Content Type: Article

  • View From McDermott: The Church Plan Struggle as Litigation Unfolds

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    View From McDermott: The Church Plan Struggle as Litigation Unfolds

    June 23, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Cancellation of REDSKINS Trademark Registrations Highlights Distinction Between Registration and Use

    Cancellation of REDSKINS Trademark Registrations Highlights Distinction Between Registration and Use

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Cancellation of REDSKINS Trademark Registrations Highlights Distinction Between Registration and Use

    June 23, 2014

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On June 18, 2014, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ordered the cancellation of six U.S. Trademark Registrations[1] for the REDSKINS trademark used by the iconic Washington Redskins football franchise for over 80 years. The TTAB ruled that the REDSKINS mark violates the provision of the primary U.S. Trademark statute (the Lanham Act) that prohibits registration of marks that “may disparage” or “bring into contempt or disrepute” persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols.[2] The lengthy decision garnered instant media attention, but a closer look at the decision shows that while some initial accounts greatly exaggerated its likely effect on the team, the legal issues at play in the case can in fact impact businesses of all types. No matter the industry, companies seeking to protect their brands need to understand the difference between trademark registration and use.

    Some Media Attention Overstates Impact

    The primary misconception surrounding some early takes on the “ramifications” of the TTAB decision centered around the impact it would have on the ability of the National Football League (“NFL”) and the Redskins team to continue using the REDSKINS name and collect royalty and merchandising revenue from the exploitation of jerseys, memorabilia and other goods and services bearing the REDSKINS brand. These reports claimed that the Redskins could no longer use the mark, that the NFL could no longer collect on its vast revenue stream from royalties and merchandising payments and that anyone could now freely use the REDSKINS name without paying the NFL.

    The NFL Will Still Be Able to Use the REDSKINS Mark and Stop Infringement

    The TTAB decision only applies to the trademark registrations; the TTAB does not have the power to order anyone to stop using a trademark. The NFL and the Redskins may continue to use REDSKINS as the team name and claim trademark rights in this term, and royalty payments will certainly continue. Because the decision does not impact use, the NFL and its authorized licensees can continue selling merchandise bearing the REDSKINS trademark in accordance with the terms of existing commercial agreements.

    Enforcement will still be possible because registration is not necessary to enforce rights in a trademark. The primary purpose of the trademark laws isto avoid consumer confusion and deception and protect consumers’ expectations when they encounter products in the market. Courts in future cases involving counterfeit or infringing REDSKINS products are unlikely to ignore these fundamental principles and will have the ability to protect these interests by recognizing the NFL’s ongoing use-based rights as prescribed by the Lanham Act.

    Enforcement Efforts Will Be Hindered, But Not Significantly

    Trademark registrations help to enforce a trademark owner’s rights, so the loss of these registrations will make policing the REDSKINS name incrementally more difficult for the NFL. For example, owners of federal trademark registrations are entitled to the legal presumption of their ownership of the registered mark and protection of their exclusive right to use the mark nationwide in connection with the goods and services listed in the registration.[3] In addition, and of significance to businesses, like the NFL, that must be constantly vigilant for counterfeit merchandise from abroad, federal trademark registration provides the ability to record the trademark registration with U.S. customs officials, which can aid in the confiscation of infringing merchandise at U.S. borders.[4] These benefits will be lost if the TTAB decision is upheld on appeal.

    But even though the NFL will lose some of these policing benefits, the organization can still count on its use-based rights to protect itself. Evidence to support continued protection for the REDSKINS mark is readily available to the NFL and one of its most prominent franchises in the form of sales revenue, advertising spend, media mentions and similar evidence, which they can use to establish consumer recognition of the REDSKINS trademark. After presenting financial numbers, the NFL can also dip into its archives for footage of the likes of John Riggins’ epic Super Bowl touchdown run in 1983, Doug Williams’ historic Super Bowl triumph in 1988, or other memorable moments in Redskins team history that have served to cement name recognition. Suffice it to say, the NFL will have little trouble establishing the protectability of its REDSKINS trademark under traditional legal standards based on the use of the name and the widespread fame and renown that such use has achieved since its adoption in the 1930s.

    Decision Is Still Significant

    Still, the decision may prove to be a watershed cultural moment leading to the eventual abandonment of a name that is simultaneously loathed by many Americans yet identified strongly with by many fans of the team. And the story is bound to grab more headlines as it unfolds.

    Legally, the decision is significant because it establishes a benchmark for the type and amount of evidence sufficient to invoke the Lanham Act’s prohibition on disparaging marks. Other groups that have battled discrimination or suffered cultural disparagement now have a playbook from which to plan their attack on other trademarks they find offensive, and we could see more cancellation proceedings brought on these grounds.

