Content Type: Article

  • Focus on Private Equity

    Focus on Private Equity

    ARTICLE

    Focus on Private Equity

    July 2014

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Recent trends in competition law enforcement in Europe show that private equity funds are increasingly exposed to potential liabilities for alleged infringements of their portfolio companies. Therefore, private equity funds investing in companies that operate in Europe should consider putting in place adequate measures to minimize such risks.

    Breach of competition laws may result in serious fines of up to 10 percent of the group turnover of the company in question being imposed on those companies which are found to have participated in alleged infringements by the European Commission (the Commission) and/or the applicable national competition authorities in the European Economic Area. In addition, decisions of the Commission and/or national competition authorities are binding proof of a breach of competition law, which, in turn, can result in follow-on damage claims being brought before the national court of the applicable jurisdiction within the European Economic Area.

    Under what is known as the “parental liability doctrine,” competition authorities can attribute liability to entities that exercise a “decisive influence” over a company or group of companies that have participated in an alleged infringement. As a consequence, the controlling entity or entities are considered jointly and severally liable for the fine imposed on the infringing subsidiaries.

    Decisive influence is presumed by the competition authorities where there are wholly-owned or almost wholly owned subsidiaries, and it is extremely difficult for parent companies to rebut such presumption in practice. Where this is not the case, the competition authorities are required to prove that the parent company exercised decisive influence. Any economic, organizational or legal link between the two entities would, in principle, be sufficient to meet the decisive influence test and would, in principle, equally apply in cases of minority shareholdings. In addition, parental liability can be found between two entities even after the subsidiary involved in the infringement has been disposed of by the controlling entity and may arise even if the controlling entity was not involved in or aware of the infringement.

    Past decisions of the Commission and the case law of the European courts show that private equity funds are not considered any differently from other businesses for the purposes of the parent liability doctrine. The fact that private equity funds are only involved in the high-level strategy and commercial policy of their portfolio companies does not exclude their potential liability, with respect to alleged infringements. To the contrary and as we expand on below, recent trends in competition law enforcement seem to indicate that private equity funds are increasingly exposed to potential liabilities for competition law infringements of their portfolio companies.

    In its decision of April 2, 2014, in relation to the underground and submarine high-voltage power cables cartel case (COMP/39610), the Commission held the parent companies of the producers involved liable, on the basis that they had exercised decisive influence over the producers. The fines levied by the Commission in this case totalled €301.6 million. One of the businesses found liable was Goldman Sachs, the former owner of Prysmian, which is one of the companies that allegedly participated in the cartel.

    Goldman Sachs had acquired a (minority/majority) stake in Prysmian in 2005 through its private equity fund and completely divested of it in 2010. The fact that Goldman Sachs no longer owned Prysmian did not prevent the Commission from fining the bank, holding that it was the entity ultimately exercising decisive influence over Prysmian at the time of the alleged infringements.

    This is not the first time that the Commission has imposed fines on private equity funds for alleged infringements by their portfolio companies. In 2009, the Commission fined the German company SKW Stahl-Metallurgie (SKW) and its former parent companies, amongst which was the investment company Arques Industries, for alleged participation in the calcium carbide cartel from 2004 to 2007. During that period, SKW was owned by several parent companies, and the Commission held each one liable for its respective period of ownership. The Commission’s decision was confirmed by the General Court of the European Union on January 23, 2014. However, the judgment was appealed on May 8, 2014, and the case is now pending before the Court of Justice of the European Union.

