclosure of the information is permitted under SEC or state bar rules.

    Criteria for Award Amounts: Dodd-Frank Section 21F mandates awards of 10 to 30 percent of monetary sanctions collected based on the information provided by the whistleblower. Under the SEC’s proposed rules, the award amount was based on evaluation of four mandatory factors and 11 discretionary factors. The SEC’s final rules jettisoned the mandatory/discretionary dichotomy in favor of identifying factors that will increase or decrease the amount of a whistleblower’s award.

    Factors that may increase the amount of a whistleblower’s award include:

    • Significance of information — including reliability, completeness, and degree to which it supported successful actions;
    • Timeliness, degree, reliability and effectiveness of the whistleblower’s assistance, including attempts to remediate harm;
    • Programmatic interest of the SEC in deterring violations by rewarding whistleblowers, including whether the subject matter is an SEC priority and the danger to investors or others from the underlying violations; and
    • Participation in internal compliance systems — whether the whistleblower reported internally and assisted with internal investigation. Factors that may decrease the amount of a whistleblower’s award include:
    • Culpability — including role in actions, education, training, responsibility, scienter, and egregiousness of underlying fraud;
    • Unreasonable reporting delay — failing to take action or acting only after an investigation began; and
    • Interference with internal compliance and reporting systems.

    Cooperation or interference with internal compliance programs will affect the amount of a whistleblower’s award — thus encouraging internal reporting. The SEC will not pay awards to whistleblowers when the monetary sanctions are based on payments by the whistleblowers themselves or by entities whose liability is substantially based on the whistleblower’s unlawful conduct.

    Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections

    In addition to the incentive provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act significantly enhances whistleblower protections by prohibiting employers from discharging, demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing or otherwise discriminating against whistleblowers who provide information to enforcement authorities. The Dodd-Frank Act also creates a private right of action for employees who experience retaliation as a result of whistleblower activity. Such protections and rights do not extend to non-employee whistleblowers, even though they are eligible for awards.

    The final rules clarify that a whistleblower need not be eligible for an award or even report an actual violation of the securities laws to be protected from retaliation. To be protected, a whistleblower need only have a reasonable belief that the reported information relates to a possible violation. The anti-retaliation provision, however, does not apply to employees who only report possible violations internally. Generally, to be protected from retaliation, the employee must report the possible violation to the SEC, directly or indirectly.

    Implications of the Whistleblower Rules

    In recent remarks, Chairman Schapiro acknowledged the impact of the SEC’s whistleblower program to date, including the increased volume and quality of tips since the Dodd-Frank Act became law. There is little doubt that the new whistleblower program will result in increased complaints and SEC enforcement activity. Unfortunately, the SEC’s final rules do little to quell concerns voiced regarding the proposed rules. Despite provisions intended to encourage whistleblowers to report possible violations internally, whistleblowers are eligible to receive awards if they bypass internal reporting procedures, and generally are protected from retaliation only if they report violations to the SEC. Accordingly, all companies should:

    • Review codes of conduct to assess whether changes are appropriate, including provisions regarding reports of potential whistleblower concerns and anti-retaliation policies;
    • Review internal reporting and investigation processes, including documentation requirements for internal investigations and any adverse employment actions taken against potential whistleblowers;
    • Train employees to understand relevant policies and procedures including how they can bring possible violations to management’s attention without surrendering eligibility for any whistleblower awards;
    • Consider whether to require, or provide rewards or other incentives for, employees to report possible violations internally, whether periodic acknowledgements that employees are not aware of potential violations are appropriate, whether and how to permit anonymous reporting, and whether and to what extent to promise no retaliation for internal reporting; 
    • Prepare for an increased need to conduct internal investigations, establish basic protocols for investigating whistleblower complaints and develop processes for reports to senior management and, if appropriate, to the SEC;
    • Investigate whistleblower complaints as warranted, recognizing that employees may report complaints to the government notwithstanding the results of an internal investigation; and
    • Be prepared to explain to the SEC what management did in response to complaints and to defend the investigative efforts and findings, regardless of whether violations are established.

