Content Type: Article

  • Do Online Retailers’ Search Results Constitute Trademark Infringement?

    ARTICLE

    Do Online Retailers’ Search Results Constitute Trademark Infringement?

    September 20, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

    More insights

  • CFTC Determines That Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies Are Commodities

    CFTC Determines That Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies Are Commodities

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFTC Determines That Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies Are Commodities

    September 18, 2015

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 17, 2015, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued an order against an online platform (and against its sponsor) for facilitating the trading of Bitcoin options contracts.[1] The Order is based on the activities of Francisco Riordan, the chief executive officer of Coinflip Inc., and of Coinflip itself in operating an unregistered online trading platform that enabled trading in Bitcoin-based derivatives.

    Background

    Beginning in March 2014, the “Derivabit” platform was made available to users as a “risk management platform” that enabled transactions in “standardized Bitcoin options and futures contracts.”[2] Coinflip, as the operator of the platform, designed and made available for trading numerous put and call options contracts. Bitcoin was the reference asset for the options contracts, and the strike and delivery prices were denominated in U.S. dollars. Premiums and settlement payments, however, were to be made in Bitcoins at a spot exchange rate.[3]

    Resolution of the Action

    Holdings and Findings

    In the Order, the CFTC sets forth a number of holdings and findings that serve to establish its formal position on the regulatory characterization of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin:  

    • First, the CFTC defined the term “virtual currency” as “a digital representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of value, but does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”[4]
    • Second, the CFTC distinguished — with particularity — virtual currencies from “real” currencies, which it defined as “coin and paper money of [a sovereign state] … that are designated as legal tender, circulate, and are customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance.”

    • Third, the CFTC held that “Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are encompassed in the definition [of a “commodity”[5]] and [are] properly defined as commodities.”

    Given a determination that virtual currencies are commodities, options contracts that reference a virtual currency, therefore, are “commodity options” and “commodity option transactions.” The Order accordingly held that: (1) by offering and entering those contracts on the Derivabit platform, Coinflip violated Section 4c(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulation 32.2; and (2) the Derivabit platform constituted an (improperly) unregistered swap execution facility,[6] in violation of Section 5h(a)(1) of the CEA and Regulation 37.3(a)(1). The CFTC also held that Riordan, as a controlling person of Coinflip, was personally liable for Coinflip’s violations.

    Sanctions

    The sanctions in this matter were non-monetary[7] and included a cease and desist order and an undertaking to cooperate with the CFTC and any other governmental agency in future investigations or litigation related to the facts of this action.

    Certain Implications

    The CFTC’s position, while it is not statutory law and not binding on other regulators,[8] may be the final word on the regulatory categorization of virtual currencies, particularly with respect to whether virtual currency units are securities or commodities.[9] It is, however, important to note that nothing in this decision imposes standards or regulation directly on virtual currencies; the regulation of virtual currencies themselves (as opposed to virtual currency derivatives), and certain activities involving virtual currencies, remains outside of the CFTC’s scope of authority. The actual creation, distribution, transmission and trading of virtual currency units remains as regulated (or as unregulated) as it was a week ago.[10]

    Obviously, managers currently holding virtual currency derivatives in client accounts will need to consult with counsel to determine their rights in these assets, as these arrangements are directly implicated by the CFTC Order. The impacts on the broader community of private fund managers include the following:

    • Client accounts that hold actual Bitcoins or other virtual currency units (as distinguished from Bitcoin or other virtual currency derivatives) are not directly affected by this matter’s resolution; this decision does not directly impose CFTC reporting or similar obligations for direct holdings of virtual currency units.
    • Derivatives (including futures, options and swaps) referenced to virtual currency units, however, now need to be considered “commodity interests.” This has reporting and recordkeeping implications for managers and may also trigger certain mandatory clearing, swap execution facility trading and minimum initial margin requirements.

    • In addition, as a result of this decision, it is clear that virtual currency unit derivatives will continue to count against the CFTC Rule 4.13(a)(3) de minimis exemption.

    For other financial industry participants that are seeking to design or market products linked to virtual currencies, the Order is instructive on the extent to which they will need to account for CFTC regulatory oversight. It is important to note, however, that the banking regulators and other authorities (both U.S. and foreign) may have supplemental or differing views on this product.

    It is possible that the clarity of this decision will spur greater adoption of standardized Bitcoin-based derivatives by mainstream participants in the futures, options and swaps markets; at the same time, however, is also possible that the lack of understanding and control over the “physical” Bitcoin market, as well as the lack of clarity from other regulators, may continue to constrain the development and use of virtual currency products.  

