Content Type: Article

  • Competition, Regulatory and Public Sector (full article in French)

    ARTICLE

    Competition, Regulatory and Public Sector (full article in French)

    July 15, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Commission Publishes White Paper on Minority Shareholdings

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    Commission Publishes White Paper on Minority Shareholdings

    July 15, 2014

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  • The Minimum Wage and the Working Time Account

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    The Minimum Wage and the Working Time Account

    July 11, 2014

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  • District Court Blocks Bankruptcy Trustee’s Foreign Entanglement

    District Court Blocks Bankruptcy Trustee’s Foreign Entanglement

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Blocks Bankruptcy Trustee’s Foreign Entanglement

    July 11, 2014

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    U.S. District Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York held on July 6, 2014 that the Madoff Securities SIPA trustee could not recover customer funds subsequently transferred abroad by “foreign feeder funds” to their foreign “customers, managers, and the like.” Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (In re Madoff Securities), 2014 WL 2998557, *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2014). The trustee had sued not only certain feeder funds for having received “allegedly avoidable transfers,” but also their “immediate and mediate transferees.” Id. at *1. Essentially, the trustee sought to “recover [the] subsequent transfers — transfers made abroad between a foreign transferor and a foreign transferee.” Id.

    The court merely dismissed the trustee’s recovery claims “to the extent that they seek to recover purely foreign transfers.” Id. at *8. But for the notoriety of the Madoff case, the result here should be unsurprising.

    The Relevant Code Section

    The trustee’s claim against the subsequent transferees here turned on a Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) section that reads in relevant part:

    “[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under … [the Code], the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from — (1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or (2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.”

    11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (emphasis added).

    The Securities Investors Protection Act (“SIPA”) enables a trustee “to utilize the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance and recovery provisions to reclaim customer property.” 2014 WL 2998557, *6. Nothing in SIPA, however “expressly provides[s] for extraterritorial application.” Id. Indeed, “SIPA’s predominantly domestic focus suggests a lack of intent by Congress to extend its reach extraterritorially.” Id.

    According to the court, “Congress [never] intended for this section to apply to foreign transfers.” Id. at *4. Although the trustee argued that Code Section 541 defines “property of the estate” to include certain property “wherever located and by whomever held,” this only means that the trustee obtains title “over all of the debtors’ property, regardless of whether it is physically present in the United States.” Id. The court found the trustee’s argument to be “clever” but “neither logical nor persuasive.” Id. at *5. Until the trustee recovers “property of the estate,” it is not the “debtor’s property.” Id. at *5. In the words of the Second Circuit, “property is not to be considered property of the estate until it is recovered.” Id. (quoting In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992)). Therefore, reasoned the court, Code Section 541(a)(1) “cannot supply any extraterritorial authority that the avoidance and recovery provisions lack on their own.” 2014 WL 2998557, at *5.

    Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application

    The foreign defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Code Section 550 (a)(2) “does not apply extraterritorially and therefore does not reach subsequent transfers made abroad by one foreign entity to another.” Id. at *2. They relied on leading U.S. Supreme Court precedent: “It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). According to the Supreme Court, as quoted by the district court in Madoff Securities, this “‘presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes’ serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.” 2014 WL 2998557, at *2 (quoting 499 U.S. at 248).

    The court first rejected the trustee’s argument that his suit was “domestic.” Id. at *3. In the words of the court, “a mere connection to a U.S. debtor, be it tangential or remote, is insufficient on its own to make every application of the Bankruptcy Code domestic.” Id.

    The “relevant transferors and transferees [in this case] are predominantly foreign: foreign feeder funds transferring assets abroad to their foreign customers and other foreign transferees.” Id. Although the trustee was seeking “to make the recovery of these otherwise thoroughly foreign subsequent transfers into a domestic application of [Code Section 550(a)],” his claims would still require “extraterritorial application of [Code Section] 550(a).” Id. Moreover, the defendants’ use of “correspondent banks in the United States to process dollar-denominated transfers” was hardly enough to make these foreign transfers domestic. Id. at *3 n.1.

    The court also rejected the trustee’s argument that the U.S. debtor here had fraudulently transferred assets “offshore and then [arranged for the] retransfer [of] those assets to avoid the reach of U.S. bankruptcy law.” Id. Because “the Trustee here may be able to utilize the laws of the countries where such transfers occurred to avoid such an evasion while at the same time avoiding international discord,” the court explained, these defendants were not being “more favorably … treated” than other “customer-beneficiaries of the SIPA estate,” as the trustee “disingenuous[ly]” argued. Id. They would “stand to benefit little, if at all, from the customer-property estate through their now-defunct feeder funds.” Id.