    Private equity firms investing in companies operating in the European Union should take note of the recent decisions in competition law enforcement handed down by the Commission. In order to minimize potential risks, private equity firms would be advised to ensure that:

    • Adequate due diligence is carried out that is sufficient to capture potential competition law infringements by prospective subsidiaries
    • Existing and prospective subsidiaries have in place tailored and effective competition law compliance programs and codes of ethics, and that these are rigorously implemented. Such programs and codes should, amongst other things, provide for the dismissal of employees and directors who fail or refuse to comply with antitrust rules. In Parker ITR and Parker-Hannifin v. Commission T-146/09 (currently under appeal), the General Court dismissed Parker’s argument that the conduct of its subsidiary’s directors prevented Parker from exercising its control over the subsidiary. The General Court held that there was nothing to prevent Parker from dismissing the directors who deliberately ignored the group’s code of ethics, which, amongst other things, prohibited its employees from taking part in collusive activities.
    • Consider the feasibility of contractual arrangements that provide for allocation of liability between the portfolio companies and parent companies and/or an indemnity in favour of the parent companies
    In depth
    Authors

    Eleanor West

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • Terms of Engagement: Board Support of the General Counsel

    ARTICLE

    Terms of Engagement: Board Support of the General Counsel

    July 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Corporate Law & Governance Update – July 2014

    ARTICLE

    Corporate Law & Governance Update – July 2014

    July 1, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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    Overview
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  • AHLA Fundamentals of Health Law, 6h Edition

    ARTICLE

    AHLA Fundamentals of Health Law, 6h Edition

    July 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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    Overview
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  • The IPO and Public Company Primer

    The IPO and Public Company Primer

    ARTICLE

    The IPO and Public Company Primer

    July 2014

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Initial public offering (IPO) deal type, volume and size have changed significantly over the last decade. From 2001 through 2003, following the burst of the dot-com bubble, US IPOs raised comparatively modest total proceeds of slightly more than $80 billion. The market revived from 2004 to 2007, producing about 200 US IPOs and raising approximately $40 billion each year. In contrast to the market prior to 2001, this market was characterized by larger and more seasoned IPO companies, many with private equity sponsors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Andrew C. Liazos

    Partner

    Boston, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Christine Corkran Kretkowski

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Board Risk-Driven Investigations

    ARTICLE

    Board Risk-Driven Investigations

    June 30, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Fifth Circuit Affirms Bankruptcy Court’s Reasonableness Review of Oversecured Lender’s Legal Fees in Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale

    Fifth Circuit Affirms Bankruptcy Court’s Reasonableness Review of Oversecured Lender’s Legal Fees in Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Affirms Bankruptcy Court’s Reasonableness Review of Oversecured Lender’s Legal Fees in Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale

    June 30, 2014

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on June 23, 2014 that an oversecured lender’s legal fees were subject to the bankruptcy court’s review for reasonableness despite a court-ordered non-judicial foreclosure sale of the lender’s collateral. In re 804 Congress, LLC, ­­__ F.3d ­­__, 2014 WL 2816521 (5th Cir. June 23, 2014). Affirming the bankruptcy court’s power and reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit found the lender’s utter failure to detail its legal fees with any documentary support to be fatal.

    Facts

    The debtor had financed the purchase of a Texas office building with a note (“Note”) and a Deed of Trust Security Agreement/Financing Statement (“Deed of Trust”), giving its lender (“Bank”) a first lien on the building. The Note entitled the Bank to be paid its reasonable attorneys’ fees following a default.

    The debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition to avoid the Bank’s scheduled foreclosure sale. The Bank promptly moved in the bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay for “a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property.” The bankruptcy court granted the motion, permitting the Bank “‘to conduct a foreclosure sale of the Property . . . in accordance with applicable state laws.’” Id. at *1.

    The non-judicial foreclosure sale yielded proceeds of approximately $4.355 million. Under the Deed of Trust, the Bank was entitled to be paid the “full amount of principal, interest, attorney’s fees, and other charges”: $3.3 million, including pre-petition and post-petition legal fees of more than $87,000. Id. at *1.