    Authored by Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz , Jacob Preiserowicz , Donald J. Mosher and Melissa G.R. Goldstein .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] In the Matter of Coinflip, Inc., d/b/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan, CFTC Docket No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015) (the “Order”). The Order is available on the CFTC’s website.

    [2] Apparently, futures contracts were never actually offered on the Derivabit platform.

    [3] While this was not directly addressed for purposes of sanctions, the CFTC also noted that the Derivabit facility made “OTC Bitcoin Forward Contracts” available for trading. Derivabit users were, through the facility, to be matched with other users to execute a contract to exchange U.S. dollars for Bitcoin at a fixed price and date. Initial and maintenance margin was to be calculated, collected and held by Coinflip through the Derivabit platform, and final settlement payments, in Bitcoin, were similarly to be facilitated by the platform.

    [4] Order, at n.2.

    [5] As the CFTC noted in the Order, Section 1a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act defines “commodity” to include, among other things, “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”

    [6] The CEA’s definition of “swap” includes option contracts.

    [7] The lack of monetary sanctions likely reflects both the novel subject matter as well as the fact that Riordan and Coinflip cooperated with the CFTC’s investigation.

    [8]  Note that other U.S. federal and state regulators have already established formal positions on the regulation of activity involving virtual currency, and some regulators may still reach different conclusions. For example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a bureau of the U.S. Department of Treasury, categorizes virtual currency as “a medium of exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all the attributes of real currency” and requires “administrators” and exchangers” of certain types of virtual currency to adopt anti-money laundering programs and abide by the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations. See FIN-2013-G0001, “Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies” (Mar. 18, 2013).  Further, on June 24, 2015, the New York Department of Financial Services adopted a formal regulatory and licensing framework for businesses that engage in virtual currency business activity involving New York or a New York resident. See 23 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 200.

    [9] This conclusion is consistent with informal positions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission staff.

    [10] For example, the Order has no applicability to the anti-money laundering and consumer protection regulations and state licensing requirements that apply to businesses that buy and sell certain types of virtual currencies or engage in the acceptance and transmission of certain types of virtual currencies.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Second Circuit Rules That Internal Whistleblowers Are Protected Under Dodd-Frank

    Second Circuit Rules That Internal Whistleblowers Are Protected Under Dodd-Frank

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Rules That Internal Whistleblowers Are Protected Under Dodd-Frank

    September 18, 2015

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 10, 2015 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, in a 2-1 decision, that the anti-retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) protects employees who report violations of securities laws only internally. The court’s decision in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC[1]conflicts with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,[2] in which that court held that employees are protected from retaliation under Dodd-Frank only if they report securities law violations to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The scope of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision is, therefore, poised for review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

    In Berman, Daniel Berman served as finance director of Neo@Ogilvy LLC (“Neo”) and was responsible for Neo’s financial reporting and compliance with accounting standards. After his employment was terminated by Neo in April 2013, Berman sued Neo and its parent, WPP Group USA Inc., alleging that his employment was terminated as a result of his whistleblowing activity — specifically, his internal report of alleged accounting fraud. The district court granted Neo’s and WPP’s motions to dismiss the complaint, holding that the anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank only protects employees who report securities law violations to the SEC.

    The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. In the majority opinion, Judge Newman concluded that there was tension between the definition of whistleblower in Subsection 21F(a)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) (which defines a “whistleblower” as an individual who reports violations to the SEC) and the anti-retaliation provision set forth in Subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (which prohibits retaliation for, inter alia, internal reporting). While the Fifth Circuit in Asadi held that employees who do not report violations to the SEC do not fall within the statute’s definition of “whistleblower,” the Second Circuit held that there was sufficient ambiguity in the statute for the court to give Chevron deference to the reasonable interpretation of the agency responsible for administering the statute — the SEC.

    After the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC implemented Exchange Rule 21F-2, taking the position that employees who report violations in a manner described in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act — which includes reporting violations internally — are protected regardless of whether the employee satisfies the requirements to qualify for an award under Dodd-Frank’s bounty program.[3] After oral argument in Berman, the SEC issued a release that reinforced its position that employees who report violations only internally are entitled to the same anti-retaliation protection as employees who report violations to the SEC.[4] The Second Circuit deferred to the SEC’s interpretation.