    Comity

    Principles of international comity would further preclude the trustee from maintaining his suit under Code Section 550(a). “Comity ‘is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.’” Id. at *7 (quoting In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1046 (2d Cir. 1996)). Indeed, according to the Second Circuit, “[c]omity is especially important in the context of the Bankruptcy Code.” Maxwell, 93 F.3d. at 1048. In this case, “many of the feeder funds are currently involved in their own liquidation proceedings in their home countries,” with “their own rules concerning on what bases the recipient of a transfer from a debtor should be required to disgorge it.” Id. at *7. Because of the remote, “indirect relationship” between Madoff Securities and the transfers “at issue here, these foreign jurisdictions have a greater interest in applying their own laws than does the United States.” Id.

    Conclusion

    This recent Madoff Securities decision is hardly novel in view of Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent. The court saw through the trustee’s attempt “to use SIPA [and the Code] to reach around … foreign liquidations in order to make claims to assets on behalf of the SIPA customer property estate.” Id. There was no need to apply U.S. law in a U.S. bankruptcy court.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • The Supreme Court Rules in Hobby Lobby Case that Contraception Coverage Mandate Impermissibly Burdens Closely-Held Corporations’ Religious Exercise

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    The Supreme Court Rules in Hobby Lobby Case that Contraception Coverage Mandate Impermissibly Burdens Closely-Held Corporations’ Religious Exercise

    July 10, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Keeping the Peace – The Need for Multi-Provider Agreements

    ARTICLE

    Keeping the Peace – The Need for Multi-Provider Agreements

    July 2014

    Read time: 2 min

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    Shawn Helms and Alfred Cheng co-authored this article on how multi-provider “cooperation and accountability agreements” can facilitate multi-sourcing arrangements. Such agreements, the article states, should cover multi-provider service levels, drive coordination, implement a full confidentiality regime, structure multi-provider governance and define the liability exposure among the service providers.

    In depth
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    Shawn C. Helms

    Partner

    Dallas

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  • What’s the secret?

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    What’s the secret?

    June 2014

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  • Supreme Court to Review Another Decision Limiting Bankruptcy Court’s Power

    Supreme Court to Review Another Decision Limiting Bankruptcy Court’s Power

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court to Review Another Decision Limiting Bankruptcy Court’s Power

    July 8, 2014

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Supreme Court, on July 1, 2014, granted a petition for certiorari in an important Seventh Circuit case limiting the power of bankruptcy courts to decide property disputes. Wellness International Network, Ltd. et al. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit had held last year that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to determine whether purported trust assets were property of the debtor’s estate. In its view, this was a “state-law claim between private parties that is wholly independent of federal bankruptcy law and is not resolved in the claims-allowance process.” 727 F.3d at 776.

    As we noted in an earlier Alert , the Supreme Court had just held, on June 9, 2014, that certain nominally “core” proceedings (e.g., fraudulent transfer suits) could be litigated in the bankruptcy court, but only if that court’s proposed fact findings and legal conclusions were subject to the district court’s de novo review. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 2014 WL 2560461 (U.S. Sup. Court June 9, 2014) (“Bellingham”). This ruling followed the Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (5-4), which, we noted in another Alert , held that bankruptcy courts “lack . . . constitutional authority to enter final judgment on a state law . . . claim [by the estate] that is not resolved in . . . [the] process of ruling on . . . [the] creditor’s claim.” According to the Court, Article III of the Constitution did not permit a bankruptcy court in Stern to enter a final judgment on the debtor’s counterclaim for tortious interference. Bellingham, at *4; 131 S. Ct. at 2620.

    Relevance

    The litigants challenging the constitutional authority of the bankruptcy court in Bellingham and Stern were third parties who had been sued by the bankruptcy estate. In Wellness, however, the debtor who voluntarily chose to file his bankruptcy petition after a stinging defeat in the federal court system had belatedly challenged the bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority after losing a fight over his discharge and his ownership of trust assets in that court. The Supreme Court will have to resolve a conflict between the Seventh Circuit and other U.S. Courts of Appeals over the bankruptcy court’s ability to decide routine property ownership issues.