    The bankruptcy court took jurisdiction over distributing the sale proceeds after the U.S. Trustee objected to the Deed of Trust trustee’s (“Deed Trustee”) motion to distribute proceeds. The Bank and the Deed Trustee each filed claims for what they were owed under the Deed of Trust. In response, the bankruptcy court directed the Deed Trustee to pay the Bank its entire claim except for the legal fees it sought, reasoning that the Bank “had not filed a proper application for fees” nor provided “supporting documentation or testimony that the fees were reasonable.” Id. at *2. Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) provides that when a creditor’s claim is oversecured (i.e., the collateral is worth more than the amount of the creditor’s underlying claim), the creditor is entitled to post-petition interest plus “any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

    The Bank appealed to the district court, which held that “when the bankruptcy court lifted the stay and the foreclosure sale occurred, the bankruptcy court ceased to have jurisdiction over the property and sale proceeds.” Id. at *2. The distribution of the sale proceeds, in its view, was governed by Texas law rather than federal bankruptcy law. The debtor appealed to the Fifth Circuit.

    The Fifth Circuit’s Review

    The Fifth Circuit held that “federal law [i.e., Code § 506(b)] governs what is to be distributed to . . . [an] oversecured” lender, “regardless of state law.” 2014 WL 2816521 at *3, 4. Moreover, the bankruptcy court’s lifting of the automatic stay for a non-judicial foreclosure under state law “did not give the [Deed Trustee] any further authority and did not have the effect of insulating the debtor or any of the creditors from the reach of § 506(b).” Additionally, said the court, “Lifting the automatic stay to allow [the Bank] to foreclose was not tantamount to an abandonment of property.” Id. at *5.  

    The court then reviewed the bankruptcy court’s determination of the reasonableness of the Bank’s legal fees under an abuse of discretion standard. According to the Fifth Circuit, the bankruptcy court had not erred in finding the Bank’s legal fees were unsubstantiated and thus unreasonable: “[T]here was no documentation of the time that was spent and no testimony as to what was a reasonable fee.” Id. at *6.

    Other circuits, the court noted, have found that unreasonable fees were still allowable as unsecured claims instead of being disallowed. Id. at *6–7. See, e.g., In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“If a portion of the [legal] fees are deemed unreasonable . . . [then] the fees should be bifurcated between the reasonable portion, treated as a secured claim, and the unreasonable portion, treated as an unsecured claim.”). Because it was unclear whether this issue had been raised in the lower courts and because the parties had barely briefed the issue, the Fifth Circuit left it to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the Bank could file an unsecured claim for reimbursement under Code Section 502. Id. at *8.

    Comments

    To ensure recovery of contractually negotiated-for attorneys’ fees, an oversecured lender should detail all legal fees, costs and expenses with supporting documentation. Bills for services supported by time records often suffice, but note that the Eleventh Circuit in Welzel found a $147,000 bill, based on a “contractually set” 15 percent fee, to be unreasonable in view of $40,000 in actual time charges. 275 F.3d at 1311.

    Alternatively, the lender might add a provision regarding distribution in the order modifying the stay to permit foreclosure, such as the following: The foreclosure and distribution will be made exclusively under applicable state law, with any dispute regarding the procedure or distribution to be decided by any state court with competent jurisdiction. In 804 Congress, however, the court noted a reasonableness requirement under Texas law. 2014 WL 2816521 at *6.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Lucy F. Kweskin.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Supreme Court Issues Divided Ruling on EPA’s Tailoring Rule

    Supreme Court Issues Divided Ruling on EPA’s Tailoring Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Issues Divided Ruling on EPA’s Tailoring Rule

    June 27, 2014

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 23, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , striking down one part of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Tailoring Rule but upholding another. The Court struck the section of the rule that required Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permits for stationary sources based solely on their emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) above 75,000 or 100,000 tons per year (TPY). The Court left another section of the Tailoring Rule intact, however, allowing the EPA to require Best Available Control Technology (BACT) for GHGs at sources otherwise subject to PSD and Title V permits that emit (or have the potential to emit after a modification) over 75,000 TPY of GHGs. Although the first part of the decision is a blow to the EPA’s Tailoring Rule, as a practical matter, given that most of the largest sources of GHG emissions are subject anyway to PSD and Title V permits, this ruling will likely have little impact on the EPA’s implementation of GHG emissions reductions through PSD permit requirements under the Tailoring Rule.