    The decision is likely to result in an increase in whistleblower retaliation claims under Dodd-Frank. Now, in the Second Circuit at least, employees who believe they have been retaliated against for having reported violations only internally will more likely choose to sue their employers under Dodd-Frank, rather than initiating a claim under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”). Dodd-Frank provides a direct route to federal court, while SOX claimants must first file and exhaust administrative claims with the Department of Labor. In addition, Dodd-Frank has a much longer statute of limitations period and double back pay is available. Accordingly, employers should ensure that they: (1) promptly investigate internal reports of securities law violations and take appropriate action to remedy matters reported (including by taking steps to avoid retaliating against a whistleblower); and (2) vet and document the legitimate bases for adverse employment actions against whistleblowers, to be in a better position to defend against retaliation claims under Dodd-Frank should they arise.

    Authored by Holly H. Weiss and Jessica Augarten.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] No. 14-4626 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015).

    [2] 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).

    [3] 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii).

    [4] Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Release No. 34-75592, 2015 WL 4624264 (F.R.) (Aug. 4, 2015).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Distressed Debt Trading Protocol: Kaupthing Closing Transfer Register

    Distressed Debt Trading Protocol: Kaupthing Closing Transfer Register

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Distressed Debt Trading Protocol: Kaupthing Closing Transfer Register

    September 17, 2015

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Winding-Up Committee (“WUC”) of the failed Icelandic bank Kaupthing hf. (“Kaupthing”) announced that Oct. 2, 2015 (“Transfer Bar Date”) will be the last date for the filing of Claim Transfer Request Forms (“CTRFs”) for transferring claims filed against Kaupthing. Parties to unsettled claims trades that require assignment of title must submit their CTRFs to Kaupthing’s transfer agent, Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC, or Epiq Systems Limited (“Epiq”) on or before Oct. 2, 2015.

    Kaupthing and Epiq are requiring the freeze of the claims register for calculation, notice and voting consistency in connection with the convening of a meeting to approve a composition between Kaupthing and its creditors to be completed before Dec. 31, 2015.

    To enable creditors to quickly transfer their claims before the Transfer Bar Date, an expedited transfer process will be applied to all pending and future timely filed CTRFs effective immediately. 

    Based on such expedited transfer procedure:

    • Each transfer will take four to nine days to settle instead of the normal 14 to 21 days (provided all required transfer documents are submitted with the CTRF and all administrative fees are paid).
    • Following receipt of a CTRF, and after the notice of proposed transfer has been issued, the WUC will effectively eliminate the objection period.
    • Both the transferor and the transferee must acknowledge receipt of the notice of proposed transfer by email. Such acknowledgment will serve as a full waiver of the objection period.
    • The notice of successful transfer will be sent the following day after the later of the two email acknowledgements is received by the WUC.

    As we discussed in our Sept. 10, 2015 Alert, “Glitnir Trading Protocol Impacted by Closing of Transfer Register,” trades where CTRFs are not submitted to Epiq prior to the deadline will need to settle via an alternative method (i.e., by way of participation or some alternative means, such as a total return swap).

    Kaupthing announced that its next creditors’ meeting will take place on Sept. 30, 2015.

    Authored by David J. Karp, Alexia Petrou and Anthony Lombardi.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • The Legal Framework for Renewable Energy Projects

    The Legal Framework for Renewable Energy Projects

    ARTICLE

    The Legal Framework for Renewable Energy Projects

    September 2015

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Christoph Coenen

    Partner

    Frankfurt

    More insights

  • International News: Focus on Private Equity

    International News: Focus on Private Equity

    INTERNATIONAL NEWS / REPORT

    International News: Focus on Private Equity

    Autumn 2015

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Glitnir Trading Protocol Impacted by Closing of Transfer Register

    Glitnir Trading Protocol Impacted by Closing of Transfer Register

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Glitnir Trading Protocol Impacted by Closing of Transfer Register

    September 10, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Glitnir hf. (“Glitnir”) has announced that as of the end of day on Sept. 11, 2015 (“Transfer Cut-Off Time”), it will no longer be processing Claim Transfer Request Forms (“CTRFs”) or issuing any Notices of Successful Transfers (“NOSTs”). Parties to unsettled claims trades that require assignment of title must submit their CTRFs to Glitnir’s transfer agent, Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC, or Epiq Systems Limited (“Epiq”) before the end of day on Friday, Sept. 11, 2015. Glitnir will then undertake to process any claim transfer requests submitted within four to nine days from submission and to issue the relevant NOSTs. If the parties cannot meet the Transfer Cut-Off Time, they will need to settle by way of participation or by some alternative mechanism (such as a total return swap or cash settlement).