    Practically, a lender who has successfully pursued a debtor in the court system and is then confronted with its debtor’s bankruptcy does not want to spend valuable resources and more time litigating over whether the bankruptcy court can determine what assets are included within the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Until Wellness, other appellate courts had regularly held that bankruptcy courts had the power to determine whether property in the debtor’s possession belongs to the estate under Bankruptcy Code § 541 as federal law claims despite the presence of state-law issues. In re Johnson, 960 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that bankruptcy courts continue to have authority to enter final orders and actions against debtor to determine whether property in debtor’s possession belongs to bankruptcy estate); In re Croft, 737 F.3d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that actions under Code § 541 are federal claims although issues of state law present). The Seventh Circuit’s narrow focus on state law issues in Wellness would shift much of the usual bankruptcy court litigation to the district courts, creating unnecessary delay and expense to creditors.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • NY Court of Appeals to Bankruptcy Trustees: Partner Matters Are Not Law Firm Property

    NY Court of Appeals to Bankruptcy Trustees: Partner Matters Are Not Law Firm Property

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    NY Court of Appeals to Bankruptcy Trustees: Partner Matters Are Not Law Firm Property

    July 3, 2014

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York Court of Appeals, on July 1, 2014, in response to questions certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held that “pending hourly fee matters are not [a dissolved law firm’s] ‘property’ or ‘unfinished business’” under New York’s Partnership Law. In re Thelen LLP, __ N.Y.3d __, slip op. at 2 (July 1, 2014); seeIn re Thelen LLP, 213 F.3d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 2013). A federal district court judge applied California law to reach the same conclusion in a similar case three weeks ago. In re Heller Ehrman, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8/087, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014) (“A law firm — and its attorneys — do not own the matters on which they perform their legal services. Their clients do.”).

    The bankruptcy trustees of two dissolved law firms (Thelen LLP and Coudert Brothers) raised the issue when they sought to recover profits that other law firms had earned on hourly fee matters brought to those firms by departing Thelen and Coudert partners. According to the trustees: (1) pending hourly fee matters that were taken to the new firms were Thelen and Coudert property; and (2) the new firms had to account for their earnings on those matters.

    Relevance to Clients

    The New York Court of Appeals stressed that the trustees’ position “would have numerous perverse effects” and would conflict “with basic principles that govern the attorney-client relationship under New York law and the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Slip op. at 15. Among other things, the departing lawyers “might advise their clients that they can no longer afford to represent them, a major inconvenience for the clients and a practical restriction on a client’s right to choose counsel.” Id. at 16. In addition, “clients might worry that their hourly fee matters are not getting as much attention as they deserve if the [new] law firm is prevented from profiting from its work on them.” Id. More important, New York has a “strong public policy encouraging client choice and, concomitantly, attorney mobility.” Id. at 16-17. Quoting from a 1943 New York County Lawyers’ Association opinion, the court stressed that “[c]lients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but personal service.” Id. at 17.

    The Unfinished Business Doctrine

    The Thelen and Coudert trustees relied on the so-called “unfinished business doctrine” that had originated with an intermediate California appellate court. Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that, absent an agreement to the contrary, profits derived from a law firm’s unfinished business are owed to former partners in proportion to their partnership interests). As the New York Court of Appeals noted, according to Jewel and other courts that have followed it, “departing partners owe a fiduciary duty to the dissolved firm and their former partners to account for benefits obtained from use of partnership property in winding up the partnership’s business . . . .” Id. at 9. But nothing in New York’s Partnership Law, continued the New York Court of Appeals, says anything “about whether a law firm’s ‘client matters’ are partnership property.” Id. In rejecting the unfinished business doctrine, the court reasoned that “no law firm has a property interest in future hourly legal fees because they are ‘too contingent in nature and speculative to create a present or future property interest’. . . , given the client’s unfettered right to hire and fire counsel. Because client matters are not partnership property, the trustees’ reliance on [New York] Partnership Law . . . is misplaced.” Id. at 10. A law firm only owns unpaid compensation for legal services already provided with respect to a client matter. In the words of the court, “a client’s legal matter belongs to the client, not the lawyer.” Id. at 12.

    The Thelen and Coudert trustees’ litigation will now return to the Second Circuit for disposition. Because of this final ruling on applicable New York law, the court should direct the dismissal of the trustees’ complaints. In New York, at least, the unfinished business doctrine is finished — and may be on its way out in California, too.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • IP Update, Vol. 17, No. 7

    IP Update, Vol. 17, No. 7

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 17, No. 7

    July 2014

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
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    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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