    Background

    After Massachusetts v. EPA,[1] when the Supreme Court held that the definition of “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act (CAA) could include GHGs so long as the EPA made an endangerment finding, the EPA made such a finding, determining that GHGs endanger public health and welfare. Accordingly, the EPA regulated GHG emissions levels from new motor vehicles. The EPA then took the position that once GHG became a regulated pollutant for mobile sources, the EPA would then be obligated to regulate GHGs from stationary sources as well.

    The EPA then issued a rule tailoring the PSD provisions and Title V operating permit provisions of the CAA to apply to GHGs (the Tailoring Rule). The EPA recognized that the statutory levels triggering a requirement for a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit were too low to apply rationally to GHGs. Specifically, the statute makes PSD applicable to a “major emitting facility” or a modification thereof. The CAA defines this as any source that emits more than 250 TPY (or, in some cases, more than 100 TPY) of any regulated air pollutant. Similarly, Title V is applicable to “a major source,” a stationary source with the potential to emit more than 100 TPY “of any air pollutant.” The EPA determined that, in the case of GHGs, this would include thousands of previously unregulated sources, such as apartment buildings, retail stores, offices, schools and churches. Specifically, the EPA estimated that if the 100/250 TPY threshold were to apply, annual PSD permit applications would increase from approximately 800 to 82,000 and Title V permit applications would increase from less than 15,000 to 6.1 million. The EPA reasoned that this would not be administratively feasible to manage, that the great majority of these sources would be small sources that Congress had no intent to regulate and that were not the major contributors to GHG emissions, and that this would cripple the PSD and Title V permit programs, “severely undermin[ing] what Congress sought to accomplish.”

    Accordingly, in the Tailoring Rule, the EPA provided that the applicability of GHG to PSD and Title V would be phased in over three stages. During the first stage, sources that were subject to PSD and Title V anyway (called “anyway sources”) would be required to comply with BACT for GHGs if they emitted (or were expect to emit) more than 75,000 TPY of GHGs. In the second stage, GHGs alone could trigger the requirements of PSD and Title V, as new sources that would emit more than 100,000 TPY of GHGs would be subject to PSD or Title V for their construction, and existing sources that made a modification that would increase their GHG emissions by more than 75,000 TPY would be subject to PSD. The rules of the third stage, which were intended to further reduce GHG emissions, were not finalized.

    The Majority Decision

    The Supreme Court held that the EPA’s regulation of GHGs with respect to mobile sources did not compel the agency to regulate GHGs for stationary sources and that the EPA should not have done so because regulating GHGs under the PSD and Title V programs could not be done without exceeding the EPA’s authority under the CAA. The Court struck down the part of the Tailoring Rule at issue in Stage 2, holding that the EPA did not have the authority to change the statutory threshold level triggering PSD and Title V permitting obligations from 100/250 TPY to 75,000/100,000 TPY. The Court held that given that the EPA’s broad interpretation of the term “any air pollutant” would bring hundreds of thousands of previously unregulated sources under PSD and Title V regulation, such an interpretation could not be made by the agency and had to be made by Congress using its legislative powers. The Court held that the EPA’s actions would “deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers.”

    On the other hand, the Supreme Court afforded the EPA Chevron[2] deference with respect to the Stage 1 part of the Tailoring Rule, holding that the EPA could interpret the BACT provision to allow the EPA to require reductions in emissions of any regulated pollutant, including GHGs, so long as the source was “anyway” subject to PSD and Title V permitting requirements for pollutants other than GHGs.

    Authored by Howard B. Epstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] 549 U.S. 497 (2007).

    [2] Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).