    Legal Relevance to Companies in All Industries

    For trademark owners in other industries, the case offers a “teachable moment” as a prominent example of the distinction between trademark registration and use, which is very important to keep in mind for all businesses, whether established or start-up, domestic or global.

    On one hand, having a trademark registration can be invaluable both as a deterrent to others who might adopt similar names and as a weapon against those who actually do. This is especially true for companies, such as ones that have historically needed to avoid publicity, that cannot easily establish entitlement to trademark protection based on use of a name in commerce. For example, hedge fund managers are typically, and for obvious reasons, secretive about their market positions; they will usually not be able to elicit the type of advertising expenditure and widespread public recognition that a mass-consumer, cultural and media giant like the NFL can. Registration of a trademark protecting their name might be the best path.

    On the other hand, because use and registration are distinct, if obtaining a registration is not possible it may not be terribly significant for other businesses. For example, an investment manager or hedge fund that has a long and successful track record of using a mark might never feel the absence of a trademark registration. Or a start-up that is entering a field crowded with similar names and uses but dominated at the Trademark Office by a single registration that would block the start-up from getting its own registration in the first place could still thrive.

    For companies operating across multiple jurisdictions, the ramifications of having or not having a trademark registration will usually be more significant in jurisdictions that do not recognize use-based rights (“first-to-file” countries) than in jurisdictions that do (“first-to-use” countries).

    The Redskins case also teaches that sooner is better than later when it comes to registering your trademark. Here, delay in seeking trademark registration may have doomed the NFL because the test for whether a trademark is too disparaging to be registered is applied not as of the time a cancellation proceeding is brought, but as of the time the registration in question was issued. The Washington Redskins claimed use of the REDSKINS mark dating back to the 1930s. But neither the team nor the league sought to trademark the name until 1966, and the first registration issued in 1967. By then, the civil rights movement had greatly increased overall awareness of this term’s offensiveness, which, while clearly present before then, was not nearly as well documented as it had become by the mid-1960s. This made it much easier for the plaintiffs in the present case to prove disparagement. In fact, the NFL may well have withstood the challenge to the REDSKINS marks that were adopted in the 1930s and 1940s had registration been obtained then.

    As always, consideration and determination of trademark rights depend heavily on the facts and circumstances of each case, and absolute rules are hard to come by. Consultation with experienced trademark counsel should always be part of the game plan for any company that is concerned about protecting its intellectual property.

    Authored by Scott M. Kareff .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] Reg. No. 0836122 (for the mark THE REDSKINS [stylized]; registered in 1967); Reg. No. 0978824 (for the mark WASHINGTON REDSKINS; registered in 1974); Reg. No. 0986668 (for the mark WASHINGTON REDSKINS and Design; registered in 1974); Reg. No. 0987127 (for the mark THE REDSKINS and Design; registered in 1974); Reg. No. 1085092 (for the mark REDSKINS; registered in 1978); and Reg. No. 1606810 (for the mark REDSKINETTES; registered in 1990).

    [2] 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).

    [3] See http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426681.

    [4] Id.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Scott M. Kareff

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • UK-Based LLP Partners Now Enjoy More Protections

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    UK-Based LLP Partners Now Enjoy More Protections

    June 19, 2014

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  • Investors in France Face a New Rise in Minority Shareholder Activism

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    Investors in France Face a New Rise in Minority Shareholder Activism

    June 2014

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  • Pricing for New Innovative Drugs – Public Payers Attempt New Approach

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    Pricing for New Innovative Drugs – Public Payers Attempt New Approach

    June 18, 2014

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  • Supreme Court Upholds Bankruptcy Court’s Limited Procedural Power

    Supreme Court Upholds Bankruptcy Court’s Limited Procedural Power

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Upholds Bankruptcy Court’s Limited Procedural Power

    June 18, 2014

    Read time: 8 min

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    The United States Supreme Court, on June 9, 2014, unanimously held that certain “core” proceedings (e.g., fraudulent transfer suits ) could still be litigated in the bankruptcy court, but only if that court’s proposed fact findings and legal conclusions are subject to de novo review by the district court. Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency), 2014 WL 2560461 (U.S. Sup. Court, June 9, 2014). Affirming the Ninth Circuit’s fraudulent transfer judgment against the insider defendant “in light of the procedural posture of this case,” id. at *9, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether a defendant could consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction, an issue that had caused a split among the circuits. See, e.g., In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that bankruptcy judge could decide fraudulent transfer claim when parties consent); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 921 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that bankruptcy court could not enter final judgment on state law fraud suit by debtor even when defendant had consented); In re Frazin, 732 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2013) (same); In re BP RE LP, 735 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2013) (same).