    Glitnir and Epiq are requiring the freeze of the claims register for calculation, notice and voting consistency in connection with the convening of a meeting to approve a composition between Glitnir and its creditors to be completed before Dec. 31, 2015.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • And They Adhere Yet! – Air Traffic Controllers Strike – Damages v Strike-Related Damage to Third Parties?

    ARTICLE

    And They Adhere Yet! – Air Traffic Controllers Strike – Damages v Strike-Related Damage to Third Parties?

    September 9, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Eleventh Circuit Reverses Denial of Lenders’ Claim for Default-Rate Interest

    Eleventh Circuit Reverses Denial of Lenders’ Claim for Default-Rate Interest

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Eleventh Circuit Reverses Denial of Lenders’ Claim for Default-Rate Interest

    September 9, 2015

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A Chapter 11 debtor’s reorganization plan purporting to cure a default under a pre-bankruptcy loan agreement must pay “the agreed-upon default rate interest,” consistent with “the underlying agreement” and the “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on Aug. 31, 2015. In re Sagamore Partners, Ltd., 2015 WL 5091909, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2015). Reversing the district and bankruptcy courts, the Eleventh Circuit found they had “erred in [holding] that [the lenders] waived their rights to default-rate interest.” Id. at *1. Moreover, it explained, the “bankruptcy court … clearly erred in finding that [the lenders] ‘consistently assessed late fees and not default interest.’” Id. at *5. Agreeing with the district court’s reversal of the bankruptcy court on this second related issue, the Eleventh Circuit held the lenders’ purported “faulty notice of default was legally irrelevant, because no notice of default was required.” Id. at *6.

    Relevance

    Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) Section 1123(a)(5)(G) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a [reorganization] plan shall … provide adequate means for the plan’s implementation, such as … curing or waiving of any default.” Section 1123(d) further provides that “if it is proposed in a plan to cure a default the amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.” (emphasis added).

    According to the Eleventh Circuit in Sagamore, when “the underlying agreement calls for default-rate interest and the applicable nonbankruptcy law permits it, a party cannot cure its default [and reinstate the loan] without paying the agreed-upon default-rate interest.” Id. at *4. To hold otherwise, the court concluded, would run afoul of the “clear mandate of [Code] § 1123 that allows a creditor to demand default-rate interest as a condition for reinstating the loan.” Id. at *4.

    The lower courts in Sagamore both denied the lenders’ claim for default-rate interest based on their purported waiver of default interest. In challenging the lenders’ claim, the debtor had “relied primarily on opinions issued by [other] circuits and … courts prior to … 1994 amendments to the … Code” plus “legislative history.” Id. at *3. Earlier case law held that creditors lost any right to recover default-rate interest despite contractual provisions to the contrary. See, e.g., In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that before 1994, “[t]he Code d[id] not define ‘cure’” so courts typically looked for guidance to  Section 1124’s discussion of what constitutes an impaired claim); In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1984) (held,debtor’s cure of its default returned the parties to the “status quo ante,” meaning that creditors lost any contractual right to recover default-rate interest).

    Facts

    The debtor had borrowed $31.5 million from the lenders, securing the loan with its hotel property. The loan bore a non-default 6.54-percent interest rate, but the default-rate was 11.54 percent. Although the lenders were not required to send a notice of default under the loan agreement for the default interest to begin to accrue in 2009, when the debtor had defaulted, the lenders did send a notice of default to the debtor, but not to the debtor’s New York counsel (which, under the loan agreement, was to receive a copy of any “required or permitted” notice to the debtor).

    The debtor later filed a Chapter 11 petition, and proposed a reorganization plan that would reinstate the secured loan and only pay accrued pre-default-rate interest to cure its default. When the lenders objected, the debtor amended the plan, proposing to set aside all of the funds required to cure the default in any amount deemed appropriate by the court. The debtor argued, though, that it did not owe default interest because the lenders had waived their right to default-rate interest of $5.5 million by accepting, under protest, late fees of $250,000. According to the debtor, the lenders chose to accept late fees instead of default-rate interest. The debtor also argued that the lenders’ notice of default was defective because the lenders had failed to send it to the debtor’s New York counsel.

    The Lower Courts

    The bankruptcy court held the lenders’ notice of default “defective,” invalidating the lenders’ acceleration letter, foreclosure efforts and their claim to default-rate interest. Alternatively, it found that the lenders had “failed to demand default-rate interest” and were now precluded from doing so because they “asserted [their] entitlement to late fees.” Id. at *3.

    The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that [the lenders] waived default-rate interest. But it reversed the bankruptcy court’s invalidating of the lenders’ notice of default and remanded to the bankruptcy court the lenders’ claim for legal fees and costs. Id.