    In depth
    Authors

    Howard B. Epstein

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Court Determines California Teacher Tenure Laws Are Unconstitutional

    Court Determines California Teacher Tenure Laws Are Unconstitutional

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Court Determines California Teacher Tenure Laws Are Unconstitutional

    June 27, 2014

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 10, 2014, Judge Rolf M. Treu of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles issued an opinion in Vergara v. California,[1] striking down provisions of the California Education Code as unconstitutional. The sections of the California Education Code in question concerned teacher tenure (the so-called “Permanent Employment Statute”), dismissal (the “Dismissal Statutes”) and layoffs (known as “Last-In-First-Out” (LIFO)).[2] The court held that these statutes violate the equal protection clause of the California Constitution because they prevent students from accessing their fundamental rights to equal education by adversely affecting the quality of the education they are afforded. The statutes were held to “cause the potential and/or unreasonable exposure of grossly ineffective teachers to all California students but with particular detriment to minority and/or low income students.” Vergara at 4.

    Although the Vergara decision involves a California court interpreting California law with respect to public schools, it is instructive beyond that jurisdiction because the court began its decision by echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that education facilities separated by race are inherently unequal and deny students equal protection under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Judge Treu focused on Brown in finding that the California statutes resulted in “grossly ineffective teachers obtaining and retaining permanent employment.” Vergara at 3. Relying on Brown, together with various California higher court decisions, Judge Treu found the cases “held that unconstitutional laws and policies would not be permitted to compromise a student’s fundamental right to equality of the educational experience.” Id. at 3.

    Vergara holds unconstitutional those laws which would deprive students of the equal opportunity to quality education. Both parties in Vergara agreed that “competent teachers are a critical, if not the most important, component of success of a child’s in-school educational experience. All sides also agreed that grossly ineffective teachers substantially undermine the ability of that child to succeed in school.” Id. at 7.

    The court held that the plaintiffs, nine public school students, “prove[d] by preponderance of the evidence, that the statutes impose a real and appreciable impact on students’ fundamental right to equality of education and that they impose a disproportionate burden on poor and minority students.” Id. at 8. As a result, the statutes were examined with “strict scrutiny.” The State of California thus had the burden to establish a compelling interest justifying that the distinctions drawn by the statutes were necessary to further their purpose.

    The court found that “both students and teachers are unfairly, unnecessarily, and for no legally cognizable reason (let alone a compelling one), disadvantaged by the current Permanent Employment Statute.” Id. at 10. As to the Dismissal Statutes, the court found that the law epitomized the issue of “uber due process” and bemoaned the process as “tortuous.” Id. at 12–13. Although the court agreed that teachers should be afforded reasonable due process, it found the current statutes “so complex, time consuming and expensive as to make an effective, efficient yet fair dismissal of a grossly ineffective teacher illusory.” Id. at 13. Finally, regarding the LIFO statute, the court stated that the state’s logic in defending the law was “unfathomable and therefore constitutionally unsupportable.” Id. at 14. The court found LIFO flawed because it contained

    “no exception or waiver based on teacher effectiveness. The last-hired teacher is the statutorily-mandated first-fired one when lay-offs occur. No matter how gifted the junior teacher, and no matter how grossly ineffective the senior teacher, the junior gifted one, who all parties agree is creating a positive atmosphere for his/her students, is separated from them and a senior grossly ineffective one who all parties agree is harming the students entrusted to her/him is left in place. The result is classroom disruption on two fronts, a lose-lose situation.”

    Id. at 13–14.

    The judge cited studies showing that “a single year in a classroom with a grossly ineffective teacher costs students $1.4 million in lifetime earnings per classroom.” Id. at 8. Students in Los Angeles County who were “taught by a teacher in the bottom 5% of competence lose 9.54 months of learning in a single year compared to students with average teachers.” Id. The court found substantial evidence that the “churning (aka Dance of the Lemons) of teachers caused by the lack of effective dismissal statutes and LIFO affected high-poverty and minority students disproportionately.” Id. at 15.

    Because Vergara originates from California’s first-level trial court, an appeal is likely. Much uncertainty remains as to how the decision will fare pending any appeal. U.S. Secretary of Education Arnie Duncan called the decision a “mandate” to fix the problems in public education and called on states to “build a new framework.” Although the court’s decision reaches only California public schools, the Vergara case may be the first of many court and legislative challenges to tenure.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Scott A. Gold and Donna Lazarus.