    The Supreme Court essentially accepted the Ninth Circuit’s alternative holding in Bellingham “that the Bankruptcy Court’s state law fraudulent transfer judgment could . . . be treated as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject to de novo review by the District Court.” 2014 WL 2560461, at *4, citing 702 F.3d at 565-66. As the Court explained, the “procedural posture” of Bellingham mooted the jurisdiction issue:

    “At bottom, [the defendant] argues that it was entitled to have an Article III court review de novo and enter judgment on the fraudulent [transfer] claims asserted by the trustee. In effect, [the defendant] received exactly that. The District Court conducted de novo review of the [bankruptcy court’s] summary judgment [ruling], concluding in a written opinion that there were no disputed issues of material fact and that the trustee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In accordance with its statutory authority over matters related to the bankruptcy, see [28 U.S.C.] §1334(b), the District Court then separately entered judgment in favor of the trustee. [The defendant] thus received the same review from the District Court that it would have received if the Bankruptcy Court had treated the fraudulent [transfer] claims as non-core proceedings under [28 U.S.C.] § 157(c)(1). In short, . . . the District Court’s de novo review and entry of its own valid final judgment cured any error [by the Bankruptcy Court].”

    Id. at *7-8.

    Facts

    The defendant in Bellingham had never filed a claim in the bankruptcy court, but the corporate debtor’s Chapter 7 trustee had sued it for having received a fraudulent transfer under applicable state law. “[T]he complaint alleged that [the debtor’s insiders] used various methods to fraudulently convey [the debtor’s] assets to [another affiliate].” Id. at *3. The trustee moved for summary judgment against the affiliate in the bankruptcy court, which granted summary judgment for the trustee on all claims. Id. The affiliate then appealed to the district court, which conducted a de novo review, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision and entered judgment for the plaintiff trustee. Id.

    The defendant further appealed to the Ninth Circuit. After the defendant filed its opening brief, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (holding that non-Article III bankruptcy courts “lack . . . constitutional authority to enter final judgment on a state law . . . claim [by the estate] that is not resolved in . . . [the] process of ruling on . . .] [the] creditor’s claim”). Thus, “Article III of the Constitution did not permit a bankruptcy court to enter a final judgment on a counterclaim for tortious interference.” 2014 WL 2560461, at *4.

    The defendant in Bellingham moved to dismiss its appeal in the Ninth Circuit, relying on Stern, arguing that Article III did not give Congress the right “to vest authority in a bankruptcy court to finally decide the trustee’s [state law fraudulent transfer] claims.” Id. The Ninth Circuit relied on the defendant’s implied consent to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, however, reasoning that it had failed to raise the issue in the lower courts. Bellingham at *4, citing 702 F.3d at 566, 568. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court’s judgment “could instead be treated as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,” which had actually been reviewed, de novo, by the district court. Id., citing 702 F.3d at 565-66. Other circuits (the Fifth and Sixth, as noted above) disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on the consent issue, causing the split that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address. Unfortunately for scholars, the Court found a neat way to avoid the difficult jurisdictional consent issue with a fact-intensive holding based on the district court’s de novo review of the bankruptcy court’s ruling.

    Fraudulent Transfer Litigation to Be Deemed Non-Core

    Congress provided in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) that fraudulent transfer proceedings were “core,” enabling the bankruptcy judge to “hear and determine” these claims and “enter appropriate orders and judgments” under 28 U.S.C § 157 (b)(1). Courts have construed Stern, however, to apply to fraudulent transfer litigation in the bankruptcy court, creating constitutional issues. See, e.g., In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 467 B.R. 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (bankruptcy court cannot, after Stern, enter final judgment on fraudulent transfer claim); In re Adelphia Commc’n Corp., 2012 WL 264180 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same); In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 464 B.R. 348 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same). Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the fraudulent transfer claims in Bellingham were “not . . . core” because, after Stern, “Article III [of the Constitution] does not permit these claims to be treated as ‘core.’” 2014 WL 2560461, at *8. Nevertheless, because these claims were “related to” the bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“civil proceedings related to cases under title 11”) to hear this matter but not enter a judgment “as [it would] in a typical core proceeding.” Id. at *7. Thus, despite the statutory “core” label, for fraudulent transfer suits, the bankruptcy judge should only propose fact findings and conclusions of law for the district court’s de novo review.