    Default Rate Interest Not Waived

    The Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower courts’ finding that the lenders had waived their rights to default-rate interest by accepting late fees. Under applicable Florida law, claims for default-rate interest and late fees are consistent remedies that can be asserted together so long as the party does not receive payment of both. Id. at *5 (quoting Princeton Homes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1334 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (“‘Under Florida law, all consistent remedies may in general be pursued concurrently even to final adjudication,’ so long as a party does not receive ‘satisfaction of the claim by one remedy’”)). The lenders here had properly demanded both default-rate interest and late fees but later waived their claim to late fees for any time period for which they received default-rate interest. Although they accepted payment of late fees, under protest, reasoned the court, “[p]ayment accepted under protest cannot be the basis of waiver.” Id. at *6.

    Defective Notice of Default Irrelevant   

      The lenders were not required by the loan documents to provide notice of default in order for default-rate interest to begin to accrue. Moreover, the debtor expressly waived in those documents any right to receive such notice. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding “that the faulty notice of default was legally irrelevant, because no notice of default was required.” Id.

    Default Interest Issue Not Equitably Moot

    Despite the substantial consummation of the debtor’s plan, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the debtors’ reliance on the equitable mootness doctrine to preclude appellate review. According to the court, it could grant effective relief because the plan specifically provided for the payment of any cure amount, as later determined by the lower court on remand. Id. The debtor apparently had funds on deposit or available to pay the default-rate interest. Thus, there was no need to unravel the consummated plan.

    Remand

    Aside from awarding the lenders their default-rate interest, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that the debtor’s plan was “feasible” (i.e., that the debtor would be able to make all required payments). 2015 WL 5091909, at *7. But the court remanded “the question of [the Lenders’] costs and fees … , the timing of payment of the default-rate interest, and any other remaining [unresolved] issues” to the lower court for “resolution.” Id.

    Comments

    The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Sagamore is consistent with other court rulings since the Code’s 1994 amendment. See, e.g., In re 139-141 Owners Corp, 306 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2004) (debtor may not “avoid or vitiate a secured creditor’s contractual right to default interest by complying with” Code Section 1124), aff’d in part and vacated on different grounds, 313 B.R. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Moody Nat’l SHS Houston H, LLC, 426 B.R. 667, 676 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (held, the plan must provide for payment of default interest pursuant to Section 1123(d)); In re Sweet, 369 B.R. 644, 648-51 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2007) (held, where the default interest rate was not considered a penalty, default interest was appropriate to effectuate a Section 1124(2)(A) cure). 

    The court’s equitable mootness ruling, enabling it to review the lenders’ appeal on the merits, is consistent with other recent appellate rulings. See In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 791 F.3d 1140, 1142 1 (9th Cir. 2015) (2-1) (appellate review would not unfairly affect “third parties or entirely unravel the plan”); In re One2One Communications LLC, 2015 WL 4430302, at *6 (3d Cir. July 21, 2015) (reversed district court’s dismissal of confirmation order appeal on equitable mootness grounds; “[confirmed] Plan did not involve the issuance of any publicly traded securities, bonds or other circumstances that would make it difficult to retract the plan”; “limited evidence of potential third-party injury”); In re Tribune Media Co., 2015 WL 4925923, at *9-*10 (3d Cir. Aug. 19, 2015) (finding one of the two appeals before it, where the appellant had challenged the plan’s allocation of funds among two classes of creditors, not to be equitably moot because relief could be granted to the appellant; third parties would not be harmed; and because the plan would not be fatally scrambled); but seeid. at *11 (finding second appeal before it was equitably moot because (1) the plan had been “consummated”; (2) the appellant had “spurned the offer of a stay accompanied by a bond”; and (3) “it would be unfair” to unravel “the most important aspect of the overwhelmingly approved Plan”).  

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Brian C. Tong.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • California: Slow Down on Your Harley-Davidson

    ARTICLE

    California: Slow Down on Your Harley-Davidson

    September 8, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Arthur Rosen, Alysse McLoughlin, and Richard Call wrote this bylined article on the California Court of Appeal’s Harley-Davidson decision, arguing that the court misapplied standard principles to expand nexus beyond what is allowed under the Commerce Clause. The authors wrote that the decision “could have significant ramifications for many out-of-state businesses and could result in significant burdens being imposed on interstate commerce” because its test for nexus “is too broad; it is not clear what business activities would not satisfy this test.”

    Authors

    Arthur R. Rosen

    Senior Counsel

    Miami, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Richard C. Call

    Partner

    Boston, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    More insights