    Authored by David K. Momborquette, Richard J. Morvillo, Holly H. Weiss and Jeffrey F. Robertson.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The SEC’s final rules are available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf. An SRZ Client Alert about the proposed whistleblower program. The final rules, which implement Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act, are effective 60 days from publication in the Federal Register.

    [2] Speech by Mary Schapiro, Opening Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 2 – Whistleblower Program, May 25, 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • European IP Bulletin, Issue 81

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin, Issue 81

    June, 2011

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In Depth

    PATENTS

    Musion Systems Ltd v Activ8-3D Ltd: Disposal, Making and Offer to Supply

    In Musion Systems Ltd v Activ8-3D Ltd [2011] EWPCC 12, the judge ruled on a preliminary issue in a patent infringement action regarding the extent to which various acts by four Defendants amounted to offering for disposal, manufacture and supply of certain infringing apparatus under Section 60(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1977 (the Act).

    TRADE MARKS

    Court of Appeal of England and Wales Allows Appeal in Unlawful Threats Action

    In Best Buy Co Inc v Worldwide Sales Corporation España SL [2011] EWCA Civ 618, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales has allowed an appeal against a decision that a letter before action containing threats of infringement fell within the “without prejudice” rule because the letter also contained an offer to negotiate an out-of-court settlement of the parties’ dispute.

    COPYRIGHT

    Rights Holders and Internet Service Providers Discuss Combating File-Sharing

    The European Commission’s Stakeholders’ Dialogue on illegal uploading, downloading, and file-sharing was concluded with the publication of a Synthesis Report. The Report sums up the content of the meetings and discussions held by various participants to the Dialogue.

    Solicitor Picks up The Bill as Claim For Wasted Costs Order is Upheld Successfully

    Andrew Crossley and his law firm ACS:Law have been issued with a wasted costs order, following its mass letter writing campaign regarding alleged copyright infringement of Media CAT’s copyright material (Media CAT Ltd v Adams & Ors [2011] EWPCC 10)

    COMMUNITY DESIGN

    PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic SA: Advocate General Analyses “Designer’s Degree of Freedom” and “Informed User”

    In PepsiCo v Grupo Promer Mon Graphic SA C-281/10 P, Advocate General Mengozzi offered his analysis of the key but nebulous concepts of “degree of freedom of the designer” and “informed user” under the Community Design Regulation (6/2002/EC).

    CONFIDENTIALITY

    Super-Injunctions made by United Kingdom Courts

    On 20 May 2011, the Report by the Committee on Super-Injunctions—“Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice”—was published. The Report examines procedural issues surrounding super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions and considers how the courts should approach them.

    DATA PROTECTION

    UK Cookie Compliance: As Easy as 1, 2, 3….?

    The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has published guidance on the use of cookies technology to assist companies in complying with the new cookie regime that came into force on 26 May 2011. The advice is useful, but is vague on the practical and technological measures that would enable website operators to be compliant with the new law. Thankfully, the ICO is giving operators 12 months to “get their house in order” before enforcement begins.

    INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

    The European Commission Releases a New Strategy on Intellectual Property Rights

    Due to the growing importance of online activities, the European Commission considers that the existing mix of European and national rules on intellectual property rights (IPRs) need to be modernised. As a result, on 24 May 2010, the Commission set out its blueprint for IP rights to boost creativity and innovation within Europe.

    E-COMMERCE

    Rights Holders, Internet Platforms and Anti-Counterfeiting Organisations Sign Memorandum of Understanding

    Various stakeholders in the field of e-commerce have reached a non-binding agreement to cooperate in the fight against the sale of counterfeit goods online.

    EU

    Jurisdiction: Ruling on The Scope of Article 22(2) of the Brussels Regulation

    The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled on the scope of Article 22(2) of the Brussels Regulation. The Regulation allows EU counter-parties to choose which Member State they wish to have jurisdiction over their disputes about particular legal relationships (such as contracts).

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