    No Statutory Gap

    The Stern decision never decided “how bankruptcy or district courts should proceed when a ‘Stern claim’ is identified.” Id. at *3. Following Bellingham, according to the Supreme Court, “when, under Stern’s reasoning, the Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a bankruptcy-related claim,” the Judiciary Code (Title 28) still “permits a bankruptcy court to issue proposed findings” of fact and law “to be reviewed by the district court.” Id.

    The Court thus rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view in Bellingham (702 F.3d at 565) and elsewhere that Stern claims had created “a statutory ‘gap.’” Id. at *7. See, e.g., In re Ortiz, 665 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir. 2011) (“bankruptcy courts cannot order proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in any” core proceeding). It found “a severability provision” in 28 U.S.C. § 151 “that accounts for decisions, like Stern, that invalidate certain applications of the statute.” Id., citing 98 Stat. 344, note following 28 U.S.C. § 151. Thus, if “the claim satisfies the criteria of [28 U.S.C.] § 157(c)(1) [‘related to’ the bankruptcy case], the bankruptcy court simply treats the claims as non-core” (i.e., “hear[s] the proceeding and submit[s] proposed findings . . . to the district court for de novo review and entry of judgment”). Id.

    Comments

    Bellingham merely ratifies what many courts had already been doing in the wake of Stern over the past three years. By order dated Jan. 30, 2012, the Southern District of New York amended its standing “order of reference” of cases to bankruptcy judges as follows: “If a bankruptcy judge or district judge determines that entry of a final order or judgment by a bankruptcy judge would not be consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution in a particular proceeding . . . and [it is] determined to be a core matter; the bankruptcy judge shall, unless otherwise ordered by the district court, hear the proceeding and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court.” Delaware has a similar order.

    Bellingham will enable savvy courts and practitioners in all future cases to avoid the jurisdiction-by-consent issue. A trustee may bring a fraudulent transfer claim in the bankruptcy court, but any party to the suit or the court itself can always insist on de novo review by the district court. In short, the Supreme Court not only avoided a thorny jurisdictional issue in Bellingham but also blessed a procedure for other cases.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Supreme Court Rules Competitors Can Bring Suit Against FDA-Regulated Labels

    Supreme Court Rules Competitors Can Bring Suit Against FDA-Regulated Labels

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Rules Competitors Can Bring Suit Against FDA-Regulated Labels

    June 17, 2014

    Read time: 7 min

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    On June 12, 2014, a unanimous Supreme Court of the United States ruled that competitors may bring federal false advertising and unfair competition claims against beverage labels that are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 12-761 (June 12, 2014).

    Background

    At issue in this case was POM Wonderful LLC’s (POM) claim that a competing Minute Maid pomegranate juice blend sold by Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) was being marketed in a deceptive manner. Coca-Cola identified its Minute Maid product on the front of the carton as “pomegranate blueberry flavored blend of 5 juices from concentrate with added ingredients and other natural flavors.” This description complied with detailed FDCA labeling requirements for the kind of juice blend that Coca-Cola was marketing. However, POM complained—and the Supreme Court found—that the label presented the words “POMEGRANATE BLUEBERRY” in large, capital letters, with the remaining text “flavored blend of 5 juices” in much smaller type and the phrase “from concentrate with added ingredients and other natural flavors” in even smaller type. The undisputed facts showed that the Minute Maid juice blend contained 99.4 percent apple and grape juices, 0.3 percent pomegranate juice, 0.2 percent blueberry juice and 0.1 percent raspberry juice. The Supreme Court characterized the blueberry and pomegranate juice content as “miniscule.”

    POM sued Coca-Cola for false advertising and unfair competition in federal court in California under the federal Lanham Act, which proscribes (among other things) false or misleading descriptions of fact and misrepresentations about the nature, characteristics or quality of one’s product. The California federal trial court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed POM’s complaint, ruling that a Lanham Act claim cannot be brought against a food and beverage label that complied with the FDCA. The California courts noted that the FDCA prohibits the misbranding of food and drink, and therefore the California courts concluded that a food or beverage label that complies with the FDCA’s detailed labeling requirements cannot be challenged as misleading under a different federal statute like the Lanham Act.

    The Supreme Court Decision

    In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, and held that the FDCA and the Lanham Act complement each other in the regulation of misleading labels. Despite the fact that both of these federal statutes address misleading statements of goods sold in commerce, the Supreme Court cited several reasons why the more specific FDCA requirements were merely a floor—and not a ceiling—on the question of whether a food and beverage label is misleading:

    Neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA by their terms prohibit or limit a Lanham Act claim against labels that are regulated by the FDCA. The Supreme Court noted that Lanham Act and the FDCA have coexisted for almost 70 years, and despite amendments to both statutes over the decades, Congress has never taken the opportunity to amend either law to prohibit a Lanham Act claim against a label regulated by the FDCA. Although many state law claims against food and beverage labels that comply with the FDCA were expressly pre-empted by one of the amendments to the FDCA, the Supreme Court found that Congress intended the federal Lanham Act and the FDCA to be complementary to each other.