    SRZ summer associate Lucy Zhang (not admitted) assisted in the preparation of this Alert.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Tentative Decision, Vergara v. State of California (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 2014) (Case No. BC484642).

    [2] The statutes found unconstitutional are: California Education Code Section 44929.21(b) (Permanent Employment Statute); California Education Code Sections 44934, 44938(b)(1) and (2) and 44944 (collectively, the Dismissal Statutes); and California Education Code Section 44955 (LIFO).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • New York Court of Appeals Permits Individual Noteholder Suit Despite Indenture’s No-Action Clause

    New York Court of Appeals Permits Individual Noteholder Suit Despite Indenture’s No-Action Clause

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Court of Appeals Permits Individual Noteholder Suit Despite Indenture’s No-Action Clause

    June 24, 2014

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York Court of Appeals, on June 10, 2014, unanimously held that “a trust indenture’s ‘no-action’ clause” barring “contractual claims . . . under the indenture” did “not bar a security holder’s independent common law or statutory claims.” Quadrant Structured Products Co. Ltd. v. Vertin, 2014 WL 2573378, at 6 (N.Y. June 10, 2014). Answering certified questions raised by the Delaware Supreme Court about New York law, the court stressed that “the clear import of the no-action clause [before it] is to leave a security holder free to pursue independent claims involving rights not arising from the indenture agreement.” Id. at 7.

    Relevance

    A typical no-action clause provides that a “Security holder may not pursue any remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities unless [specified conditions are met].” Id. at 7, quoting Lange v. Citibank, N.A., 2002 WL 2005728, at 5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2002). See generally Feldbaum v. McCrory Corp., 1992 WL 119095, at 7-8 (Del. Ch. June 2, 1992) (plaintiffs who buy bonds “consent . . . to no-action clauses” and thus “waive their rights to bring claims that are common to all bondholders,” and that “waiver . . . applies equally to claims against non-issuer defendants as to claims against issuers”; fraudulent transfer claims “could only be brought by the trustee”). Within the past two years, the Eleventh Circuit, applying New York law and relying on the precise language of an indenture’s “standard” no-action clause, “barr[ed] [individual] noteholders [(hedge funds with a majority ownership of the notes)] from bringing” fraudulent transfer claims against the issuer of notes, its directors and officers. Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Compucredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2012). The recent Quadrant decision shows how effective lawyering by plaintiff’s counsel saved the day for the client.

    Facts

    The plaintiff in Quadrant sued several defendants in Delaware “for alleged wrongdoing related to notes purchased by Quadrant and issued by defendant Athilon Capital Corp. (‘Athilon’),” an allegedly insolvent entity. 2014 WL2573378, at 3. As part of an effort to raise capital, Athilon “incurred debt through the issuance of a series of securities . . . consisting of” senior and subordinated notes. Id. Quadrant held certain classes of the subordinated notes. Id. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, Athilon “entered into runoff mode . . . .” Id. at 4. Quadrant later sued Athilon, its officers and directors, and another affiliated entity, “asserting various counts directly and derivatively as a creditor of Athilon[, including] claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, seeking damages and injunctive relief, [plus] . . . fraudulent transfer claims against [affiliated entities].” Id.

    The defendants moved to dismiss the Quadrant complaint, asserting it was “barred by a no-action clause” of the relevant indenture “governing the subordinated notes.” Id. Specifically, the clause in question provided as follows:

    No holder of any Security shall have any right by virtue or by availing of any provision of this Indenture to institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity . . . or for any other remedy hereunder, unless such holder previously shall have given to the [Indenture] Trustee written notice of default in respect of the series of Securities held by such Security holder . . . and unless also the holders of not less than 50 percent of the aggregate principal amount of the relevant series of Securities at the time outstanding shall have made written request upon the trustee to institute such action or proceedings in its own name as trustee hereunder and shall have offered to the Trustee such reasonable indemnity as it may require . . . .

    Id. According to the defendants, this clause “permitted only Trustee-initiated suits upon the request of a majority of security holders, and prohibited individual security holder actions.” Id. They relied on Feldbaum and Lange. The court, however, found that relevant no-action clauses “in those cases barred a security holder’s action ‘with respect to this Indenture or the Securities . . . ’.” Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

    After rounds of litigation in the Delaware courts, the Court of Chancery found that the no-action clause applied only to contractual claims arising under the indenture, and “that the majority of Quadrant’s claims were not barred under the clause . . . .” Id. Thereafter, the Delaware Supreme Court certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals as to “whether, under New York law, the absence of any reference in the no-action clause to ‘the Securities’ precludes enforcement only of contractual claims arising under the Indenture, or whether the clause also precludes enforcement of all common law and statutory claims that security holders as a group may have.” Id.

    Purpose of No-Action Clauses

    The court agreed with the defendants “that generally a no-action clause prevents minority security holders from pursuing litigation against the issuer, in favor of a single action initiated by a Trustee upon request of a majority of the security holders.” Id. at 9. These clauses generally “protect issuers from the expense involved in defending [individual] lawsuits that are either frivolous or otherwise not in the economic interest of the Corporation or its creditors . . . [They] protect against the risk of strike suits, [making] it more difficult for individual bondholders to bring suits that are unpopular with their fellow bondholders.” Feldbaum, 1992 WL 119095, at 5-6.

    New York Court of Appeals

    According to the Court of Appeals, “a no-action clause which by its language applies to rights and remedies under the provisions of the indenture agreement, but makes no mention of individual suits on the securities, does not preclude enforcement of a security holder’s independent common law or statutory rights.” Id. at 6. Thus, “the clear and unambiguous text of this no-action clause, with its specific reference to the indenture, on its face limits the clause to the contract rights recognized by the indenture agreement itself.” Id. Accord Gen. Inv. Co. v. Interborough R.T. Co., 200 A.D. 794, 796 (1st Dept. 1922) (no-action clause applied only to suit to enforce indenture, but plaintiff’s action “is not to affect, disturb or prejudice the lien of the collateral indenture or to enforce any right thereunder”); Cruden v. Bank of New York, 957 F.2d 961, 968 (2d Cir. 1992) (plaintiff’s fraud and RICO claims not made under indenture and thus not barred by language of no-action clause). In contrast, the no-action clauses in Feldbaum and Lange were “broad enough to encompass conditions on enforcement of indenture and securities based claims.” 2014 WL 2573378, at 7 (emphasis added).

    Most significantly, the no-action clause in Quadrant dealt only with the issuer’s default in payment. Id. at 10. It was not “an outright prohibition on” a security holder’s suit when “the Trustee [lacks] authorization to act.” Id. The parties never “intended [to] limit the no-action clause in this way.” Id.

    Comment

    Quadrant is a welcome development. In the past few years, courts have stretched to bar suits by individual noteholders despite the flexible language of the indenture. See, e.g., Beal Sav. Bank v. Sommer, 8 N.Y. 3d 318, 321, 333-34 (N.Y. 2007) (affirmed dismissal of suit by one lender in syndicated loan because other “required lenders” had settled; they had right to sue through their agent; lenders “intended to act collectively”; but dissent argued majority misread documents to deprive minority lender of right to sue; nothing in documents gave agent exclusive right to sue or showed a “surrender of individual lender’s right to sue”; to the contrary, documents recited that “each lender severally agrees to make loans,” and that no “right or remedy” given the “Agent . . . is intended to be exclusive of any other right or remedy . . . in . . . other Loan Documents or at law and equity”); In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (agent given authority to release collateral in event of default; overruled single lender’s objection to agent’s credit bid for collateral); In re GWLS Holdings, Inc., No. 08-12430 (PJW), 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009) (same; unanimous voting requirement for release of collateral and amendments; waivers not applicable).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

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