    The FDCA and the Lanham Act have largely different scopes and primary purposes. The Supreme Court found that the FDCA is designed “primarily to protect the health and safety of the public at large,” whereas the Lanham Act protects competitors from “an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by [a] defendant’s misrepresentations.” The Supreme Court found, therefore, that the two statutes provide “synergies” for consumer protection.

    Threats of Lanham Act suits against labels that are authorized by the FDCA “provide incentives for manufacturers to behave well.” Although the FDCA considers whether labeling is misleading when it prescribes an acceptable way to advertise a juice-blend beverage, the FDA acknowledged that it does not necessarily pursue enforcement actions against all objectionable labels, and a competitor cannot bring a lawsuit to enforce the FDCA. Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the FDA “does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors possess …. Competitors have detailed knowledge regarding how consumers rely upon certain sales and marketing strategies. Their awareness of unfair competition practices may be far more immediate and accurate than that of agency rulemakers and regulators.”

    What the Supreme Court Decision Means for Manufacturers and Advertisers

    Manufacturers and advertisers would be wise to consider potential Lanham Act liability for all advertising claims, even in highly regulated industries. Though by its terms the Supreme Court’s decision relates to the interplay between the FDCA and the Lanham Act, there is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s decision may also be followed in relation to many other regulatory statutes, both inside and outside the food and beverage arena. Indeed, the Supreme Court found that the Lanham Act is broad in application and that the need for national uniformity is served by concurrent application of the Lanham Act and federal regulations: “The [Lanham] Act is uniform in extending its protection against unfair competition to the whole class it describes. It is variable only to the extent that those rights are enforced on a case-by-case basis. The variability [and non-uniformity with the FDCA]… is no different than the variability that any industry covered by the Lanham Act faces.” [Emphasis added.]

    In addition, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the U.S. government’s position in this appeal that a Lanham Act claim should be precluded only “to the extent the FDCA or FDA regulations specifically require or authorize the challenged aspects of the label.” In other words, the government argued that POM should not be able to bring a Lanham Act claim against Coca-Cola’s use of the phrase “pomegranate blueberry flavored blend of 5 juices from concentrate with added ingredients and other natural flavors” per se, but POM should be permitted to challenge aspects of the use of that phrase that are not “specifically require[d] or authorize[d]” by the FDA or FDCA, such as the relative type size of the words in that phrase. In rejecting the U.S. government’s position, the Supreme Court noted “practical concerns” with differentiating between material that is specifically authorized by the FDA or FDCA. The Supreme Court also reiterated that Congress intended the Lanham Act and the FDCA to complement each other with respect to food and beverage labeling, and that the FDCA regulations are not a ceiling on the regulation of food and beverage labeling, even to the limited extent of the U.S. government’s position. The Supreme Court cautioned that “an agency may not reorder federal statutory rights [such as the federal Lanham Act] without Congressional authorization.”

    While subsequent decisions of the federal court may add nuances to the Supreme Court’s decision, the fact that the decision was unanimous suggests that there is no disagreement within the Supreme Court on the issues decided in this case. Unless a federal law expressly exempts an industry from Lanham Act liability, or until the courts expressly find that a particular industry is exempt from the Lanham Act, the safer assumption is that the Lanham Act applies.

    What Clients Should Do

    It remains a best practice to secure advance legal review of all labeling and advertising, both for regulatory requirements and for Lanham Act compliance. It would be unwise to assume that full compliance with federal regulations—even very detailed regulations like those embodied in the FDCA —insulate a party from a competitor lawsuit under the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court’s decision suggests that it is not limited to the food and beverage industry, so parties in all industries would be wise to consider the Lanham Act in advertising review.

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  • Clawbacks, Compliance and Incentive Compensation: A Supplemental Approach

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    Clawbacks, Compliance and Incentive Compensation: A Supplemental Approach

    June 17, 2014

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  • Assessing Technology Transfer Agreements under the EU Anti-Trust Rules: Revised TTBER—Assessment and Outlook

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    Assessing Technology Transfer Agreements under the EU Anti-Trust Rules: Revised TTBER—Assessment and Outlook

    June 2014

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  • Paperless Direct Debit Mandates in the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)

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    Paperless Direct Debit Mandates in the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)

    June 2014

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